(Pix from New York Times HERE)
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| (Pix Wikimedia) |
Like others, I recently noted ("Will COVID-19 infect the world order?") that the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a cover or a portal or an excuse, or a convenient nodal point (depending on thew perspective one chooses to view events) for the acceleration of transformations (but not their genesis), the trajectories of which were already clear. For those starting from this premise, then, COVID-19, then, has not been used to make meaning; rather it has served as the prism through which that meaning acquires a more complex coloring.
Nowhere is this made clearer than at the borderlands of emerging post-global Empires (CPE EmpireSeries). Those borderlands can be abstract (as in the territorialization of global production chains built on the hub-and-spoke-model of America First or China's Belt and Road Initiative). Or it can be evidenced in forays at the physical frontiers of Imperial domains. These are neither natural nor inevitable spaces (real or virtual; concrete or abstract). Rather they are point along a continuum chosen because they appear to signal a weak point in the construction of the protective boundaries that are being constructed to define and separate one Imperial system from another.
For all kinds of reasons, Hong Kong has appeared to serve such a purpose. More importantly, since the start of 2020, Hong Kong has also proven to be an important site from which one can observe the character of the COVID-19 accelerator effect. The convergence and the likely consequences of these post-global imperial system conflicts in Hong Kong (here understood as a physical territory and as an abstract space that itself stands for competing narratives of order and of historical progression), accelerated by pandemic, has moved to another stage in the wake of the April 2020 arrests of Hong Kong opposition figures by the authorities (e.g., Amid Pandemic, Hong Kong Arrests Major Pro-Democracy Figures).
More than a dozen leading pro-democracy activists and former lawmakers in Hong Kong were arrested on Saturday in connection with the protests that raged in the city last year, the biggest roundup of prominent opposition figures in recent memory. * * * The high-profile arrests were made as Hong Kong battled to contain the coronavirus outbreak, which has helped quiet down the huge street protests but fueled further distrust of the authorities. The virus has halted protests around the world, forcing people to stay home and giving the authorities new laws for limiting public gatherings and detaining people with less fear of public blowback while many residents remained under lockdowns or observing limits on their movement. (Amid Pandemic, Hong Kong Arrests Major Pro-Democracy Figures).)
This post briefly considers the recent arrests of important figures in the conflicts in Hong Kong.
At its core, and from a legal perspective, it is fundamentally a challenge for and a test of the complex political-economic model that China has constructed, one which distinguishes the application of that model among its territories. For China, that has proven to be a delicate and sensitive matter requiring the balancing of a number of objectives around the core driving premises of its political-economic order (2019 Hong Kong Situation). One gets a sense of that from the recent writing of leading Hong Kong academics who understand the very delicate line that defines Hong Kong as a challenge for the integrity of internal governance of China, and as a site for its international dimensions (see, Chen Zimo and Willa Wu, "Experts confirm liaison office's role not limited by Article 22," China Daily 19 April 2020). After more intense local coverage (Leading legal adviser says Beijing offices right to criticise opposition lawmakers), one of those experts quoted then thought it prudent to further elaborate (Albert Chen elaboration of opinion as posted to Facebook; also here).
Ordinarily that alone might not provide much of a wedge point for inter-Imperial competition. But Hong Kong is different--born of a series of international agreements, and bound up in its own history of territorial trading under the rules of 19th Century imperial constructions--it provides an almost ideal opportunity for competitor aggregations of power to test China's. And not just that; it produces substantial value-added for the project of internal meaning making as a means of advancing narratives of differences in the construction of imperial order (their respective constitutional-moral orders).
It is in this context that one can usefully consider recent actions undertaken in Hong Kong, as well as the power of the international reactions it might produce. Those together will then be even more purposefully fitted together within the larger framework of the construction of the meaning of the global order from the narrative spinning of its Chinese and American makers. None of this is spectacular or new--what makes it interesting is the way that it might be used to understand and define the characteristics and modalities of the COVID-19 Accelerator Effect on inter-imperial systemic relations. The accelerator works in two directions simultaneously. Internally, it changes the scope and character of the movement to the end of the special status for Hong Kong within Chinese space. Externally , it accelerates the movement toward the decoupling of empire and the refinement of the conceptual territories of each. Conceptual territories, more than physical space, mark the actual territorial limits of post-global empire. Conceptual territories, the expression of meaning making, the objectification of the systems around which contemporary empire is constructed, is the essential framework within which these systems can be incarnated, and thus incarnated manged across what will become secondary borders (territory, ethnicity, religion, and the like). In this case, the principal territorial decoupling and meaning making revolve around the Chinese and the American empires. And in the process it would be foolish to sell either short.
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Written reply to first journalist’s inquiry (18 April 2020):
“I think the statements made by the HKMAO and Liaison Office are legitimate and lawful comments on important aspects of the implementation of the Basic Law that are the concerns of the Central Authorities. As pointed out in the statements, the Central Authorities have the responsibility to exercise supervision over the implementation of the Basic Law. The Basic Law was intended to establish a legislature in the HKSAR that is effective in its operation. The effective operation of the LegCo is in the public interest of Hong Kong people, as well as in the interest of the Central Authorities who have legitimate concerns regarding any 'malfunctioning' of LegCo.
The filibuster during the meetings to elect the chairman and deputy chairman of LegCo's House Committee has resulted in LegCo being paralysed. Without a chairman the House Committee cannot meet to discuss and do any normal legislative business. According to LegCo rules and practice, the House Committee occupies a central role in the operation of LegCo as a whole. It scrutinises bills and subsidiary legislation. It decides on the establishment of bills committees to study bills, and on the appointment of subcommittees to study subsidiary legislation. It decides on the establishment of select committees or committees of inquiry. It decides whether to refer particular matters to the LegCo panels on various policy domains. It prepares for the plenary meetings of the LegCo.
The failure of the House Committee to elect a chairman and deputy chairman (and then to start its normal operation) after 15 meetings in the last six months is scandalous and a matter of grave public concern in Hong Kong. The paralysis of LegCo's normal legislative function is clearly detrimental to the public interest of Hong Kong, and a significant malfunctioning of the constitutional role which the Basic Law assigns to LegCo.
In these circumstances, I consider it legitimate for the Central Authorities, acting through the HKMAO and Liaison Office, to issue an admonition and to draw the public's attention to this matter.
The courts of HK have pointed out that the Basic Law should not be iinterpreted merely literally and narrowly. Provisions should be interpreted purposively and in their context. Adopting the proper approach to the interpretation of Article 22 of the Basic Law, I do not think it is a breach of the article for the HKMAO and Liaison Office to make the recent statements or comments. ”
Witten reply to second journalist’s inquiry (19 April 2020):
“The crux of the matter (which may not have been reported in a balanced manner by the media) is that 'opposition' politicians have paralysed the legislative function of LegCo (since the beginning of the current LegCo session in October 2019) by paralysing its House Committee (by filibuster so that it has failed to elect a chairman after 15 meetings in the last 6 months). Many people don't understand the function of the House Committee, which actually is the heart of LegCo's legislative activities -- this Committee decides on whether a bill should be further considered by setting up a Bills Committee, and decides on the setting up of subcommittees to scrutinize subsidiary legislation. LegCo has not been able to perform these basic and vital legislative functions in the last 6 months because the House Committee cannot handle its normal legislative business (because there is no chairman to chair its meetings for normal business (other than the election of a chairman)). To put it simply, almost all legislative activities in Hong Kong have come to a halt. LegCo is still able to perform its financial (as distinguished from its legislative) function (such as approving the allocation of money yesterday to assist those affected by the economic downturn caused by COVID) because the LegCo Finance Committee (as distinguished from the House Committee) is still able to function. As regards legislative business, 14 bills and 89 pieces of subsidiary legislation (in the form of regulations) are in a state of limbo because of LegCo's paralysis, including a bill on paternity leave for fathers, and a bill to provide tax relief to those adversely affected by the pandemic, and many pieces of regulations to introduce social distancing measures.
In my opinion, the paralysis (in the last 6 months) of the legislative function of LegCo is unprecedented in the history of HK (including its colonial history and the history of the HKSAR). This is a constitutional crisis of major magnitude. I cannot imagine any HK court interpreting Artice 22 of the Basic Law in such a way as to hold that public statements (which have no legal effect whatsoever and can be simply ignored by LegCo members concerned) made by the Hong Kong and Macau Office and the Liaison Office alerting Hong Kong people to this constitutional crisis in HK constitute an unlawful or unconstitutional 'interference in the affairs' of the HKSAR.”