Quantcast
Channel: Law at the End of the Day
Viewing all 3362 articles
Browse latest View live

Ruminations 77(6): Looking Back on 2017 in Epigrams and Aphorisms

$
0
0


(Pix © Flora Sapio 2016)

The year 2017 is ending with as great a flourish as 2016, even in the absence of a U.S. Presidential election to make the world buzz.

2017 is rich with events that expose the complex connections between law, politics, economics, religion and culture. These events will set the course for 2018, even as new actors seek to take manage people, events, states, enterprises and other institutions with substantial consequential effects of the mass. But most of all 2017 was the year of big data, of social credit, and of the realization that the algorithmic institution (state or otherwise) might well replace the regulatory state as the driving force for the management of people, institutions and behaviors. Where once the regulatory state was said to express the will of the people refined through their representatives in government, currently the algorithmic enterprise can be said to build systems for managing people and institutions from the data it harvests from them applied to metrics that both reflect their desires and directs it toward certain ends. But this was also the year of statues, of mass violence and of surprising revelations that both marked and drove significant cultural change.

With no objective in particular, this post and a number that follow provides my summary of the slice of 2017 to which I paid attention through epigrams and aphorisms.  It follows an end of year  tradition I started in 2016 (for those see here). 

This Part 6 rounds out the 2017 series, with a focus on the nature of U.S: influence, on the character and nature of the manifestation of Chinese influence in the world, and the return of open (African) slavery now (again) run by and through Africa in the context of the fundamental contradictions of labor in globalized production. Share your own!

Ruminations 77: 2017 in Epigrams and Aphorisms
77(1);
77(2);
77(3);
77(4);
77(5);
77(6).



Part 6

 
 (Pix credit HERE)

1. When Western elites bray about the loss of U.S. influence they are really whining about the loss of their own influence in the U.S.  [I myself have argued that the U.S: is transforming its engagement from system builder to deal maker; but does it necessarily follow that the result is a reduction of influence or its transformation? But for an elite heavily invested in old ways of thinking about power this change tends to be measured by relation to the loss of their own influence then transferred to the nation.  "I would argue that the largest trend today is the decline of American influence. Not the decline of American power — the country remains economically and militarily in a league of its own — but a decline of its desire and capacity to use that power to shape the world. "The decline of U.S. influence is the great global story of our age]

2. One does not measure the influence of Western societies through the antics of their states but, for good or ill, through the power of their private sector institutions--civil, religious and economic. [The greatest success of U.S. influence was in the creation of an autonomous and global system of production and value chains that are themselves autonomous of the state that made them possible; to speak to the loss of influence pf the state in the West is to congratulate those states on the success of their own project to privatize and deeply embed their normative structures within the entire body of social relations. Why GE Will Not Be Impacted By U.S. Withdrawal From Paris Climate Agreement]

3. If human rights emerge from the people, it acquires its form only when it is delivered back to them through the state; from the people, to the people through the state; that appears to be the fundamental relational structure of human rights. ["Despite the fact that the UN human rights framework is grounded on the principle of the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights, China nonetheless is pushing its version of “human rights with Chinese characteristics,” which prioritizes the right to development and economic rights over individual civil and political rights, and insists on a relativistic approach to human rights based on each country’s unique history, culture, values, and political system."China Pushes ‘Human Rights With Chinese Characteristics’ at the UN]

4. When states speak about sovereign equality, they act as if that means the equality of those those states that exist below them on hierarchies of power and dependence.  [Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind ("Sovereign equality is the most important norm governing state-to-state relations over the past centuries and the cardinal principle observed by the United Nations and all other international organizations. The essence of sovereign equality is that the sovereignty and dignity of all countries, whether big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, must be respected, their internal affairs allow no interference and they have the right to independently choose their social system and development path."); and contrast How China bungled its coming out party ("Be that as it may, the most surprising and consequential story of the year was how Chinese power revealed itself in all its breathtaking size for the very first time in centuries, and — more importantly — how the world recoiled in horror. . . . Not wanting to be left behind, Chinese diplomats in charge of Europe managed to sprinkle the year with recurring scandals: censorship of British academic publishers; a scurry of acquisitions of German companies that raised alarms all the way to Brussels; and — most damagingly — an over-solicitous defense of Chinese interests by a number of friendly European nations.")]

5.  It is usually the states asserting the greatest control of foreign influence within its borders that seeks to project its own influence in other states. [ China Scolds Australia Over Its Fears of Foreign Influence;Beijing vies for greater control of foreign universities in China]  





6. The powerful tend to speak about themselves as  if they were the embodiment of the system or ideology that they control or in which they are embedded; sometimes, then, when elites speak to the undoing of rules and systems they usually mean that those rules and systems are about to be remade and that in the remaking they will have been removed from positions of dominance and influence in the system that emerges. [""While emasculating the trade organization may seem foolhardy, trade experts warn that blowing up international trade law may be the only way the Trump administration could pursue its quixotic goal of eliminating the bilateral trade deficits that it has with most countries."  Trump’s Trade Endgame Could Be the Undoing of Global Rules]

7. The cult of personality is the disease that eventually kills every political, social, economic or religious system in which it finds a home; it is a fundamental inversion which runs its course when the ideology becomes the leader. ["All of Leninism may be reduced to two famous words uttered by the Founder in 1921 and repeated by Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin: “Kto kovo?” “Who, whom?” That is, who will do in whom?"  The First Totalitarian]. 

8. All canons are matters of communal judgement with national characteristics; to argue otherwise is to misunderstand the way ideas are embedded in collective life; to single one out is to expose one's own politics rather than any particular truth of the assertion made to advance it.  [Why the Western philosophical canon is xenophobic and racist – Bryan W Van Norden | Aeon Essays

9.  We all await our Gods to manifest deliverance in forms that appear to satisfy our desires. [Awaiting Trump's coal comeback, miners reject retraining]

10. It is sometimes hard to distinguish wars on religion from wars of religion.    [An old pattern in new garb; Drug lords in Brazil appear to be the new Clovis; religion continues to serve the secular power well as a tool for extending and managing control; "For drug kingpins, developing positive relationships with local Rio pastors while in jail can tighten their grip on power once released."  In Brazil, religious gang leaders say they're waging a holy war]

 (Pix credit HERE)


11. No society has confronted the fundamental contradiction of the dual nature of labor (as person and as task); and the fundamental problem of labor revolves around the question of servitude, not to capital (a distraction) but as the incarnation of hierarchy.  [African refugees bought, sold and murdered in Libya ("He added that people were being auctioned off in the town, with men and women fetching 1,000 Libyan dinars ($735). Others from Ghana and Cameroon might fetch several thousand Libyan dinars.")  People for sale: Where lives are auctioned for $400

12.  It is only when employees are understood not as the providers of labor but as the servants of a  master that one can understand the ordinariness of the premise that any act of the servant affects the reputation of the master and thus can be controlled by the master. [Unlike capital, labor has a dual nature; that is labor is provided by a person but the labor provided is not inextricably personal; to be able to command has the effect of transferring power over individuals to others--and that reduces all labor to a spectrum of control of the person, the limiting condition of which is that off the slave. [My manager wrote me up because she didn’t approve of someone on my personal Facebook page. Thoughts?; How To Train Your Employees To Be Brand Ambassadors]

13.  And thus the cult of personality infects the relationship between master and servant and between the leader and the state; in the former case the enterprise buys the individual to serve as a husk into which to insert its manifestation, in the later the individual is dissolved within the body of the leader. [NBC News source says Matt Lauer will not receive a payout ("Television news contracts typically include a morals clause, giving a network some flexibility to fire a high-priced anchor for cause.") and here; How Hollywood aims to change its culture of sexual harassment; Social Media Can Get You Fired So Plan Accordingly ("Your brand is who you are, and you are your brand. If you want to be a famous, then by all means be incredibly incendiary online. File law suits, make up a whole new persona. But I really hope it pays off, or you will likely be unemployable.")]

14.  And yet the great contradiction of labor defines the power relations between master and servant--an individual does not merely sell her labor, she binds herself to service and thus consents to the suzerainty of the master in all aspects of the servants life. [Within these parameters there is only a difference in degree (a substantial one to be sure and one on which legal distinctions are built) between the labors of the independent contractor and of the slave and to treat slavery as exceptional and historically contingent affects generally the analysis of labor;  Death by Overwork in Japan: Cultivating a Healthy Workforce From Across the World ("In the wake of increased international focus on karoshi—a common Japanese term meaning “death by overwork”—Japan’s government and business leaders alike agree that Japan’s “culture of overwork” is a critical issue in need of a solution."); but see Right to a private life at work? Monitoring an employee's communications was a breach of the Article 8 right to a private life (managing the scope and application of the power in employers); ]

15. The feudatory relation between labor and enterprise suggests the fundamental ordering framework of human rights; the state has a duty to protect but the enterprise has a responsibility to respect precisely because the servant has consented to the overlordship of both.   [It is within these webs of polycentric governance that the gross sexual harassment scandals of late 2017 can be situated with respect to the normative violations (of rights and individual dignity), of social expectation, of enterprise reputation, and of the requirements of law, including the more general requirements of social norms and process; and their failures Weinstein's Complicity Machine; A powerful person has been accused of misconduct at a rate of nearly once every 20 hours since Weinstein; Harvey Weinstein and the #MeToo Movement]



The Orishas Speak: The 2018 Letter of the Yoruba Association of Cuba (Letra del Año para el 2018 de la Asociación Yoruba de Cuba)

$
0
0

(Pix CiberCuba Jan 1, 2018)

In most states, the priestly role has been transformed.  But it is useful, as one examines the priestly role in modern western states, to consider a more traditional relationship between the priest and the state.  One of the more interesting manifestations of the role of religion within political life is that of the priests of the practitioners of the old religions of Africa as re-established in the Western Hemisphere, particularly in Marxist-Leninist Cuba.  (here)

For the last six years I have written of the annual letter of the Cuban Council of the High Priests of Ifá (Consejo Cubano De Sacerdotes Mayores De Ifá), the practitioners of traditional religion brought over from West Africa with the slave trade and now naturalized as a powerful indigenous religion throughout the Caribbean and growing in the United States. (e.g., 2017, 2016, 2015; 2014; 2013; 2012).
La Letra del Año comenzó a emitirse en Cuba a finales del siglo XIX, sin poder precisar la fecha exacta. Por datos y documentos se revela que babalawos procedentes de las diferentes ramas religiosas existentes en el país comenzaron a reunirse para efectuar con todo rigor las ceremonias establecidas, que concluían el primero de enero con la apertura de la Letra del Año. (EcuRed, Letra del Año) (The Annual Letter was first produced sometime near the end of the 19th century.  Existing evidence suggests that the Babalawos of the different branches of the faith in the nation started to gather together  to invoke with all rigor the appropriate ceremonies that concluded on the 1st of January) with the opening of the Letter of the Year).
2018 marks the third year of an important change, in which many of the most important branches of the faith came together to produce a unified letter. ("El documento, que copiamos íntegramente a continuación, incluye el signo y el orisha regentes, además de la oración profética. El documento se ha elaborado conjuntamente entre la Asociación Yoruba de Cuba y la Comisión Organizadora para la letra del Año Miguel Febles Padrón." (here)) The object of the annual letter is to provide guidance for the nation and its people.  More specifically it is meant to provide guidance for faith practitioners otherwise unable to receive more specific guidance within their own branch.
Probablemente uno de los acontecimientos más importantes y que une tanto a religiosos como ateos en Cuba es la salida, en los primeros días de enero, de la Letra del Año, interpretación del oráculo de Ifá con las predicciones para el año que comienza.El cuerpo de la Letra del Año lo conforman recomendaciones, sugerencias, advertencias, etc, para pasar tener un año provechoso y sin grandes percances. Casi todas las áreas quedan cubiertas entonces, desde la salud hasta la familia, sin dejar de pasar por acontecimientos de índole política y medioambiental. (CiberCuba, Letra del Año) [In all likelihood, one of the most important events that unites both religious and atheists in Cuba is the delivery, in the first days of January, of the Letter of the Year, interpretation of the oracle of Ifá with the predictions for the coming year.The body of the Letter of the Year is made up of recommendations, suggestions, warnings, etc., to have a successful year and avoid major mishaps.Almost all areas are covered then, from health to the family, without avoiding events of a political and environmental nature]

The Advance (Adelanto) Preliminary Letter for 2018 (also HERE) follows along with a brief reflection. It is the bare bones of the divination; the recommendations and more precise interpretations will follow.   The full letter will be forwarded in the next several days. 

(Pix CiberCuba Jan 1, 2018)


Adelanto de la Letra del Año 2018:

Signo Regente: OSA SHE, OGBE SA, OTURA TIYU

Oración Profética: Iré ariku Yale Tesi timbelaye Lese Orunmila. (Un bien de salud completa, siguiendo los patrones de Orunmila).
Onishe: Aladimu (Rogativa a Orunmila con 16 frutas en una canasta, y sus velas).
Divinidad que Gobierna: YEMAYA.
Deidad Acompañante: ELEGUA

Bandera del Año: MITAD BLANCA MITAD AZUL, CON RIBETES NEGROS.

Ebbo: UN CHIVO MAMON, 7 MACHETES, 7 BANDERAS, TIERRA 4 ESQUINAS, ROPA SUDADA, Y DEMAS INGREDIENTES.

Refranes del signo:
-Toda persona es digna de respeto.
-Si no sabes con la ley que se vive en este mundo, tienes que ir a vivir al otro.
-Los padres no piden bendición a los hijos.
-Si no sabe el camino del derecho que le pertenece, el muerto sí.
-El hijo sigue la tradición del padre.

Código ético de Ifá: El osorde es un acto secreto que el Awó no debe divulgar.

En este signo nace:

Obras del signo:
Onishe Orunmila: Aladdimu ni opolopo asogi fun Ifá, ofrenda de frutas variadas (dieciséis partes de frutas) ofrecidas en una canasta y dos velas blancas para Orunla.

Plantas del signo:
Flor de agua
Pico de pato
Sargazo

RECOMENDACIONES

Nota: en aras de esclarecer cualquier duda, se recomienda, acudir a los mayores.
 __________

The divination for 2018 point to fairly significant ruptures and also to fairly significant disclosures in the sense that what was hidden will be revealed. The emphasis is on the crossroads--communication, movement, luck, and starts, true or false--and on symbols that has traditionally been gendered female--the sea, the moon, intuition, fecundity, and protectiveness of  family. One might believe that the foretaste of this combination has already been much in evidence, especially relating to the revelations of long held secretes (open or otherwise) touching on the mistreatment of women by powerful men.  It is likely that more revelations will follow this year.  It is likely that those revelations will touch on abuses of power relationships and in the process of revelation, overturn them. The Oddu's speak to reversals of trust and of betrayals--of communication that cannot be trusted along with those who speak. But they also speak to broken peace then reconstituted--this is a period of breakdown and of reconstruction. And they suggest that these reconstitution are associated with secrets and their revelations, with the cycle of breaking down and building up, of which there will appear to be a lot this year.  This will not be a tranquil year but a year in which the old ways--in virtually every aspect of life--will experience both decay and change. Not all of it will be positive for those affected as the true character of many who have operated in the shadows will more clearly be revealed.

Osa-Se is here relevant--but perverse.  In a year long context of revelations and of revolution on that basis, Osa-Se warns against false accusation. But these are false accusations built on a pattern of falsity, that of of the manipulation of revelation for other purposes. I would expect that this is a year in which data itself become corrupted--not that information is false, but perhaps falsely used.  It will be the accusations that are false not the information on which it is made. This can apply to the conduct of institutions as well as of individuals ("A difa fun Owa. Owa nfi oju ole wo enikan tokose"). And it will require sacrifice as both revelation and the falsity of accusation will complicate communication ("won niki o wa rubo ki Esu ma baa tiilo dunrunmo eniyan kan saa ti ko see").

Ogbe-Sa amplifies the perversity of communication, revelation and disruption. It warns against deceit from friends (not enemies) and of the need to finish what is started.   But the warning is for both the deceived and the deceiver--for the former who is to be sacrificed might by a presence of mind escape the consequences of deceit, while the deceiver might wind up the sacrifice herself. One is warned against the game player who invokes rules of play (in a game of death, of sacrifice) with which one is nor familiar but for which there is trust because the rules are said to be oldHere the story of the ram seeking to sacrifice Iki by playing a game of hiding inside a bowl reminds us that knowledge of deceit may come too late  ("Emi ko mo pe're iku l'Agbo nba mi se"") but that in the end it is the deceiver who is deceived.

Otura-Tiyu (or rete or irete) points to the excess inherent in the use or misuse of talent but also of the growth of new from old. It speaks to preparation and moderation--to planning and preparedness.  Yet that suggests that old is being swept aside, perhaps as a consequence of its inability to manage its tendency toward excess.  It speaks to the regularity of the waves but also of their destructive effect on the land. It speaks to new solutions--it is a movement away from repetition and into unknown space.  And the intimation is a warning about the consequences of the revelation-shocks that the year will bring--the consequences of which will be both unexpected and untimely.

All of these warnings apply to states, to enterprises and to the relationships (power relationships) among people.  It is focused on women--or the culturally female but suggests that female inter-relations are as subject to its general warnings as those in the dialectic among the culturally male and culturally female. The Oddu do not appear to be speaking as much to gendered wars (physically manifested) as to the manifestation of gender dynamics within relationships and the consequences of exposure, of deceit, and of the arrogance of power (which is not gendered at all). This is a period in which trust ought to be in shorter supply and in which things are made to appear in particular light for specific effect, and where ultimately those efforts will produce disaster and the overturning of power hierarchies in the face of talent and need.

And especially there is an undertone here--it cautions about the reflex to admire the great and powerful for what they do, when their talents do little to meet the needs of those who power serves. It is a warning to the powerful that sometimes their efforts to impose a hierarchy of worth on the basis of size and power will undo them where talent and specific skills are needed.  A further warning--power when used to cut and separate--to destroy--will produce nothing; it is only when the small and nimble are able to cobble the pieces  together that something useful can be made. 

Just Published: "Commentary on the New Charity Undertakings Law: Socialist Modernization through Collective Organizations " The China Nonprofit Review 9(2):273 – 309

$
0
0
http://www.brill.com/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/ftp/images/products/295x295/31453.jpg?itok=D4cCtJph

I am happy to report the publication of my article: "Commentary on the New Charity Undertakings Law: Socialist Modernization through Collective Organizations."  It appears in the The China Nonprofit Review, Volume 9, Issue 2, pages 273 – 309 (2017). The article considers the new Charity Undertakings Law for its conformity to the Basic Line of the Chinese Communist Party (or in more Western terms, for its conformity to the fundamental political normative principles of the Chinese state).  I thought it useful to consider the conformity of lawmaking within its own system's principles as a necessary foundation for any comparative analysis.

The abstract and introduction follow.  In keeping with Brill Journal Self Archiving Rights policy, I can only provide access to the submitted version of the article: HERE






"Commentary on the New Charity Undertakings Law: Socialist Modernization through Collective Organizations."
Larry Catá Backer
The China Nonprofit Review, Volume 9, Issue 2, pages 273 – 309 (2017)
DOI: 10.1163/18765149-12341334); ISSN: 1876-5092 E-ISSN: 1876-5149
Submission version HERE



China’s new Charity Law represents the culmination of over a decade of planning for the appropriate development of the productive forces of the charity sector in aid of socialist modernization. Together with the related Foreign NGO Management Law, it represents an important advance in the organization of the civil society sector within emerging structures of Socialist Rule of Law principles. While both Charity and Foreign NGO Management Laws could profitably be considered as parts of a whole, each merits discussion for its own unique contribution to national development. Moreover, while analysis tends to focus on legal conformity of the Charity Law to the state constitution, little work has been done to analyze the relationship of the Charity Law to the political constitution of China. This essay seeks to fill that gap by considering the role of the Charity Law through the lens of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China. More specifically, the essay examines the extent to which the provisions of the Charity Law, and its underlying policies, contribute to the implementation and realization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Basic Line and in the context of the overall political policy of “socialist modernization which has served as the core of the political line of the CCP since the last decades of the 20th century. The essay is organized as follows: Section II considers the specific provisions of the Charity Law, with some reference to changes between the first draft and the final version of the Charity Law. Section III then considers some of the more theoretical considerations that suggest a framework for understanding the great contribution of the Charity Law as well as the challenges that remain for the development of the productive forces of the civil society sector at this historical stage of China’s development.

 


I Introduction

After almost a decade of discussion,1 the Chinese National People’s Congress enacted its first Socialist Charity Undertakings Law (the “Charity Law”).2 The effort culminated in a consultation of drafts in late 2015 and early 2016. In 2015, Chinese authorities released an initial draft of a Charity Undertakings Law to which Chinese authorities invited commentary from both within China and from foreigners. In January 2016, Chinese authorities circulated a second draft Charity Undertakings Law to which they again invited commentary.3 The Charity Law was thereafter amended and adopted by the NCP in March 201, effective September 1, 2016.4

In announcing this important milestone in the development of the Socialist legal architecture for the People’s Republic of China, Xinhua/China Daily fo- cused on four measures of its importance and three measures of challenges.5 The most significant portions of the new Charity Law touched on its broad definition of charity,6 its efforts to simplify the registration and supervision system for charities,7 its encouragement of public fundraising,8 and certain fa- vorable tax preferences for charities.9 These are meant to meet the challenges of charity in China – providing a means for supervising a growing number of social organizations, with an aggregate budget of over 104 billion yuan, and encouraging individual donations which lag behind those of the United States per capita.10 Additionally, the Charity Law represents a decisive move toward public accountability through state supervision.11

Along with the Charity Law, the NCP also approved a regulation of Foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (FNGOs). But while charity organizations are now subject to local civil affairs departments, except to the extent of na- tional legislation, foreign NGOs will put the supervision of foreign NGOs under the public security organs at the national, provincial or local levels.12 Both rep- resent an effort to organize the productive forces of and better manage the civil society sector in line with the basic national policies of pushing forward the development of Socialist rule of law, Socialist culture and Socialist environ- mental policies. Both seek to ensure that non-economic activity within China serve the state as its government determines and for the ends of state. But each takes a quite distinct approach to regulatory management. Both have received positive and negative comments in China and the West. 13 Despite their relationship, the administrative coordination between these two regulatory frame- works has yet settled.14

These approaches mark both the great strength and the ultimate contradiction of the management of labor in the provision of public goods within a Marxist Leninist foundational conception of law, society and politics. The Foreign NGO Management Law treats foreign actors as a quasi-state actor.15 In contrast, the Charity Law treats charitable organizations as Leninist labor cooperatives.16 While both Charity and Foreign NGO Management Laws could profitably be considered as parts of a whole, each merits discussion for its own unique contribution to national development. It is easy to agree with NCP spokesperson Fu Ying that “the importance of the law ‘cannot be underestimated.’”17

This essay considers the role of the Charity Law through the lens of the Constitution of the Communist party of China.18 That is, the essay focuses on an analysis of the conformity of the Charity Law to the authoritative political rules of the nation;19 it does not attempt the conventional legal analysis of the conformity of the Charity Law to the state constitution.20 More specifically, the essay examines the extent to which the provisions of the Charity Law, and its underlying policies, contribute to the implementation and realization of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Basic Line.21 In addition, the essay considers the Charity Law in the context of the overall political policy of “socialist modernization”22 which has served as the core of the political line of the CCP since the last decades of the 20th century. Key elements in the implementation of “socialist modernization” are the political concepts of emancipating the mind, reform and opening up.23 More generally, the CCP Basic Line pro- duces a core set of political objectives to which all administrative expression is expected to conform through the application of the leadership authority of the CCP. “The Party must integrate the reform and opening up policy with the Four Cardinal Principles, carry out its basic line in all fields of endeavor, implement in an all-around way its basic program for the primary stage of socialism and combat all “Left” and Right erroneous tendencies, maintaining vigilance against Right tendencies, primarily against “Left” tendencies.”24 Considered from the perspective of the CCP line the Charities Undertakings Law offers both challenge and opportunity. It offers both a comprehensive approach to legalizing the field and yet presents an unfinished project deeply embedded generally in the political work of socialist modernization. The key areas that merit further consideration include provisions dealing with corruption protec- tion, the voluntary nature of service on charitable organizations and the role of foreign NGOs. “The law’s provisions affect not only domestic and foreign non- profits, but also a wide range of companies and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives.”25

The essay is organized as follows: Section II considers the specific provisions of the Charity Law, with some reference to changes between the first draft and the final version of the Charity Law. Section III then considers some of the more theoretical considerations that suggest a framework for understanding the great contribution of the Charity Law as well as the challenges that remain for the development of the productive forces of the civil society sector at this historical stage of China’s development. The comments assume familiarity with the Charity Law. 
NOTES:
1 Zhiqiang Meng, “Understanding the Core Essence of the Charity Law,” China Journal of Social Work 9.2 (2016): 184-190.
2 «中华人民共和国慈善法» (Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China), enacted March 16, 2016. English translation available http://chinalawtranslate.com/2016charitylaw/ ?lang=en. Please note that the essay considers the Charity Law as enacted. It does not consid- er any supplementary legislation. Nor does it consider the documents released for comment around the time of the enactment of the Charity Law. The author acknowledges the potential importance of the supplementary legislation for implementation, but its development would not change the trust of the analysis here, which is principally a legal-political rather than legal-technical analysis. The author notes as well that there will, as is common when dealing with translated work, for disagreements, sometimes substantial to center of the meaning of words.
3 See, “Charity Law Comparison Between the First and Second Draft” (2016) available http:// www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Comparison_CUL1_CUL2_2016 .pdf.
4 Charity Law Article 112. See also, Ashwin Kaja and Timothy P. Stratford, “China Builds New Framework Governing Civil Society Organizations, Part I: Charity Law,” Global Policy Watch (Covington & Burling, May 12, 2016) available https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2016/05/ china-builds-new-framework-governing-civil-society-organizations-part-i-charity-law/.
5 See, “China’s Charity Law takes effect Thursday,” Xinhua/China Daily (Aug. 31, 2016), available http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-08/31/content_26658510.htm. 
1 Zhiqiang Meng, “Understanding the Core Essence of the Charity Law,” China Journal of Social Work 9.2 (2016): 184-190.
2 «中华人民共和国慈善法» (Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China), enacted March 16, 2016. English translation available http://chinalawtranslate.com/2016charitylaw/ ?lang=en. Please note that the essay considers the Charity Law as enacted. It does not consid- er any supplementary legislation. Nor does it consider the documents released for comment around the time of the enactment of the Charity Law. The author acknowledges the potential importance of the supplementary legislation for implementation, but its development would not change the trust of the analysis here, which is principally a legal-political rather than legal-technical analysis. The author notes as well that there will, as is common when dealing with translated work, for disagreements, sometimes substantial to center of the meaning of words.
3 See, “Charity Law Comparison Between the First and Second Draft” (2016) available http:// www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Comparison_CUL1_CUL2_2016 .pdf.
4 Charity Law Article 112. See also, Ashwin Kaja and Timothy P. Stratford, “China Builds New Framework Governing Civil Society Organizations, Part I: Charity Law,” Global Policy Watch (Covington & Burling, May 12, 2016) available https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/2016/05/ china-builds-new-framework-governing-civil-society-organizations-part-i-charity-law/.
5 See, “China’s Charity Law takes effect Thursday,” Xinhua/China Daily (Aug. 31, 2016), available http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-08/31/content_26658510.htm.  
13 For the Charity Law, see, e.g., Reza Hasmayj, “The Pros and Cons of China’s NGO Laws,” The Diplomat (March 23, 2016), available http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/the-pros-and -cons-of-chinas-ngo-laws/. Jia Xijin, “Legislation for Foreign NGOs; how will the second boot land?” originally in Chinese in Caijing; English version http://chinadevelopment brief.cn/articles/legislations-for-foreign-ngos-how-will-the-second-boot-land/. Western criticism tended to focus on the effects of the new Charity Law on the creation of Western style civil society sectors in China. See, e.g., Josh Freedman, “China’s Charitable Turn?: How Beijing is Redefining the NGO Sector,” Foreign Affairs (July 10, 2016), available https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-07-10/chinas-charitable-turn.
14 See, e.g., Dong Zijin, “Five Considerations Regarding the Charity Law,” Alliance Magazine (Herman Zheng, trans., June 6, 2016), available http://www.alliancemagazine.org/blog/ five-considerations-regarding-the-charity-law/ (“Thus, in spite of the Charity Law, foreign charitable organizations regarded as charitable organizations cannot be included in the Charity Law management. This would require organic links in the management system in order to achieve the necessary combination, and a delicate balance between the manage- ment of charities and foreign NGOs.”).
15 See Larry Catá Backer, “Walls and the Symbolic Barrier in the Era of Reform and Opening Up” Law at the End of the Day (May 7, 2016), available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot .com/2016/05/larry-cata-backer-on-chinas-new-foreign.html.
16 On the concept of Leninist labor cooperatives as they operate in Cuba, see, Jesús Cruz Reyes and Camila Piñero Harnecker, “An Introduction to Cooperatives,” in Cooperatives and Socialism: A View From Cuba, ed. Camila Piñeiro Harnecker (London & New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013). For critical analysis, see, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, “The Cooperative as Proletarian Corporation: The Global Dimensions of Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity in Cuba,” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 33.3 (2013): 527-618.
17 “The Good – And Bad – About China’s New Charity Law,” supra. 
18 Constitution of the Communist Party of China 《中国共产党章程》 (adopted 1982, as amended).
19 Considered in Larry Catá Backer, “Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System,” Boston University International Law Journal 30.1 (2012): 331-408.
20 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China «中华人民共和国宪法» (adopted 1982 as amended). It is important to note that the Charity Law, like many recent legislative efforts, has been the product of a much more open textured and transparent consulta- tion process, both within China and abroad. Indeed, the draft Charity Law was released for online public consultation in 2015. See China Development Brief, “Draft Charity Law released online for public consultation,” 2 Nov. 2015, available http://chinadevelopment- brief.cn/news/draft-charity-law-released-online-for-public-consultation/. The argument could be made, then, that the draft Charity Law represents another example of a new kind of legislative effort in China, one that avoids the top down opaque processes of prior legislative efforts in favor of a more open process sin which the CCP plays a less decisive role. Yet it is important to distinguish between open consultation processes that might be meant to produce technical assistance with legislation (does it hold together, is it inter- nally consistent, was something overlooked, etc.) and those in which the consultation is meant to shift political oversight. In this case, like all others in China, the CCP continues to play a decisive leadership role. And that leadership role must be exercised in accor- dance with the CCP’s Line. To that end, socialist modernization, as it has evolved now into broad programs of developing productive forces in society, politics, law and culture, as well as in economic development, remain critical factors that tend to weigh heavily in the selection among policy choices. Technical matters, on the other hand, are less sensitive and might lend themselves to broader participation. In any case, even Western oriented techniques might eventually produce transpositions with Chinese characteristics. Cf. Adam Chodorow, “Charity with Chinese Characteristics,” UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 30 (2012): 1.
21 “The Basic Line of the Communist Party of China in the primary stage of socialism is to lead the people of all ethnic groups in a concerted, self-reliant and pioneering ef- fort to turn China into a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and har- monious modern socialist country by making economic development the central task while upholding the Four Cardinal Principles and the reform and opening up policy.” Constitution of the Communist Party of China, supra, General Program ¶ 10. The Basic Line of the Communist Party is elaborated in the General Program of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China, which comprises the first 28 paragraphs of that document. It sets out the basic political principles under which the Communist Party asserts political leadership over the state and its governmental organs, and of which the state constitution serves as an expression. See, Larry Catá Backer, “Towards a Robust Theory of the Chinese Constitutional State: Between Formalism and Legitimacy in Jiang Shigong’s Constitutionalism,” Modern China 40.2 (2014): 168-195.
22 Socialist modernization references the key political principal that “shifted the focus of the work of the whole Party onto economic development and carried out reform and open- ing to the outside world, ushering in a new era of development in the cause of socialism, gradually formulating the line, principles and policies concerning the building of social- ism with Chinese characteristics.” Constitution of the Communist Party of China, supra, General Program ¶ 5. The political principle of “socialist modernization” is elaborated fur- ther: “In building socialism, the basic task is to further release and develop the productive forces and achieve socialist modernization step by step by carrying out reform in those aspects and links of the production relations and the superstructure that do not conform to the development of the productive forces.” Ibid., ¶ 9.
23 “Emancipating the mind” touches on the obligation toward an appropriate working style centered on innovation and progress. “Second, persevering in emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, keeping up with the times, and being realistic and pragmatic. The Party’s ideological line is to proceed from reality in handling all matters, to integrate theory with practice, to seek truth from facts, and to verify and develop the truth through practice.” CCP Constitution, supra, General Program ¶25. “Reform” and “opening up” are two related concepts. “Reform and opening up are the path to a stronger China. Only reform and opening up can enable China, socialism and Marxism to develop themselves.” CCP Constitution, supra, General Program ¶ 13. The reform element is centered on eco- nomic reform and the development of national productive forces. These productive forc- es are understood as economic, social, cultural and political. Opening up references the need to consider global innovation and their utility to China, “breaking new ground in reform and opening up, make its reform decisions more scientific, better coordinate its reform measures and blaze new trails in practice.” Ibid.

The EU to the Rescue of the Cuban Economy? the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)

$
0
0

Even as the United States retreated from direct economic connections with Cuba, the European Union sought to step into the space left by the American action.  That strategic initiative, the  Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) took final form accelerated in the wake of the prior U.S. Administration's policy of opening up.
Negotiations for the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) were launched in April 2014 and concluded on 11 March 2016. After the approval by the Council of the European Union, it was officially signed on 12 December 2016. In parallel, the agreement was submitted to the EU Member States' national parliaments and the Cuban National Assembly for ratification. The European Parliament gave its consent on 5 July 2017. Most parts of the agreement start to be provisionally applied as of 1 November 2017. (here)
The Europeans view this as the marker of a new and more intensely profitable relationship with the Cuban state--though one not without its costs to Cuba. PDCA is the successor policy to the EU's Common Position which was repealed 12 December 2016 (repeal of the Common Position).

And now the EU's Federica Mogherini is on an official visit to Cuba for talks aimed at implementing the PDCA.  It is likely that on the agenda will be the structuring of the Joint Council established by PDCA to oversee the fulfillment of the agreement (PDCA art. 81) and the Joint Committee (Art. 82) charged with the actual implementation of the PDCA (Art. 82).

This post includes current reporting on the visit by Marc Frank for Reuters and an analysis of the PDCA. Most interesting is the possibility that in return for stronger ties the EU might have waived the application of its strong business and human rights measures to EU Cuba bilateral relations. The Background Brief on the PDCA (CPE Background Brief 1/2018) may be downloaded HERE.




The EU's Press Release announced the visit this way:
The High Representative/Vice President Federica Mogherini will travel to Cuba on 3-4 January, reconfirming the strong EU-Cuban relationship. During her visit, she will meet with government representatives, with a view to an ambitious and swift joint implementation of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between the EU and Cuba. Together with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla she will also prepare for the first EU-Cuba Joint Council meeting at ministerial level within the framework of the PDCA.

The Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement entered into provisional application on 1 November 2017. This landmark agreement – the first ever between the EU and Cuba – constitutes the new legal framework for EU-Cuba relations. It foresees an enhanced political dialogue, improved bilateral cooperation and the development of joint action in multilateral fora.
 


The PDCA binds the EU other than potentially the UK and or Ireland (PDCA, CU/EU/en 9). The General Principles (Article 1) reaffirm general commitments to a set of ambiguous concepts: multilateralism, respect for international law and the principles of the U.N. Charter, the principles of equality, reciprocity and mutual respect, and to the promotion of sustainable development. (Art. 1 ¶¶1-2, 4).  Of course these are likely understood in almost diametrically different ways by the EU and Cuba but it provides sufficient cover for moving forward along pragmatic lines without losing face. That fig leaf is made clear by the agreement that implementation of PDCA would be undertaken "in accordance with their respective constitutional principles, legal frameworks, legislation, norms and regulations, as well as the applicable international instruments to which they are parties." (Art. 1 ¶ 3).  Complicating these initial principles are declarations of "respect for and the promotion of democratic principles, respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the core international human-rights instruments and their optional protocols which are applicable to the Parties, and respect for the rule of law." (Art. 1 ¶5).  But this is limited both by the provisions of ¶¶ 1-2 as well as by the provisions of ¶ 6 in which both sides "recognise that all peoples have the right to freely determine their political system and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." (Art. 1, ¶ 6). Taken together these Principles balance nicely the political needs of the EU and Cuba in a way that recognizes both but permits each to ignore the contradictions of their respective positions applied to the condition of the other. 

Article 2 specifies the objectives of the PDCA.  These are both straightforward and general. It is meant to help Cuba update its economy and society (Art. 2 ¶ (b)) through dialogue and cooperation (Ibid, ¶¶ (a), (g) ),  promote mutual trade (Ibid ¶ (e)), and the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Ibid, ¶ (d)).  Most interesting is the objective of enhancing regional trade in the Caribbean and Latin America (Ibid ¶ (f)).  

To those ends, Part II of PDCA speaks to the contours of political dialogue.  These touch on the usual: promoting exchanges, enable broad exchanges of views , center exchange son the UN system, and promote strategic partnerships between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) created in 2010 (Ibid., Art 3). The later is particularly useful to Cuba, which has had long term ambitions to lead at least Caribbean regional trade and political framework (see, e.g., here).  All of this cooperation is to be undertaken at the state to state level--no people to people focus here (Ibid., Art. 4). That approach serves as the heart of an open ended and vague provision respecting human rights.  Article 5 provides in its entirety:
Within the framework of the overall political dialogue, the Parties agree to establish a human rights dialogue, with a view to enhancing practical cooperation between the Parties at both multilateral and bilateral level. The agenda for each dialogue session shall be agreed by the parties, reflect their respective interests and take care to address in a balanced fashion civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights.
The key is in the last sentence. The Cubans will emphasize economic, social and cultural rights while the Europeans will push civil and political rights.  To some extent this serves U.S. interest as well--to the extent that the EU can be used as a proxy for pushing for political reform acceptable to the Americans.  The Cubans, anticipating this, will likely negotiate hard. 

In addition, PDCA covers illicit trade in small arms and lkight weapons and other conventional weapons (Art. 6); disarmament and non proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Art. 7); anti-terrorism measures (art. 8); international criminality (art. 9);  and unilateral coercive measures (art. 10).  Additional areas of cooperation include combating trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling (Art. 11); trade in illicit drugs (Art. 12); and combating race discrimination, xenophobia and relate intolerance (art. 13).  With respect to the latter the focus is on exchanging best practices. Lastly Article 14 focuses on sustainable development, mostly through the exchange of views.

Article 10, of course, is the most interesting to the extent that the specter of the U.S: embargo hangs over it.  But much more important is the potential effect of Article 10 on the ability of the EU to export its increasingly effective extraterritorial regime for the promotion of human rights.  It is not clear from PDCA whether this provision is meant to prohibit the application of new measures--the Modern Slavery Act and the French Supply Chain Due Diligence Law in  relations between the EU and Cuba, where ever they might manifest.  The EU will resist that reading by emphasizing the language "that are contrary to international law and commonly accepted rules of international trade." (Art. 10 ¶ 1). The Cubans, on the other hand, would emphasize the language: "which are used as a means of political and economic pressure against States and affect the sovereignty of other States." (Ibid).  How this will be decided remains to be seen--but for the moment it is clear that both sides believe they have protected their respective principles and thus creating a contradiction that will manifest itself the first time a human rights related charge is brought against enterprises operating in or through Cuba or its SOEs. Expect to see this potentially through the OCED Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise NCP mechanisms

Part III gets to the root of things, the provisions on Cooperation and sector-policy dialogue.  These touch on the core areas of development set out in the Cuban 2030 Plan (see here)(discussed HERE).  In particular, Part III, Title VI then deals with sector specific economic development at ties EU Cuba cooperation to the focal points of the Cuban 2030 Economic Plan. These touch on agriculture (Art. 50); tourism (Art. 51); science, technology and innovation (Art. 52); technology transfer (Art. 53); energy production (Art. 54); and transport (Art. 55).

However, Title I on cooperation sectors (Art. 20) that follow an EU pattern: "(a) sustainable development, (b) human rights and good governance, (c) environmental sustainability, (d) disaster prevention, (e)gender perspective, (f) persons in a situation of vulnerability, (g) building national capacities, and (h) knowledge management." The objectives (Art. 15) emphasize focus on Cuban economic development goals within the sustainable development framework. The principles (Ar. 16) focus on cooperation through which each sides makes the best deal it can ( echoing ironically enough the recasting of trade policy by the Trump Administration (see, e.g. here).  Sector policy dialogue (Art. 17) is centered on information sharing, the harmonization of standards, and capacity building through best practices sharing. Implementation of dialogue (Art. 18, Cooperation modalities and procedures) is meant ot be enhanced by EU money (Art. 18 ¶1((a) ("technical and financial assistance")), and by coordination that furthers and complements Cuba's ·development strategies and policies." (Art. 18 ¶1((b)).  Also interesting is the focus on the EU's help in securing financing for Cuban economic ambitions (Art. 18 ¶1((g) ("innovative cooperation and financing modalities and instruments in order to improve the effectiveness of cooperation")). Cuba for its part agrees not to use cooperation as a means of enhancing its revenues and not impede travel by officials(Art. 18 ¶5).  Article 19 then identifies relevant actors covered by the cooperation arrangements.  In addition to the usual international public actors, Art. 19 ¶ (e) also identifies "civil society, including scientific, technical, cultural, artistic, sports, friendship and solidarity associations, social organisations, trade unions and cooperatives." Again, the provision is vague enough to give Cuba the authority to ban civil society groups that it deems politically threatening, while the EU might take the position that all such organizations come within the umbrella of this provision.  Expect some friction here.  Some clarity, however, is attempted in Article 36
The Parties recognise the potential contribution of civil society, including academia, think tanks and media, to the fulfilment of the objectives of this Agreement. They agree to promote actions in support of greater civil-society participation in the formulation and implementation of relevant development and sectoral cooperation activities, including through capacity-building.
I expect that the Cubans might read this narrowly (academics, think tanks and credentialed media).  Expect some friction as well in the context of the anti-fraud and corruption provisions of Article 21.

Part III, Title II deals specifically with the EU's great concern--democracy, human rights and good governance.  These provisions give the EU some leeway in tying economic benefits to political reform, but the potential hidden in those provisions may require substantial work for their realization--at least as the EU might see things.  Article 22 touches on human rights.  Its first paragraph nicely evidences the mishmash resulting from an attempt to push together two very different views of human rights
Mindful that the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is the first responsibility of governments, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and of various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds and acknowledging that it is their duty to protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, the Parties agree to cooperate in the area of democracy and human rights.
Note the tensions in the provisions, the balancing of distinct approaches that will be difficult to untangle and that provides neither side with an advantage.  The likely result will be little beyond the usual rhetoric and claims to victory by both sides as their respective enterprise seek to make money.  Article 23 (good governance) and Article 25 (modernization of public administration) provides the Cuban with necessary capacity building that aligns with the focus of the Cuban Lineamientos on the development of governance in furtherance of their economic model. It is not clear in what direction Article 24 (rule of law) will develop. It is likely that this will be used to ensure a measure of protection of investors from the EU operating in Cuba through agreements negotiate under the umbrella of PDCA, something to which Article 26 (prevention and resolution of conflicts) is also devoted. 

Part III, title II then focuses on issues of justice, citizen security and migration.  These include issues around the protection of personal data (Art. 27), an issue quite dear to the EU and less so to the Cubans. It also touches on trade in illicit drugs (Art. 28); money laundering (Art. 29); organized crime (Art. 30); anti-corruption measures (Art. 31); illicit trade in small arms (Art. 32); anti-terrorism (Art. 33); migration (Art. 34); and consular protection (Art. 35).  Part III, Title IV then touches on social development and social cohesion. This furthers basic Cuban policy elaborated in the 7th Cuban Communist Party Congress'Conceptualización del Modelo Económico y Social Cubano de Desarrollo Socialista (2017) (discussed HERE).  Article 37 essentially summarizes the Cuban position on the integration of socialist economic and social development from its 7th PCC principles. Article 38 may be more problematic for Cuba, aligning cooperation around ILO standards.  Article 39 speaks to educational cooperation, Article 40 to public health, and Article 41, tersely, with consumer protection.  There is a wide scope of agreement possible with respect to a number of related areas of cooperation: culture and heritage (Art. 42); protection of vulnerable persons (Art. 43); a focus on gender (Art. 44); interaction of youth (Art. 45); and local community development (Art. 46 with respect to which Cuba has a long history especially with EU based NGO). 

Part III, Title V focuses on environment, disaster risk management, and climate change.  These are areas in which cooperation is likely to produce a substantial amount of positive effects. The principal focus (Art. 47 ¶ 4) includes conservation and sustainable development, protection of fresh and marine waters, and climate change issues generally.   Disaster risk management (Art. 48) of critical importance to Cuba, looks to "common commitment to improving prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery measures in order to increase the resilience of their societies and infrastructure, and to cooperate, where appropriate, at bilateral and multilateral political level to improve disaster-risk-management outcomes."  Water sanitation (Art. 49) has also been a concern of Cuban planning as its infrastructure, especially in the older portions of its major cities, has been deteriorating. This also aligns with Cuban central planning goals for 2030. 

Beyond its focus on the sectoral development of the Cuban economy that aligns with the Cuban 2030 Economic and Social Plan, Part III, Title VI touches on modernization of the economic and social model. But this modernization is narrowly tailored to avoid the complications of political repercussions or back door regime change strategies.  Art. 56 ¶ 1 focuses on strengthening Cuban public administration and the development of Cuban cooperatives and enterprises.  This is somewhat sensitive in light of recent efforts by the Cuban state to stop licensing cooperatives and to better control the private sector (see here). Art. 56 ¶ 3 makes the "helpful but not threatening" approach explicit.
The Parties agree to promote and encourage cooperation between institutions, including sector-based institutions, that promote instruments to support SMEs, particularly those whose efforts are aimed at improving competitiveness, technological innovation, integration in value chains, access to credit and training as well as strengthening the institutional capacity and institutional framework. They also agree to promote contacts between companies from both Parties to support their insertion into international markets, investments and technology transfer.

Lastly issues of good governance in taxation (Art. 58) and statistics and data production (Art. 57) are covered. The last is particularly important as regulation moves form command to big data management systems.  It encourages "including the exchange of scientists; the development of improved and consistent methods of data collection, disaggregation, analysis and interpretation; and the organisation of seminars, working groups or programmes complementing statistical capacities." 

Part IV then turns to trade and trade cooperation.  Article 60's objectives include the usual.  There are some more interesting and points to the unequal element in the cooperation deal that the PDCA represents.  Cuba has a need that the EU does not--to be integrated into the world economy (Art. 60 ¶ (b)).  That means not merely integration into economic globalization, but also avoidance of the U.S. trade sanctions in place since the 1960s.  That is a tall order, especially as the U.S: moves from global embargoes to precision blacklists. This is especially likely with expanded use of Global Magnitsky Act sanctions.   The EU has also adopted this approach. (see The List as Law: CARICOM, Cuba and the EU's Tax Haven List for its effects on Caribbean economies and potentially against Cuba). As important, Europe is seen as an important target zone for the exploitation of a key area of sectoral development in Cuba under its 2030 Plan--pharmaceuticals (See Art. 60 ¶(f)).   

Part IV Title I focuses on trade and the outlines of bilateral investment (BIT) terms.  It is meant to be developed to reduce trade barriers (fiscal and otherwise; Art. 61 ¶1), and to be grounded on  "rule-based multilateral trading system under which the Parties are responsible for maintaining the primacy of rules and their effective, fair and balanced implementation" (Ibid ¶ 2).  The parties pledge to accord most favored nations treatment to each other  with the usual exception  in accordance with WTO agreements (Art. 62) as well as to each accord national treatment to the goods of the other (Art. 63). There are affirmances of transparency of trade measures (Art. 64) and of mutual commitment to the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (Art. 65) and the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Art. 66) along with standards agreements (Art. 67), trade defense (Art. 68), and of existing  obligations under Article XX of GATT (Art. 70), all subject to mutually agreed revision (Art. 69).

Part IV Title II, then focuses on trade related cooperation. These include customs (Art. 71), and administrative measures around trade facilitation (Art. 72).  These later commitments will pose something of a challenge for both the rules rigid EU and the sometimes heavy handed administrative control cultures of Cuba.  But it is the thought that counts and many of these measures are written as inspirational goals rather than as implementable measures. Protection of intellectual property is the focus of Article 73, which itself can pose problems given the messiness on that score that was generated after the 1959 Revolution. Going forward deals, on the other hand may be easier. Capacity building is an important focus on measures regarding cooperation on technical barriers to trade (Art. 74) and trade defense (Art. 78).  Increasing trade in agricultural products is the core of the provisions around food safety and animals welfare (Art. 75) with a similar objective for trade in traditional and artisanal goods--from both sides (Art. 76) though in the absence of strong consumer markets in Cuba it is hard to see how this flows any way but out of Cuba and into the hands of wealthy European consumers. A sustainable development chapeau is also provided (Art. 76). The EU secured recognition of the importance (to it) of protection of rules of origin (Art. 79) and both parties pledged greater and better coordinated mutual investment (Art. 80).

All of these aspirations have to be institutionalized somehow and Part V serves to memorialize these new institutional structures. Given the heavily bureaucratized cultures of the EU and of Cuba it comes as no surprise that
A Joint Council is hereby established. It shall oversee the fulfilment of the objectives of this Agreement and supervise its implementation. It shall meet at ministerial level at regular intervals, not exceeding a period of two years, and extraordinarily whenever circumstances so require, if the Parties so agree. (Art. 81 ¶ 1)
Beyond the policy and direction of the Joint Council, a working directorate--the Joint Committee is established to actually attempt implementation (Art. 82).  It meets once a year.  It is unlikely to have much control of the day to day movement on the agreement which suggests that the driving force will be elsewhere within the EU and Cuban bureaucracies. That "somewhere may be overseen by the various sub-committees that may be established under the Joint Committee (Art. 83), though these too meet infrequently though regularly. 

Taken together, the PDCA appears to give both parties what they want most. For the Cubans that is a counterweight to both their friends (the Russians and Chinese) and their frenemies (the Americans). It provides a more solid basis for the fulfillment of key areas of the 2030 Economic Plan through entry into lucrative European markets--but only if the Cubans can deliver.  And that may take a bit of financial help from either the Europeans (intimated in the PDCA) or from their friends. Even better, the PDCA might help Cuba avoid the effects of the U.S: embargo--especially those aspects targeting the economic drivers of the Cuban economy that have been targeted by the latest round of U.S. sanctions. For the Europeans it appears to broaden their influence abroad.  It also appears to provide a wedge in to reform on two levels.  The first is with respect to human rights related reforms on the political level. The second, and much more achievable in part is the opening to human rights and sustainability based business conduct.

But Cuba and the Europeans have been down this road before.  It is far too early to determine whether this time there will be greater success over the long term than in the past.  Given the potential instability of the beginning of the transition era, it is likely that success will have to target very long term targets.




__________
European Union diplomat visits Cuba to strengthen ties
By Marc Frank
Reuters Jan. 3, 2018

HAVANA, Jan 3 (Reuters) - The European Union’s top diplomat Federica Mogherini arrived in Cuba on Wednesday to help strengthen member countries' economic and political ties with the Communist-run island.

Mogherini’s visit “reconfirms the strong EU-Cuban relationship,” and she will press for an “ambitious and swift joint implementation of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement,” the EU said in a statement.

As the U.S.-Cuba rapprochement unfolded in 2015-2016 the EU dropped all sanctions and negotiated the agreement, the first accord between Cuba and the 28-nation bloc.

Signed in December 2016 and ratified in November, the EU said at the time that it hoped to position its companies for Cuba’s transition to a more open economy and allow it to press for political freedoms on the island.

Mogherini’s visit contrasts with the Trump administration’s partial rollback of a fragile detente between the old Cold War foes begun by former U.S. President Barack Obama.

Her first official meeting on the two-day visit was with Foreign Investment and Cooperation Minister Rodrigo Malmierca.

She was also scheduled to meet with the head of the Roman Catholic Church, Archbishop Giorgorio Lingua, and Cuban Foreign minister Bruno Rodriguez on Thursday.

“Cuba's weak economy has been battered by the collapse in Venezuela, making it more vulnerable and open to foreign capital. Europe is seizing the moment,” Economist Andrew Zimbalist, a Cuba expert at Smith College in the United States, said.

Cuba faces a host of challenges, including declining aid from socialist ally Venezuela. Last month it extended the term of its current leadership to April, signaling a two-month delay in the historic handover from Raul Castro to a new president, while announcing tighter regulations on the non-state sector. (Full Story)

The official Juventud Rebelde newspaper reported on Wednesday that the EU is the most important exporter and second trading partner of Cuba, and also the most important donor of cooperation and foreign investment.
(Reporting by Marc Frank; Editing by Susan Thomas)

Interpretation and Fracture As the Orishas Speak Part II: The Full 2018 Letter of the Yoruba Association of Cuba (Letra del Año para el 2018 de la Asociación Yoruba de Cuba)

$
0
0


(Pix CiberCuba Jan 3, 2018)

For the last six years I have written of the annual letter of the Cuban Council of the High Priests of Ifá (Consejo Cubano De Sacerdotes Mayores De Ifá), the practitioners of traditional religion brought over from West Africa with the slave trade and now naturalized as a powerful indigenous religion throughout the Caribbean and growing in the United States. (e.g., 2016, 2015; 2014; 2013; 2012).

The annual letter is usually received in two parts. Immediately after the New Year the oracular portions of the Annual Letter are distributed (Adelanto). These include the bare oracular pronouncements received during the ceremonies undertaken at the start of the year.  Those oracular pronouncement are then amplified by a more extensive set of interpretations--including predictions, advice and ritual suggestions in an amplified letter delivered a few days later.

In that respect this year was no different. The Full 2018 Annual Letter with its predictions and guidance follows (and here). But this year was also different in one important respect. This year a group of priests have contested the predictions (not the oracles) of the association of priests who came together to draw them up.  (Polémica entre los santeros cubanos por predicciones "manipuladas" para el 2018, CiberCuba 3 Jan. 2018). This is a dispute about interpretation that in may ways mirrors those of the religious controversies  within Christianity, Islam and Eastern religions.  Interpretation becomes more important where the oracle is pointed toward criticism or prediction about consequences to powerful social actors--the state, great officials, members of the higher rungs of society, and within the fundamental social relationships through which society is organized. It is here that oracular wisdom can be put to more profane use, and where the politics (as well as the semiotics) of interpretation becomes  a matter of politics, and social power.  My brief comments and the news reporting of the interpretive schism follows.






In a prior post I included the Adelanto to the 2017 Annual Letter of the Cuban Yoruba Association. The great value of the Adelanto was its close connection with the oracular.  It provided the bare bones of the annual divination--the odùs ifá, the guiding manifestations of the divine (the ruling Orishas)and related information.  It provides enough so that one could, with reference to this information, to develop one's own sense of the direction that the oracular pronouncements might lead--in a general way (consider mine here).

Most religions demand more of the priestly caste than an oracle and a bare divination; the priestly function is inherently interpretive not merely oracular. The people require more than a communication from the divine, they demand guidance, grounded in the traditions, practices, and authority of the priestly institution.  That applies as much to well established Abrahamic religions, as it does to the great religious institutions of South and East Asia.

And so, the Annual Letter includes not merely oracle but interpretation, amplifying and guiding the community of believers.  It is these predictions that have tended to generate interest among individuals, communities and when so inclined, the state and its officials (particularly for a time in Cuba).

2018 was no different in that respect.  But what was different this year was the potential fracture that the interpretive portion of the Annual Letter appears to have generated among the Cuban priestly community (Polémica entre los santeros cubanos por predicciones "manipuladas" para el 2018, CiberCuba 3 Jan. 2018). The controversy touches on the specific predictions extracted from the oracles received. And more importantly it toucvhes on the political effects of the predictions in light of the current situation in Cuba.
Según un comunicado de la Asociación Yorubas Libres, la otra asociación anuncia "una Letra del Año totalmente manipulada y a tono con los intereses de la tiranía ateo materialista" y sus miembros "carecen de autoridad moral religiosa para hablar en nombre de los yorubas y publicar predicciones que afectan al presente y futuro" del país.
Esta asociación reprochó también a la Asociación Cultural Yoruba que les haya "faltado el coraje de pronunciarse a favor de los presos políticos cubanos y de las torturas y vejámenes que padecen" y también criticó que rezaran "a favor" del ex presidente Fidel Castro , fallecido en 2016. (Polémica entre los santeros cubanos por predicciones "manipuladas" para el 2018, CiberCuba 3 Jan. 2018). [According to a statement from the Asociación Yorubas Libres, the other association delivered "a Letter of the Year totally manipulated and in tune with the interests of the materialistic atheist tyranny" and its members "lack religious moral authority to speak on behalf of the Yoruba and publish predictions that affect the present and future" of the country. This association also criticized the Yoruba Cultural Association on the basis that it "lacked the courage to speak out in favor of the Cuban political prisoners and the tortures and humiliations they suffer" and also criticized that they prayed "in favor" of former President Fidel Castro, who diedin 2016.]
The curious point is that the predictions were quite general and neutral.  But that was the problem.  And that went not to the interpretation of the oracular aspects of the divination but to the role of the priestly caste in its interpretation--and thus in the role of the priest in relation to the leaders of industry and the state. The issue was made clear by leaders of the religious community in Miami
“Hay que tomar en cuenta las condiciones sociopolíticas del país, porque en Cuba todo es política”, dice Pichardo a el Nuevo Herald en su casa del sur de Miami. “Hay que analizarlas en su contexto, no desde la perspectiva de acá. Hay que entender que allá ciertas cosas se omiten o tienen que decirlas diferentes”.“La función de nuestra iglesia es ponerla desde un punto de vista coherente para el que vive aquí”.Pichardo explica así el significado que puede tener unos de los refranes más intrigantes del signo de la Letra del Año: “El hijo sigue la tradición del padre”.“Esa frase es muy manipulable en el contexto de Cuba”, apunta. “Si un padre es un sociópata, ¿el hijo debe serlo también?”.En un ambiente y cultura sociópata, decir que el hijo no tiene otras opciones es “una frase muy conveniente”, afirma.Pichardo también señala que para las personas interesadas en el estatus quo, este signo puede hablar de conspiraciones. Una de las recomendaciones de la letra es “No debemos revelar secretos confiados a nosotros”. (Sarah Moreno, Letra del Año 2018 trae ‘frases manipulables’ y en Cuba ‘se omiten ciertas cosas’, dice babalawo de Miami,El Nuevo Herald, 3 Jan. 2018)

Read more here: http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/cuba-es/article192863514.html#storylink=cpy

Read more here: http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/america-latina/cuba-es/article192863514.html#storylink=cpy
The prblem of interpretaiton., then, is the problem of politics.  What is understoodf may sometimes be required to remain unuttered, and sometimes must be uttered in diffeernt ways.  The chopice is that of the priest, but of the priest deeply embedded within the political and social context in which he is situated.  The divine voice, then, acquires, a very human face.

This is an issue at the center of continuing controversy within the West and elsewhere. It touches on  the uses of the interpretive powers of religious leaders in states that are founded, or whose masses can be mobilized  around revelation, in whatever form received.  One can read revealed truth in many ways; to read revealed truth in an authoritative way is quite distinct exercise.  And it is in the human act of receiving divine communication that one encounters the all to human needs of politics and social relations.  One is reminded here of Nietzsche and his criticism of the perversions of the priestly function:  "By letting God judge, they them,selves judge; by glorifying God, they glorify themselves; by demanding the virtues of which they happen to be capable--even more, which they require in order to stay on top of all--they give themselves the magnificent appearance of a struggle for virtue." (Nietzsche, The Antichrist ¶ 44).  That is the inevitable test of those who stand between the divine and the all to human. And the trap is set by an unchecked authority whose worthiness is only understood after the fact.

And yet for those who seek it, the divine voice remains readily accessible within the revealed oracles and memorialñs that the world's religions provide us. If one believes.  And perhaps the sum of those revelations begin to produce a glimpse of the outer reaches of the manifestaiton of the divine in which its readers might well play only a peripheral role. That, at any rate, is a matter itself bound up with ther revelaiton embedded within eavch community of believers. 

The Full 2018 Annual Letter with its predictions and guidance follows. The CiberCuba reporting on the controversy over interpretation also follows with links to a video. Lastly   links to the Letters from the communities in other states, courtesy of Proyecto Orunmila.



 
A los sacerdotes de Ifá, a los hermanos Oriaté, Babaloshas, Iyaloshas e Iworos. Pueblo religioso en general y a quien pueda interesar.

El día 31 de Diciembre del 2017 se reúnen en la sede social de la ̈Institución Religiosa ̈ Asociación Cultural Yoruba de Cuba (ACYC) los miembros de la Comisión Organizadora de la Letra del Año, para realizar la Ceremonia de Apertura del Año 2018. Presidida por el Sacerdote de Ifá Lucas abellasturis, “Awo Ogbeyono”. y el respaldo de los Sacerdotes de IFA de todas las familias de Cuba y sus descendientes en el Mundo, sacó La Letra el Sacerdote más pequeño.

Signo Regente:OSA SHE Primer Testigo OGBE SA Segundo Testigo OTURA TIYU
Oración Profética: iré ariku Yale Tesi timbelaye Lese Orunmila. (Un bien de salud completa, siguiendo los patrones de Orunmila).
Onishe.
Aladimu (Rogativa a Orunmila con 16 frutas en una canasta, y sus velas).
Divinidad que Gobierna: YEMAYA
Deidad Acompañante:ELEGUA
Bandera del Año:Mitad Blanca, Mitad Azul, Con Ribetes Negros.
Ebbo: Un Chivo Mamon a Elegua, 7 Machetes, 7 Banderas, Tierra 4 Esquinas, Ropa Sudada, maíz, jutia, pescado ahumado, miel de abejas, cascarilla y demás Ingredientes.

Refranes del Signo:
  • ▪  Toda persona es digna de respeto.
  • ▪  Los padres no piden bendición a los hijos.
  • ▪  Si no sabes con la Ley que se vive en este mundo, tienes que ir a vivir al otro.
  • ▪  El hijo sigue la tradición del padre.
    Atender el mensaje que brinda el caracol de osha. (Respetar los tabúes que han sido prohibidos a través de este oráculo).
    Plantas del Signo:Flor de agua, Pico de Pato, Sargazo, y Tibisí. ENFERMEDADES QUE AUMENTAN SU ÍNDICE.
  • ▪  Enfermedades neurológicas.
  • ▪  Enfermedades del tractus digestivo-intestinal.
  • ▪  Impotencia a temprana edad, como consecuencia de la promiscuidad.
  • ▪  Incremento del índice de enfermedades de trasmisión sexual.
Acontecimientos de Interés Social
Problemas en el sector agrícola fundamentalmente en la producción de viandas, granos y hortalizas, como consecuencia de la poca fertilización de los suelos, y la poca convocatoria de recursos humanos a este sector.
▪ ▪ ▪
Movimientos telúricos, que pueden conducir a derrumbes. Incremento de violaciones a menores de edad.
Catástrofes naturales.

Recomendaciones:
No debemos guardar rencor por cosas pasadas, hay que aprender a perdonar, el perdón no libera a la persona que nos daño de su culpa, pero si a nosotros de un sufrimiento.
Hay que mantener buena conducta social y moral.
Controlar el exceso de la ingestión de bebidas alcohólicas.
No debemos revelar secretos confiados a nosotros
Cuidar, y proteger el eco sistema y medio ambiente.
Los padres deben mantener control y vigilancia sobre la conducta de sus hijos.
Evitar la violencia domestica en todas sus manifestaciones.
Hay que ser organizado en las proyecciones tanto sociales, como religiosas.
Afectación en los miembros inferiores producto de accidentes.
Los Padres deben ser ejemplo de las buenas costumbres en su actuar en beneficio de sus
hijos.
Recomendamos que las personas acudan a casa de sus padrinos en busca de orientaciones. Revisar el sistema educacional.

Agradecemos a los Órganos Masivos de Comunicación que hacen posible que estas Predicciones lleguen a todos los rincones del Mundo.

Feliz y Próspero Año 2018
ESTA HOJA ES GRATUITA.

 __________

La Habana, 3 ene (EFE).- Los vaticinios anuales que difunden los santeros cubanos estuvieron envueltos este año en una polémica después de que una de las asociaciones que agrupan a este colectivo religioso acusara a otra de anunciar predicciones "manipuladas" y acordes a los intereses del Gobierno de la Isla.

Estas predicciones, conocidas como la "Letra del Año", se difunden en los primeros días de enero y son muy esperadas por los cubanos, ya que un alto porcentaje de la población del país practica, en mayor o menor medida, las tradiciones religiosas afrocubanas, muy sincretizadas con el catolicismo.




Los medios estatales se hicieron eco el martes de los vaticinios elaborados por la Asociación Cultural Yoruba, mientras que la Asociación Yorubas Libres de Cuba pidió a los cubanos que no reconocieran esa "Letra del Año" porque los sacerdotes que la elaboran son "un apéndice del cuartel general de la seguridad del Estado".

Según un comunicado de la Asociación Yorubas Libres, la otra asociación anuncia"una Letra del Año totalmente manipulada y a tono con los intereses de la tiranía ateo materialista" y sus miembros "carecen de autoridad moral religiosa para hablar en nombre de los yorubas y publicar predicciones que afectan al presente y futuro"del país.




Esta asociación reprochó también a la Asociación Cultural Yoruba que les haya "faltado el coraje de pronunciarse a favor de los presos políticos cubanos y de las torturas y vejámenes que padecen" y también criticó que rezaran "a favor" del ex presidente Fidel Castro , fallecido en 2016.

En vida del ex mandatario y especialmente desde que enfermó en 2006, la "Letra del Año" también provocaba una fuerte expectación en la isla por si contenía alguna pista sobre el estado de salud de Castro, asunto que fue motivo de especulación durante años.
La "Letra del Año" difundida por la Asociación Cultural Yoruba destacó para 2018 la necesidad de cuidar el ecosistema, mantener la armonía familiar y mantener "buena conducta social y moral", según un reporte de la agencia estatal Prensa Latina.
Frente a las críticas de los Yorubas Libres, esa nota resalta que las predicciones las hicieron sacerdotes "de las diferentes ramas religiosas existentes en el país, que por tercer año consecutivo realizan sus ceremonias en un ambiente de unidad y ecumenismo".




El vaticinio augura "problemas en el sector agrícola, fundamentalmente en la producción de viandas, granos y hortalizas como consecuencia de la poca fertilización de los suelos y la poca convocatoria de recursos humanos a este sector", pronostica sismos y alude a las relaciones entre padres e hijos.

"Toda persona es digna de respeto", "los padres no piden la bendición a los hijos" y "el hijo sigue la tradición del padre" son algunos de los proverbios destacados en la predicción afrocubana para este año.

Además, de acuerdo a los medios oficiales cubanos, los santeros anticiparon un aumento de las enfermedades neurológicas, digestivas y de transmisión sexual; un alza en la impotencia sexual a temprana edad como consecuencia de la promiscuidad y de las violaciones a menores; y exhortaron a no guardar rencor por cosas pasadas, aprender a perdonar y evitar la violencia doméstica.

Este año estará regido por la deidad Yemayá, diosa de la maternidad y dueña del mar, que estará acompañado de Elegguá, dios de los caminos.

__________

Just Published: "Sovereign Wealth Funds, Capacity Building, Development and Governance," Wake Forest Law Review 52(4):735-780 (2017)

$
0
0



I am happy to announce the publication of "Sovereign Wealth Funds, Capacity Building, Development and Governance," which appears in the Wake Forest Law Review 52(4):735-780 (2017).  The article considers sovereigns wealth funds in a new environment in which what had been a relatively straightforward device has become enmeshed in complex webs of finance, regional politics, and global production.  It considers the ways that emerging forms of SWF forms could be used by African states to enhance their autonomy and development. 

The Abstract and Introduction follow.  The article can be accessed here and here.



"Sovereign Wealth Funds, Capacity Building, Development and Governance" 
Larry Catá Backer
Wake Forest Law Review 52(4):735-780 (2017)

Abstract: Though operating in some form or another for over half a century, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) did not become an object of general attention until the early part of the 21st century when a combination of the need of developed states for investment and the growing acceptability of state investment in private markets abroad made them both threatening and convenient. Assured by the framework of the Santiago Principles most states now view SWFs as a useful multi-purpose sovereign investment vehicle. Yet over the last decade or so, SWFs appear to have developed the potential to become an important instrument in good governance and development, especially for resource rich and capacity poor developing states. Following the lead of Chile, and with the patronage of IFIs, these SWFs have begun to serve objectives as and with development banks both within and beyond their home state. This paper considers the capacity of SWFs to serve ends beyond mere fund value maximization as envisioned in the Santiago Principles. It explores the value of SWFs as a means of enhancing governance capacity in weaker states, its utility in enhancing development objectives, the emerging landscape of joint ventures among SWFs for development and their intersections with emerging infrastructure and development banks, and their importance in enhancing the operationalization of emerging international business and human rights standards not only within their own organizations but through their investment activities. A brief assessment of these trends ends the paper. It develops a set of transformative changes in approaches to SWF instrumentality that SWFs, especially the smaller SWFs and those in developing states, with a focus on Africa, might deploy in structuring and operating their SWFs within a globalized economic order. These strategies are meant to avoid the circular characteristics of current discussions grounded on premises of finance instrument silos and state based systems that no longer accord with the realities of, and fail to take advantage of the possibilities now offered through, global finance and can be grouped into the three transforming categories suggested in Section III: regionalization strategies; financial objectives strategies; governance strategies.The Article ends by suggesting  that it may be time to move from the constraining language of SWFs to the more realistic law of sovereign investing.



Introduction

A peaceable kingdom:[1] once upon a time, and not so long ago, there existed the Empire that is (or was) Globalization, one made up of many kingdoms woven together into a single transnational order. While there was order, there was little peace and the Empire was constantly on the defense against monsters spawned from out of itself, and thus spawned, such monsters might be set free to terrorize the inhabitants of those many kingdoms that together constituted this transnational order. With the rise of each monster, all would seem lost, or at least diminished. But for every beast whose ravings threaten the good order of the global system, the great defenders of the transnational order could wield regulatory reform, like music in William Congreve’s play, The Mourning Bride, with “[c]harms to sooth a savage B[r]east, To soften Rocks, or bend a knotted Oak.”[2] But could all beasts be so domesticated by the sonorous melodies of reform that preserved the good order of the system itself?

Enter the beast: When the state is itself the beast that seeks both the protection of Globalization and its undoing, the protection of the good order of the transnational system becomes more complicated, against which the tonics may have little effect. Enter sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”); though operating in some form or another for over half a century,[3] SWFs did not become an object of general attention until the early part of the twenty-first century when a combination of the need for developed states for investment and the growing acceptability of state investment in private markets abroad made them both threatening and desirable.[4] This was the beast set loose on the kingdoms, especially those realms grown fat on the profits of global production, but that now found themselves at the mercy of a monster whose potential appetite could reduce these cash starved realms to the sort of penury they could not contemplate—at least not contemplate if they meant to keep their kingdoms stable and their heads on their shoulders. SWF money could prop up failing markets in the West,[5] but it could also be used to control Western apex corporations,[6] and thus indirectly threaten the authority of Western states—that was the essence of the fear at the time of the Great Recession of 2008.[7]

And how to soothe this beast?: The approach embraced was centered on the crafting of a narrative that would both provide food to the beast and put the monster to work for the preservation of the realms which it might otherwise have threatened. That master narrative[8] both framed a rational understanding of the sovereign wealth fund, and embedded model or idealized SWFs within emerging global financial systems.[9] A SWF was conceived in a form that served the needs of the host states into which investment was injected, as well as the home state that sought to make money from these investments.[10] With a focus on money, the political threat of the SWF could be diffused.[11] No longer a threat, the beast became an ox, and its masters were now welcomed into the club of those who ate well—and they have, eaten well that is.[12] And its story—of its apparent threat and the manner of the breaking of the beast—shearing its monstrosity for the stoic utility of the ox, became one fit for retelling as an important marker of the scope and triumph of the global financial master narrative and the domesticated SWF’s role within it.[13]

Thus, the beast that was the rogue SWF served two purposes. The first purpose was its contribution to the productivity of capital and investment across global markets, enriching those societies in which it might graze—as long as it played by the rules. The second purpose was its contribution to the mechanics and language of narrative and its articulation of the mechanisms of the regulatory order (in soft and hard national and international rules) that served the domesticated beasts as yoke and plough. The kingdom that is Globalization also generates stories of triumph over threats to the good order of the global political-economic and social systems.[14] These are the stories elites like to tell themselves over what passes for the campfires of community bonding—academic conferences, meetings of eminent persons at national and international organizations.[15] These are also the stories that help mask the sausage making that is regulatory governance in this age[16]—an age that might itself be coming to an end[17]—of global regulatory networks that provide the basis of good order for transnational economic activity.[18]

The nature, features, and character of this master narrative that reframed discourse and activity were developed around two primary premises. The first created a strong case of classification that made the SWF, so defined, amenable to management that would reduce its potential threats to good order. This classification system distinguished between the beast—which might forage and feed upon the financial instruments of foreign states—and other financial instrument livestock stomping around global financial and operational markets.[19] SWFs were to be encased in a precise and narrow definition,[20] which excluded both State Owned Enterprises (“SOEs”)—whose taming and use would be dealt with through a different regulatory narrative—and other forms of investment vehicles that feel outside the definition.[21]

The second encompassed the even larger project of socialization muted for what the political community constituted the most dangerous aspects of SWFs. The principles that emerged as the bars of the cage that made the SWF palatable had a single object—to de-nature the public element of the mechanism and to produce the illusion—and perhaps sometimes the reality—that these instruments would operate on the same basis as their non-state analogues.[22] That provided some advantages to the host states—the power to regulate the activities of these instruments in their home territories like other private enterprises, and the right to develop systems that might allow them to void such investments as they deemed threatening.[23] These usually were meant to protect sensitive industries, but could also be used to protect national development schemes.[24] There were some odds and ends to be sure. The issue of sovereign immunity required some action. The issue of state subsidies and of the need for a wall between the political and investment arms of the state also had to be considered.[25]

What was then required was a simple and straightforward application of well-worn hard and soft law regimes to tame the SWF, or at least to create a more or less fungible investment vehicle that could be regulated and evaluated much like any other private investment fund.[26] All of this was nicely framed within the general principles developed at the height of that epoch, now sometimes called the Great Recession, when the lust of western states for investment inflows into their capital markets exceeded their fear of rapidly developing and cash flush states now seeking to project their financial power into the capital markets abroad.[27] This was undertaken by a collective allegiance to the principle that such states would forego the use of their financial power for political ends by projecting investment as an enhanced weapon of international relations.[28]

The result was the compromised settlement that are the Santiago Principles.[29] These twenty-four principles were affirmed by the International Working Group of SWFs (“IWG”) and welcomed by the International Monetary Fund’s (“IMF”) International Monetary Financial Committee in 2008.[30] The IWG’s successor organization, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IFSWF), formed in 2009.[31]

To some extent, the Santiago Principles have proved useful.[32] Among the Santiago Principles’ more important uses has been as a global centering element around which rational discussion could be organized.[33] The Santiago Principles produced—or better, they reflected—an ideology of sorts, one which was framed around a core set of principles:

To help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of capital and investment; To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which SWFs invest; To ensure that SWFs invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and return-related considerations; and To ensure that SWFs have in place a transparent and sound governance structure that provides adequate operational controls, risk management, and accountability.[34]

That ideology has been furthered through the tireless work of its own quasi-governance apparatus.[35] The Secretariat that was created to support the project of the Santiago Principles has become an important source of useful storytelling and examples of appropriate conduct.[36]

Assured by the narrative framework that was encapsulated in the Santiago Principles, most states could view SWFs as useful limited-purpose sovereign investment vehicles.[37] As such the privileged sovereign investment fund (“SIF”) was meant to be constrained within the borders of the now precisely defined SWF. As Allie Bagnall and Edwin Truman suggested in 2011, the Santiago Principles represented an “admirable but flawed transparency.”[38] The flaws, of course, provided states, civil society, and academics much food for thought.[39] Transparency flaws might also prove useful as metrics for gauging the performance of SWFs as a class.[40]

Yet, over the last decade or so, SWFs appear to have developed the potential to become an important instrument in good governance and development, especially for resource-rich and capacity-poor developing states. Following the lead of Chile, and with the patronage of International Financial Institutions (“IFIs”), these SWFs have begun to serve objectives as and with development banks both within and beyond their home state.[41] They are also viewed not merely as a vehicle for training in fiscal discipline, but also as a means through which anti-corruption strategies can be realized.[42] They also appear to be useful as the means through which state-to-state development ventures may be undertaken.[43] Taken together, these movements appear to move SWFs back into its more general SIF form.

This Article considers the capacity of SWFs to serve ends beyond a strict economic role to maximize fund value, which describes the core ideology that is envisioned in Santiago Principle 19 envisions.[44] The Article then considers the continuing relevance of the Santiago Principles as a basis for ordering and supporting legitimacy structures for state SIFs. To that end it, examines the principal emerging alternative or supplemental ends for which SWFs are created (and the ideologies underlying them). These include the following: (1) the value of SWFs as a means of enhancing governance capacity in weaker states; (2) SWF utility in enhancing development objectives; (3) the emerging landscape of joint ventures among SWFs for investment, development, and enhancing economic political objectives abroad along with the intersection of these objectives with emerging roles of infrastructure and development banks; and (4) the importance of SWFs in enhancing the operationalization of emerging international business and human rights standards not only within their own organizations but through their investment activities. Section I considers the emerging realities on the ground. Particular attention will be paid to SWFs as means of projecting state policy through its investment decisions and as an active shareholder, SWFs as development funds, SWF joint venturing in projects with other SWFs, SWFs as owners or controlling shareholders of SOEs, and SWFs as a means for strengthening governance in weak governance zones. Section III then considers the compatibility of these changes within the normative framework of the Santiago Principles and some emerging regulatory issues—from transparency initiatives in hard law, to national extraterritoriality projects, to the emerging business and Human Rights frameworks in operations and financial transactions. A brief assessment of these trends ends the Article.


NOTES:

[1]. Edward Hicks, Peaceable Kingdom (oil on canvas) National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. (1834) https://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/Collection
/art-object-page.59908.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).

[2]. William Congreve, The Mourning Bride act I, sc. 1, 9 (Glasgow: 1751) (1697).

[3]. See Simon Johnson, The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Fin. & Dev., Sept. 2007, at 56, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/09/pdf/straight.pdf (explaining the history of SWFs); see also Joseph J. Norton, The “Santiago Principles” and the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global Administrative Networking and Related “Soft” Rulemaking?, 29 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 465, 472–78 (2010).

[4]. See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State Owned Enterprises and the Chinese Experience, 19 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 3, 24 (2010).

[5]. Eric Langland, Misplaced Fears Put to Rest: Financial Crisis Reveals the True Motives of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 18 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 263, 264 (2009).

[6]. Id.

[7]. See id.; see also Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investment, 41 Geo. J. Int’l L. 425, 474–82 (2010); Luca Schicho, Pride and Prejudice: How the Financial Crisis Made Us Reconsider SWFs, 2 Goettingen J. Int’l L. 63, 69 (2010); Robert Rich, The Great Recession, Federal Reserve History, https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709 (last visited Sept. 26, 2017).

[8]. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition 3 (Manchester Univ. Press 1984) (1979), https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/lyotard.htm (explaining a master narrative is a theory of postmodernism that posits a societies storytelling in a historical sense, which centers or focuses on that societies’ particular point of view).

[9]. For a discussion of the SWF master narrative, see Larry Catá Backer, SWFs in Five Continents and Three Narratives: Similarities and Differences, in Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law 57, 57–98 (Fabio Bassan ed., 2015).


[10]. Róbert Csoma, Appreciation of the Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Global Economy, Pub. Fin. Q. no. 2, 2015, at 270, 275, https://asz.hu/storage/files/files/public-finance-quarterly-articles/2015/a_csomar_2015_2.pdf.

[11]. Id. at 285.

[12]. Mathias Okwe, Sovereign Wealth Fund Records N5.17b Profit, The Guardian (Sept. 8, 2015), https://guardian.ng/news/sovereign-wealth-fund-records-n5-17b-profit/ (discussing SWFs located in Nigeria); see also Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund Books $30 Bln Profit in Third Quarter, Reuters (Oct. 7, 2016), www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-swf-idUSKCN1270O2.

[13]. See Csoma, supra note 10, at 270–87.

[14]. Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization Ascendant: Four Perspectives on the Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 La Raza L.J. 141, 145 (2006).

[15]. Cf. Neil Gross and Crystal Fleming, Academic Conferences and the Making of Philosophical Knowledge, in Social Knowledge in the Making 151 (Charles Camic et al., eds., U. Chicago Press 2011).

[16]. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. Inv. Div., Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Countries—Working Together to Maintain and Expand Freedom of Investment (2008), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/41456730.pdf.

[17]. See Larry Catá Backer, The 45th Presidency and Multilateral Treaties—Fear, Loathing and a Repudiation of 20th Century Americanism, L. End Day (Feb. 2, 2017, 10:53 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/the-45th-presidency-and-multilateral.html#more.

[18]. See, e.g., Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004); Thierry de Montbrial, For a New World Economic Order, Foreign Aff. (Oct. 1, 1975), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1975-10-01/new-world-economic-order; Anne Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, Foreign Aff. (Oct. 1997), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-09-01/real-new-world-order.

[19]. Veljko Fotak, Xuechen Gao & William Megginson, A Financial Force to Be Reckoned With? An Overview of Sovereign Wealth Funds 4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 476/2016, 2016), http://ecgi.global/working-paper/financial-force-be-reckoned-overview-sovereign-wealth-funds.

[20]. Id. at 8.

[21]. See id. at 8.

[22]. See id. at 9.

[23]. See id.

[24]. See id. at 7.

[25]. See id. at 9.

[26]. See Larry Catá Backer, “The Future of Sovereign Wealth Funds”: Notes From the Symposium Sponsored by the Wake Forest Law Review, Law at the End of the Day (Mar. 24, 2017, 10:06 AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-future-of-sovereign-wealth-funds.html.

[27]. Id.

[28]. Id.

[29]. Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices: “Santiago Principles” (Oct. 2008) [hereinafter Santiago Principles].

[30]. Id. at 1–2, 7–9.

[31]. See Kuwait Declaration, Int’l F. of Sovereign Wealth Funds (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles-landing/kuwait-declaration (establishing the IFSWF).

[32]. See Int’l Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Implementing the Santiago Principles: 12 Case Studies 15, 19, 23, 37, 49 (Nov. 2016), www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/IFSWF_CaseStudies_Nov2016_0.pdf (analyzing the positive values of the Santiago Principles).

[33]. Id. at 5, 23.

[34]. Santiago Principles, supra note 29, at 4.

[35]. See Who We Are, Int’l F. Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://www.ifswf.org/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (explaining the IFSWF has its own small secretariat through which it produces knowledge that elaborates the fundamental ideology of the Santiago Principles themselves).

[36]. See Santiago Principles, supra note 29, at 4; see also Int’l Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Santiago Principles: 15 Case Studies 66 (Nov. 2014), http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/SantiagoP15CaseStudies1_0.pdf.

[37]. Allie E. Bagnall & Edwin M. Truman, IFSWF Report on Compliance with the Santiago Principles: Admirable But Flawed Transparency, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. (Aug. 2011), https://173.242.152.27/publications/pb/pb11-14.pdf.

[38]. See id.

[39]. See Sven Behrendt, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Policy Outlook: Gulf Arab SWFs—Managing Wealth in Turbulent Times 2–4 (2009), http://dafg.eu/fileadmin/dafg/Downloads/S_Behrendt_update_Q4_2008.pdf; Research Handbook on Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law (Fabio Bassan ed., 2015); Larry Catá Backer, Regulating Financial Markets: What We Might Learn From Sovereign Wealth Funds, in Reshaping Markets: Economic Governance, the Global Financial Crisis and Liberal Utopia (Bertram Lomfield et al. eds., 2016); Jason Buhi, Negocio de China: Building Upon the Santiago Principles to Form an Effective International Approach to Sovereign Wealth Fund Regulation, 39 H.K. L.J. 197, 202–03 (2009); Anna Gelpern, Sovereignty, Accountability, and the Wealth Fund Governance Conundrum, 1 Asian J. Int’l L. 289, pin? (2011); Ashby Monk, Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate: Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance, 14 New Pol. Econ. 451, 452 (2009); Joseph J. Norton, The ‘Santiago Principles’ for Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Case Study on International Financial Standard-Setting Processes, 13 J. Int’l Econ. L. 645, 649–50 (2010); Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the Shadow of Regulation and Politics, 40 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1207, 1208 (2009); Schicho, supra note 7, at 69–70; Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Is Asia Different? (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., Working Paper No. 11-12, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1898787.

[40]. Bagnall & Truman, supra note 37.

[41]. See Implementing the Santiago Principles: 12 Case Studies, supra note 32, at 19.

[42]. Thomas Holt, Jr., To Be or Not To Be: Sovereign Wealth Funds Face Increasingly Complex Legal Challenges, Fletcher Network for Sovereign Wealth & Global Cap., http://fletcher.tufts.edu/SovereigNet/About/letterholt (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).

[43]. See Santiago Principles, supra note 29, at 4.

[44]. Santiago Principles GAPP 19 should be read in conjunction with GAPP 18 that states that investment policy ought to be based on sound portfolio management principles.

The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack--Injured Canadian Children and Spats Within the Republican Party in Congress

$
0
0


One of the most interesting aspects of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack has been the pace of its development.  It has tended to show up ion news cycles at several weeks intervals, to lie dormant between short sharp bursts of public attention. In November 2017, I suggested the economic effects of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attacks--its intermeshing with economic policy and political objectives beyond  a determination of culpability for injury to the individuals affected (The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: Collateral Effects and Costs on Cuban Efforts to Rejoin the International Financial Community; and here). In December the media coverage again revived and amplified the Soviet connection and contemporary Cuban foreign policy (the trajectory of which works against U.S. interests) (The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: Collateral Effects and Costs on Cuban Efforts to Rejoin the International Financial Community).  

But then the beginning of 2018 was marked by change (as has not been unusual over the course of the history of the post 1959 governmental system in Cuba.  I noted the visit of E.U. officials seeking to implement a new trade and cooperation arrangement with Cuba  that appeared to take up the renewal of relations where those of the United States veered off in early 20'17 (The EU to the Rescue of the Cuban Economy? the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)).  This appeared to provide cover for the recent efforts by Cuban authorities to pull back from "reform and opening up" as they tighten control over to contain the size of the private sector (Under Cover of the Sonic Weapons Attack: The Cuban Private Sector as Collateral Damage as Cuba Retreats Toward Central Planning).

But Congress has also become involved in the Affair--and in the process raised the political profile, shifting emphasis from the administrative bureaucracies of the Executive branch to the political sensibilities of Congress (The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: And now the U.S. Congress Becomes Interested in a Public Sort of Way).  

This post picks up two strands of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attacks through which the Affair is currently being carried forward (Marie-Danielle Smith, Canadian children were among those affected by sonic attacks in Cuba, documents suggest, National Post 4 Jan. 2018).  The first touches on the medical evidence of injury and the second amplifying political activity in Congress (Francisco Ordoñez, Rubio calls Cuba sonic attacks a “documented fact” after GOP colleague questions evidence, Miami Herald 7 Jan. 2018).   The Associated Press report includes link to a recording of what some U.S. embassy workers heard in Havana.



The issue of the extent of the Sonic Weapons Attack remains unclear.  The reporting from early January serves to remind its readers that the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack might not be merely another localized expression of bad behaviors between the Cubans and the U.S.  Including the Canadians within the Sonic Weapons Attack broadens the implications and makes it difficult to easily dismiss  the attacks as another example of American paranoia or of opportunism as a cover for changes of U.S. policy. But as interesting, it suggests the hesitations and difficulties of the Canadian position between Cuba and the U.S. for a government that might have preferred for this not to have happened.  Even more interesting, perhaps, is the omission of any particular coordination between the U.S: and the Canadians. On the other hand it is as likely that neither country was eager to expose the nature and extent of coordination, specially as Canada was eager to preserve  what it considered it relationship with the Cubans.  Yet the reporting was useful in two respects.  First it served to increase the sympathy factor-- those affected included children.  And Second, it appeared to add evidence of the reality of the occurrence of the attacks and of the physical harm sustained especially by the vulnerable.  One builds here the foundation for asserting liability for violation of international norms and perhaps of international law as well.  The reporting from Canada follows.

Marie-Danielle Smith, Canadian children were among those affected by sonic attacks in Cuba, documents suggest, National Post 4 Jan. 2018


OTTAWA — Children were among those affected by a series of mysterious and still-unexplained attacks on the health of Canadian and American diplomats in Cuba last year, documents from the Canadian government have revealed.

Correspondence from diplomats in Havana, apparently detailed but heavily redacted when obtained by the National Post under access-to-information law, show officials at Global Affairs Canada learned as early as April that Canadian embassy staffers and their families in Cuba were reporting mysterious health problems. In May, they scrambled to determine whether the severe symptoms they were reporting — including, the documents say, the loss of memory, hearing and even consciousness — could be psychosomatic. It appears to have taken weeks before Canadian doctors officially examined those affected.

August saw the first media reports about the alleged attacks. The Associated Press reported that American diplomats in Havana had heard loud, jarring noises that seemed to be audible only in specific rooms or even in very specific parts of rooms, mostly in their homes and at night. They then began suffering hearing loss and other physical symptoms. After those reports, the U.S. confirmed to media that 24 of its own had been affected. In September, AP reported that about 10 Canadian families had been affected and that both countries had deployed criminal investigators.

* * *
Months earlier, officials in Ottawa had first been made aware of U.S. allegations. A late April email to officials in Ottawa is fully redacted but titled “Attacks on US Personnel.” About two weeks later, on May 11, the Canadian mission in Havana sent Global Affairs Canada colleagues a formal request for assistance in “determining next steps” for Canadians experiencing symptoms.

A message to Ottawa May 16, approved by Canada’s ambassador to Cuba, detailed a concern that whatever Canadians were experiencing might be psychosomatic. Officials knew “confirmed incidents” at the time were isolated to U.S. diplomats.

* * *

Lines of communication didn’t appear clear over the first few weeks. One diplomat from Canada’s Washington, D.C. mission mentioned “broken telephone” issues on May 18.

By May 23, Canada was aware that two Cuban diplomats were being expelled from the U.S. as a “measure of reciprocity” after five American diplomats had to be evacuated from Havana, according to a report. At that time, there were “no answers” to questions around who or what was behind the attacks.

Still, it appears to have taken weeks before Canada’s government dispatched medical personnel to assess the Canadians’ symptoms.

On June 6 the mission was urgently requesting that a ministerial letter be sent to the national defence department, so as to get Canadian military doctors on the ground. A meeting for the same day was being arranged in Havana to “advise of the increased threat level.”

An attached report included a request for clarification on the ages of children involved, though according to prepared media lines from August, Canadian officials were instructed not to reveal to the public whether any children had been affected.

The report also detailed symptoms Canadians were experiencing: “headaches, dizziness, nausea, hearing loss, nosebleeds, cognitive functions including loss of short term memory.” It predicted “follow-up treatment, care and rehabilitation may be required,” and listed “begin preparing for any more wide-ranging plans to evacuate Canadian staff and/or their dependants” as a next step.

In a June 8 report, the list of symptoms expanded to include loss of consciousness, blurred eyesight, lack of balance and ear pain. “Many have heard strange noises in their residences and have experienced symptoms that they have not had before in their lives,” it said.

On June 9, the head of mission was requesting a medical adviser come to Havana “as soon as possible” to screen all families of all Canadian diplomats there. Travel for a Health Canada doctor was approved for the following week. An email that day says mission operations would be affected by absences. “Surge support may be required,” and “non-essential travel and visits to Havana may need to be postponed.”

A few days later, emails show local guards posted at Canadian residences 24/7 had been “put on notice to increase their patrols around the properties and to be extra vigilant in reporting any (unusual) vehicles or activity.” The June 12 report notes the ambassador to Cuba was to extend key messages to Cuban officials, including requests for additional security patrols and “any additional technical security measures that could be preventative.”

By June 16, a to-do list still included seeking advice on “sound blocking devices” and “recording equipment,” and briefing incoming Canadian diplomats “about the threat and risk.”

The Health Canada doctor arrived June 18 and held a town hall with Canadian staff June 21, during which he emphasized “symptoms and findings are similar to the U.S.’s experience,” and “high incidence of cases in multiple neighbourhoods demonstrates that it is an ongoing problem.”

Objectives for a meeting between Cuba, foreign officials and the Privy Council Office, which supports the prime minister and cabinet, were attached to a July 6 email. It says to “encourage closer collaboration on fact-finding” and specifically includes a note to “express Canada’s long-standing and ongoing commitment to the Canada-Cuba relationship.”

By August it appeared the situation was not yet resolved. A Health Canada medical adviser suggested in an Aug. 11 email that “routine audiometry,” which measures individuals’ hearing sensitivity, could be conducted as a baseline for Canada-based staff headed on posting to Havana.

* * *
__________

This week also picked up an important strand in the politics of the Affair fo the Sonic Weapons Attack. Here one confronts a very real political battle between different factions of the ruling Republican majorities in Congress.  On the one hand, one has Marco Rubio--former aspirant for the U.S. presidency and an influential driver of American policy toward Cuba continuing to push aggressively for action on the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack. On the other side one hears Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona who dismisses the whole affair. "The Cubans told Flake the FBI has told them that, after four trips to Cuba, its agents have found no evidence that mysterious illnesses suffered by U.S. diplomats were the result of attacks." (Rubio To Hold Hearing On ‘Sonic Attacks’ On U.S. Diplomats In Cuba)

Senator Rubio already accepts the "fact" of the attack, and draws from that the conclusion that the Cubans bear responsibility--for which U.S: responses are necessary (beyond those already taken). Flake appears convinced by the Cuban position, Rubio takes the opposite approach. On Tuesday June 9th, these positions will likely be debated before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee chaired by Senator Rubio.
The goal of the hearing is to establish the facts surrounding the attacks and conduct oversight over the State Department’s handling of the attacks.

Three State Department officials are scheduled to testify. Francisco Palmieri, the acting assistant secretary for the western hemisphere; Todd Brown, diplomatic security assistant director for international programs; and Charles Rosenfarb, medical director of the Bureau of Medical Services. (Rubio To Hold Hearing On ‘Sonic Attacks’ On U.S. Diplomats In Cuba)

Whatever the outcome, the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack will continue to be int he news and will drive, to some extent, the future of American foreign policy in the region (and potentially also with Russia). The reporting of the dispute follows. 

WASHINGTON

Sen. Marco Rubio pushed back Sunday against comments from a Republican colleague that the United States has found no evidence of “sonic attacks” in Cuba.

The Florida Republican charged the attacks were a “documented fact.”

In a series of tweets Sunday, Rubio dismissed comments by Sen. Jeff Flake of Arizona, a longtime advocate for improving ties with Cuba, stating that any U.S. official briefed on the mysterious events in Havana “knows full well that while method of attack still in question, that attacks and injuries occurred isn’t.”

“It’s a documented FACT that 24 U.S. govt officials & spouses were victims of some sort of sophisticated attack while stationed in Havana,” Rubio tweeted.

Flake said Saturday that he has seen no evidence that American diplomats who suffered health symptoms while in Havana were “attacked,” according to the Associated Press.

After meeting with high ranking Cuban officials, Flake said classified briefings from U.S. officials had given him no reason to doubt Cuban officials who said there was no evidence any health symptoms were a result of an attack.

Rubio countered calling it impossible “to conduct 24 separate & sophisticated attacks" on U.S. government personnel without Cuban officials knowing.

The back and forth between the two senators sets up a potentially explosive hearing Tuesday at a highly anticipated Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing chaired by Rubio. Members are expected to press State Department officials for more answers about the mysterious events.

The Trump administration has already pulled much of the U.S embassy staff from Havana and expelled 15 of their Cuban counterparts working in Washington.

The State Department continued to call it an “attack” on Sunday despite not knowing the source or cause of the events.

“The investigation is ongoing,” a State Department spokesperson said. “The State Department continues to be deeply concerned about the safety and security of our personnel. We continue to remind the Cuban government of its obligations under the Vienna Convention to take all appropriate steps to protect our diplomats.”

Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack--Summary of Senator Rubio's Position and Statements of Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues

$
0
0



On January 9, 2018, Senator Marco Rubio chaired a meeting of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues entitled "Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight."  It was live broadcast ( Foreign Relations here, and C-Span here). Recording of the hearing here.  Some of the background and the run up to the hearings may be found here. The public portion of the hearings permitted the members to stake out their positions--from skepticism to conviction that something, of some kind, occurred an that the Cuban state might in some way be involved. 
This post includes a summary of the case that Senator Rubio sought to make in the Hearings and  also includes, without comment, the written submissions of the three witnesses called to testify: (1) Mr. Francisco Palmieri, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau Of Western Hemisphere Affairs; (2) Mr. Todd Brown, Diplomatic Security Assistant Director, International Programs; and (3) Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, Medical Director, Bureau Of Medical Services.
Senator Rubio obtained a consensus that people suffered injury.  He then sought to determine what role there was for the Senate in that context. He then laid out his sense of the facts around Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack, which he explained should have caused the Secretary of State to constitute an Accountability Review Board.  He was informed that such a board was constituted but only on December 11, 2017 and that notice thereof was sent somehow to the Senate by the Secretary of State's office. Senator Rubio remained skeptical.  He rejected the notion that anti-Castro Cubans in Miami had anything to do with the Affair as a means of destroying U.S. Cuba normalization.  He was skeptical as well of Cuban denials--suggesting to him that Castro was aware of rogue elements within the Cuban state apparatus that did seek to derail U.S. Cuba normalization. The witnesses denied that any communication occurred in which Mr. Castro had ever suggested that he knew of the possible involvement of Cuban "rogue elements." 
Senator Rubio than raised the issue of Russian involvement; the witnesses recalled the Soviet microwave attacks in Moscow (see here) but the witnesses were careful in their answers and suggested the need to answer only in a classified setting.   Senator Rubio noted the extent of surveillance of U.S. diplomats in Cuba but again the witnesses suggested any answer would have to be classified except in the most general terms. But Senator Rubio's point was to make a circumstantial case for Cuban knowledge of any attack or injury to foreigners in Havana, He asserted that it was unfair to deride the injury of U.S. diplomats in Cuba--that was "unfair."  He concluded by suggesting the "we know people were hurt" and the the Cuban government knew who did it. He continued to express his displeasure with the pace and scope of State Department response. 

Senator Rubio noted that the record of the hearing would remain open for several days to establish a record of quesitons to be asked and hopefully answered by relevant Administration officials. 
 ___________


Testimony of Senior Bureau Official Francisco L. Palmieri
before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on “Attacks Against U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight”
January 9, 2018

Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to speak about the attacks against U.S. diplomats in Cuba and the Department of State’s efforts in response. At the outset, I want to thank you for your concern for the safety and security of our diplomatic personnel in Havana. As you know, that is Secretary Tillerson’s top priority. It is mine as well.

I am pleased to be here today with my colleagues from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Medical Services, with whom the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs has worked closely on this complex issue.

I would also like to emphasize up front that the investigation into these health attacks is ongoing. I understand that there are ongoing discussions within the committee regarding this matter, and the fact is, there is still much we do not know, including who or what is behind the injuries to our personnel. We have the best experts in the government and the private sector working to help us understand it. At every step in our response to these events, we have worked closely with our medical and technical experts in evaluating health conditions and the nature of the attacks.

I will walk you through a general timeline, which will describe our diplomatic engagement with the Cubans on this issue, and review many of the actions we have taken to date. Then, I will defer to my colleagues to address the security and medical issues.

In late 2016, some members of our diplomatic community serving at U.S. Embassy Havana complained about hearing strange noises and a variety of unexplained physical symptoms. As the Department investigated, we began to see signs suggesting that these events – initially in diplomatic residences, and later, at hotels – may have begun as early as November 2016.

As soon as we identified a pattern connecting these unusual events with certain health symptoms, U.S. officials approached the Cuban government in mid- February to demand it meet its obligations under the Vienna Convention to protect our personnel. The Cubans denied involvement, offered their cooperation, and opened their own investigation. Since then we have engaged the Cubans more than 20 times, from the working level to the highest level of the Cuban government, both here in Washington and in Havana.

In addition to our diplomatic efforts, we prioritized the medical care of our personnel. State Department and private medical experts examined more than 80 post employees and their families, both in the United States and in Havana. Dr. Rosenfarb will provide you with additional details.

Separately, we launched a government-wide effort to find the cause and culprits behind these attacks. Apart from the investigation, we have met with U.S. interagency partners more than a dozen times to discuss and refine our response to these attacks.

The attacks initially appeared to occur in clusters, but starting in late March, sporadic attacks continued until late April and then seemed to stop. Beginning in mid-April, we allowed anyone serving at Embassy Havana who did not feel safe at post to return to the United States. We also expelled two Cuban diplomats in May in order to underscore the Cuban government’s responsibility to protect our personnel.

After a period without any attacks, there were two additional attacks reported in close proximity in late August, which were medically confirmed in September. Based on the resumption of these attacks, Secretary Tillerson ordered the departure of non-emergency personnel from post on September 29. The Secretary assessed this was the only way to significantly reduce the risk to our diplomats and their families.

As a follow-on to the Ordered Departure decision, we expelled 15 more Cuban diplomats in October to ensure equity in the impact on our respective operations and to underscore to Cuba its obligation to stop the attacks. These decisions – both to draw down our personnel at Embassy Havana and to expel Cuban diplomats – did not signal a change in policy.

Prior to the Secretary’s decision to institute Ordered Departure, our Embassy held 17 town hall meetings with American staff. Since the return of U.S. diplomats to Washington, we have held a number of meetings with them. Secretary Tillerson personally met with these evacuees to explain his decision to institute Ordered Departure, and we have organized a number of meetings to address evacuees’ concerns. The well-being of the 24 confirmed victims, as well as the well-being of all of our evacuees and those remaining in Havana, continues to be our priority, as does the ongoing investigation.

With that, I will turn it to my colleagues to discuss their areas of expertise. Then I will be happy to answer your questions.

__________

 


STATEMENT BY Todd J. Brown Department of State Assistant Director, International Programs Directorate, Bureau of Diplomatic Security

BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL

CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES

January 9, 2018


Good morning Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Menendez, and other distinguished members of the Committee.

Thank you for your invitation to appear today to discuss the health attacks involving U.S. diplomatic personnel and their families in Havana. Along with my colleagues, I share your concerns regarding the safety and security of our personnel in Cuba, and welcome any discussion that may lead to a better understanding of this issue and stronger safeguards for our employees.

From a security and investigative standpoint, we continue to work with Embassy Havana to aggressively counter, mitigate, and better understand who and what are causing injuries to our diplomatic staff. Unfortunately, this remains a perplexing case.

Our Regional Security Officer at Embassy Havana first became aware of potential health attacks involving Embassy personnel in late December 2016. In the early stages of trying to understand what may have been occurring, Post leadership and supporting offices in Washington believed it was likely a form of harassment by forces hostile to the United States and our presence in Cuba.

As more incidents were reported in early 2017 and greater awareness of the seriousness of symptoms became known, our level of concern and mitigation efforts rose exponentially. After senior level meetings with Cuban officials in February outlining Cuba’s responsibility to protect diplomats under the Vienna Convention, the Regional Security Officer received confirmation from Cuban counterparts that the Cuban government was conducting its own investigation into the matter.

Senior U.S. officials on Embassy Havana’s Emergency Action Committee met frequently as part of our ongoing attempt to better understand the nature of the apparent attack and protect staff. Among other things, the Embassy deployed recording devices in staff residences in an effort to better identify or capture the possible source behind the threat, as many victims had associated the attacks with an acoustic event.

After further investigative attempts and expert analysis failed to identify the cause or perpetrator, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened a case in early May. An FBI team has since visited Havana several times and met with Cuban officials. The FBI’s investigation has interviewed victims and conducted surveys of the residences and hotel rooms. However, the investigation remains ongoing and we would refer all specific questions concerning the investigation to the FBI.

Thank you. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.


__________

 


ATTACKS ON U.S. DIPLOMATS IN CUBA: RESPONSE AND OVERSIGHT

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES ROSENFARB, M.D.
MEDICAL DIRECTOR
BUREAU OF MEDICAL SERVICES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JANUARY 9, 2017

Chairman Rubio, Ranking Member Menendez, and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Department’s response to the recent health attacks in Havana. I will be describing the evolution of the medical response and what we currently know about the health effects.

From the individual and public health perspective, managing this evolving situation is challenging. Mission personnel describe a multitude of symptoms, many of which are not easily quantifiable and not easily attributable to a specific cause. The sharing of information that occurs in a small, tight-knit community has helped identify more affected personnel, but, as typically is the case with any community outbreak, also can complicate an epidemiological investigation. However, the most challenging factor is the lack of certainty about the causative agent and, therefore, the precise mechanism of the injuries suffered.

Individuals first visited our medical unit in Embassy Havana in late December 2016 and January 2017 reporting various symptoms including headache, ear pain, dizziness, and hearing problems. They associated the onset of these




2



symptoms to their exposures with unusual sounds or auditory sensations. Various descriptions were given: “a high pitched beam of sound”; an “incapacitating sound”; a “baffling sensation” akin to driving with the windows partially open in a car; or just an intense pressure in one ear. Since the symptoms first reported primarily affected auditory functions, an otolaryngologist at the University of Miami, highly experienced in evaluating acoustic injuries in military personnel, was identified to perform additional assessments.

Between February and April of last year, this specialist evaluated eighty members of the Embassy community. Of the individuals evaluated in this initial tranche, sixteen were identified to have symptoms and medically verifiable clinical findings of some combination similar to what might be seen in patients following mild traumatic brain injury or concussion.

In early July, my office convened a panel of academic experts to review the case histories and the test results gathered to date. Although the assembled group identified that some of the symptoms and findings could be caused by other things such as viral illnesses, previous head trauma, aging, and even stress, the consensus was that the patterns of injuries that had so far been noted were most likely related to trauma from a non-natural source.

In light of the emerging clinical parallels to mild traumatic brain injury, the nationally-recognized brain injury center at the University of Pennsylvania was identified to provide detailed reevaluations of employees with prior exposures and to evaluate Embassy community members who reported new exposures. As a result of further evaluations begun in late August, additional individuals with exposures that occurred prior to April 24 were added to the list of confirmed cases. Two other individuals who reported exposures that occurred in mid-August 2017 were also medically confirmed as cases, bringing the total number of cases to 24.

I would like to now describe the health effects identified so far. While the descriptions of the reported auditory sensations have varied, all medically- confirmed cases have described some combination of the following symptoms beginning within minutes to hours of the event: sharp, localized ear pain; dull unilateral headache; tinnitus in one ear; vertigo; visual focusing issues;




3



disorientation; nausea; and extreme fatigue. In many of the patients, the acute symptoms resolved within days to weeks, but other health issues emerged that were more persistent. These have included: cognitive problems, including difficulty with concentration, working memory, and attention; recurrent headache; high-frequency unilateral hearing loss; sleep disturbance; and imbalance walking. As in the acute phase, the duration and severity of these later symptoms have varied widely.

Defining the prognosis for the confirmed cases is extremely difficult since no precise analogue for this possibly novel syndrome exists. Some patients remain symptomatic months after their exposures. The persistent symptoms have improved to varying degrees in all individuals, some after extended rehabilitative therapy, some over time without treatment. Ten of the 24 patients have returned to either full or part-time work, while others continue to receive treatment with an anticipation of return to duty. However, at this time we are unable to state whether or not the injuries may result in adverse long-term consequences to the individuals’ future health or functional abilities.

All government personnel who travel to Havana on official duty now receive a detailed medical briefing and are encouraged to undergo pre-deployment screening including baseline audiograms and neurocognitive testing. We have formally requested assistance from the Centers for Disease Control for performing a broader epidemiological analysis and providing appropriate medical information to the American public. Discussions have also been held with the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke at the National Institutes of Health regarding its participation in the ongoing medical investigation.

I look forward to your questions.

And the Response From Cuba on Senator Rubio's Hearings on the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: "Cuba es un país seguro, pacífico y saludable" ("Cuba is a safe, peaceful and healthy country")

$
0
0


The Cuban authorities have quickly responded to the hearings conducted by Senator Rubio, "Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba: Response and Oversight," in his role as chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues (Reporting on that here). It comes as no surprise that the Cuban authorities took the opportunity not merely to denounce the hearings, and Senator Rubio, but also to make their case that they were neither involved in any purported attack nor that the attacks in fact took place.  Josefina Vidal, the director General of the Cuban Foreign Ministry's U.S. desk denounced the hearings as irresponsible.



The Cuban social media machinery also emphasized that Cuban experts continue to be skeptical.  They also emphasized the conclusions of an unpublished FBI report that has to date failed to find a proof of attack. On that point they encourage readers to take the position of Senator Flake against that of Senator Rubio. The emphasis, and the media position of the Cuban government, published in Spanish and English is that "Cuba is a safe, peaceful and healthy country." Indeed the Cuban response was careful to deploy as well their parade of experts to counter the testimony adduced during the Rubio hearings.  In the process Cuba seeks to lay out its public case against the American accuasations (Cinco incongruencias de los supuestos ataques sónicos), including the listing of 10 conclusions of Cuban experts.

This Post includes the responses in English and Spanish as reported in official and media sources cited above (in English and Spanish). We have reached a point in the public battle over control of the narrative of the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack where both sides have now put forward allthe evidence they are willing to share, and both sides have more finely tuned their line. It is now time for more action.  And from the indications by Senator Rubio's committee that action will come from the investigative committee of the U.S. Department of State.  The story continues.





Cuba Criticizes US Senate Hearing on Attacks on Diplomats

HAVANA TIMES – The Cuban government questioned today the validity of the hearing held in the United States Senate on Tuesday over the alleged acoustic attacks on US diplomats in Havana, and restated its denial of having any responsibility in the events, reported dpa news.

“The true purpose of this hearing was not to establish the truth, but to impose by force and without any evidence an accusation that they have not been able to demonstrate,” said Josefina Vidal, director of the United States desk of the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the alleged attacks, whose origin is unknown and according to Washington happened between the end of 2016 and August 2017.

Todd Brown, Deputy Director of Diplomatic Security at the State Department, said that in addition to the possibility of an acoustic or sonic attack, US researchers are considering the possibility of someone infecting the victims with a virus.

“The acoustic symptoms could be part of another attack,” Brown said. “There is a virus, there is an ultrasound, and there are a variety of things that the technical experts are looking at.”

The official did not offer more details or evidence in his testimony at the hearing that was chaired by Republican Senator Marco Rubio, one of the politicians most critical of the softened Cuba policy promoted by former President Barack Obama.

“The State Department has no evidence that allows it to affirm there were attacks against its diplomats in Havana, nor that Cuba may be responsible or have knowledge of third-party actions,” Vidal said at a press conference.

The Cuban official pointed out that “on the contrary, months of exhaustive investigation have shown that there was no attack”.

A few days ago, an FBI report was leaked to US media, according to which no evidence of an acoustic attack has been found.

The United States claims that since November 2016, 24 diplomats stationed in Cuba and relatives suffered attacks of unknown origin that caused symptoms such as dizziness, headaches, hearing loss, among others.

Cuban experts who investigated the US accusations ruled out the acoustic attack because it would have caused an extremely loud noise in the neighborhood where the diplomatic residences are located, something that did not happen.

__________



Declaración del Minrex: Cuba es un país seguro, pacífico y saludable

Declaraciones a la prensa de la Directora General para Estados Unidos del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, Josefina Vidal Ferreiro
Granma

Autor: Josefina Vidal Ferreiro | internet@granma.cu

9 de enero de 2018 19:01:25
En la mañana de hoy, 9 de enero, se realizó una audiencia en el Subcomité del hemisferio Occidental del Comité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, organizada por el senador republicado de Florida, Marco Rubio y copresidida por el senador demócrata de Nueva Jersey, Robert Menendez, ambos con un vasto récord de trabajo en contra de mejores relaciones entre Cuba y los Estados Unidos, y promotores de todo tipo de propuestas legislativas y políticas que afectan los intereses de los pueblos cubano y estadounidense, y solo benefician a una minoría cada vez más aislada que históricamente ha lucrado con la agresión a Cuba.

Desde su propio título “Ataques a diplomáticos estadounidenses en Cuba”, se evidenció que el verdadero propósito de esta audiencia, a la que fueron convocados tres funcionarios de alto rango del Departamento de Estado, no era establecer la verdad, sino imponer por la fuerza y sin evidencia alguna una acusación que no han podido demostrar.

A nadie le sorprenden las acusaciones infundadas ni las fabricaciones de los senadores anticubanos, cuya única agenda política a lo largo de los años ha sido llevar a nuestros dos países hacia una confrontación, sin importarles las consecuencias. Su total falta de escrúpulos y credibilidad es reconocida. La gran víctima de la audiencia del día de hoy ha sido la verdad.

Para el gobierno cubano resultan inaceptables las irresponsables declaraciones realizadas en la audiencia por el secretario adjunto para los Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental del Departamento de Estado, Francisco Palmieri.

El Director de Asuntos de Servicios Médicos del Departamento de Estado, Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, dijo que hay una multitud de síntomas que no son atribuibles a una causa específica y que hay falta de certeza sobre el agente causal. El Director Adjunto de Programas Internacionales del Buró de Seguridad Diplomática, Todd Brown, expresó que los expertos no han podido identificar la causa ni el perpetrador. Y el Sr. Palmieri utilizó repetidas veces el término ataques. Quedó claro que se trata de una acusación infundada contra Cuba.

El Departamento de Estado no tiene evidencia alguna que le permita afirmar que ha habido ataques contra sus diplomáticos en La Habana, ni que Cuba pueda ser responsable o tener conocimiento de acciones de terceros.

Por el contrario, meses de investigaciones exhaustivas han demostrado que no ha existido ataque alguno.

Reitero categóricamente que el gobierno cubano no tiene responsabilidad alguna en las afectaciones de salud reportadas por diplomáticos estadounidenses. Cuba nunca ha perpetrado ni perpetrará, ni ha permitido ni permitirá que terceros actúen contra la integridad física de ningún diplomático sin excepción. El gobierno cubano tiene conciencia de sus responsabilidades y las cumple de manera ejemplar.

Una vez más afirmo que la investigación realizada por las autoridades cubanas, a cuyos resultados el Departamento de Estado y las agencias especializadas de los Estados Unidos han tenido amplio y sistemático acceso, ha arrojado que no existe evidencia alguna sobre la ocurrencia de los alegados incidentes y no se ha producido ataque de tipo alguno.

Nada de lo aportado por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos a lo largo de este período e incluso hoy apunta con evidencias que los problemas de salud reportados por los diplomáticos hayan tenido su origen o su causa en Cuba.

Rechazamos la politización de este asunto y las medidas injustificadas que ha adoptado el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, con un alto costo para nuestra población, la emigración cubana y el pueblo estadounidense.

Denunciamos también la manipulación política de estos hechos por los elementos anticubanos, que buscan agravar el clima bilateral, con el único propósito de volver a una etapa de confrontación, con consecuencias negativas para ambos países y la región.

Cuba es un país seguro, pacífico y saludable para los cubanos, para los extranjeros, para los diplomáticos acreditados y para los millones de personas que nos visitan cada año, incluyendo los estadounidenses.

Fuente: Minrex

__________




Statements to the press by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs General Director for the United States, Josefina Vidal Ferreiro, in response to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere hearing regarding alleged “sonic attacks” on U.S. diplomatic personnel in Havana


Author: Josefina Vidal | internet@granma.cu

january 10, 2018 10:01:27
 
Granma
 


This morning, January 9, a hearing was held in the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, organized by Republican Senator for Florida Marco Rubio and co-chaired by New Jersey Democrat Senator Robert Menendez, both with a vast record of work against better relations between Cuba and the United States, and the promoters of all kinds of legislative and political proposals that affect the interests of the Cuban and American peoples, and only benefit an increasingly isolated minority that has historically profited from attacks on Cuba.

From its very title “Attacks on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba,” it was evident that the true purpose of this hearing, to which three high-ranking officials of the State Department were summoned, was not to establish the truth, but to impose by force and without any evidence an accusation that they have not been able to prove.

No one is surprised by the unfounded accusations or the fabrications of these anti-Cuban senators, whose only political agenda over the years has been to bring our countries to confrontation, regardless of the consequences. Their total lack of scruples and credibility is renowned. The great victim of today’s hearing has been the truth.

For the Cuban government, the irresponsible statements made at the hearing by the Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Department of State, Francisco Palmieri, are unacceptable.

The Director of the Bureau of Medical Services at the State Department, Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, said there are a multitude of symptoms that are not attributable to a specific cause and that there is a lack of certainty about the causal agent. The Assistant Director for International Programs of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Todd Brown, said experts have not been able to identify the cause or perpetrator. And Mr. Palmieri repeatedly used the term attacks. It became clear that this is an unfounded accusation against Cuba.

The State Department does not have any evidence that allows it to affirm that there have been attacks against its diplomats in Havana, or that Cuba may be responsible, or have knowledge of the actions of third parties.

On the contrary, months of exhaustive investigations have demonstrated that there have been no attacks.

I categorically reiterate that the Cuban government has no responsibility whatsoever for the health conditions reported by U.S. diplomats. Cuba never has, and never will, perpetrate such acts, nor has it or will it permit third parties to act against the physical integrity of any diplomat, without exception. The Cuban government is aware of its responsibilities and fulfils them exemplarily.

Once again I affirm that the investigation carried out by Cuban authorities, the results of which the State Department and specialized agencies of the United States have had ample and systematic access to, has shown that there is no evidence at all regarding the occurrence of the alleged incidents and no attack of any kind has occurred.

Nothing presented by the government of the United States throughout this period, including today, provides evidence that the health problems reported by its diplomats have their origin or cause in Cuba.

We reject the politicization of this matter and the unjustified measures adopted by the United States government, with a high cost for our population, Cuban émigrés and the U.S. people.

We also condemn the political manipulation of these events by anti-Cuban elements, who seek to aggravate the bilateral atmosphere, with the sole purpose of returning to a an era of confrontation, with negative consequences for both countries and the region.

Cuba is a safe, peaceful and healthy country for Cubans, for foreigners, for accredited diplomats and for the millions of people who visit us every year, including U.S. 

__________



FBI finds no evidence of “sonic attacks” in Cuba

Following months of investigations and four visits to the island the FBI has uncovered no evidence of the alleged “sonic attacks” against U.S. diplomatic personnel in Cuba


Author: Redacción Internacional | internacionales@granma.cu

january 9, 2018 10:01:18


Washington.– Following months of investigations and four visits to the island the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has uncovered no evidence of the alleged “sonic attacks” against U.S. diplomatic personnel in Cuba, according to a January 8 article by Associated Press (AP).

In the article AP cites an unreleased interim report from the bureau’s Operational Technology Division, dated January 4.

According to the news outlet, “The probe has uncovered no evidence that sound waves could have damaged the Americans’ health.”

The results of the FBI investigation coincide with those of the Committee of Cuban experts after senior government officials ordered a thorough investigation into the alleged incidents.

Ever since reports of health issue related to U.S. personnel emerged the Cuban government has categorically stated that its territory has never, nor will it ever, be used to harm accredited diplomatic personnel on the island or their families.

Despite a lack of clarity surrounding the case, Washington took unilateral steps withdrawing the majority of its diplomats from the island - practically paralyzing the visa processing system in Havana - and demanding the withdrawal of 17 Cuban officials from the island’s embassy in Washington.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, speaking to AP, confirmed that the U.S. government has no plans to send its diplomats back to Havana because the United States would be “putting people intentionally in harm’s way.”

Likewise, Florida Senator Marco Rubio – who has been trying to manipulate the case to reverse the few advances made in bilateral relations between the two countries - is set to hold a Senate hearing on the alleged attacks this January 9.

However, Jeff Flake, also a Republican Senator, speaking in Havana January 6 stated that there is no reason to doubt the Cuban government’s position, adding that there is no evidence of the involvement of the Cuban government in any of the reports he has seen.

__________



No hay evidencias de «ataques sónicos» en Cuba, asegura el FBI

El FBI no ha encontrado prueba alguna de los supuestos «ataques sónicos» contra el personal diplomático estadounidense en Cuba, tras meses de investigaciones y cuatro viajes a La Habana


Autor: Redacción Internacional | internacionales@granma.cu

9 de enero de 2018 00:01:48


WASHINGTON.–El FBI no ha encontrado prueba alguna de los supuestos «ataques sónicos» contra el personal diplomático estadounidense en Cuba, tras meses de investigaciones y cuatro viajes a La Habana, reveló este lunes la Associated Press (AP).

La agencia estadounidense tuvo acceso a un informe interino de la División de Operaciones Tecnológicas del FBI, fechado el 4 de junio último, que todavía no se ha hecho público.

«El FBI probó la hipótesis de que ondas audibles, infrasónicas o ultrasónicas pudieran haber sido utilizadas clandestinamente para herir a estadounidenses en Cuba y no encontró evidencia alguna», refiere la AP.

Las conclusiones de los investigadores estadounidenses concuerdan con la del Comité de Expertos cubanos que condujo una exhaustiva investigación sobre los supuestos incidentes, indicada por la máxima dirección del Gobierno.

Desde un inicio, las autoridades cubanas enfatizaron en que jamás se ha permitido ni se permitirá que el territorio nacional sea utilizado para cualquier acción en contra de funcionarios diplomáticos acreditados ni sus familiares, sin excepción.

A pesar de la poca claridad en el caso, Washington tomó medidas unilaterales y retiró a la mayor parte de sus diplomáticos de la Isla, paralizando el procesamiento de visados en La Habana. Asimismo, exigió la retirada de 17 funcionarios cubanos en Estados Unidos.

Según confirmó a la AP el secretario de Estado, Rex Tillerson, todavía no se maneja el regreso del personal estadounidense porque, en su opinión, estarían «exponiéndolos intencionalmente al peligro».

Se espera que hoy se efectúe una audiencia sobre el tema en el Congreso, dirigida por el senador de la Florida, Marco Rubio, quien intenta manipular el caso para desmontar los escasos avances registrados en los vínculos bilaterales.

El también senador republicano, Jeff Flake, aseguró en La Habana el sábado último que no existen motivos para dudar de la posición del Gobierno cubano y añadió que los informes a los que ha tenido acceso carecían de pruebas sobre el involucramiento de las autoridades de la Isla.


__________



El Departamento de Estado carece de pruebas para hablar de «ataques» contra diplomáticos estadounidenses en Cuba

Josefina Vidal, directora general de Estados Unidos de la Cancillería cubana, calificó de «irresponsables» las declaraciones de funcionarios estadounidenses durante una audiencia en el Senado


Autor: Sergio Alejandro Gómez | internet@granma.cu

10 de enero de 2018 00:01:10
 


«El Departamento de Estado no tiene evidencia alguna que le permita afirmar que ha habido ataques contra sus diplomáticos en La Habana, ni que Cuba pueda ser responsable o tener conocimiento de acciones de terceros», aseguró este martes la directora general de Estados Unidos de la Cancillería cubana, Josefina Vidal.

Durante una conferencia de prensa en la capital cubana, Vidal criticó con firmeza que se utilizara reiteradamente la palabra «ataque» en una audiencia del subcomité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado en Washington, sin aportar evidencias que respaldaran la ocurrencia de tales hechos.

«Por el contrario, meses de investigaciones exhaustivas han demostrado que no ha existido ataque alguno», señaló la diplomática cubana.

«Para el Gobierno cubano resultan inaceptables las irresponsables declaraciones realizadas por el secretario adjunto para los Asuntos del Hemisferio Occidental del Departamento de Estado, Francisco Palmieri», dijo.

Palmieri, a pesar de reconocer que aún faltaba «mucho por saber», incluido «quién o qué estaba detrás» de los supuestos acontecimientos, no se limitó en utilizar el calificativo de «ataques».

Un reporte del Buró Federal de Investigaciones –que aún no es público, pero al que la agencia AP tuvo acceso– asegura que, después de llevar a cabo varias pruebas en el terreno, no existen evidencias de que se hayan perpetrado «ataques acústicos» contra diplomáticos estadounidenses en La Habana.

Las conclusiones del FBI, que ha viajado en cuatro ocasiones a la Mayor de las Antillas para adelantar pruebas en el terreno, coinciden con las del Comité de Expertos creado en Cuba para investigar los incidentes y con otras de reconocidos especialistas internacionales.

La audiencia de este martes fue organizada por el senador republicano de Florida, Marco Rubio, y copresidida por el senador demócrata de Nueva Jersey, Robert (Bob) Menéndez.

Josefina Vidal aseguró que ambos cuentan con un «vasto récord de trabajo en contra de mejores relaciones entre Cuba y Estados Unidos».

Asimismo, son promotores de «todo tipo de propuestas legislativas y políticas que afectan los intereses de los pueblos cubano y estadounidense, y solo benefician a una minoría cada vez más aislada que históricamente ha lucrado con la agresión a Cuba».

«Su total falta de escrúpulos y credibilidad es reconocida», dijo Vidal tras recordar que la única agenda política de los congresistas anticubanos ha sido «llevar a nuestros dos países hacia una confrontación, sin importarles las consecuencias».

La diplomática cubana aseguró que la «gran víctima» de la audiencia de este martes fue la verdad.

También reiteró categóricamente que «el Gobierno cubano no tiene responsabilidad alguna en las afectaciones de salud reportadas por diplomáticos estadounidenses» y

«Cuba nunca ha perpetrado ni perpetrará, ni ha permitido ni permitirá que terceros actúen contra la integridad física de ningún diplomático, sin excepción».
Rechazó en otro momento la politización de este tema y las medidas «injustificadas que ha adoptado el Gobierno de Estados Unidos, con un alto costo para nuestra población, la emigración cubana y el pueblo estadounidense».

«Cuba es un país seguro, pacífico y saludable para los cubanos, para los extranjeros, para los diplomáticos acreditados y para los millones de personas que nos visitan cada año, incluyendo los estadounidenses», concluyó.

 __________




Marco Rubio se queda sordo con Cuba

No importa lo que digan el FBI, los investigadores o la realidad. No hay peor sordo que Marco Rubio, cuando se trata de Cuba



Autor: Sergio Alejandro Gómez | internet@granma.cu

10 de enero de 2018 01:01:28
 


Incluso si de un altavoz a máxima potencia saliera una verdad sobre Cuba, el senador por la Florida Marco Rubio sería incapaz de escucharla.

Rubio sufre hace décadas una sordera selectiva sobre su país de origen. Solo oye lo que le conviene.

Por eso, mientras el Buró Federal de Investigaciones (FBI, por sus siglas en inglés) asegura que no existen pruebas sobre los supuestos «ataques acústicos» contra diplomáticos estadounidenses en La Habana, él prefiere montar un circo en el Congreso y convertir a diplomáticos de carrera en contorsionistas de la realidad.

Con bombo y platillo anunció que el subcomité de Relaciones Exteriores del Senado, donde tiene un asiento, llevaría a cabo este martes una audiencia para abordar el tema. Convocó a tres altos funcionarios del Departamento de Estado y ni siquiera se molestó en buscar un título neutral para la parodia: «Ataques a diplomáticos estadounidenses en Cuba».

De hecho, y para alegría de Rubio, la palabra «ataque» sonaba una y otra vez en el hemiciclo sin que nadie aportara una sola evidencia para respaldarla.

«El personal diplomático describe una multitud de síntomas, muchos de los cuales no son fácilmente cuantificables ni atribuibles a una causa específica», aseguró Charles Rosenfarb, director del buró de Servicios Médicos del Departamento de Estado, sin que nadie pareciera inmutarse. «El reto mayor ha sido la falta de certeza acerca del agente causal», añadió y tampoco hubo grandes sobresaltos.

El propio Francisco Palmieri, secretario adjunto en funciones para el Hemisferio Occidental del Departamento de Estado, reconoció que todavía hay «mucho que no sabemos, incluido quién o qué está detrás». Pero, como si nadie lo hubiera escuchado, siguió hablando de «ataques» y «lesiones».

Resultó cuando menos penoso ver a funcionarios con largos y prolíficos historiales sometidos a las presiones de un congresista que ha hecho carrera a costa de mentir sobre Cuba. En su biografía oficial aún aparece que la familia Rubio salió del país «huyendo del comunismo», cuando en realidad lo hizo en plena dictadura de Fulgencio Batista.

Existe una larga tradición de extorsiones y chantajes de los comités del Congreso que atienden las Relaciones Exteriores hacia el Departamento de Estado. Un solo senador puede bloquear el nombramiento de un funcionario casi indefinidamente. Pero eso no exime a nadie de los principios éticos elementales.
Fue un momento tragicómico cuando, en plena audiencia, Rubio lanzó la pregunta retórica de quién podría tener el interés de crear fricción entre Estados Unidos y Cuba. Su rostro se contrajo por un segundo y quizá en ese momento pasó por su cabeza una idea elemental: «bueno, aparte de mí, quién más puede tener interés».

Aunque el supuesto objetivo de la audiencia era dar seguimiento a la investigación que se lleva a cabo en la actualidad, era obvio que el senador por la Florida no estaba interesado en análisis científicos o pruebas de campo.

Su único objetivo era señalar a las autoridades cubanas como responsables y tratar de desmontar cualquier avance en las relaciones, que es su verdadera obsesión.

No importa lo que digan el FBI, los investigadores o la realidad. No hay peor sordo que Marco Rubio, cuando se trata de Cuba.

CINCO INCONGRUENCIAS DE LOS SUPUESTOS ATAQUES SÓNICOS

01. Para causar daños con sonido audible la intensidad debe ser tan alta como la turbina de un avión y es imposible que sus efectos pasen desapercibidos.

02. Los científicos ponen en duda que el ultrasonido o el infrasonido (aquellos que no son detectados por el oído por estar fuera del rango de audición), puedan ser utilizados como armas. El ultrasonido se disipa rápidamente y el infrasonido es muy difícil de dirigir, afectando áreas completas.

03. Los ataques tendrían que haber tenido una precisión láser para afectar a una persona en específico y no causar efecto alguno en las otras.

04. La conmoción cerebral o los problemas cognitivos reportados por la parte estadounidense no tienen ningún referente clínico en eventos vinculados con sonidos. 05. Cuba, amenazada de guerra o en momentos de gran tensión, jamás optó por el camino de agredir a diplomáticos de ninguna nacionalidad. ¿Qué sentido tendría hacerlo después de tomar la decisión soberana de restablecer los nexos con Washington?

__________





01. No existen evidencias con respaldo científico para asegurar que se llevaron a cabo ataques acústicos contra diplomáticos estadounidenses en Cuba.

02. La sintomatología descrita por Washington y filtrada por la prensa no coincide con los efectos del sonido en la salud humana.

03. Resulta inverosímil el contexto en el que supuestamente se habrían producido los alegados incidentes, en lugares custodiados por los propios estadounidenses y sin acceso directo al exterior, así como el hecho de que habrían resultado dañadas unas personas en específico y otras no.

04. Existen otras causas probables, incluido los factores sicosociales, que explicarían mucho mejor la variada sintomatología alegada por Washington. Las mismas deben ser estudiadas a profundidad antes de emitir un criterio definitivo.

05. Cuba no está familiarizada ni existen precedentes del uso en territorio nacional de armas acústicas, las cuales sí existen, pero están en manos de las grandes potencias y generan efectos distintos a los descritos.

06. El Comité de Expertos cubanos que analizó el caso estuvo limitado por la falta de colaboración de las autoridades estadounidenses, que no compartieron toda la información disponible ni permitieron el acceso a los pacientes o sus registros médicos.

07. Los especialistas de la Mayor de las Antillas están dispuestos a colaborar con sus contrapartes estadounidenses de manera transparente para llegar a resultados conclusivos.

08. Cuba se destaca por el cumplimiento de la Convención de Viena y jamás ha perpetrado ni prestado su territorio para perpetrar ataques de cualquier naturaleza contra el personal diplomático de ningún país.

09. Por el contrario, los diplomáticos cubanos han sido víctimas de acciones violentas en territorio estadounidense, llevadas a cabo por miembros de grupos terroristas conocidos y vinculados con Washington.

10. Los sectores que están en contra de la mejoría en las relaciones entre los dos países están manipulando el tema de los supuestos incidentes acústicos para justificar el retroceso en los vínculos bilaterales.

Joel Slawotsky: "Principled Realism: Thoughts on the New National Security Strategy"

$
0
0


Joel Slawotsky, of the Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, and the Law and Business Schools of the College of Management, Rishon LeZion, Israel has guest blogged for "Law at the End of the Day"  on issues relating to corporate liability under international law  (e.g., "Rethinking Financial Crimes and Violations of International Law", Jan. 9, 2013; "Corporate Liability Under The Alien Tort Statute: The Latest Twist" April 26, 2014) and on issues of multilateral trade and finance (Joel Slawotsky Reports From Chinese University of Hong Kong: Asia FDI Forum II--China's Three-Prong Investment Strategy: Bilateral, Regional, and Global Tracks; Joel Slawotsky--Essay "On the potential shift from the present-day architects to new architects on the definition of international law" (March 16, 2017)). He has also recently also served as Guest Editor of the Sovereign Wealth Fund special issue of Qatar University International Review of Law (IRL) (2015).

He has very kindly produced a marvelously insightful essay: "Principled Realism: Thoughts on the New National Security Strategy."  In the essay he considers the ramifications of the shifts and developments of U.S. policy as just recently delivered through the National Security Strategy of the United States (4 Dec. 2017) (hereafter the "NSS")(for my own thoughts, see here, and here).  He provides an important perspective on on what NSS might reveal of the direction of U.S. strategic thinking under the current administration. An excellent analysis of principled realism and of the emerging strategic relationships among China, Russia and the U.S.

The essay follows below.




Principled Realism: Thoughts on the New U.S. National Security Strategy
Joel Slawotsky

The recent thought provoking analysis on the National Security Strategy (“NSS”) (here) is an important contribution towards grasping the “Trump Doctrine’s” potential influence on the global governance architecture. I intentionally use quotation marks because I am far from certain that President Trump was directly involved in the document’s detailed formulation although as America’s leader and Commander in Chief, President Trump undoubtedly approved the document. The premises of the NSS also dovetail with the Trump campaign’s themes as well. Note however that some do directly ascribe the NSS to Trump (see, e.g., here).

The reason I am not sure to what extent President Trump shaped this document (any more so than previous U.S. Presidents have by themselves shaped prior NSSs) is that a similar document, Joint Operating Environment (JOE), “The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World,” was published in mid-2016 by the U.S. Department of Defense – bearing striking similarities to the NSS and also referencing revisionists and rivals.

The DofD document uses the word “competitor” 43 times and references “China” almost 20 times. It singles out China as harboring ambitions threatening American hegemony closely paralleling the NSS.
For the foreseeable future, the rising economic and cultural power of some Asian countries, particularly China, is breeding new and more expansive political and geostrategic ambitions backed by growing military power. (“The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World,” p. 28).
The DofD echoes near identical warnings raised in the NSS and references the revisionist competitors specifically as “China, Russia, Iran, and others”. Notice also the emphasis on cyber and technological threats to the U.S. military and the need to remedy any deficiencies. Again, echoing the NSS JOE 2035 notes.

China’s recent industrial and economic growth combined with its desire to once again be a regional hegemon and global power may result in new nuclear doctrine emphasizing first use and a counter force approach, versus its current counter value doctrine and capabilities. Future delivery mechanisms might include hypersonic missiles, long-range cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads, all designed to penetrate U.S. defensive systems.. . . (“The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World” p. 25)

Looking ahead, competitive behavior between the U.S. and potential – and actual – adversaries will be overt and violent. But just as often, our interaction with competitors will include attempts to deter and deny us our strategic objectives or be marked by ambiguous, but still coercive pursuit of political goals backed by the threat or potential of applied military power.. . . (Ibid., p. i (Foreword))

The cyber forces and activities of many states will also likely be used to stress or fracture the social and political cohesion of competitors. . . . (p. 35)

Our forces face the very real possibility of arriving in a future combat theater and finding themselves facing an arsenal of advanced, disruptive technologies that could turn our previous technological advantage on its head – where our armed forces no longer have uncontested theater access or unfettered operational freedom of maneuver. . . . (“The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World” p. 15 quoting Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, Remarks to the National Defense University Convocation (August 5, 2014))

Russia, China, and other revisionist states may also increasingly partner and coordinate with each other or with smaller, but militarily-active partners such as Pakistan or North Korea (Ibid., 29)
Therefore, a likely scenario is that the NSS is principally the product of “senior executives and the directors” of the United States - the “Deep State”; the network of senior defense, intelligence and key career officials who in practical terms “man the fortress” and are responsible for the overall protection and projection of American power. If so, we may look at both of these recent documents as a product of a critical mass of strategic thinking within the highest realms of the American command and intelligence communities - allied against staying the course of what they believe are failed policies. In other words, the NSS is calling out for a re-evaluation of direction – i.e., that something needs to be changed to “Make America Great Again.”


The NSS emphasizes the rivalry and competition with revisionists which appears to be conceptualized as a zero-sum game. The competition is not framed in a friendly or “co-team captain” cooperative context of “winning hearts and minds” but a “winner” and “loser” framework. Indeed, the Chinese threat is essentially lumped together with other strategic threats also viewed as “winner takes all” such as terrorism, North Korea and Iran.

The NSS document reads as a “wake-up call” describing certain nations particularly China, but also Russia, as rivals of the United States led order. Pursuant to this view, as China integrates into the international governance architecture and other developing powers surge, the “American Empire” is at risk of slipping. Such thinking is a recognition of the cyclical nature of global hegemons.
History has never set any precedent that an empire is capable of governing the world forever. (Cite here).
As Trump’s campaign theme of MAGA indicates, and as his election demonstrates, a large segment of the U.S. citizenry agrees with the assessment that the United States in essence is “losing the game”. If one believes that the U.S. is losing at the game responses might be: to leave the game or alternatively to amend the rules before the game is lost. Is this the meaning of Principled Realism? As detailed below, the answer is probably yes.

Moreover, this perception of an America that is at risk of losing its edge is not new to the Trump Administration. Even President Obama recognized that U.S. leadership was slipping and stated that his push for the TPP was proximately caused by U.S. efforts to contain China:

Right now, China wants to write the rules for commerce in Asia. If it succeeds, our competitors would be free to ignore basic environmental and labor standards, giving them an unfair advantage over American workers … We can’t let that happen. We should write the rules. (President Obama: "Writing the Rules for 21st Century Trade").
The U.S. – under Obama – also tried mightily to persuade allies from joining the Chinese led AIIB – and failed which could be interpreted as “losing the edge.”

This past month may be remembered as the moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system . . . . I can think of no event since Bretton Woods comparable to the combination of China’s effort to establish a major new institution and the failure of the United States to persuade dozens of its traditional allies, starting with Britain, to stay out. (Larry Summers, "Time US leadership woke up to new economic era" (2015)).
Therefore, rather than the hyperbole that Trump is a “rogue” or claims that President Trump “use[s] foreign policy to throw red meat to your base while other cabinet members are scrambling to stop Armageddon"("Trump’s National Security Strategy Is a Farce") and is set on disrupting the current order, a more objective view suggests that the NSS may simply reflect a belief that the policies of the “Grand Bargain” – the strategy to accommodate threats and simultaneously contain revisionists is a failure. The importance of the NSS document lies in the apparent policy shift to “Principled Realism” as opposed to the perceived failures of the “Grand Bargain.”

For approximately 70 years, the American mantra encouraged free trade and the promotion of a grand bargain - a liberal international order with U.S. led international financial institutions, the WTO and initiatives such as the Washington Consensus stabilizing the world and enforced by massive U.S. military power diffused through dozens of bases in Europe, the Gulf and Asia. The United States also spent substantial sums globally to provide “stabilization” ("The End of Foreign Aid As We Know It")  and to promote “democratic values” and thus win the hearts and minds of foreign populations ("Did U.S. aid win hearts and minds in Afghanistan? Yes and no"). 

More recently, the “Grand Bargain” was perhaps also employed as a means of containing or delaying the day of reckoning. This policy of containment through the grand bargain would have encouraged China’s entry into the WTO and the economic integration of rivals such as China. This policy would also accommodate – despite saber-rattling - the nuclear ambitions of other nations.

Focusing on China, prior policies appear to have indeed been modeled on a belief that if China were integrated into the trade order and allowed to invest globally and prosper, China would somehow “modernize” in terms of rights and a domestic governance model. U.S. policy experts seem to have believed that a developing China within the rubric of the U.S. led governance architecture would lead its citizens to think Western, demand empowerment and  its citizens to think Western, demand rights, and therefore bring internal political pressure on China to become a more Western oriented state.

The 2006 National Security Strategy stated:
China’s leaders … cannot let their population increasingly experience the freedoms to buy, sell, and produce, while denying them the rights to assemble, speak, and worship. (here)
The 2002 NSS noted
In time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of [national] greatness (here).
U.S. policy was therefore predicated on a belief that through economic modernization, a more Western oriented and less CCP dominated China was “inevitable” and that social and political freedom was an inevitable part and parcel of China’s development. Encouraging trade and a globalized China was held out as a sort of “containment through democracy” goal of the grand bargain. Under this strategy, China would be allowed to integrate to a degree while the U.S: and Western allies would remain the globañ governance architects. However, over time China began insisting on a larger role but was rebuffed.  Indeed, a motivating factor for the AIIB was the belief that the U.S. was attempting to contain China at the IMF and World Bank. The U.S. had also sought a TPP without China--further corroborating this containment strategy.

The 2017 NSS therefore stems from a belief that the U.S. led global order under the rubric of the “grand bargain” is no longer working in favor of U.S. national security interests. This would certainly dovetail with recent developments: rather than encouraging FDI and economic integration the U.S. is more closely scrutinizing China’s acquisitions based upon national security (e.g., here, and here).

In this light, other recent developments which run counter to the “grand bargain’s” mantra of globalization also make sense: U.S. withdrawal from TPP, Paris Accords, renegotiation over existing trade agreements such as NAFTA, a U.S. reluctance to support the WTO, a more confrontational posture at the UN and states with nuclear ambitions and pruning the State Department and foreign aid.

Of course, it is not simply the failed policies to “contain” rivals but the concern that these rivals may threaten the U.S. destiny that motivates the new policy of “Principled Realism”.

The NSS clearly states this:
China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders. (NSS, supra., p. 25).
Again, this is seemingly a realization that Russia and China are not friendly partners of the United States but rather calculating adversaries that seek to restore their greatness and export their governance models abroad.But neither Chinese nor Russian perceptions were hidden.
We all know that after the end of the Cold War—everyone is aware of that—a single center of domination emerged in the world, and then those who found themselves at the top of the pyramid were tempted to think that if they were strong and exceptional…. we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world …("Read Putin’s U.N. General Assembly speech")

And again:
Western States try to impose their system, whether political or economic, on other societies. They do this through direct means such as trade and aid, or indirect means such as the monetary and economic policies imposed through the financial arms of the West-the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This is, and has always been, part of the political game played by the major powers to enhance their position at the world stage because it is economic dominance that they want to achieve through the imposition of their system on weaker societies. (Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on June 3, 2015).

Focusing on China, the initial question is whether the NSS's assessment is realistic or a mistaken perception based upon hyperbole and fear mongering. After all, some claim that China is not yet a rival to American economic power ("China’s economic power is actually a lot smaller than you think").  Some believe the United States remains “indispensable” ("Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony")  and that the American Empire will continue to reign unimpeded by any potential rivals.
[T]here is no United States demise. For the rest of the 21st century the United States will remain the world’s strongest military power, its most innovative economy and the chief defender of the core values on which our country was established. Our economy is the strongest it’s ever been, our corporate sheets are the strongest they’ve ever been, our unemployment rate is at a record low, we have seen 15 million new jobs created and these are honest numbers, not numbers created by a party machine. ("Centre stage in the China-US soft power contest" quoting U.S. Ambassador to Australia John Berry).
Notwithstanding these claims, it is beyond debate that China does harbor great ambitions and perceives itself as a great power that has been disadvantaged by the Western powers. It is therefore only natural that China uses its leverage - as did the United States – and insist on greater recognition and perhaps adoption of norms and ideals as preconditions for economic engagement.

A realistic evaluation of current developments reveals that any hubris of United States invincibility is misplaced (Slawotsky, "The Clash of Architects: Impending Developments and Transformations in International Law"; citing "The dollar's 70-year dominance is coming to an end").  The reality is that the U.S. role as Chief Architect is “at risk” of replacement. And this is perfectly natural should rising powers begin to potentially exert influence over the global financial, trade and legal architecture.
In particular, there does not appear to be a comparable example of a great power (or multiple powers) rising within a normative framework not of its own making, where that normative framework has not undergone substantial change or revolution as a result of the new power’s values and interests. (Chesterman, "Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, Present and Futures").
China in particular has been remarkably successful in integrating into the existing architecture with a growing ability to influence the global governance architecture. While the NSS names Russia as an important rival it is China, not Russia, that has brought the specter of a reduced U.S. role to fruition has a currency used in trade deals and has ensconced itself as an integral and dynamic player in global affairs. By masterfully contributing to the global architecture, China has the potential (and has commenced utilizing it) to project power and influence much to the same degree as the United States has done.
It is the Chinese Yuan that may be used as a benchmark for crude oil and it is the Chinese led AIIB and OBOR that may potentially be transformative (Slawotsky, "Essay "On the potential shift from the present-day architects to new architects on the definition of international law").
And, again:
A yuan-denominated oil contract could also challenge the role of the U.S. dollar—currently the dominant commodity-pricing currency— by making it possible for crude exporters to sell the oil in another currency ("China to Shake Up Global Market With Yuan-Based Oil Futures Contract").

Encouraging oil producers to accept yuan rather than USD could also sway these energy producers to become Chinese allies ("China Is Eyeballing a Major Strategic Investment in Saudi Arabia’s Oil").

China’s AIIB continues to bring within China’s orbit new member states ("China-led AIIB approves 13 new members, Canada joins") and even Japan - the last significant U.S. ally holdout - is militating towards joining the AIIB ("Japan Could Still Join China Infrastructure Bank, Abe Ally Says").

China is indeed a global leader and has ambitions for strategic supremacy in many sectors which will project both “hard” and “soft” power. Chinese technological breakthroughs are impressive and undeniable in dual-use civilian-military technology with respect to space exploration, drones, supercomputers, etc. ("Nine ways Chinese scientists pushed the envelope in 2017") as well as artificial intelligence ("The US is losing to China in the AI race"). Chinese advances are clearly perceived--and correctly so-- as impinging on the global advantage of the United States.

China’s ambitious OBOR is also bringing many nations within China’s sphere of economic leverage and influence.
In terms of scale or scope, OBOR has no parallel in modern history. It is more than 12 times the size of the Marshall Plan, America’s post-World War ii initiative to aid the reconstruction of Western Europe’s devastated economies. Even if China cannot implement its entire plan, OBOR will have a significant and lasting impact ("China’s Imperial Overreach").



Along with China’s growing role in the economic and trade pillars of the international governance architecture, China’s military has assembled an impressive force ("China's military tech challenging West's dominance: Study")  This has resulted in China asserting itself more substantially ("Chinese paper warns Australia on 'interference' in South China Sea") China is also a growing weapons exporter ("Can China Replace the United States as the World's Top Arms Dealer?").

The NSS is therefore an explicit recognition that not only has the hoped for Westernization of China not been effective, it signals a belief that China’s trajectory may negatively impact U.S. destiny and is being grouped together with America’s historic rival, Russia. This is somewhat reminiscent of the Reagan years where U.S. policy was framed as “good versus evil” and the current scenario bears resemblances to the Reagan-era theme – replacing the Soviet Union with China - of a struggle between the “U.S. and Western democratic rights-based model versus the China socialist conformist state”. Therefore, the competition may also be understood as a test of domestic governance. Ultimately, China (as was the Soviet Union) is a suspect in attempting to subvert the United States and promote its socialist vision. The focus on technology and its use in advancement of this goal is clearly important as AI, control of data and surveillance are tools that can be used. The NSS’s emphasis on these areas is revealing.




Where do we go from here?

The NSS document and the policy orientation is under the overarching theme of "principled realism". However, "principled realism" is undefined. It would appear that the “realism” refers to a U.S. that is realistic in assessing the ambitions and the possible success of rival nations. But joined by “principled” the term “Principled Realism” becomes an enigma. Does principled realism suggest or imply the need to vigorously and actively confront revisionist powers as opposed to backing down, or the opposite, inaction (i.e., leaving a global governance framework perceived as “a loss for the U.S. and thus inherently conflicting with U.S. interests)?

The likely meaning is a combination. Principled realism will likely translate into United States assessment of various components of the international governance architecture and disengagement from those parts of the structure the U.S. views as “a lost cause” (or not worth the resources) simultaneous with vigorous attempts at salvaging via renegotiation those parts that might be salvageable (NAFTA). Principled Realism will also result in deciding whether a particular situation requires confrontation or engagement controlling whether the U.S. in fact more aggressively confronts other nations or jettisoning the engagement as failing to advance U.S. interests. Engagement for the sake of the Grand Bargain seems over.


How will Principled Realism be implemented?

As for U.S.-China relations the U.S. will likely cooperate with China at times and refuse in other contexts and may confront China in some others. For example, the U.S. has more severely scrutinized incoming FDI from China via CFIUS to protect vital U.S. interests. A focus on national security reviews and more intensive scrutiny of Chinese investments particularly in the financial and technology sectors is likely. Whether tariffs are utilized as part of Principled Realism is less probable due to the potential damage to the U.S. economy, but the U.S. is likely to insist on remedying perceptions of trade unfairness such as demanding reciprocity.

What will happen to the “Grand Bargain” - the attempts the U.S. has made to “socialize” rogues and despots (which can be read as “civilize” in the sense it relates to or in the context of "civilized" nations). Does Principled Realism mean those efforts are likely over? Is this effort at ensuring the growth of democratic movements and a Western model of governance now abandoned? At a minimum, these efforts are likely to be cutback, being viewed as an “unprofitable” allocation of resources the U.S. can no longer afford. Indeed, spending on “capturing hearts and minds” seems to already be in decline ("The End of Foreign Aid As We Know It"; "U.N. budget cuts highlight new U.S. approach"; "State Department to Offer Buyouts in Effort to Cut Staff";  "Tillerson to cut more than half of State Department's special envoys") .

Another major question is how Principled Realism will re-shape U.S. relations and foreign policy in general. Principled Realism may result in cutting back diplomatic efforts and aid to nations seen as aligned with China and/or hostile to U.S. interests. Rather than continuing “Grand Bargain” attempts at bringing nations within the U.S. orbit, Principled Realism would translate into stopping these failed efforts ("Trump Suggests Freezing $1.9B in Aid to Pakistan Just the Start").

Principled Realism will likely translate into result in decisions being made on North Korea and Iran as opposed to kicking the can down the road ("Trump Says U.S. Open to North Korea Talks at the Right Time").

With respect to rising powers that may share similar interests to the U.S. Principled Realism will control the policy. India for example is a regional rival to China and has declined – despite strong Chinese efforts - to join China’s OBOR. India is also wary of growing Chinese Naval power ("First Djibouti ... now Pakistan port earmarked for a Chinese overseas naval base, sources say").

Principled Realism will likely translate into enhanced cooperation with India ("The US National Security Strategy and Great Power Relations") and jettisoning engagement with Pakistan ("U.S. Suspends Most Security Assistance To Pakistan").

There may be other Western oriented nations also "waking-up" or re-examining their own national security ("France, Germany, Italy urge rethink of foreign investment in EU"; "China and Germany in a dust up over cybersecurity").  The U.S. will certainly look to allies but how does integrating these allies into "Principled Realism" work? The allure of economic self-interest will surely impact the decisions of many U.S. allies whether to join the "China Consensus.” ("Canada has everything to gain through research collaboration with China") If nations do in fact ally with China, how will Principled Realism direct U.S. reaction to this (mis)conduct?

Another crucial aspect is the objection by internal opposition on the part of the governing apparatus and population that either ideologically or for economic interests support a multi-polar world with US national interests being of secondary importance.
The old orthodoxy saw the world as a series of challenges that could be remedied as the U.S. oversaw the transformation of the system of states into a global system into which all states would be embedded ("From Global to Fortress America").
Political, media and academic elites within the United States are powerful and together with influential trade interests will oppose U.S. disengagement. They will resist the policies directed by Principled Realism. Will these interests really allow Principled Realism to be fully and effectively implemented?

The internal divides in the US are also a serious impediment to a successful implementation of Principled Realism. Although political discord in the United States is historic, the current schisms are extreme. Nothing in recent memory bears any resemblance to the almost surreal attacks and counter-attacks engaged in by some U.S. elites such as media personalities who view the current U.S. Administration as “dangerous” and members of the Administration fighting back against their belief these elites are employing “Fake News” to distort and discredit U.S. policy. The rise of the Alt-Right as well as Antifa all reflect serious fissures in the United States that lead to substantial uncertainty as to the ability to implement Principled Realism. Indeed, “pragmatic realism” may also dilute the potency of the “Principled Realism” of the NSS. The remarks of President Trump accompanying the NSS release were less hostile and more along the lines of “partnership building” ("Trump's National Security Strategy").

Last, but not least, the possibility exists that China has already advanced the prospect of a "reduced US" to an extent that it will be exceedingly hard to reverse absent an open confrontation. While it is impossible to count out the United States a successful implementation of the NSS, through Principled Realism, is hardly assured. China has a proven successful model ("My trip to China shattered my biases about developing nations") that other nations may wish to emulate or at least endeavor to align with out of self-interest.

China's rise is remarkable. In little over a decade China has become an economic superpower ("China Plots What’s Next as Influence on Global Markets Grows").  The size of the U.S economy as valued by Gross Domestic Product is approximately $19 trillion with China at number 2 at $11 trillion. On a PPP basis, China has already surpassed the United States ("World GDP Ranking 2017").

China continues to invest heavily in research and development and is positioned to lead in the important future technologies such as AI ("China Is Using America’s Own Plan to Dominate the Future of Artificial Intelligence").

How will the US regain the advantage when allies flocked to the AIIB and OBOR? Not that it cannot be undone but China already has substantial influence (here). 

Indeed, it would have been unthinkable 10-15 years ago that a vital financial institution such as the AIIB - and key part of the developing international governance architecture - would be established and led by China rather than under the control of the United States. China has already used its influence to promote its own agendas ("China Thwarts Taiwan’s Bid to Be Founding Member of AIIB").

The possibility exists that China is very close to crossing the Rubicon and will be positioned to trump the U.S. as the chief architect of the global governance architecture. This is not meant as a critique of China. The United States also used its power and influence as chief architect to shape international law, establish trade rules, the “Washington Consensus” and a promotion of U.S. policy goals.

As this essay has outlined, although Principled Realism is undefined, we can plausibly understand the meaning - and ramifications - based upon U.S. disengagement at certain levels and simultaneous attempts at re-setting other levers of the international economic and trade orders. It is probable that the NSS together with DofD, is indicative of the realization that United States control of the economic, trade, and legal orders is no longer assured. Most of the Trump Administration’s actions comport with the understanding outlined in this Essay. The next 12-18 months will be critical in determining the longer-term outcome of the U.S. efforts at retaining its current position as chief architect in the economic and legal global governance orders.

Constitutional Reform Comes to the Chinese State Constitution and Changes to China's Global Trade Relationships

$
0
0


The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party announced a program of potentially significant development of its constitutional model.  The changes required adjustment of the two great instruments of Chinese political legitimacy--first, the constitution of the vanguard Party, the holder of political leadership, and second, from that the modification of the constitution of the administrative state to conform its organization and operation, to ensure that the principles through which it is operated, conforms to that of the political constitution of the vanguard party. 

The amendment to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party were announced with the closing of the 19th CPC Congress--"Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China" (October 24, 2017). Those amendments decisively affirmed the determination of Chinese constitutionalism to forge its own normative path, yet one that continues to conform to global expectations of legitimacy enhancing constitutionalism. 

It is now time for the coordinated amendment to the State constitution This post and those that follow will consider the path to those amendments in light of the political constitution of the Chinese Communist Party within the grounding normative structures of global constitutionalism.

The task of the amendment to the state constitution was set for the 2nd Plenum of the 19th CPC Congress.  The CPC Central Committee met on January 11 to discuss the agenda for the 2nd Plenum which will occur on 18-19 January 2018. (中共中央政治局召开会议 讨论拟提请十九届二中全会审议的文件 中共中央总书记习近平主持会议).
The official Xinhua News Agency reported on December 27 that the Politburo decided to convene the Second Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party in January 2018. The main agenda of the Plenum is to “discuss and study proposals for amending part of [China’s current] Constitution,” which was adopted in 1982 and later amended four times in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004. (Explainer: China to Amend the Constitution for the Fifth Time).

That was a logical progression between the announcement of the amendment of the vanguard party constitution in October 2017 and the meetings of the Naitonal People's COngress that will occur early in 2018.
It will be the second full meeting of around 400 party elites from the Central Committee following a major reshuffle at the party congress in October. The second plenum normally sets the tone for the upcoming National People’s Congress, when the new president, premier and other top cabinet figures will be formally named. This time, the two-day meeting will focus on the proposal to revise the constitution, according to a Politburo statement announcing the date of the meeting carried by Xinhua on Friday. It is also being held a month earlier than usual, and it was unclear whether there would be a third plenum ahead of the NPC parliamentary session, which is usually held in March. (Revisions to Chinese constitution will be key task for top cadres at plenum)
Those changes are not merely political, but enhance the "all around" (comprehensive) approach to Chinese development which sees an intimate connection between law, politics, culture, internal and external relations.
According to an agenda released yesterday, the upcoming week-long session of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee will review proposals made by the CPC Central Committee on the amendments to the Constitution and deliberate draft amendments based on the proposals. According to the agenda, the NPC Standing Committee will discuss amendments to the country's 10-year-old foreign trade law in light of the new situation and demands made on China after it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) two years ago. The amendments proposed by the State Council will include "major changes'' to the existing foreign trade codes.The session will also continue to examine three financial laws key to the reform of China's banking businesses, namely, the draft law on supervision and management of the banking industry, the draft amendments to the central bank law and draft amendments to the commercial bank law. A treaty with Russia on the transfer of convicts and a treaty with Thailand on criminal justice assistance are also pending ratification by the legislature. (Chinese constitution amendments to be discussed).
In the Chinese version of reports the political objectives were much more clearly outlined:


会议认为,宪法是国家的根本法,是治国安邦的总章程,是党和人民意志的集中体现。现行宪法颁布以来,在改革开放和社会主义现代化建设的历史进程中、在我们党治国理政实践中发挥了十分重要的作用。实践证明,我国现行宪法是符合国情、符合实际、符合时代发展要求的好宪法。

  会议指出,我们党高度重视宪法在治国理政中的重要地位和作用,明确坚持依法治国首先要坚持依宪治国,坚持依法执政首先要坚持依宪执政,把实施宪法摆在全面依法治国的突出位置,采取一系列有力措施加强宪法实施和监督工作,为保证宪法实施提供了强有力的政治和制度保障。

  会议认为,我国宪法以国家根本法的形式,确认了中国共产党领导中国人民进行革命、建设、改革的伟大斗争和根本成就,确立了工人阶级领导的、以工农联盟为基础的人民民主专政的社会主义国家的国体和人民代表大会制度的政体,确定了国家的根本任务、领导核心、指导思想、发展道路、奋斗目标,规定了中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度,规定了社会主义法治原则、民主集中制原则、尊重和保障人权原则,等等,反映了我国各族人民共同意志和根本利益。我国宪法确立的一系列制度、原则和规则,确定的一系列大政方针,具有显著优势、坚实基础、强大生命力,必须长期坚持、全面贯彻。

  会议指出,宪法修改是国家政治生活中的一件大事,是党中央从新时代坚持和发展中国特色社会主义全局和战略高度作出的重大决策,也是推进全面依法治国、推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化的重大举措。为更好发挥宪法在新时代坚持和发展中国特色社会主义中的重要作用,需要对宪法作出适当修改,把党和人民在实践中取得的重大理论创新、实践创新、制度创新成果上升为宪法规定。党中央决定用一次全会专门讨论宪法修改问题,充分表明党中央对这次宪法修改的高度重视。

  会议认为,这次宪法修改要高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜,全面贯彻党的十九大精神,坚持以马克思列宁主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想、科学发展观、习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导,坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一,体现党和国家事业发展的新成就新经验新要求,推动宪法与时俱进、完善发展,为新时代坚持和发展中国特色社会主义、实现“两个一百年”奋斗目标和中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦提供有力宪法保障。

  会议强调,宪法修改必须贯彻以下原则:坚持党的领导,坚持中国特色社会主义法治道路,坚持正确政治方向;严格依法按照程序进行;充分发扬民主、广泛凝聚共识,确保反映人民意志、得到人民拥护;坚持对宪法作部分修改、不作大改的原则,做到既顺应党和人民事业发展要求,又遵循宪法法律发展规律,保持宪法连续性、稳定性、权威性。(中共中央政治局召开会议 讨论拟提请十九届二中全会审议的文件 中共中央总书记习近平主持会议)
The meeting held that the constitution is the fundamental law of the country, the general charter of governing the country and bringing peace to the people, and the epitome of the will of the party and the people. Since its promulgation, the current constitution has played a very important role in the party’s practice of governing the country in the historical process of reform and opening up as well as the socialist modernization. The practice has proved that the current constitution of our country is a good constitution that is in line with the actual conditions and the reality and meets the requirements of the development of the times.

The meeting pointed out that our party attaches great importance to the status and role of the Constitution in governing the country. It made clear that the principle of governing the country according to law must first adhere to the principle of governing the country according to the constitution, ruling according to law must first adhere to the principle of ruling according to the constitution. The implementation of the constitution should be placed in an outstanding position during comprehensive governing according to the law. At the same time, a series of effective measures should be taken to strengthen the implementation and supervision of the constitution and provide strong political and institutional guarantee for the implementation of the constitution.

The meeting held that our constitution, in the form of the fundamental law of the country, confirmed the great struggle and fundamental achievements of the Chinese Communist Party in leading the Chinese people in revolution, construction, and reform. It established the socialist system of people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants and the political system of the state based on the people's congress system. It determined the fundamental tasks, leadership core, guiding ideology, development path and goal of the state, stipulated the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC, and stipulated the principles of the socialist rule of law, the principle of democratic centralism, the principle of respecting and safeguarding human rights, and so on, reflecting the common aspiration and fundamental interests of the people of all ethnic groups in our country. A series of systems, principles, and rules and a series of major policies set by the constitution of our country have significant advantages, a solid foundation, and strong vitality. They must be carried out in a long-term and comprehensive way.

The meeting pointed out: the amendment of the constitution is a major event in the country's political life. It is a major policy decision made by the Party’s Central Committee from the perspective of maintaining and developing the overall situation and strategic importance of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era. It is also a major move to push forward comprehensive governing according to the law, promote the modernization of the country's governance system and the ability to govern in a comprehensive manner. In order to give better play to the important role of the constitution in upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, it is necessary to make appropriate changes to the constitution and raise the major theoretical innovations, practical innovations and institutional innovations made by the party and the people in practice up to constitutional provisions. The decision of the Central Committee of the Party to devote a plenary session specifically to discuss the issue of constitutional amendment fully demonstrates that the Central Committee of the Party attaches great importance to the amendment of this constitution.

The meeting held that this constitutional amendment must hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and fully implement the spirit of the 19th National Congress of the Party. We must take Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of Three Represents, the scientific concept of development, and Xi Jinping’s thought of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era as our guide, adhere to the party's leadership, people being the masters of the country, unifying the state by law and embodying the party's and the nation's cause, demonstrate the new achievement, new experiences and new requirements. This amendment should keep the constitution advance with the times and promote the development of the constitution, provide a strong constitutional safeguard to persisting and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era and realizing of the goal of Two Centenaries the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

The meeting emphasized that the following principles must be adhered to in the amendment of the constitution: upholding the party's leadership, upholding the path of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics, adhering to the correct political orientation; strictly following the procedures in accordance with the law; giving full scope to democracy, extensively unifying consensus, ensuring that the will of the people is reflected and support from the people is obtained; insisting on the principle of partial revision of the constitution and no major change, complying not only with the requirements of the development of the cause of the party and the people but also the law of development of the constitution and keep the continuity, stability and authority of the constitution.
And, of course, that quite specific set of affirmations several important points are worth emphasizing.  First is the principle that the constitution is not the source of constituent power but merely its expression; it implements the will of people and party, but one which must remain in line with "reality meets the requirements of the development of the times." This is a living instrument that reflects popular and that must be attuned to changes in it. Second, the role of the constitution os quite specific (and form Western standards) quite narrow--it serves to administer the country.  It is a means of providing direction to officials int he way in which they must exercise discretion and meet their obligations to the people under the leadership of the party.  Third, the constitution is understood as "state fundamental law;" the "political system of the state body" determines the scope, form, principles, and operation of the state and not the other way around. That is, the state constitution is not the instrument that determines the scope and character of the political system. Fourth, constitutional revision must be understood as only one part of a larger overall political obligation of the vanguard party to maintain and develop " the overall situation and strategic importance of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era . . . to push forward the country's governance system and the ability to govern in a comprehensive manner." Fifth, the objective of constitutional revision is inherently political in the sense of ensuring that the provisions of the state administrative constitution continues to adhere to the core political values of the state, to which both state and Party are bound, int he form suitable for the "New Era" in the development of the nation.  Here again, the state constitution changes int he face of the requirements of the fundamental principles of the political system, which themselves are also developing as the vanguard moves more deeply away form revolutionary to ruling party, even as they provide flexibility in contextually driven implementation. Sixth, and those principles themselves are sourced not in the state constitution but in the political constitution of the vanguard party and in the fundamental obligation of the vanguard party to enhance its obligation to develop socialist democracy through principles of the mass line and in the forms of endogenous democratic institutions (e.g., here).

Yet most the attention on the amendment process will focus on the way in which the State Constitution's amendments will be directed to conformity with the changes in the political constitution of the vanguard party. The NCP Observe Blog recently speculated:
First, there is no doubt that this constitutional amendment will focus on granting constitutional status to supervision commissions. This will involve changing an array of existing constitutional provisions and adding a few new ones. A new section titled “Supervision Commissions” will probably be added to “Chapter III: The Structure of the State.” And the following is a non-exhaustive list of constitutional provisions that some argue must be amended for the Supervision Law to be constitutional:
Article 3, paragraph 3 (on the creation of other state organs by the people’s congresses)
Article 37, paragraph 2 (on the authority to approve and carry out arrest of citizens)
Article 40 (on the authority to inspect citizens’ private communications)
Article 62 (on the NPC’s functions and powers)
Article 63 (on the NPC’s removal power)
Article 67 (on the NPCSC’s functions and powers)
Article 89, item 8 (on the State Council’s authority to direct and manage supervision)
Article 101 (on local people’s congresses’ appointment and removal powers)
Article 104 (on the functions and powers of the standing committees of local people’s congresses)
Article 107 (on local governments’ authority to conduct administrative work concerning supervision)

Second, there is also no doubt that President Xi Jinping’s tongue-twisting political theory, the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, along with his predecessor President Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook on Development, will be written into the Preamble to the Constitution. (Explainer: China to Amend the Constitution for the Fifth Time).
The provisions are all controversial--in the sense that the consensus around their actual reduction to constitutional form has not solidified except perhaps among the senior leadership. This is especially the case with respect to the provisions on the supervision authority.  Also interesting will be to see how the changes to the provisions on provincial and local bodies, as well as on the NPCSC will have a substantial effect on the  administrative operaiton fo the state.

Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) Webinar Series for 2018

$
0
0

 I am happy to pass along information about the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) Webinar Series for 2018. Carmelo Mesa, Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies University of Pittsburgh, will open the series with a Webinair entitled, "Social Welfare in Cuba.  The Webinar Series can be accessed HERE.



January 17, 2018 (Wednesday, 12:00 to 1:00 pm eastern).
Title: Social Welfare in Cuba

Abstract: In 1989, Cuban social welfare indicators led most of Latin America. This was possible by the government commitment and the strong economic aid of the Soviet Union. This presentation will describe the social situation in Cuba for 2006 to 2017 which is much different than in 1989. It will start with the examination of the aging process; then analyzes several aspects of social welfare.

Presenter: Carmelo Mesa-Lago is Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus of Economics and Latin American Studies University of Pittsburgh, has been a visiting professor/researcher in 8 countries and lecturer in 39, founder/editor for 18 years of Cuban Studies, and author of 95 books/pamphlets and 318 articles/chapters published in 7 languages in 34 countries, on Cuban economy, social security and comparative economic systems. 

Click here for Powerpoint Slides.

 
 _______


March 14, 2018 (Wednesday, 12:00 to 1:00 pm eastern).
Title: Currency Unification and Exchange Rate Policy in Cuba: Lessons from Exchange Rate Unification in Transition

Abstract: Currency unification and multiple exchange rates are among the most discussed topics by macroeconomists doing research on the Cuban economy. This presentation describes the inherent difficulties associated with distribution of losses and gains that would result from currently unification.

Presenter: Rafael Romeu is the President and CEO of DevTech Systems, Inc., (DevTech). Dr. Romeu joined DevTech from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), where he worked since 2001. From 2010 on, he served in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, as the fiscal economist assigned to Spain. He holds a Ph.D. in international finance from the Department of Economics of the University of Maryland, College Park. 


________


May 16, 2018 (Wednesday, 12:00 to 1:00 pm eastern).
Title: Foreign Investment in Cuba: Law, Policy, and Practicalities

Abstract: Cuba’s 2014 foreign investment law and its annual portfolio of opportunities for foreign investment signal Cuba’s openness to foreign direct investment. This presentation provides a detailed description of Cuban law relevant to foreign investment, bilateral and other agreements with Cuba, transaction formation pitfalls and best practices, and how to steer clear of liability and policy traps.

Presenter: Larry Catá Backer is the W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law and International Affairs at Penn State Law. Professor Backer has conducted extensive research on Cuba’s economic development and governance model, as well on U.S.-Cuban relations. More broadly, his research focuses on globalization and on issues stemming from governments as private actors in global markets.

Just Published: "The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises: Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International Law and Policy," Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 50(4):827-888 (2017)

$
0
0



I am happy to announce the publication of "The Human Rights Obligations of State-Owned Enterprises: Emerging Conceptual Structures and Principles in National and International Law and Policy," which appears in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law 50(4):827-888 (2017).  The article considers the way that classical conceptions of the state owned enterprise, and the regulatory structures created around them, have been changing in the context of globalization and the rise of business and human rights governance regimes. The analysis is built around the 2016 Report of the U.N. Working Group for Business and Human Rights and offers a set of ten challenges and recommendations for further development.  The recommendations and challenges suggest the ways in which issues of corporate personality, of sovereign immunity, and asset partitioning will be central to the development of the SOE as an object of law and governance within and among states. 

The Abstract, Table of Contents and the Introduction follow.  The article can be accessed here.



Abstract: The distinction between the obligations of public and private entities, and their relation to law, is well known in classical political and legal theory. States have a duty that is undertaken through law; enterprises have a responsibility that is embedded in their governance. These fundamental divisions form part of the current international efforts to institutionalize human rights-related norms on and through states and enterprises, and most notably through the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights. The problems of conforming to evolving norms becomes more difficult where states project their authority through commercial enterprises. These state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operate where state duty and enterprise responsibility meet.

This Article takes a close look at the issue of the human rights duties of states as owners of SOEs, and of the responsibilities of SOEs for their own human rights related conduct. The form and substance of these duties and responsibilities are considered in light of three recent developments. The first is the increasingly prominent focus on SOEs as human rights-bearing institutions in international soft law and norms. The second is the substantial change in the direction of US policy in trade and globalization. The other is the maturation of Chinese outbound economic and investment policy, where its construction of an outbound nationalist globalization—the One Belt One Road policy—relies to some extent on the projection of commercial power through Chinese SOEs.

The Article offers a set of challenges and recommendations for further development. These recommendations and challenges suggest that issues of corporate personality, sovereign immunity, asset partition, and regulatory compartmentalization may well hobble the work of embedding human rights within the operation of states as owners and SOEs as public enterprises. To embed human rights more effectively in accordance with evolving international standards, it may be necessary to substantially change contemporary and backwards-looking legal frameworks within which SOEs now operate. Moreover, the Article demonstrates the shortcomings of the current strongly held consensus that the focus of regulatory governance must be grounded in and through a formally constituted enterprise, the SOE, rather than focusing regulation on economic activity irrespective of the form in which it is undertaken. Until these conceptual issues are considered, the effective regulation of SOEs, supply chains, and multinational corporations will remain elusive. 


--> -->

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. Challenging Engagement and Engagement Challenges Through the Lens of the 2016 WG Report

A. Foundations: SOE CSR and Human Rights Compliance

B. The 2016 Working Group Report
1. Introduction to Analysis
2. Section I: Introduction
a. Background, Aims, and Outline of the Report
b. Defining State-Owned Enterprises
c. State-Owned Enterprises: State of Play
d. Scope and Limits of the Report
3. Section II: Normative and Policy Framework Underpinning State Action in Relation to SOEs
a. State Duty to Protect against Abuses by SOEs
b. The SOEs as Business Enterprises: the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights 
c. Link between Corporate Governance and Human Rights 
4. Section III
a. Setting Expectations 
b. Instituting Mechanisms to Set and Manage Expectations through Ownership Arrangements
c. Developing the Relationship between the State and SOE Boards of Directors
d. Ensuring Oversight and Follow Up Mechanisms.
e. Instituting Capacity-building Obligations
f. Imposing Requirements of Human Rights Due Diligence
g.Instituting Requirements of Disclosure, Transparency, and Reporting
h. Developing Effective Remedies
5. Section IV: Conclusions and Recommendation
a. Conclusions
b. Recommendations

IV. The Work left to be Done: From Conceptual Lacunae to Implementation
A. Definitions Impede Efficient Regulatory Approaches
B. The Current Approach Exacerbates the Existing Disjunction Between the Legal Duty of States and the Societal Responsibilities of Enterprises
C. The Possibility of Double Standards (Home State-Host State) Detracts From Regulatory Coherence and Promotes Regulatory Hierarchy
D. Extraterritoriality Continues to Plague Regulatory Governance at the Transnational Level
E. There is a Contradiction between the Principle of Active Shareholding and the Legal Protection of Corporate Autonomy and Asset Partitioning

F. Sovereign Immunity Serves as the Procrustean Bed on which State–SOE Relations are Distorted, and with it the Global Economy

G. Encouraging Governance Gaps and Multiple Standards among Classes of Public Economic Activity Produces Regulatory Incoherence within States and Governance Gaps Among Them

H. Legalization through SOE Active Shareholding Damages the UNGP Framework and Calls into Question the Value of Legalization

I. The Perversities of Capacity Building in an Asymmetrical Global Order 

J. Data-Driven Regulatory Governance and Its Distorting Effects

V. Conclusion


__________







Consider the antique automobile pictured above. It sits rusting in a shop, still beautiful but now incapable of being driven anywhere and always awaiting repair. One can repair the auto, and perhaps one can drive it. But it remains obsolete, relates poorly to the modern highway and the objectives of driving, and has become less relevant to everyday life. Yet it produces a comforting nostalgia for for the museum or the Sunday drive, but is hardly fit for modern life.

This Article takes that automobile as its starting point. Sovereign conduct on the margins of the law, the title of the Symposium for which this Article was produced,[1] is perhaps no better manifested than in the commercial activities of states. And it is most fully formed when the state—the fundamental political body corporate—reconstitutes part of itself as an economic body corporate to engage in activities in national and transnational markets.[2] Yet, like the antique automobile in the picture above, the conventional law of the commercial activities of states, especially when undertaken in the form of state owned enterprises (SOEs), suggest not merely that old auto, but the futility of bringing life back to a model of economic activity that has not had a sound foundation since the beginning of this century. This futility is most acutely expressed in current debate touching on state and SOE engagement with the human rights consequences of their economic activity. Global elites might better consider the value of that work for the purposes to which it is being deployed. This Article develops that thesis in the context of recent efforts at the public international level to breathe new life into an old machine and suggests the contours of new approaches—a new regulatory machine for new times. This Introduction provides the context for the argument that follows. It sketches the emerging character of SOEs within globalization and the failures of governance regimes to regulate the conduct norms for these enterprises.

The conduct of economic activities through SOEs occupies the space where public duty and private obligation meet—that is, where the legal duties of the state merge with the governance responsibilities of the private organization. The SOE does not easily fit within the classical division of obligation, expressed in political and legal theory, between public and private entities, or into those entities’ respective relationships to law.[3] States have a duty that is undertaken through law;[4] enterprises have a responsibility that is embedded in their governance.[5] These fundamental divisions form part of the current international efforts to institutionalize human rights related norms on and through states and enterprises, most notably through the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGP).[6] The problems of conforming to evolving norms become more difficult where states project their authority through commercial enterprises—that is, where the societal (and economic) governance order of the enterprise is conflated with the political and legal order of the state.[7]

SOEs have undergone tremendous change in both operation and framework ideology since 1945.[8] The contemporary faces of SOEs also reflect substantial divergences in the character and operation of SOEs. .[9] Within globalization, consensus about the role and operation of SOEs, like that of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs),[10] has moved toward a commercial and private model.[11] For all that change, SOEs remain an important element of national macroeconomic policies and a means through which states may directly operationalize macroeconomic policies through governmental instrumentailities;[12] they continue to serve quite important public purposes.[13] The SOE’s importance is in part the product of the malleability of the SOE concept itself, which has made the device a useful tool for states.[14] That malleability has also permitted SOEs to become an increasingly important factor in globalized economic activity,[15] shaping its patterns and approaches with a reference to the national policy and politics of the owner-state.

But their use by states has also been criticized for inhibiting the construction of robust internal and global markets, in part because of their inefficiency,[16] and in part because such open and robust markets serve as the foundation of economic activity within and beyond states.[17] The difficulty stems from the relationship between states and their economic enterprises. On the one hand, states regulate all economic enterprises—including SOEs (to the extent they are treated like other similarly constituted entities). On the other hand, the state that regulates also owns the regulated entity; the state, in this instance, may distort markets by using its regulatory power to favor its own entities over others. That produces asymmetries in market power that might challenge the efficacy of the emerging market-driven regulatory structures of globalization and its so-called neoliberal order.[18] The asymmetries run beyond the usual problem of state subsidies, from that of states being tempted to tilt markets in favor of SOEs (producing a sort of systemic corruption in markets driven systems), to that of issues of interference with sovereignty when SOEs serve as the apex enterprise in global production chains.[19]

The legal status of an SOE varies from being a part of government to being a stock company with a state as a regular stockholder.[20] But their purpose—national development and the projection of economic power abroad—has remained constant, though with quite distinct differences in emphasis and application among states inclined to use them.[21] The regional variations are quite contextually rooted and historically driven. European models from the 1980s were driven by the principles of free movement basic to the EU treaties, within the context of de-socialization from the 1980s.[22] The contemporary approaches of European states represent a long dialogue (sometimes quite strident) between market-driven states and the brand of market-rejecting European Marxist Leninism that characterized the old Soviet Empire and its satellites in Europe. The apex of this European flirtation with robust SOE-driven economies occurred through the 1970s[23] with substantially different approaches to “socialism” and state management of economic activities across democratic Europe, in contradistinction to the central planning economies of the Soviet Union with a negligible private sector.[24] By the end of the 1990s, that system was in the advanced stages of dismantling. The dismantling of SOE-driven economies was propelled both by the fall of the Soviet Union and by the rise of a level- and unsubsidized-markets ideology within the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and reflected in the policies of the institutions of the European Union.[25] The emerging rules constraining state aids reduced the value of state ownership and its relevance, and economic integration made the consequences less drastic.

The Nordic states are a current driving force in European SOEs, under the so-called policy of Nordic Capitalism.[26] Nordic Capitalism is guided by principles of profitability and exemplary responsibility—profits rendered to the state and the state directing the form and effect of the responsibilities it meant to impose.[27] Sweden provides a good example of the model with respect to the operation of Swedish SOEs, in which the state “has a major responsibility to be an active and professional owner. The Government's overall objectives are for the companies to generate value and, where applicable, to ensure that specially commissioned public policy assignments are well performed.”[28] Other European states also maintain state enterprises.[29] France, for example, “has equity positions in 81 French companies, ranging from Alstom to Orange and EDF, worth an estimated €90bn and employing 1.7m people. It keeps a firm guiding hand on hundreds more, ready and able to defend its interests.”[30]

In contrast, developing states find SOEs useful as instruments of internal development, usually for the control and exploitation of national resources.[31] Despite substantial pressure to privatize SOEs at the end of the twentieth century,[32] developing state SOEs might again be thought to serve as a mechanism for state planning and macro-economic policies.[33] Indeed, within developing states, a new turn on state to state economic activities may now be undertaken through SOE investment. In Peru, for example, the Las Bambas mines were purchased in 2014 by a consortium of Chinese SOEs.[34] Especially in the extractives sector SOEs owned by developing states, the role of the state varies substantially “but can include tax collection, assignment of operating rights, monitoring and management of cadasters, setting rules governing performance, ensuring compliance by companies with legislation, regulation and contracts, and approving key decisions by partner companies.”[35]

For developing states, SOEs are a legacy of both the ideologically driven post-colonial policies of their first generation of leaders, and the then fashionable policies that sought to convince developing states that the future lay in export substitution policies and in economic development that would produce a self-sufficient state. Globalization has substantially softened these ideologies and in the process also reduced the vigor with which developing states have sought to build up and deploy SOEs. Yet especially in resource-rich states, SOEs remain an important part of macroeconomic and production management. SOEs are also important stabilizers of labor markets and thus indirectly of political stability.[36] Increasingly, these efforts have been tied to stabilization strategies that are advanced by international financial institutions (IFIs) and in conjunction with state SWFs as the basis of development efforts, including development finance. Not inconsequential is the use of SOEs (and SWFs) as a means of reducing corruption in state where corruption is systemic.[37] Producing autonomous enterprises that may be managed or made accountable through mechanisms not under the control of state officials may sometimes serve to protect those resources. Yet issues of productivity and economic viability continue to weaken these enterprises, even as they continue to be viewed as essential to developing states.[38]

Since the 1980s, The People’s Republic of China has been the site of the most vibrant contemporary development of Marxist-Leninist frameworks for SOEs.[39] It has developed a markets-based socialism grounded in strong markets and state ownership of substantial sectors of the economy.[40] This approach—socialist modernization—is grounded in the notion that all of the productive forces of society must be available to the state through regulatory governance or direct command structures to help the Chinese vanguard party fulfill its core obligation to move society along toward the establishment of a communist society.[41] Through China’s Go-Out Policies (走出去战略)[42] and policies on internationalism,[43] Chinese SOEs have become more and more important in global economic activity. They also have become an important element in the socialization of Chinese approaches to Marxist state planning.[44] These might also become more influential as a form of economic productivity in developing states in which China has invested heavily. Yet, even Chinese SOEs are subject to the inefficiencies of operational objectives that include goals beyond pure financial wealth maximization.[45] And the Chinese economic and political system is incompatible with a goal of complete detachment between state (as regulator) and enterprise (including finance and bank SOEs).[46]

Globalization has also had a profound effect on the character, utility, and operation of SOEs.[47] Once understood (like their private counterparts) and targeted toward national markets, the possibilities of cross-border economic activities and the development of complex and strong production chains have pushed SOEs beyond their borders.[48] SOEs now compete with their private counterparts for global business and are deeply embedded at all levels in global production chains. This produces substantial issues around concepts of competitive neutrality, grounded in fears that states could use their political power to support the economic activities of their SOEs, especially abroad.[49] To that extent, they represent not merely the willingness of SOEs to access growth potential beyond the state, but also the willingness of states to leverage their power through SOE projection in private markets. But sometimes, SOEs tend to substitute for foreign state macroeconomic planning rather than serving in market driven transactions. This appears especially important where SOEs from larger states are used to project public policy through ownership of resources of developing states. Again in Peru, in 2013, Petrobras, a Brazilian SOE, sold its Peruvian assets to a PetroChina, a Chinese SOE.[50]

Despite the growing impact of SOEs in global economic activities, there has been little successful effort to manage their behaviors in the international sphere.[51] That is, there is little by way of law to govern those governance gaps[52] that exist when SOEs (like other economic enterprises) operate between states in ways that make it impossible for a single state to assert effective regulatory oversight over the enterprise and its transactions.[53] There have been some multilateral efforts that have produced soft law,[54] the most important of which has been the OECD’s Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs.[55] These have sought to develop principles of conduct touching on seven areas of governance.[56] The thrust of these guidelines is to ensure that SOEs operate like their private counterparts—that is, to mitigate the public character of these enterprises.[57] The reasons are obvious—SOEs that are more public than private in character may be viewed as political institutions and barred from entry into foreign states. And the sovereign immunity regimes of most states distinguish between public regulatory actions and activities and commercial activities.[58]

Even as the character and use of SOEs has been changing and adjusting to the potentials and risks of global activity, the international community has also sought to develop ever stronger mechanisms for the management of the character of such activity with respect to human rights, sustainability, and fidelity to the numerous international instruments that have sought to develop global consensus norms about economic behavior.[59] Efforts to create a more effective legal structure to embed human rights obligations onto SOEs have recently focused on trade agreements. However, these efforts have produced little by way of substantive changes to date. One of the targets has been in the discussion about the construction and implementation of bilateral trade agreements.[60] A related effort has been undertaken around multilateral agreements.[61] The difficulty tends to focus on issues of equal treatment and on the scope and application of duties, as well as on the inclusion of SOEs (and sometimes of SWFs) as investors in such arrangements.[62]

Beyond those trade related efforts, most other projects have been directed toward formal lawmaking and to the development of “soft” normative principles. Among the international frameworks that have been most influential are those that have been developed for managing behaviors that touch on human rights impacts of economic activity. These are to be distinguished from older efforts aimed generally at the legalization of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of enterprises.[63] CSR frameworks tend to be state-based and focused on the structures of corporate governance and institutional obligation to society. The debates touch on the primacy of shareholder versus stakeholder benefit models of corporate operation,[64] and they have generally found expression in national law through the management of corporate philanthropy.[65] In contrast, the debate is of a substantially different character where the obligations of economic activity are considered in an international framework. In this context, the principal focus is on the developing normative structures for human rights. This approach is partly structural, in the sense that global governance has tended to be constructed around the pillars of democracy, respect for human rights, and economic development.[66]

These international frameworks center around a few key instruments, two of which are especially influential. The first is the UNGP,[67] introduced earlier, which the U.N. Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed in 2011.[68] The other is the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNE Guidelines).[69] The MNE Guidelines have existed in one form or another since the 1970s and constitute recommendations addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or from adhering countries. Their object is to provide a soft law framework “for responsible business conduct in a global context consistent with applicable laws and internationally recognised standards.” [70]

The UNGP are structured as three “Pillars”: the First Pillar is the state duty to protect human rights,[71] the Second Pillar is the responsibility of corporations to respect human rights,[72] and the Third Pillar is the remedial mechanism that must be established to implement the state duty and corporate responsibility.[73]

SOEs occupy a dual place within the UNGP. They are to some extent an instrumentality of the state and thus potentially subject to the state duty to protect. At the same time, they function as commercial ventures and are thus subject to the less legalized provisions of the corporate responsibility to respect. Yet their owners have a duty in exercising their ownership responsibilities that may also be constrained by the state duty to protect human rights. In the context of SOEs, UNGP paragraph 4 has proven most relevant, providing that states take “additional steps to protect against human rights abuses” by their SOEs or with respect to entities that receive substantial state support in other ways.[74]

The provisions of the UNGP have been substantially incorporated into the OECD framework through its MNE Guidelines. These are also non-binding, but they incorporate a remedial mechanism in the form of “special instances” (complaints) that may be lodged by individuals and others against enterprises alleging violation of the MNE Guidelines before a “National Contact Point,” an administrative office maintained by states to comply with their OECD member state obligations.[75]

While these efforts have yet to produce legally binding instruments, they have produced increasingly influential systems of soft law. And irrespective of these soft-law instruments, global enterprises have sought to manage their global operations through governance mechanisms that span their production chains, drawing in substantial part on these international instruments.

Since UNGP endorsement in 2011, a Working Group on Business and Human Rights, established at the time of the endorsement, has undertaken formal international engagement with the UNGP.[76] The Working Group and the OECD recently have been considering application of multilateral soft-law frameworks to hybrid entities—SWFs and SOEs. The object is to extend the scope of the UNGP and the MNE Guidelines, but also to make the application of those instruments more coherent. At the same time, they have been following a policy of encouraging states to “lead by example,” supported in this endeavor by Nordic states[77] especially in the context of their efforts touching on SOEs and human rights.

This focus was augmented by the theme adopted by the Working Group for the 5th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, November 14–16, 2016.[78] One of the most important products of that approach was the delivery, during the summer of 2016, of the Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (the 2016 WG Report).[79] It focused on the application of the UNGP framework to the governance obligations of both SOEs and their owners. The "Note by the Secretariat" explained the reason for the centrality of this theme:

In the report, the Working Group examines the duty of States to protect against human rights abuses involving those business enterprises that they own or control, which are generally referred to as State-owned enterprises. . . . The report calls attention to and clarifies what States are expected to do in their role as owners of enterprises and why. . . . In the present report, the Working Group suggests a range of measures that States could take to operationalize the call to take additional steps with regard to State-owned enterprises, by building on existing international guidance and national practices related to the corporate governance of those enterprises.[80]

The press release announcing the 2016 WG Report explained the focus and scope of the effort.[81] It started with a reminder of an important premise—that states are also economic actors in their own right. Those economic activities, the management of which has been refined over the course of the last century, under conditions of globalization and the emerging normative structures of international human rights norms, now require states and their SOEs to lead by example. But currently SOEs appear to lag behind the private sector in embedding human rights sensibilities in their operations. And this is important as the state economic sector is now quite large.[82]

“Governments are currently sending an incoherent message to businesses,” said human rights expert Dante Pesce, who chairs the U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, during the presentation of the group’s latest report to the U.N. Human Rights Council. “On the one hand, they ask private businesses to respect human rights, and increasingly set out such expectations in law and policy,” Mr. Pesce noted. “On the other hand—barring notable exceptions—they show no great desire to use the means at their disposal to ensure that those enterprises they own or control respect human rights.”[83]

The 2016 WG Report gives itself an ambitious goal: “It is high time for States to show concrete leadership, and require the enterprises they own or control to be role models on human rights,” the expert stressed. “Doing so is part of States’ international legal obligations, and it will only reinforce the legitimacy of States’ expectations towards private businesses.”[84]

This Article examines the emerging issues of the human rights duties of states as owners of SOEs, and of the responsibilities of SOEs for their own human rights-related conduct, through the lens of the 2016 WG Report for the purpose of engaging with its premises and suggestions. The 2016 WG Report represents a very needed focus on one of the more difficult challenges for the UNGP. The state duty to protect differs from the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The differences present some complexity when it is the state itself that operates the enterprise, directly or indirectly. It is to those issues that the 2016 WG Report, and the analysis that follows, are directed.

The analysis is also informed by the proceedings of the Working Group discussions on SOEs held at the annual U.N. Forum on Business and Human Rights, which took place at the UN headquarters in Geneva (Palais des Nations) from November 14 to 16, 2016.[85] These proceedings are considered in light of two particularly important developments. The first is the substantial change in the direction of US policy in trade and globalization.[86] Its abdication of a retreat from robust multilateralism and the cultivation of a project of nationalist bilateralism has changed the dynamic within which policy globally may develop. The second development is China’s project of outbound nationalism—the One Belt One Road policy—which relies to some extent on the projection of commercial power through Chinese SOEs.[87]

Part II develops a deep analysis of the 2016 WG Report, interrogating its conceptual framework and its implementation programs. Part III then briefly considers the work left to be done, from conceptual lacunae to implementation. It consists of a set of ten challenges and recommendations for further development. These recommendations and challenges suggest that issues of corporate personality, sovereign immunity, asset partition, and regulatory compartmentalization may well hobble the work of embedding human rights within the operation of states as owners and SOEs as public enterprises. More importantly, it demonstrates the shortcomings of the current strongly held consensus that the focus of regulatory governance must be grounded in and through a formally constituted enterprise, the SOE, rather than focusing regulation on economic activity irrespective of the form in which it is undertaken. Until these conceptual issues are considered, the regulation of economic activities—SOEs, supply chains, multinational corporations—will remain elusive.



NOTES:
[1]. Larry Catá Backer, "Sovereign Conduct on the Margins of the Law" Notes From the Symposium Hosted by the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Law at the End of the Day (Feb. 17, 2017), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/sovereign-conduct-on-margins-of-law.html [https://perma.cc/XRE6-72BS] (archived Feb. 22, 2017).

[2]. Jan M. Broekman & Larry Catà Backer, Lawyers Making Meaning: The Semiotics of Law in Legal Education II 176–78 (2013).

[3]. See generally, e.g., José Alvarez, International Organizations as Law Makers 45–65 (2005); José Alvarez, Are Corporations ‘Subjects’ of International Law?, 9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 1 (2011); A. Claire Cutler, Critical Reflections on the Westphalian Assumptions of International Law and Organization: A Crisis of Legitimacy, 27 Rev. Int'l Stud. 133, 133 (2001).

[4]. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 26–29 (1995).

[5]. See, e.g., David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 Va. J. Int'l L. 931, 953–56 (2004); see generally Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 Geo. J. Int'l L. 591 (2008) (suggesting measures that conform to the classical division of authority).

[6]. See generally Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework, HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter UNGP].

[7]. See generally, e.g., John G. Ruggie, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda, 101 Am. J. Int'l L. 819 (2007). The interstices of that conflation have produced some interesting conceptual scholarship. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1901 (2003).

[8]. Compare, e.g., The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World (Pier Angelo Toninelli ed., 1983) [hereinafter Toninelli] (discussing SOEs before 1945), with Philippe Aghion et al., The Behaviour of State Firms in Eastern Europe, Pre-Privatisation, 38 Eur. Econ. Rev. 1327 (1994) (discussing SOEs in Soviet-dominated Europe through the 1980s), and Toninelli, supra, at 103–253 (discussing Western European SOEs).

[9]. For a discussion of European SOEs within the European Union, see generally Angela Huyue Zhang, The Single-Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb for Chinese State-Owned Enterprises?, 8 J. Competition L. & Econ. 805 (2012) (discussing anti-trust treatment of European SOEs). For a discussion of the operation and principles of Chinese SOE operation, see generally Fan Gang & Nicholas C. Hope, The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy, in US-China Economic Relations in the Next Ten Years: Towards Deeper Engagement and Mutual Benefit 2–17 (2013), www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5362-7MV8] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Fan Gang]. Many developing states have created SOEs through which to manage their natural resources, especially in the extractive sector. For a discussion, see generally, e.g., Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51 World Pol. 297 (1999).

[10]. See generally, e.g., Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, Sovereign Wealth Funds Generally Accepted Principles and Practices: “Santiago Principles” (Oct. 2008), http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default/files/santiagoprinciples_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7RL-3M3D] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Capacity Building, Development, and Governance, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds].

[11]. See generally, e.g., OECD, Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015 ed.) http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2615061e.pdf?expires=1493181688&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=0613E3D8DE30A7861776806095099811)[https://perma.cc/Q4KV-SD76] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].

[12]. See generally, e.g., A. Erin Bass & Subrata Chakrabarty, Resource Security: Competition for Global Resources, Strategic Intent, and Governments as Owners. 45 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 961, 975–78 (2014); Francisco Flores-Macias, The Return of State-Owned Enterprises, Harv. Int'l Rev. (Apr. 4, 2009) http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=1854 [https://perma.cc/ED73-ZFF5] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[13]. See generally, e.g., Jing-Lin Duanmu, State-Owned MNCs and Host Country Expropriation Risk: The Role of Home State Soft Power and Economic Gunboat Diplomacy, 45 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 1044 (2014) (arguing SOEs promote international business); James S. Ang & David K. Ding, Government Ownership and the Performance of Government-Linked Companies: The Case of Singapore, 16 J. Multinational Fin. Mgmt. 64 (2006).

[14]. See generally, e.g., Aldo Musacchio & Sergio G. Lazzarini, Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance (May 30, 2012) (working paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2070942 [https://perma.cc/L8DF-ZC9N] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Musacchio].

[15]. See generally, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra et. al., Governments as Owners: State-Owned Multinational Companies, 45 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 919 (2014); Lin Cui & Fuming Jiang, State Ownership Effect on Firms' FDI Ownership Decisions Under Institutional Pressure: A study of Chinese Outward-Investing Firms, 43 J. Int'l Bus. Stud. 264 (2012).

[16]. See generally, e.g., Gabriel Wildrau, China’s state-owned zombie economy, Fin. Times (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/253d7eb0-ca6c-11e5-84df-70594b99fc47 [https://perma.cc/JA7W-S52T] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); Julia Ya Qin, WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) - A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol, 7 J. Int´l Econ. L. 863 (2004). But see Musacchio, supra note 16.

[17]. For an early version, see generally Douglas F. Lamont, Foreign State-owned Enterprises: Threat to American Business (1976). For contemporary consideration of the issue, see generally, e.g., Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? (2010); see also Fernanda Ribeiro Cahen, Internationalization of State-Owned Enterprises Through Foreign Direct Investment, 55 Rev. de Administração de Empresas 645, 653–55 (2015) .

[18] See Daniel J. Ikenson et al., Should Free Traders Support the Trans-Pacific Partnership? An Assessment of America’s Largest Preferential Trade Agreement, 54–56 (CATO Institute, Working Paper No. 39, 2016), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/working-paper-39_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9ZM-DCPH] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[19]. For the OECD position, see generally OECD, Competitive Neutrality: Maintaining a Level Playing Field Between Public and Private Business (2012). An apex enterprise is the company (however organized) that resides at the top of the production chain, that is, that effectively owns or controls the production chain that defines the scope of its economic activities. Most multinational enterprises are apex enterprises. The relationship among apex enterprises can be complex. For example, Foxconn can be seen as an apex enterprise producing or assembling products for wholesale markets, yet Foxconn is also downstream of Apple’s production chain for iphones. Larry Catá Backer, Realising Socio-Economic Rights Under Emerging Global Regulatory Frameworks: The Potential Impact of Privatization and the Role of Companies in China and India, in Socio-Economic Rights in Emerging Free Markets: Comparative Insights From India and China 44, 59–63 (Surya Deva ed., 2016).

[20]. See Wei Cui, Taxing State-Owned Enterprises: Understanding a Basic Institution of State Capitalism, 52 Osgoode Hall L.J. 775, 787–90 (2015).

[21]. See generally, e.g., Hans Christiansen, The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries (OECD Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 5, 2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cwps0s3-en [https://perma.cc/4J2J-ZR7L] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Christiansen].

[22]. See, e.g., Nicola Bellini, The Decline of State Owned Enterprise and the New Foundations of the State-Industry Relationship, in Toninelli, supra note 10, at 25–48; see generally Carles Boix, Privatizing the Public Business Sector in the 1980s: Economic Performance, Partisan Responses, and Divided Governments, 27 Brit. J. of Pol. Sci. 473 (1997).

[23]. See William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. of Econ. Literature 321, 323 (2001) (“Until Margaret Thatcher's conservative government came to power in 1979, the answer to this debate in the United Kingdom and elsewhere was that the government should at least own the telecommunications and postal services, electric and gas utilities, and most forms of non-road transportation (especially airlines and railroads). Many politicians also believed the state should control certain 'strategic' manufacturing industries, such as steel and defense production. In many countries, state-owned banks were also given either monopoly or protected positions.”); see also Ulrich Wengenroth, The Rise and Fall of the State Owned Enterprise in Germany, in Toninelli, supra note 10, at 103–253.

[24]. See generally, e.g., Richard E. Ericson, The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and Implications for Reform, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 11 (1991).

[25]. See the “Golden Share” cases. See Case C-367/98, Comm'n of the European Communities [CEC] v. Portuguese Republic, 2002 E.C.R. I-4731; Case C-483/99, CEC v. French Republic, 2002 E.C.R. I-4781; Case C-503/99, CEC v. Kingdom of Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4812; Case C-463/00, CEC v. Kingdom of Spain, 2003 E.C.R. I-4581; Case C-98/01, CEC v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2003 E.C.R. I-4644; Case C-112/2005, CEC v. Federal Republic of Germany (Volkswagen), 2007 E.C.R. I-9020; Case C-463/04 and C-464/04, Federconsumatori v. Comune di Milano, 2004 E.C.R. I-10433. For a discussion of the importance of the “Golden Share” cases, see generally Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, And the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 1801 (2008).

[26]. See generally, e.g., Torben M. Andersen et al., The Nordic Model: Embracing globalization and sharing risks (2007), https://economics.mit.edu/files/5726 [https://perma.cc/H3B4-7QRH] (archived Aug. 27, 2017); The Nordic Countries: The Next Supermodel, The Economist (Feb. 2, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571136-politicians-both-right-and-left-could-learn-nordic-countries-next-supermodel [https://perma.cc/5F4Y-7C9L].

[27]. See Sari Kuvaja, Expectations for state-owned companies: profitability and exemplary responsibility, Nordic Morning (2015), http://reporting2015.nordicmorning.com/en/corporate-responsibility/expectations-for-state-owned-companies-profitability-and-exemplary-responsibility.html [https://perma.cc/3SJV-XLSK] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[28]. See Objectives for state-owned companies, Government Offices of Sweden, http://www.government.se/government-policy/state-owned-enterprises/goals-for-state-owned-companies/ (last updated Mar. 10, 2015) [https://perma.cc/7KGY-EBNU] (archived Aug. 27, 2017). The Swedish state speaks here of the use of its ownership to move forward balanced gender distribution policies, economic goals, sustainability goals, and additional goals assigned to specific enterprises. Id.

[29]. See, e.g., Christiansen, supra note 23 (describing substantial investment in enterprises across OECD states, both in terms of overall employment and in terms of investment in enterprises). For Germany, see Germany - Competition from State-Owned Enterprises, Export.gov (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.export.gov/article?id=Germany-Competition-from-State-Owned-Enterprises [https://perma.cc/V3CQ-5N25] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[30] See Michael Strothard, France: The Politics of State Ownership, Fin. Times (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/9be75d5c-a72e-11e6-8898-79a99e2a4de6 [https://perma.cc/7V8S-DML6] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[31]. See, e.g., OECD, State-Owned Enterprises in the Development Process 34 (2015) (“If the government of a low-income country embarks on a strategy of catch-up industrialisation, a case can certainly be made for establishing SOEs to carry out key functions.”).

[32]. See, e.g., John Nellis, The Evolution of Enterprise Reform in Africa: From State-owned Enterprises to Private Participation in Infrastructure —and Back? 37 (Energy Sector Mgmt. Assistance Program, Technical Paper 084, 2005), https://www.esmap.org/sites/esmap.org/files/08405.Technical%20Paper_The%20Evolution%20of%20Enterprise%20Reform%20in%20Africa%20From%20State-owned%20Enterprises%20to%20Private%20Participation%20In%20Infrastructure%20and%20Back.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ETW-K37Y] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[33]. See Ha-Joon Chang, State-Owned Enterprise Reform 8–14 (2007), https://esa.un.org/techcoop/documents/pn_soereformnote.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ8T-KSJF] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[34] See Ximena Benavides Reverditto, Economic Development and State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 1 (2014), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/SELA14_Benavides_CV_Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/B56M-EDBM] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[35] See Nat. Res. Governance Instit., State Participation and State-Owned Enterprises: Roles, Benefits, and Challenges 4 (2015), https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_State-Participation-and-SOEs.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD4F-U5BA] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[36]. See generally, e.g., Arkamoy Dutta Majumdar, West Bengal to restructure state-owned enterprises, Live Mint (Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/zUcXsREgJSe875buUFuGiL/West-Bengal-to-restructure-stateowned-enterprises.html [https://perma.cc/BBM7-Y78Z] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (“The government said at least 16 companies are to be merged and five subsidiaries of West Bengal Electronics Industry Development Corp. Ltd, or Webel, to be wound up. The state would, after the restructuring, continue to run 44 focused enterprises, most of which, though, are loss-making. Chief minister Mamata Banerjee reiterated that this restructuring will not lead to job cuts.”).

[37]. But see SOEs holding regulation not in line with laws, says economist, The Jakarta Post (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/02/01/soes-holding-regulation-not-in-line-with-laws-says-economist.html [https://perma.cc/HFQ4-BNB6] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[38]. See e.g., PM says too many state-owned enterprises underperforming, Saturday Express (Jan. 18 2017), http://www.trinidadexpress.com/20170118/business/pm-says-too-many-state-owned-enterprises-underperforming [https://perma.cc/5BUF-8XC6] (archived Aug. 27, 2017) (“In his address, Rowley said that since the 1960’s government has become involved in various aspects of the local economy to the point that this policy has brought “us to our present situation where we have about 100 state enterprises and their subsidiaries.”); BIDV Securities: Reform still needed in Vietnam’s state-owned enterprises, World Fin. (Feb. 6 2017), http://www.worldfinance.com/inward-investment/asia-and-australasia/bidv-securities-reform-still-needed-in-vietnams-state-owned-enterprises [https://perma.cc/K68B-226U] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[39]. For a critical assessment, see generally, e.g., Wendy Leutert, Challenges Ahead in China’s Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, 21 Asia Pol'y 83 (2016) .

[40]. This policy is founded on the concept of socialist modernization and its principal object to develop Chinese productive forces under the leadership of the Communist Party to advance the development of the state and its population. See generally, e.g., China’s Socialist Modernization (Yu Guangyuan ed., 1984) (discussing China's transition to a socialist economy); Qizhi Zhang, An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture 441–467 (2015).

[41]. See Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The 'Three Represents'), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 101, 133–47 (2008); see also Jiang Shigong, How to Explore the Chinese Path to Constitutionalism? A Response to Larry Catá Backer, 40 Mod. China 196, 202–03 (2013).

[42]. See generally, e.g., Hongying Wang, A Deeper Look at China’s “Going Out” Policy, CIGI (Mar. 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/hongying_wang_mar2016_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYQ7-B2T5] (archived Aug. 27, 2017).

[43]. See generally Chen Zhimin, Nationalism, Internationalism and Chinese Foreign Policy, 14 J. Contemp. China 35 (2006).

[44]. “Major problems plaguing the entities uncovered through the inspections include corruption, weakening of the Party's leadership, and procedural violations in personnel selection and placement, according to the findings released by the CCDI on Thursday.” CCDI warns of corruption risks after inspections, Xinhuanet (Feb. 4, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/05/c_135075770.htm [https://perma.cc/WS4Z-T7PQ] (archived Oct. 22, 2017). See also (CPC Central Committee and State Council On Creating a Healthy Environment for Entrepreneurship) 中共中央国务院关于营造企业家健康成长环境 弘扬优秀企业家精神更好发挥企业家作用的意见, http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0926/c1001-29558449.html [https://perma.cc/CT5L-KR2P] (archived Oct. 22, 2017).

[45]. See, e.g., China says debt risk for main state firms is controllable, The Bus. Times (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/china-says-debt-risk-for-main-state-firms-is-controllable [https://perma.cc/J26N-W3B4] (archived Sept. 6, 2017) ("While many state companies are bloated and inefficient, China has relied on them more heavily over the past year to generate economic growth in the face of cooling private investment.").

[46] It has been suggested that

Given the long history of SOEs and the enormous social responsibilities imposed on them, China’s gradual approach to SOE reform is understandable. Today, deficiencies in China’s market infrastructure continue to prevent the government from fully allowing free market forces to run the economy. The government will continue, therefore, to have an important role to play in resolving these transition problems in China’s development.
See Fan Gang, supra note 11, at 3.

[47]. See generally Ian Bremmer, The New Rules of Globalization, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Jan.–Feb. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/01/the-new-rules-of-globalization [http://perma.cc/CZ8S-PAZR] (archived Aug. 24, 2017); Hao Liang et al., An Anatomy of State Control in the Globalization of State-Owned Enterprises, 46(2) J. Int’l Bus. Stud. 223 (2015) (considering golabalization’s effect on SOEs).

[48]. See, e.g., Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan 33 (2004).

[49]. See, e.g., OECD, Policy Roundtables, State Owned Enterprises and the Principle of Competitive Neutrality 9 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/46734249.pdf [http://perma.cc/82KA-23X3] (archived Aug. 24, 2017) (“Due to their privileged position SOEs may negatively affect competition and it is therefore important to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible consistent with their public service responsibilities, they are subject to similar competition disciplines as private enterprises.”); Antonio Capobianco & Hans Christiansen, Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options 3 (OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 1, 2011), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/competitive-neutrality-and-state-owned-enterprises_5kg9xfgjdhg6-en [https://perma.cc/GY8F-UEYB] (archived Sept. 17, 2017).

[50] Reverditto, supra note 36.

[51]. See OECD, State-Owned Enterprises as Global Competitors 27 (2016), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/finance-and-investment/state-owned-enterprises-as-global-competitors_9789264262096-en#.WTNqHcm1tPM [http://perma.cc/C326-2S7X] (archived Aug. 24, 2017).

[52] See John G. Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary General, Protect, Respect, Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, Human Rights Council of the United Nations, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (April 11, 2008). But see Penelope Simons & Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights and the Home State Advantage 154 (2014) (discussing 2013 reporting standard imposed on SOEs involved in extractive projects). See generally Tara J. Melish & Errol Meidinger, Protect, Respect, Remedy and Participate: ‘New Governance’ Lessons for the Ruggie Framework, in The U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation 303, 305–06 (Radu Mares ed., 2011).

[53]. I have considered this in the broader context of transnational public economic activity with a focus on China. See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 3, 8 (2010) (discussing regulatory oversight over Chinese SOEs in the context of transnational public economic activity).

[54] See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 Int’l Org. 421, 422 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. of Legal Analysis 171, 198 (2010).

[55]. OECD Guidelines, supra note 13.

[56]. These include: I. Rationales for state ownership; II. The state’s role as an owner; III. State-owned enterprises in the marketplace; IV. Equitable treatment of shareholders and other investors; V. Stakeholder relations and responsible business; VI. Disclosure and transparency; and VII. The responsibilities of the boards of state-owned enterprises. Id.

[57]. See id. ¶¶ III–IV.

[58]. The issue of sovereign immunity is of long standing. See John G. Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 751, 774 (1929). The issue of sovereign immunity became particularly pressing after 1945 when emerging Western markets systems confronted Soviet state based economic activity. See Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 614, 634 (1950); Michael Brandon, Sovereign Immunity of Government-Owned Corporations and Ships, 39 Cornell L. Q. 425, 442 (1954); George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforcing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some Proposals for Its Reform, 25 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 665, 671 (2008). See generally A. F. M. Maniruzzaman, Sovereign Immunity and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards against State Entities: Recent Trends in Practice, in Am. Arb. Ass’n Handbook on Int’l Arb. Prac. 338 (2010), http://www.academia.edu/519348/Sovereign_Immunity_and_the_Enforcement_of_Arbitral_Awards_against_State_Entities_Recent_Trends_in_Practice [http://perma.cc/BZD4-XQTR] (archived Aug. 25, 2017).

[59]. See, e.g., Camilla Wee, Regulating the Human Rights Impact of State-owned Enterprises: Tendencies of Corporate Accountability and State Responsibility 4 (2008).

[60]. See, e.g., Paul Blyschak, State-Owned Enterprises and International Investment Treaties: When are State-Owned Entities and their Investments Protected?, 6 J. Int’l L. & Int’l Rel. 1, 14 (2011); Norah Gallagher, Role of China in Investment: BITs, SOEs, Private Enterprises, and Evolution of Policy, 31 ICSID Rev. 88, 93 (2016); Junji Nakagawa, Regulatory Harmonization Through FTAs and BITs: Regulation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, Working Paper No. 55, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2103237 [http://perma.cc/8DQZ-K939] (archived Sept. 7, 2017).

[61]. See, e.g., Ines Willemyns, Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises In TPP: Have Expectations Been Met? 15–18 (Leuven Ctr. for Glob. Governance Studies, Working Paper No. 168, 2016), https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp161-170/wp-168-willemyns-website.pdf [https://perma.cc/H88P-WJZG] (archived Aug. 25, 2017) (discussing the rules placed on SOEs at the multilateral level).

[62] See, e.g., Yuri Shima, The Policy Landscape for International Investment by Government-controlled Investors: A Fact Finding Survey 10 (OECD, Working Paper No. 2015/01, 2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/the-policy-landscape-for-international-investment-by-government-controlled-investors_5js7svp0jkns-en [https://perma.cc/ZNF9-TAVE] (archived Sept. 17, 2017).

[63] I have noted at greater length elsewhere on the differences between CSR and business and human rights:

At its broadest, it refers to the extent to which an aggregation of capital that is recognized as a separate legal person must, may, or should, operate in accordance with certain standards of conduct. That mimics the general conversation a society has about the legal, civic, ethical and societal obligations of its citizens. But . . . CSR has acquired a quite specific and distinct meaning. It references the question of the extent of the legal, social, civic and moral obligations of enterprises in their operations. . . . CSR has also become a key element of international debates. . . . But the debate is of a substantially different character. In this context, the principal focus was on the developing normative structures for human rights.
Larry Catá Backer, The Corporate Social Responsibilities of Financial Institutions for the Conduct of their Borrowers: The View from International Law and Standards, 21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017).

[64] See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 169 (1954) (discussing the stakeholder benefit model of corporate operation); Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 133–34 (University of Chicago Press 1962); see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423 (1993) (providing a more recent defense of the arguments against the doctrine of corporate social responsibility).

[65] Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility as International Law, 37 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 287, 294–306 (2006).

[66] See, e.g., What is CSR?, Australian Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility, http://accsr.com.au/what-is-csr/ [https://perma.cc/V2NQ-UQQ9] (archived Aug. 25, 2017) (“The view of CSR as a global governance mechanism emerges from the global trans-national institutions that developed in the twentieth century, such as the United Nations, the International Labour Organisation, The World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), together with international treaties and agreements negotiated by governments and non-government organisations.”).

[67] UNGP, supra note 8.

[68] Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011), https://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/un-human-rights-council-resolution-re-human-rights-transnational-corps-eng-6-jul-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6CH-QF9R] (archived Aug. 26, 2017).

[69] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6Z9-4QQK] (archived Aug. 26, 2017) [hereinafter MNE Guidelines].

[70] Id. at 3.

[71]. UNGP, supra note 8, at 3.

[72]. Id. at 13.

[73]. Id. at 27.

[74]. Id. at 6.

[75] The National Contact Points (NCP) are as close as soft law frameworks have come to development of an enforcement framework. OECD states and otherwise adhering governments are obliged to establish NCP and vest them with authority under the OECD MNE Guidelines to advance the objectives of the OECD corporate governance project, and most importantly serve as a mechanism through which allegations of violations of the MNE Guidelines may be raised. See MNE Guidelines, supra note 69, at 71–74 (“The National Contact Point will contribute to the resolution of issues that arise relating to implementation of the Guidelines in specific instances in a manner that is impartial, predictable, equitable and compatible with the principles and standards of the Guidelines.”); see generally Larry Catá Backer, Rights And Accountability In Development (Raid) v. Das Air and Global Witness v. Afrimex; Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 10 Melb. J. of Int’l L. 258 (2009).

[76]. See Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx [https://perma.cc/3AHR-58KG] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).

[77]. And principally the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, Government Offices of Sweden. See OHCHR, Leadership and Leverage: Embedding Human Rights in the Rules and Relationships that Drive the Global Economy, 2016 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights Forum Programme, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ForumSession5/PoW_printable.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EDX-8XX8] (archived Aug. 28, 2017).

[78]. See 2016 United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/2016ForumBHR.aspx [https://perma.cc/T7X7-76ZF] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) [hereinafter OHCHR, 2016 UN Forum]. The UN Human Rights Council, under paragraph 12 of its resolution 17/4, established the Forum to serve as a key global platform for stakeholders to “discuss trends and challenges in the implementation of the Guiding Principles and promote dialogue and cooperation on issues linked to business and human rights.” It is guided by the Working Group on Business and Human Rights.

[79]. U.N. Secretariat, Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/45 (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter WG, 2016 Report].

[80] Id. at 1.

[81]. See State-owned Enterprises Must Lead by Example on Business and Human Rights – New UN Report, OHCHR (June 17, 2016) [hereinafter OHCHR, SOEs], http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20123&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/F6ED-CJUB] (archived Aug. 28, 2017) .

[82]. Id. (“Many States the world over manage large portfolios on State-owned enterprises (SOEs), which have risen as significant actors in the global economy, active at home and abroad in diverse sectors such as energy, utilities, infrastructure, transports, telecommunications, and banking. The proportion of SOEs among Fortune Global 500 companies has grown from 9.8% in 2005 to 22.8% in 2014, with US $389.3 billion of profit and US $28.4 trillion in assets.”).

[83]. OHCHR, SOEs, supra note 83.

[84]. Id.

[85]. OHCHR, 2016 UN Forum, supra note 78.

[86]. See Larry Catá Backer, Ruminations 70: American Anti-Multilateralism and the Prospects for a Comprehensive Treaty for Business and Human Rights, Law at the End of the Day (Feb. 8, 2017, 8:44 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/ruminations-70-american-anti.html [https://perma.cc/3KCX-WRP9] (archived Aug. 29, 2017) (considering the effects of the US rebooting its policy in trade and globalization); Larry Catá Backer, The 45th Presidency and Multilateral Treaties--Fear, Loathing and a Repudiation of 20th Century Americanism, Law at the End of the Day (Feb. 2, 2017, 10:53 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2017/02/the-45th-presidency-and-multilateral.html.

[87]. See TDM Call for Papers: Special issue on "China's One Belt, One Road: Economic Changes, Power Shifts and Prospects / Consequences for the World of Arbitration", Transnat’l Disp. Mgmt. (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/news.asp?key=1652 [https://perma.cc/MWD9-AT52] (archived Aug. 29, 2017).

Daisuke Takahashi: "”Tokyo Olympic Sustainable Sourcing Code and its Grievance Mechanism in a Japanese Legal Context” "

$
0
0


Daisuke Takahashi, Partner Attorney, Shinwa Sohgoh Law Offices and Vice Chair, CSR Project Team, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, is one of the leading voices in the area of Japanese corporate social responsibility (including sustainability and business and human rights). It has been my great pleasure to post some of his work before:  Daisuke Takahashi on the Japan Federation of Bar Association's Guidance on Human Rights Due Diligence Plus JFBA Model Clause in Supplier Contract (2016); and Daisuke Takahashi on "Japanese Lawyers' Engagement to Avoid the 'Lost in Translation' Effect on Business and Human Rights" (2015).

Mr. Takahashi made a quite important presentation at the last U.N. Forum for Business and Human Rights, held in Geneva in late November 2017. Organized by the Global Compact Network Japan, the
Institute of Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO -EY Japan and Climate Change and Sustainability Services, the session was entitled Taking stock and reiterating commitment to remedy: Embedding respect for human rights in the Tokyo Olympics. It considered the challenges facing Japan as it seeks to embed corporate responsibility to respect human rights (along with a refinement of the state duty to protect human rights being developed through a Japanese National Action Plan) into the preparations for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics.


Mr. Tahahashi had very kindly given me permission to share his presentation slides, which follow below. The excellent and quite useful presentation material is provided below. Links are also provided to the Taking stock and reiterating commitment to remedy session description, the  Tokyo 2020 Sustainable Sourcing Code, and the Tokyo 2020's outline of the Grievance Mechanism (also reproduced below in provisional translation). These are all worth careful study and engagement. 











__________


__________
Parallel session
29 November
13:30-14:45
Organized by the Global Compact Network Japan, the Institute of Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO -EY Japan and Climate Change and Sustainability Services

Background: At the 2016 Forum the Permanent Mission of Japan announced the commitment to the implementation of the Guiding Principles, the commencement of the National Action Plan formulation process and a commitment that the Tokyo Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games will take into full account the impact of its procurement process on human rights and labour issues.

In March 2017, the first edition of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games Sustainable Sourcing Code was formulated. This Code includes the specific Sustainable Sourcing Codes for Agricultural Products, Livestock Products and Fishery Products and the revised Sustainable Sourcing Code for Timber, and will in future also include codes for palm oil and paper.
Addressing access to remedy, the Code sets out a commitment to establish a grievance mechanism to accept and investigate reports of breach of the Code by supplier companies, the details of which are being defined separately by Tokyo 2020.

With three short years to crystallize ongoing work towards a sustainable Tokyo Olympics, 2017 represents an important moment to take stock of progress towards embedding protection of, and respect for, human rights in the Tokyo Olympics, and to recommit to ensuring access to remedy.
Session outline: At this session key players will share their view of progress and challenges and seek input from participants on their expectations. CSO Network representatives will also discuss how these efforts connect to the ongoing National Action Plan drafting process in Japan.
Key discussion questions:
  • What has been done to embed respect for rights into Tokyo2020? In particular, what has been done to ensure access to remedy?
  • What has been the reaction from, and what are the expectations from, companies and civil society in Japan in preparation for Tokyo2020?
  • How does this link to the ongoing NAP process in Japan?
    Target audience:
    •   All stakeholders interested in Japan’s progress on business and human rights and the Games as a catalyst for improvements in both the state duty and corporate responsibility.
    •   NGOs tracking the progress of Japan and Japanese companies ahead of the Olympics
    •   Governments considering hosting future mega sporting events
    •   Companies seeking to understand expectations and actions to incorporate respect for human
      rights in the context of event sponsorship/partnership
      Speakers:1
  •   Masataka Nagoshi, Manager, EY Japan, Climate Change & Sustainability Services (Moderator)
  •   Takeo Tanaka, Senior Director of Sustainability, Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and
    Paralympic Games
  •   Chikako Miyata, Vice President, Corporate Brand & CSR, ANA HOLDINGS INC
  •   Daisuke Takahashi, Vice Chair, CSR Project Team, Japan Federation of Bar Associations
  •   Minky Worden, Director of Global Initiatives, Human Rights Watch
  •   Miwa Yamada, Director, Law and Institutions Study Group, Institute of Developing Economies,
    IDE-JETRO (Final comments)
1 Further information on speakers provided in Annex

ANNEX. SPEAKERS SHORT BIOS AND DISCUSSION INFORMATION.

Mr Takeo Tanaka, Senior Director of Sustainability, Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games
Mr. Tanaka was appointed the head of Sustainability of Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games in April, 2015. He serves as a member of IOC Sustainability and Legacy Commission and a member of JOC Sports and Environment Commission.
Mr Tanaka will discuss both the vision for, and implementation mechanisms, concerning respect for human rights in the context of the Tokyo Olympics, including progress on the development of a grievance mechanism.

Ms Chikako Miyata,Vice President, Corporate Brand & CSR, ANA HOLDINGS INC
ANA Group is a Japanese airline group that utilizes its domestic and international networks to develop operations in various fields centering around its Air Transportation business. ANA is an official Partner of the Tokyo Olympics. Ms Miyata is the vice president of Corporate Brand & CSR and in charge of Human Rights, Environment, Social Contribution and Corporate Brand.
ANA Group is pursuing efforts to respect human rights based on the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
As official Partner of the Tokyo Olympics, ANA will discuss the human rights-related mechanisms it is strengthening and putting in place, and the remaining challenges it must tackle, ahead of the Olympics.

Mr Daisuke Takahashi, Partner Attorney, Shinwa Sohgoh Law Offices / Vice Chair, CSR Project Team, Japan Federation of Bar Associations
As Japanese attorney, Daisuke has been advising companies and organizations on legal compliance issues and corporate sustainability issues. As Vice Chair of CSR Project Team of Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA), he contributed to drafting the JFBA’s Human Rights Due Diligence Guidance and Anti Bribery Guidance. Daisuke is also an Officer of the CSR Committee of the IBA; a Lecturer at Sophia University; and a Member of Research Committee on Business & Human Rights at IDE-JETRO.
Having advised on the content, Mr Takahashi will share legal insights on how the Sourcing Code has embedded the elements of human rights due diligence, and how it might positively affect future procurement practice and legal compliance practice in Japan.
Ms Minky Worden, Director of Global Initiatives, Human Rights Watch
As Human Rights Watch's Director of Global Initiatives, Minky Worden develops and implements international outreach and advocacy campaigns. She previously served as Human Rights Watch's Media Director, working with the world’s journalists to help them cover crises, wars, human rights abuses and political developments in some 90 countries worldwide.
As Human Rights Watch's Director of Global Initiatives, Minky Worden will share her expectations for the Tokyo Olympics from the perspective of Human Rights Watch’s extensive experience with outreach and advocacy in the context of mega sporting events
@MinkysHighjinks

Ms Miwa Yamada, Director, Law and Institute Studies Group, Inter-disciplinary Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies, IDE-JETRO
LL.M (Georgetown), LL.M (King’s College London), joined Institute of Developing Economies after working at a business law firm. Served as a Rapporteur at 2016 Asia Regional Forum on Business and Human Rights, Doha. Current research interests include human trafficking, human rights due diligence in supply chain with focus on migrant workers in Japan and Asian countries, implementation of UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in practice, human rights risks and responsibilities in government and private sector co-financing projects. Recent writings includes: ‘Legal Technical Assistance and “UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights” – All for the Rights of PeopleICD News Law for Development, February 2017, Research and Training Institute, Ministry of Justice, Japan.
Ms Yamada will comment on the presentations and the interventions and explain Japanese quasi- governmental research institute, IDE-JETRO’s research on responsible supply chain practices of Japanese companies in the Asia region, conducted to contribute evidence-based measures to the NAP drafting process

New Draft Posted: "The Ideal and Practice of Chinese Comprehensive Constitutionalism in the 'New Era'"

$
0
0

(Pîx © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Bronze Cowerie Container With Sacrificial Ceremony Scene (Dian Container)  Western Han Dynasty 202 BC - 8 AD; National Museum of China, Beijing )


I am happy to post for comments and reactions the draft of a recently completed article: "The Ideal and Practice of Chinese Comprehensive Constitutionalism in the 'New Era'.” It will eventually appear in Volume 33(2) of the Connecticut Journal of International Law.  My thanks to Ryan Hoyler and the editorial staff of CJIL who all continue to be a pleasure to work with.

The Article considers the evolution of Chinese Constitutionalism in the wake of the last, 19th,  Congress of the Chinese Communist Party.  While many in the West used the opportunity of the Congress to engage in high level speculation about the politics embedded within the event (see, e.g., here, here, here, here, here, and here), few might have appreciated the significance of the 19th Congress for its contribution to the development of a Marxist-Leninist Constitutionalism with distinctly Chinese characteristics. That development is important not merely for its internal effects but for what it might offer to other states as a model of legitimating constitutionalism (and the construction of constitutional states) that varies in fundamental respects from the forms and expression of constitutionalism and the construction of constitutional states in the West. 

And, indeed, to some extent, the emerging structures of Chinese constitutionalism appear tailored not merely to best express Chinese notions of legitimacy in the structuring of a political order, but also to offer alternatives to states which have wrestled with the transposition of Western notions and practices over the course of the last half century or more. More importantly is the comprehensive nature of that objective.  Chinese constitutionalism appears to be just one element of a multi-prong effort to provide the world community with an alternative to political, economic, societal and cultural orderings that is meant to challenge the dominance of Western versions.  This "all-around" approach is not a secret.  Xi Jinping revealed its contours quite openly in his Report to the 19th CPC Congress in October 2017 (Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era). And thus the reference in the title of the drat article to both the elements of comprehensiveness and to the "New Era". 

The Abstract and Introduction follow.  Comments and engagement most welcome. 

 

(Pîx © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Bronze Cowerie Container With Figures Paying Tribute Western Han Dynasty 202 BC - 8 AD; National Museum of China, Beijing )



 



Larry Catá Backer[1]

Connecticut Journal of International Law 33(2):– (forthcoming 2018)


Abstract: The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party concluded at the end of October 2017. It set the fundamental policy positions of China’s leadership for the next five years with particular emphasis on its approaches to constitutionalism, law, and the political theory of the state. These internal political changes will have substantial effects on China’s external relations and on the ways in which Western liberal democracies engage with China. In that context among the most important questions for law revolve around the extent and character of the evolution of CPC thinking, and the CPC Basic Line, with respect to Socialist Rule of Law and Socialist Constitutionalism now bound up in the adoption of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” The question is central to a consideration of the Work Report delivered by Xi Jinping reflected in the resulting final Resolution of the 19th Congress to amend the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party and thereafter in 2018 to amend the State Constitution to reflect the advances in political principle and the CPC political framework embedded in the CPC Constitution. A key element of that question involves constitutional trajectory: to what extent did this report reflect an official downshifting of the importance of the state constitution and constitutionalism within the construction of Chinese notions of Constitutionalism, and if so, what variation on constitutionalism is likely to emerge? If so, what are the effects of any such downshift on the relation between the state and the political constitutions of China. To that end, it is worth considering whether principles of constitutionalism for the “New Era” may be extracted from Xi Jinping’s Report to the 19th Congress. And if they can, to try to extract a sense of the likely characteristics of emerging structures of Chinese constitutionalism. What follows, then is a preliminary report and assessment of Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era from Out of the 19th CPC Report. After this short introduction to the issues and context of Chinese constitutionalism before the 19th Congress, Section II provides a contextual framework for situating the constitutional work of the 19th CPC Congress within contemporary Chinese currents of constitutional theory. Section III then explores the references to notions of constitution in earlier CPC Congress Reports. Section IV then turns to the consideration of the constitution project for China in the “New Era.” It first considers in more detail the understanding of constitution and its role in politics and governance within the 19th CPC Congress Report itself. It then explores the role of constitutionalism within the structures of the 19th CPC Congress Report through a close reading of the specific references to constitutions in the Report (state, political and mixed). Lastly, it provides a concise consideration of the connection between constitutionalism and the emerging characteristics of Chinese consultative democracy.

I. Introduction

The Communist Party of China (CPC)[2] Congress is “a twice-per-decade event to set the party’s national policy goals and elect its top leadership.”[3] The first Congress was held in 1921, on the suggestion of European members of the Comintern,[4] who had urged that the various communist organizations then recently established in China should send representatives to a general Congress.[5] Since then, periodic CPC Congresses have provided a critical space through which the CPC can articulate, develop, and operationalize its objectives as a vanguard party. It provides a formal arena where the vanguard can come together to express the results of a reflexive period of internal dialogue ideally founded on its own process principles.[6] The Congress serves as the meeting at which the leadership is elected and confirmed. It is also the key formal event in which such work can be elaborated and disseminated to the nation at large. “But the practice of quinquennial gatherings dates to Deng Xiaoping’s attempts in the 1980s to introduce a sense of order and predictability after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.”[7]

With the 19th CPC Congress, held during the last week of October 2017, the CPC has announced that state, party and people have entered into a new historical stage, a “New Era.”[8]“With decades of hard work, socialism with Chinese characteristics has crossed the threshold into a new era. This is a new historic juncture in China’s development.”[9] That New Era itself pointed to a further development of Marxism Leninism in the Chinese context, the “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” which was itself at the center of the 19th CPC Report.[10]”That New Era has a number of important consequences for politics, for law and for the construction of a responsive constitutional state. The first is that the New Era again shifts the fundamental contradiction of society. “As socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, the principal contradiction facing Chinese society has evolved. What we now face is the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life.”[11] The second is that, like the American approach to politics and law that came before it, “New Era” offers an important alternative to legitimate construction of states and their politics: “It means that the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization.”[12] But it also conflates national and international structural and normative development. On the one hand, it conflates with the “China Dream of national rejuvenation”[13] with its transnational implications that it is explained, will see “China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind.”[14] Thus, the thrust of the changes announced in the 19th CPC Congress through the articulation of the “New Era” principles “are not merely political, but enhance the "all around" (comprehensive) approach to Chinese development which sees an intimate connection between law, politics, culture, internal and external relations.”[15]

The emerging principal contradiction of the “New Era,” however, does not diminish the role of the vanguard party is its leadership obligations or in its role as the center of political authority in China. “The basic dimension of the Chinese context—that our country is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism—has not changed. . . . We must remain fully committed to the Party’s basic line as the source that keeps the Party and the country going and that brings happiness to the people.”[16] To that end the leadership of the CPC—expressed through its Party and state constitutions—is essential.[17]“We must keep on strengthening the Party’s ability to lead politically, to guide through theory, to organize the people, and to inspire society, thus ensuring that the Party’s great vitality and strong ability are forever maintained.”[18] It is to that end that the governance reforms implicit in the “New Era” thinking, “The Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era and the Basic Policy” is elaborated.[19]

The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party announced a program of potentially significant development of its constitutional model. The changes required adjustment of the two great instruments of Chinese political legitimacy--first, the constitution of the vanguard Party, the holder of political leadership, and second, from that the modification of the constitution of the administrative state to conform its organization and operation, to ensure that the principles through which it is operated, conforms to that of the political constitution of the vanguard party.[20]

The CPC moved quickly to implement the recommendations of the 19th CPC Congress Report. At the close of the 19th CPC Congress it adopted a Resolution,[21] to amend the Constitution of the CPC[22] to incorporate the thrust of the ideological changes and principles elaborated in the 19th CPC Congress Report. In January 2018, the CPC also announced that the central element of its 2nd Plenum[23] was to be to consider and adopt corresponding amendments to the 1982 State Constitution.[24] That transposition of the work of the CPC into the CPC and State Constitutions evidence the thrust of the Chinese legal-political system, one grounded on the CPC as polity, the CPC Constitution as the expression of binding ideology of that polity, and the state constitution as its expression.[25] The CPC Constitution organizes the government of politics; the State Constitution organizes the government of state, and both under the leadership of the CPC in its vanguard role.

The relationships among these actors and what they might suggest about the evolving theories of Chinese constitutionalism were an object of consideration during the course of a Round Table[26] held shortly after the conclusion of the 19th Congress.[27] In the course of the proceedings, the speakers collectively wondered[28] about the extent and character of the evolution of CPC thinking, and the CPC Basic Line, with respect to Socialist Rule of Law and Socialist Constitutionalism. The question arose in the context of a discussion around the question of the extent to which – the 19th CPC Report delivered by Xi Jinping[29] and the resulting final Resolution of the 19th Congress[30] reflected a downshifting of the importance of the state constitution and constitutionalism in general from the Basic Line of the CPC itself. A related question around the effects of any such downshift on the relation between the state and the political constitutions of China. To that end, it is worth considering whether principles of constitutionalism for the “New Era” may be extracted from the sum of Xi Jinping’s Report to the 19th Congress. What follows, then is a preliminary report and assessment of Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era from Out of the 19th CPC Report. What follows, then is a preliminary report and assessment of Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era from Out of the 19th CPC Report.

After this short introduction to the issues and context of Chinese constitutionalism before the 19th Congress, Section II provides a contextual framework for situating the constitutional work of the 19th CPC Congress within contemporary Chinese currents of constitutional theory. Section III then explores the references to notions of constitution in earlier CPC Congress Reports. Section IV then turns to the consideration of the constitution project for China in the “New Era.” It first considers in more detail the understanding of constitution and its role in politics and governance within the 19th CPC Congress Report itself. It then explores the role of constitutionalism within the structures of the 19th CPC Congress Report through a close reading of the specific references to constitutions in the Report (state, political and mixed). Lastly it provides a concise consideration of the connection between constitutionalism and the emerging characteristics of Chinese consultative democracy.

That analysis is grounded in the principle that Chinese constitutionalism cannot be understood as limited to or flowing form the state constitution—an almost entirely Western misreading of the path of constitutionalism in China. Recent scholarship has increasingly suggested the centrality of the CPC to the study of constitutionalism in China, my own work included.[31]
To explain contemporary China, one cannot avoid the CCP, the most important political actor in the country ever since the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. The CCP, however, has been marginalized in our scholarly research both within and outside China in recent decades when the focus of research on China has shifted to non-party actors such as the state and society.[32]
The CPC continues to play a central role in the development of constitutional norms and their connection with constitution making with Chinese characteristics. This essay provides a small window on the dynamic evolution of Chinese constitutionalism, the central importance of Chinese (rather than Western) political normative context for that development, and the specific shape of emerging constitutional doctrine in what the CPC itself has declared to be a “New Era.” What now clearly emerges is not radical change but rather an important shift in the explicit recognition of the constitutional role of the vanguard party as the center of legitimate political expression, and of the state constitution as the means through which that expression is manifested in the operation of the state. Though it has important roots in traditional socialist constitutionalism,[33] the refinements and developments of Marxist and Leninist theory represents a substantial advance requiring careful study in its own right.

NOTES:


[1] W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law & International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University. Special thanks to Miaoqiang Dai (Penn State School of International Affairs M.I.A. expected 2019) and Shan Gao (Penn State Law SJD 2017) for their excellent research assistance (including invaluable translations from the original Chinese) and to the participants in the Roundtable for lively discussion and debate on these issues. 

[2] The Communist Party of China (CPC) is a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party whose leadership role in the operation of state, society, politics, economics and culture forms the essential and central element of the political and constitutional system of the Chinese state. It has a long and complex history, with origins in the transposition of Russo-European notions of Marxism and Leninism into China, which was then naturalized within a rich political culture of post-Imperial anti-colonialist nationalism, contentious relations with the counterpart Chinese Nationalist Party (Zhongguo Guomindang (GMD)), Soviet and European state Marxist Leninism, and ultimately developed with Chinese characteristics increasingly after 1949. See, Brief History of the Communist Party of China, China Daily, available http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-09/07/content_13901594_2.htm,

[3] Brookings Institute, China’s 19th Party Congress (2017) available https://www.brookings.edu/product/chinas-19th-party-congress/.

[4]“In March 1919 leading members of the Communist Party in Russia founded the Communist International (later known as Comintern). The aim of the organization was to fight "by all available means, including armed force, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition stage to the complete abolition of the State".” Comintern, Sparticus Educational (n.d.) available http://spartacus-educational.com/RUScomintern.htm. See, Vladimir I. Lenin, The Third, Communist International, in Lenin’s Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972 Volume 29, pages 240-241, reproduced in V. I. Lenin Internet Archive (www.marx.org) 2002 and available https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/mar/x04.htm (“In March of this year of 1919, an international congress of Communists was held in Moscow. This congress founded the Third, Communist International, an association of the workers of the whole world who are striving to establish Soviet power in all countries. The First International, founded by Marx, existed from 1864 to 1872. . . . The Second International existed from 1889 to 1914, up to the war.”).

[5] The First National Congress of the CPC (中国共产党第一次全国代表大会) was held in Shanghai from 23 July to 2 August 1921 in the course of which the CPC itself was established. See, 中国共产党第一次全国代表大会简介, available http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64553/4427940.html (“共产国际代表建议及早召开党的代表大会,宣告中国共产党的正式成立。” [“The Comintern's representative suggested convening the congress of the party as soon as possible and declaring the formal establishment of the Chinese Communist Party.”]) See also , Hans J. Van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (University of California Press, 1991) (arguing that the CPC emerged from the consolidation and transformation of a group of study societies, that acquired definitive contemporary form only after 1927 as a mass Marxist-Leninist party); see also Tony Saich, The Chinese Communist Party During the Era of the Comintern (1919-1943), prepared for Juergen Rojahn, ed., Comintern and National Communist Parties Project," (International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam ), available https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/asaich/chinese-communisty-party-during-comintern.pdf.

[6] See, e.g., Cheng Li, Preparing For the 18th Party Congress: Procedures and Mechanisms, China Leadership Monitor, no. 36 (Hoover Institute 2012), available http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/CLM36CL.pdf.

[7] What is China’s 19th Communist Party congress and why does it matter?, The Economist (Oct. 17, 2017) available https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/10/economist-explains-11. For English language CPC sources on the 19th CPC Congress, see 19th CPCP Congress, available http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/19cpcnc/index.htm.

[8] Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China October 18, 2017, available http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.

[9] Id., p. 10.

[10] Id., p. 15-23. See Michael A. Peters, The Chinese Dream: Xi Jinping thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, 49(14) Educational Philosophy and Theory, 1299-1304 (2017), available http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00131857.2017.1407578. “’The Thought is the biggest highlight of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and a historic contribution to the Party's development,’ said Zhang Dejiang when joining a panel discussion at the congress opened Wednesday. ‘This important thought represents the latest achievement in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context, and is an important component of the system of theories of socialism with Chinese characteristics,’ Yu Zhengsheng said while joining another panel discussion.” CPC creates Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Xinhua, Oct. 19, 2017, available http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/19/c_136689808.htm.

[11] Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, supra, pp. 9-10 (“We must recognize that the evolution of the principal contradiction facing Chinese society represents a historic shift that affects the whole landscape and that creates many new demands for the work of the Party and the country.” Id., 10).

[12] Id., 9.

[13] Id. National Rejuvenation was elaborated id., at 11-14. Rejuvenation “is designed to hark back to and move on a century of hardship and humiliation, utilising the master narrative of Chinese nationalism to harness Chinese identity and nation building.” Peters, The Chinese Dream, supra, 1302-1303.

[14] Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, supra, 10.

[15] Larry Catá Backer, Constitutional Reform Comes to the Chinese State Constitution and Changes to China's Global Trade Relationships Law at the End of the Day (Jan. 15, 2018) available http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/constitutional-reform-comes-to-chinese.html.

[16] Id., 10-11.

[17] This idea found expression in the Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China (October 24, 2017) (the “Resolution”), available http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702726.htm . The Resolution provided, in part that “The Congress holds that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential attribute of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and the greatest strength of this system; the Party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavor in every part of the country.”

[18] Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, supra, 14.

[19] Id., 15-23. For an interesting analysis see Son Daekwon, Xi Jinping Thought Vs. Deng Xiaoping Theory: Xi’s “new era” will see some of Deng’s famous maxims altered, if not discarded altogether, The Diplomat (Oct. 25, 2017), available https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/xi-jinping-thought-vs-deng-xiaoping-theory/.

[20] Larry Catá Backer, Constitutional Reform Comes to the Chinese State Constitution and Changes to China's Global Trade Relationships, Law at the End of the Day (Jan. 15, 2018), available https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2018/01/constitutional-reform-comes-to-chinese.html#more.

[21] Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China (October 24, 2017) (the “Resolution”), available http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/24/c_136702726.htm .

[22] Constitution of the Communist Party of China revised and adopted at the 18th CPC National Congress revised and adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on Oct. 24, 2017 (“CPC Constitution”), available http://www.china.org.cn/20171105-001.pdf.

[23]中共中央政治局召开会议 讨论拟提请十九届二中全会审议的文件 中共中央总书记习近平主持会议 , available http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2018-01/12/c_1122250299.htm. See also Explainer: China to Amend the Constitution for the Fifth Time, NCP Observer, available https://npcobserver.com/2017/12/27/explainer-china-to-amend-the-constitution-for-the-fifth-time/.

[24] Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (“State Constitution”) (Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation by the Announcement of the National People’s Congress on December 4, 1982 and revised through March 14, 2004), available http://english.gov.cn/archive/laws_regulations/2014/08/23/content_281474982987458.htm.

[25] Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government, and State: On Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law System, 30 B.U. Int’l L.J. 331(2012), available http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/international/volume30n2/documents/article_backer.pdf. This builds and elaborates the classical Leninist notion of the relationship between state, Party and constitution: “the state constitution is by and large a codification of the crucial elements of the communist party program.” Chris Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-Party States, 3 Rev. Socialist L. 155, 161 (1977).

[26] Roundtable on the Implications of the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs, 3 Nov. 201, available http://www.thecpe.org/?page_id=575.

[27] The Communist Party Congress is “a twice-per-decade event to set the party’s national policy goals and elect its top leadership.” Brookings Institute, China’s 19th Party Congress (2017) available https://www.brookings.edu/product/chinas-19th-party-congress/. “China’s Communist Party has held congresses since its foundation. The first was in 1921. But the practice of quinquennial gatherings dates to Deng Xiaoping’s attempts in the 1980s to introduce a sense of order and predictability after the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.” What is China’s 19th Communist Party congress and why does it matter?, The Economist (Oct. 17, 2017) available https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/10/economist-explains-11. For English language CPC sources on the 19th CPC Congress, see19th CPCP Congress, available http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/19cpcnc/index.htm

[28] See Roundtable, supra, video recording available http://mediasite.dsl.psu.edu/mediasite/Play/a9565c8857f144788fd4935ac8e67f7c1d.

[29]

[30] Resolution of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Revised Constitution of the Communist Party of China, supra.

[31] See, e.g., Richard MacGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (Harper Perennial 2010); Zheng, Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, reproduction, and transformation (Routledge, 2010); David L. Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation 103-161 (Woodrow Wilson Press 2008); Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Zheng Yongnian, eds., The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (Routledge 2006); Larry Catá Backer, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (The Three Represents), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism, 16 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 29 (2006-2007).

[32] Zheng, Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, reproduction, and transformation xiv (Routledge, 2010).

[33] See, Osakwe, The Common Law of Constitutions of the Communist-Party States, supra, 162.

"America First" Explained at the Davos World Economic Forum: Text of President Trump's Address And White House Background Briefing

$
0
0


Founded by Klaus Schwab in 1971, the World Economic Forum’s original mission was to introduce successful American management techniques to European firms. The annual global gathering—now known to most simply as “Davos”—has grown into a four-day conference that hosts about 3,000 of the world’s elite in business, government, and civil society. (President Trump to Davos: ‘America Is Open for Business’)

So begins the U.S. Administration's description of the World Economic Forum, which President Trump Addressed on January 26, 2018.  That description (along with the image chosen for it, reproduced above) was itself a window of the world view that infuses current U.S. approaches to globalization and global trade.  

For much of the tenure of the 45th President, there has been much criticism and little explanation of the emerging U.S. approaches to global trade and the principles on which it will be operationalized.  There is a growing chasm between business and the intelligentsia, however, on its potential. 

What follows are the Remarks by President Trump and President Berset of the Swiss Confederation Before Bilateral Meeting, posted to the White House Website, and theFull text: Trump Davos speech transcript  that wasreproduced by Politico. Also included is the Background Briefing given by a "Senior Administration Official" and also posted to the White House Website. All are worth considering carefully.  They suggest a development of the new American position on trade that appears to affirm that the American Administration has come to believe that the U.S: has entered into a new historical stage and is developing U.S. principles and engagement for this "New Era" of global engagement.






Remarks by President Trump and President Berset of the Swiss Confederation Before Bilateral Meeting | Davos, Switzerland

Issued on: January 26, 2018

World Economic Forum Congress Centre

Davos, Switzerland

11:36 A.M. CET

PRESIDENT BERSET: So I want to welcome President Trump and his delegation here to Davos. It’s the first time that President Trump visits Davos and Switzerland. And it has been 18 years since the last visit from a U.S. President here.

And we appreciate the significance of the gesture, Mr. President. Thank you for being here. Thank you for being here.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you.

PRESIDENT BERSET: You chose to come to Davos, one of the most important, most significant international meeting we host in Switzerland. And you are also always welcome to Geneva, Mr. President, where major global decisions and deals are cut every day.

Switzerland and the U.S. — that’s a longstanding, excellent relationship. We share a deep, historic commitment to freedom, to democracy, to human rights, to free markets. And there is one more point I want to highlight to you, one aspect: our mutual economic footprints.

We have very strong economic relations. They are very strong, and they are growing very fastly. This is really interesting: More than 500 Swiss firms in United States and more than 3,500 business locations with a (inaudible) — creation of a half a million jobs.

And I think, I believe, we can even deepen these relations to strengthen our economies, and to build up, together, solutions to global issues.

So once again, welcome. Thank you for being here, and I look forward to a good discussion.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you very much. Appreciate it.

Mr. President, it is a great honor to be with you. Davos has been exciting. And in addition to that, I think we’re bringing a lot of things back to our country, including tremendous goodwill.

I yesterday and last night — dinner with some of the great business leaders of the world, as you know. And it was very interesting to see and hear. They’re very happy with what’s happening in the United States.

We’re setting records every day. We’re setting records, and we’re going to continue to set records. We actually — believe it or not, we have a long way to go. We have a lot of upside. Tremendous — we have a tremendous margin up. And a lot of people are saying, “Well, we’ve gone up a lot, but can you go up?” We really have a tremendous — I think we have a long way to go.

We’ve cut regulations, we’ve passed the tax bill, the likes of which our country has never seen. Included in that bill is ANWR. A tremendous potential in ANWR, in Alaska. You know, that’s a part of the bill which people don’t even talk about. They’ve been trying to get ANWR approved since the start of Reagan — President Reagan — and we got that.

And the individual mandate, which is — essentially, it’s a — at least a partial, but a pretty good repeal of Obamacare. It was a very important thing that we got that.

But we got the biggest tax cuts in the history of our country, and we also have major tax reform. It’s had a tremendous impact on our country. You see it, and everybody sees it.

And Switzerland is just a great place. So many friends in Switzerland. Great investors. And you have a lot of our stock in the United States. So I have helped to make Switzerland even richer, and I’m very happy about that.

But the stock market is up almost 50 percent. And I will say this with great conviction, that had the opposing party won, in my opinion — because they would have added additional regulation to already the tremendous regulations we have — I believe the markets would have been down anywhere from 25 to 50 percent, instead of being up almost 50 percent.

We’ve done a great job, and a lot of people are very happy about it. And in a little while, I’ll be speaking about it.

But I just want to thank you for honoring us. We have tremendous respect for you — and congratulations on the election — and tremendous respect for your country. And it’s an honor to be here. Thank you.

PRESIDENT BERSET: Thank you very much.

PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you very much.

END

11:40 A.M. CET


__________


Full text: Trump Davos speech transcript By POLITICO STAFF 01/26/2018 07:55 AM EST

The following is the speech President Donald Trump delivered at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland on Jan. 26, 2018.

It’s a privilege to be here at this forum an business and science diplomacy and people from world affairs gathered for many, many years to discuss how we can to advance prosperity and peace. I'm here to represent the interests of the America people and affirm America's friendship and partnership in building a better world.

Like all nations represented at this great forum, America hopes for a future which everyone can prosper and every child can grow up free from violence, poverty, and fear. Over the past year, we have made extraordinary strides in the U.S. We're lifting up forgotten communities, creating exciting new opportunities, and helping every American find their path to the American dream. The dream of a great job, a safe home and a better life for their children.

After years stagnation the nights is once again experiencing strong economic growth. The stock market is smashing one record after another, and has added more than $7 trillion in new wealth since my election. Consumer confidence, business confidence, and manufacturing confidence are the highest that they have been in many decades.

Since my election we've created 2.4 million jobs and that number is going up very, very substantially. Small business optimism is at an all-time high. New unemployment claims are near the lowest we've seen in almost half a century. African-American unemployment reached the lowest rate ever recorded in the United States and so has unemployment among Hispanic-Americans.

The world is witnessing the resurgence of a strong and prosperous America. I'm here to deliver a simple message. There has never been a better time to hire, to build, to invest and to grow in the united States. America is open for business and we are competitive once again. The American economy is by far the largest in the world and we've just enacted the most significant tax cuts and reform in American history. We've massively cut taxes for the middle class, and small businesses to let working families keep more of their hard earned money.

We lowered our corporate tax rate from 35 percent all the way down to 21 percent. As a result, millions of workers have received tax cut bonuses from their employers in amounts as large as $3,000. The tax cut bill is expected to raise the average American's household income by more than $4,000. The world's largest company, apple, announced it plans to bring $245 billion in overseas profits home to America. Their total investment into the United States economy will be more than $350 billion over the next five years. Now is the perfect time to bring your business, your jobs, and your investments to the United States.

This is especially true because we have undertaken the most extensively regulatory reduction ever conceived. Regulation is stealth taxation. The U.S. Like many other countries unelected bureaucrats, we have, believe me, we have them all over the place, and they have imposed crushing and anti-business and anti-worker regulations on our citizens with no vote, no legislative debate, and no real accountability. In America those days are over. I pledged to eliminate two unnecessary regulations for everyone new regulation. We have succeeded beyond our highest expectations. Instead of two for one, we have cut 22 burdensome regulations for everyone new rule. We are freeing our businesses and workers so they can thrive and flourish as never before. We are creating an environment that attracts capital, invites investment, and rewards production. America is the place to do business, so come to America where you can innovate, create and build.

I believe in America. As president of the United States I will always put America first just like the leaders of other countries should put their country first also. But America first does not mean America alone. When the United States grows, so does the world. American prosperity has created countless jobs all around the globe and the drive for excellence, creativity, and innovation in the U.S. Has led to important discoveries that help people everywhere live more prosperous and far healthier lives.

As the United States pursues domestic reforms to unleash jobs and growth, we are also working to reform the international trading system so that it promotes broadly-shared prosperity and rewards to those who pray -- play by the rules. We cannot have free and open trade if some countries exploit the system at the expense of others. We support free trade but it needs to be fair and it needs to be reciprocal because in the end unfair trade undermines us all. The United States will no longer turn a blind eye to unfair economic practices including massive intellectual property theft, industrial subsidies, and pervasive state-led economic planning.

These and other predatory behaviors are distorting the global markets and harming businesses and workers not just in the U.S. But around the globe. Just like we expect the leaders of other countries to protect their interests, as president of the United States, I will always protect the interests of our country, our companies, and our workers. We will enforce our trade laws and restore integrity to our trading system. Only by insisting on fair and reciprocal trade can we create a system that works not just for the U.S., but for all nations.

As I have said, the United States is prepared to negotiate mutually beneficial, bilateral trade agreements with all countries. This will include the countries within TPP, which are very important. We have agreements with several of them already. We would consider negotiating with the rest either individually or perhaps as a group if it is in the interests of all. My administration is also taking swift action in other ways to restore American confidence and independent. We are lifting self-imposed restrictions on energy production to provide affordable power to our citizens and businesses and to promote energy security for our friend all around the world. No country should be held hostage to a single provider of energy. America is roaring back and now is the time to invest in the future of America.

We have dramatically cut taxes it make America competitive. We are eliminating burdensome regulations at a record pace. We are reforming the bureaucracy to make it lean, responsive and accountable and we are insuring our laws are enforced fairly. We have the best colleges and universities in the world and we have the best workers in the world. Energy is an abundant and affordable. There is never been a better time to do business in America. We are also making historic investments in the American military because we cannot have prosperity without security. To make the world safer from rogue regimes, terrorism and revisionist powers, we're asking our friend and allies to invest in their own defenses and to meet their financial obligations. Our common security requires everyone to contribute their fair share.

My administration is proud to have led historic efforts at the united nations security council and all around the world to unite all civilized nations in our campaign of maximum pressure to de-nuke the Korean peninsula. We continue to call on partners to confront Iran's support for terrorists and block Iran's path to a nuclear weapon. We're also working with allies and partners to destroy jihad it terrorist organizations such as ISIS and very successfully so. The nights is leading a very, very broad coalition to deny terrorists control of their territory and populations, to cut off their funding and to discredit their wicked ideology. I am pleased to the support that the coalition to defeat ISIS has retaken almost 100% of the territory once held by these killers in Iraq and Syria. There is still more fighting and worked to be done. And to consolidate our gains. We are committed to insuring that Afghanistan never again become as safe haven for terrorists who want to commit mass murder to our civilian populations.

I want to thank those nations represented here today that have joined in these crucial efforts. You are not just securing your own citizens but saving lives and restoring hope for millions and millions of people. When it comes to terrorism we will do whatever is necessary to protect our nation. We will defend our citizens and our borders. We are also securing our immigration system as a matter of both national and economic security. America is a cutting-edge economy but our immigration system is stuck in the past.

We must replace our current system of extended family chain migration with a merit-based system of admissions that selects new arrivals based on their ability to contribute to our economy, to support themselves financially, and to strengthen our country.

In rebuilding America we are also fully committed to developing our workforce. We are lifting people from dependence to Independence because we know the single-best anti-poverty program is a very simple and very beautiful paycheck. To be successful it is not enough to invest in our economy.

We must invest in our people. When people are forgotten the world becomes fractured. Only by hearing and responding to the voices of the forgotten can we create a bright future that is truly shared by all. The nation's greatness is more than the sum of its production and a nation's greatness is the sum of its citizens, the values, pride, love, devotion and character of the people who call that nation home.

From my first international G-7 summit to the g20, to the U.N. General assembly, to APEC, to the world trade organization and today at the world economic forum my administration has not only been present but has driven our message that we are all stronger when free, sovereign nations cooperate towards shared goals and they cooperate toward shared dreams. Represented in this room are shared dreams.

Represented in this room are some of the remarkable citizens from all over the worlds. You are national leaders, business titans, industry giants and many of the brightest mind in many fields. Each of you has the power to change hearts transform lives and shape your country's destinies. With this power comes an obligation however, a duty of loyalty to the people, workers, customers, who made you who you are.
Together let us resolve it use our power, our resources and our voices, not just for ourselves but for our people, to lift their burdens, to raise their hopes and to empower their dreams. To protect their families, their communities, their histories and their futures. That's what we're doing in America, and the results are totally unmistakable. It's why new businesses and investment are flooding in. It's why our unemployment rate is the lowest it's been in so many decades. It's why America's future has negative been brighter. Today, I am inviting all of you to become part of this incredible future we are building together. Thank you to our hosts, thank you to the leaders and innovators in the audience but most importantly, thank you, to all of the hard-working men and women who do their duty each and every day, making this a better world for everyone. Together let us send our love and our gratitude to make them because they really make our countries run. They make our countries great. Thank you and god bless you all. Thank you very much.

__________




SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good morning. Thank you for coming. I apologize that we are late. This session is on background, attributable to a senior administration official.

There is no recording of this other than for notes. There’s no broadcast recording, no video, and please no stills.

And with that said, [senior administration official], would you like to start?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. Good morning. It’s good to be with all of you.

The President looks forward to addressing the forum later this afternoon and talking about America and the world, and in particular, America’s place in the world and America’s role in the world.

I think you can expect to hear the President talk about, broadly speaking, three themes in this speech.

The first is that America is open for business again, in the sense that there’s been no better time to build, to invest, to hire in the United States. And you can expect him to talk about some of the policy priorities and accomplishments of his administration thus far, and the policy orientation designed to help unleash economic growth and create a very business-friendly climate.

So the significant tax cuts and tax reform, especially on the business and international sides; his very successful efforts thus far at regulatory reform and relief, seeking to roll back burdensome regulations and create a more business-friendly environment; efforts at boosting energy production and keeping energy costs low. And you can also expect the President to tout many of the economic successes of the United States; many of the leading economic indicators that attest to the United States being a very business-friendly environment — the GDP growth, stock market records, unemployment, and job creation.

The second theme that I think that you will hear the President speak to relates to America’s engagement in the world. So a vision for U.S. participation in the global economic order, but on terms that are fair and equitable. So an example would be United States engagement in the international trading system; a commitment to free and open trade, but on terms that are fair and reciprocal; commitment to trade enforcement, enforcing trade agreements and trade laws and trade norms; no longer tolerating things like the theft of intellectual property or forced technology transfers, industrial subsidies, state economic planning, dumping, those sorts of things.

But in the context that it’s only by enforcing the rules of the road and ensuring that all countries play by the rules — the rules of international trade — that we can preserve and maintain the integrity of the international trading system. So very much that trade enforcement — meaningful, rigorous, fair trade enforcement — is a way of supporting the global trading system.

As well as on the security side, I think you’ll hear him call on the international community to work together towards a variety of shared goals, things like defeating ISIS, applying maximum pressure to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, combatting terrorism in all of its forms and varieties.

And finally, I think you’ll hear the President articulate a vision of free and sovereign nations cooperating towards shared goals — peace, security, prosperity, and in particular, given the theme of this year’s forum, empowerment, lifting up and empowering the forgotten men and women in the United States and throughout the world.

So with that as, sort of, a thematic backdrop of what you can expect to hear the President speak to this afternoon, I’m happy to take your questions.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, when you ask a question, I’ll call on you. Please say your name and the media outlet. Ma’am.

Q (Inaudible) from CNN. Did the President order Robert Mueller to be fired?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, that’s beyond the scope of the themes of the speech, and not something that I care to discuss in this forum. Thanks, though.

Q What was the question?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Whether or not the President ordered the firing of Robert Mueller.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, in the back there, in the middle. There’s a microphone right there.

Q Sorry. Peter Baker, New York Times. The President yesterday, in his interview with CNBC, suggested that he was open to rethinking the TPP decision of a year ago. A, will he walk about that in his speech? And B, what would actually cause him to do that? Is there any actual process that would be initiated to do that, or is this just sort of a random thing he says in an interview that wouldn’t actually lead to something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure. So you can certainly expect the President to talk about trade in this speech as part of engagement with the world and with the global economic order.
The President has, over the course of a series of speeches, many of them given during his international travel — the most recent in Danang, Vietnam — has talked about an openness and a desire to engage, in particular, on bilateral trade negotiations, trade agreements. He’s indicated an eagerness to negotiate additional free trade agreements, and even a willingness to engage in the multilateral trade system in general. So I think that those are some of the things that motivated his comments about TPP.

I think that you can expect in his speech for him to speak broadly about what the principles of U.S. engagement would be, and potentially mention some specifics that could include TPP. But a real desire to continue to have America as a leader in free and open trade, but, again, as a leader in ensuring that all nations play by the rules and that trade laws and trade agreements are enforced, such that people can count on the global trading system, and that its integrity can be preserved such that people the people have confidence in it and that all share in the rewards and the upshots of the trading system as well.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And, Peter, I would just say one thing in addition, which is, he didn’t indicate that he’s rethinking his decision of last year. His decision of last year is — really, his campaign promise was not to be in the TPP as it exists. He stands by that decision. He doesn’t think it was a good deal for the United States as it exists.

What he indicated in the interview is a willingness to perhaps enter a similar trade arrangement with the same nations on different terms, if those terms are fundamentally more favorable to the United States.

Q Will there be follow-through or was that just a general statement?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There will be follow-through. But again, as there’s follow-through on his trade agenda broadly, the USTR is constantly talking to other countries about ways to expand trade in ways that are free and fair and reciprocal, including the renegotiation of existing deals and, perhaps, the renegotiation of deals that haven’t yet been enacted.

But the decision that he made was based on what had been negotiated before he came into office, and he absolutely stands by that. He thought that was a bad deal, and he still thinks that was a bad deal.

Q (Inaudible) with Televisa Mexico. Will the President present his vision on the broad structure of NAFTA 2.0?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is not designed to be a trade speech in particular; more touching on sort of broad themes of U.S. engagement in the world, and certainly in, sort of, the global economic system. He will talk about principles of trade, but I think it unlikely to — he’s unlikely to have time to get down into a great deal of specificity of any particular trade arrangement or trade agreement or trade enforcement action.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would just add to that, especially since the negotiation is ongoing between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. And I don’t think — the President would be one of the first to tell you that he doesn’t negotiate things like that in public. These talks are private at the moment, and the United States Trade Representative, along with senior officials from Canada and Mexico, are still talking. And so he’s going to continue those talks in private and see what can be accomplished.

Q Gideon Rachman from the Financial Times. Talking to Cecilia Malmström yesterday, who’s the EU’s lead person on trade, she responded to Wilbur Ross’s comments about a trade war already being underway, and said talk of a trade war was irresponsible. She also said that the EU is extremely alarmed by the way the Trump administration is blocking the appointment of new judges at the World Trade Organization. Given what you just said about the President’s preference for bilateralism in trade rather than multilateralism, I mean, are the EU right to be alarmed? Is the WTO something that you’re downgrading, really, in your view of how global trade works?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, look, as I said before, the President is very committed to ensuring that all nations and all participants in the global trading system play by the same set of rules so that the prosperity that’s generated can be broadly and fairly shared, a commitment to fairness and reciprocity.

There are a variety of ways in which those principles are enforced. Some of them relate to domestic law and to various enforcement actions that have been taken. Some relate to negotiations between countries. And some relate to various enforcement actions at bodies like the WTO.

I think the President is very much committed to ensuring that, in all of those trade relationships and all of those trading arrangements, that they are free and are open but also conducted on the basis of fairness and reciprocity. And sometimes that can include having to reform some of the ways in which trade agreements and trade arrangements are enforced.

But I don’t expect that you will hear in this speech today a great deal of detail about particular WTO actions or WTO reforms, although that remains a priority for Ambassador Lighthizer. It’s something that he has spoken to in the past and continues to be engaged in presently.

Q Thanks so much. Joe Hayes from ITV News. Which nations aren’t playing by the rules? And will President Trump be naming them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, in such a brief speech, I don’t think that you’re likely to hear the President name individual nations — particular nations — in a speech such as this.

You know, I think that you’re likely to see — you have already, in some of the actions that Ambassador Lighthizer has taken, in some of the anti-dumping countervailing duty cases that have been brought through the department of Commerce, and a whole variety of trade enforcement actions that have taken place and that may take place in the future — that you’ll see examples of areas of countries, of particular products where there’s a sense that there are unfair trade practices.

And that’s likely to be, sort of, the venue and the forum in which you would see sort of a nation-by-nation or product line-by product-line type analysis. Unlikely to see a whole lot of that in a 10- or 15-minute speech here at the WEF.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION: I would just add to that. The President hasn’t been shy about stating his views on which countries and which specific practices he objects to, both as a candidate and as President. And he’s even done so in specific countries, in specific meetings with specific leaders, on the record, on camera.

So he’s been quite clear about this, and I agree with my colleague that this is not a speech to necessarily name names. It’s to lay out broad principles. And it’s fundamentally an optimistic speech that tells people the story of the U.S. economy in 2017 and his hopes for the U.S. economy in 2018 and 2019, going forward, and that this is a great time to invest in America, but that trade needs to be conducted on a — I was going to say on a fundamentally different basis, but that’s not really right. On a — according to rules that we’ve all agreed to that maybe have been unevenly enforced, but that he’s saying that the period of, sort of, toleration for that on the part of the United States is over with the advent of a new administration.

Q Hi, Miriam Elder from Buzzfeed News. In light of the New York Times report that President Trump was prepared to fire Mueller, do you still feel confident serving this administration? And how do you address concerns that that report will likely overshadow what by all accounts sounds like an optimistic speech?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I feel 100 percent confident serving this administration.

Q Hi, Jen Rogers, Yahoo Finance. Do you think we can hear anything on immigration or border security?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think the President will touch on a whole range of international affairs and, sort of, homeland security issues. I think he may well touch on immigration in, sort of, the context of describing some of the objectives of immigration systems, some of the shared goals, and some of the ways in which that affects international relationships.

But that is not necessarily going to be a primary theme of the speech or a topic, given how brief the speech is, and given, sort of, the nature of the audience of the forum and of the themes that’s we’ve talked about — talking about America’s economic reconnaissance of now being a good time to do business in the United States and of really, sort of, laying out even more of a vision for the United States engagement in the world, economically and otherwise. Immigration, obviously, plays a role in that, and I think you can expect a mention, but this is not primarily a speech about immigration.

Q Hi, thanks so much. It’s Heather Timmons from Quartz. A number of CEOs from African nations I’ve talked to have said they’re considering boycotting this speech, or they may walk out in the middle of it. Can you tell us what the President is going to say today to the President of Rwanda? And is he going to apologize? And if so, what for?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There’s a lot of common interests between the United States and Africa. This is — in a way, it’s a follow-up to a lunch the President held in the United Nations General Assembly week in September with a number of African heads of government and heads of state. So there’s areas of security cooperation that the United States and African leaders — and remember that the President of Rwanda is the head of the African Union now.

There’s areas of security cooperation that they’ll talk about, trade cooperation, economic development, various other — not in security, not just in terms of terrorism, although that’s an issue, but there are health issues and a pretty wide range of issues that they’ll talk about to build on a strong relationship the United States has had with African nations for many years, and that this administration has tried to move forward, again, through the U.N. luncheon and through other venues. So this is part of keeping that agenda strong and moving forward.

Q A follow-up question to that. Michelle Caruso-Cabrera from CNBC. Is the President aware that some of these African CEOs are threatening a boycott or threatening to walk out?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It’s not something I’ve heard him talk about. I think he’s focused on giving a great speech. He’s happy with the reception he’s had at the World Economic Forum. He’s, really, very pleased with the reception he’s had. He came with a strong message that America is open for business. And he looks forward to repeating that business in the highest-profile venue of the forum for him, which is a speech to leaders. And so he’s going to do that. It’s a great, sort of, capstone and high point, right as he returns to the United States. It will be his last event here.

Q Hi, Luciana Coehlo with (inaudible) Sao Paulo, Brazil. Some foreign officials have said that President Trump may leave the door open to rejoin the Paris Agreement, in the speech. Is that so?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you don’t need foreign officials to tell you that he’s left the door open to rejoin the Paris Agreement because the President himself has said that he’s open to rejoining the Paris Agreement. And, in fact, he said it in the very speech in which he announced, initially, the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. So it’s something that he’s still open to. Again, the same point I would make about this, I already made about the TPP: He’s open to rejoining, if the terms are different and if the terms are better for the United States.

You will later today — I think they’ve already started to preview it in an interview that he did with Piers Morgan, with CNN International. And this very question he was asked, and he spoke at length about the United States’ environmental record and about his administration’s agenda for environmental protection, including water and clean air and conservation, all of which he feels very strongly about.

He just thought that the Paris Agreement, as drafted and as entered into by the previous administration, put too many constraints on the U.S. economy and put the U.S. economy at a vast disadvantage to other economies. So his objection to the Paris Agreement was not in any way related to its goals of environmental protection; it was the way that it enacted environmental restrictions and the way that it restricted the U.S. economy vis-à-vis other countries. And if that can be fixed, he said six months ago, he’s open to rejoining, or to joining a new agreement.

Q Will there be a specific mention?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don’t think that’s likely to come up as part of the speech, although there are any number of topics that he could mention and discuss. But again, the focus is going to be on the United States and its approach, its posture towards, and its involvement in, the international community and, in particular, sort of, the global economic community. And that will be the primary theme.

Q Thank you. (Inaudible), Bloomberg News. How do you explain the apparent difference in opinion between the President and his Treasury Secretary in their view of the U.S. dollar? It cost a lot of volatility in markets over the last 48 hours.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don’t think there’s any daylight between the President and Secretary Mnuchin. I think that there were some people who took some comments that the Secretary made, where he was essentially reciting and explaining, in a descriptive manner, a basic economic principle, and took it to represent some sort of normative judgment or some sort of policy announcement or shift. When you go back and look at the transcript of what he said, it was quite clear that that was not the case. And I think that’s been borne out in all of the successive comments that he’s made and the President has made.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay, thank you very much. Have a good day.

END

10:37 A.M. CET

Instituting a Cuban Internet Task Force "to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba"

$
0
0
(Estados Unidos mantiene a internet y las redes sociales como un campo de batalla contra Cuba. Foto: Tomada de Internet; Pix Granma)

The U.S. State Department has created a Cuban Internet Task Force.  
As directed in the June 16, 2017 National Security Presidential Memorandum “Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” the Department of State is convening a Cuba Internet Task Force composed of U.S. government and non-governmental representatives to promote the free and unregulated flow of information in Cuba. The task force will examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access and independent media in Cuba.
The first open meeting is scheduled for 7 February2018 in Washington D.C., at the Harry S. Truman Building. Information for those wishing to attend will be provided in a Federal Registry Notice.

For the Americans, this is not just an initiative in line with the resetting of U.S.-Cuban relations initiated by President Trump--it also preserved an important vestige of President Obama's program for opening relations tied to greater internet access for all Cubans and the encouragement of open cyberspace. (For discussion of the internet directive see Implementing the "New" Cuba Policy: Considering the "National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba"). The policy speaks to amplifying "efforts to support the Cuban people through the expansion of internet services, free press, free enterprise, free association, and lawful travel. " (“Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba,” §2(d)). More specifically, §3(i) of the Policy directs  that:

(i) The Secretary of State shall convene a task force, composed of relevant departments and agencies, including the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and appropriate non-governmental organizations and private-sector entities, to examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access in Cuba, including through Federal Government support of programs and activities that encourage freedom of expression through independent media and internet freedom so that the Cuban people can enjoy the free and unregulated flow of information.
For the Cubans, this is another indication of the continued importance of an American project to destabilize the Cuban government as currently constituted (and thus the picture above as part of Cuban Communist Party Press coverage of the Cuban Internet Task Force). Cubans see this initiative as a successor to the projection of U.S. views through Radio Martí. They are particularly challenged by a  policy that deliberately seeks to avoid interactions with the state and reach the Cuban people directly.   

Reporing from Reuters and the reporting (in Spanish) from the Cuban Communist press organ) is included.




U.S. State Department creates Cuba Internet Task Force


HAVANA (Reuters) - The U.S. State Department said on Tuesday that it had created a Cuba Internet Task Force to promote “the free and unregulated flow of information” on the Communist-run island, an action denounced by Cuban state media as subversive.

“The task force will examine the technological challenges and opportunities for expanding internet access and independent media in Cuba,” the agency said in a statement. It said the task force of U.S. government and non-governmental representatives would meet for the first time on Feb. 7Cuban Communist Party newspaper Granma said it was “destined to subvert Cuba’s internal order.”

“In the past, Washington has used phrases like ‘working for freedom of expression’ and ‘expanding access to internet in Cuba’ to cover up destabilizing plans,” Granma wrote, adding that some 40 percent of Cubans connected to the internet in 2017, 37 percent more than in 2010

Some analysts said the creation of the task force seemed counterproductive.

“By casting the issue of internet access in an explicitly political frame, it will only create greater obstacles for those U.S. telecom companies that have made inroads toward partnerships with the Cuban side,” said Michael Bustamante, an assistant professor of Latin American history at Florida International University.

“Measures like these strengthen the hand of those in Cuba for whom the prospect (and reality) of external meddling justifies maximum caution with respect to internal reform.”

Cuba has created public Wi-Fi hotspots and hooked up more homes to the internet, but most Cubans cannot get access on cellphones and only a tiny share of homes has broadband access.

The $1.50 hourly tariff for using a Wi-Fi hotspot in Cuba represents 5 percent of the average monthly state salary of $30.

Havana has said it has been slow to develop network infrastructure because of high costs, attributed partly to the U.S. trade embargo. Critics have said the government fears losing control.

Former U.S. President Barack Obama made improved internet access a central part of his efforts to normalize relations with Cuba. Telecommunications equipment and services were among the first exemptions to the embargo after Washington and Havana said in 2014 that they would restore diplomatic relations.

Google signed an agreement with Cuba in 2016 granting internet users there quicker access to its branded content.

Cuba has balked at allowing U.S. companies to participate in wiring the country. (Reporting by Sarah Marsh; Editing by Michael Perry)

__________



Estados Unidos retoma políticas fracasadas hacia Cuba

La creación de una «Fuerza de Tarea en Internet» contra Cuba sigue la ruta de otros programas subversivos como ZunZuneo, Piramideo y Commotion


Autor: Sergio Alejandro Gómez | internet@granma.cu

23 de enero de 2018 23:01:28



Si la administración del presidente Donald Trump pretende usar nuevas tecnologías para imponer cambios en el ordenamiento interno de Cuba, escogió caminos muy viejos que ya demostraron en el pasado su inoperancia e inefectividad, sin mencionar el hecho obvio de que violan las leyes del país afectado e incluso las de Estados Unidos.

La creación de una Fuerza de Tarea en Internet contra Cuba, anunciada ayer por el Departamento de Estado, abre las puertas al regreso a una política fracasada de la Guerra Fría que ambos países habían intentado superar a partir del 17 de diciembre del 2014.

Es la continuación del desatinado y mal asesorado discurso del mandatario en Miami, el 16 de junio del año pasado, cuando se reunió con una selección de la ultraderecha de origen cubano para anunciar con bombo y platillo su cambio de política hacia Cuba, que en pocas palabras se podría resumir como más bloqueo económico y menos viajes entre los dos países.

El terreno escogido para la nueva agresión, internet, demuestra a las claras cuáles son los verdaderos objetivos de Washington cuando reclama «libre acceso» a la red de redes en los países que se le oponen, mientras en su territorio mantiene un megasistema de rastreo y acumulación de datos sobre lo que hacen sus ciudadanos en la web.

De igual manera, a comienzos de enero, el Congreso de Estados Unidos avanzó un proyecto de ley para quitar las pocas restricciones que existían para el espionaje internacional, el mismo que quedó en evidencia tras las filtraciones del excontratista de la NSA, Edward Snowden.

De la llamada «Primavera Árabe», ya caída en el olvido, a planes más recientes como la incentivación de protestas en Irán y el apoyo a los sectores violentos en Venezuela, Washington muestra un claro patrón del uso de las redes sociales e internet con objetivos geopolíticos y de dominación.

Todo forma parte de una doctrina de Guerra No Convencional pensada para desestabilizar naciones sin el uso directo de fuerzas militares, que se ha arraigado tras los fracasos en los conflictos de Irak y Afganistán.

La activación de la nueva «fuerza de tarea» evidencia también que no hay falta de liquidez, en un gobierno paralizado y sin fondos, cuando se trata de financiar proyectos subversivos contra Cuba. Tampoco carecen de lugares de donde sacar el dinero a pesar de que el presupuesto presentado por el presidente Trump al Congreso para el 2018 elimina la partida tradicional y pública de 20 millones de dólares anuales que se venía aprobando desde hacía varias décadas para las agresiones.

La facilidad para crear nuevos organismos, con funcionarios «gubernamentales y no gubernamentales», contrasta también con la drástica reducción del personal diplomático de Washington en La Habana, que ha supuesto la paralización de la emisión de visados y una afectación directa a los servicios que recibían los cubanos y sus familiares en Estados Unidos.

Los nuevos planes de Trump no toman por sorpresa a Cuba, que acumula más de medio siglo de experiencia en el enfrentamiento a programas de agresión de toda clase.

Proyectos recientes como ZunZuneo, Piramideo, Commotion y otros, chocaron contra la capacidad de las autoridades cubanas de detectarlos y la unidad de su población ante las agresiones.

Llegan, además, en un momento en que se dan pasos claros hacia la informatización de la sociedad, con una
visión que prioriza el acceso social y busca proteger la soberanía del país, a pesar de las limitaciones económicas.

Tras la apertura de más de 500 puntos a lo largo de la Isla para el acceso público a internet, sin restricciones que no sean las que impone el bloqueo y los motivos de Seguridad Nacional, el país se apresta a la entrada en funcionamiento del servicio de internet en los móviles –con más de cuatro millones de ellos activados en la red– y a la ampliación de la conexión desde los hogares.

Si lo que pretende la administración Trump es exclusivamente garantizar el acceso de los cubanos a internet, bien podría eliminar las restricciones del bloqueo que impiden la compra de tecnología de punta en este sector u ofrecer facilidades para su adquisición. Quizá le salga más barato que una «fuerza de tarea» que está, desde un inicio, condenada al fracaso.



PROYECTOS SUBVERSIVOS CONTRA CUBA CENTRADOS EN LAS NUEVAS TECNOLOGÍAS

- ZunZuneo: Financiado por la Agencia Internacional de Estados Unidos para el Desarrollo (Usaid), su objetivo era lanzar una red de mensajería que pudiera llegar a cientos de miles de cubanos usando «contenido no controversial»: noticias de fútbol, música, parte del clima y publicidad. Cuando lograran su meta enviarían mensajes de contenido político para incitar a los cubanos a crear convocatorias en red y concentraciones masivas para desestabilizar el país.

- Piramideo: Similar a ZunZuneo, este programa estaba a cargo de la Oficina de Transmisiones a Cuba (OCB), a la que se supeditan Radio y TV Martí. El mismo promovía la creación de una red de «amigos», ofreciéndoles la posibilidad de que una persona enviara a los miembros de su «pirámide» un SMS masivo por el valor de un solo mensaje. El objetivo último era contar con una plataforma para la subversión.

- Conmmotion: Fue una herramienta desarrollada por el Instituto de Tecnología Abierta (OTI) de la New America Foundation, con sede en Washington, originalmente para uso militar, y que consiste en la creación de redes inalámbricas independientes. Aunque no se conoce su entrada en funcionamiento en Cuba, fuentes del Gobierno de Estados Unidos aseguraron al periódico The New York Times que se habían dedicado fondos millonarios con ese fin.

- Operación Surf: Desenmascarado por el agente Raúl de la Seguridad del Estado, Dalexi González Madruga, este programa consistía en la entrada de equipamientos y software para la instalación de antenas ilegales para el acceso ilegal a internet.








If the Trump administration presumes to use new technologies to impose changes on Cuba's internal order, it has chosen a very timeworn route, one that has been inoperative and ineffective in the past - not to mention that it violates the laws of the country involved, and even those of the United States.



The creation of an Internet Task Force focused on Cuba, announced by the State Department January 23, opens the doors for the continuation of a failed Cold War policy, which the two countries had stated their intention to change on December 17, 2014.

This move comes in the wake of the mistaken, poorly-advised speech given by the President in Miami, this past June 16, when he met with a group from the far-right of Cuban origin, to announce with much pomp and circumstance his changes to the country's policy toward Cuba, which can be summarized, in a few words, as more blockade and less travel between the two countries.

The battlefield chosen for this latest aggression, the internet, shows clearly Washington's true objectives when references are made to "free access" in countries it opposes, while in U.S. territory a mega-system is maintained to scan and gather data about what citizens are doing on the net.

Likewise, at the beginning of January, the U.S. Congress advanced a bill to remove the few restrictions that exist on international cyber-espionage, the extent of which was made evident by the leaks of former National Security Agency employee, Edward Snowden.

From the so-called Arab Spring - already lost in oblivion - to more recent plans like the promoting of protests in Iran and support to the violent opposition in Venezuela, Washington has shown a clear pattern of how it uses social networks and the internet for its hegemonic geopolitical purposes.

This is all part of the non-conventional war strategy developed to destabilize nations without the direct use of military force, increasingly deployed since the fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The activation of this new "task force" also demonstrates that, despite facing a government shutdown, there is no lack of liquidity when it comes to financing subversive projects in Cuba. There are plenty of places to find money, even though the Trump administration's budget presented to Congress for 2018 eliminates the customary 20 million dollars allocated for decades, to carry out such aggression.

The facility with which new bodies are staffed, with "government and non-government" personnel, contrasts sharply with the dramatic reduction of U.S. diplomats assigned to the embassy in Havana, which has practically paralyzed the issuing of visas and impacted services provided Cubans and their families in the United States.

Trump's new plans did not take Cuba by surprise, since the country has more than 50 years of experience in confronting all kinds of U.S. aggression.

Recent projects like ZunZuneo, Piramideo, Commotion and others run up against both the capacity of Cuban authorities to detect them and the Cuban population's unity in the face of such attacks.

They come at a time, moreover, when steps are being taken to advance in the digitalization of society, with a vision that prioritizes public access to the internet and protection of the country's sovereignty, despite economic limitations.

Since the opening of more than 500 wifi hotspots across the island to provide internet access, without restrictions beyond those created by the blockade and the needs of national security, the country is moving forward with internet service on cell phones - with more than four million in use - and expansion of home connections.

If the Trump administration is only interested in guaranteeing Cubans access to the internet, they could eliminate the blockade restrictions that hamper purchases of advanced telecommunications technologies and provide credit for their acquisition. This would perhaps be less expensive than a "task force" that is, from the start, condemned to failure.

SUBVERSIVE PROJECTS BASED ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES

- ZunZuneo: Financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) with the objective of launching a messaging system that could reach hundreds of thousands of Cubans using "non-controversial" content, like sports news, music, weather reports, and announcements. When they had won over a following, the plan was to begin sending political messages inciting Cubans to make appeals on the network for massive demonstrations to destabilize the country.

- Piramideo: Similar to ZunZuneo, this program was undertaken by the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB), responsible for the infamous Radio and TV Martí. The plan was to create a network of "friends" that would offer the possibility of sending a massive message to members of a "pyramid" at the cost of a single SMS. The objective was to prepare a platform for subversion.

- Conmotion: A tool to create independent create wireless networks, developed by the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute (OTI), with headquarters in Washington, originally intended for military use. Although no information on its functioning in Cuba is known, government sources told the New York Times that millions of dollars had been dedicated to an effort toward that end.

- Operation Surf: Unmasked by State Security agent Raúl - Dalexi González Madruga - this program involved the smuggling of equipment and software into the country to install illegal antennas to access the internet.

The Emerging Pattern of Anti-Corruption Approaches in Domestic Law--The Case of Argentina and Perú

$
0
0


The political context in which corruption is understood and managed has seen a fundamental transformation from the first steps to redefine the political response to corruption by the U.S. and its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the 1970s, to the embrace of global normative political anti-corruption rules in the form of the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention and the UN Corruption Convention. And, indeed, it may well be the multilateralism and consensus inherent in the rise of international frameworks for anti-corruption standards and structures that might be an important element in further development. "The UK Bribery Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the US started a trend that has spread across the globe, including Latin America, to crack down on corruption. Anti-bribery laws and enforcement efforts attract business from multinational companies that may be less inclined to do business in countries deemed unsafe. . . . .Perhaps part of the growth of local anti-corruption efforts stems from the apparent cooperation of foreign and Latin American authorities to root out corruption." (Anti-corruption trends across Latin America).

Yet Transparency International Reported in October 2017 that its Latin American and Caribbean survey indicated that 
Almost two thirds of people that we surveyed for the latest Global Corruption Barometer, People and Corruption: Latin America and the Caribbean, said that corruption had risen in the 12 months prior to when they were questioned (62 per cent).

More than half said that their government is failing to address corruption (53 per cent). And one in three people who had used a public service in the last 12 months said they had to pay a bribe (29 per cent). We talked to more than 22,000 people in 20 countries.

It’s no surprise then that across the region people regularly take to the streets to protest corruption. We’ve seen it in Brazil, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic. We’ve seen it in Mexico and Honduras. In fact seven in ten citizens stand ready and willing to get involved in the fight against corruption (70 per cent).

Yet despite this, few bribe payers said that they had actually reported this to the authorities (9 per cent), and of those who do, almost one third said that they suffered negative retaliation as a result (28 per cent). (Corruption on the rise in Latin America and the Caribbean).



For all that, change appears to be coming to Latin America.  This post looks to two--the adoption of new anti-corruption statutes in Argentina and Perú. Argentina enacted Law 27.401, which will enter into force in March 2018. Parú enacted into force Law 30424. The texts of the new statutes follow (Spanish) along with commentary (English) for the Argentine statute (Jorge and Basch: In Argentina, a new statute on corporate criminal liability for corruption) and Perú (Sandra Orihuela: Amid Odebrecht fallout, Peru enacts world-class anti-bribery law) both published in The FCPA Blog. These efforts join similar initiatives in Mexico (2017),  Columbia (2016), Chile (2013),  Brazil (2013), Uruguay (1998).  Argentina is particularly interesting because in addition to its new statute, it has sought to apply the system of governance through administrative discretion manifested in systems for the management of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion (Jorge and Basch: Argentina introduces deferred prosecution agreements, standards for compliance programs). This has application potentially in China as well (my thoughts here).  Other states are still a work in progress, though they have been moving toward embracing international standards: e.g., Paraguay.




Jorge and Basch: In Argentina, a new statute on corporate criminal liability for corruption



On December 1, the Argentine government enacted Law 27.401, which will enter into force in March 2018. We were deeply involved in the drafting and debate of the statute. In this post and the next one, we'll summarize some of the key features of the new law.
Which legal entities are subjected to the new regime? Argentina Law Nº 27.401 (unofficial English translation here) establishes criminal liability for “private legal persons,” defined in the Argentine Civil Code.
These include:
  • Companies incorporated under any legal form (LLCs, PLCs, partnerships, etc.) whether of national or foreign capital and including state-owned enterprises
  • Civil associations, foundations, mutual associations, cooperatives
  • Churches, confessions, religious communities or entities, and
  • Horizontal property regimes.
Notably, labor unions and their healthcare associations (“obras sociales sindicales”), professional associations and political parties are not considered “private legal persons” under Argentine law. Therefore, these entities are out of the new statute's reach.
Which offenses trigger corporate liability? Article 1 of the statute establishes the liability of the aforementioned legal persons for the following offenses:
  • Active domestic bribery (article 258 of the Criminal Code)
  • Transnational bribery (article 258-bis of the Criminal Code)
  • Trading in influence (Article 258 of the Criminal Code)
  • Participating in the offense of "concusión" - the act of incorporating the proceeds of an illegal exaction into the patrimony of the public official or of a third party (art. 268 of the Criminal Code)
  • Participating in the offense of illicit enrichment of public officials (art. 268 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code), and
  • An aggravated form of misrepresentation in books and records specifically directed at concealing the commission of bribery or trading in influence offenses (art. 300 bis of the Criminal Code).
Notably, these offenses do not have a minimum threshold, making legal persons liable regardless of the significance of the prohibited transaction.
Standards of Liability. The Argentine private sector strongly advocated for a standard of liability based on organizational failure. But consistent with the existent regime for other crimes, the law creates a standard of strict liability: legal persons are liable for the aforementioned crimes committed, directly or indirectly, with their intervention or in their name, interest or benefit (Article 2).
This approach is consistent with the standard of corporate liability already in force for other crimes, such as custom’s crimes, tax crimes, money laundering, insider trading, and securities fraud, among others.
The individual offenders may be employees or third parties -- even unauthorized third parties, provided that the legal person ratified the act, even tacitly. Therefore, the statute creates a need for robust due diligence, monitoring, and management programs over business partners and other third parties.
The statute also establishes successor liability in cases of merger, acquisition or other forms of corporate transformation. Therefore, integrity due diligence will also become an important part of any M&A transaction.
Defenses. Strict liability is mitigated somewhat by what we called "organizational merit," which can offset organizational failure.
According to article 9, companies may be exempted from punishment and from administrative liability provided that they:
  • Have implemented an adequate compliance program, prior to the commission of the offense and the violation of which required a specific effort from the individual offenders
  • Self-report the crime to the competent authorities, and
  • Return the undue benefit.
Since these three conditions are concurrent, the law is more demanding than the models based on “organizational failure” (Chile, United Kingdom, Spain), where adequate procedures alone are enough for a full defense.
*    *    *
In the next post, we'll talk about deferred prosecution agreements under the new law, as well as penalties and other sanctions for offense, aggravating and mitigating factors, mandatory compliance programs for some contracts with the national government, and components of an "adequate" compliance or integrity program.
_____
Guillermo Jorge, pictured above left, (gjorge@glatam.com.ar) and Fernando Basch, right, (fbasch@glatam.com.ar) are partners at Governance Latam, an advisory firm based in Buenos Aires www.glatam.com.ar.

__________


Objeto y alcance.

El Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina reunidos en Congreso, etc. sancionan con fuerza de

Ley:

ARTÍCULO 1°.- Objeto y alcance. La presente ley establece el régimen de responsabilidad penal aplicable a las personas jurídicas privadas, ya sean de capital nacional o extranjero, con o sin participación estatal, por los siguientes delitos:

a) Cohecho y tráfico de influencias, nacional y transnacional, previstos por los artículos 258 y 258 bis del Código Penal;

b) Negociaciones incompatibles con el ejercicio de funciones públicas, previstas por el artículo 265 del Código Penal;

c) Concusión, prevista por el artículo 268 del Código Penal;

d) Enriquecimiento ilícito de funcionarios y empleados, previsto por los artículos 268 (1) y (2) del Código Penal;

e) Balances e informes falsos agravados, previsto por el artículo 300 bis del Código Penal.

ARTÍCULO 2°.- Responsabilidad de las personas jurídicas. Las personas jurídicas son responsables por los delitos previstos en el artículo precedente que hubieren sido realizados, directa o indirectamente, con su intervención o en su nombre, interés o beneficio.

También son responsables si quien hubiere actuado en beneficio o interés de la persona jurídica fuere un tercero que careciese de atribuciones para obrar en representación de ella, siempre que la persona jurídica hubiese ratificado la gestión, aunque fuere de manera tácita.

La persona jurídica quedará exenta de responsabilidad sólo si la persona humana que cometió el delito hubiere actuado en su exclusivo beneficio y sin generar provecho alguno para aquella.

ARTÍCULO 3°.- Responsabilidad sucesiva. En los casos de transformación, fusión, absorción, escisión o cualquier otra modificación societaria, la responsabilidad de la persona jurídica es transmitida a la persona jurídica resultante o absorbente.

Subsiste la responsabilidad penal de la persona jurídica cuando, de manera encubierta o meramente aparente, continúe su actividad económica y se mantenga la identidad sustancial de sus clientes, proveedores y empleados, o de la parte más relevante de todos ellos.

ARTÍCULO 4°.- Extinción de la acción. La acción penal contra la persona jurídica sólo se extinguirá por las causales enumeradas en los incisos 2 y 3 del artículo 59 del Código Penal.

La extinción de la acción penal contra las personas humanas autoras o partícipes del hecho delictivo no afectará la vigencia de la acción penal contra la persona jurídica.

ARTÍCULO 5°.- Prescripción de la acción. La acción penal respecto de las personas jurídicas prescribe a los seis (6) años de la comisión del delito.

A tal fin serán aplicables las reglas de suspensión e interrupción de la acción penal que prevé el Código Penal.

ARTÍCULO 6°.- Independencia de las acciones. La persona jurídica podrá ser condenada aún cuando no haya sido posible identificar o juzgar a la persona humana que hubiere intervenido, siempre que las circunstancias del caso permitan establecer que el delito no podría haberse cometido sin la tolerancia de los órganos de la persona jurídica.

ARTÍCULO 7°.- Penas. Las penas aplicables a las personas jurídicas serán las siguientes:

1) Multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces del beneficio indebido obtenido o que se hubiese podido obtener;

2) Suspensión total o parcial de actividades, que en ningún caso podrá exceder de diez (10) años;

3) Suspensión para participar en concursos o licitaciones estatales de obras o servicios públicos o en cualquier otra actividad vinculada con el Estado, que en ningún caso podrá exceder de diez (10) años;

4) Disolución y liquidación de la personería cuando hubiese sido creada al solo efecto de la comisión del delito, o esos actos constituyan la principal actividad de la entidad;

5) Pérdida o suspensión de los beneficios estatales que tuviere;

6) Publicación de un extracto de la sentencia condenatoria a costa de la persona jurídica.

ARTÍCULO 8°.- Graduación de la pena. Para graduar las penas previstas en el artículo 7° de la presente ley, los jueces tendrán en cuenta el incumplimiento de reglas y procedimientos internos; la cantidad y jerarquía de los funcionarios, empleados y colaboradores involucrados en el delito; la omisión de vigilancia sobre la actividad de los autores y partícipes; la extensión del daño causado; el monto de dinero involucrado en la comisión del delito; el tamaño, la naturaleza y la capacidad económica de la persona jurídica; la denuncia espontánea a las autoridades por parte de la persona jurídica como consecuencia de una actividad propia de detección o investigación interna; el comportamiento posterior; la disposición para mitigar o reparar el daño y la reincidencia.

Se entenderá que hay reincidencia cuando la persona jurídica sea sancionada por un delito cometido dentro de los tres (3) años siguientes a la fecha en que quedara firme una sentencia condenatoria anterior.

Cuando fuere indispensable mantener la continuidad operativa de la entidad, o de una obra, o de un servicio en particular, no serán aplicables las sanciones previstas por los incisos 2) y 4) del artículo 7° de la presente ley.

El juez podrá disponer el pago de la multa en forma fraccionada durante un período de hasta cinco (5) años cuando su cuantía y cumplimiento en un único pago pusiere en peligro la supervivencia de la persona jurídica o el mantenimiento de los puestos de trabajo.

No será aplicable a las personas jurídicas lo dispuesto en el artículo 64 del Código Penal.

ARTÍCULO 9°.- Exención de pena. Quedará eximida de pena y responsabilidad administrativa la persona jurídica, cuando concurran simultáneamente las siguientes circunstancias:

a) Espontáneamente haya denunciado un delito previsto en esta ley como consecuencia de una actividad propia de detección e investigación interna;

b) Hubiere implementado un sistema de control y supervisión adecuado en los términos de los artículos 22 y 23 de esta ley, con anterioridad al hecho del proceso, cuya violación hubiera exigido un esfuerzo de los intervinientes en la comisión del delito;

c) Hubiere devuelto el beneficio indebido obtenido.

ARTÍCULO 10.- Decomiso. En todos los casos previstos en esta ley serán de aplicación las normas relativas al decomiso establecidas en el Código Penal.

ARTÍCULO 11.- Situación procesal de la persona jurídica. La persona jurídica tendrá los derechos y las obligaciones previstos para el imputado de acuerdo a lo establecido en los códigos de procedimiento, en cuanto le sean aplicables.

ARTÍCULO 12.- Notificaciones. Cuando la persona jurídica no se hubiera presentado al proceso, las notificaciones se le cursarán al domicilio legal, que tendrá carácter de domicilio constituido. Sin perjuicio de ello, se le podrán cursar notificaciones a cualquier otro domicilio que se conozca.

ARTÍCULO 13.- Representación. La persona jurídica será representada por su representante legal o por cualquier persona con poder especial para el caso, otorgado con las formalidades que correspondan al tipo de entidad de que se trate, debiendo designar en cualquier caso abogado defensor. En caso de no hacerlo se le designará el defensor público que por turno corresponda.

El representante deberá informar el domicilio de la entidad y constituir domicilio procesal en la primera presentación. A partir de entonces, las notificaciones a la persona jurídica se cursarán a ese domicilio procesal.

En cualquier momento del proceso la persona jurídica podrá sustituir a su representante. Si la sustitución tuviere lugar una vez iniciada la audiencia de juicio, deberá ser motivada, y podrá interrumpir el proceso dentro del límite de los plazos procesales correspondientes.

La sustitución no perjudicará la eficacia de los actos cumplidos por su anterior representante.

Las facultades, número e intervención de los defensores que la asistan se regirán por las disposiciones procesales correspondientes.

ARTÍCULO 14.- Rebeldía. En caso de incomparecencia a la citación, la persona jurídica será declarada rebelde por el juez, a requerimiento del fiscal.

El juez que disponga la rebeldía deberá informar dicha resolución a la Inspección General de Justicia o autoridad equivalente en las jurisdicciones locales, a la Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos y al Registro Nacional de Reincidencia, a sus efectos.

Además, deberá disponer de inmediato todas las medidas cautelares necesarias para asegurar la oportuna continuación y finalidad del proceso, de conformidad con el último párrafo del artículo 23 del Código Penal.

ARTÍCULO 15.- Conflicto de intereses. Abandono de la representación. Si se detectare la existencia de un conflicto de intereses entre la persona jurídica y la persona designada como representante, se intimará a aquella para que lo sustituya.

ARTÍCULO 16.- Acuerdo de Colaboración Eficaz. La persona jurídica y el Ministerio Público Fiscal podrán celebrar un acuerdo de colaboración eficaz, por medio del cual aquella se obligue a cooperar a través de la revelación de información o datos precisos, útiles y comprobables para el esclarecimiento de los hechos, la identificación de sus autores o partícipes o el recupero del producto o las ganancias del delito, así como al cumplimiento de las condiciones que se establezcan en virtud de lo previsto en el artículo 18 de la presente ley.

El acuerdo de colaboración eficaz podrá celebrarse hasta la citación a juicio.

ARTÍCULO 17.- Confidencialidad de la negociación. La negociación entre la persona jurídica y el Ministerio Público Fiscal, así como la información que se intercambie en el marco de ésta hasta la aprobación del acuerdo, tendrán carácter estrictamente confidencial, siendo su revelación pasible de aplicación de lo previsto en el Capítulo III, del Título V, del Libro Segundo del Código Penal.

ARTÍCULO 18.- Contenido del acuerdo. En el acuerdo se identificará el tipo de información, o datos a brindar o pruebas a aportar por la persona jurídica al Ministerio Público Fiscal, bajo las siguientes condiciones:

a) Pagar una multa equivalente a la mitad del mínimo establecido en el artículo 7° inciso 1) de la presente ley;

b) Restituir las cosas o ganancias que sean el producto o el provecho del delito; y

c) Abandonar en favor del Estado los bienes que presumiblemente resultarían decomisados en caso que recayera condena; Asimismo, podrán establecerse las siguientes condiciones, sin perjuicio de otras que pudieran acordarse según las circunstancias del caso:

d) Realizar las acciones necesarias para reparar el daño causado;

e) Prestar un determinado servicio en favor de la comunidad;

f) Aplicar medidas disciplinarias contra quienes hayan participado del hecho delictivo;

g) Implementar un programa de integridad en los términos de los artículos 22 y 23 de la presente ley o efectuar mejoras o modificaciones en un programa preexistente.

ARTÍCULO 19.- Forma y control judicial del acuerdo de colaboración. El acuerdo se realizará por escrito. Llevará la firma del representante legal de la persona jurídica, la de su defensor y del representante del Ministerio Público Fiscal, y será presentado ante el juez, quien evaluará la legalidad de las condiciones acordadas y la colaboración pactada, y decidirá su aprobación, observación o rechazo.

ARTÍCULO 20.- Rechazo del acuerdo de colaboración. Si el acuerdo de colaboración eficaz no prosperase o fuese rechazado por el juez, la información y las pruebas aportadas por la persona jurídica durante la negociación deberán devolverse o destruirse y no podrán ser empleadas judicialmente, excepto cuando el Ministerio Público Fiscal hubiera tenido conocimiento de ellas de forma independiente o hubiera podido obtenerlas a raíz de un curso de investigación existente en la causa con anterioridad al acuerdo.

ARTÍCULO 21.- Control del cumplimiento del acuerdo de colaboración eficaz. Dentro de un plazo no superior a un (1) año, el Ministerio Público Fiscal o el juez corroborarán la verosimilitud y utilidad de la información que hubiera proporcionado la persona jurídica en cumplimiento del acuerdo de colaboración eficaz.

Si se corroborare la verosimilitud y utilidad de la información proporcionada, la sentencia deberá respetar las condiciones establecidas en el acuerdo, no pudiendo imponerse otras penas.

En caso contrario, el juez dejará sin efecto el acuerdo y el proceso continuará de acuerdo a las reglas generales.

ARTÍCULO 22.- Programa de Integridad. Las personas jurídicas comprendidas en el presente régimen podrán implementar programas de integridad consistentes en el conjunto de acciones, mecanismos y procedimientos internos de promoción de la integridad, supervisión y control, orientados a prevenir, detectar y corregir irregularidades y actos ilícitos comprendidos por esta ley.

El Programa de Integridad exigido deberá guardar relación con los riesgos propios de la actividad que la persona jurídica realiza, su dimensión y capacidad económica, de conformidad a lo que establezca la reglamentación.

ARTÍCULO 23.- Contenido del Programa de Integridad. El Programa de Integridad deberá contener, conforme a las pautas establecidas en el segundo párrafo del artículo precedente, al menos los siguientes elementos:

a) Un código de ética o de conducta, o la existencia de políticas y procedimientos de integridad aplicables a todos los directores, administradores y empleados, independientemente del cargo o función ejercidos, que guíen la planificación y ejecución de sus tareas o labores de forma tal de prevenir la comisión de los delitos contemplados en esta ley;

b) Reglas y procedimientos específicos para prevenir ilícitos en el ámbito de concursos y procesos licitatorios, en la ejecución de contratos administrativos o en cualquier otra interacción con el sector público;

c) La realización de capacitaciones periódicas sobre el Programa de Integridad a directores, administradores y empleados.

Asimismo también podrá contener los siguientes elementos:

I. El análisis periódico de riesgos y la consecuente adaptación del programa de integridad;

II. El apoyo visible e inequívoco al programa de integridad por parte de la alta dirección y gerencia;

III. Los canales internos de denuncia de irregularidades, abiertos a terceros y adecuadamente difundidos;

IV. Una política de protección de denunciantes contra represalias;

V. Un sistema de investigación interna que respete los derechos de los investigados e imponga sanciones efectivas a las violaciones del código de ética o conducta;

VI. Procedimientos que comprueben la integridad y trayectoria de terceros o socios de negocios, incluyendo proveedores, distribuidores, prestadores de servicios, agentes e intermediarios, al momento de contratar sus servicios durante la relación comercial;

VII. La debida diligencia durante los procesos de transformación societaria y adquisiciones, para la verificación de irregularidades, de hechos ilícitos o de la existencia de vulnerabilidades en las personas jurídicas involucradas;

VIII. El monitoreo y evaluación continua de la efectividad del programa de integridad;

IX. Un responsable interno a cargo del desarrollo, coordinación y supervisión del Programa de Integridad;

X. El cumplimiento de las exigencias reglamentarias que sobre estos programas dicten las respectivas autoridades del poder de policía nacional, provincial, municipal o comunal que rija la actividad de la persona jurídica.

ARTÍCULO 24.- Contrataciones con el Estado nacional. La existencia de un Programa de Integridad adecuado conforme los artículos 22 y 23, será condición necesaria para poder contratar con el Estado nacional, en el marco de los contratos que:

a) Según la normativa vigente, por su monto, deberá ser aprobado por la autoridad competente con rango no menor a Ministro; y

b) Se encuentren comprendidos en el artículo 4° del decreto delegado N° 1023/01 y/o regidos por las leyes 13.064, 17.520, 27.328 y los contratos de concesión o licencia de servicios públicos.

ARTÍCULO 25.- Registro Nacional de Reincidencia. El Registro Nacional de Reincidencia dependiente del Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Nación registrará las condenas que recayeran por los delitos previstos en la presente ley.

ARTÍCULO 26.- Competencia. El juez competente para entender en la aplicación de penas a las personas jurídicas será el competente para entender en el delito por cuya comisión sea imputable la persona humana.

ARTÍCULO 27.- Aplicación complementaria. La presente ley es complementaria del Código Penal.

ARTÍCULO 28.- Aplicación supletoria. En los casos de competencia nacional y federal alcanzados por la presente ley, será de aplicación supletoria el Código Procesal Penal de la Nación.

Invítase a las provincias y la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires a adecuar sus legislaciones a los lineamientos de la presente ley.

ARTÍCULO 29.- Sustitúyese el artículo 1° del Código Penal, por el siguiente:

Artículo 1°: Este Código se aplicará:

1) Por delitos cometidos o cuyos efectos deban producirse en el territorio de la Nación Argentina, o en los lugares sometidos a su jurisdicción.

2) Por delitos cometidos en el extranjero por agentes o empleados de autoridades argentinas en desempeño de su cargo.

3) Por el delito previsto en el artículo 258 bis cometido en el extranjero, por ciudadanos argentinos o personas jurídicas con domicilio en la República Argentina, ya sea aquel fijado en sus estatutos o el correspondiente a los establecimientos o sucursales que posea en el territorio argentino.

ARTÍCULO 30.- Sustitúyese el artículo 258 bis del Código Penal por el siguiente:

Artículo 258 bis: Será reprimido con prisión de un (1) a seis (6) años e inhabilitación especial perpetua para ejercer la función pública el que, directa o indirectamente, ofreciere, prometiere u otorgare, indebidamente, a un funcionario público de otro Estado o de una organización pública internacional, ya sea en su beneficio o de un tercero, sumas de dinero o cualquier otro objeto de valor pecuniario u otras compensaciones tales como dádivas, favores, promesas o ventajas, a cambio de que dicho funcionario realice u omita realizar un acto relacionado con el ejercicio de sus funciones públicas, o para que haga valer la influencia derivada de su cargo en un asunto vinculado a una transacción de naturaleza económica, financiera o comercial.

Se entenderá por funcionario público de otro Estado, o de cualquier entidad territorial reconocida por la Nación Argentina, a toda persona que haya sido designada o electa para cumplir una función pública, en cualquiera de sus niveles o divisiones territoriales de gobierno, o en toda clase de organismo, agencia o empresa pública en donde dicho Estado ejerza una influencia directa o indirecta.

ARTÍCULO 31.- Incorpórase como artículo 259 bis del Código Penal el siguiente:

Artículo 259 bis: Respecto de los delitos previstos en este Capítulo, se impondrá conjuntamente una multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces del monto o valor del dinero, dádiva, beneficio indebido o ventaja pecuniaria ofrecida o entregada.

ARTÍCULO 32.- Sustitúyese el artículo 265 del Código Penal por el siguiente:

Artículo 265: Será reprimido con reclusión o prisión de uno (1) a seis (6) años e inhabilitación especial perpetua, el funcionario público que, directamente, por persona interpuesta o por acto simulado, se interesare en miras de un beneficio propio o de un tercero, en cualquier contrato u operación en que intervenga en razón de su cargo.

Se aplicará también multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces del valor del beneficio indebido pretendido u obtenido.

Esta disposición será aplicable a los árbitros, amigables componedores, peritos, contadores, tutores, curadores, albaceas, síndicos y liquidadores, con respecto a las funciones cumplidas en el carácter de tales.

ARTÍCULO 33.- Sustitúyese el artículo 266 del Código Penal por el siguiente:

Artículo 266: Será reprimido con prisión de un (1) a cuatro (4) años e inhabilitación especial de uno (1) a (5) cinco años, el funcionario público que, abusando de su cargo, solicitare, exigiere o hiciere pagar o entregar indebidamente, por sí o por interpuesta persona, una contribución, un derecho o una dádiva o cobrase mayores derechos que los que corresponden.

Se aplicará también multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces del monto de la exacción.

ARTÍCULO 34.- Sustitúyese el artículo 268 del Código Penal por el siguiente:

Artículo 268: Será reprimido con prisión de dos (2) a seis (6) años e inhabilitación absoluta perpetua, el funcionario público que convirtiere en provecho propio o de tercero las exacciones expresadas en los artículos anteriores.

Se aplicará también multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces del monto de la exacción.

ARTÍCULO 35.- Incorpórase como segundo párrafo al artículo 268 (1) del Código Penal el siguiente texto:

Se aplicará también multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces del lucro obtenido.

ARTÍCULO 36.- Modifícase el primer párrafo del artículo 268 (2) del Código Penal, que quedará redactado de la siguiente manera:

Será reprimido con prisión de dos (2) a seis (6) años, multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces del valor del enriquecimiento, e inhabilitación absoluta perpetua, el que al ser debidamente requerido, no justificare la procedencia de un enriquecimiento patrimonial apreciable suyo o de persona interpuesta para disimularlo, ocurrido con posterioridad a la asunción de un cargo o empleo público y hasta dos (2) años después de haber cesado en su desempeño.

ARTÍCULO 37.- Incorpórase como artículo 300 bis del Código Penal el siguiente:

Artículo 300 bis: Cuando los hechos delictivos previstos en el inciso 2) del artículo 300 hubieren sido realizados con el fin de ocultar la comisión de los delitos previstos en los artículos 258 y 258 bis, se impondrá pena de prisión de un (1) a cuatro (4) años y multa de dos (2) a cinco (5) veces el valor falseado en los documentos y actos a los que se refiere el inciso mencionado.

ARTÍCULO 38.- Sustitúyese el artículo 33 del Código Procesal Penal de la Nación, ley 23.984, por el siguiente:

Artículo 33: El juez federal conocerá:

1) En la instrucción de los siguientes delitos:

a) Los cometidos en alta mar, a bordo de buques nacionales o por piratas, ciudadanos o extranjeros;

b) Los cometidos en aguas, islas o puertos argentinos;

c) Los cometidos en el territorio de la Capital o en el de las provincias, en violación de las leyes nacionales, como son todos aquellos que ofendan la soberanía y seguridad de la Nación, o tiendan a la defraudación de sus rentas u obstruyan y corrompan el buen servicio de sus empleados, o violenten o estorben o falseen la correspondencia de los correos, o estorben o falseen las elecciones nacionales, o representen falsificación de documentos nacionales, o de moneda nacional o de billetes de bancos autorizados por el Congreso;

d) Los de toda especie que se cometan en lugares o establecimientos donde el gobierno nacional tenga absoluta y exclusiva jurisdicción, con excepción de aquellos que por esta ley quedan sometidos a la jurisdicción ordinaria de los jueces de instrucción de la Capital;

e) Los delitos previstos por los artículos 41 quinquies, 142 bis, 142 ter, 145 bis, 145 ter, 149 ter, 170, 189 bis (1), (3) y (5), 212, 213 bis, 258 bis y 306 del Código Penal.

2) En el juzgamiento en instancia única de aquellos delitos señalados en el párrafo anterior que estén reprimidos con pena no privativa de la libertad o privativa de la libertad cuyo máximo no exceda de tres (3) años.

ARTÍCULO 39.- Entrada en vigencia. La presente ley entrará en vigencia a los noventa (90) días de su publicación en el Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina.

ARTÍCULO 40.- Comuníquese al Poder Ejecutivo nacional.

DADA EN LA SALA DE SESIONES DEL CONGRESO ARGENTINO, EN BUENOS AIRES, EL OCHO DE NOVIEMBRE DE DOS MIL DIECISIETE.

— REGISTRADO BAJO EL N° 27401 —

MARTA G. MICHETTI. — EMILIO MONZO. — Eugenio Inchausti. — Juan P. Tunessi.

e. 01/12/2017 N° 93803/17 v. 01/12/2017



Fecha de publicación 01/12/2017

_________

Peru



Sandra Orihuela: Amid Odebrecht fallout, Peru enacts world-class anti-bribery law


By Sandra Orihuela | Wednesday, January 10, 2018 at 9:08AM

Peru welcomed the new year by enacting into force Law 30424, which introduces corporate criminal liability applicable to bribery.

Peruvian law now recognizes the independent criminal liability of a legal person for local and foreign bribery, imposing sanctions ranging from fines, debarment from government contracting to dissolution of the legal entity.

This is aligned with the U.S. standard of respondeat superior applicable to the FCPA and other offenses, in that corporate entities face criminal liability for the illegal conduct of their employees or agents when acting within the scope of their employment or agency, and when such illegal conduct was intended to provide, at least in part, a benefit to the corporate entity.

Responding primarily to its accession efforts before the OECD and to other international commitments, at the beginning of 2017 Peru broadened the corporate liability applicable to legal entities by way of Law Decree 1352, giving corporations a full year to transition into the heightened requirements. The country’s objective is to comply with its international agreements and to improve its legal framework by introducing a new system of administrative liability to regulate the autonomous liability of the legal person when involved in bribery related offenses, including money laundering and terrorism financing.

While the new law is a step forward in the fight against corruption, it comes at a time when Peru is facing some of its worst corruption scandals and the country appears overwhelmed in a state of disruption resulting from corruption. Former presidents serving during the last 17 years are accused of alleged involvement in some form of corruption, the most recent of which narrowly avoided President Kuczynski’s removal from office before Christmas on the grounds that he was “morally handicapped” to serve as president after admitting he had received advisory fees from Odebrecht while he served as Peru’s economy minister and prime minister.

Several government officials, politicians, well known private citizens and executives are being subject to prosecution and face bribing, corruption or money laundering charges. This has caused disruption at all levels of government and society. Now the corporate tier faces additional scrutiny.

The most significant provisions of the new amended legislation are:
It applies to all forms and size of legal entities, private and public, including de facto legal entities such as associations, committees and irregular entities.
It applies independently to the legal entity and does not require the act or conduct of an individual to trigger the corporate criminal liability.
It applies to local and foreign bribery of public officials as provided in the criminal code; to money laundering, terrorism financing and to other illicit acts (i.e. illegal mining) pursuant to specific law.
Penalties and sanctions are to be applied on the basis of the benefit derived from the bribery and the annual income of the legal entity.
Legal entities can be subject to compulsory intervention or supervision, as well as to a stay of sanctions and fines for a period of up to two years (which appears analogous to the DPAs and NPAs of the U.S. but is subject to regulations not yet enacted).

Mitigating factors include substantial cooperation, reparation, the existence of an “adequate” corporate compliance program (called “preventive compliance model”), to the adoption and implementation of the compliance program following the crime but before sentencing.

The adequacy of the corporate compliance program is based on the size and nature of each legal entity. Its minimal requirements, however, mirror certain key components of an effective compliance program per the Evaluation Guidance of Corporate Compliance Programs published by the Fraud Section of the U.S. Department of Justice last February:
Autonomy of the Compliance Function
Risk Assessments
Training and Communications
Confidential Reporting, and
Continuous Improvement, Testing and Review.

These are subject to further detail by way of the pending regulations.

Not without criticism and its own challenges -- primarily related to the yet to be published regulations and the designation of the securities regulator to determine the adequacy of the corporate compliance program -- the newly imposed corporate criminal liability is part of Peru’s new chapter in the globalization of its anti-corruption efforts.

____

Sandra Orihuela, pictured above, is a U.S. and Peru licensed attorney and founder of a legal boutique specializing in international business transactions primarily involving Latin America, with a special emphasis on corporate governance, anti-bribery and compliance. She can be contacted here.


__________




LEY Nº 30424 EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA POR CUANTO: EL CONGRESO DE LA REPÚBLICA;

Ha dado la Ley siguiente:

LEY QUE REGULA LA RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA DE LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS POR EL DELITO DE COHECHO

ACTIVO TRANSNACIONAL

SECCIÓN I

DISPOSICIONES GENERALES

Artículo 1. Objeto de la Ley

La presente Ley regula la responsabilidad administrativa de las personas jurídicas por el delito de cohecho activo transnacional previsto en el artículo 397-A del Código Penal.

Artículo 2. Ámbito subjetivo de aplicación

Para efectos de la presente Ley, son personas jurídicas las entidades de derecho privado, así como las asociaciones, fundaciones y comités no inscritos, las sociedades irregulares, los entes que administran un patrimonio autónomo y las empresas del Estado peruano o sociedades de economía mixta.

El cambio de nombre, denominación o razón social, reorganización social, transformación, escisión, fusión, disolución, liquidación o cualquier acto que pueda afectar la personalidad jurídica de la entidad no impiden la atribución de responsabilidad a la misma.

SECCIÓN II

ATRIBUCIÓN DE RESPONSABILIDAD ADMINISTRATIVA A LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS

Artículo 3. Responsabilidad administrativa de las personas jurídicas

Las personas jurídicas a que se hace referencia en el artículo 2 son responsables administrativamente por el delito de cohecho activo transnacional, previsto en el artículo 397-A del Código Penal, cuando este haya sido cometido en su nombre o por cuenta de ellas y en su beneficio, directo o indirecto, por:

a. Sus administradores de hecho o derecho, representantes legales, contractuales y órganos colegiados, siempre que actúen en el ejercicio de las funciones propias de su cargo.

b. Las personas naturales que prestan cualquier tipo de servicio a la persona jurídica, con independencia de su naturaleza, del régimen jurídico en que se encuentren o de si media relación contractual y que, estando sometidas a la autoridad y control de los gestores y órganos mencionados en el literal anterior, actúan por orden o autorización de estos últimos.

c. Las personas naturales señaladas en el literal precedente cuando, en atención a la situación concreta del caso, no se ejerza sobre ellas el debido control y vigilancia por parte de los administradores de hecho o derecho, representantes legales, contractuales u órganos colegiados de la persona jurídica.

Las personas jurídicas no son responsables en los casos en que las personas naturales indicadas en los literales a, b y c del primer párrafo, hubiesen cometido el delito de cohecho activo transnacional, previsto en el artículo 397-A del Código Penal, exclusivamente en beneficio propio o a favor de un tercero distinto a la persona jurídica.

Artículo 4. Autonomía de la responsabilidad administrativa de la persona jurídica y extinción de la acción contra la persona jurídica

La responsabilidad administrativa de la persona jurídica es autónoma de la responsabilidad penal de la persona natural. Las causas que extinguen la acción penal contra la persona natural no enervan la responsabilidad administrativa de las personas jurídicas.

La acción contra la persona jurídica se extingue por prescripción, cosa juzgada, amnistía o el derecho de gracia.

La prescripción de la acción contra la persona jurídica se rige por lo dispuesto, en lo que corresponda, en los artículos 80, 82, 83 y 84 del Código Penal.

SECCIÓN III

MEDIDAS ADMINISTRATIVAS APLICABLES

A LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS

Artículo 5. Medidas administrativas aplicables

El juez aplica, según corresponda, las siguientes medidas administrativas contra las personas jurídicas que resultaren administrativamente responsables de la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional, tipificado en el artículo 397-A del Código Penal:

a. Multa hasta el séxtuplo del beneficio obtenido o que se espera obtener con la comisión del delito, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el literal a del primer párrafo del artículo 7.

b. Inhabilitación, en cualquiera de las siguientes modalidades:

1. Suspensión de las actividades sociales por un plazo no mayor de dos años.

2. Prohibición de llevar a cabo en el futuro actividades de la misma clase o naturaleza de aquellas en cuya realización se haya cometido, favorecido o encubierto el delito. La prohibición podrá tener carácter temporal o definitivo. La prohibición temporal no será mayor de cinco años.

3. Suspensión para contratar con el Estado por un plazo no mayor de cinco años.

c. Cancelación de licencias, concesiones, derechos y otras autorizaciones administrativas o municipales.

d. Clausura de sus locales o establecimientos, con carácter temporal o definitivo. La clausura temporal es no mayor de cinco años.

e. Disolución.

Artículo 6. Medidas administrativas complementarias

El juez puede ordenar a la autoridad competente que disponga la intervención de la persona jurídica que resultare administrativamente responsable de la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional, cuando sea necesario, para salvaguardar los derechos de los trabajadores y de los acreedores hasta por un período de dos años.

La intervención puede afectar a la totalidad de la organización o limitarse a alguna de sus instalaciones, secciones o unidades de negocio. El juez debe fijar exactamente el contenido y alcances de la intervención y determinar la entidad a cargo de la intervención y los plazos en que esta debe cursarle informes a fin de efectuar el seguimiento de la medida.

La intervención se puede modificar o suspender en todo momento previo informe del interventor y disposición del Ministerio Público. El interventor está facultado para acceder a todas las instalaciones y locales de la entidad y recabar la información que estime necesaria para el ejercicio de sus funciones, debiendo guardar estricta confidencialidad respecto de la información secreta o reservada de la persona jurídica, bajo responsabilidad.

Artículo 7. Multa

Cuando no se pueda determinar el monto del beneficio obtenido o del que se esperaba obtener con la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional, el valor de la multa se establece conforme a los siguientes criterios:

a. Cuando el ingreso anual de la persona jurídica al momento de la comisión del delito asciende hasta ciento cincuenta unidades impositivas tributarias, la multa es no menor de diez ni mayor de cincuenta unidades impositivas tributarias.

b. Cuando el ingreso anual de la persona jurídica al momento de la comisión del delito asciende hasta mil setecientas unidades impositivas tributarias, la multa es no menor de cincuenta ni mayor de doscientas cincuenta unidades impositivas tributarias.

c. Cuando el ingreso anual de la persona jurídica al momento de la comisión del delito asciende a un monto mayor a las mil setecientas unidades impositivas tributarias, la multa es no menor de doscientas cincuenta ni mayor de quinientas unidades impositivas tributarias.

La multa debe ser pagada dentro de los diez días hábiles de pronunciada la sentencia que tenga la calidad de consentida o ejecutoriada. A solicitud de la persona jurídica y cuando el pago del monto de la multa pueda poner en riesgo su continuidad o el mantenimiento de los puestos de trabajo o cuando sea aconsejable por el interés general, el juez autoriza que el pago se efectúe en cuotas mensuales, dentro de un límite que no exceda de treinta y seis meses.

En caso de que la persona jurídica no cumpla con el pago de la multa impuesta, esta puede ser ejecutada sobre sus bienes o convertida, previo requerimiento judicial, en la medida de prohibición de actividades de manera definitiva, prevista en el numeral 2 del literal b del artículo 5.

Artículo 8. Inhabilitación

La medida de suspensión para contratar con el Estado, prevista en el numeral 3 del literal b del artículo 5, se impone de forma obligatoria en los casos en que el delito es cometido en el marco de un proceso de contratación pública.

El juez puede imponer cualquier modalidad de inhabilitación en supuestos distintos al señalado en el primer párrafo, en atención a las particularidades del caso concreto y considerando los criterios establecidos en el artículo 14.

Artículo 9. Cancelación de licencias u otras autorizaciones y clausura

La medida prevista en el literal c del artículo 5 se aplica de forma obligatoria cuando el delito de cohecho activo transnacional estuvo destinado o vinculado a la obtención de licencias u otras autorizaciones administrativas.

Sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en el primer párrafo, el juez puede imponer las medidas previstas en los literales c y d del artículo 5, en otros supuestos cuando lo estime pertinente en atención a los criterios establecidos en el artículo 14.

Artículo 10. Disolución

La disolución se aplica solo a las personas jurídicas que hayan sido constituidas y operado para favorecer, facilitar o encubrir la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional. En ningún caso podrá aplicarse para otras circunstancias.

Esta medida no es aplicable cuando se trate de personas jurídicas de derecho privado y empresas del Estado o sociedades de economía mixta que presten un servicio de utilidad pública, cuya interrupción pueda causar graves consecuencias sociales o económicas o daños serios a la comunidad.

Artículo 11. Decomiso

El juez, cuando corresponda, dispone el decomiso de los instrumentos, objetos, efectos y ganancias del delito de cohecho activo transnacional por el que se declare responsable administrativamente a la persona jurídica, de conformidad con el artículo 102 del Código Penal, conjuntamente con las medidas administrativas del artículo 5 que resulten aplicables.

SECCIÓN IV

DETERMINACIÓN DE LAS MEDIDAS ADMINISTRATIVAS APLICABLES A LAS PERSONAS JURÍDICAS POR LA COMISIÓN DEL DELITO DE COHECHO ACTIVO TRANSNACIONAL

Artículo 12. Circunstancias atenuantes

Son circunstancias atenuantes de la responsabilidad administrativa de las personas jurídicas las siguientes:

a. Haber procedido a través de sus administradores de hecho o derecho, representantes legales, contractuales y órganos colegiados a confesar la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional, con anterioridad a la formalización de la investigación preparatoria.

b. La colaboración objetiva, sustancial y decisiva en el esclarecimiento del hecho delictivo, en cualquier momento del proceso.

c. El impedimento de las consecuencias dañosas del ilícito.

d. La reparación total o parcial del daño.

e. La adopción e implementación por parte de la persona jurídica, después de la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional y antes del inicio del juicio oral, de un modelo de prevención, conforme a lo dispuesto en el artículo 15.

f. La acreditación parcial de los elementos del modelo de prevención, previstos en el párrafo 17.2 del artículo 17.

Artículo 13. Circunstancias agravantes

Son circunstancias agravantes de la responsabilidad administrativa de las personas jurídicas:

a. La comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional en virtud de cualquiera de los supuestos del artículo 3, dentro de los cinco años posteriores a la imposición, mediante sentencia firme, de una o más medidas del artículo 5 a la misma persona jurídica. En tal caso, el juez puede aumentar las medidas establecidas en los literales a, b y d del artículo 5, hasta en una mitad por encima del máximo legal establecido.

b. La utilización instrumental de la persona jurídica para la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional. Se entiende que se está ante este supuesto cuando la actividad legal sea menos relevante que su actividad ilegal.

Artículo 14. Criterios para la aplicación de las medidas administrativas

Las medidas administrativas previstas en los literales b, c y d del artículo 5 son determinadas por el juez en atención a los siguientes criterios, según corresponda:

a. La gravedad del hecho punible.

b. El tamaño y naturaleza de la persona jurídica.

c. La capacidad económica de la persona jurídica.

d. La extensión del daño o peligro causado.

e. El beneficio económico obtenido por el delito de cohecho activo transnacional.

f. La modalidad y la motivación de la utilización de la persona jurídica en el delito.

g. El puesto que en la estructura de la persona jurídica ocupa la persona natural u órgano que incumplió el deber de control.

Artículo 15. Individualización de las medidas administrativas

En caso de que el juez imponga la medida de multa o las medidas administrativas previstas en los literales b y d del artículo 5 con carácter temporal, debe desarrollar los siguientes pasos:

a. Identifica la extensión de la medida que corresponda, según los límites establecidos en el artículo 5, y la divide en tres partes.

b. Determina la medida concreta, evaluando la concurrencia de circunstancias agravantes o atenuantes, conforme a las siguiente reglas:

1. Cuando concurran únicamente circunstancias atenuantes o no existan atenuantes ni agravantes, se aplica la medida dentro del tercio inferior.

2. Cuando concurran circunstancias agravantes y atenuantes, se aplica la medida dentro del tercio intermedio.

3. Cuando concurran únicamente circunstancias agravantes, se aplica la medida dentro del tercio superior.

4. Cuando se trate de circunstancias atenuantes previstas por la ley como privilegiadas, se aplica la medida por debajo del tercio inferior.

5. Cuando se trate de circunstancias agravantes previstas por la ley como cualificadas, se aplica la medida por encima del tercio superior.

6. En caso de concurrencia de circunstancias atenuantes privilegiadas y agravantes cualificadas, se aplica la medida dentro de los límites del rango legal.

Para efectos del presente artículo, son circunstancias atenuantes privilegiadas aquellas previstas en la ley penal o procesal penal que prevean la reducción de la pena por debajo del mínimo legal. Del mismo modo, son circunstancias agravantes cualificadas aquellas previstas en la ley penal o procesal penal que prescriban el incremento de la pena por encima del máximo legal.

Artículo 16. Suspensión de la ejecución de las medidas administrativas

16.1. El juez puede, mediante resolución debidamente motivada y de modo excepcional, considerando especialmente el número de trabajadores o las ventas anuales netas o los montos de exportación de la persona jurídica, suspender la ejecución de las medidas administrativas impuestas y sus efectos por un plazo no menor de seis meses ni mayor de dos años. La suspensión procede siempre que la persona jurídica no esté incursa en el supuesto de reincidencia previsto en el literal a del artículo 13.

16.2. En el caso de empresas del Estado, sociedades de economía mixta o de personas jurídicas que prestan un servicio de utilidad pública cuya interrupción pueda causar graves consecuencias sociales y económicas o daños serios a la comunidad, el juez puede ordenar la suspensión, cualquiera fuese la medida administrativa impuesta en la sentencia.

16.3. Si durante el periodo de suspensión no se dispone la incorporación formal de la persona jurídica al proceso penal de conformidad con lo previsto en los artículos 90 y 91 del Código Procesal Penal, aprobado por el Decreto Legislativo 957, el juez deja sin efecto la medida administrativa impuesta y resuelve el sobreseimiento de la causa.

16.4. Esta suspensión no afecta el decomiso dispuesto judicialmente, según lo previsto en el artículo 11.

SECCIÓN V

MODELO DE PREVENCIÓN

Artículo 17. Eximente por implementación de modelo de prevención

17.1. La persona jurídica está exenta de responsabilidad administrativa por la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional, si adopta e implementa en su organización, con anterioridad a la comisión del delito, un modelo de prevención adecuado a su naturaleza, riesgos, necesidades y características, consistente en medidas de vigilancia y control idóneas para prevenir el delito de cohecho activo transnacional o para reducir significativamente el riesgo de su comisión.

17.2. El modelo de prevención a que se hace referencia en el párrafo 17.1 debe contener como mínimo los siguientes elementos:

a. Una persona u órgano, designado por el máximo órgano de administración de la persona jurídica, que ejerza la función de auditoría interna de prevención y que cuente con el personal, medios y facultades necesarios para cumplirla adecuadamente. Esta función se ejerce con la debida autonomía respecto del órgano de administración, sus propietarios, accionistas o socios, salvo en el caso de la micro, pequeña y mediana empresa, donde puede ser asumida directamente por el órgano de administración.

b. Medidas preventivas referidas a:

1. La identificación de las actividades o procesos de la persona jurídica que generen o incrementen riesgos de comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional.

2. El establecimiento de procesos específicos que permitan a las personas que intervengan en estos, programar y ejecutar sus tareas o labores de una manera que prevenga la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional.

3. La identificación de los procesos de administración y auditoría de los recursos financieros que permitan a la persona jurídica prevenir su utilización en la comisión de la conducta delictiva de cohecho activo transnacional.

4. La existencia de sistemas de denuncia, protección del denunciante, persecución e imposición de sanciones internas en contra de los trabajadores o directivos que incumplan el modelo de prevención.

c. Un mecanismo de difusión y supervisión interna del modelo de prevención, el cual debe ser aprobado por un reglamento o similar emitido por la persona jurídica.

17.3. El reglamento desarrolla y precisa los elementos y requisitos necesarios para la implementación del modelo de prevención.

17.4. En el caso de las empresas del Estado o sociedades de economía mixta, el modelo de prevención se ejerce sin perjuicio de las competencias y potestades que corresponden a los órganos de control institucional como de todos los órganos conformantes del Sistema Nacional de Control.

17.5. Se excluye también la responsabilidad administrativa de la persona jurídica, cuando cualquiera de las personas naturales señaladas en el artículo 3 comete el delito eludiendo de modo fraudulento el modelo de prevención debidamente implementado atendiendo a los elementos previstos en el párrafo 17.2.

Artículo 18. Efectos jurídicos y valoración

El fiscal o el juez, según corresponda, verifican la efectiva implementación y funcionamiento del modelo de prevención. Si en el curso de las diligencias preliminares se acredita la existencia de un modelo de prevención implementado con anterioridad a la comisión del delito de cohecho activo transnacional, el fiscal dispone el archivo de lo actuado, mediante decisión debidamente motivada. En caso de que la investigación preparatoria se hubiese formalizado, el juez puede, a petición del Ministerio Público, dictar auto de sobreseimiento de conformidad con la normatividad procesal vigente.

Artículo 19. Certificación del modelo de prevención

El modelo de prevención puede ser certificado por terceros debidamente registrados y acreditados, con la finalidad de acreditar el cumplimiento de todos los elementos establecidos en el párrafo 17.2 del artículo 17. El reglamento establece la entidad pública a cargo de la acreditación de terceros, la norma técnica de certificación y demás requisitos para la implementación adecuada de los modelos de prevención.

DISPOSICIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS

FINALES

PRIMERA. Vigencia

La presente norma entra en vigencia el 1 de julio de 2017.

SEGUNDA. Reglamento

El Poder Ejecutivo, dentro de los sesenta días hábiles siguientes a la publicación de la presente Ley, aprueba el reglamento a que hace referencia el párrafo 17.3 del artículo 17.

TERCERA. Vía procesal

La investigación, procesamiento y sanción de las personas jurídicas, de conformidad con lo establecido en la presente Ley, se tramitan en el marco del proceso penal, al amparo de las normas y disposiciones del Código Procesal Penal, aprobado por el Decreto Legislativo 957.

CUARTA. Normas aplicables

Durante la investigación y proceso penal, la persona jurídica goza de todos los derechos y garantías que la Constitución Política del Perú y la normatividad vigente reconoce a favor del imputado.

La persona jurídica puede ser asistida por la defensa pública, en caso lo requiera, bajo los alcances de la Ley 29360, Ley del Servicio de Defensa Pública, del Decreto Supremo 007-2012-JUS y demás normas conexas, en lo que resulte pertinente.

Asimismo, son aplicables los artículos 372 y 468 al 471 del Código Procesal Penal, aprobado por el Decreto Legislativo 957, que regulan la conclusión anticipada del juicio y el proceso de terminación anticipada respectivamente, con plena intervención del apoderado judicial de la persona jurídica, y demás normas del citado código que resulten pertinentes.

QUINTA. Registro de personas jurídicas sancionadas administrativamente

El Poder Judicial implementa un registro informático de carácter público para la inscripción de las medidas administrativas impuestas a las personas jurídicas, con expresa mención del nombre, clase de sanción y duración de la misma, así como el detalle del órgano jurisdiccional y fecha de la sentencia firme, sin perjuicio de cursar partes a los Registros Públicos para la inscripción correspondiente, de ser el caso.

En caso de que las personas jurídicas cumplan con la medida administrativa impuesta, el juez, de oficio o a pedido de parte, ordena su retiro del registro, salvo que la medida tenga carácter definitivo.

El Poder Judicial puede suscribir convenios con otras instituciones para compartir la información que conste en el registro.

El Poder Judicial, en el plazo de noventa días hábiles contados a partir de la publicación de la presente Ley, emite las disposiciones reglamentarias pertinentes que regulen los procedimientos, acceso, restricciones, funcionamiento del registro y demás aspectos necesarios para su efectiva implementación.

SEXTA. Campañas de difusión

La Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción, a través de su Coordinación General, realiza campañas de difusión sobre los alcances de la norma, dirigida a las empresas, a la policía, a los fiscales, a los procuradores, a los jueces y a los ciudadanos.

SÉTIMA. Financiamiento

La implementación de lo establecido en la presente Ley se financia con cargo a los presupuestos institucionales de las entidades involucradas, sin demandar recursos adicionales al tesoro público.

OCTAVA. Informe técnico de la Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción

Cualquier propuesta normativa que modifique la presente Ley o que implique la reducción o ampliación de su objeto y alcances, cuenta para su aprobación con un informe técnico no vinculante de la Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción.

En el supuesto de facultades delegadas a que se refiere el artículo 104 de la Constitución Política del Perú, el sector responsable solicita el referido informe técnico a la Comisión de Alto Nivel Anticorrupción.

NOVENA. Responsabilidad por denuncias maliciosas

La presentación de denuncias maliciosas en el marco de la presente Ley da lugar a responsabilidad penal, civil, administrativa y disciplinaria, conforme a ley.

DISPOSICIONES COMPLEMENTARIAS MODIFICATORIAS

PRIMERA. Incorporación del artículo 401-C al Código Penal

Incorpórase el artículo 401-C al Código Penal con el texto siguiente:

“Artículo 401-C. Multa aplicable a las personas jurídicas

Cuando las personas jurídicas señaladas en el artículo 2 de la Ley que regula la responsabilidad administrativa autónoma de las personas jurídicas por el delito de cohecho activo transnacional resulten responsables por el delito previsto en el artículo 397-A, el juez impone la medida de multa, conforme al literal a del artículo 5 de la citada norma, sin perjuicio de las demás medidas administrativas allí previstas que resulten aplicables”.

SEGUNDA. Incorporación del artículo 313-A al Código Procesal Penal

Incorpórase el artículo 313-A al Código Procesal Penal, Decreto Legislativo 957, con el texto siguiente:

“Artículo 313-A. Medidas cautelares en casos de responsabilidad administrativa autónoma de personas jurídicas

En los supuestos previstos en la Ley que regula la responsabilidad administrativa autónoma de las personas jurídicas por el delito de cohecho activo transnacional, el juez, a pedido de parte legitimada, puede ordenar, además de las medidas establecidas en el numeral 1 del artículo 313, las siguientes:

a. Prohibición de actividades futuras de la misma clase o naturaleza de aquellas con cuya realización se habría cometido, favorecido o encubierto el delito.

b. Suspensión para contratar con el Estado.

La imposición de las medidas señaladas en el primer párrafo procede siempre que existan suficientes elementos probatorios sobre la responsabilidad administrativa de la persona jurídica por el delito de cohecho activo transnacional y que fuese indispensable para prevenir los riesgos de ocultamiento de bienes o de insolvencia sobrevenida o para impedir la obstaculización de la averiguación de la verdad.

Estas medidas cautelares no duran más de la mitad del tiempo fijado para las medidas de carácter temporal previstas en el artículo 5 de la Ley que regula la responsabilidad administrativa autónoma de las personas jurídicas por el delito de cohecho activo transnacional”.

Comuníquese al señor Presidente de la República para su promulgación.

En Lima, al primer día del mes de abril de dos mil dieciséis.

LUIS IBERICO NÚÑEZ

Presidente del Congreso de la República

NATALIE CONDORI JAHUIRA

Primera Vicepresidenta del Congreso de la República

AL SEÑOR PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA

POR TANTO:

Mando se publique y cumpla.

Dado en la Casa de Gobierno, en Lima, a los veinte días del mes de abril del año dos mil dieciséis.

OLLANTA HUMALA TASSO

Presidente de la República

PEDRO CATERIANO BELLIDO

Presidente del Consejo de Ministros

1370638-1

Normas Legales / miércoles, 10 de enero de 2018

Democracy Part 41: The E.U. in Cuba: Reflections From the Cuban Independent Sector

$
0
0
In a recent post I considered the emerging state of E.U.-Cuban relations (The EU to the Rescue of the Cuban Economy? the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)).  These centered around the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) negotiations for which were launched in April 2014 and concluded on 11 March 2016.To celebrate this new stage of E.U.-Cuban relations and to move the implementation of the PDCA forward the EU's Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, paid an official visit to Cuba in early January 2018 for "talks aimed at implementing the PDCA.  It is likely that on the agenda will be the structuring of the Joint Council established by PDCA to oversee the fulfillment of the agreement (PDCA art. 81) and the Joint Committee (Art. 82) charged with the actual implementation of the PDCA (Art. 82)." (The EU to the Rescue). That visit and the PDCA itself, were undertaken within the analytical structure of the EU's 2016 Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World, in which Cuba was described as "a one-party democracy, in which elections take place at municipal, provincial and national level. At municipal level, candidates can be proposed by the voters and delegates are selected by all voters in the constituency" (Ibid., 261) but on in which "candidates that do not represent mainstream party or mass organisation positions will not become candidates for provincial or national delegates." (Ibid.).

This E.U. initiative produced little interest in the United States, as its press and elites are busy either obsessing about other events deemed more interesting (to them), or in the context of U.S.-Cuban relations on the melodrama that has been the drawn out Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack. And yet both the visit and more importantly the potential and challenges of the PDCA for the E.U., Cuba and the U.S. are worth careful study and response by the U.S. This is especially the case as the U.S. and Cuba retreat again into ancient patterns of bilateral relations. That reversion provides a space in which the European Union might develop a "common template" for relations with the Cuban state in a way that the U.S. will find increasingly difficult to oppose or bend to its own interests. And, indeed,  template setting is precisely the role that the E.U., in the person of Ms. Mogherini, seeks for itself in Cuba (see, e.g., here). The Cuban State gave prominence to her remarks: "“Regardless of the changes in policy in Washington, the message I am bringing here is that Cuba's friendship and relationship with the EU is here to stay. It’s solid, it’s stable and it’s reliable,” stated Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" cite HERE).  She noted  that the PDCA "is a solid instrument to further support the social and economic modernization of Cuba and provide new opportunities to increase trade and investment, and find common solutions to global challenges, she stated." (Id.). 

That template and its trajectory for modernization has raised some concern among elements of the Cuban independent sector.  And ironically those concerns center on the very project that the E.U. prides itself on advancing elsewhere, the democratization of society. This post suggests the contours of reaction within Cuba from other than the official sector (here, here, and here).  To that end it reproduces an essay, La democracia que ve Europa en Cuba, written by René Gómez Manzano, (whose bio appears below and whose work has appeared form time to time on this blog) along with my brief comments and the section in the EU Human Rights and Democracy Report that discusses Cuba. The essay appeared recently in CubaNet (in the original Spanish with my English translation).  The reactions suggests the difficulty of reconciling democratic visions within the context of contests for trade and influence.  More importantly, it suggests the difficulty of speaking coherently about a concept that is proving to be quite malleable in the emerging age. 



René Gómez Manzano, for the Cuban independent sector, and Federica Mogherini, for the European Union, both raise one of the more challenging questions of this age--on the character and practice of democratic politics in the contemporary world.  There is no easy answer, and no clear approach. Democracy, in its theory and practice has been a moving target for some time.  Since the 18th century it has evolved a particular approach (though not meaning) grounded on certain performative indicia centered on voting, some of which have become probvlematic (e.g.,The Utility of Voting in the Shadow of the Administrative StateDemocratic Accountability--From Voter to Managed Mob; Brexit, Mass Democracy and the Contradictions of Voting in Globalization).
In this age of mass democracy, elections are the essence of democratic constitutionalism. Elections, like some purifying elixir, cleanse all (political) sins of states that indulge in the practice. An act of sovereign will, by which the people of a state convey their political power to agents who act on their behalf, elections conform the appropriate relationship between state apparatus and the sovereign masses. Elections have proven crucial for legitimating states and their governments. There is a strong connection between democracy and elections. One is impossible without the other. Together they implement notions of popular sovereignty in the construction and operation of government. (Larry Catá Backer, Democracy Part XIX: Electoral Legitimacy in Honduras and Afghanistan, Law at the End of the Day (Nov. 29, 2009)).
Gómez Manzano remains true to this ancient understanding of the constriuciton of democratic states. And within the E.U., so do its elites. It places greatest value on the exogenous element of democracy--the direct connection between the masses and at least some portion of the members of the apparatus of government. 

Yet that indicia of the democratic impulse is not solely dependent on voting--the administrative state  must find of way to achieve democratic accountability among the masses of those officials who do not stand for election.  To that end, robust theories of engagement and participation have also  circulated, the so-called robust civil society element of Western democracy. This endogenous element of democratic practice has to some extent generated interest in the West, but serves as well as a basic principle of democratic organization in states that aspire to democratic functioning but not one grounded on an election-representation system.  "If the central problem of the expression of democracy—popular elections—ignores the effectiveness of democratic function within modern governments, and indeed, remains exterior to it, then might an alternative path to democratic expression also serve to legitimize the democratic constitutionalism of a state? These questions are central to the constitutional discourse of states,especially China, that have developed a strong constitutional discourse but are organized on Party-State principles." (Democracy Part 31: In a World Premised on Exogenous Democracy is a Theory of Endogenous Democracy Possible?).

If a core objective of democratic organization within political systems in which the exercise of democratic power must be undertaken through popular representatives who, within a government established for that purpose, is to exercise power in the name of the people in a representational capacity, it is possible to consider two quite distinct tracks for the implementation of that objective.  The first and most common focuses the exogenous exercise of democracy--in the choice of those individuals to whom are devolved political authority.  The second choice, far less common and far less developed conceptually, focuses the endogenous exercise of democracy--in the way in which power is exercised within government collectively not by but through individuals. Each system requires a rule set to avoid systemic perversion--cults of personality (dictatorship) in endogenous systems and oligarchy (through control of voting processes) in exogenous systems. The possibility of a working endogenous system will substantially broadened the current discussion of democracy.  It might, as well, provide alternatives especially with respect to that growing number of states in which the structures of cultures of exogenous democracy do not seem to produce positive results. (Id.).


Yet the West appears to demand the performance of voting as the foundational act of democracy while excusing the insufficiency of democratic accountability within the bureaucracies that operate the modern state. Moreover, the issue of the role of the elected official itself remains problematic--the representational capacity of these actors is in tension with thier fidelity to the state and its political premises where the masses seek representation for objectives that run counter to national norms (and interest?--but then who interprets those?).  And it is here that Gómez Manzano's criticism has some bite. Madame Mogherini noted in her remarks of 2016 introducing PDCA:
We are excited about the prospect of turning the PDCA into reality and achieve its objectives: enhancing EU-Cuba relations, promoting dialogue and cooperation to foster sustainable development, democracy and human rights, accompanying the process of "updating" the Cuban economy and society and finding common solutions to global challenges. (Statement by Federica Mogherini on Cuba-EU Agreement)
And indeed that was the only reference to democracy. That, and the comment that so excited Mr. Gómez Manzano. What of either form of democratic operation does he see in Cuba? from his perspective--neither.  And from the European Union he appears to hear both lip service and a bit of condescension typical of leaders of former colonial powers addressing the now independent Ultramaresstill in need of "development." And, given the quite subtle framework for democracy building work in the PDCA ("These provisions give the EU some leeway in tying economic benefits to political reform, but the potential hidden in those provisions may require substantial work for their realization--at least as the EU might see things.  Article 22 touches on human rights.  Its first paragraph nicely evidences the mishmash resulting from an attempt to push together two very different views of human rights"The EU to the Rescue).

Cuba and the E.U have chosen to focus on human rights rather than on democracy.  And that makes perfect sense.  Cuba respects the primary value and dominant interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the principles of which drive U.S. policy).   They adhere more closely to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which the United States sees as flowing form the other).  The Europeans embrace both. Agreement with the Cubans on Human rights (understood as centering on economic, social and cultural rights) has some measure of plausibility; any democracy enhancing work (centering principles of civil and political rights) much less so.  And so Madame Mogherini could praise  the progress of human rights discussions with Cuba--without  having to emphasize democracy in the conventional sense.
A year ago, FM Rodriguez and I agreed on launching a dedicated Human Rights dialogue to exchange views on this important and sensitive area. We wanted to develop our mutual understanding, and sound out possibilities for cooperation. This is destined to become an important part of the new PDCA framework.

A first meeting was held in Brussels in June 2015, under the leadership of EUSR for Human Rights Lambrinidis. It was a very constructive encounter and we had frank exchanges, on the concepts of HR, on the respective situation and recent developments in the EU and Cuba; respectful of the sovereignty of each other but mindful of the universality of human rights. (Statement by Federica Mogherini on Cuba-EU Agreement).

The reference to the democratic nature of Cuba's political system suggests that the PDCA's provisions int hat regard might well be dead letter,  That that is the tragedy.  Other Marxist Leninist States have been devoting substantial efforts to engage with the democratic impulse on their own terms.  That may not satisfy Western tastes but it does suggest an effort to engage with the principles that underlie the notions.  And there is some sense that those states might be moving toward more robust endogenous democratic expression--focusing on collective decision making and engagement rather than on representation and voting.  But it is not clear that Cuba is even following the Marxist path.  To the extent that the E.U. might have facilitated such discussion (even along the lines of Marxist Leninist development in other places) it would have been a useful exercise.  What we appear to get, though, is potentially very little.  It is here, ironically that the Chinese rather than the Europeans may move Cuba toward a more robust conversation about democracy. Though, the reality is likely that the Cubans will follow their own path to the extent that their economic situation permits.  And that connection--between democratic expression and economic development--remains the underused element in dialogue among all actors with Cuba, and within Cuba itself.  


 __________


Miércoles, enero 24, 2018 | published in CubaNet

LA HABANA, Cuba.- A comienzos del presente año, viajó a Cuba la señora Federica Mogherini, jefa de Exteriores de la Unión Europea. La visita sirvió de marco a la “profundización” y la “normalización” de relaciones entre el Viejo Continente y la dictadura castrocomunista. Amén de hacerles numerosas zalemas y generosas promesas a los personeros del régimen, la encumbrada visitante bautizó a este último de manera sorprendente: “democracia de un solo partido”.

Los antecedentes históricos de la frase son poco tranquilizadores. Como señalara el colega Juan González Febles, la misma proviene de un compatriota de la ilustre viajera. Pero se trata de alguien dotado de una mala fama merecidísima: el felizmente desaparecido Duce fascista Benito Mussolini.

Las reacciones indignadas a ese fruto lamentable del cerebro fértil de la visitante, no se hicieron esperar en el seno de la prensa independiente ni entre los perseguidos activistas que en la Isla luchan en pro de la democracia. Algunas de aquéllas fueron bien enérgicas, y uno no puede criticar a sus autores, pues mucho hizo la visitante para hacerse merecedora de esas expresiones.

Pero no quisiera limitarme en este trabajo a lanzar calificativos o epítetos sobre la encargada de las relaciones internacionales del bloque comunitario, no importa cuán merecidos ellos sean. En lugar de realizar ataques personales contra una dama, prefiero analizar en sí misma la aludida frase, y ver si existe algún fundamento real para que la diplomática la haya empleado.

El concepto de “democracia” ha evolucionado a lo largo del tiempo. La etimología nos dice que es el “poder del pueblo”, pero desde el punto de vista político parecería más exacto definirla como el “gobierno ejercido por el conjunto de los ciudadanos”. No se trata simplemente de que los más se impongan a los menos; lo fundamental es que todos, de un modo u otro, puedan participar en la administración de la cosa pública.

En ese contexto, un elemento esencial de la democracia es el ejercicio del sufragio libre. ¿Desconoce doña Federica que éste no existe en Cuba? Ahora mismo, a pocos días de su partida, acaban de ser postulados los candidatos a las curules en el “Parlamento cubano”. Han sido aprobados por unanimidad en las asambleas municipales. Además, a mano alzada. Un candidato para cada cargo. El pueblo no podrá escoger. En vista de esto, ¿se asombra alguien de que todos los propuestos, siempre, hayan “ganado la votación”?

Pero eso es una mera formalidad. En realidad, el poder se ejerce desde lo alto. Y durante los casi seis decenios de régimen castrista ha sido unipersonal. Nada —pues— que se asemeje siquiera al ejercicio de las facultades de mando por parte de una pluralidad de personas. El jerarca de turno decide, por sí y ante sí, sin limitación alguna. Y, para colmo, sin una oposición reconocida.

No existe siquiera una división formal o teórica de poderes públicos diversos y contrapesados. La doctrina marxista-leninista enarbolada por el castrismo proclama la unidad de poder. Tampoco hay un control basado en el respeto a la Constitución. Ésta puede ser cambiada de la noche a la mañana por los diputados que —como ya vimos— nomina el propio régimen. En caso de duda, corresponderá a ellos mismos determinar si alguna disposición se ajusta o no a la carta magna.

La violación de los derechos humanos de los cubanos es sistemática. Además, está institucionalizada, ya que las mismas leyes —y hasta la propia Constitución— los infringen de diversos modos. Las libertades de expresión, prensa y asociación brillan por su ausencia. En Cuba, el principio de que rija la mayoría con respeto a la minoría no es siquiera letra muerte. Simplemente, no se le reconoce.

Pero, hablando en un plano especulativo: ¿Es posible en principio una “democracia unipartidista”? ¿Se trata o no de un oxímoron? Los antecedentes históricos en Nuestra América son harto inquietantes. Sabemos que, bajo el tirano quisqueyano Trujillo, existía una sola organización de ese tipo: el Partido Dominicano. A él debían pertenecer todos los ciudadanos del país.

Claro que aquello no se acercaba —ni de lejos— a la democracia. ¡Pero es que los cubanos ni siquiera contamos con esa posibilidad! El partido encabezado por el hermano Castro de turno es, por definición, selectivo. Sus jefes se arrogan el derecho de admitir o no a los ciudadanos que soliciten el ingreso. De hecho, los militantes de esa única organización política constituyen menos de la décima parte de los ciudadanos con derecho al voto.

¡Y es ese engendro elitista el que la señora Mogherini nos quiere presentar como cauce idóneo para el ejercicio democrático! ¿Por qué doña Federica no promueve esa venenosa receta entre sus cultos compatriotas europeos!

Acerca del Autor René Gómez Manzano

(La Habana, 1943). Graduado en Derecho (Moscú y La Habana). Abogado de bufetes colectivos y del Tribunal Supremo. Presidente de la Corriente Agramontista. Coordinador de Concilio Cubano. Miembro del Grupo de los Cuatro. Preso de conciencia (1997-2000 y 2005-2007). Dirigente de la Asamblea para Promover la Sociedad Civil. Ha recibido premios de la SIP, Concilio Cubano, la Fundación HispanoCubana y la Asociación de Abogados Norteamericanos (ABA), así como el Premio Ludovic Trarieux.

[TRANSLATION

The democracy that sees Europe in Cuba:
Power on the Island is exercised from on high.
And during the almost six decades of the Castro regime it has been unipersonal

Wednesday, January 24, 2018 | published in CubaNet

René Gómez Manzano


HAVANA, Cuba.- At the beginning of this year, Mrs. Federica Mogherini, Head of Foreign Affairs of the European Union, traveled to Cuba. The visit served as a framework for the "deepening" and "normalization" of relations between the Old World and the Castro-communist dictatorship. As well as the numerous kowtows and generous promises to the personages of the regime, the eminent visitor baptized the personages of that regime in a surprising way: "single party democracy".


The historical background of the phrase is not very reassuring. As noted by my colleague Juan González Febles, it originates with a compatriot of the illustrious traveler. But that compatriot is someone endowed with a well deserved ill fame: the happily deceased Fascist Duce Benito Mussolini.


The indignant reactions to that unfortunate fruit of the fertile brain of that visitor, was not confined within the independent press or among the persecuted activists that fight in favor of democracy in the Island. Some of them were very energetic in their reactions, and one can not criticize their authors, since the visitor went to some effort to deserve those expressions.


But I do not want to limit myself in this work to hurl judgements or epithets about the person in charge of the international relations of the European Community Block, no matter how deserved they may be. Instead of making personal attacks against a lady, I prefer to analyze the aforementioned phrase in itself, and see if there is any real basis for the diplomat to have used it.


The concept of "democracy" has evolved over time. The etymology tells us that it is the "power of the people", but from the political point of view it would seem more accurate to define it as the "government exercised by the group of citizens". It is not simply that the majority imposes on the minority; the fundamental thing is that everyone, in one way or another, can participate in the administration of public affairs.


In this context, an essential element of democracy is the exercise of free suffrage. Do you not know, Madame Federica, that this does not exist in Cuba? Right now, a few days after her departure, candidates to the seats in the "Cuban Parliament" have just been nominated. They have been approved unanimously in the municipal assemblies. Also, by show of hands. A candidate for each position. The people will not be able to choose. In view of this, is anyone astonished that all those proposed have always "won the vote"?


But that is a mere formality. Actually, power is exercised from on high. And during the almost six decades of the Castro regime it has been unipersonal. Nothing that can be made to even resemble the exercise of the powers of command by a plurality of people. The hierarch decides, by himself and before himself, without any limitation. And, to top it off, without a recognized opposition.


There is not even a formal or theoretical division of diverse and counterweighted public powers. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine raised by Castroism proclaims the unity of power. Nor is there a control based on respect for the Constitution. This can be changed overnight by the deputies who, as we have already seen, nominate the regime itself. In case of doubt, it will be up to them to determine if any provision is adjusted or not to the constitution.


The violation of the human rights of Cubans is systematic. In addition, it is institutionalized, since the same laws - and even the Constitution itself - infringe them in various ways. Freedom of expression, press and association are conspicuous by their absence. In Cuba, the principle that the majority rules with respect to the minority is not even a death letter. It simply is not recognized.


But, speaking on a speculative level: Is a "one-party democracy" possible in principle? Is it an oxymoron or not? The historical background in Our America is very disturbing. We know that, under the Trujillo-born tyrant, there was only one organization of that type: the Dominican Party. All the citizens of the country must belong to it.


Of course, that did not come close to democracy. But we Cubans do not even have that possibility! The party led by the Castro brother in turn is, by definition, selective. Their chiefs arrogate to themselves the right to admit or not to citizens who request entry. In fact, the militants of that one political organization constitute less than a tenth of the citizens with the right to vote.


And it is that elitist monstrosity that Madame Mogherini wants to present to us as the ideal channel for democratic exercise! Why Doña Federica does not promote that poisonous prescription]

__________


Cuba is experiencing economic difficulties resulting from the fading support capacities of its Venezuelan ally. The opening towards the USA and uncertainties related to the new USA administration are creating both high expectations and fears. Against this background, short-term detention of members of the opposition, activists and human rights defenders continued and increased in 2016. 

As a priority, the EU aims to contribute to reforms that improve freedom of association and assembly, to promote equal opportunity (in relation to gender, LGBTI people, racism and disabilities), to promote economic rights, to encourage steps towards greater freedom of the media and access to information and to empower human rights defenders. In addition, the EU is actively monitoring developments concerning the criminal justice system.

The main issues in Cuba are restrictions to freedom of speech and expression, association and assembly, as well as the absence of an independent press. Civil society activists and political opponents are harassed, in particular through short-term detentions, occasionally coupled with alleged humiliating or violent treatment. Cuba is a one-party democracy, in which elections take place at municipal, provincial and national level. At municipal level, candidates can be proposed by the voters and delegates are selected by all voters in the constituency. Nominations for delegates at provincial and national level are agreed in a Nominations Committee, composed of representatives of the political and ‘mass organisations’, and chaired by a party representative. The legal professions are insufficiently independent of the political authorities, as is the court system. The government is preparing legislative proposals for a new electoral law and a modified law of association; however, the laws have not yet been submitted to the National Assembly. Renewal of the country’s leadership is another positive prospect, as President Castro has given a public commitment to stepping down in 2018. 

Participation in the political process is wide, with local, regional and national-level elections, but in the present electoral legal framework candidates that do not represent mainstream party or mass organisation positions will not become candidates for provincial or national delegates.

During 2016, the USA-Cuba political rapprochement intensified, and the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement was signed, signalling Cuba’s political will to engage. For example, the first formal human rights dialogues with both the EU and the USA were held on the island in 2016. In addition President Obama’s conducted a historical visit to Cuba in March 2016. Progress is being made on access to information, through wider use of internet, including the creation of public hotspots, and a reduction in associated prices.

The signature of the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement, with a particular focus on dialogue and cooperation to promote human rights, constitutes a major breakthrough in terms of bilateral political engagement. The EU-Cuba human rights dialogue enabledan open discussion on freedom of association, gender equality in the context of the SDGs and Agenda 2030, racism and xenophobia, as well as the treatment of vulnerable groups, including migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The human rights dialogue also enabled the establishment of contacts with the judicial system (Ministry of Justice and National Lawyers’ Association). Lastly, the participation of the Attorney General’s Office in the exchange of experts programme should also be noted in the context of bilateral cooperation.

The EU Delegation to Cuba maintained systematic contacts with all sectors of independent civil society. A visit was paid to EP Sakharov laureate and dissident, Guillermo Fariñas during his hunger strike. The EU also expressed concerns on various occasions to the Cuban authorities regarding the repression of peaceful protesters or activists, such as Cubalex, a group of lawyers defending victims of human rights violations. 

On Human Rights Day, the EU and Sweden organised an event on gender issues and violence against women. The EU Delegation and the Netherlands also co-hosted a seminar for young self-employed people with a view to empowering them and supporting their activities. The EU has continued to fund human rights-related projects to educate and empower young people and to support elderly and disabled persons. 

The challenges ahead and areas for further progress are concentrated around freedom of association and assembly, freedom of expression and of the media, and the functioning of the justice system.

The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack: Tourists and Tourism

$
0
0
(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Varadero beachfront)


The Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack in Cuba is slowly but now quite perceptively shaping the contours of U.S.-Cuba relations going forward.  Even as the "rest of the West" moves toward engagement following the approach developed by the European Union and the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) (see here and here), the United States has re-framed its engagement along its traditional lines to to emphasize efforts to support the private sector and challenge the public sector (including the governmental apparatus).  

Almost invariably, and recently, the U.S. seems to draw attention to the Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack as it continues to develop its policy approaches and objectives. So it is that one can more clearly see the way that the evolution of the investigation of the Affair is now more directly impacting strategic decisions on the extent of U.S. engagement. 

At the center of this are two now related currents: first the expansion of the scope of the investigations to include children and non-diplomatic personnel from the U.S. and Canada that appear to have been victims of the attacks (e.g., here); and the second is the resulting reaction by the State Department to warn against travel to Cuba.  


On January 29, 2018, the Miami Herald Newspaper published an article in which it was revealed that the U.S: State Department had been "contacted by 19 U.S. citizens who reported experiencing symptoms similar to those listed in the Travel Warning after visiting Cuba” (Nora Gómez Torres, "19 American travelers to Cuba report symptoms similar to those suffered by diplomats,"The Miami Herald Jan. 29, 2018). The story was otherwise vague but did try to connect this ongoing development with the modulations of the travel warning issued by the State Department.
In late September, the State Department issued a travel warning advising Americans not to travel to Cuba because they could become victims of mysterious attacks such as those suffered by 24 diplomats and their families while they were stationed in Havana. . . . In January, the State Department changed the wording and currently recommends “reconsidering” traveling to Cuba. However, officials stressed that the situation on the island had not changed, nor their message to American travelers. The list of possible symptoms remained unchanged in the new travel advisory. (Nora Gómez Torres, "19 American travelers to Cuba report symptoms similar to those suffered by diplomats,"supra).

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article197255084.html#storylink=cpy

Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article197255084.html#storylink=cpy
Meanwhile, "U.S. officials, however, have addressed the issue at several bilateral meetings held in Washington this month with members of the Cuban government." (Ibid). The connection between warning and negotiations is hard to avoid--but that is hardly a criticism of the U.S. Ironically, it suggests U.S. restraint, considering the additional (and traditionally deployed) weapons the U.S. has in its arsenal.  But it also suggests the sort of targeted pressure (in this case on one of the critical sector  identified for development in the Cuban long term economic plan) whose use was pioneered well before the start of the term of the present Administration.  

The campaign is appearing to have an effect significant enough to worry the Cubans--and perhaps more importantly U.S. tour operators and the European corporate partners of the Cuban public sector with substantial investments in the tourist sector.  
But in the past six months, the Cuba travel industry has been hit by a triple whammy of adverse events: U.S warnings and advisories against traveling to Cuba stemming from mysterious health episodes affecting diplomats, a Category 5 hurricane that battered tourism facilities, and confusing statements and restrictions from the Trump administration on travel to the island. (Mimi Whitefield, "American visitors aren’t flying in droves to Cuba now. Tour operators: Please come back,"The Miami Herald, Jan. 30, 2018).
Even as the U.S: State Department was discussing the wider scope of danger from "sonic attacks", InsigthCuba and other U.S. tour operators seeking to enhance travel demand to Cuba "organized an outing in Havana with the singular purpose of showing that it is safe and legal to travel to Cuba," with the Spanish travel and hotel MNE Melia donating "space at its Melia Cohiba hotel, for the Havana meeting. It operates 27 hotels in Cuba with 12,570 rooms. By 2020, it hopes to be running 38 hotels on the island with 15,548 rooms." (Ibid.).  The event had the blessing of the Cuban state apparatus.
Cuban tourism officials also joined the Havana media day, distributing guidebooks and promotional materials with the slogan “la vives, la amas” (you live it, you love it), and took American journalists on a tour of Old Havana and Central Havana. (Ibid.).
This suggests the extent of the worry within Cuba of the potential effects of the U.S. actions. Yet that worry appears insubstantial enough to produce breakthroughs, even secret ones, between the two states with respect to the "sonic attacks." Yet what emerges from the reporting by Ms. Whitefield is the confused state of play in both U.S. Cuba relations and they way they are playing out in the tourist sector under the shadow of the "Affair of the Sonic Weapons Attack."  The Americans have walked back some of the Obama era engagement initiatives, but have not walked back all that many.  The new restrictions--when carefully applied--produce substantial loopholes that effectively change less than they  appear to (see, e.g., here). The Sonic Weapons Attack supplies ammunition for a rhetoric that produces travel warning and recommendations, but no stronger measures.  The U.S. warns but does nothing to make it harder for the U.S. travel sector to seek to enhance Cuba travel even by working closely with the Cuban state. The Cubans continue to meet with their American counterparts even as they publicly mock the America position on the Sonic Weapons Attack. The scope of the injuries caused by the "mysterious" agency expands--though only mildly and intermittently. 
 
(Pix REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghin from Marc Frank,  Trump casts pall on inauguration of U.S. statue of Marti in Cuba, Reuters Jan. 28, 2018)
And the symbols of that new relationship between the U.S. and Cuba were nicely captured in the recent dedication ceremony in Havana of the copy of a statue of Jose Martí on horseback moments before his death, whose donation had been organized by the Bronx Museum of Arts after the 2014 announcement of  U.S. Cuba rapprochement (reported in Marc Frank, Trump casts pall on inauguration of U.S. statue of Marti in Cuba, Reuters Jan. 28, 2018). "The original statue, sculpted by Anna Hyatt Huntington in 1958, was erected on the south end of Central Park and was a gift from the Cuban people before the Communist takeover of 1959." (Reuven Blau," Cuba gets statue of national hero Jose Marti from Bronx Museum of the Arts,"  New York Daily News (Jan. 28, 2018) ).
Just a few years ago, the hundreds gathered for the event overseen by Cuban President Raul Castro would have been in a celebratory mood, but the brief ceremony at daybreak in Havana’s colonial district was a sober affair. . . . Throughout Sunday’s event, Castro and other officials sat stone-faced. “I was hoping for a party, but since I arrived yesterday, we have all been commiserating over the situation,” said a banker who donated to the $2.5 million project and asked for anonymity. . . . A handful of U.S. politicians and many more businessmen and representatives from the arts and Cuban-American community attended the event, which marked the 165th anniversary of Marti’s birth. Joseph Mizzi, chairman of the museum’s board of trustees, said the statue symbolized the friendship between the people of both countries. A letter was read from New York Mayor Bill de Blasio stating his city was proud of its friendship with Cuba. Marc Frank, Trump casts pall on inauguration of U.S. statue of Marti in Cuba, supra.).
Trade, statecraft, human casualties in the name of advancing interests in international relations, and the strategic use of mass media and the levers of hard and soft power all mark the Affair.  There is likely more to come, though it is hard to imagine a direction other than one that leads to exhaustion by repetition and disclosures of marginal tidbits. It is what is going on behind the scenes that produce the seemingly contradictory public actions of the actors that would be far more interesting.  


Viewing all 3362 articles
Browse latest View live