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Announcing Symposium "On the Internationalization of the RMB: Risks and Challenges Ahead" Organized by the Queen Mary University of London Centre for Commercial Law Studies and the East China University of Political Science and Law

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It is my great pleasure to announce an upcoming "Symposium On the Internationalization of the RMB: Risks and Challenges Ahead." The Symposium is presented by the Queen Mary University of London Centre for Commercial Law Studies in collaboration with the East China University of Political Science and Law, in association with the Institute for Global Law, Economics and Finance. It was organized by Professor Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and takes place on 27 June 2017 at the Center for Commercial Law Studies.

The Symposium Concept Note and Program follows.




Symposium on the Internationalization of the RMB: Risks and Challenges Ahead

The economic literature has underlined that an international currency is one that is used and held beyond the borders of the issuing country, not merely for transactions among the country’s residents but also, and importantly, for transactions among non-residents. Also, an international currency usually functions as a unit of account, a means of exchange and a store of value not only within but also outside the borders of the issuing country.

Usually, from a theoretical point of view, the benefits that a country can get by issuing an international currency are: (1) transaction cost reduction; (2) possibility for firms and financial institutions to issue bonds denominated in their own currency, which in turn can expand the country financial market and allow issuers to enjoy lower borrowing costs; (3) international seigniorage arising from the fact that the currency circulates abroad; and, (4) greater economic power of the country in the international context.

However, there are also certain costs associated with the internationalization of a currency, such as: (1) currency appreciation; (2) external constraints imposed on domestic monetary autonomy; and, (3) greater global policy responsibility.

The RMB is already an international currency, however, additional challenges remain to convert it into an international means of reserve and obtain a leading place in international finance transactions. Some economists have argued that the benefits for China in having the RMB as an international currency overcome the costs, above all in the long run. In particular, China could benefit from reduced exchange risks, significant development of its financial market and consequently growth of its firms and financial institutions.

Apart from the political implications that the Chinese Government will have to consider, in order to make the RMB a fully international currency, a number of legislative reforms. Therefore, the focus of the symposium would be on the legislative reforms impacting the financial system and the capital markets and how to address these reforms from the most efficient way to maximize the benefits and minimize any possible negative implications. The aspects on which the symposium will focus are:
(1) a complete liberalisation of inward and outward capital flows with the consequent free access of foreign institutions to the domestic markets;
(2) creation of a government and corporate bond market;
(3) increase in the number of private financial institutions; and, (4) reshaping of the banking and financial supervision.

These reforms need the adoption of an adequate and modern regulatory framework. From this point of view, the symposium aims at contributing to the legal and economic debate about the features of the Chinese financial regulation and supervisory structure of the next decades will have to have by providing some inputs towards its shaping.

The symposium will take place on 27 June 2017 in the City of London, at Queen Mary University of London’s campus situated in Lincoln’s Inn Fields (67-69 Lincoln’s Inn Fields, London, WC2A 3JB). Registration will start at 8:30hs and the symposium will finish at 16:00hs.

PROGRAMME 

8.30
Registration
9.00
Welcome Remarks
Prof. Spyros Maniatis (QMUL) Professor Li Weifang (ECUPL) and Prof. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal
9.15
Opening Remarks
Guo Chentao
Counsellor, Policy Section Director of the Chinese Embassy in London
9.30
Key Note Speech
The Hon. Mr Justice Blair
Session I 10.00- 11.00
Internationalization of the RMB: a Western Perspective
Chair: Professor Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal (QMUL)
One Belt One Road and RMB Internationalization—A Strategic Alliance
Professor Larry Catá-Backer Pennsylvania State University
An International Currency in Progress: Prospect and Challenges for the Renminbi
Dr. Paola Subacchi
Chatham House

Internationalization of the RMB: An analysis of legal developments
Charles Proctor Fladgate LLP
11.00- 11.30
Coffee Break
Session II 11.30- 12.30
Internationalization of the RMB: a Chinese Perspective
Chair: Dr. Andrea Miglionico (University of Reading)
Internationalization of the RMB: The Chinese Lawyer’s Practice
Li Zhiqiang and Qu Long Jin Mao Partners
Internationalization of the RMB and China’s Seigniorage
Dr. Na Li ECUPL
3|Page
RMB Internationalization, Legitimacy, Research Topics, Methodologies and Network
Associate Professor Huachun Guo
ECUPL
12.30- 1.30
Lunch
Session III 1.30- 2.40
Policy Reinforcement: Reshaping Banking and the Capital Markets
Chair: Dr. Michael Waibel (University of Cambridge)
The Development of Bond Markets: Risks and Challenges
Professor Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal and Dr. Andrea Miglionico Queen Mary University of London
The Role of the Authorities in Bank Resolution
Dr. Marco Bodellini University of Bologna
Cross-border Issues in Home and Host Supervision and Resolution
Professor Dalvinder Singh University of Warwick
Status and Implications of Korean shadow banking regulations: A Chinese Twist
Professor Gi Jin Yang
Chonbuk National University, School of Law
2.40- 3.00
Concluding Remarks




New FLIA and CPE Project: "Civil Society Organizations Participation in Grassroots-Level Governance in China: Raising The Capacity of Local Judicial Organs"

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The Foundation for Law and International Affairs and the Coalition for Peace and Ethics are pleased to announce the start of a research project on

Civil Society Organizations Participation in Grassroots-Level Governance:
Raising The Capacity of Local Judicial Organs

In October 2014, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee adopted the ‘Decision on Some Major Issues in Comprehensively Advancing Governance According to the Law’. The Decision created a space to allow participation of domestic and foreign social organizations in the construction of a rule of law society and in social affairs.

Provincial level justice bureaus and civil affairs bureaus have defined the roles and functions NGOs can play in China’s justice system in various policy documents issued since 2016. The research project is situated within this broader context, in a scenario which is seeing an increasing participation of not-for-profit entities to judicial system reform. According to The Diplomat, as of March 4, 2016 there are a total of more than 7,000 NGOs in China, included 91 registered foreign NGOs.

The project will be completed by the end of 2018, and it will involve a team of international researchers.More to come as the project develops.

国务院办公厅关于进一步完善 国有企业法人治理结构的指导意见 (Guiding Opinions on Corporate Governance Structure of State - Owned Enterprises State Council issued [2017] No. 36)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2017)

I have posted a draft of my essay, "The Human Rights Obligations of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs): Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International Law and Policy."  Though the essay focused on the challenges of applying emerging CSR and human rights related responsibilities on SOEs, it also noted that one of the great gaps in the context of emerging thinking about SOEs was the lack of much effort to embed Chinese SOEs into the global discourse.  

Chinese authorities are not waiting on the West to recognize the importance (and eventually the global influence) of its SOE model. On 30 May 2017 the Chinese State Council published its 国务院办公厅关于进一步完善  国有企业法人治理结构的指导意见 (Guiding Opinions on Corporate Governance Structure of State - Owned Enterprises State Council issued [2017] No. 36). It is worth considering the extent to which the Chinese approach is compatible with the Western project embedded within the OECD's work. Chinese authorities continue to work through issues of good corporate governance within the logic of the Chinese political and economic system on their own terms.  That is great for China, but it exacerbates the possibilities that this forward motion will widen gaps in approaches between Western and Chinese approaches to SOEs and SOE management.  The most notable area where the gap is likely to have effects relates to the embedding of the Communist Party within the structures and management of the SOE (¶ 5 below).

These provisions are a logical application of the Chinese political principles set out in the Communist Party Basic Line.  But it has no analogue in the West and might, and in some instances, may conflict with core Western corporate governance with respect to the powers of shareholders and the fiduciary duty of board members. And yet the central issue of the role of vanguard parties within the governance structures of enterprises has never been adequately understood--or theorized. These gaps can have profound effects especially (1) where Chinese SOEs seek to engage in joint ventures with Western enterprises, (2) when Chinese SOEs take substantial equity positions in Western enterprises, and (3) when Chinese SOEs begin to operate in substantial respect outside of China (and in their own right. Much more work is needed. 

The Chinese SOE governance project ought not to be understood in isolation.,  It is part of a coordinated effort to modernize--perhaps in a way that leaps over the conceptual constraints of Western enterprises--corporate governance to better serve the political and economic projects of state and its vanguard party in attaining national objectives.  The thrust and character of of those objectives and the larger project were made clearer on 22 June 2017 when
The general office of the State Council released a guideline on Wednesday establishing 92 new demonstration bases nationwide to promote entrepreneurship and business startups. These will include 21 famous enterprises such as internet giant Tencent Holdings Ltd. The bases encompass 45 districts, including Beijing's Shunyi district, and 26 universities and research institutes, such as Peking University. (State Council designates 92 bases for entrepreneurship and business startups)
This post includes the original text of 国务院办公厅关于进一步完善  国有企业法人治理结构的指导意见 (Guiding Opinions on Corporate Governance Structure of State - Owned Enterprises State Council issued [2017] No. 36) issued April 24, 2017 and published 30 May 2017,  along with an English translation for which I am greatly indebted to Flora Sapio. 





各省、自治区、直辖市人民政府,国务院各部委、各直属机构:
完 善国有企业法人治理结构是全面推进依法治企、推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的内在要求,是新一轮国有企业改革的重要任务。当前,多数国有企业已初步建 立现代企业制度,但从实践情况看,现代企业制度仍不完善,部分企业尚未形成有效的法人治理结构,权责不清、约束不够、缺乏制衡等问题较为突出,一些董事会 形同虚设,未能发挥应有作用。根据《中共中央 国务院关于深化国有企业改革的指导意见》等文件精神,为改进国有企业法人治理结构,完善国有企业现代企业制度,经国务院同意,现提出以下意见:
一、总体要求
(一)指导思想。
全 面贯彻党的十八大和十八届三中、四中、五中、六中全会精神,深入贯彻习近平总书记系列重要讲话精神和治国理政新理念新思想新战略,认真落实党中央、国务院 决策部署,统筹推进“五位一体”总体布局和协调推进“四个全面”战略布局,牢固树立和贯彻落实创新、协调、绿色、开放、共享的发展理念,从国有企业实际情 况出发,以建立健全产权清晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学的现代企业制度为方向,积极适应国有企业改革的新形势新要求,坚持党的领导、加强党的建设,完 善体制机制,依法规范权责,根据功能分类,把握重点,进一步健全各司其职、各负其责、协调运转、有效制衡的国有企业法人治理结构。
(二)基本原则。
1.坚持深化改革。尊重企业市场主体地位,遵循市场经济规律和企业发展规律,以规范决策机制和完善制衡机制为重点,坚持激励机制与约束机制相结合,体现效率原则与公平原则,充分调动企业家积极性,提升企业的市场化、现代化经营水平。
2.坚持党的领导。落 实全面从严治党战略部署,把加强党的领导和完善公司治理统一起来,明确国有企业党组织在法人治理结构中的法定地位,发挥国有企业党组织的领导核心和政治核 心作用,保证党组织把方向、管大局、保落实。坚持党管干部原则与董事会依法选择经营管理者、经营管理者依法行使用人权相结合,积极探索有效实现形式,完善 反腐倡廉制度体系。
3.坚持依法治企。依据《中华人民共和国公司法》、《中华人民共和国企业国有资产法》等法律法规,以公司章程为行为准则,规范权责定位和行权方式;法无授权,任何政府部门和机构不得干预企业正常生产经营活动,实现深化改革与依法治企的有机统一。
4.坚持权责对等。坚持权利义务责任相统一,规范权力运行、强化权利责任对等,改革国有资本授权经营体制,深化权力运行和监督机制改革,构建符合国情的监管体系,完善履职评价和责任追究机制,对失职、渎职行为严格追责,建立决策、执行和监督环节的终身责任追究制度。
(三)主要目标。
2017 年年底前,国有企业公司制改革基本完成。到2020年,党组织在国有企业法人治理结构中的法定地位更加牢固,充分发挥公司章程在企业治理中的基础作用,国 有独资、全资公司全面建立外部董事占多数的董事会,国有控股企业实行外部董事派出制度,完成外派监事会改革;充分发挥企业家作用,造就一大批政治坚定、善 于经营、充满活力的董事长和职业经理人,培育一支德才兼备、业务精通、勇于担当的董事、监事队伍;党风廉政建设主体责任和监督责任全面落实,企业民主监督 和管理明显改善;遵循市场经济规律和企业发展规律,使国有企业成为依法自主经营、自负盈亏、自担风险、自我约束、自我发展的市场主体。
二、规范主体权责
健 全以公司章程为核心的企业制度体系,充分发挥公司章程在企业治理中的基础作用,依照法律法规和公司章程,严格规范履行出资人职责的机构(以下简称出资人机 构)、股东会(包括股东大会,下同)、董事会、经理层、监事会、党组织和职工代表大会的权责,强化权利责任对等,保障有效履职,完善符合市场经济规律和我 国国情的国有企业法人治理结构,进一步提升国有企业运行效率。
(一)理顺出资人职责,转变监管方式。
1. 股东会是公司的权力机构。股东会主要依据法律法规和公司章程,通过委派或更换董事、监事(不含职工代表),审核批准董事会、监事会年度工作报告,批准公司 财务预决算、利润分配方案等方式,对董事会、监事会以及董事、监事的履职情况进行评价和监督。出资人机构根据本级人民政府授权对国家出资企业依法享有股东 权利。
2. 国有独资公司不设股东会,由出资人机构依法行使股东会职权。以管资本为主改革国有资本授权经营体制,对直接出资的国有独资公司,出资人机构重点管好国有资 本布局、规范资本运作、强化资本约束、提高资本回报、维护资本安全。对国有全资公司、国有控股企业,出资人机构主要依据股权份额通过参加股东会议、审核需 由股东决定的事项、与其他股东协商作出决议等方式履行职责,除法律法规或公司章程另有规定外,不得干预企业自主经营活动。
3. 出资人机构依据法律法规和公司章程规定行使股东权利、履行股东义务,有关监管内容应依法纳入公司章程。按照以管资本为主的要求,出资人机构要转变工作职 能、改进工作方式,加强公司章程管理,清理有关规章、规范性文件,研究提出出资人机构审批事项清单,建立对董事会重大决策的合规性审查机制,制定监事会建 设、责任追究等具体措施,适时制定国有资本优先股和国家特殊管理股管理办法。
(二)加强董事会建设,落实董事会职权。
1. 董事会是公司的决策机构,要对股东会负责,执行股东会决定,依照法定程序和公司章程授权决定公司重大事项,接受股东会、监事会监督,认真履行决策把关、内 部管理、防范风险、深化改革等职责。国有独资公司要依法落实和维护董事会行使重大决策、选人用人、薪酬分配等权利,增强董事会的独立性和权威性,落实董事 会年度工作报告制度;董事会应与党组织充分沟通,有序开展国有独资公司董事会选聘经理层试点,加强对经理层的管理和监督。
2. 优化董事会组成结构。国有独资、全资公司的董事长、总经理原则上分设,应均为内部执行董事,定期向董事会报告工作。国有独资公司的董事长作为企业法定代表 人,对企业改革发展负首要责任,要及时向董事会和国有股东报告重大经营问题和经营风险。国有独资公司的董事对出资人机构负责,接受出资人机构指导,其中外 部董事人选由出资人机构商有关部门提名,并按照法定程序任命。国有全资公司、国有控股企业的董事由相关股东依据股权份额推荐派出,由股东会选举或更换,国 有股东派出的董事要积极维护国有资本权益;国有全资公司的外部董事人选由控股股东商其他股东推荐,由股东会选举或更换;国有控股企业应有一定比例的外部董 事,由股东会选举或更换。
3. 规范董事会议事规则。董事会要严格实行集体审议、独立表决、个人负责的决策制度,平等充分发表意见,一人一票表决,建立规范透明的重大事项信息公开和对外 披露制度,保障董事会会议记录和提案资料的完整性,建立董事会决议跟踪落实以及后评估制度,做好与其他治理主体的联系沟通。董事会应当设立提名委员会、薪 酬与考核委员会、审计委员会等专门委员会,为董事会决策提供咨询,其中薪酬与考核委员会、审计委员会应由外部董事组成。改进董事会和董事评价办法,完善年 度和任期考核制度,逐步形成符合企业特点的考核评价体系及激励机制。
4. 加强董事队伍建设。开展董事任前和任期培训,做好董事派出和任期管理工作。建立完善外部董事选聘和管理制度,严格资格认定和考试考察程序,拓宽外部董事来 源渠道,扩大专职外部董事队伍,选聘一批现职国有企业负责人转任专职外部董事,定期报告外部董事履职情况。国有独资公司要健全外部董事召集人制度,召集人 由外部董事定期推选产生。外部董事要与出资人机构加强沟通。
(三)维护经营自主权,激发经理层活力。
1.经理层是公司的执行机构,依法由董事会聘任或解聘,接受董事会管理和监事会监督。总经理对董事会负责,依法行使管理生产经营、组织实施董事会决议等职权,向董事会报告工作,董事会闭会期间向董事长报告工作。
2. 建立规范的经理层授权管理制度,对经理层成员实行与选任方式相匹配、与企业功能性质相适应、与经营业绩相挂钩的差异化薪酬分配制度,国有独资公司经理层逐 步实行任期制和契约化管理。根据企业产权结构、市场化程度等不同情况,有序推进职业经理人制度建设,逐步扩大职业经理人队伍,有序实行市场化薪酬,探索完 善中长期激励机制,研究出台相关指导意见。国有独资公司要积极探索推行职业经理人制度,实行内部培养和外部引进相结合,畅通企业经理层成员与职业经理人的 身份转换通道。开展出资人机构委派国有独资公司总会计师试点。
(四)发挥监督作用,完善问责机制。
1. 监事会是公司的监督机构,依照有关法律法规和公司章程设立,对董事会、经理层成员的职务行为进行监督。要提高专职监事比例,增强监事会的独立性和权威性。 对国有资产监管机构所出资企业依法实行外派监事会制度。外派监事会由政府派出,负责检查企业财务,监督企业重大决策和关键环节以及董事会、经理层履职情 况,不参与、不干预企业经营管理活动。
2.健全以职工代表大会为基本形式的企业民主管理制度,支持和保证职工代表大会依法行使职权,加强职工民主管理与监督,维护职工合法权益。国有独资、全资公司的董事会、监事会中须有职工董事和职工监事。建立国有企业重大事项信息公开和对外披露制度。
3. 强化责任意识,明确权责边界,建立与治理主体履职相适应的责任追究制度。董事、监事、经理层成员应当遵守法律法规和公司章程,对公司负有忠实义务和勤勉义 务;要将其信用记录纳入全国信用信息共享平台,违约失信的按规定在“信用中国”网站公开。董事应当出席董事会会议,对董事会决议承担责任;董事会决议违反 法律法规或公司章程、股东会决议,致使公司遭受严重损失的,应依法追究有关董事责任。经理层成员违反法律法规或公司章程,致使公司遭受损失的,应依法追究 有关经理层成员责任。执行董事和经理层成员未及时向董事会或国有股东报告重大经营问题和经营风险的,应依法追究相关人员责任。企业党组织成员履职过程中有 重大失误和失职、渎职行为的,应按照党组织有关规定严格追究责任。按照“三个区分开来”的要求,建立必要的改革容错纠错机制,激励企业领导人员干事创业。
(五)坚持党的领导,发挥政治优势。
1. 坚持党的领导、加强党的建设是国有企业的独特优势。要明确党组织在国有企业法人治理结构中的法定地位,将党建工作总体要求纳入国有企业章程,明确党组织在 企业决策、执行、监督各环节的权责和工作方式,使党组织成为企业法人治理结构的有机组成部分。要充分发挥党组织的领导核心和政治核心作用,领导企业思想政 治工作,支持董事会、监事会、经理层依法履行职责,保证党和国家方针政策的贯彻执行。
2. 充分发挥纪检监察、巡视、审计等监督作用,国有企业董事、监事、经理层中的党员每年要定期向党组(党委)报告个人履职和廉洁自律情况。上级党组织对国有企 业纪检组组长(纪委书记)实行委派制度和定期轮岗制度,纪检组组长(纪委书记)要坚持原则、强化监督。纪检组组长(纪委书记)可列席董事会和董事会专门委 员会的会议。
3. 积极探索党管干部原则与董事会选聘经营管理人员有机结合的途径和方法。坚持和完善双向进入、交叉任职的领导体制,符合条件的国有企业党组(党委)领导班子 成员可以通过法定程序进入董事会、监事会、经理层,董事会、监事会、经理层成员中符合条件的党员可以依照有关规定和程序进入党组(党委);党组(党委)书 记、董事长一般由一人担任,推进中央企业党组(党委)专职副书记进入董事会。在董事会选聘经理层成员工作中,上级党组织及其组织部门、国有资产监管机构党 委应当发挥确定标准、规范程序、参与考察、推荐人选等作用。积极探索董事会通过差额方式选聘经理层成员。
三、做好组织实施
(一)及时总结经验,分层有序实施。在 国有企业建设规范董事会试点基础上,总结经验、完善制度,国务院国资委监管的中央企业要依法改制为国有独资公司或国有控股公司,全面建立规范的董事会。国 有资本投资、运营公司法人治理结构要“一企一策”地在公司章程中予以细化。其他中央企业和地方国有企业要根据自身实际,由出资人机构负责完善国有企业法人 治理结构。
(二)精心规范运作,做好相互衔接。国有企业要按照完善法人治理结构的要求,全面推进依法治企,完善公司章程,明确内部组织机构的权利、义务、责任,实现各负其责、规范运作、相互衔接、有效制衡。国务院国资委要会同有关部门和单位抓紧制定国有企业公司章程审核和批准管理办法。
金融、文化等国有企业的改革,中央另有规定的依其规定执行。
                           国务院办公厅
                           2017年4月24日
(此件公开发布)



State Council General Office

Guiding Opinion on Further Improving the Governance Structure of State-Owned Enterprises

Guobanfa 2017 no. 36

To all provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly controlled by the central government, all State Council ministries, and all directly controlled institutions:

Perfecting the governance structure of state-owned enterprise is an intrinsic requirement of comprehensively advancing ruling enterprises in accordance to the law, promoting the modernization of the national governance system and governing ability. It is an important task of the new round of SOEs reform.At present, most state-owned enterprises have initially established a modern enterprise system, but judging from the situation in practice, the modern enterprise system is still imperfect. Some enterprises have not yet formed an effective corporate governance structure. The powers and responsibilities are not clear, constraints are not sufficient, the lack of checks and balances and other issues are  prominent. Some board of directors exist in name only, and cannot bring their function into play.According to the spirit of the "Central Committee, State Council Guiding Opinion on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises", in order to improve the governance structure of state-owned enterprises, and perfect the modern enterprise system of SOEs, the following Opinion is issued with the agreement of the State Council:

I. General Requirements

(a) Guiding Ideology.

Comprehensively implement the spirit of the Party's 18th Congress and its 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th plenary sessions; thoroughly implement the spirit of the important speeches of the General Secretary Xi Jinping and the new strategic ideology of managign state affairs; earnestly implement the CPC Central Committee, and State Council's strategic deployment, to advance the overall plan and the coordination of the "Five-in-One" strategic deployment; firmly establish and implement the concept of innovative, coordinated, green, open, and shared development concept; depart from the reality of state-owned enterprises in order to establish as a direction a system of sound and clear property rights, clear responsibility, separation between government and enterprises, and a modern enterprise system. Actively adapt to the needs of the new situation of state-owned enterprises reform, uphold Party leadership, strengthen Party construction, improve the institutional mechanisms, regulate authority in accordance with the law, graspe the main points according to the classification of functions, and further improve the responsibilities, accountability, coordinated operation, effective checks and balances of state-owned enterprises corporate governance structure.

(b) Basic Principles.

1. Uphold deepening reform. Respect the market subject status of  enterprises, follow the law of market economy and the law of enterprise development, focus on standardizing the decision-making mechanism and perfecting the mechanism of checks and balances, uphold the combination of incentive mechanisms and restraint mechanisms, embody the principles of efficiency and fairness, fully mobilize the enthusiasm of entrepreneurs, promoting the marketization of state-owned enterprises, and the modernization of their entrepreneurial level.

2. Uphold Party leadership. Implement the strategic deployment of comprehensively strictly governing the Party. Bring together strengthening Party leadership and improving corporate governance, specify the statutory position of Part organizations in the corporate governance of State-owned enterprises, bring into play the core leadership and core political role of Party organizations in State-owned enterprises, guarantee that Party organizations maintain their direction, manage the general situation, and guarantee implementation. Uphold the principle of Party management of cadres, and the choice of managers by the Board of Directors in accordance with the law,  combine the exercise of human authority and power by managers in accordance with the law, actively explore effective forms to improve the anti-corruption system.

3. Uphold managing enterprises in accordance with the law.According to the "People's Republic of China Company Law", the "People's Republic of China Enterprise State-Owned Assets Law", companies articles of association are the code of conduct, the position of rights and responsibilities and the use of authority should be standardized. Without authorization, no government department or agency should interfere in the normal productive and management operations of enterprises,  the rights and responsibilities and the way of the right; without authorization, no government departments or agencies shall interfere with the normal production and management activities of enterprises. Establish the organic unity of enterprise reform and corporate governance in accordance with the law.

4. Uphold the equivalence of rights and responsibilities.Uphold the unity of right and duty, standardize the operation of power, strengthen the equivalence of rights and responsibilities, reform the system of authorized management of state-owned capital, deepen the reform of power operation and supervision mechanism, construct a supervision system which conforms to the national conditions, perfect duty evaluation and accountability mechanisms, strictly pursue the responsibility for dereliction of duty and malfeasance, and establish a system of lifelong accountability for decisions, [their] implementation, and [their] supervision.

(c) Main Objectives.

By the end of 2017, the reform of state-owned enterprise system will be basically completed.By 2020, the statutory position of Party organizations in the governance structure of state-owned enterprises will be firmer, the basic role of companies statutes in corporate governance will be brought into full play, all sole-investor state-owned enterprises and wholly funded enterprises will establish a board of directors where the majority is held by of external board members. State-owned holding enterprises will carry out the external Board of Directors system and will complete the reform of the external Board of Supervisors. They will give full play to the role of entrepreneurs, create a large number  of chairmen and managers who are politically firm, good at management, full of vigor. They will cultivate directors and supervisors uniting ethics to integrity, proficient in business, courageous and daring. The construction of Party's clean governance responsibility for subjects,  and supervision responsibility will fully be implemented. Enterprises democratic supervision and management will manifestly improve. Following the law of market economy and the law of enterprise development, State-owned enterprises will become a self-managing, self-responsible market subject responsible for their of losses and for their risk, and which will discipline themselves and develop autonomously.

II. Norms and responsibilities of  main bodies

Improve companies statutes as the core of the enterprise system, give full play to companies statutes as the basis of corporate governance. In accordance with laws and regulations and the company's statutes, strictly regulate the performance of responsibilities by the investing institutions (hereinafter referred to as the investor institutions), the rights and responsibilities of the shareholders ' meeting (including the general meeting of shareholders, same for what follows), the Board of directors, the management, the Committee of Supervisors, Party organizations and the Workers ' Congress. Strengthen the equivalence of rights and responsibilities, guarantee the effective performance of duties, and perfect the governance structure of State-owned enterprises in line with the law of the market economy and our national circumstances, and further improve the effective operation of state-owned enterprises.

(a) Rationalize the responsibility of investors and change the mode of supervision.

1. The Shareholders' assembly is an institution of the enterprise's authority.The Shareholders' assembly will appoint and replace directors, supervisors (excluding the workers' representatives) in accordance with laws and regulations and the company' statute. It will examine and approve the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors annual work reports, approve the company's financial budgets, profit distribution plans. It will perform appraisals of and supervise performance of duties by the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors.The investing institution shall enjoy shareholders rights on State-invested enterprises according to legislation issued by the same level people's government.

2. Sole-investor State-owned enterprises do not have a shareholders assembly, and shareholders authority shall be exercised by the investing institution.Reform the authorized management system of State-owned capital on the basis of the management of capital. The investing institutions will regulate the distribution of state-owned capital, regulate the operation of capital, strengthen restraints on capital, raise returns on capital, and maintain capital security towards directly-invested State-owned enterprises.Investing institutions in State-owned enterprises, State-owned holding enterprises perform their duties by participating in shareholders meetings based on the total of their shares, by reviewing items to be approved by the shareholders assembly, by negotiation major resolutions with other shareholders, and in other ways. Except for laws, regulations and the company's statute, they shall not interfere with the enterprise's independent exercize of business activities.

3. The investing institution enjoys shareholder's rights and fulfils shareholders' obligations in accordance with the laws and regulations and the company's statute. Relevant regulatory content shall be incorporated in the company's statute in accordance with the law. According to the requirements of managing capital as a priority, the investing institution will change its job function and improve its working methods. It will strengthen the management of the companies' statute, it will clean up relevant regulations and normative documents, it study and put forward the list of the items to be approved by the investing institution, it  will establish a compliance review mechanism for major decisions of the Board of Directors, it will formulate concrete measures, on constructing the Board of Supervisors, on concrete measures to pursue responsibilities, in due course it will establish measures on preferred stocks and on State special management stocks.

(b) Strengthen the Board of Trustees and implement the functions of the Board.

1. The Board of Directors is the decision-making body of the enterprise, it is responsible towards the shareholders assembly, it carries out its decisions, and decides on the enterprise important matters in accordance with statutory procedures and the authority of company statute. It receives the supervision of the shareholders meeting and the Board of Supervisors, it earnestly carries out the duties of decision-making, internal management, risk prevention and deepening of reform. Sole-investor state-owned enterprises shall implement and maintain the major decisions by the Board of Directors in accordance with the law, the election of personnel, the distribution of remuneration and other rights. They shall enhance the independence and authority of the Board of Directors, implement the system of annual reporting by the Board of Directors. The  Board of Directors shall fully communicate with the Party organ, and conduct orderly pilot trials of management election by the Board of Directors of wholly State-owned companies, and strengthen the management and supervision of the management.

2. Optimize the board structure.The chairman and the general manager of wholly state-owned and wholly-owned enterprises shall in principle be divided into internal executive directors and report regularly to the board of directors.The Chairman of wholly state-owned enterprises, as the legal representative of the enterprise, has the primary responsibility for the reform and development of the enterprise, and should make timely reports to the Board of directors and shareholders of major managerial problems and risks.The directors of wholly state-owned company are responsible for the investing institution and are guided by the investing institution. Among them, the election of external directors shall take place by the investing institution after nomination by the relevant organ, and their appointment shall take place in accordance with statutory procedures.The directors of wholly state-owned enterprises and state-holding enterprises shall be dispatched under recommendation by relevant shareholders according to their shares. They shall be elected or demoted by the shareholders' assembly.  Directors dispatched by state shareholders shall actively safeguard the rights and interests of the state-owned capital. External directors of State-owned wholly-owned companies are recommended by shareholders other than the controlling shareholder. They shall be elected or replaced by the shareholders' assembly. State holding enterprises shall have a definie proportion of external directors, which shall be elected or replaced by the shareholders' assembly.

3. Regulate the board's rules of procedure.The Board shall strictly implement collective deliberation, independent vote, the individual responsible decision-making system, the equal and full expression of views, one-person-one-vote, to establish a clear and transparent information disclosure system of major deliberations and a disclosure of information to the outside. It shall ensure the integrity of Board meeting's records and motions. It shall establish the Board of Directors to follow up on the implementation of resolutions and evaluation system, and it shall do a good job of liasing with other main governance bodies.The Board of Directors shall set up special committees such as the Nomination Committee, the Remuneration and Assessment Committee and the Audit Committee to advise the Board or Directors. Among these, the Remuneration and Evaluation Committee and the Board of Auditors shall be composed by external directors.Improve the evaluation methods of the Board of Directors and directors, improve the annual and quarterly assessment system, and gradually form and  evaluation system and incentive mechanism in line with the characteristics of enterprises.

4. Strengthen the construction of the board. Conduct the pre-appointment and continuing training of directors, do a good job in managing directors' appointment and tenure. Establish and improve the external directors selection and management system, strict procedures to determine their qualification and examination, broaden the source of external Directors, expand the contingent of full-time external directors, select a number of current directors of State-owned enterprises to be transferred to full-time external directors, regularly report on the situation of external directors.Sole-investor State-owned enterprises should perfect the system of convening independent external directors, and the convenor shall be periodically elected by the external directors. External directors should strengthen communication with the funding institution.

(c) Maintain the autonomy of business and stimulate the vigor of management.

1. The management level is the executive body of the enterprise, which is appointed or demoted by the Board of Directors in accordance with the law, and is subject to supervision by the Board of Directors and the Board of Supervision.The General Manager shall be responsible before the Board of Directors. He shall manage production and operations in accordance with the law, organize and implement decisions of the Board of Directors, report work to the Board of Directors, and report work to the Chairman when the Board of Director is not in session.

2. Establish a standardized management system for the managment, implement a differentiated system of compensation which matches the mode of appointment, is suited to the functional nature of the enterprise, and is linked to the enterprise achievements. The management of state-owned sole-investor enterprises shall gradually implement the tenure and contract management.According to the different situations of enterprise property rights structure, degree of marketization and so on, orderly advance the construction of professional management system, gradually broaden the Professional management team, orderly implement a market-oriented salary, explore and perfect  medium and long term incentive mechanisms, and conduct research on issuing relevant guiding opinions.State-owned enterprises should actively explore the implementation of the professional management system, implement a combination of internal training and external introduction, put into place channels for the smooth conversion of professional managers into companies managers.Carry out pilot projects on the dispatch of General Accountants in State-owned enterprises by the investor institution.



(d) Bring into play the supervisory role and improve accountability mechanisms.

1. The Board of Supervision is the enterprise's supervisory institution. In accordance with relevant laws and regulations and the company statute, it supervises the professional conduct of the Board of Directors, and of the managment.Improve the proportion of full-time supervisors, strengthen the independence and authority of the Board of Supervisors.Implement the system of the external Board of Supervisors on enterprises invested by State-owned Assets Supervision Institutions.The external Board of Supervisors is dispatched by the Government to check the financial affairs of the enterprise, supervise major and crucial decisions of the enterprise, the board of directors and managers. It does not participate in or interfere with business management activities.

2. Improve the democratic management system with the workers' assembly as its basic form, support and guarantee the workers- assembly exercize of its authority in accordance with the law, strengthen the democratic management and supervision workers, and safeguard workers' lawful rights and interestsThe Board of Directors and the Board of Supervisors of State-owned enterprises and Wholly-funded State-owned enterprises shall have their respective staff.Establish a clear and transparent information disclosure system of major deliberations of State-owned enterprises and a disclosure of information to the outside.

3. Strengthen the sense of responsibility, determine the boundaries between power and responsibility, establish and govern the main bodies to adapt to the accountability system.Directors, supervisors and the management shall abide by the laws and regulations and the company statute. They shall have a faithful and diligent obligation to the company. Their credit information shall be included in the National Credit Information Sharing Platform, and their breaches of trust shall be disclosed on the "Credit China" website. Directors shall participate to Board of Directors' meetings. They shall take responsibility of major resolutions by the Board of Directors. Where resolutions by the Board of Directors violate the laws and regulations, or contravene the company's statute, decisions by the Shareholders' Meeting, causing the company to suffer severe losses, directors shall be held responsible in accordance with the law. If a member of the management violates the laws or regulations or the companies' statute, causing the enterprise to suffer a loss, the enterprise shall be held responsible for the liability of the managers concerned in accordance with the law.If the executive directors and managers are not in time to report to the Board or the state-owned shareholders of major business issues and operating risks, the relevant personnel shall be held accountable according to law.The members of the Enterprise Party organization shall strictly investigate the responsibility in accordance with the relevant provisions of the party organizations when there are major mistakes and dereliction of duty and malfeasance in the course of their duties.According to the requirements of "Three Sistinctions", a necessary mechanism shall be established to tolerate mistakes and stop mistakes in the reform process, and motivate enterprise leaders to innovate business. 

(e) Uphold Party leadership and exert political advantage.

1. Adhering to the Party's leadership and strengthening the Party's construction is the unique advantage of state-owned enterprises. To clarify the statutory position of Party organizations in the governance structure of State-owned enterprises, the general requirements of Party building work shall be incorporated into the company statutes of State-owned enterprises, to clarify the responsibilities and working methods of Party organizations in enterprise decision-making, execution, and supervision, and to make Party organizations become an organic party of enterprise governance structure. Full play shall be given to the leading core and political core role of Party organizations, to leadership of the ideological and political work of enterprises, support to the Board of Directors, the Board of Supervisors and managers in the fulfillment of their duties in accordance with the law, and in ensuring implementation of the Party and State policy.

2. Full play shall be given to the supervisory role of discipline inspection committees, inspection work tours and audit. Party members among directors, supervisors and managers of State-owned enterprises shall report to the Party Committee on a regular basis every year on their personal performance and self-discipline.Superior level Party organs implement the system of delegation and the turn-over system toward the chair of the discipline inspection group of the State-owned enterprise (Commission for discipline inspection secretary). The chair of the Party discipline inspection group (Commission for discipline inspection secretary) must uphold principle and reinforce supervision.He chair of the Party discipline inspection group (Commission for discipline inspection secretary)  may attend the meetings of the Board of Directors and board committees.

3. Actively explore organic combinations of channels and methods of the principle whereby the Party manages cadres and the Board of Directors appoints the management.Uphold and improve the two-way entry, crossing  leadership system. Leading members of State-owned enterprises Party groups (committees) where conditions exist may enter the Board of Directors, the  Board of Supervisors, the management, through statutory procedures. Party members among members of the Board of Supervisors, of the Board of Directors, and of the management  where conditions exist may become members of the Party group (committee) through statutory procedures. The office of Secretary of the Party group (committees) and of Chairman is normally held by one person. Promote the ingress of  full-time deputy secretaries of the Central Enterprise Party Committee (CPC) to the Board of Directors.In the work whereby the Board of Directors appoints the management, superior-level Party committees and their organizational departments, and the Party committees of State-owned Assets Supervision organizations shall play the role of determining standards, standardizing procedures, participating in inspection and recommending candidates.Actively explore the Board of Directors' election of managers by having a number of candidates higher than  available positions.

III. Implement the Organization Well

(a) Summarize experience in a timely way, an implement it in an orderly and sequentialy fashion.Based on the pilot projects standardizing the Board of Directors in teh construction of State-owned enterprises, summarize experience, and improve the system. Central enterprises of the State Council SASAC should be transformed into wholly state-owned enterprises or state-owned holding enterprises. Comprehensively regulate Board of Directors.The capital investment and the corporate governance structure of the operating State-owned enterprises should be refined according to the policy of employing multiple forms and apply particular policies to each of the enterprises in the company statute.Other central enterprises and local State-owned enterprises shall, in accordance with their own reality, be responsible for perfecting the governance structure of State-owned enterprise through the responsibility of the investing institution.

(b) Carefully standardize operation, and do a good job of cohesion.State-owned enterprises should improve their corporate governance structure according to the requirements of perfecting the corporate governance structure of legal persons, comprehensively promote corporate governance in accordance with the law, perfect the companies' statute, specify the rights, obligations and responsibilities of internal organizations, realize their respective accountability, standardize their operations, connect with each other, and check them effectively.The State Council shall, in conjunction with the relevant departments and units, draw up the rules for the examination and approval of the Articles of Association of State-owned enterprises.

The reform of state-owned enterprises, such as those finance and culture, shall be carried out in accordance with relevant provisions of the central government.


                           State Council General Office
                           April 24, 2017
(This document has been publicly issued)

Congressional-Executive Commission on China Event: "Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations"

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(Pix Credit here)


The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by the U.S. Congress in 2000 "with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress. The Commission consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior Administration officials appointed by the President." (CECC About). The CECC FAQs provide useful information about the CECC. See CECC Frequently Asked Questions. They have developed positions on a number of issues: Access to Justice; Civil Society;Commercial Rule of Law; Criminal Justice; Developments in Hong Kong and Macau ; The Environment ; Ethnic Minority Rights;Freedom of Expression; Freedom of Religion ; Freedom of Residence and Movement ; Human Trafficking ; Institutions of Democratic Governance ; North Korean Refugees in China; Population Planning ; Public Health ; Status of Women ; Tibet ; Worker Rights ; and Xinjiang.

CECC tends to serve as an excellent barometer of the thinking of political and academic elites in the United States about issues touching on China and the official American line developed in connection with those issues. As such it is an important source of information about the way official and academic sectors think about China. As one can imagine many of the positions of the CECC are critical of current Chinese policies and institutions (see, e.g., here, here, herehere, here, here, here, and here.

Recently, the CECC has announced hearings designed to highlight what it views as the un-American way in which China has been dealing with its lawyers, especially as they seek public venues to spotlight issues of potential administrative failures under the law in China. Those hearings, Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations will be held at HVC-210 Capitol Visitor Center, Washington, DC 20515; Wednesday, June 28, 2017 - 2:00pm to 4:00pm.

Of course, the most interesting thing about these interventions is not its value for strengthening the U.S.'s own view of its own legal and political cultures.  After all, at its heart the hearings are really about this: how would these actions have been handled in an (idealized) American legal and political system.  And indeed, the most interesting question--and one hardly to be pursued, would be the comparative project. That would require the Committee to consider--dispassionately and rigorously, the political and legal consequences of such actions if undertaken in equivalent circumstances in the United States.   That might serve the useful purpose of highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of our own systems and also to suggest those points where systemic comparison spotlights incompatibility.  It is at that point that the most useful work can be undertaken: Given the differences in norms and structures, to what extent are the actions undertaken compatible with the (idealized and actual) law and norms of China. That analysis produces two important contributions to analysis.  The first is a deeper understanding of inter-systemic points of compatibility and contradiction.  The second is a clearer analysis of the contextual reasons why (without attacking the legitimacy of the underlying system) government policy might be in some respects inconsistent with its own ideology and perhaps, to some extent, with the basic line of the CCP.

But, of course, CECC, and those who serve it, are engaged in a political--not a scholarly--project.  To that extent its actions and production of materials serve as primary source research for knowledge production, rather than as the production of knowledge itself. That is not a bad thing.  Indeed, it ought to be welcome within the framework of the American political system as an expression of its own politics. It is also useful for indications of the state of U.S. Chinese political jousting as well as a hint of internal politics at the federal level of our system. And the content of the hearings will reveal more about the U.S. than it might about the objects of inquiry. With that in mind, one might more effectively approach both the hearing, its product and the already anticipated Chinese reaction (that, also ought to be analyzed in the same way for its own self-reflections and internal politics) for the overarching scholarly project of seeking truth from facts.

 

The Congressional-Executive Commission on China

announces a hearing

Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations 
Wednesday, June 28, 2017
Capitol Visitor Center
HVC-210
2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

Over the past four years, the Chinese government has carried out an extensive campaign to silence political dissent, curtail civil society, and ensure ideological loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party from various sectors of society, including business leaders, bloggers and social media users, university professors, and journalists. One of the most vicious aspects of the campaign has been the use of detentions, arrests, torture, televised confessions, and enforced disappearances to punish lawyers and legal advocates who have defended various victims of the Chinese government’s human rights abuses, including religious adherents, petitioners, artists, and reporters.  On July 9,2015, an unprecedented, sweeping, nationwide crackdown began in which over 300 human rights lawyers, legal professionals, and human rights advocates were detained, summoned for questioning, or disappeared. This intensified targeting of the Chinese legal community came to be called the “709” crackdown.

Through the testimony of a legal expert and individuals with firsthand knowledge of repression at the hands of the Chinese government, the Commission will examine the foreign policy implications of China’s campaign to silence human rights lawyers in light of President Xi Jinping’s stated commitment to establish the rule of law in China.  The Commission will also examine the chilling effect of the July 2015 crackdown, the lawyers’ motivation for taking on politically sensitive cases, and the responses of many of their spouses and family members, who have been emboldened in their own advocacy despite ongoing intimidation and harassment.

Hearing can be viewed via live Webcast

Witnesses:

Terence Halliday: Co-director of the Center on Law & Globalization at the American Bar Foundation and Co-author (with Sida Liu) of the book Criminal Defense in China: The Politics of Lawyers at Work.

Teng Biao: Chinese human rights lawyer; Visiting Scholar, Institute for Advanced Study, and Co-founder, the Open Constitution Initiative and China Human Rights Accountability Center.

  
******Additional witnesses may be added


China's Social Credit Initiative in a Global Context: Foundations--"Monitoring, Assessment and Reward: Are there Social Credit Systems in the West?"

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2017)


The Coalition for Peace and Ethics and the Foundation for Law and International Affairs have started a joint project on "Social Credit." Series Contents HERE.

Social credit can be understood in two senses. First, Social Credit itself references the specific project of the Chinese state to create a comprehensive legal and regulatory mechanism that they have named "social credit."Second, it refers generally to a new mode of governance that recombines law and governance, and the public and private spheres in new and hybrid ways that will likely transform the structures and principles on which legal, governance, and societal regulatory systems are now understood and through which they acquire their legitimacy.

At its limit, the enterprise of social credit suggests both the emergence of a new field of law as well as the negation of the privileging of law within economic and political structures. On the one hand, one might be tempted to see in the social credit enterprise a notion of the dissolution of the constitution of law within itself; that is that the structures of legality, and its constitution, will have consumed itself. What will emerge from that self consumption will be the methods and systems that it had once generated and which had been deployed in the service of the constitutional project—that the success of the constitutional notion will ultimately consume it so that where once there was constitution there will only be mechanics; where once there was principle, there will only be data; and where once there was norms, there will be “statistics.” This is bound up in the more fundamental idea of the end of law and the irrelevance of lawyer except as technician of a new system the lawyer no longer controls. On the other hand, the success of social credit may require and indeed may be dependent on the simultaneous development of a law for the digital and data age. That is, in the digital age, society (however constituted) is even more in need of law's nomos and narrative. That nomos and narrative may vary depending on the societal and political context, but it must nevertheless develop alongside the re-constitution of the principles, customs and manners of governance.

This post includes the PowerPoints of a presentation I recently made. Entitled Monitoring, Assessment and Reward: Are there Social Credit Systems in the West?, the presentation had as its object to sketch out the global context in which the social credit phenomenon arises and to point to the challenges and opportunities of social credit not just within the more contextually narrow Chinese social credit project, but within globalized governance structures as well.



















  




















































"One Belt One Road and RMB Internationalization—A Strategic Alliance"--PowerPoints of My Presentation at the "Symposium On the Internationalization of the RMB: Risks and Challenges Ahead"

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2016))

It was my great pleasure to participate in the recently concluded "Symposium On the Internationalization of the RMB: Risks and Challenges Ahead," presented by the Queen Mary University of London Centre for Commercial Law Studies in collaboration with the East China University of Political Science and Law, in association with the Institute for Global Law, Economics and Finance and organized by Professor Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal (Conference Note and program HERE). 

This post includes the PowerPoints of my presentation: One Belt One Road and RMB Internationalization—A Strategic Alliance
 

(Pix © Larry Catá Backer; taken June 2017 London Heathrow Airport Terminal 2) 
 
 
Structure of Discussion: (1) Situating RMB internationalization within broader issues of Chinese policy; (2)  The OBOR initiative and related development efforts; (3)  Putting the pieces together— (a) Tie it back to issues of reality (trade and investment use) and perception (consensus of others states); And (b) Reasons for OBOR and RMB internationalization linkage--stability, development, and control.  Focus: Consideration of the peripheral structures of Chinese trade and investment policy and its potential effects on RMB internationalization. Thesis: RMB internationalization is one small part of a larger more ambitious project: (1) External: An integral part of Chinese trade and development policies; an interlocking set of objectives to solidify the all around central position of China. (2) Internal: Core of socialist modernization and development of productive forces within China; situating China at center of global commerce essential for next stage of economic and political development. 
 
 The PowerPoints may also be accessed HERE.


 
 
 


















 

CECC Releases Video From the Event: "Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations"

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(Pix Credit here)


I recently posted on the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) program with its focus on what it views as the un-American way in which China has been dealing with its lawyers, especially as they seek public venues to spotlight issues of potential administrative failures under the law in China. Those hearings, Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers and Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations wwere held at HVC-210 Capitol Visitor Center, Washington, DC 20515; Wednesday, June 28, 2017 - 2:00pm to 4:00pm. 
CECC has recently made available selected video from those hearings. Summaries and links as provided by CECC follow.
A word beyond the context of the specific instances described in the conference, the difficulties of which bear substantial consideration within the normative frameworks of China and of the United States, both with respect to the nature of the normative systems implicated and perhaps substantial shortcoming in their application. The video clips provide a great insight into the form and orientation of elite thinking on the issues, if only with respect to China. And that makes for the most interesting issue of all--for elite ideology in the United States, of the sort expressed in the videos that follow, tends to be as consistent as one might expect of this sort of project in any state.  What makes for a politics of ideology are the choices that elite makes in the costs it is willing to incur to focus the implications of that ideology in some cases and to ignore others. This applies with equal force to China as to the United States, though each distinguished by the forms of the cages of their respective ideologies and discretionary structures. There is no shame in politics, of course, and one ought to be pleased to see the political class deploying its resources to that task.  Yet, there is something more interesting when that deployment then appears to bend law to the politics of ideology. This is not an American problem, but is generally an interesting mechanics that ought to serve as a caution for those--anywhere--who would derive comfort from any sort of (false) decision between law as norm and law as technique. Indeed, the ease with which one can glide from norm to technique, and form ideology to the politics of discretionary choices in the service of something other than the normative structures of the tools deployed, that is of the political nature of law as it is exercised through discretionary choices, is nicely brought out here.  And it is int way that application is formulated for a specific application that suggests, in a more subtle way, the greatest fears and desires of that elite in the application of those principles within their own system. 





VIDEO: Key Moments from CECC hearing “Gagging the Lawyers: China’s Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers & Its Implications for U.S.-China Relations”

June 30, 2017

(Washington)— U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and U.S. Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ), the chair and cochair respectively of the bipartisan Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC), held a hearing this week looking at the Chinese government crackdown on human rights lawyers and legal advocates.

Witnesses included Terence Halliday, co-director of the Center on Law & Globalization at the American Bar Foundation and co-author of the book Criminal Defense in China: The Politics of Lawyers at Work; Teng Biao, Chinese human rights lawyer and a Visiting Scholar, Institute for Advanced Study; Li Xiaorong, independent scholar and former researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland; and Xia Chongyu, the son of imprisoned human rights lawyer Xia Lin.

Partial transcripts and links to videos of some of the hearing’s key moments are below. Witness testimonies and the opening statements of Senator Rubio and Congressman Smith can be found on the CECC’s website. The hearing webcast is archived and can be viewed via the CECC’s YouTube page.

VIDEO: Senator Rubio says U.S. problems with Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese people
“I welcome China’s rise in many ways, I don’t welcome a totalitarian state’s rise…If somehow there was a Chinese government that cared about the rights of all mankind that could work together with us, I think we would be a lot further along in some the major issues confronting this country. But when you don’t care about the rights of your own people, why would you care about the rights of anybody else? That is our problem with the Chinese Communist Party, and its leadership, not its people. While I remain hopeful for change, in the interim, we will continue to speak out…”

VIDEO: Rep. Smith says U.S. must be a voice for those silenced and repressed in China
“The one thing that gives me hope is that the people of China long for liberty, justice and opportunity… The need for principled and consistent American leadership is now more important than ever, as China’s growing economic power, and persistent diplomatic efforts, have succeeded in dampening global criticism of its escalating repression and failures to adhere to universal standards. The U.S. must be a beacon of liberty and a champion of individual rights and freedoms. The United States must also continue to be voice for those silenced, jailed, or repressed in China. We cannot…will not…forget those in China bravely seeking liberty and justice and the unalienable rights we all share here in the United States—like China’s human rights lawyers—and like Liu Xiaobo—those who bravely seek peaceful change in China. That’s our focus. That’s our priority. That’s our hopes and prayers for them. ”

VIDEO: Terry Halliday explains why repression has not stopped the work of human rights lawyers
“Many lawyers build their courageous representation upon legal ideals that underwrite the good political society. They insist on the protection of basic legal freedoms, such as the right to be represented by a lawyer, due process in trials, and fair adjudication. They insist upon freedoms of speech, of association and religion...Our research documents that many lawyers, notable and ordinary practitioners, also draw their courage from their Christian faith. Christians insist upon the values of equality, most importantly, that in the eyes of God and in the eyes of the law, said one lawyer, “Chairman Mao is as equal as me”… They believe in fairness—that justice should be available reliably and fairly to all, whether they are Han Chinese or Tibetan, Party members or Falun Gong members. Finally, they hold China’s law accountable to God’s law.”

VIDEO: Teng Biao Offers Recommendations for U.S. Policy
“…A powerful and autocratic China will bring calamities to mankind. Supporting democracy and human rights in China not only corresponds to American declared values; it will also benefit American politics, society and economics in the long term. Please stand on the side of Chinese people, not on the side of Chinese Communist Party. China should be represented by the human rights lawyers, activists, dissidents and all Chinese people fighting for freedom and democracy, not the illegitimate Party and government.”

VIDEO: Xia Chongyu asks the U.S. Government to work for his father’s (Xia Lin) release
“Human rights lawyers are the cornerstone of the society. I hope the US. Government can increase its involvement in these cases in the future. Moreover, I wish the Congress of America could urge the Chinese government to stop controlling the judiciary system and stop the persecution against 709 lawyers. Lastly, I plead that the White House summon the Chinese ambassador and ask the Chinese government to respond to me and my 94,000 petition supporters….By making a clear stance, the US. Government would communicate to the world that human rights violations will not be tolerated. I appreciate the Congress for organizing this hearing so that our voice could be heard by the world.”

VIDEO: Xiaorong Li says systematic human rights abuses call into question China’s fitness to take global leadership role
“Congress should support U.S. actions holding the Chinese government accountable for its failures to live up to its international human rights obligations…As China becomes a rising world power the government’s systematic human rights abuse raises serious questions about its credibility or fitness to take global leadership in areas where the U.S. is retreating. The Chinese government has a clear track record of signing up for international human rights treaties, meanwhile violating them outright—back at home and in countries where it is investing, lending money, and building infrastructures. It is important to lay bare this track record of deceit and hypocrisy. A government that can’t honor its own commitments, can’t keep its own promises has no credibility.”

VIDEO: Senator Rubio asks Xia Chongyu if he faced threats from the Chinese government
“After my father was arrested, he was completely missing. We did not receive any warrant and so we do not know where they took him or who took him. That’s one of the pressures we got. The police also summoned my mom to ask her to divorce with my father, and I was on the threaten list, that is the reason why my family sent me here—to keep me safe. But I think, the first two years, I was threatened by the government...The police officers went to my family friends and other family members to threaten them, and me and my mom kind of get isolated. So, I’m just worrying about everything, and I was scared; I just kept silence here. But, I have learned—I have learned what is right to do and what is justice, I would say, so the pressure turned into my power, and I would have the chance to speak here.”

VIDEO: Senator Rubio asks Terry Halliday whether prisoners of conscience benefit from public advocacy on their behalf
“In my empirical research and the work of our team, speaking to many activist lawyers over a period of time, there is absolutely no doubt in their mind that China must be spoken to publicly and China must be publicly shamed…I have no doubt that when the world speaks—out loud and publicly—China listens. China has a very thin skin. When the American Bar Association awarded its International Human Rights prize to Wang Yu, within 48 hours, the Global Times had an editorial trying to rebut that move. That tells me that not only was China listening, but China felt it had to respond. And finally, the point that you made, Mr. Chairman, is that in our interviews with notable activists, time and again, they have said that when there is public calling for their release or public calling for news about them, their treatment is improved. They can perceptibly point to the day or the week or the month when their treatment changes when the international has turned the spotlight publicly on their plight.”



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Ruminations 73: On American Independence Day 2017—Collective Rights Individually Performed at the Dawn of the Age of Data

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2016)



For American Independence Day I have gotten into the habit of considering questions touching on the essence of American political ideology (e.g., Democracy Part 36: Representative Democracy in an Age Beyond the State--The United States in a Global Political Society; Ruminations 56: On Symbols in American Political Ideology--From Russian Imperial Anthems to Confederate Battle Flags, Marriage, Legislature, and Statute; Ruminations 52: Surmizing Liberty and Equality in American Political Ideology; Democracy Part 28/Ruminations 51: On the Contradiction of Voting, Democracy and Revolution in the U.S. and Egypt).

Yet Americans don't think much in ideological terms; Americans think even less in historical terms, except perhaps to the extent necessary to reach back to a term useful in new ways for current debates. Americans invoke ideology instrumentally, especially in defense of their customs and traditions, or sometimes against them, in either case with sometimes profound effects. And sometimes Americans use their ideology strategically to manage or rework historical perception--but only when it is practical, that is when it furthers some political, social, economic or cultural objective with respect to which sufficient political mobilization can be cultivated.

This year my focus is on the ideology of rights at the dawn of the age of data governance. My suggestion is that the reconstitution of the individual as the convergence point of data (in the private sector) has now given new form to the principles inherent in our Declaration of Independence, and in the process, appears (again) to open the door to the start of a radical transformation of the constitution of the state and the language of power. It is only a matter of time before the state—together with the non-state sectors through which state power will be privatized—will begin to move aggressively not merely to “see” individuals as collections of data, but to use that data to make judgements about those individuals and choices, and to seek to both discipline and control. And yet, that move from rights to data might also be inherent in the notions of rights collectivity at the heart of the Declaration of Independence itself.




Ruminations 73: On American Independence Day 2017—On Collective Rights Individually Performed at the Dawn of the Age of Data

As has been my practice the last few years, I take a little time to reflect on the state and nature of the Republic on the formal anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. As we take a moment to celebrate the existence of our Republic (now a nation, once a union) it is also a good time to reflect on the transformations that both speak to the fluidity of the concept of our nationality and to the relationship of the individual to the political and social order constructed and reconstructed now several times over since 1776.

It strikes me this year that the American Declaration of Independence, after a long period of worrisome irrelevance, has once again become pointedly relevant to the state of this Republic in contemporary times at least in one respect—what we celebrate today is the collective and not its individuals; the state and not its citizens; and the collective bases on which legitimate government can be constituted. That, in turn, serves as a reminder that, within the purview of the state individual rights are collectively expressed but individually performed, and thus performed, judged in relation to the expectations of those who control the apparatus of state in its governmental and societal forms. Rights are the collective expression of those individual activities that the state must protect or against which the state may not interfere. Collective rights individually applied—that appears to be the principle on which the state (and eventually private collectives to some extent) have been managed within a cage of law. Still, the power relation always tilts toward the state and toward the preservation of the right, understood as “property” in the hands of the collective in whose service the state is constituted. And that is the essence of the Declaration’s foundations in ways that may resonate to the modern mind—that “rights” are the aggregated terms under which a state retains the Western version of the Chinese political notion of “mandate of heaven” ((天命)).

All of this is well known, and well worn. Its modern manifestation—even within the fractured politics and societal control battles among the various ethnicities, religions, genders, and classes that now constitute the tribal structures of the United States attest to the vigor of the notion of collectivity (even when fractured) in norms and individuality in performance and discipline. The intensification of modern battles among these tribal units for control of national space has produced the large number of so-called political conflicts of our own day. This is nothing new, of course, religious factions previously had long sought to apply their own structures “extraterritorially” within national spaces, and those tools of aggressive expansion have now been taken and refined by others eager to expand the sting of their collective norms beyond their volkish boundaries.

That this has now been deeply embedded within the politics of the state is merely the acknowledgement of the growing popular taste for the expansion of the jurisdiction of the state into virtually every facet of life—and thought. And that appears to have opened a door that technology has constructed and the private sector has long inhabited—the world in which the collective right itself becomes an incarnate object(ive) and its subjects the individuals whose performance of rights serves as evidence of the incarnation of the right (collectively). At the same time, that transformation both elevates the individual to a position as the ultimate target of rights, and simultaneously reduces the individual to nothing more than that expression. The individual is “seen” only through and as its performance of abstract principles (rights), and it is those collective rights that then assume concrete form. Consider the individual in the territory of the enterprise. She is the sum of her shopping habits, her consumption of food and other objects. She is the sum of her “Netflix” account or her reading purchases from iBooks or Amazon. Her political views are understood as the sum of her donations to charities and her political affiliations. She becomes “real” only when seen against the accumulated consumptive choices she makes (one can consume politics and religion as easily as one consumes a bowl of porridge). But she is more than that—this aggregation of choices that re-incarnates the abstracted individual (in the face of collective rights)—also opens the possibilities of judgement, discipline, and control. Judgement comes when the collective offers its view of the value (collectively) of the exercise of individual rights (eating fatty foods, drinking, viewing certain movies, etc.). Discipline comes when the costs of choices can be imposed on the individual (bad credit ratings increases the cost of borrowing; smoking raises costs of health benefit plans, etc.). And control comes when aggregated data of choices suggests the turn of policy in terms of managing the range of choices and directing choices toward particular ends (offering vinyl records, restricting the sale of liquor, etc.).

But this progress from collective rights to collective management in the age of information has a more transformative effect as well. This age of metrics, of information, and of the algorithm, appears to have inverted the traditional relationship between collective and individual, though not the principle itself (i.e., collective rights individually applied). Where once there was only the state managed within law, now individual performance of collective rights is managed within cages of information. And not just by the state, but through its direct and indirect instrumentalities—enterprises, educational institutions, religion, and societal organizations (especially those fractured along sub-collective lines). Each of us already is reduced to the incarnation of the aggregation of our actions every time we seek entry into the United States; and sometimes when we seek to vote or get a job. It is only a matter of time before the state, through objectives based management programs—grounded in rights and obligations, of course—embraces fully the pattern of judgment, discipline and control through data management and interpretation as the foundation for a new sort of governance. It is only a matter of time before the state—together with the non-state sectors through which state power will be privatized—will begin to move aggressively not merely to “see” individuals as collections of data, but to use that data to make judgements about those individuals and choices, and to seek to both discipline and control. To that end, the algorithm will become the new statute and the variable in econometrics the new basis of public opinion. We appear to be passing from the age of rights to the age of information-management, and from the age of collective responsibility and constraints to the age of collective management.

The reconstitution of the individual as the convergence point of data has now given new form to the principles inherent in our Declaration of Independence, and in the process, appears (again) to radically transform the constitution of the state and the language of power. On this Independence Day we are already far beyond debating the folly or brilliance of this movement. Those decisions were taken years ago and are unlikely to be overturned in the near future. The only real question touches on the relationship of ancient structures of laws and rights—the violations of which revoked Britain’s mandate of Heaven over its American colonies in 1776—to the new structures of governance and management from which rights will now be derived, preserved and managed.

Announcing Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy Annual Conference

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The 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy will take place in Miami, Florida 27-29 July 2017. The three-day conference, around the theme Cuba: Navigating a Turbulent World, will focus on evaluating the state of the Cuban economy taking into consideration the impending changes in Cuba’s relations with the United States. I will post the final program when it is ready. Those of you in Miami at the end of July might consider participating.The press release announcing the Conference follows.






Cuba: Navigating in a Turbulent World


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE​
Contact: Blanca Silva
786-493-7210
blancaesilva@bellsouth.net

ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY
TO HOLD 27th ANNUAL CONFERENCE
"Cuba: Navigating in a Turbulent World" Taking Place at Downtown Miami Hilton July 27-29

Miami – July 7, 2017 – The Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) will hold its 27th Annual Conference at the downtown Miami Hilton (1601 Biscayne Boulevard) July 27-29. Titled "Cuba: Navigating in a Turbulent World," the three-day event will focus on evaluating the state of the Cuban economy, taking into consideration the impending changes in Cuba's relations with the United States. The conference program will feature scholarly individual presentations and roundtable discussions by world-class experts, including specialists from the island.

"With Venezuela's collapsing economy, one of the key issues to be discussed at this year's conference is the future of Cuba without Venezuelan trade and subsidies," says Helena Solo-Gabriele, Ph.D., ASCE president and an engineering professor at University of Miami. "Another key issue is whether Cuba will implement the economic reforms needed to stimulate the private sector and attract foreign investment to spur economic growth."

​Cuba's dual currency system, current economic policies, and prospects for future growth and change will be covered at the conference, together with social and legal issues related to the economy. This year, there will be two sessions dedicated to legal issues in Cuba titled "Foreign Investment in Cuba: Law, Policies, and Practicalities" and "Coordinating U.S. and Legal Principles to Resolve Property and Damage Claims." Continuing law education credits are available for both sessions. Additional topics include tourism, real estate, and agriculture.

An impressive roster of presenters who have been chosen based on the quality of their paper submissions include keynote speaker Marc Frank, a journalist working in Havana for Reuters and "Financial Times," and author of "Cuban Revelations: Behind the Scenes in Havana." Others include faculty from many esteemed universities in the United States and experts from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, U.S. Department of Labor, and U.S. Department of State.

Special guest presenters who will be able to travel from Cuba include leading economist Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva who will speak about economic anticipations on the island; intellectuals Dagoberto Valdés Hernández and Yoandy Izquierdo Toledo, both from Centro de Convivencia, who will speak about Cuba's education system and its impact on the economy; Dr. Alina Lopez Hernández, a philosophy professor and essayist, who will speak about the realities of the Cuban economy; top journalist Ernesto Perez Chang of Cubanet News who will speak about journalistic interpretations of Cuba's economy; Dr. Olimpia Gómez Consuegra, an agricultural engineer and a member of the Cuban Academy of Science until 2011 who will participate on a panel about agriculture; Laritza Diversent, a lawyer, independent journalist and human rights defender who will discuss the struggle to establish independent civil society organizations; and Joanna Columbié, an activist with Academia del Movimiento Politico Somos + who will also touch on the struggles of independent civil society. Sessions by these guest presenters will be conducted in Spanish.

"We aim to gauge the state of the Cuban economy with scholarly discussions and research where the participation of intellectuals in Cuba is very relevant," said Solo-Gabriele. "With this valuable exchange, we are creating a rich body of knowledge that supports ASCE's mission of promoting scholarly discussion on the Cuban economy."

In addition to scholars and professionals, the conference will feature a graduate and undergraduate student panel with papers addressing Cuba's housing sustainability, the influence of foreign policies, and even the influence of foreign fashion on the Cuban identity. Student papers were judged by a panel of experts and the winning students will receive a modest scholarship award plus travel funds to participate in the conference. These students are represented internationally from the U.S., the Netherlands, and Belgium.

"We are very appreciative of the financial support received from the Christopher Reynolds Foundation for the student paper competition and the Cuban scholar travel plans," says Solo-Gabriele.

"Cuba: Navigating in a Turbulent World" will open on Thursday, July 27th with two plenary sessions after an 8 a.m. breakfast; concurrent sessions will follow lunch and will dominate the Friday and Saturday programs. While a cocktail reception will take place on Thursday after the conference, an ASCE business meeting will be held on Friday at 6:45 p.m. The event closes on Saturday at 12:45 p.m. with two concurrent sessions. For more information on this conference, go to www.ascecuba.org. To register, go to http://www.ascecuba.org/2017-asce-conference-registration-form.

The Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) is a non-profit, non-political organization incorporated in the state of Maryland in 1990. With members from the US, Latin America and Europe, its mission is to promote research, publications, and scholarly discussion on the Cuban economy in its broadest sense, including on the social, economic, legal and environmental aspects of a transition to a free market economy and a democratic society in Cuba. ASCE is committed to a civil discussion of all points of view. Affiliated with the American Economic Association and the Allied Social Sciences Association of the United States, ASCE maintains professional contacts with economists inside Cuba –whether independent or associated with the Cuban government-- who are interested in engaging in scholarly discussion and research.

Norway Government Pension Fund Global--Responsibility or Duty; Observation or Exclusion?: Hansae Yes24 Holdings Co. Ltd Put Under Observation for Gross Violations of Human Rights

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There has been a noticeable widening of what may eventually be a conceptual rift between the Norges Bank and the Ethics Council with respect to the interpretation and (especially with respect to ) the application of the Ethics Guidelines.  On June 29, 2017, the following was posted to its website:
On 5 May 2017, the Council on Ethics recommended to exclude the company Hansae Yes24 Holdings Co. Ltd and its subsidiary Hansae Co. Ltd. due to an unacceptable risk of the companies being responsible for systematic human rights violations. Hansae Co. Ltd. owns garment manufacturing facilities in a number of countries, including Vietnam. The recommendation is based on investigations into working conditions which uncovered that the norm violations at several of the company’s factories in Vietnam have been extensive and have gone on for a long time, and that the company has not previously proved itself capable of generating lasting improvements in working conditions.

On 23 June 2017, Norges Bank decided to place the companies under observation, and has asked the Council to follow developments in the case.
Norges Bank's decision was based, in part, on its assessment that the company has sought to take measures to improve working conditions and that this was sufficient to justify a  continued inter-action as shareholders rather than invoke the more drastic step of excluding the company from the Government Pension Fund Global investment universe.   

Please find the Council’s recommendation here. It also follows below, along with brief comments on the rift in the context of governance culture principles that reflect not merely the institutional-cultural framework of the Norway SWF but also echo the cultural differences at the heart of the UN Governing Principles for Business and Human Rights (and similar frameworks).

The action of the Norges Bank--favoring observation--in the face of the Council on Ethics recommendation for exclusion suggests the widening rift between the business and societal governance sensibilities at Norges Bank in contradistinction to the more formalist and legalist approach of the Ethics Council.  That rift is not merely idiosyncratic to the specific context of the Norwegian SWF governance architecture.  Rather it nicely highlights the cultural differences between the societal and legal approaches to the management of human rights norms that are embedded in all emerging regulatory systems that touch on this objective.  In particular, it is worth considering the way that the Norges Bank increasingly embodies the sensibilities inherent in the 2nd (societal) Pillar of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights; while the approaches of the Ethics Council increasingly echoes the more traditional sensibilities of state organs embedded within legal systems that are at the core of the UNGP's 1st Pillar. Those differences, in turn, may speak to the operational (and perhaps drafting) consequences for current efforts at treaty writing for a comprehensive treaty for business and human rights (on my comments with respect to that effort, see here). 

The observation-exclusion rift suggests the consequences of the different approaches between law and societal cultures of governance.  Those differences can be reduced (in this case at least) to two fundamental issues: (1) the way that facts are weighed and balanced; (2) the basic assumptions about the role of the investor in the face of norms that must be enforced. 

With respect to the first, both Norges Bank and the Ethics Council "see" the same set of basic "conclusory" facts: (a) Hansae is prepared to make changes throughout its supply chain to conform to legal-normative expectations; (b)  those changes will require transformation of corporate cultures, compliance frameworks, and patterns of monitoring that will likely take a long time to implement successfully; (c) Hansae has been down this road before and has failed to implement a program of compliance successfully even in the face of commitment form the top; (d) the objectionable conduct is deeply embedded in current operations; and (e) the scale of the changes necessary are quite large.  For the Ethics Council, the combination of past failures, the size and time necessary to make the necessary changes are sufficient to trigger the legal standard risk that is unacceptable (¶ 1.1). The Ethics Council, prior failure established a pattern of behavior that present efforts could not overcome in light of the enormity of the task.  For Norges Bank, on the other hand,  the combination of present efforts, including the involvement of third parties, dod not overcome the risk of failure--instead it overcame the risk that the risk was unacceptable. In a sense, legal norms when applied buy institutional actors are likely much more risk averse than societal norms applied by an enterprise entity (even one connected to the state). Risk aversion, then, bends the interpretive project of law-norms in ways that suggest that societal frameworks are willing to take greater risk than law based state institutions. 

With respect to the second, a greater willingness to operate in the face of risk suggests, for Norges Bank, the value of engagement.  The risk aversion of state-law institutions, on the other hand, suggest separation as the only legitimate course. The Norges Bank, then, would work with Hansae to ensure compliance with norms and operational objectives.  The Ethics Council would apply "the law" and leave Hansae to fend for itself.

Risk aversion, of course, is hardly ever the topic of the enterprise of business and human rights in any context.   And yet, it sits at the heart of decision making--and in the cultures of decision making--that define the operational cultures of business and of the state.  Approaches to risk also color the way in which institutional decision makers (and especially those with a regulatory role) tend to define the scope and character of their interactions with the objects of regulation.

The Ethics Council has constructed itself as risk averse, and with it, has adopted the customs and forms of risk aversion: legalism, formalism, bright line rules, and especially a strict separation between its functions as regulator and judge, and the operational and managerial context in which enterprises operate. For them, there is only "the law" and compliance, strictly observed.  But there is no obligation to engage with the objects of judgement--there is only a determination of compliance or of non compliance--of separation or of investment.

The Norges Bank is constructing itself (ironically given that it is, after all a bank) is constructing itself as at least risk neutral, and with it, has adopted the customs and behaviors of risk neutrality: pragmatism, objectives based approaches, and engagement grounded on the intuition that management and control is more effective than distance and judgement. For them, there are only objectives (for the Bank to make money; for the enterprise compliance with investment rules) and a functional approach to compliance, with a somewhat more flexible time horizon.

In effect, Norges Banks takes a more responsibility based approach to the business of operationalizing business and human rights norms than would the Ethics Council, which appears increasingly to embrace the approach of norm-based duty to protect. But the same might also be true of state duty under the 1st Pillar of the UNGP in contradistinction to corporate responsibility under the 2nd Pillar.  The 1st Pillar, and the law-state framework, would judge and punish; the 2nd Pillar, and the enterprise, would engage and manage.  And that, perhaps, is the most important element of the difference in approaches--one judges and the other manages.  And the consequence of this distinction is important as well--judgment without management produces an idealized and pure world of principles that ignores the world and ultimately produces more injustice (at the operational level) than it prevents; management without principle produces unmoored pragmatism that compromises the fundamental ideals that produces the likelihood of subversion. And perhaps that is the greatest lesson of all--that the optimization of the system (like that of the UNGOP itself) requires a constant interplay (and sometimes friction) between autonomous Ethics Council and Bank. Principled pragmatism, of the sort suggested by John Ruggie in the construction of the UNGP, then require a balancing of law and norm, of enterprise and state, and of engagement and judgement (here¶¶ 70-81).



__________








To Norges Bank 5 May 2017

UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recommendation to exclude Hansae Yes24 Holdings Co Ltd and Hansae Co Ltd from the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG)



Summary


The Council on Ethics for the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) recommends that Hansae Yes24 Holdings Co Ltd (Hansae Yes24) and its subsidiary Hansae Co Ltd (Hansae) be excluded from the GPFG due to the working conditions at the latter’s textile factories.

Hansae has 11 subsidiaries, which produce textiles and clothing in five countries in Southeast Asia. Hansae Yes24 is Hansae’s largest shareholder and has a decisive influence over it. Both companies are listed on the stock exchange in South Korea.

Matters considered by the Council on Ethics

The Council on Ethics has considered whether there is an unacceptable risk that HansaeYes24 and Hansae contribute to or are themselves responsible for systematic violations of internationally recognised human rights and labour rights.

To qualify as systematic, the human rights violations must be substantial in scope - that they are numerous in quantity, that different types of rights are infringed or that abuses take place in many entities within the company. The Council takes the position that “systematic” requires an accumulation of such violations and not merely isolated incidents; in other words that they constitute a pattern of behaviour. Furthermore, in its capacity as employer, each company has an individual and direct responsibility for its workforce and for preventing their employees’ labour rights from being infringed at its own operations. The Council takes the position that, with respect to norm violations perpetrated within a company’s own operations, the threshold for what can be accepted must be lower than when a company contributes to norm violations perpetrated by a third party.

In its assessment of the risk of further human rights violations, the Council attaches importance to how a company has responded when norm violations have been uncovered, and what it has done to prevent their reoccurrence.

Scope of the Council’s investigations and its assessment

This recommendation is based largely on reports deriving from inspections of working conditions at Hansae Vietnam’s factories in the period October 2015 to October 2016, conducted by US organisations the Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC).

Numerous violations of statutory health and safety provisions were uncovered at Hansae Vietnam, including overwork leading to workers fainting at their sewing machines, restrictions on employees use of toilet facilities, as well as harassment, deficient fire safety precautions, forced overtime, illegal restrictions on sick leave, unfair dismissal, discrimination and a lack of freedom of association. These violations of ethical norms took place at several of Hansae Vietnam’s factories, and also seem to be occurring at Hansae’ subsidiary, Costec, in Myanmar.

Not all the violations can be characterised as human rights abuses and are not individually serious – but they are substantial in scope. They demonstrate that national laws are not being complied with, that measures are not implemented and that management makes little effort to verify and follow up that requirements relating to working conditions at the factories are met. The FLA found 81 violations of its guidelines, and has ordered Hansae Vietnam to implement around 250 measures via a “corrective action plan”. According to the FLA report, Hansae Vietnam has already carried out many measures, with more scheduled for implementation in 2017.

Violation of labour rights at Hansae’s operations has been pointed out over many years. Both individual customers and the Better Work Program regularly inspect the factories. For example, in several of its annual reports, Better Work has pointed out the lack of fire safety precautions and the lack of freedom of association. These conditions were nevertheless still observed by the WRC in 2016. The Council on Ethics concludes that, up to now, the company has not had a system in place to prevent, uncover and remedy violations of workers’ rights.

The Council has communicated with Hansae on several occasions in the past year, and has also met with the company. Hansae Vietnam is in the process of remedying many of the norm violations uncovered during the inspections in 2016, Following its meeting with the Council on Ethics in September, Hansae has disclosed that it has put in place new management at Hansae Vietnam. The company has engaged a US law firm with experience in the field of human rights to evaluate the company’s policies and initiatives, and to propose improvements to management systems and the implementation of best practices. The Council is also aware that Hansae has hired third-party expertise to help the company improve the dialogue between employees and factory management, and to provide training for Hansae Vietnam’s management staff.

The Council on Ethics has noted that the company is now endeavouring to improve working conditions at Hansae Vietnam. Nevertheless, the Council attaches considerable weight to the fact that labour rights violations at the company have been pointed out for many years, and that Hansae has also previously pledged to correct norm violations in its own operations, without this resulting in lasting improvements. The Council considers that Hansae must create the necessary framework for a permanent improvement in working conditions, not merely at its factories in Vietnam, but in all its production facilities. This requires a significant change in attitudes to labour rights in the Group, as well as a comprehensive system through which the Group communicates that norm violations are unacceptable. It must also take responsibility for identifying risks, uncovering violations, addressing non-conformances and introducing a management system in which non-compliance with statutory provisions and internal guidelines has tangible consequences. It is not enough to respond piecemeal to norm violations at the individual factory only after they have been pointed out, as Hansae has done to date.

Even though Hansae is now prepared to make changes at other subsidiaries and factories as well, it is not clear to the Council how or when this will take place. A change in corporate culture, leadership and organisation in areas that are not solely linked to profit will be demanding and will probably take a long time. In light of the fact that the company’s efforts to take a more systematic approach to labour rights seem to be in their infancy, that the scale of the norm violations at several of the company’s factories has been extensive and has persisted over a long period, and that the company has not previously proved itself capable of generating lasting improvements in working conditions, the Council on Ethics considers that there is still an unacceptable risk that Hansae will continue to be responsible for systematic violations of labour rights.

Table of contents

1 Introduction 1
1.1 Matters considered by the Council 
1 1.2 Sources 3
2 Working conditions at Hansae’s factories 3
2.1 Hansae Vietnam 3 
2.1.1 Occupational health and safety 5
2.1.2 Forced overtime 8
2.1.3 Wage deductions for lawful sick leave 9
2.1.4 Unfair dismissal 9
2.1.5 Discrimination 9
2.1.6 Complaints procedures 10
2.1.7 Freedom of association 10
2.2 Hansae in Myanmar – Costec International 11

3 Information from the company 12
3.1 The Council on Ethics’ contacts with the company 12
3.2 The company’s efforts to improve working conditions 12
3.3 The company’s efforts to reduce the risk of norm violations 15
4 The Council on Ethics’ assessment 16

5 Recommendation 19


1 Introduction

Following a number of serious accidents and reports of poor working conditions in certain countries’ textiles industries, the Council on Ethics has started to examine working conditions at textiles factories in countries where violations of labour rights are presumed to be particularly widespread. Hansae is one of the companies that has been scrutinised.

Hansae is a multinational company, with 11 subsidiaries producing textiles and clothing in five countries (Vietnam, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, Indonesia and Myanmar). Over 90 per cent of its output (around 300 million pieces of garments) are sold in the US market. The company employs more than 36,000 people.1

Hansae Yes24 owns 42 per cent of the shares in Hansae, and is the company’s largest shareholder. Together with the shareholdings belonging personally to the company’s senior executives, Hansae Yes24 has a controlling interest of 53.93 per cent.2 Both Hansae and Hansae Yes24 are listed on the stock exchange in South Korea.

As at 31 December 2016, the GPFG owned 1.29 per cent of the shares in Hansae (market value USD 11 million) and 1.52 per cent of the shares in Hansae Yes24, (market value USD 5.2 million).

1.1 Matters considered by the Council

The Council on Ethics has considered whether there is an unacceptable risk that HansaeYes24 and its subsidiary Hansae “contribute to or are responsible for serious or systematic human rights violations” as set out in the Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion from the Government Pension Fund Global (ethical guidelines).3 The Council’s assessment builds largely on the result of investigations into working conditions at Hansae’s factories in Vietnam.

This case relates to labour and human rights violations at the company’s own operations. In several respects, therefore, this assessment differs from recommendations that have resulted from the Council’s evaluation of companies’ contribution to the violation of ethical norms by third parties. In its capacity as employer, a company has a direct responsibility for its workforce and for preventing the violation of their employees’ labour rights.

The GPFG’s ethical guidelines state that a company may be excluded as a result of human rights violations that are either serious or systematic. The Council bases its assessment of what constitutes “serious or systematic” violations on internationally recognised conventions and authoritative interpretations thereof. A specific assessment must be made in each individual case to determine whether the human rights violations will qualify as serious or systematic.

Of particular relevance in this case are the labour rights encompassed by articles 23 and 24 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and set out in article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), whose provisions include the right to a fair wage, safe and healthy working conditions, the reasonable limitation of working hours, periodic holidays with pay and equal opportunities. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has elaborated on how article 7 should be interpreted, and has made it clear that health, safety and the environment are fundamental elements in the right to safe and healthy working conditions.4 Article 8 of the ICESCR encompasses the right to form trades unions and join the trades union of one’s choice, and the right to strike. In addition, the ILO’s core conventions lay down minimum standards for several areas of working life, including freedom of association5 and equal pay.6 Conventions covering occupational safety and health are also relevant.7

Although international human rights conventions bind states not companies, companies can be said to contribute to human rights violations. The Council on Ethics takes no position on the extent to which the state is responsible for any human rights violations that may occur. It is sufficient to establish that the company in question acts in a way that contributes to serious or systematic violation of internationally recognised human rights.8 This applies irrespective of whether the state in which the violations take place has signed the conventions against which the actions are assessed.

The Council has considered whether conditions at Hansae’s own factories must be deemed to constitute systematic human rights violations pursuant to the GPFG’s guidelines. The Council has previously taken the position that a small number of human rights violations may be sufficient for a company to be excluded from the GPFG if the abuses are of a serious nature. On the other hand, individual violations do not need to be as serious if the abuse is systematic.9

To qualify as systematic, the human rights violations must be substantial in scope. This could mean that they are numerous in quantity, that different types of rights are infringed or that abuses take place in many entities within the company. The Council takes the position that “systematic” requires an accumulation of such violations and not merely isolated incidents; in other words that they constitute a pattern of behaviour. In previous recommendations, the Council has attached importance to the existence of a “systematic and planned practice on the part of the company to operate at, or beyond, the boundaries of what are accepted standards for the working environment”.10

With regard to assessing the risk of new human rights violations occurring in a company’s own operations, the Council holds the view that previous norm violations could provide an indication of future patterns of behaviour. The Council attaches importance to how a company has responded when norm violations have been uncovered, and what it has done to prevent their reoccurrence. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights articulates an expectation that companies will respect human rights, prevent the risk of their abuse and take action to remedy any human rights violations that do occur.11 The company has a duty to comply with national legislation and norms even when these are not enforced by the authorities. It is expected that a company assess the actual and potential negative impacts that its operations have on those affected by them, and demonstrate that it has strategies and procedures in place that help to prevent human rights violations. Companies must also consider whether the measures implemented are effective, and make whatever changes are necessary to prevent violations happening again. The company must also publish details of what it is doing to prevent human rights violations in its own operations. The Council on Ethics takes the position that it is up to the company concerned to substantiate that it is working adequately to prevent human rights violations.

1.2 Sources

This recommendation rests on studies of the working conditions at Hansae Vietnam’s factories in the period October 2015 to October 2016 performed by US organisations the Fair Labor Association (FLA)12 and the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC).13 Information relating to working conditions at the company’s factories in Myanmar is based on information and reports provided by the WRC, among others.

The company has itself contributed a significant amount of information after it received a copy of the Council’s draft recommendation. This information includes policies, procedures and measures to prevent violations of workers’ rights. A meeting has also been held between representatives of the Council and Hansae Yes24, Hansae and Hansae Vietnam. At Hansae’s request, the Council has also communicated with consultants that the company has engaged to help it in the human rights area.

2 Working conditions at Hansae’s factories 2.1 Hansae Vietnam

More than half of Hansae’s textiles production takes place in Vietnam, where the company has three garment production facilities and one textile finishing plant. Established in 2001, Hansae Vietnam Co. Ltd. (Hansae Vietnam) is the company’s oldest production unit in Vietnam, and with a workforce of 10,000 it is also the largest.14 The facility comprises 12 separate factories, each with its own management, and is located in the Cu Chi Industrial Zone in Ho Chi Minh City.

Vietnam’s Labor Code of 2012 and associated statutory regulations,15 including the Labor Hygiene Standards of 2012,16 regulate working conditions and labour rights in accordance with international conventions. The law contains detailed provisions on an employer’s obligations with respect to its workforce, including those relating to occupational health, safety and environment (HSE).

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) have established Better Work programmes which, through measures such as inspections and training, are intended to improve working conditions and competitiveness in the textiles industry.17 Hansae Vietnam has been evaluated by Better Work since 2009.18

Furthermore, Hansae’s customers also inspect working conditions at the factories which produce textiles for them. According to information provided by Hansae, 26 such inspections were carried out at Hansae Vietnam in 2015, without any serious non-conformances with the customers’ ethical guidelines being identified.19

Investigations performed by the Worker Rights Consortium and the Fair Labor Association

The FLA and WRC investigate working conditions following complaints submitted by third parties. In both cases, the complaints against Hansae came from universities in the USA. The WRC launched its investigation into Hansae Vietnam in October 2015, during a period of strike action at the factory which is supposed to have been motivated by working conditions. At that time, the WRC was not given access to the factory, but carried out interviews with employees outside the factory premises. The investigation’s findings indicated many violations of workers’ rights. The report was published in May 2016.20 In parallel with this, early in 2016, the FLA started investigating the reasons for the strikes at the factory. The FLA’s investigation was based on interviews with factory managers and workers, both on site and off site, and a review of documents. The report was published in June 2016 and concluded that the strikes were due partly to misunderstandings and poor communication between workers and line managers/executives, and partly to working conditions at the factory, including extremely high production quotas, the lack of effective complaints procedures and inadequate fire safety precautions.21 The findings of the two investigations largely concurred.

In July 2016, the FLA inspected the entire facility to assess working conditions against the organisation’s own guidelines.22 The FLA and the WRC then performed a further joint inspection in October 2016. The WRC interviewed 41 current and former Hansae employees both off site and on site, and performed a thorough occupational health and safety (OHS) inspection of the factories with the help of technical experts. The FLA examined the extent to which the company had made improvements following the inspection in July. Both reports were published in December 2016, and covered the findings from May to October.23 The reports substantiate each other and document widespread violations of national labour legislation, international norms and the FLA and the US universities’ own code of conduct, with which Hansae has pledged to abide under the terms of its contracts with buyers.

The investigations into working conditions at Hansae Vietnam uncovered violations of statutory OHS provisions, including high temperatures in the premises, overwork leading to workers fainting at their sewing machines, harassment, forced overtime, illegal restrictions on sick leave, unfair dismissal, discrimination, inadequate complaints procedures, a lack of freedom of association, restrictions on employees’ use of toilet facilities and certain line managers’ illegal demands for kickbacks from job seekers in return for employment.

The FLA found 81 violations of its code of conduct. Not all the violations can be characterised as human rights abuses. However, they demonstrate that national laws are not being complied with, that measures are not implemented and that management makes little effort to verify and follow up that requirements relating to working conditions at its factories are actually met. All in all, the company has been ordered to implement around 250 measures through a corrective action plan. According to the FLA report, Hansae Vietnam has already carried out many measures, with more scheduled for implementation in 2017.

2.1.1 Occupational health and safety

The right to a safe and healthy working environment is laid down in international norms and Vietnamese law, and clearly spelled out by the CESCR:

“Preventing occupational accidents and disease is a fundamental aspect of the right to just and favourable conditions of work, and is closely related to other Covenant rights, in particular the right to the highest attainable level of physical and mental health”.24

The committee also states that freedom from harassment is part of a safe and healthy working environment.

High production quotas, exhaustion and fainting

In the investigations undertaken in May 2016, workers spoke about unreasonably high production quotas, a lack of breaks and high temperatures in the factory premises.25 Employees at eight factories testified that workers often fainted in the workplace. In some of the buildings, this was a daily occurrence in the hot season. In one of the factory buildings, workers brought their own fans to keep cool. More than half of the workers interviewed reported having either fainted themselves or seen others do so, or said that it was general knowledge that workers fainted during the working day. Employees linked the fainting episodes to a combination of factors, including:

 Overtime working due to unreasonably high production quotas based on what the most proficient workers can manage under optimal conditions, including overtime. The company’s practice has also been to increase production targets even further for employees who do meet their quotas.

 A lack of rest breaks. Many employees reported working through their lunch breaks and beverage breaks to avoid losing work time. Some managers have also restricted the employees’ bathroom breaks or prevented them from using the toilet facilities other than at times determined by management.

 Harassment and disciplinary measures against employees who work too slowly.

 High temperatures in several of the factory buildings.

Harassment

Workplace harassment is prohibited under Vietnamese law.26 Nor is it legal to unfairly terminate a worker’s employment contract, e.g. on the grounds of a dispute with management or failure to meet production quotas.27

Workers at Hansae reported widespread harassment from supervisory staff at the factory. Verbal abuse is particularly common, though there have also been reports of individual instances of physical violence against employees. Both the FLA and the WRC write about a worker in one of the factories who was first physically abused by a supervisor and then fired illegally. The factory subsequently attempted to cover this up by means of fabricated salary payments.28 Workers report that line managers shout insults at them when they visit the toilet, when they work too slowly or make a mistake, when they ask for time off or refuse to work overtime. Workers are also threatened with dismissal if they fail to meet their production quotas or obey their supervisors.

High temperatures in the factory buildings

The authorities in Vietnam require that, in the hot season, the indoor temperature does not exceed 34 degrees Celsius for light work, 32 degrees for normal work and 30 degrees for heavy work.29 Better Work has set 32 degrees Celsius as the maximum temperature in the textiles industry.30

The inspection undertaken in October, a cool month, measured an average temperature in the seven factory buildings of 30-35 degrees Celsius, with four exceeding 32 degrees. The inspection also showed that the cooling systems installed in some of the buildings had little effect. The FLA report states that “ The temperature is too high during the summer months to work in the factories that do not have a ventilation system (Factories 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, and Mini)”.

The company has shared its own temperature measurements with the Council. The measurements apply to four buildings and date from June 2016, which is normally a hot month. The results show that none of the measuring points exceeded 34 degrees Celsius. Since neither the outdoor temperature nor the method of measurement has been disclosed, it is not possible to assess these results.31 The WRC concludes that “temperature levels in many of Hansae’s facilities, during a large part of the year, even with evaporative cooling systems will violate the relevant legal maximum and, as a result, contribute to incidents of physical collapse among Hansae workers”.32

Other violations of HSE requirements

In total, the October inspection at Hansae Vietnam uncovered 41 regulatory infractions.33

The inspections uncovered a large number of infractions relating to fire safety, including locked exit doors, blocked corridors, missing fire extinguishers, poor handling of flammable chemicals, inadequately signposted escape routes and inadequate evacuation plans. According to management at one of the factories, the prevention of pilfering was as important as the employees’ safety, and locked doors were necessary to prevent workers from leaving the building without permission. Poor fire safety standards have been pointed out repeatedly in Better Work’s inspections – most recently in 2015.

It was also pointed out that the company does not investigate the causes of work-related accidents and illnesses. A review of 10 randomly chosen work-related accidents between November 2015 and August 2016, where workers were transferred to hospital for treatment, after being given first-aid at the factory infirmary, showed that the conclusion in each case was that it had been caused by errors or carelessness on the part of the worker. The injuries included electrocution resulting in a fall and head injuries, broken fingers and cuts. In connection with these accidents, no evaluation of the equipment or work routines was performed. The corrective response was worker retraining and frequent reminders that employees must work safely. All the post-accident investigations were carried out by managers and supervisors at the factory concerned.34

According to the FLA, Hansae Vietnam’s HSE policy dates from January 2016, but the company lacks procedures for how it should be followed up in-house. No one at management level is specifically responsible for HSE at the individual factory, although there are two HSE employees at head office.35 However, these individuals do not engage in practical HSE supervision at the factories.

“They do not participate in periodic walk-around safety inspections of the 12 manufacturing plants – these are conducted by members of Hansae’s compliance department who lack any safety and health training. They also do not investigate accidents or illness incidents, nor do they measure employees’ exposure to airborne contaminants, such as the chemical solvents used in the cleaning/spot-removing rooms. The safety staff also do not interact with other company personnel whose duties also relate to health and safety, such as the staff of the factory’s health clinic or Hansae’s compliance department. They are not members and do not participate in meetings of the facility’s 27- member health and safety committee.”36

The FLA assesses the company’s HSE efforts thus:
“There is an overall lack of monitoring and governance of the Health, Safety & Environment System. The factory [Hansae Vietnam] lacks the manpower and resources to properly monitor the implementation of the Health, Safety & Environment policies and procedures.”
It also says: “The factory has not properly conducted a risk assessment to identify the risks and hazards in the factory and establish the necessary Health & Safety policies and procedures.”37

2.1.2 Forced overtime

Entitlement to rest, leisure time and a reasonable limit on working hours is laid down in article 7(d) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This is further set out in a number of ILO conventions,38 including ILO Convention 1, which establishes the principle of an eight-hour working day and a 48-hour working week as the maximum total working hours. Working hours are similarly regulated in Vietnamese labour law. However, this caps permitted overtime at 300 hours per year, 30 hours per month and 12 hours per week. 39 Pursuant to Vietnam’s labour law, all overtime must be voluntary.

Hansae has admitted that many of its employees have previously worked more than 300 hours’ overtime per year. This is also stated in Better Work’s reports. Some workers claimed that the company has tried to circumvent the statutory ceiling by asking workers to clock out at the normal time but continue to work for a further two hours. Workers are supposed to have received cash payments for these hours, which were not recorded. It is uncertain how widespread this practice is.40 The company itself asserts that it carefully monitors the use of overtime and complies with the statutory requirements.

Hansae Vietnam’s voluntary overtime policy dates from May 2016. In the opinion of the FLA, however, there is no congruence between the policy and the factories’ actual practice, because workers must sign a consent form stating that they have voluntarily chosen to work overtime. Any employee not wishing to work overtime must explain why and obtain a supervisor’s permission.41 A request to avoid working overtime is often met with verbal abuse on the part of management.42 Unauthorised refusal to work overtime leads to a written warning and, in some cases, dismissal.

According to the investigations carried out, unregistered and unpaid working has been common. Until recently, it was required that employees were present 15 minutes before the start of the working day. This practice had been going on for several years. Over the course of a year, the unregistered time accumulates to approx. 1.5 weeks’ unpaid work.43 At six of the factories, employees worked through their lunch and dinner breaks to meet their production quotas, without this being recorded or compensated.44

The FLA maintains that the company lacks mechanisms to monitor and manage how the overtime requirements are implemented.45

2.1.3 Wage deductions for lawful sick leave

Vietnamese law entitles employees to take sick leave if they have a doctor’s certificate.46 Employees interviewed in May 2016 claimed that the company made it difficult for them to take the sick leave to which they were entitled. Sometimes, managers simply refused to grant them sick leave at all; sometimes, managers overrode the doctor’s certificate and granted only some of the days that they were supposed to take off sick.

According to the employees interviewed, the entire monthly attendance bonus (VND 250,000 (USD 11.22)) would be withdrawn in the event of one or more days of lawful sickness absence. This corresponds to two days’ wages, and was perceived by workers to be punishment for being off sick.47

2.1.4 Unfair dismissal

Vietnam’s labour law does not permit unfair dismissal, and employers are entitled to fire workers only if they have breached the terms of their employment contract.48

At Hansae, it has been usual for managers who wish to get rid of an employee, for whatever reason, to ask the person to leave voluntarily rather than justify their termination of employment. Documents also show that, in some cases, the company has forged an employee’s timesheets to give the impression that they have left voluntarily and that they have worked out their notice, while – in fact – the person was fired with immediate effect.49

The review also indicated that managers did this when there were insufficient grounds for termination in accordance with the company’s own regulations or the employee’s employment contract, for example when an employee brought their own needles to work, was in conflict with a manager or did not meet their production quota.50

2.1.5 Discrimination

The UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contain explicit provisions (in articles 2 and 3) prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of gender, birth or status, etc. The ban on discrimination against women is set out in further detail in the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. ILO Convention 100 on equal pay for men and women establishes the same principle. Under Vietnamese law, it is prohibited to terminate a woman’s employment on the grounds of pregnancy.51

According to the workers at Hansae, it has been common practice not to renew the contracts of women workers when they become pregnant. This applies in particular to workers on short- term contracts. At the same time, this seems to have been practised slightly differently at the various factory buildings.52 In the FLA’s assessment, this practice is the result of company management’s lack of interest in promoting an equal-opportunities working environment.53

2.1.6 Complaints procedures

Access to effective complaints procedures is one of the cornerstones of the UN’s guidelines for responsible business practice. Employees must be able to raise issues relating to working conditions, so that measures may be implemented to remedy any harm or abuse that has occurred.

Hansae Vietnam has a scheme whereby employees can submit complaints by means of, among other things, suggestion boxes that are located in the factories. According to the FLA, employees have no faith that they will not be met with reprisals if they complain, since complaints cannot be submitted anonymously. They must include the complainant’s name and ID number. Furthermore, the suggestion boxes are located in the production premises, in full view of everyone. The FLA points out that no one at the company is responsible for the complaints procedure or for dealing with complaints.

2.1.7 Freedom of association

Freedom of association is laid down in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in addition to ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (one of the ILO’s core conventions) and in the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.

According to Vietnamese law, all trades unions in the country must be affiliated to the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour (VGCL), which sorts under the Communist Party of Vietnam.54 Free and independent trades unions are therefore not permitted. Nevertheless, the law does not preclude employees from nominating and electing trades union representatives.

At Hansae Vietnam, two managers in the HR department were the leader and the deputy leader of the union. Other managers at the factory also held positions in the union, and made up over half of the union’s executive board. The rest of the board comprised employees in the HR department and other head office staff.55 The FLA writes: “There is no proof that the workers voted democratically on the Labor Union representative nominees or subsequently the Labor Union representatives.”56

Hansae Vietnam has been a member of and been inspected by Better Work since 2009. Management’s encroachment on trades union activity at the company has been pointed out in every single report from 2009 to 2015.57

2.2 Hansae in Myanmar – Costec International

Hansae owns two production companies in Myanmar: Myanmar Ayeyarwaddy MFG Co, Ltd and Costec International Co, Ltd (Costec), which Hansae purchased in 2013 and 2014 respectively. The companies produce textiles and clothing, and employ 900 and 700 employees respectively.

In June and July 2016, the WRC undertook interviews with a small selection of current and former Costec employees.58 The survey indicates violations of labour rights and national legislation relating to freedom of association, working hours, wages, harassment and OHS.

In January and February 2015, before the introduction of the minimum wage in Myanmar, employees at several textiles factories, including Costec, went on strike in support of higher pay. The strike at Costec lasted a month. Government authorities and employers cracked down hard on the striking workers,59 and many, including 14 Costec employees, were arrested and sentenced to prison. When the dispute ended, those who had gone on strike were refused further work at the factory. This applied to 158 people, who have still not been readmitted to the workforce. The case was heard at various levels of the judicial system in Myanmar, and Costec’s right to blacklist the workers was eventually upheld. 60

In Myanmar, the law caps the number of working hours at 10 hours per day (including breaks) and 60 hours per week. According to the workers, in the past year, the normal working day has lasted 12.5 hours, corresponding to a 75-hour week. The company is said to have reduced the workers’ lunch breaks from 40 minutes to 30 minutes. It was claimed that many workers have had further cut their breaks to 20 minutes in order to meet their high production quotas. In the course of the past year, the company is said to have introduced a 20-minute break after the ordinary shift and before the start of overtime. At the same time, according to the same interviewees, the company has demanded that those workers who make use of the break must work 20 minutes longer after their ordinary working hours. The workers said that they are not compensated for overtime in their breaks.

According to the workers interviewed, forced overtime is, in practice, imposed at the factory. Any exemption from overtime must be applied for, and requires the signature of five specific managers and head office staff. In practice, this is extremely difficult to obtain.

The country’s labour law entitles workers to six days’ paid welfare leave per year. Costec employees who make use of this entitlement report that their wages are docked for the period in which they are away from work. In connection with sick leave, the company also seems to require that any medical certificate be issued by a state-run hospital, and does not accept medical certificates issued by a doctor in general practice. If true, this would be illegal.

At Costec, too, workers report being verbally abused and insulted, as well as physically assaulted.61 The company is said to have installed CCTV surveillance cameras near the toilet facilities, which require a special key card to access (the factory has 2-3 key cards for 100 employees). Visits to the toilet without a key card are punished by the loss of a half-day’s pay. Workers also report a periodic lack of clean drinking water and high temperatures in the factory. The premises are said to be without ventilation/cooling equipment.

3 Information from the company
3.1 The Council on Ethics’ contacts with the company

The Council contacted Hansae for the first time in June 2015 to request information about working conditions at the company’s factories in Vietnam. Hansae did not reply to this request, nor did Hansae wish to grant access for an inspection of the factories in Vietnam.

Hansae responded to a draft recommendation that the Council sent to the company in June 2016. The draft was based on investigations carried out in May of that year. The subsequent FLA and WRC investigations from July and October 2016 had not yet been published. The draft recommendation addressed largely the same issues as this recommendation, although certain of the conditions, including those relating to OHS, were not as well documented. Since then, the Council has been in contact with the company up to and including February 2017. The company has provided details of Hansae Vietnam’s policies, initiatives and activities relating to working conditions at the factories, and has shared Better Work’s inspection reports from 2009 and 2011-2015.

In September 2016, the Council also held a meeting with Hansae in Oslo, Norway, at which management systems and procedures, among other topics, were discussed.

Only later did the Council receive information on working conditions at Costec in Myanmar. This information was sent to Hansae in January 2017, and the company has commented on it, as described below.

3.2 The company’s efforts to improve working conditions

In its reply to the draft recommendation, Hansae writes that it has focused on promoting human rights in the workplace since the company was established. The company has therefore implemented many measures to uphold and improve the workers’ rights and welfare.

Hansae has its own guidelines which, according to the company, comply with buyers’ requirements and national legislation. Among other things, they include a ban on discrimination and forced labour, and address wages and working hours, the working environment (including a ban on any form of harassment) and freedom of association. Both the inspection reports from the FLA and WRC, and Hansae’s communications with the Council describe the measures Hansae Vietnam will implement to improve working conditions.

High production quotas, exhaustion and fainting

With respect to fainting, the company writes: “The company can state with confidence that fainting is not a regular occurrence at any of its factories in Vietnam... In order to guarantee a safe and healthy working environment, the Company has continuously maintained internal standards that were higher than what was mandated by law.” And furthermore: “We are indeed aware of cases where employees have fainted while working in the factory. However, based on experience and health examinations conducted on such individuals, fainting may be due to several reasons (at least, not solely attributable to inhumane working conditions).”62

The company has an infirmary with medical staff, where patient visits are recorded. At its meeting with the Council, Hansae confirmed that fainting episodes are not recorded as a separate category in the log. The company therefore has no overview of how many people have fainted during working hours.63 One of the measures being taken after the inspection is that the company will now ensure correct registration. According to employees interviewed, those who faint are allowed around half an hour’s rest at the infirmary before they must return to work. The Council raised this with Hansae, which stated that it was voluntary for the individual to return to work, and that the workers themselves generally wished to do so.

At its meeting with the Council, the company disclosed that it plans to revise the system for calculating production quotas, which will not be based on the use of overtime and will take account of rest periods. Such a system will be piloted at one of the factory buildings in 2017 and implemented in the other buildings in 2018. Hansae has disclosed that the company has reduced its production quotas following the investigations in May. However, according to workers who were interviewed in October, this seems to vary between the factory buildings. Some workers reported that the quotas have actually been reduced, that breaks are kept and that there is less harassment. Quotas applicable to others are unchanged, while some have even reported that they have been told that their quotas will be increased. In general, it seems as though the number of fainting episodes has fallen. It is not certain whether this is due to the measures taken by the company or to cooler weather.

Harassment

In 2016, Hansae collaborated with Better Work with respect to training and communication in the workplace, and has held meetings with managers at the factories to ensure that internal guidelines are followed up. According to the WRC, it seems as though the level of harassment has been reduced since the inspections in 2016. The company has made it clear that such behaviour, including the verbal abuse of employees, is not accepted. Moreover, the company has said that it will provide better training for supervisory staff and improve complaints procedures.

High temperatures

In connection with the inspections, Hansae Vietnam has said that it will install cooling systems at all its factory buildings that do not have air conditioning, and will also consider other opportunities to reduce the indoor temperature.

Fire safety

With respect to fire safety, the company says: “Along with the welfare of its employees, the Company considers the safety of its employees a top priority.” Following the inspections in July and October 2016, Hansae has improved certain conditions and says that it will continue to improve fire safety standards.64

Forced overtime

The company confirms that employees must give written consent to working overtime. According to Hansae, the company has never forced anyone to work overtime, and expressed surprise at the survey’s findings. Hansae has changed its practice, such that employees no longer need to justify why they do not wish to work overtime. The work no longer takes place during breaks (the machines are powered down during the lunch break), and all working hours are recorded and compensated.

However, according to the WRC, the company has not compensated workers for unpaid and unrecorded work performed over a long period.65

Wage deductions for lawful sickness absence

With respect to sick leave, the company states that this is regulated by its internal guidelines, which comply with the law in Vietnam. The company is unaware of any cases where employees have lost bonuses as a result of sick leave. “The Company believes that this practice most likely occurred in only isolated instances [ ] and is not a widespread practice amongst all of the factories.” The inspection in October shows that these conditions have improved. Nevertheless, it remains difficult for employees to get sick leave approved because the doctor’s certificate must be handed in on the morning of the same day that the period of sick leave commences.

Unfair dismissal

Hansae has responded that the company has changed its procedures such that all disciplinary cases are now evaluated in meetings between the manager, union, witnesses and the employee concerned.

Discrimination

Hansae permits no discrimination and, according to the company’s policy, aims to: “create an equal and favorable work environment in which all employees in the Company are treated respectfully and are ensured legitimate rights.” Hansae claims that the reason pregnant workers did not have their contracts renewed was that they were not considered skilled enough. The company says that many pregnant women have had their contracts renewed, and that it plans to implement better training and communication with employees to make it clear that discrimination is not accepted.

Freedom of association

According to the WRC, the leader of the trades union has now moved to a new position as an HR consultant, while the deputy leader has resigned from his position in the union. The company has accepted that incumbents of management positions should not stand for election to union office.

It is not clear to the Council whether this has actually been implemented. As far as the Council is aware, the election of the trades union leader in the spring of 2017 was carried out by secret ballot. However, there was only one name on the ballot paper, which the employees could vote yes or no to. This person was the former leader of the union and not nominated by the employees.

Costec, Myanmar

With respect to working conditions at Costec, Hansae repeats that it is “committed to operating in accordance with applicable legal requirements and the standards of our customers. In addition, the Hansae Code of Conduct states that our factories should ‘respect the human dignity of the employees’ and ‘provide the utmost working environment’ in a manner that is compliant with all ‘rules, regulations, and standards related to working conditions’.” The company also writes that, in response to the Council’s queries, it has looked into working conditions at the factory with the help of an external law firm from South Korea, which has reviewed documents at the factory and interviewed factory management, among other things. Hansae admits that in some areas, such as forced overtime and a lack of breaks, working conditions at the factory were not up to standard. Since 20 February this year, the company has altered its procedures to avoid forced overtime and will also change the length of the breaks to a minimum of 30 minutes in order to comply with regulatory requirements.

With respect to the strike, the company takes the position that it had no legal obligation to readmit the 158 workers. In this connection, the Council notes that at the meeting in September, Hansae said that the company had been in conflict with trades union representatives, but that the conflict had resolved itself when they voluntarily handed in their notice.

In all other respects, the company maintains that it acts within the law, and that its own investigations have not revealed problems corresponding to those described in the interviews with employees and reported in Section 2.2.

3.3 The company’s efforts to reduce the risk of norm violations

At its meeting with the Council on Ethics, Hansae described the procedures and routines it has established to ensure that working conditions at its factories comply with internal guidelines. The company has a Compliance department at head office, as well as regional teams. The department deals with buyers and works to document and follow up inspections through corrective action plans. Among other things, the regional teams carry out self-audits and assist the factory with the correction of non-conformances and training. Hansae stated that it performs monthly self-audits, the results of which are evaluated and improvements measured. Hansae also described the method it uses to reduce the number of non-compliances (assessment tool for recurrence prevention). In short, this involves identifying the problem, observing current practice, comparing current practice with applicable standards and implementing changes. Furthermore, factory management is engaged in an evaluation process that involves training, subsequent assessment of practice, development of action plans and measurement of progress.

Following the meeting in September, Hansae has disclosed that it has installed new management at Hansae Vietnam. The company has also engaged a local firm of consultants to undertake quarterly inspections of the factory. Furthermore, the company has hired a US law firm with experience in the human rights area to evaluate the company’s policies and measures, and propose improvements to management systems and the implementation of best practices. The project is primarily aimed at Hansae Vietnam, but Hansae writes that the company will in future also work with the law firm to address working conditions at its other factories.

The Council received a copy of the consultants’ report in March 2017. Its assessment is based on the working conditions and norm violations that were uncovered by the FLA and WRC’s investigations in 2016. Among other things, it examines the extent to which Hansae’s management systems are capable of limiting or preventing similar norm violations in the future. The consultants make recommendations on what Hansae Vietnam and Hansae should do to ensure that working conditions at the factories comply with national legislation, buyers’ requirements and internationally recognised labour rights standards. The report points to the importance of a corporate culture that is based not only on compliance with buyers’ requirements, but where managers at all levels of the organisation are motivated to respect workers’ rights. Furthermore, the report underlines the importance of having an overarching human rights policy, of performing risk assessments as a foundation for preventing norm violations and the systematic implementation of the company’s policies at the factories themselves.

The Council is also aware that Hansae has recently hired in expertise to help the company improve the dialogue between employees and factory managers, and to provide training for management personnel at Hansae Vietnam.

4 The Council on Ethics’ assessment

The Council on Ethics has considered whether there is an unacceptable risk that Hansae Yes24 and Hansae contribute to or are themselves responsible for systematic violations of internationally recognised human rights and labour rights norms in connection with their production of textiles and clothing. The Council’s scrutiny has been directed principally at Hansae’s textiles factory in Vietnam.

Hansae is the direct owner of the factories in Vietnam. The holding company Hansae Yes24 is, along with members of company management, the controlling owner of Hansae. This was confirmed at a meeting with the Council. The Council upholds its practice from previous recommendations and takes the position that if a subsidiary is excluded on the grounds that the GPFG’s ethical guidelines have been contravened, the parent company must also be excluded if it has a decisive influence over the subsidiary’s operations.

In other cases involving violation of the human rights criterion, the Council has considered companies’ contribution to norm violations perpetrated by third parties. The starting point for this case is that Hansae, as the employer, is itself responsible for any norm violations that occur at its factories. The Council takes the position that, with respect to norm violations perpetrated within a company’s own operations, the threshold for what can be accepted must be lower than when a company contributes to norm violations perpetrated by a third party.

The norm violations at Hansae Vietnam’s factories are well documented through investigations carried out in 2015 and 2016. The violations of labour rights are not individually serious, but they are extensive. The Council finds it substantiated that the working environment at the company’s factories has been harmful to workers’ health. Overwork, driven by unreasonably high production quotas, a lack of rest, high temperatures and harassment from supervisors seem to have been a widespread problem at Hansae Vietnam. Although fainting has not been uncommon at the factories, the company has neither recorded the incidents nor investigated their cause. The Council has also noted violations of fire safety provisions, that legitimate periods of sick leave have been penalised by loss of wages or cut short by management dictate, and that the company has – in practice – forced employees to work overtime. Frequent and repeated threats of dismissal if production quotas are not met, restrictions on bathroom breaks, verbal abuse and other harassment which certain managers at the factory have practised, are all clear violations of the right to safe and healthy working conditions. The Council notes that the violations also seem to contravene national labour laws, whose purpose is precisely to ensure good working conditions at the textiles factories.

Other norm violations relate to discrimination and restrictions on freedom of association. Workers have been fired or have not had their contracts renewed due to pregnancy. Even though freedom of association is limited in Vietnam, Hansae curtails it even further by having the union run by managers and administrative personnel. The right to form a trades union and to organise is considered a precondition for improving working conditions, conducting collective bargaining negotiations and for preventing the violation of other labour rights.

Violations of labour rights at Hansae have been pointed out over many years. As far back as the early 2000s, violations of labour rights at a subsidiary in Saipan were cited in a lawsuit filed in a US court. “Workers are typically required to meet a high quota or may not be paid for the full hours worked in a day. Workers may be forced to work overtime to meet that quota. [ ] Employees have also been required to provide "volunteer time" to the

factory. Hansae is a contractor with defendants Dayton, J.C. Penney, Sears, GAP and Limited.” 66

Following a comprehensive assessment, the Council finds it well documented that the company’s practices in many areas contravene internationally recognised labour rights and national legislation. Norm violations have been numerous in quantity, different types of rights have been infringed, and the violations seem to have continued over a long period of time. It also seems as though the norm violations are taking place at several of the company’s entities – in many of Hansae Vietnam’s factories and at Costec in Myanmar. In the Council’s opinion, this constitutes a pattern of behaviour indicating that the norm violations are systematic.

The Council attaches importance to the fact that Hansae previously seems, only to a limited extent, to have implemented measures leading to lasting improvements in working conditions at its factories. Despite the fact that Hansae has regularly been inspected by customers and Better Work, corresponding to an average of one inspection every second week in 2015, numerous norm violations are still being found at the company. For example, in several of its annual reports, Better Work has pointed out inadequate fire safety and restrictions on freedom of association. These same issues were nevertheless still observed by the WRC in 2016.

The Council has noted that the company has painted a groundlessly positive picture of working conditions by, for example, giving the impression that workers have themselves chosen to work overtime or given their notice voluntarily, while in reality they have been unfairly dismissed.

The company claims that it performs regular internal controls and assessments to prevent repeated norm violations, but has apparently failed to discover that neither statutory regulations nor its own guidelines are being complied with. Nor has the company established any system for following up workplace injuries or other work-related incidents, and has therefore a limited potential to learn from them. The Council concludes that the company has so far had no system to prevent, uncover or remedy violations of labour rights within its operations.

Following the investigations in 2016, Hansae has installed new management at Hansae Vietnam and has given notice of a number of measures to remedy the human rights violations that the WRC and FLA have uncovered. Hansae has also made minor changes at Costec. However, the Council on Ethics takes into account that Hansae also previously has pledged to implement directives resulting from inspections without this having led to lasting improvements. The Council also attaches importance to the fact that some conditions do not seem to have been remedied, such as compensation for unpaid overtime. Furthermore, the changes that the company has implemented with respect to the election of trades union representatives make very little difference in practice. As long as there does not seem to be any real dialogue between workers and management, the Council cannot be confident that the measures Hansae has announced will have any lasting effect. This also applies to the company’s factory in Myanmar.

The Council considers that systematic human rights violations in a company’s own operations do not occur by accident, but are often a consequence of the way the company organises its business. Almost without exception, it seems as though the purpose of the many different violations and restrictions on workers’ statutory rights is to cut operating costs. In previous recommendations, the Council has attached importance to the existence of a “systematic and planned practice on the part of the company to operate at, or beyond, the boundaries of what are accepted standards for the working environment”.67 The norm violations found at Hansae are of such a scale and such a nature as to appear to the Council to constitute a planned practice.

The Council on Ethics takes the position that in areas where there is a high risk of human rights violations, companies must work systematically to prevent such abuses, as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The Council considers that Hansae must create the preconditions for a permanent improvement in working conditions, not just in Vietnam, but in all the company’s factories. This requires a significant change in attitudes to workers’ rights within the Group, and a comprehensive system through which the Group communicates that norm violations are unacceptable. It must also take responsibility for identifying risks, uncovering violations, addressing non-conformances and introducing a management system in which non-compliance with statutory provisions and internal guidelines has consequences. It is not sufficient to respond piecemeal and reactively to norm violations at the individual factory as and when they are pointed out, as Hansae has done to date.

Hansae has 11 subsidiaries, 12 factories and 36,000 employees in countries where the risk of human rights violations is known to be high. In the Council on Ethics’ dialogue with Hansae’s consultant on human rights, it was implied that Hansae is now prepared to make changes that will also have an impact in other factories belonging to the company. However, the Council gained no clear picture of how or when this will happen.

The Council has received no information indicating that the company has pledged to implement a wide-ranging, long-term process which could lead to a system capable of preventing human rights violations within the company. A change in corporate culture, leadership and organisation in areas that are not solely linked to profit will be demanding and will probably take a long time. In light of the fact that the company’s efforts to take a more systematic approach to labour rights seem to be in their infancy, that the norm violations at several of the company’s factories have been extensive and have gone on for a long time, and that the company has not previously proved itself capable of generating lasting improvements in working conditions, the Council on Ethics considers that there is still an unacceptable risk that Hansae will continue to be responsible for systematic violations of labour rights.

5 Recommendation

The Council on Ethics recommends that Hansae Yes24 Holdings Co Ltd and its subsidiary Hansae Co Ltd be excluded from the GPFG due to the unacceptable risk that the companies are responsible for systematic human rights violations.



***

Johan H. Andresen Hans Chr. Bugge Cecilie Hellestveit Chair

(sign.) (sign.) (sign.)


Arthur Sletteberg (sign.)


Guro Slettemark (sign.)




NOTES




1 Hansae’s homepage: https://www.hansae.com/en/index.asp
2 Bloomberg
3 Guidelines for Observation and Exclusion from the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), https://lovdata.no/dokument/INS/forskrift/2014-12-18-1793?q=retningslinjer+++pensjonsfond+++utland.
4 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is an independent committee of experts, which monitors states’ implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/CESCRIntro.aspx. In April 2016, the committee published “General comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work (article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)”, in which it elaborated in more detail how article 7 should be interpreted, see https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/087/51/PDF/G1608751.pdf?OpenElement
5 ILO Conventions 87 and 98.
6 ILO Conventions 100 and 111.
7 Inter alia, ILO Convention 155 on Occupational Safety and Health.
8 This is discussed in more detail in the Council on Ethics’ recommendation to exclude Wal-Mart Stores Inc, section 3.2, 15 November 2005, and the recommendation to exclude Monsanto Co, section 5.1, 20 November 2006.
9 Council on Ethics recommendation to exclude Total SA, section 3.1
10 Council on Ethics recommendation to exclude Wal-Mart Stores Inc, p. 21.
11 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
12 Fair Labor Association is a collaboration between universities, voluntary organisations and brands to improve working conditions at textiles factories, among others, see http://www.fairlabor.org/.
13 Worker Rights Consortium is an independent organisation that investigates working conditions at textiles factories worldwide, see http://www.workersrights.org/.
14 Hansae Fashion Worldwide, “Overseas Facilities: Vietnam,” https://www.hansae.com/ko/overseas/vietnam.asp.
15 Labor Code of June 18, 2012, Law 10-2012-QH13 (“Labor Code”), for the English translation, see
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/MONOGRAPH/91650/114939/F224084256/VNM91650.pdf.
16 Ministry of Health, Labour Hygiene Standards (Oct. 10, 2012).
17 More information about the programmes can be found at http://betterwork.org.
18 Hansae’s letter to the Council on Ethics, 5 August 2016.
19 See footnote 18.
20 Worker Rights Consortium Assessment of Hansae Vietnam Co., Ltd May 6, 2016,
http://workersrights.org/Freports/WRC%20Assessment%20re%20Hansae%20Vietnam%205.6.2016.pdf
21 Global Standards, Independent Investigation at Hansae Vietnam for FLA, 9 May 2016, http://www.fairlabor.org/report/hansae-vietnam.
22 FLA Code of Conduct, http://www.fairlabor.org/our-work/labor-standards.
23 Worker Rights Consortium Factory Assessment Hansae Vietnam Co., Ltd. Vietnam) Findings, Recommendations, Status Update December 6, 2016, http://www.workersrights.org/freports/WRC%20Assessment%20re%20Hansae%20Vietnam%2012.6.16.pdf and Fair Labor Association Independent External Assessment Report 5 July 2016, http://portal.fairlabor.org/fla/go.asp?u=/pub/zTr5&tm=5&Rid=1854&Fdn=13&Fna=AA0000002066%5F2016 %2Epdf.
24 CESCR General comment No. 23 (2016) on the right to just and favourable conditions of work, section 1.
25 WRC Assessment Report p. 9.
26 Labor Code, Article 8.
27 FLA Assessment Report, Finding no. 13.
28 FLA Assessment Report Finding no. 15: “The foreign manager took the fabric bag that the worker was sewing and shouted at the worker for not reaching the quota. The worker then took the bag back to resume work and the factory manager grabbed a metal stick in an attempt to assault the worker, at which point the other workers, the line supervisor, and the production manager intervened. The worker was asked to sign a letter of resignation citing a personal reason. The worker was terminated immediately and compensated for not being given advance notice of termination. The payroll and time records provided to assessors showed that this worker’s ID card was swiped in and out for 45 days following termination (the required advance notice period for termination according to the worker’s indefinite term contract) and that the worker continued to receive monthly payments after termination. There was no reprimand or any other disciplinary actions taken against the manager involved in the incident.” See also the WRC Assessment Report, p. 76.
29 Ministry of Health, Labor Hygiene Standards (Oct. 10, 2012)
30 Better Work, Guide to Vietnamese Labor Law for the Garment Industry 2016, section 9.7,
http://betterwork.org/vietnam/wp-content/uploads/BWV_LLG-update_English_280316.pdf .
31 Hansae’s letter to the Council on Ethics, 5 August 2016.
32 WRC Assessment Report, pp. 18-19.
33 WRC Assessment Report, Appendix 1.
34 FLA Assessment Report, Finding no. 30 and WRC Assessment Report, Appendix 1.
35 According to the company, Hansae Vietnam has an OHS department comprising two full-time employees at its head office, as well as 23 people working partly with OHS issues at the company’s 12 factories. According to the investigations conducted in 2016, those working partly with OHS issues are responsible primarily for production management at the factories not OHS, see the WRC Assessment Report p. 43. 
36 WRC Assessment Report, Appendix 1.
37 FLA Assessment Report, Finding no 121, Root Causes no. 104, no. 106.
38 A total of 22 ILO conventions, 18 recommendations and one protocol have been adopted with respect to working hours. This includes ILO Convention 1 (Hours of Work (Industry)), Convention 14 (Weekly Rest (Industry)) and Convention 132 (Holidays with Pay).
39 Labor Code, Article 69, Decree 109/2002/NĐ-CP, Article 1 (C) 3 Circular 15/2003/TTBLĐTBXH, § II (1.2) 40 WRC Assessment Report, p. 55.
41 FLA Assessment Report Finding no.11.
42 WRC Assessment Report p. 53.
43 WRC Assessment Report p. 59.
44 Factory 2, Factory 5, Factory 6, Factory Mini, Factory 11 and Factory12.
45 FLA Assessment Report, Finding no.11 Root Causes no. 56 -57
46 Law on Social Insurance of November 20, 2014, Law 58/2014/QH13 (“Law on Social Insurance”), Article 25 (1), for the English translation, see http://vietnamlawenglish.blogspot.com/2014/11/vietnam-social-insurance-law-2014.html
47 WRC Assessment Report p. 49.
48 Labor Code, Article 38.
49 WRC Assessment Report p. 75.
50 FLA Assessment Report Finding no. 13.
51 Labor Code Article 155 (3).
52 In factories no. 5, 8, 9, 11 and 12, employees described cases where women’s employment contracts were not renewed if they became pregnant during their first two years of employment. See FLA Assessment Report Finding no. 4.
53 FLA Assessment Report Finding no. 13, Root causes no. 2
54 VGCL, Statutes of the Vietnamese Trade Unions (5 November 2008),
http://ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=94503&p_country=VNM&p_count=532
55 WRC Assessment Report, p. 67.
56 FLA Assessment Report Finding no. 14, point 53.
57 Better Work Compliance Assessment Reports and Hansae 2009, 2011-2015.
58 WRC Assessment Costec International CO Ltd (Hansae Co Ltd) Myanmar/Burma, Information from Worker Interviews. April 2017.
59 See, for example, The Irrawaddy “Police Arrest Protesting Garment Workers”, 4 March 2015,
http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/police-arrest-protesting-garment-workers.html
60 The reason for this was that the workers had not returned to work within the specified deadline. According to the workers, the deadline could not be met because they were either in prison, afraid of reprisals or had not been told about the deadline. See footnote 58 and Hansae’s letter to the Council on Ethics dated 20 February 2017.
57 Better Work Compliance Assessment Reports and Hansae 2009, 2011-2015.
58 WRC Assessment Costec International CO Ltd (Hansae Co Ltd) Myanmar/Burma, Information from Worker Interviews. April 2017.
59 See, for example, The Irrawaddy “Police Arrest Protesting Garment Workers”, 4 March 2015,
http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/police-arrest-protesting-garment-workers.html
60 The reason for this was that the workers had not returned to work within the specified deadline. According to the workers, the deadline could not be met because they were either in prison, afraid of reprisals or had not been told about the deadline. See footnote 58 and Hansae’s letter to the Council on Ethics dated 20 February 2017.
61 Employees said that, in a fit of rage, one of the Korean senior executives at the factory had thrown packets of shirts at employees.
62 Letter to the Council on Ethics, 20 February 2017.
63 In July 2016, two employees who had fainted at factories 5 and 11 were admitted to the clinic. The incident was recorded in the handwritten log of workers who had visited the clinic. However, the fainting episodes were not recorded in the clinic’s list of illnesses and injuries for that month. Instead, they were logged under the categories “low blood sugar” and “digestive problems”. WRC Assessment Report p. 20.
64 WRC Assessment Report, pp. 22-27.
65 WRC Update on Remediation of Labor Rights at Hansae Vietnam (Nike) 10 April 2017,
http://www.workersrights.org/university/memo/041017.html
66 Lawsuit filed by trades unions and human rights organisations against US fashion brands that buy clothing from, among others, Hansae, see http://www.globallabourrights.org/reports/html-file/abstract-48.html#V.A., paragraph 54.
67 The Council on Ethics’ recommendation to exclude WalMart Stores Inc.

Transnational Regulation of Bangladesh's Economic and Labor Conditions: Agreement Reached by Companies and Global Trade Unions on a 2d Accord on Fire and Building Safety

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 (link to original pix here)



I have been writing about the fracturing of law and the rise of extra-national governance structures as the forms of economic globalization mature around transnational production chains. This produces fracture, porosity, permeability and polycentricity in the political structures of states (see, e.g., here, and here) and threatens the representational character of state legitimacy by shifting control of the most intimate relationships between a polity and its government from its own citizens to a host of overlapping transnational and foreign actors (e.g., here). The effect of these changes are more deeply felt in states that host the middle and lower tiers of global production chains (see, e.g., here).  They tend to reinforce traditional power relationships--now grounded on governance and control of economic activity, in place of the old relationships grounded on military power and political control (see, e.g., here). As a consequences, and especially for lower tiered host states, the solidity of the state itself becomes more difficult to maintain. 

Among the most interesting examples of these transformations is Bangladesh--especially in the context of its control of its garment sector.  Those transformations were especially exposed in the aftermath of the collapse of the Rana Plaza factory building  (see, e.g., here). One of the most visible elements of the polycentric structures of law and governance in Bangladesh has been the built by multilateral groups of transnational corporations around fire and building safety (e.g., here).  But those structures have been enough to encourage global actors to build additional governance structures around economic institutions (the production chain) applicable to and through those states in which they operate (e.g., here (transparency pledge here)). 

Among the most influential, and institutionally sophisticated, efforts is the Accord for Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. "It is a five year independent, legally binding agreement between global brands and retailers and trade unions designed to build a safe and healthy Bangladeshi Ready Made Garment (RMG) Industry" (here; see also SignatoriesBrochure about the Accord; Download the Accord; Guide for potential signatories; Accord Annual Report 2015; Accord Annual Report 2014; Accord Annual Report 2013).

The institutional longevity of this arrangement appears to have been strengthened with the recent announcement of the renewal of the Accord for a second term.  That should come as no surprise, and follows form the logic of economic management through global production chains. "The agreement covers all suppliers producing for the signatory companies. In the event that agents or other intermediaries are part of the signatory’s business model, the signatory is responsible to assure that these intermediaries support the signatory’s efforts to fulfill obligations of this Agreement, independent of whether the intermediaries have signed this Agreement or not." (Here). The Accord's Press Release about this follows. The 2018 Accord may be accessed HERE.




Press Release New Accord 2018
Posted on June 29, 2017

Companies and trade unions agree on Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh for second term

Amsterdam/Dhaka, 29 June 2017. Companies and global unions have agreed on a 2nd Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (“Accord”). The agreement will enter into effect when the current Accord expires in May 2018. The Accord is an unprecedented, legally binding agreement between companies and trade unions to make factories in Bangladesh safe.


Several companies have now signed the renewed agreement with IndustriALL Global Union and UNI Global Union. Many more companies are expected to sign in the coming days.

– The Accord will continue its independent safety inspections and remediation program at existing and new factories covered under the agreement.
– The Safety Committee and safety training program will be extended to all factories.
– The renewed agreement includes additional commitments to ensure that workers’ rights to Freedom of Association are respected to protect their own safety.

The renewed agreement builds on the fundamental elements that have made the Accord successful; including: independent inspections, bi-partite governance, commitment to transparency, provisions to ensure remediation is financially feasible, Safety Committee training and a credible complaints mechanism.

“The new agreement demonstrates that international brands and global trade unions recognise the positive impact of the Accord and the need for the Accord to continue its work in Bangladesh to ensure that factories are made safe and stay safe”, says Rob Wayss, Executive Director and Acting Chief Safety Inspector of the Accord.

The Ready-Made-Garment (RMG) factories covered under the current Accord have made significant progress with safety remediation over the past four years. In this final year of the current Accord, the focus is on completing all outstanding key safety measures such as structural retrofitting, installation of fire alarm and fire protection systems and protected fire exits, and the continued delivery of the Safety Committee training program.

The Accord and its trade union, company, and NGO witness signatories will intensify our constructive work with factory owners, the Government of Bangladesh, BGMEA and BKMEA, the International Labour Organisation and donor governments and their relevant programs and initiatives.

The Accord encourages all companies sourcing from Bangladesh to sign the renewed Accord and join our collective goal of safe and sustainable RMG and related industries.

For more information, please contact:
media@bangladeshaccord.com
Joris Oldenziel, Head of Public Affairs and Stakeholder Engagement
joris.oldenziel@bangladeshaccord.com
Office Amsterdam: +31 (0) 20 520 7431 Mobile: +31 614954430

Download the Press Release here

Download the 2018 Accord full text here

Reshaping the Norwegian Pension Fund Global? From Global-Legal to Welfare State Enhancing Economic Instrument

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The mandate of the Commission has been to propose a new Act relating to Norges Bank and the Monetary System and consider the organisation of Norges Bank and the management of the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG), also referred to as the Fund. (Report NOU 2017:13 at ¶ 1.1)
The Report includes a number of relevant recommendations for the operation of the Norwegian Pension Fund Global and the structures for its embedding within the Norwegian State apparatus. In its 23 June Press Release, the Norwegian state described a core recommendaiton: "Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) be managed by a separate statutory entity demerged from Norges Bank."

The Press Release along with brief comments follow.  The Report itself may be accessed here



The reorganization of the central banking functions in Norway might be long overdue.  Over the past decades the Bank has been increasingly tasked with a number of objectives that reflected the sometimes conflicting agendas of temporary government majorities while they were in power. In addition, as the report suggests, the ability of the Bank to focus on its core missions in ways that are efficient and efficiently accountable, could be improved by structural adjustments and reallocation of functions. 
The management of the Fund has become more extensive than expected at the time this function was assigned to Norges Bank. The Fund’s investment universe has been broadened to include emerging economies and real estate. The size of the Fund has increased substantially and hence the Fund has become of considerable importance for the Norwegian economy. The Fund is now of a size equivalent to around three times annual national income. (Report NOU 2017:13 at ¶ 1.1.1)
The proposed alternatives are unremarkable. The Commission had no interest in changing the overall function of the Pension Fund, but defined that role in narrow and substantially financial terms.

In order to safeguard the important role of the Fund in overall economic policy, the Commission proposes to incorporate into the Government Pension Fund Act that the Fund is to be invested abroad, that the capital in the Fund is to reflect real government saving and a goal formulation that strengthens the emphasis on the Fund’s function as a source of financing of the welfare state across generations.  The requirement of the highest possible return at an acceptable and carefully weighed risk level is thus of particular importance. (Report NOU 2017:13 at ¶ 1.1.1(4))
The Commission cautioned against breaking up the Pension Fund Global (though there was no hint of any effort to recombine the Pension Fund Global with the domestic fund, the Folketrygdfondet). More potentially troubling is the suggestion that the objectives of the Fund exclude any but the most narrow macro-economic objectives tied to the maintenance of the Norwegian welfare state: 
The Commission would also caution against using the Fund as an instrument of foreign policy, business policy, regional policy or environmental policy. Public resources to promote these policies should be allocated via the central government budget subject to the criteria for prioritisation, realistic budgeting, transparency and the loss provisioning practices that follow thereof. (Report NOU 2017:13 at ¶ 1.1.1(4))
The statement is odd precisely because the Fund has been used precisely for these purposes since its establishment. Indeed, the Fund has served the state well in that respect, and in the process augmented the ability of the Fund to achieve its internal macro-economic objectives with respect to the care and feeding of the Norwegian welfare state (see, e.g., here).  And it has done so authoritatively just recently (see, e.g., here). To some extent it may appear to reflect Norwegian internal politics. This statement may be read in light of recent reforms to reduce the influence of the Ethics Council and to detach the oversight of the Fund from the Foreign Ministry to the Norges Bank. Yet to the extent it signals even more structural changes in the principles under which the Fund operates, this trend bears some close watching. This is especially important in the context of the duties and responsibilities of the Pension Fund Global with respect to human rights.  For the moment, however, it is too early to tell. 

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Press release from the Law Commission: The Government Pension Fund Global should be managed by a separate statutory entity


Press release | Date: 2017-06-23


The Commission on the Act relating to Norges Bank and the Monetary System recommends that the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) be managed by a separate statutory entity demerged from Norges Bank.


The Commission today submitted its report to the Minister of Finance, Siv Jensen.

“Both central banking and investment management place greater demands on the board, senior management and the organisation than earlier. Moreover, the activities differ in nature, and the scope of the tasks involved is substantial. With two separate entities, the professional competence and the governing bodies can more easily be tailored to the task at hand,” said the chair of the Commission, Svein Gjedrem.

The Commission proposes that the investment management company be established as a separate statutory entity along the lines of the Folketrygdfondet. The entity should have a government-appointed board. The Ministry of Finance should, as is the case today, define the investment mandate pursuant to the Act on the Government Pension Fund. The Commission assumes that the practice of parliamentary endorsement of important changes to the mandate is retained.

The Ministry oversees the board’s decisions and compliance with the investment mandate. The entity reports to the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry reports on the Fund’s activities to the Storting (Norwegian parliament).

“The main risk ssociated with such a separation is that the current framework for the Government Pension Fund Global could be compromised. I want to emphasise that a separation must be carried out in a sound manner and must not in any other respect affect the framework for the Fund,” said Mr Gjedrem.

The Commission would caution against dividing the Fund into several entities, in the light of the additional costs and management challenges this would entail. It is not meaningful in this case to create competition between government-controlled investment entities. The Commission would also caution against using the Fund as an instrument of foreign policy, business policy, regional policy or environmental policy. The Fund must not become a government budget number two for purposes that are not prioritised in the annual budget process.

With a view to safeguarding the Fund’s important role in overall economic policy, the Commission proposes a goal formulation in the Government Pension Fund Act that strengthens the emphasis on the Fund’s function as a source of financing of the welfare state across generations. The requirement of the highest possible return at an acceptable and carefully weighed risk level is thus of particular importance. The Fund must be a responsible investor. The Commission further proposes that the current practice of investing the Fund abroad be established by law.

“This would reflect the Fund’s role as a pillar for financing the welfare state and its role as a savings fund for the nation,” said Mr Gjedrem.

The Government Pension Fund Global can be managed by Norges Bank

The Commission presents two alternative models should the Fund be kept under the Bank. In one model, a separate board is established for investment management, in addition to a board for Norges Bank and a committee for monetary policy and financial stability. The other model builds to a greater extent on today’s governance model with a board and a supervisory council, but includes a committee for monetary policy and financial stability and some changes to the supervisory council. The Commission is of the view that both of these models are feasible and adequate, but the first model may be preferable.

John Ruggie and John Sherman Respond to Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale, "Is the Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the Guiding Principles Coherent?"

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(Pix © Larry Catña Backer 2017)
The role of human rights due diligence is central to the understanding of the societal responsibilities of enterprises under the Second Pillar of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights. In Is the Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the Guiding Principles Coherent?, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale, human rights due diligence simultaneously and incoherently refer to (1) a set of processes used by businesses to identify and manage risks and (2) a standard of conduct expected of an actor in order to discharge a responsibility, obligation or duty. This, they argue, suggests that the UNGP imposes a strict responsibility on business enterprises to avoid causing adverse human rights impacts, but imposes a lesser due diligence standard of conduct to prevent adverse human rights impacts caused by third parties with which the enterprise has business relationships.
Recently John Ruggie  and John Sherman has responded to this argument in The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Reply to Professors Bonnitcha and Mccorquodale, which will appear in a future issue of the European Journal of International Law. Ruggie and Sherman suggest that "none of these interpretations [put forward by Bonnitcha and McCorquidale] is aligned with the UNGPs, and they fall well short of the UNGPs’ own scope conditions of enterprises’ responsibility to respect human rights and provide for or contribute to remedy."
Both article and response are well worth reading. They suggest the development of a vibrant interpretive community around the UNGP, one in which the UNGP themselves serve as the definitive and legitimate source of framing the context in which the regulatory management of the human rights responsibilities of enterprises and the human rights duties if states may be understood and elaborated.  This post briefly considers some of the arguments of the rich analysis of Bonnitcha and McCorquidale through the lens of Ruggie and Sherman's sophisticated and nuanced response. 
(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2017)
A reading of the two articles suggests the continuing richness of the debate about the UNGP in the evolving context of managing behaviors in global production. Some of the points that especially struck me on a first reading:

1. I would agree with Ruggie and Sherman that human rights due diligence is not at the heart of the UNGP.  HRDD is a critical methodology for operaitonalizing the 2nd Pillar corporate responsibility--that is, it is a means through which enterprises might embed their responsibilities in the operations.  Due diligence, of course, is an essential component of all of the Pillars, but they manifest differently within the complex of duties that makeup the state duty to protect, and are expressed quite differently with respect to the remedial rights of Pillar 3. 

2. It is those distinctions between the legal frameworks of Pillar I (and to some extent Pillar 3) and the societal expression of managerial responsibility in Pillar 2 that much of the disagreement between these scholars lies. Bonnitcha and McCorquidale are of course correct in their analysis of due diligence within the construction of legal systems. Yet Ruggie and Sherman are quite correct to note that Pillar 2 is grounded in societal responsibility rather than in legal constructs.  That difference is important.  In its societal manifestation, HRDD doe snot necessarily share the characteristics, nor the constraints, of due diligence as a methodology (and  as a normative expression) of law. But this difference also suggests something more profound--the extent to which the scholars differ on their sense of the importance of law as a totalizing ordering principle for the management of human and institutional relationships. Ruggie and Sherman argue that "the transposition of a state-based legal concept onto the corporate responsibility to respect human rights under the UNGPs is fundamentally inappropriate." (draft pp. 4).  And yet, Bonnitcha and McCorquidale are correct to suggest that within state law systems and especially within the governance matrices of domestic legal orders, the legal basis of HRDD is important and cannot be ignored.  Yet that importance does not transform the legal construction of HRDD into a legally cognizable universalizing character that can have mandatory effect outside the domestic legal orders of states (and of the 1st Pillar itself). 

3. Given that distinction between the societal and legal realms of law-governance, it follows that Ruggie and Sherman would correctly be suspicious of any proposal that would conflate the law-state and societal orders into a singular aggregation in which law triumphs beyond its jurisdiction. In some respect, of course, Bonnitcha and McCorquidale articulate and apply a set pr premises that have powerful advocates within the global academy and in many quaters of public organizations (and states). That view tends to organize the global order around states and through the language of law. It makes perfect sense, then, that just as the current efforts toward a comprehensive treaty on business and human rights would view societal governance with suspicion as unaccountable and illegitimate, so might one view the legitimacy of a HRDD system (and its normative overtones) as grounded in law.  That conservative view, in part, largely ignores the work of Professor Ruggie as SRSG and the repeated emphasis in his reports through 2011, on the autonomy and importance of both legal and societal spheres.  The former was bound up with the state, with law, and in the "state duty" pillar.  The later was bound up with the enterprise (and with non governmental organizations), with governance, and with the "corporate responsibility" pillar of the UNGP. These were separated for a reason.  And all efforts to rejoin them under the banner of politics and the state have at their core the rejection of the fundamental organizing premises on which the UNGP are built. Not that these alternative visions are "wrong"--just that they do not reflect the object of their interpretation; they seek to read into the UNGP expectations and sensibilities that were themselves rejected in the very construction of the UNGP.  For that reason alone the great insight of Bonnitcha and McCorquidale, whose vision is plausible if not compatible with the UNGP, is that in order to effectuate the interpretive framework they suggest a comprehensive treaty is necessary.  In other words, theirs is not so much an interpretive project as a normative one, one for which the mechanics of (international) law will be necessary.  
4.   Bonnitcha and McCorquidale's construction of a two part liability standard built around the HRDD obligation is quite interesting and worth considering in detail.  It is, in its own way, respectful of the principles of asset partitioning at the heart of the legal distinctions between enterprises in global production chains. In a sense, their notions have been taken up by the French Supply Chain Due Diligence Law. And, as a matter of constructing legal standards around due diligence, it has much in its favor. To that extent, Bonnitcha and McCorquidale have provided a powerful argument for the basis of legal regulation through and in due diligence.  Yet, Ruggie and Sherman are right to argue that as a societal standard within the 2nd Pillar, the distinction has less power. They advance a more nuanced and pragmatic approach, consistent with the ethos of societal governance and point to the way this is supported by their interpretation of the UNGP and its commentary. 

5. This is not to suggest that Bonnitcha and McCorquidale ignore the differences between the business sense of due diligence and that of states, that is the difference between the methodologies of meeting enterprise responsibility and the standards to which states are bound in meeting their duties. Where the differences between Bonnitcha and McCorquidale on the one hand, and Ruggie and Sherman on the other, appear to be acute, is in the relationship between  state and enterprise, or better put, between law and governance. One would appear to conflate enterprises within the state, the other recognizes regulatory spaces beyond the state.  The recognition of an autonomous place for such societal governance suggests that difficulty of assuming that the structures of societal governance can be folded into and arranged according to the conventional logic that animates the domestic legal orders of states. 
6.  In the end, it is the analogy to international law--that great stretch that marks many recent efforts to "legalize" the 2nd Pillar and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights--that do not work compatibly with the fundamental logic of the UNGP. The UNGP quite clearly rejects the identity of 1st and 2nd Pillars.  That distinction has consequences--and these consequences can be great, indeed.  The 2nd Pillar corporate responsibility produces a baseline normative standard--the international bill of human rights.  The 1st Pillar applies the logic of international law and the global public order by recognizing that as among states there is no baseline normative standard as binding law (even international law). The 1st Pillar speaks to legal relationships, to politics, and policy. It recognizes the formalities and limitations of political structures expressed as law.  The 2nd Pillar speaks to economic relationships and risk. It recognizes the pragmatic functionalism and limitations of economic structures expressed through risk. 
7.  Perhaps the best way to understand the quite distinct conceptual starting points of both sets of authors, one might remember that for Bonnitcha and McCorquidale "The corporate responsibility to respect human rights could not be implemented in law, or remedies made available, without clarification of the standard of conduct required to discharge that responsibility. "  On the other hand, for Ruggie and Sherman, "Due diligence is how risks and impacts are identified and mitigated . And remedy is commensurate with and proportional to the nature of the company’s involvement with the risk or impact." There is a wide conceptual gulf that separates these approaches, one that unlikely to be overcome in the current context of the discourse of business and human rights.   

"Unpacking Accountability: The Multinational Enterprise, the State, and the International Community": Summary of Remarks at Utrecht Center for Accountability and and Liability Law (UCALL) Conference, "Accountability and International Business Operations: Providing Justice for Corporate Violations of Human Rights, Labor and Environmental Standards"

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2017)


In May, 2017, the Utrecht Center for Accountability and and Liability Law (UCALL), sponsored an excellent conference, Accountability and International Business Operations: Providing Justice for Corporate Violations of Human Rights, Labor and Environmental Standards. As its name suggests, the Conference brought together a great group of individuals to consider one of the most dynamic areas of law and policy today--the normative and methodological issues, in economics, politics and law, that touch on the ramifications of business responsibility for human rights, labor and environmental standards in their operations (here). My thanks to the Conference organizers in bringing ot gther the very best emerging research in the field:  Prof. Ivo Giesen (private law); Dr. Liesbeth Enneking (private law); Prof. François Kristen (criminal law); Anne-Jetske Schaap, LLM (criminal law); Prof. Cedric Ryngaert (international law); and Lucas Roorda, LLM (international law).

This post belatedly includes the PowerPoint summary of my remarks, "Unpacking Accountability: The Multinational Enterprise, the State, and the International Community." The essay  developed from this presentation will be made available in a future post.
 
Larry Catá Backer

1. Unpacking Accountability: The Multinational Enterprise, the State, and the International Community. 

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2. Why Unpack Accountability? • Effective imposition of accounting regimes requires a more nuanced understanding of the structures of the character and ecologies of accounting • What is the behavior core of accountability • An act: Answering to, explaining of in relation to an expectation • For what: functionally segmented • Manifested as: for conduct, norms, methods, consequences • To whom: oneself to others, • To what end: to make right, to discipline behavior to ensure order • The Act is Relational • One brings to account • One is brought to account • One brings oneself to account • The scope (the “for what”) is functionally constrained • for Corporate Violations of Human Rights, Labor and Environmental Standards • The breadth and form of conduct (accountable manifestations) • Determined by context • Embedded in formal institutional structures of state and society • The Beneficiaries of accountability (“to whom”) • Changes character of accounting (act, for what, manifestation)

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3. The Terrains of Accountability • Thesis: • In a working system of accountability Corporate Violations of Human Rights, Labor and Environmental Standards all stakeholders in the system must (1) bring each other to account, (2) be brought to account and (3) bring oneself to account • Subjects (who accounts; who is accountable) • States • Enterprises • International Organizations • Civil Society/NGOs • Objects of Accountability (why account) • Objectives • Norm generation • Good governance • Institutional legitimacy • Remedial Mechanisms • Methods • Institutional and formal • Informal • Sources • law • norms

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4. Objectives: Norm Generation • Standards • Human Rights, • Labor and • Environmental Standards • Applied to Corporations • Applied through states • Applied by or with non-state actors (NGOs, and IOs). • Situated in • Core public law principles of government • Core principles of social organization • But also • Applied to States through other actors situated in law and politics • Applied to NGOs and IOs through other actors, etc. • Is this where we talk about Justice? Social Justice?

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5. Objectives: Good Governance • Corruption • Monitoring • Reporting • Technical proficiency • Coherence • Transparency (as a principle) • Informational • Who decides what is harvested • Who decides what is disclosed • Engagement • Timing of consultation • Weight given

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6. Objectives: Institutional Legitimacy • Transparency as a legitimacy enhancing technique • Democratic accountability • Engagement and transparency • Monitoring and reporting • Non-state actors • Stakeholder participation and • authority over institutional actors • Legitimacy in context • Input • Sources of action, norms rules embraced by each of the actors; formation of policies or principles on which action will be based. • Throughput • Engagement in crafting structures forms of response (norm, rule, process, action, etc.) • Output • Effectiveness in operation

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7. Objectives: Remediation • Provide remedial mechanisms for external breaches • Provide remedial mechanisms for internal breaches • The problem of layering • Internal accountability and external accountability resonating around each others • Multiple remediation regimes simultaneously applied • The value of remedy may be incompatible across actors situated in various places in accountability continuum—states, enterprises NGOs, IOs etc. • Whose remedy? • The remedy provider • The Remedy Recipient • Are they talking to each other? • The problems of arrogance and privilege

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8. Methods • Institutional and formal • Judicial authority of domestic legal orders • arbitration • Informal and non binding • Mediation • OECD NCP • Enterprise based • Hybrid • Ad hoc • Indigenous; traditional • Specialized transnational Courts (FIFA?) • Coherence • Jurisdiction • Substantive clash of norms • Enforceability within and across systems

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9. Sources • Against what is accountability to be had • State law (Which ones?) • Coherence issue within legal or regulatory orders • Administrative regulation • International law • International norms • Enterprise rules • Supplier codes • Rules devolved from state transparency obligations • Third Party standards (Equator Principles?) • Are all sources created equal? • Depends on the context and venue where accountability to be sorted out. • Legal hierarchies • may be contingent depending on territory and site of accountability

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10. Who Accounts: The State • Bringing the State to Account • Basis: • International obligations • Constitutional traditions • Effective Implementation • As embedded in law • As implemented through government • Form: as state, SWFs, SOEs • The State as an Agent of Accounting • Basis: • Scope: Who is subject • Remedial mechanisms • How should the state brings itself to account • Democratic accountability; political actions • Formal legal actions • International politics

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11. Who Accounts: Enterprises • Bringing the enterprise to account • Public bodies: States • International organizations: ? • Private Bodies: 3rd Party certification? • The enterprise as an agent of accounting • Supply Chain • Sectoral control: banking and finance • Upstream; downstream • Disciplining the state? International bodies? NGO? • How should the enterprise bring itself to account • Internal controls • Internal remediation

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12. Who Accounts: International Organizations • Bringing the IO to account • A vast emptiness • The enterprise as an agent of accounting • Technical assistance • Monitoring • Ranking • How should the enterprise bring itself to account • Applying accountability principles to internal operations and external activities

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13. Who Accounts: Civil Society • Bringing civil society to account • No free pass on accountability • States have now moved decisively into the field • Domestic NGOs • Foreign NGOs • The enterprise as an agent of accounting • Monitoring • Norm developing • Agent in remediation (judicial and non judicial) • How should the enterprise bring itself to account • Internal monitoring • Transparency • Stakeholder engagement • Connection between civil society and populations represented • Theory, politics, and obligation.

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14. Where does that leave the Project of Accountability? • Accountability is situated within its own complex ecology • At the institutional level it involves obligations to • Be accountable to others • Demand accountability • Be accountable to oneself • Accountability itself touches on all aspects of institutional operations • Norms • Implementation • Behaviors • Duties and responsibilities

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15. Thanks! • Accountability for Corporate Violations of Human Rights, Labor and Environmental Standards, then, • must be understood a shorthand for a set of multiple reciprocal relations • The legitimacy of which is grounded on the vitality of structures of self accountability and fidelity to internal organization and governance • Is grounded in the accountability of states and non governmental institutions for the appropriate framework for human rights, labor and environmental governance standards • Is legitimated in relation to and embedded within the accountable behaviors of states, non- governmental and international organizations

USTR Releases NAFTA Negotiating Objectives--The Outlines of 'A Better Deal for All Americans'"

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It was a long time coming, but recently the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative issued its Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation.  

The Press Release and Table of Content and Introduction to the Summary of Objectives follow. A future post will discuss in more detail the approach to State Owned Enterprises in this package and its ramifications for trade deals with China.

PRESS RELEASE:
Washington, D.C. – United States Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer today released a detailed and comprehensive summary of the negotiating objectives for the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Through the renegotiation of NAFTA, the Trump Administration will seek a much better agreement that reduces the U.S. trade deficit and is fair for all Americans by improving market access in Canada and Mexico for U.S. manufacturing, agriculture, and services.

In addition to President Trump being the first American president to begin renegotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement like NAFTA, for the first time USTR has included deficit reduction as a specific objective for the NAFTA negotiations. Since NAFTA was implemented in 1994, the U.S. bilateral goods trade balance with Mexico has gone from a $1.3 billion surplus to a $64 billion deficit in 2016. Market access issues have arisen in Canada with respect to dairy, wine, grain and other products — barriers that the current agreement is unequipped to address.

The negotiating objectives also include adding a digital economy chapter and incorporating and strengthening labor and environment obligations that are currently in NAFTA side agreements. Additionally, among other objectives, the Administration will work to eliminate unfair subsidies, market-distorting practices by state owned enterprises, and burdensome restrictions on intellectual property.

The negotiating objectives aim to apply the highest standards covering the broadest possible range of goods and services to ensure truly free and fair trade that supports higher-paying jobs and economic growth in the United States.

“President Trump continues to fulfill his promise to renegotiate NAFTA to get a much better deal for all Americans,” said Ambassador Lighthizer. “Too many Americans have been hurt by closed factories, exported jobs, and broken political promises. Under President Trump’s leadership, USTR will negotiate a fair deal. America’s persistent trade imbalances, break down trade barriers, and give Americans new opportunities to grow their exports. President Trump is reclaiming American prosperity and making our country great again.”

At the direction of the President, on May 18, 2017, Ambassador Lighthizer sent a letter notifying Congress of the Administration’s intent to initiate NAFTA renegotiations.

Since then, USTR has been conducting extensive consultations with Congress, stakeholders, and the public at large. USTR sought public comments, received more than 12,000 responses, and heard directly from over 140 witnesses over three days of public hearings. During this process, the Administration received valuable advice that directly impacted the development of the negotiating objectives.

Further, these objectives reflect the negotiating standards established by Congress in the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (TPA), which requires that USTR release objectives at least 30 days prior to formal negotiations. Negotiations will begin no earlier than August 16, 2017.

Through these negotiations, the Administration seeks an effectively implemented and enforced Agreement for more open, equitable, secure, and reciprocal market access. The Administration remains committed to conducting the negotiations with timely and substantive results for America’s workers, farmers, ranchers, and businesses.

KEY LINK:

Text of USTR Negotiating Objectives for NAFTA.

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Table of Contents
Introduction .
Summary of Specific Negotiating Objectives for the Initiation of NAFTA Negotiations
Trade in Goods:
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS):
Customs, Trade Facilitation, and Rules of Origin:
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT):
Good Regulatory Practices:
Trade in Services, Including Telecommunications and Financial Services:
Digital Trade in Goods and Services and Cross-Border Data Flows:
Investment:
Intellectual Property:
Transparency:
State-Owned and Controlled Enterprises:
Competition Policy:
Labor:
Environment:
Anti-Corruption:
Trade Remedies:
Government Procurement:
Small-and Medium-Sized Enterprises:
Energy:
Dispute Settlement:
General Provisions:
Currency
 
 
Introduction
 

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force over 23 years ago, and since that time, the U.S. economy and global trading relationships have undergone substantial changes.

The America that existed when NAFTA was signed is not the America that we see today. Some Americans have benefited from new market access provided by the Agreement. It contributed to the linking of the continent through trade, while at the same time NAFTA provided much needed market access for American farmers and ranchers.

But NAFTA also created new problems for many American workers. Since the deal came into force in 1994, trade deficits have exploded, thousands of factories have closed, and millions of Americans have found themselves stranded, no longer able to utilize the skills for which they had been trained. For years, politicians promising to renegotiate the deal gave American workers hope that they would stop the bleeding. But none followed up.

In June 2016, then-candidate Donald J. Trump made a promise to the American people: he would renegotiate NAFTA or take us out of the agreement. As President, he immediately started work to fulfill that promise. The first NAFTA consultations began just a few weeks after the President took office.

On May 18th, President Trump became the first American president to begin renegotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement like NAFTA. At the direction of the President, and following more than three months of Administration consultations with Congress, U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer announced the Administration’s intention to renegotiate the deal.

Since Ambassador Lighthizer notified Congress of the renegotiation, USTR has been conducting extensive consultations with Congress, stakeholders, and the public at large. President Trump is listening.
The Trump Administration has held dozens of meetings to solicit advice and input. In addition, USTR sought public comments and received more than 12,000 responses. Finally, USTR held three days of public hearings on the negotiations and heard from more than 140 witnesses, who provided testimony on a wide range of sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing, services, and digital trade. During this process, the Administration received valuable advice which has directly impacted the development of the negotiating objectives.

Now, in accordance with section 105(a)(1)(D) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, the Administration is providing this summary of specific objectives with respect to the NAFTA negotiations. These objectives reflect the valuable input received during the preceding consultation period from Congress, advisory committees, other agencies, and members of the public. USTR will continue to consult with Congress and stakeholders and we will update these objectives as we advance our work on these important negotiations.

Once negotiations begin, the Administration intends to ensure truly fair trade by seeking the highest standards covering the broadest possible range of goods and services. A successful renegotiation ofNAFTA will further the negotiating objectives of the United States, as described in this document, and will benefit the economies and populations of the United States and of our trading partners. The result will be a much better agreement for Americans.

The new NAFTA must continue to break down barriers to American exports. This includes the elimination of unfair subsidies, market-distorting practices by state owned enterprises, and burdensome restrictions of intellectual property. The new NAFTA will be modernized to reflect 21st century standards and will reflect a fairer deal, addressing America’s persistent trade imbalances in North America. It will ensure that the United States obtains more open, equitable, secure, and reciprocal market access, and that our trade agreement with our two largest export markets is effectively implemented and enforced. Under these objectives, a new NAFTA will give our farmers, ranchers, service providers, and other businesses new opportunities to grow their exports and reclaim American prosperity. But most importantly, the new NAFTA will promote a market system that functions more efficiently, leading to reciprocal and balanced trade among the parties.

If we succeed in achieving these objectives — maintaining and improving market access for American agriculture, manufacturing, and services — then we look forward to a seamless transition to the new NAFTA.



Announcing European China Law Studies Association 欧洲中国法研究协会 12th Annual Conference 24-25 August Hosted by the University of Leiden

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It gives me great pleasure to pass along information about the upcoming 12th Annual Conference of the European China Law Studies Association. The Conference is hosted with the support of the University of Leiden and its Faculty of Law and the Leiden Institute for Area Studies.

Since its founding in 2006, the European China Law Studies Association has become a major international venue for scholars and practitioners who are engaged in the study of Chinese law, from both comparative and interdisciplinary perspectives. The annual general conference provides an excellent forum for the exchange of information and ideas, as well as a platform for the development of research collaboration. Studies from disciplines other than law or interdisciplinary papers as well as submissions from young academics are expressly encouraged.

For the 12th Annual Conference the following topics will be featured:
• Law and Development in China and Its Region. This session will address the question how law contributed to development in China, and what the regional impact of Chinese domestic processes is. Submissions can be comparative in nature, or explore whether and how Chinese approaches have been adopted elsewhere in Asia. This session is organized in cooperation with the Asian Journal of Law and Society. Papers accepted for this panel will be published in a special edition of the journal.

• Post 4th-Plenum Reforms and State-Citizen Relationships. This session will examine how reforms announced in the 4th Plenum have been implemented, and what their impact has been on questions such as access to justice and legal protection for Chinese citizens. It is the intention that these papers will be published as an edited volume, with the support of Leiden University’s research programme in Asian Modernities and Traditions.
The Conference Program follows:


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ECLS 2017 Leiden
Programme


24 August

9.00-9.45: Welcome session

9-45-11.00: Keynote
Benjamin Liebman: Disclosure of court information: An Empirical Study from Henan
Discussant: Susan Finder

11.00-11.30: Coffee

11.30-13.00: Plenary Session 1: Post 4th-Plenum Reforms
Liu Wenting: Selecting the Lawyers: National Judicial Examination after the 4th Plenum of CCP
Sun Ying: Evaluating Judicial Reform After the 4th Plenum
Wang Zhiqiong: The Proposed State Supervision Commission - Towards the creation of a new state power structure

13.00-14.00: Lunch

14.00-15.30: Parallel sessions
Session A: Law and the environment
Navraj Singh Ghaleigh: Climate 'Law' in China?
Ma Yun: Vertical Management Reform and Environmental Law Enforcement

Session B: Insolvency Law
Shuai Guo: Cross-border Provisions in the Chinese Bank Insolvency Legal Framework
Wang Bingdao: The Analysis of Cross-border Insolvency Issues Between Mainland China and Hong Kong
Yin Huifen: Dealing with Individual Defaults in China

Session C: Law enforcement
Jasper Habicht: The Role of Campaigns in Law Making – ‘Regular Failure Campaigns’ in the Field of Immigration Law
Jing Lin: An Empirical Examination of the Death Penalty
He Ting: Reforming China's Juvenile Justice System

15.30-16.00: Coffee

16.00-17.30: Parallel sessions

Session D: Law and society
Karen Lee: Perceptions of legal institutions and public compliance with the law
Song Yaoxi: The Relation between Citizenship and Social Solidarity
Jing Li: Legal Innovation 2.0: An Empirical Study on Alternative Legal Service Providers in China

Session E: China and international law
Iina Tornberg: Transnational public policy in international arbitration in China?
Math Heckman: The definition of FRAND commitments: a comparison between EU and Chinese approaches

Session F: Foreign Investment and Arbitration
Tao Nanying: China’s Attitude towards Investment Arbitration and its Implications for Regional Trade Agreements
Jane Willems: Defining ‘Foreign’ in Chinese Investment Law: New Criteria for The Concepts of Investment and Investor?
Zhang Luping: Liberalization and Internationalization of Arbitration in China: In the Case of Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone

Evening: Conference drinks, hosted by Leiden Asia Centre

25 August

9.00-10.30: Parallel sessions
Session G: Law and the market economy
Fang Ma: Corporate Governance in China: The Development of Derivative Actions
Gianmatteo Sabatino: Legal features of Chinese Economic Planning
Xu Lu: Regulating E-Commerce in China

Session H: The crisis of representation and the Chinese Communist Party’s “Mass Line”
Panel members:
Dr. Larry Catá Backer Pennsylvania State University
Dr. Flora Sapio Australia National University
Dr. Patricia M. Thornton University of Oxford
Dr. Holly Snape Researcher ICCSL
Jean Christopher Mittelstaedt University of Oxford

10.30-11.00: Coffee

11.00-12.30: Parallel sessions
Session I: Terms and concepts
Michele Mannoni: Explaining the term "feifa quanyi"
Simona Novaretti and Hanne Petersen: Solidarity and legality – European and Chinese Perspectives

Session J: Financial and securities law
Xi Chao: Into the Mind of Securities Regulators: An Empirical Assessment of Securities Enforcement Actions in China 1998-2016
You Chuanman: Regulating Financial Innovation in China
Yu Nan: Mandatory Dividend Regulations in Emerging Financial Markets: A Case of China

Session K: Labour law
Brown, Ronald: Globalism Chinese Style: New Leader: New Rules; No Labor Protections in its Trade Agreements
Qinxuan Peng: Social equality and labour conditions
Eva Pils: The struggle for labour rights as human rights in China – understanding the debates among rights defenders

12.30-13.30: Lunch

13.30-15.00: Plenary session 2: law and development in China and its region

Gesk, Georg: How to Refinance the Rural Economy: Regional Differences of Rural Mortgages and Land Sale
Zhang, Zhong: Law and Economic Development in China: A Case Study of the Stock Market Growth
Mimi Zou: Labour Law and Developmentin China: The End of Sweatshops?

15.00-15.15: Closing session, young scholar award.

Conference Draft Posted for Comment: "The Algorithms of Ideology in Economic Planning: A Critical Look at Cuba’s National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030, With a Focus on the Pharma Sector "

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The 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy will take place in Miami, Florida 27-29 July 2017. The three-day conference, around the theme Cuba: Navigating a Turbulent World, will focus on evaluating the state of the Cuban economy taking into consideration the impending changes in Cuba’s relations with the United States. The press release announcing the Conference follows along with the draft Program are posted HERE.

I will be participating in the panel entitled, "Cuban Economic Policies & Growth Strategies," which is chaired by Carlos Quijano, World Bank (retired).  Penelists will present on a number of important themes: (1) Vadim Grishin, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Georgetown University, "Economic Reforms in Cuba: Myths and Realities"; (2) Gary Maybarduk, U.S. Department of State (retired), "Encouraging Reform in Cuba: Can We Get It Right?"; and (3) Juan Tomás Sánchez, Sugarcane Growers Association of Cuba, Inc., "The Soft-Swift Transition of Cuba to a Hard Structure with Proven Results."  Luis Locay, University of Miami; and Sergio Díaz-Briquets, Independent Consultant.

My presentation on this panel is entitled The Algorithms of Ideology in Economic Planning: A Critical Look at Cuba’s National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030, With a Focus on the Pharma Sector.  The paper considers the Conceptualización del modelo económico y social Cubano de desarrollo socialista: Plan nacional de desarrollo económico y social hasta 2030: Propuesta de vision de la nación, ejes y sectores estratégicos  in which the 7th Cuban Communist Party Congress posited that development can be better managed by rejecting the central role of markets, and substituting state planning in its place, taking an all around view of economic planning as inextricably bound up in social, political and cultural progress of a nation. The resulting structural proposal suggests behavior and choice algorithms with interesting implications even if only partially realized. This Conference draft is meant to spark conversation; it is very much a work (and thought process) in progress around a central insight  of the algorithmic qualities of central planning models and its utility in that form as a regulatory tool.

The abstract and Introduction follow.  The Conference Draft may be accessed HERE.






The Algorithms of Ideology in Economic Planning: A Critical Look at Cuba’s National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030, With a Focus on the Pharma Sector (Conference Draft)

Larry Catá Backer[1]


Short Abstract: The development plans of Marxist Leninist states are usually given short shrift as expressions of ideology (at best) and propaganda (at its most pathetic). Yet there is value in considering critically these development plans, if only to get a sense of the mindset of high level functionaries with control over macro-economic policy, and to get a sense of the administrative cultures within which governmental middle managers will actually exercise discretionary authority. Especially useful in that context is the Cuban Communist Party 7th Congress’s Conceptualización del modelo económico y social Cubano de desarrollo socialista: Plan nacional de desarrollo económico y social hasta 2030: Propuesta de vision de la nación, ejes y sectores estratégicos in which the PCC posited that development can be better managed by rejecting the central role of markets, and substituting state planning in its place, taking an all around view of economic planning as inextricably bound up in social, political and cultural progress of a nation. The resulting structural proposal elaborated in the Cuban National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030 (PNDES) suggests behavior and choice algorithms with interesting implications even if only partially realized. It is particularly important as a vision for transition developed in the wake of anticipated changes in higher leadership and the effects of normalization with the United States. This essay critically considers PNDES in the current context national and regional context. It starts with a brief analysis of PNDES for what it can reveal about entrenched ideological perspectives that shape decision making and analysis within Cuban Party and administrative elites. It then considers the way these appear to manifest themselves as a set of self-referencing decision systems that substitute or supplant market or regulatory determinations. Those premises are tested against Cuban approaches to the pharma sector, among the most important targets of centrally planned development. The essay ends with an assessment of the consequences of Cuban current approaches for national and regional affairs.


I. Introduction



Central planning for the development of the productive forces of the state has been a core element of Leninist governance since the 1920s. In the form of the Soviet five year plans, these efforts institutionalized the leadership of the Leninist vanguard party as the source of decision-making for the management of all national resources, and to “increase the state planning element in economic life” (Procopovicz 1930, 28). No less than in the Soviet Union of the late 1920s, the Cuba of the second decade of the 21st century continues to seek, through centralized planning, to naturalize a distinctly European Marxist collectivization in the “form of State organization of certain economic branches under the dictatorship of the Communist Party” (Ibid., 91). Leninist states are not the only political or economic enterprise that plans, and that reserves to its leadership class a monopoly of power to direct all of the productive forces of the enterprise. Planning in European fascist states of the 1930s shared many of the same characteristics (other than the ownership of the means of production) (Temin 1991, 573). Today most states devote substantial resources to strategic planning (Mintzberg 1994). Yet, as this essay means to demonstrate, at least within the state sector, central planning is acquiring an algorithmical character that may eventually supplant regulatory and principal based governance in the management of the state and its economic policies (Jessop 2013).


But ironically, it is in large enterprises that Soviet style central planning now thrives—organizations in which the governing institutions within the enterprise retain power and the enterprise owns all of the means of production subject to its planning. More importantly, in these enterprises, planning is an essential way to socialize their workers, express their ideology in concrete ways and set the parameters against which risks and options may be weighed and measured (Hayes 1985; Bryson 2011). Indeed, one of the most fascinating and least studied transformations is the way that Leninist principles—especially with respect to the internal ordering of a political-economic governance unit—has migrated in the West from the state to the enterprise, and from the enterprise to the structures of globalization itself (Varga 1964, 82-139). The largest Western multinationals manage their production chains (their internal economies) in ways that parallel the management by vanguard parties of the productive forces of the state. But the new planning is not merely qualitatively narrative, it has assumed the structures of algorithms—sets of rules that defines a sequence of operations, whether or not contingent (Bisschop & Meeraus 1982; Generally, Pasquale 2015).


Despite this resonance, or perhaps because of it, the development plans of Marxist Leninist states are usually given short shrift. They are useful as indicators of resource and production allocation but for little else (other than perhaps evidence of the failures of central planning when undertaken by the state). Beyond that, these documents are treated as mere (unattainable) expressions of ideology (at best) and propaganda (at its most pathetic) (Backer 2006). Yet there is value in considering critically these development plans, if only to get a sense of the mindset of high level functionaries with control over macro-economic policy, and to get a sense of the administrative cultures within which governmental middle managers will actually exercise discretionary authority. As global enterprises understand in this century (and as Soviet theorists understood a century ago) a principal object of development planning is not merely as an expression of the control of productive forces by the state apparatus under the leadership of a vanguard group, but also as a means of making meaning—(1) of expressing the ideology beneath those planning decisions, and (2) of the creation of structures within which such decisions can be valued and understood in accordance with the structural terms of the ideology from which they spring. Early in the existence of the USSR Lenin was famously quoted as explaining that “what socialism implies above all is keeping account of everything” (Kolakowski 1978, 748).


This core principle of Leninism is well expressed through the management by the state of all productive forces. Economic planning serves not merely to describe the ways that economic productive forces will be applied, but also to embed the valuation system inherent in validating those choices within the logic of the system within which these allocations are considered. More than that, it also serves to express the way in which social, political and cultural forces are to be deployed in the service of the choices made for the development of productive forces to build a socialist society. That, in essence, is the paramount aim of economic, cultural, social and political planning—the creation of a socialist society, the construction of which is left to the control of the vanguard party. Most Westerners have been inculcated with the incompatibilities of this ideology to their own. What they fail to appreciate is the extent to which this normative world view creates both a language and a means of measuring value that is then central to determinations of what for Westerners are “mere” economic transactions or capital investments. Economic plans, then, manifest a way in which the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party makes meaning through its control of the state apparatus in a manner that appears to parallel the way that meaning is made through the logic and premises of the market in trade (Generally Richards 2001). This in turn parallels the project of meaning making through law, in which the judiciary serves as the principal vehicle for making meaning within Western legal systems (Broekman & Backer 2013). The object, ultimately, is to control the meaning of words and the values they represent, including the very term “democracy” (Mitter 2017).[2]


The Cuban National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030 (PNDES) presented at the 7th Party Congress is particularly useful example of the way that ideology, social planning and politics pervades the economics of Cuban approaches to the management of their economic relations with foreigners (including the globally dispersed Cuban exile communities). But more important, it is an excellent example of the way that language is used to create meaning, to develop not merely a vocabulary (that appears tedious to the outsider) but to embed values that substantially affect the calculation of benefit among choices in both economic policy, and in dealings with foreigners. It is also important as a vision for transition developed in the wake of anticipated changes in higher leadership and the effects of normalization with the United States. But most importantly, PNDES itself can be understood as a crude but sophisticated algorithm for directing the Cuban economy and providing a coherent basis for making choices among economic activities.


This essay critically considers PNDES in this context. It starts with a brief analysis of PNDES for what it can reveal about entrenched ideological perspectives that shape decision making and analysis within Cuban Party and administrative elites. That is, it considers the way in which PNDES produces language that suggests the valuation algorithms to be used in making specific determinations about the operationalization of policy. It then considers the way these appear to manifest themselves in the context of pharma, among the most important sectors selected for development. That analysis will seek to extract the valuation algorithms embedded within PNDES and apply them to these sectors to see they can be used to understand the character of Cuban preferences and decision making in ordering these sectors. This exercise produces a crude set of relational equations that might help clarify the way that PNDES elaborates structures of decision making and incorporates valuations (though the values themselves cannot be supplied for the coefficients). The section ends with an assessment of the consequences of Cuban current approaches for national and regional affairs.


[1] W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law and International Affairs at the Pennsylvania State University . . . .  This conference draft was first presented at the 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy, “Cuba: Navigating in a Turbulent World”, Miami, Florida 27 July 2017 as part of a panel discussion on “Cuban Economic Policies & Growth Strategies.”


[2]“If China can persuade new partners to redefine “democracy” in its own terms, as a system that somehow does not involve national votes, free media or popular participation in government, then it will have won ownership in a powerful linguistic battle.” Ibid.

June 2017 Newsletter From John Knox, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment-

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John H. Knox, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment (former Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment) and Henry C. Lauerman Professor of International Law has been advancing his mandate. (See HEREHERE, HERE, and HERE, HERE, HEREHEREHERE and HERE).





Professor Knox has just released his March 2017 progress report on the work of his office, which includes links to a number of important statements and activities, principal among which is his Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (A/HRC/34/49; Feb-March 2017). One can sum up the work presented in a particularly direct statement:
The full enjoyment of human rights, including the rights to life, health, food and water, depends on the services provided by ecosystems. The provision of ecosystem services depends on the health and sustainability of ecosystems, which in turn depend on biodiversity. The full enjoyment of human rights thus depends on biodiversity, and the degradation and loss of biodiversity undermine the ability of human beings to enjoy their human rights. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (A/HRC/34/49; Feb-March 2017) ¶ 5.
The approach underlines a critical hole in the discussions that tend to silo business, human rights advocates, states and environmental advocates and businesses in increasingly remote silos.  Those silos are erected and maintained in part, no doubt, by inertia.  Yet they are also strategically important--important for actors seeking to maximize their influence and positions within the myriad power circles that pass for the international communities (and their enemies), important for the systemic integrity of a segmented approach to lawmaking at both the international and domestic levels, and important, as well, for the governance gaps that these silos produce in systems that reward arbitrage among these systemic interruptions.  Biodiversity is not merely a component of human rights--it is an essential element of the way in which the human rights duties of states and the responsibilities of business (including SOEs, SWFs, and financial actors) to respect human rights. This poses a great problem of interpretation of the core business and human rights documents--from the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, to the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  As well, it suggests some rethinking for semi private efforts like the ISO 26000 project. And most important, it suggests that the remedial projects of both UNGP and OECD Guidelines may require some substantial development if they are t embrace more fully their potential.

The post includes the 9 June 2017 Newsletter of the Special Rapporteaur (with links).







HAUT-COMMISSARIAT AUX DROITS DE L’HOMME • OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

PALAIS DES NATIONS • 1211 GENEVA 10, SWITZERLAND

www.ohchr.org• TEL: +41 22 917 9159 • FAX: +41 22 917 9006 • E-MAIL: srenvironment@ohchr.org

Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment

9 June 2017

Dear friends and colleagues,

I hope this finds you all well! This newsletter reports on my recent activities in connection with the mandate, as well as other developments that may be of interest to you.

Statement on World Environment Day. I issued a statement for World Environment Day, June 5, emphasizing that human rights depend on healthy ecosystems, and urging States to do more to protect the world’s biological diversity from extinction.

Brazil. On June 8, I joined with Vicky Tauli-Corpuz, the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights, Michel Forst, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders, and Francisco José Eguiguren Praeli, the rapporteur on indigenous rights of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, to denounce recent proposals to weaken safeguards for indigenous rights and environmental protection in Brazil. Our statement is available here.

Judicial Cooperation. On May 22 and 23, I participated in a regional judicial colloquium in Brasilia on constitutional rights and the environment. The colloquium was co-sponsored by a number of partners, including UN Environment, the Organization of American States, the IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law, and Brazilian bar and judicial organizations, and it was hosted at the Brazilian Senate. Participants included judges from many states within the Latin American and Caribbean region, who exchanged detailed presentations on lessons and challenges within their jurisdictions. This is the second in a series of these regional colloquiums – I am working with UN Environment on a third next year in Asia.

In the days before the colloquium, I also participated in the second meeting of the Global Judicial Institute for the Environment, a new organization of judges from around the world who are coordinating efforts to share information and experiences on environmental issues. More information about the creation of the Institute is available here. On May 19, I also had the pleasure of speaking at the University of São Paulo School of Law on a panel addressing issues of human rights and the environment internationally and in Brazil.

Children’s rights and the environment. In the last year, many reports and events have highlighted ways that environmental harm interferes with the rights of children, including: the report last fall by Baskut Tuncak, the Special Rapporteur on toxics, on the effect of toxics and pollution on children’s rights; the Day of General Discussion of the Committee on the Rights of the Child last September (the report is available here); the recent report by UNICEF UK examining how climate-related migration and displacement affects children’s rights around the world; the report by OHCHR on the effect of climate change on children’s rights; and the first-ever UNFCCC event on climate change and children’s rights, held in Bonn on May 8.

On June 22, I will participate in a public side event at the Human Rights Council in Geneva on children’s rights and the environment. Expected speakers include: Ambassador Nazhat Shameem Khan of the Republic of Fiji; Benyam Dawit Mezmur, Chairperson of the Committee on the Rights of the Child; Benjamin Schachter of OHCHR; Jonas Schubert of Terre des Hommes; and Marilena Viviani from UNICEF. I encourage you to attend if you’re in Geneva!
Environmental human rights defenders. On June 20, I will speak at Linacre College at the University of Oxford on the threats facing environmental human rights defenders, and then participate in a conference there on that subject.

The IUCN National Committee of the Netherlands has recently published a report aimed at improving protections for environmental human rights defenders. The report on environmental defenders that I prepared with the Universal Rights Group, which I mentioned in my previous newsletter, is available here. And recall that the website for environmental defenders, www.environment-rights.org, which several partners jointly developed, is now up and running!

Speaking in London. On June 19, I will be speaking in London at the SOAS Law, Environment and Development Centre, on the UN mandate on human rights and the environment.

Visit to Uruguay. From April 24 to 28, I visited Uruguay, where I met with government officials and civil society to learn more about how Uruguay is addressing human rights and the environment. In my statement issued at the conclusion of the visit, I said that Uruguay has a number of good practices, but that it also faces challenges. I suggested that it consider the possibility of a new “environmental ombudsperson” to coordinate the government’s responses to environmental concerns. The official report on the visit will be presented formally to the Council next March, but I hope to have it publicly available well before then.

Report on Madagascar visit. The report on my visit to Madagascar, which I presented to the Council in March, is available in English here. The French version should be available soon.

Center for Climate Crime Analysis. A group of law enforcement professionals is establishing a new organization, the Center for Climate Crime Analysis, to support prosecutions of criminal activities that result in, or are associated with, the emission of significant amounts of greenhouse gases. Illegal logging and deforestation, for example, could be included. The CCCA intends to work closely with other organizations to obtain information, and then analyze the information for transmission to national and local law enforcement authorities. For more information, visit its website, at www.climatecrimeanalysis.org.

As always, thank you for your interest in and support for the mandate!

Best regards,
John H. Knox
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment
Henry C. Lauerman Professor of International Law
Wake Forest University School of Law

PowerPoints for Conference Draft: "The Algorithms of Ideology in Economic Planning: A Critical Look at Cuba’s National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030, With a Focus on the Pharma Sector"

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(View of Havana Harbor from the Shrine of our Lady of Regla; Image © Larry Catá Backer 2017)

The 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy will take place in Miami, Florida 27-29 July 2017. I will be participating in the panel entitled, "Cuban Economic Policies & Growth Strategies." I have already posted the conference draft of my presentation: entitled The Algorithms of Ideology in Economic Planning: A Critical Look at Cuba’s National Economic and Social Development Plan 2030, With a Focus on the Pharma Sector.

The paper considers the Conceptualización del modelo económico y social Cubano de desarrollo socialista: Plan nacional de desarrollo económico y social hasta 2030: Propuesta de vision de la nación, ejes y sectores estratégicos in which the 7th Cuban Communist Party Congress posited that development can be better managed by rejecting the central role of markets, and substituting state planning in its place, taking an all around view of economic planning as inextricably bound up in social, political and cultural progress of a nation. The resulting structural proposal suggests behavior and choice algorithms with interesting implications even if only partially realized. This Conference draft is meant to spark conversation; it is very much a work (and thought process) in progress around a central insight of the algorithmic qualities of central planning models and its utility in that form as a regulatory tool. The Conference Draft may be accessed HERE.

This Post includes the PowerPoint of the presentation, as well as some thoughts (Slide 19) about the Cuban experiment's more general implications for trends in global regulatory governance in both the West and for systems like China's Social Credit Program.  Comments and conversation most welcome.  

























Cuban Economic Developments: Insights from the 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy

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The 27th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy will take place in Miami, Florida 27-29 July 2017. The three-day conference, around the theme Cuba: Navigating a Turbulent World, will focus on evaluating the state of the Cuban economy taking into consideration the impending changes in Cuba’s relations with the United States. Those of you in Miami at the end of July might consider participating. The Conference Concept Note and Progam may be accessed HERE.

This post includes summaries of the plenary presentations of the opening of the conference, with presentations by Carmelo Mesa-Lago (Pittsburgh); Omar Everleny (Havana) and Jorge Pérez-López (US Labor Dept. Retired).

Cuban Economic Developments
Chair: Helena Solo-Gabriele, University of Miami and ASCE President
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Professor Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh,""Fidel Castro's Legacy on Cuba's Social Policy and the Current Situation"
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Revista Temas, "La economía cubana: Por dónde anda y que se debería esperar"
Jorge Pérez-López, U.S. Department of Labor (retired), "Cuba's Never Ending External Sector Crisis"



"Fidel Castro's Legacy on Cuba's Social Policy and the Current Situation"
Carmelo Mesa-Lago
Emeritus Professor University of Pittsburgh


Carmelo spoke to the issue of social conditions in Cuba. Two important factors: population aging and the structural reforms undertaken since 2017.

Cuba has the oldest population in Latin America overtaking Uruguay20% of the population is over 60 going to over 30% in 2030. Problem is the birth rate declining to 1.04 and population growth is now .002. Economically active population has plunged to 4.868 million and the employed is 4.591 million. Main factor is the population aging.

Hidden unemployment is the most important aspect of labor figures,which runs about 30% down from 35% in 2011. The hope was for migration to private sector. But the rate of private sector growth has not increased enough causing the state to fudge its numbers. Official number is 2.4 in 2015. Hidden is 26.1. This hidden unemployment is labor surplus.

From a 100 base in 1989 state median wage adjusted for inflation is now 39% of the base with real growth only since Raul Castro's tenure.

Increased inequality has also been increasing. The big break is between those getting remittances versus those getting state wages. Private sector employment is also earnming substantially more than those earning median state wage. On the other hand social expenditure (education, health care, housing, etc.) between 20006 and 2015 remains the highest in Latin America but down form 36.6 to 28.2 as a % of GDP; 47.3 as a % of GDP.

Social security pension showing some rebound form reforms of 2008 when retirement age was increased as was the employer contribution rate and small employee contribution rate. But still shows a deficit of 23.3 as a percent of total cost. Mesa Lago thinks that the deficit will decrease modestly for some more years before rebounding because of structural issues (payouts will start increasing over contributions as population ages and workforce shrinks or remains stable). Another reform--freeze in median pensions will also have positive budgetary effects but of curse will affect the amounts available to pensioners many of whom (unless supported by families abroad) have little else to rely on. Median pension is now $11 U.S. month.

Health care has seen changes. Decline in facilities. Hospitals declined 32%, rural hospitals were especial targets. Medical personal decreased 22% 2008-2016 except for doctors who increased 21% but many now working abroad. But infant mortality continued to decline even as family doctors declined by 40%. Severe scarcity of medicines and access to and quality of care has declined. Infant mortality has declined however.

Housing deficit continued strong, with a deficit of over 80,000 units. Dwellings constructed per year has continued to decline form 111.4 thousand to 22.1 thousand. But the ratio of housing per 100 inhabitants is now 1.9.

Social assistance has decreased even as poverty has increased, especially in the countryside. Going back to pre Revolutionary patterns? There are no statistics so calculation with precision is difficult. But it is clear that with salaries insufficient to meet needs either needs are not met or are met in the unofficial economy. Education enrollment has also declined 72% between 2001-2015.

Conclusion: Cuba is undergoing a slow economic rectification under conditions of shrinking population and declining services. Most of this is a function of lack of funds, either self generated or received from foreign sources. Living standards have worsened and will continue so unless the reforms of 2008 on are deepened.







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La Economía cubana: Dónde está? Que debería hacerse?
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva everleny@yahoo.com


What is to be done? That is the fundamental question, especially where no sector of the Cuban institutions--government, academics, etc. fail to undertake them. Overshadowing the discussion is the aging population plus the realization that population is shrinking, especially laboring population.

What is the actual situation? An economy that grows very slowly, about 1-2% a year, which might even be understood as standing still depending on how you read the numbers. That slow growth masks uneven growth and shrinlage within important sectors. Worse, actual exports (and imports) decreased. Fatal is the need to divert national resources to social welfare programs. The result in the actual case are growing deficits (the way in which social programs are subsidized int he absence of income form trade). The teade deficit continues to grow especially as import decreases are tied to export decrease. Venezuelan trade drives asome of this. The situation there is unlikely to improve.

The only bright spot is the tourist sector. Tourism is growing, even and especially from the U.S. This represents the only possible reliable source of foreign currency and income. That growth is not driven by the Cuban diaspora but by non Cuban Americans. This despite the fact of fear of a clamp down from the regulations that will be issued in September 2017 from the U.S.

Tourism is benefiting not just generally, but especially outside of Havana for tourist centered communities. Viñales and Trinidad are good examples of small communities that are benefiting from tourism. Yet ironically the bad state of transport impedes further development beyond targeted tourist zones. And, indeed, the possibility of transport between Havana and targeted tourist sectors (like Viñales and Trinidad) remains a challenge [a theme on which I have written earlier this year].

The private sector continues to grow--again driven by tourism related demand. These are the sources of income inequality but also of fresh sources of tax revenues for the state.

Problem of course is that the state regulation of the private sector continues to inhibit robust private sector growth. Most people have to get licenses in areas that may have little to do with their education (e.g., the engineer opening a restaurant). The licensing and approval process works against the state's interest in growing the private sector.

Labor cooperatives has grown slowly. 498 have been approved. Still considered an experiment though one that is 4 years ongoing. The administrative process and the difficulties of tax administration also dog the efficient growth and utility of this sector.

Monetary unification remains an aspiration but is also a real drag on the economy. Both in terms of its lack of coherence and the differences between them inhibits trade and the development of the economy.

Special economic zones were viewed as the answer to Cuba's problems--large increases in trade and little contact. Especially Mariel was viewed as the crown jewel of this effort. But again the hyper bureaucratic process has produced few approvals and little income. 24 companies have been approved ot date, 8 in operation from 11 countries. This has generated a possibility of $1360 million in investment b but not clear what the breakdown of these investments are. What makes this even more exasperating is that the bureaucratic morass involves non U.S. companies form state with which Cuba has undertaken years of business. This administrative overlay, risk averse and slow, substantially impedes the operationalization of even the best plans. 
This administrative overlay that impedes development is especially evident in the agricultural sector.  The combination of risk averse administrators, and a misreading of regulations, plus the reworking of others has effectively impeded food security.  He gave the example of mangoes in Cuba where farmers are effectively impeded form selling their excess in the face of the interpretation of regulations for mandatory contributions to state food distributors. .  

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Cuba's Never Ending External Sector Crisis
Jorge Pérez López
U.S. Dept. Labor (retired) /Fair Labor Association


He looked at recent external sector performance (main components of balance of payments), and then key sources of external shocks: Venezuela, Brazil, and the U.S. The focus is on insights drawn from recent data, to the extent they are available or may be discerned. The fundamental insight is that Cuba appears to be unable to extricate itself from a  pattern of constant but changing external shocks as it extracts itself from one crisis by creating conditions for the next crisis.

The fundamental problem is on information.  No real data on Cuban balance of payments since 2001.  Only BOP statistics in AEC are for current accounts and most recently for 2013.  Nothing on capital and financial accounts.  Latest external sector data fr trade is 2015. Sparse and out of date information on debt, and no systematic data on investment.

Cuban balance of payments appear positive and Cuba has had a positive current account for some time.  Merchandise trade and services trade are the principal drivers  Merchandise trade shows that Cuba has had a huge deficit in merchandise trade account. Last time there was a surplus was 1960. This negative balance of trade was overcome by a huge amount recouped through trade in services--service exports (doctors, etc.) has been the savior fo the Cuban economy for a number of years.

Strategies for balancing BOT components are difficult.  Trade deficit in merchandise represent critical imports for food, fuel and the like.  Reduction could impede ability to export merchandise.  Food imports are substantial, yet a lot of this is made of food that could be grown domestically.  But the centralization of agricultural sectors and its hyper regulation has contributed to Cuban food insecurity and thus of its needs to import basic food stocks. Oil imports are essential and not made up by local production. Statics for fuel, however, are not current and are difficult to interpret. A bit of feul imported are really for re-export.

Cuba has a concentration on a few trading partners--Venezuela, China (exports), Canada, Netherlands (Rotterdam metals markets).  What is new is that 14-15 on commodity tables for Cuba but only one for services. in the Handbook. 

Some oddities: The first touches on the accounting for remittances--which are not shown on Cuban BOP statistics. There are no statistics on the capital and financial accounts--the shows flows of income to Cuba.  The main factors are debt incurred by Cuba and also investment.  Important accomplishment: in 2015 negotiations with Paris Club re Cuban debt (a significant accomplishment) which fixed the amount of Russian debt and renegotiated $11 billion of non performing debt with significant forgiveness and an 18 year repayment plan.  But also creditors  will be more demanding on the renegotiated terms.

This has created incentives to draw foreign investment into Cuba  What is needed is $2 to 2.5 billion a year. Last one shoes 395 projects available for investment.  What actually happens is harder to know.  Little data.  ZED Mariel has been invested in Mariel around 25 enterprises. Most are still in gestation.  Little present activities.  BrasCuba (relocating factory to Mariel) and Unilever as the most important. Since Ley 118 passe din 2014, 83 projects worth $700 million a year--far short of the amount needed.

So where are things now and where are things going?  2016 crisis over Venezuelan subsidies.  Three areas of concerns.  Vulnerability to Cuban development; impact on non subsidized petroleum purchases and negative impact Cuba services sales to Venezuela.  The crisis with Brazil may jeopardize the completion of the Mariel ZED (as a consequence of the Brazilian corruption scandals Oderbrecht).  With the U.S: the crisis turns of the changes in U.S: policy that will be announced in September. Immediate impact, however, on tourism. Also the transactions prohibition with entities controlled by Cuban military may chill overall investment.

Conclusion, Cuba's problems exacerbated by its isolation from globalized trade and financial flows. Dark clouds looming.  But the Cubans have seen this before and it will be interesting to see how they will survive the current cluster of crisis. China may play a role in this, but the relations between China and Cuba do not mirror those of Cuba and the USSR. China a key importer of Cuban sugar.






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