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"In the Shadow of Empires—Latin American Perceptions of Development and International Law"-- Presentation at the ASIL 2019 Annual Conference

March 26, 2019, 7:02 pm
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The Minorities in International Law Interest Group (MILIG), of which I am a member, will host a panel at the upcoming ASIL Annual Meeting on Thursday, March 28 from 09:00 AM - 10:30 AM (Columbia 11-12). The session is entitled “Diverse Perspectives on the Impact of Colonialism in International Law.” . More information on the panel HERE. ASIL 2019: Minorities in International Law Interest Group (MILIG) Panel--“Diverse Perspectives on the Impact of Colonialism in International Law”
This post includes the PowerPoints of my presentation, In the Shadow of Empires—Latin American Perceptions of Development and International Law, discussing the legacy of the Spanish Imperial system and its organization of relations in the context of Latin American regionalism and on Latin American relations with European powers, the United States and China. They follow below.





















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Brief Thoughts on the 2019 Grotius Lecture at the ASIL Annual Meeting: Martti Koskenniemi, "Enchanted by the Tools? International Law and Enlightenment"

March 28, 2019, 11:29 am
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It was with great anticipation that I attended the 2019 Grotius Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law.  This year's speaker, Martti Koskenniemi was bound to deliver insights not quite orthodox, even as they adhered to the spirit of orthodoxy in a loving kind of way.  He did not disappoint. 

Professor Koskenniemi's lecture, entitled, Enchanted by the Tools? International Law and Enlightenment, played with and against the theme of the 2019 ASIL Conference--International Law as an Instrument, as well as against the orthodoxies it was meant to underline, well brought out by Mónica Pinto of the University of Buenos Aires in her ASIL Assembly Keynote Address: International Law as an Instrument: Dialogues, Tensions, and Accomplishments. 

Both addresses are worth considerable reflection. I can only hope that they might be made available in the future.  What follows are a few very brief personal reflections on the reactions they elicited .


First, Koskenniemi's talk was woven with the thread of historical contingency.  I could not help thinking about the remarks as an application, in a very specific context, of Ibn Khadun's notions of historical cyclicity, not as imitation (there was a rejection of the error that one is doomed to repeat history precisely).  Rather it was a nod toward the patterns of human behaviors that was refreshing, especially against the premise of orthodoxy that is still considerably invested in progress and culmination. 

Second, I heard the remarks as a sort of nostalgic silver age look back at a embers (the heat of which could still be felt) of a golden age. The apogee of that golden age was the 1990s.  One can understand that view. The flush of possibility (and the arrogance, intellectual and otherwise) was that unleashed in an era when it was possible to surmise that anything was possible with the projection of a set of normative positions that then seemed both eternal and universally embraced (at least by the people who count) was then irresistible. But all of its great promise--some realized or on the road to realization--now seems ever more remote in an age of resistance, and of exhaustion.

Third, that notion of exhaustion was also palpable.  There was a sense of intellectual exhaustion, of political exhaustion, and of cultural exhaustion in the face of a resistance borne of the relentless reminder of the abyss (one common to all projects of this kind, but no matter) between the promise of international law's normative regimes, and the realities of its implementation, especially in those "lecturing states" whose example showed its failures rather than its possibilities. 

Fourth, cynicism appears to color the instrumentalist golden thread that serves as the weft for the weaving that is this silver age of international law's project.  Professor Koskenniemi did not embrace cynicism so much as acknowledge its power to drive international law's project. And yet that acknowledgment itself suggested both the connection between cynicism and instrumentalism, but also the corroding effect of cynical instrumentalism on the normative warp of the international law project's normative weave.

Fifth, there is a short road from cynicism to fear. . . .or at least worry.  And indeed, the sense of fear--well hidden behind the elegantly turned phrases that marked the lecture--bubbles just beneath its surface.   There is a fear that we have not moved from a golden to a silver age, but rather that the entire multi-century project is itself in peril. There is a fear, as well, that the project will become something a a zombie (and thus the wefting quality of cynicism in the international law project.  That is,  there is a fear that the instruments of international law will lose entirely their normative bearings; and so shorn of its principles, become useful to any group for any ends. Instrumentalism owes no allegiance and serves equally any master with the will and capacity to wield it.


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At the ASIL 2019 Annual Meeting: Matthew Erie on the Belt and Road Initiative--Six Key Points (Plus One of My Own)

March 30, 2019, 2:30 pm
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One of the last panels I attended of the 2019 Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (ASIL) (Conference Theme: International Law as an Instrument), entitled Asia's Response to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy  was organized by the Pacific Rim Region Interest Group.  As is customary the focus of the panel was the reaction-response to the recently announced US "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy advanced by the Trump administration since 2018.  The panel's Concept Note explained:
In 2018, the Trump Administration declared the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy as the new U.S. policy on Asia. The new Indo-Pacific strategy is expected to have far-reaching implications for U.S.-Asia relations. This roundtable will explore some of those issues, in particular, the impact of mega-free trade agreements and South China Sea disputes on international trade. Participants will discuss the extent to which international law facilitates or hinders US trade goals; the legal and political responses to U.S. policy available to nations in the Asia-Pacific Region; how recent diplomatic developments in China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) might serve as a counter-balance towards perceived U.S. unilateralism; and whether alternative strategies, such as the CPTPP, the RCEP and the Belt and Road Initiative, might shape international law and commercial transactions.
The focus of this post is on the marvelous presentation of one of the panelists, Matthew Erie,  an Associate Professor of Modern Chinese Studies and Associate Research Fellow of the Socio-Legal Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. Professor Erie spoke to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. After bringing his audience up to date on developments in BRI and then offered a quite useful six point structure for approaching BRI study. It is to those points that this post turns below--plus one of my own.



(Source World Bank Group)

It has only been in the last several years that the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (previously known as the One Belt One Road Strategy) came into sharp focus for Western elites.  As has been the practice of those elites (in government as well as its intelligentsia) the original announcement by Xi Jinping in 2013 was dismissed or diminished as either sloganeering, grandstanding or as ideologically motivated daydreaming.  Yet it has become real enough, and one deeply interlinked with a number fo other Chinese initiatives to expand its footprint in the global economic order, as well as to develop a means of asserting leadership in the shaping of the ideology of trade and economic interactions among states.  (e.g. Reflections on Shen Wei: "One Belt One Road Initiative and Beyond in the Context of (Anti-) Globalization").

What Professor Erie offers us is a quite useful framework for thinking through issues around the BRI as it continues to develop. These he divides into six distinct points:

1. BRI is not one thing.
Professor Erie noted the many parts of BRI, as well as its many faces.  The differences between the "belt" portion of the BRI initiative and its "road" element is important, and now underlined in the way in which the BRI courts have been established (seem, e.g., here, and here).   Equally important are the differences in the ways in which these belts and road smay be constructed within the context of the needs and practices of the specific parties.  The Europeans, for example, believe that they might be best suited for the exportation of their view of human rights  and rule of law--the connectivity  principle tends to highlight that --and in a way that replicated EU approaches to dealings with other Marxist Leninist states, principally Cuba (on which I have written here:The EU to the Rescue of the Cuban Economy? the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA)). Likewise the differences between the construction of BRI for distinct portions of South East Asia (Myanmar-Cambodia-Thailand versus Philippines-Indonesia).


2. BRI is fundamentally bi-lateral.
BRI is a creature of BITs--one which, ironically appears to have generated imitation (as a form of flattery, or potential effectiveness?) in the construction of the America First policy.  This is not the sort of multilateralism so near and dear to Western elites (and the states they might have been better at influencing before 2017). And, indeed, BRI can be quite useful as a platform for understanding the evolution of the structures of globalization post Washington Consensus Models.  But it also suggests points of challenge for those putting this initiative together, and thereafter, managing it.  Surely there is an ideology that is meant to hold this together (and thus my modest contribution as point 7 below).  And yet here is a system that is neither anarchic, nor designed in the traditional manner. This framing point also suggests the underlying premise of Professor Srie's organizing principles, the tension inherent in the model between fragmentation and harmonization, one that becomes clearer in the next set of organizing points .

3. BRI exists within a host of parallel institutions.
BRI  cannot be studied or understood as existing in some sort of glorious isolation.  Chinese approaches to governance makes such a possibility implausible (and I am being kind here). In many ways, BRI reflects the patterns of organization of both the Chinese state apparatus, and its Party structures.  Much can be learned by considering these organizations for political culture clues about the way that BRI necessarily might be conceived and the limits of imagination  for responses to challenges as they come up. Most are well aware of the relationship between the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRI. But links to Chinese Sovereign wealth Funds (and the overseas investment banks they control), for example, have yet to be explored.



4. BRI is as much about the rule of soft law instruments as it is a creature of public international law.
Professor Erie rightly emphasized the centrality of multiple governance modalities int he construction of BRI.  Critical among them, he suggested, were Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs).  Its central importance in the expansion of BRI to Old World G7 states is immense.  And indeed, just as the ASIL Conference was starting the much anticipated announcement of Italy's participation in BRI was made (March 24, 2019), memorialized through an MOU ("China and Italy signed here Saturday a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to jointly advance the construction of the Belt and Road during Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to the country."here).  I leave the irony of these MOUs both to others for the moment, and to a reflection of the value of Professor Erie's points 1 and 2, but even more so that quite distinct possibility that the two sides are speaking past each other, using the same words to mean quite different things  (e.g., "The two sides reiterated their commitment to promote multilateralism and maintain the international system with the United Nations at its core."here).

5. BRI serves as a framework for extending legal harmonization based on its core premises.
Professor Erie pointed to the enforcement of judgments as an important example of this point, though not its only one. Soft mechanisms are also potent instruments.  China has become quite adept at hosting any number of organizations and meetings through which a binding framework, and the socialization of the members of those initiatives, might be undertaken effectively.  In this context both the World Enforcement Conference, and the annual BRI Forums (2017 communiqué here) are quite important. . 


6. BRI also serves as  a site within which diversity within unity may be practiced.
This is the flip side of legal harmonization, but also intimately connected to that harmonization,.  One cannot understand BRI without embracing simultaneously its tendencies toward harmonization and fragmentation.  Professor Erie provided examples: the diversification of dispute resolution fora and institutions (centering on those of Hong Kong, Singapore and perhaps Kuala Lumpur), the creation of two BRI courts, and the development of lively markets for dispute resolution around BRI issues. 

Professor Erie concluded with the insight that though BRI is now a complex organism with many moving parts, the heart of the enterprise, and the core of its development, is still centered in the Asia Pacific region.  It is likely that innovations will be rolled out here before they are generalized for the system--with the usual contextual variations, and modifications for the belt versus road, versus (eventually) space paths all of which eventually will lead to (and maybe through) Beijing. It is there that the core fashioning of the relationship between unity and fragmentation may be worked out.

To these six framing points I have been tempted to add a seventh:

7. BRI is driven as much by ideological principles as they might be by economic or political calculation. 
To understand BRI one must first understand the evolving ideology of Chinese Marxist Leninism, and the way in which those evolving principles are then operationalized as policy through the guidelines and policies developed within the Chinese Communist Party for implementation by the state apparatus.  BRI is a deeply ideological project.  It is tied deeply to changing conceptions of the fundamental contradiction facing Chinese society (after the 19th CPC Congress); it is tied even more deeply to the changing trajectories of the fundamental "reform and opening up" principles developed during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and now significantly developed further through the ideological work of the CPC under the guidance of Xi Jinping as the Party "core."  To think about BRI in Western terms is to miss critical elements  of the Initiative and more importantly, to fail to understand the nature of its character and its sense of itself today and going forward.

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Part 12: What is the (Cuban idea of) Revolution? Differences with China (Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite)

March 31, 2019, 8:16 am
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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2017 (Viñales))


In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years series theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite. 

This Post includes Part 12: What is the (Cuban idea of) Revolution? Differences with China.

Index of posts in this series HERE. 












Part 12: What is the (Cuban idea of) Revolution? Difference with China
Flora Sapio


Press reporting of renewal of the biotechnology cooperation MoU between Cuba and China raise the question of whether the Island is embarking on a course of economic reform reminiscent of the one Deng Xiaoping launched in 1978.

Official Cuban narrations of the renewal of the MoU are punctuated with terms reminiscent of China’s policy of reform and opening up to the outside world (gaige kaifang). Any reference, however remote, to the policy of reform and opening up, and its most recent incarnation as the OBOR in turn opens up questions about the theoretical development of Caribbean Marxism-Leninism.

The “PCC’ engagement with its own founding ideology” may have well “become ossified”. After all, the Conceptualización synthetizes the thought of Fidel Castro, rather than further developing the “basic normative framework” of Cuban Marxism-Leninism. The specific stance kept towards the founding ideology of the República de Cuba– i. e. ossified rather than flexible – is however entirely distinct from the features inherent to that ideology. An ideology may display significant elements of flexibility and adaptability, and yet comparisons can sometimes obscure the existence of these elements.

The toughest nut to crack is, of course, the one related to the notion of socialist market economy. In China, the notion of socialist market economy is a core component of the idea of ‘reform and opening up’ (gaige kaifang). Reform and opening up, in turn, is part of the Basic Line of the Communist Party of China during the initial stage of Socialism:

中国共产党在社会主义初级阶段的基本路线是：领导和团结全国各族人民，以经济建设为中心，坚持四项基本原则，坚持改革开放，自力更生，艰苦创业，为把我国建设成为富强民主文明和谐美丽的社会主义现代化强国而奋斗。

The combination between two distinct modes of economic management – market and central planning – is not unique to China. The presence of the State as one of the actors in economic governance processes is an undeniable feature of the global economic system as it exists in reality, rather than in books. In most systems, the existence of the State side by side with other actors – private entrepreneurs, multi-national corporations, not-for-profit entities – is a given fact.

Chinese Marxism-Leninism, however, has gradually elevated an economic system where multiple actors co-exist from a mere fact to one of the components of the Basic Line of the CCP.

Under the premises of Cuban Marxism-Leninism, a diversified economic systemcannot become a component of the basic line of the Communist Party of Cuba. In Cuban Marxism-Leninism a notion of ‘basic line’ analogous to the one created by the Chinese Communists is simply absent. The minimum common denominator of Cuban Marxism-Leninism is given not by the conceptually composite architecture of a ‘basic line’, but by the Revolución and by attitudes towards the  Revolución. Under this light, a diversified economic system can at best be a means to sustain and continue the Revolución, but never arise to the rank of first principle, overshadowing the  Revolución. Only four attitudes are possible towards the Revolution: (a) opposition, in the words of Fidel a total identification with “imperialism and imperialism’s policies” and a denial of the fundamental role of the Revolution; (b) neutrality; (c) support; (d) indifference.

In China, notions of socialist market economy filled the ideological abyss that opened itself up at the end of the Cultural Revolution. The leftist mistakes of Chen Boda and Lin Biao had produced interpretation of the Revolution (geming) that activated its potential of destruction, more than its possibilities of renewal. The Gang of Four understood the Revolution as a mean to sweep away  ‘earthbound spirits and deities’ (guishen), old customs, habits, cultures, and ideas, rather than as an end in itself. To them, the end to achieve was the realization of a Communist society. The responsibility for the existence of old habits and customs was flatly laid on traditional Chinese culture itself. The self-loathing of one of the richest and longest-lived cultures of the world had begun much earlier, at the hands of China’s reformist elités active between the 18th and 19th Centuries. Such a loathing for China’s traditional culture, couples with seeing the Revolution as a mere mean to an end allowed destruction as the only possibility.

Cuba could not blame its own weakness and backwardness on Cuban traditional culture.  After the almost total extermination of the Taíno people by the Spanish conquistadores, the Island became home to a population composed by diverse communities of immigrants, and African slaves. Cuba’s weakness and backwardness resulted from a lack of control over the economy by the national elités.

The concept of Revolución admitted of efforts to control Cuba’s economy for and on behalf of the dispossessed. Control over the economy had the goal to end the exploitation of man by man, or by non-human factors such as abstract principles of economic or bureaucratic performance. Therefore, from a broader temporal perspective, Cuba’s attempt at developing Cuban Marxism-Leninism by reviving the economy is perfectly natural. It is a continuation of the Revolución. Equally justifiable is the attempt to maintain control through the instrument of economic planning. Yet ironically certain levers of a market economy, if placed in the hands of the State, can allow a much more detailed and precise control over domestic and transnational economic activity.

The Cuban concept of Revolución if not suitably interpreted and acted upon can indeed lead to stagnation rather than dynamism. But, it does not lend the side to the same ‘ultra-leftist’ interpretations as those of the Gang of Four.

What led China to expunge notions of Revolution from its foundational documents, replace them with notions of ‘socialist market economy’, and re-evaluate its traditional heritage were ‘ultra-leftist’ interpretations of the Revolution. Those interpretations were possible in China, but not in Cuba. The Cuban Revolución was and it is still sustained by a deep vein of humanism, and a positive appreciation of the hybrid culture created by each one of the successive waves of immigrants and slaves. Self-abasement before the technological and military superiority of adversaries were never part of the complex engine of the Cuban Revolution. Neither was the Social-Darwinist idea that only the ‘fittest’ are entitled to survival. That specific idea may have seduced  intellectual elités and provided a short-cut to national revolutions elsewhere, but not in Cuba.

In Cuba, the Revolución maintains its role as the one and only first principle of Caribbean Marxism, everything else being either a creation of the Revolution, or a means to sustain and continue the Revolution.

The unique role the Revolución  plays in Cuban Marxism-Leninism is acknowledged by the very first sentence of the Estatutos del PCC. Before being the highest expression of the united will of the Cuban people, the PCC is the genuine fruit of the Revolution (es fruto genuino de la Revolución). By contrast, the Communist Party of China is the “vanguard of the Chinese proletarian class, at the same time it is the guardian of the Chinese People and of the Chinese Nation, it is the leading core of the cause of Socialism with Chinese characteristics (…). If the Communist Party of China was founded in 1921, before the launch of armed struggle, the Communist Party of Cuba came into existence only six years after Fidel Castro’s triumphal march on Havana.

The Cuban engagement with its own ideology is a process of reflection on the Revolución.  The Lineamientos were drafted to delineate the economic and social policy of the Party and the Revolution. If the Revolution had already traced its own successful path, producing the birth of the Communist Party of Cuba, then a theoretical referent for the Revolution is perhaps not necessary. Because the Revolution, as the Mother of the Party, already contains within itself the seeds of all future possibilities.

What is needed, they believe, is the central necessity of forging the tools necessary to delineate the path of economic and social development that can best sustain the Revolution. To Fidel, only national revolutions that maintained a close coherence with the basic principles and norms of Marxism-Leninism and of Socialism could provide a credible model to other countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Those basic norms and principles were inviolable, and provided the sole basis of support to a real revolutionary leadership, because they were created by the Revolution.

Accordingly, the principles of the Revolution provide the line of ethical conduct to be followed by Cuban cadres (Lineamientos, para 63). The full development of human beings – rather than the full development of economic indicators – itself consolidates the Revolution (Lineamientos, para 116), and justifies a reconceptualization of Cuba’s Model of Economic and Social Socialist Development.

The Conceptualización is itself a daughter of the Revolution, because the Revolution provides its fundamental basis (basamento esencial). But it is also the incarnation of a sort opf vanguard that started with a military victory and only then assumed the ideological characteristics of a party in power.

But, what is the Revolution as a discursive trope, then?

Revolución es sentido del momento histórico;
es cambiar todo lo que debe ser cambiado;
es igualdad y libertad plenas;
es ser tratado y tratar a los demás como seres humanos;
es emanciparnos por nosotros mismos y con nuestros propios esfuerzos;
es desafiar poderosas fuerzas dominantes dentro y fuera del ámbito social y nacional;
es defender valores en los que se cree al precio de cualquier sacrificio;
es modestia, desinterés, altruismo, solidaridad y heroísmo;
es luchar con audacia, inteligencia y realismo;
es no mentir jamás ni violar principios éticos;
es convicción profunda de que no existe fuerza en el mundo capaz de aplastar la fuerza de la verdad y las ideas.

Revolución es unidad, es independencia, es luchar por nuestros sueños de justicia para Cuba y para el mundo, que es la base de nuestro patriotismo, nuestro socialismo y nuestro internacionalismo.

[Revolution is a sense of the historical moment;
it is changing everything that must be changed;
it is full equality and freedom;
it is to be treated and treat others as human beings;
it is emancipating ourselves and our own efforts;
it is to challenge powerful dominant forces within and outside the social and national sphere;
it is to defend values in which it is created at the price of any sacrifice;
it is modesty, disinterest, altruism, solidarity and heroism;
it is to fight with audacity, intelligence and realism;
it is never to lie or violate ethical principles;
It is a deep conviction that there is no force in the world capable of crushing the force of truth and ideas.

Revolution is unity, it is independence, it is fighting for our dreams of justice for Cuba and for the world, which is the basis of our patriotism, our socialism and our internationalism.]

It is an idea, a poem, a vision, a truth--in search of facts.

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Call for Sessions and Papers; 8th UN Forum for Business and Human Rights--"Time to act: Governments as catalysts for business respect for human rights"

March 31, 2019, 8:55 am
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Call for session proposals for 8th UN Forum on #BizHumanRights (25-27 Nov 2019) has now been circulated. Further information may be found HERE.

This year's theme moves us back from the enterprise and form remedies--a focus of the last several years, to that most troublesome partner in the Three Pillar structure fo the UNGPs--the state (in all its glory): Time to act: Governments as catalysts for business respect for human rights⁦‪@WGBizHRs‬⁩⁦‪@BHRJournal‬⁩⁦‪@BHRRC‬⁩⁦‪@corpjust‬⁩⁦‪@AfricanACCA‬⁩⁦‪@OHCHRAsia‬⁩.

This ought not to come as a great surprise--it may be time to speak to the convergence of the UNGP and the Comprehensions Treaty processes.  It may also be time to consider how enterprises and NGOs can also act as a catalyst for state duty to protect human rights in the context of economic activity.  And indeed, as I have noted before (here), it is hard for states to serve as catalysts for much of anything when they can't get their own houses in order. But of course some states are leading by example--and that is likely the point of the focus.  As for the rest, well there is a lot to speak to beyond the usal fall back of extraterritorial projection of standards from the usual suspects (and now increasingly through the Belt and Road Initiative) from China as well.  In that context the Forum should provide a venue for rich discussion.    

As a side note, it is unfortunate that the dates selected immediately precede US Thanksgiving.  But of course, perhaps the Americans who can most actively participate, especially in the increasingly important post Forum conferences, may find this holiday inconsequential, a cultural stance then reflected by the leadership. A pity.

In any case I hope many of you will be inspired to submit proposals.  As most know, barely a small fraction of proposals are accepted, and of these most wind up being creatures of consolidation of multiple proposals. This year will be worse because of construction at the venue site.  The organizers have indicated that no more than 2000 persons will be able to participate in 2019.  Still, the conference theme should serve to energize--perhaps it is time to act; perhaps it is time to serve as catalyst; and perhaps the interrogation of the state and its failures to do either except as it suits them from time to time might be a perfect place to start.

And don't forget about SNAPSHOT PRESENTATIONS (as a side note I may be able to host these myself--more on that later). 

Links to more information and the Concept Note follows below. 


About the Forum

The UN annual Forum on Business and Human Rights is the global platform for stock-taking and lesson-sharing on efforts to move the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights from paper to practice. As the world’s foremost gathering in this area, it provides a unique space for dialogue between governments, business, civil society, affected groups and international organizations on trends, challenges and good practices in preventing and addressing business-related human rights impacts. The first Forum was held in 2012. It attracts more than 2,000 experts, practitioners and leaders for three days of an action- and solution-oriented dialogue.

The Forum was established by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011  “to discuss trends and challenges in the implementation of the Guiding Principles and promote dialogue and cooperation on issues linked to business and human rights, including challenges faced in particular sectors, operational environments or in relation to specific rights or groups, as well as identifying good practices” (resolution 17/4, paragraph 12).
The Forum addresses all three pillars of the Guiding Principles:
  • The State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation and adjudication;
  • The corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which a business is involved; and
  • The need for access to effective remedy for rights-holders when abuse has occurred, through both judicial and non-judicial grievance mechanisms.
The Forum is guided and chaired by the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights and organized by its Secretariat at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).
Date and location: 25-27 November 2019, Geneva (Switzerland)
Concept note: Concept note now available
Participation: Information on participation
Call for proposals: Call for session proposals now open

Call for "snapshot proposals" now open
Get involved:Submit information on government implementation of the UN Guiding Principles
Follow us on Twitter for updates:@WGBizHRs
Hashtag:#UNForumBHR / #bizhumanrights
Contact:forumbhr@ohchr.org

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The Forum is open to all relevant stakeholder groups, including States, the wider UN system, intergovernmental and regional organizations, businesses, trade unions, national human rights institutions, non-governmental organizations, and affected stakeholders, among others. Since the first Forum in 2012 participation has grown every year, reaching more than 2,700 registrations in 2018. Due to ongoing building works at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and limits of venue capacity, participation will be capped at around 2,000 participants for the 2019 event. All participants must register online. The registration form will be made available on this web page in due course. The Forum organizers will strive to achieve balanced participation between women and men and between relevant stakeholder groups and geographic regions. Parties interested in participating when registering must indicate their organizational affiliation, job title, nationality, place of work, and clearly state how participation in the Forum may benefit their work. Due to the space limitations, only a very limited number of externally-organized (non-UN) parallel sessions or side events can be accommodated. The same applies to space available for the “snapshot” presentation tracks organized at the 2017 and 2018 Forums.Beyond the proposals for sessions, the Forum organizers welcome any other suggestions for the programme. Ideas and suggestions can be sent to forumbhr@ohchr.org.

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Time to act: Governments as catalysts for business respect for human rights

A key message from the 2018 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights was that governments must step up their action and leadership. Currently, they are not doing enough to meet their duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse. While important legal developments are evolving in some jurisdictions,and the number of countries developing national action plans on business and human rights continuesto grow, the effectiveness of current efforts and the lack of wider action are being called into question.

The lack of government leadership, reflected in governance gaps and a lack of policycoherence at all levels –national, regional and global –remains a fundamental challengeto ensuring that the human rights and dignity of all are upheld in the context of business activities. These gaps have been a recurrent theme at all Forumssince thefirst edition in 2012, and a key reason for the development of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which provide the main reference for Forum discussions.

At the Forum, civil society organizations, affected stakeholders and business alike have called on States to step up action, through strengthened regulation, improvedpolicy coherence, and through leading by example in the various roles States have as economic actors.

The 2019 Forum will focus on the need for allgovernments to demonstrate progress, commitments and plans in implementing the State duty to protectand strengthening accountability. As the Guiding Principles clarify, ensuring access to effective remedy is also a part of the State duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse, and discussions on government action need to address the full spectrum of measures from prevention to remediation.

The Forum agenda will look at what governments need to do to foster business respect for human rights, including by getting their own house in order and by setting clear expectations and creating incentives for responsible business conduct. In doing so, the agenda will consider the Guiding Principles’ call for “asmart mix of measures–national and international, mandatory and voluntary, incentives and sanctions –to foster business respect for human rights” and what this can mean in practice.

2019 Forum topics

Potential topics and agenda items under this theme mayinclude:

Lessons from current legislative and policy efforts to drive corporate human rights due diligence and how to create incentives that work

Lesson from other relevantfields, such as anti-corruption and environmental protection

What outside push and pull is needed to get States to act to address gaps in human rights protection

Lessons from recent developments and efforts to improve access to effective remedy for business-related human rights abuse

Lessons from business action in situations where the State is failing or absent, such as in relation to attacks on human rights defenders and in conflict contexts, and how to scale up good practice

Practical ways of improvingpolicy coherence across Government ministries and departments

Overcoming legal obstacles to collective action

Ways of improving policy coherence in multilateral fora that deal with development, trade, investment and financeImproving the performance of States in their roles as economic actor (in the context of SOEs, institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds, development finance, trade promotion, public procurement)

Developments in public sector finance practice on remediation

Strengtheningregional “races to the top” on business and human rights

Bringing the State back in to make multi-stakeholder initiatives more effective

What does the State duty to protect against business-related human rights abuse mean in practical policy and “smart mix” of measures –for both home and host States as well as for collective action–inthe context of key current issues such as:
-the continuous tragedy of dam failures
–through better prevention, accountability and remedy-large-scale infrastructure development projects-extraterritorial regulation
-the gig economy
-protecting the rights of migrant labour
-artificial intelligence-climate change, business and human rights
-engaging SMEs-regulating the informal sector-safeguarding the rights of groups at risk-rethinking business models that work for society
-how to build sustainable peace and reconstruction in countries emerging from conflict and fragility and address corporate crimes
-public-private partnerships to realize sustainable development goals

Integrating gender and greater attention to the rights of women across State and business action

From the perspective of human rights defenders and affected rights holders(including worker representatives, indigenous peoples’ representatives, affected community representatives), what changes in government and business practice need to happen?

__________




“Snapshot” presentations

The 2017 and 2018 Forums featured tracks with “snapshot” presentations of practice examples and experiences, tools, and new research.

Due to the space limitations for the 2019 event, only a limited number of such presentations may be included in the programme.  However, in order to enable wider exchange of new insights and developments, interested parties can submit 2-minute video presentations/lightning talks that may be posted on a dedicated online platform linked to the 2019 Forum. These may feature relevant new research, tools and initiatives focused on implementation of one or more of the three pillars of the Guiding Principles. In order to spur new thinking, presentations may also highlight relevant lessons from other fields (for example, anti-corruption, business ethics, development, behavioural economics). A small selection of presenters may be invited to participate in the snapshot track at the Forum.Instructions for submitting video presentations:

2-minute video file (mp4 format)
1-page attachment describing the content
Snappy presentations focused on new and forward-looking insights
Send to forumbhr@ohchr.orgby 1 June.
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Inviting submissions to track regulatory and policy trends -- BHR Forum 2019

April 1, 2019, 6:34 am
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An interesting opportunity from the Working Group. It means to foster some carefully managed dialogue between and among states and the rest of us. This has the potential to add a new and interesting layer to the business of human rights in economic activity.  Thos able to participate are encouraged to do so.  

Be aware, though that these are meant to be ultra summary reports--2 pages maximum, and that the Working Group and its staff will exercise discretion in which of the submissions it will publish.  NGOs and business should also consider alternative avenues for developing and publishing this valuable information. It is not clear that almost 8 years after the establishment of the Working Group system under the UNGP that the three critical actors--states, NGOs, and enterprises--ought to be tightly bound to any organ for the development of its work and its contribution to this important area.

Moore information below and HERE. 









The Forum provides an opportunity for dialogue with and between governments to take stock of and provide recommendations for their implementation of the State duty to protect. As part of a longer-term strategy for the Forum, the 2019 event will seek to encourage greater information sharing by governments and contribute to building a more solid evidence-base for stock-taking on trends and emerging practice.


Since 2012, Forum discussions have shed light on efforts by Governments to implement the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. However, such tracking to date has not been sufficiently systematic and comprehensive. In order to fill this gap, the 2019 Forum will initiate a survey on government implementation envisaged to be carried out at regular intervals and presented at the Forum, to help facilitate peer learning and compile information on Government action and initiatives to implement the Guiding Principles. This effort is in line with the Human Rights Council’s welcome of the Working Group’s work "to collect and disseminate information on ongoing processes to develop national action plans and other relevant data on global progress in the implementation of the Guiding Principles" and the Council’s call to invite States and all relevant stakeholders to submit information to and engage with the Working Group on their national action plans and other relevant initiatives to implement the Guiding Principles (res. 35/7, para. 5).


Previous surveys by the Working Group


Working Group page on national action plans


Tracking of State implementation by NGOs and others:

https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/government-action-platform
https://globalnaps.org/
http://www.bhrinlaw.org


In addition, in the spirit of working together and in line with the Forum mandate, all stakeholders are invited to submit brief reports on relevant legal, regulatory and policy developments at either global, regional or national levels. Published submissions will be posted either by country or by region, or under global developments. The deadline for submissions is 10 September.


All governments are encouraged to participate in the implementation survey that will be disseminated in the first half of 2019. Governments may also submit brief country reports on their implementation efforts. Governments may submit their reports on an ongoing basis.


Submissions will help inform several Forum sessions, including the sessions focused on trends and challenges in each of the UN regions.

Guidance for submissions on State implementation:

Guidance for State reports:
  • focus on efforts to implement the Guiding Principles
  • max 2 pages
  • submitted in one of the UN languages
  • the aim is to encourage such reporting on a yearly basis in order to enable continued and systematic tracking of implementation efforts.
Guidance for submissions by other stakeholders:
  • Submissions should be based on credible, specific, reliable, objective, well-documented information relating to pillar I, II and III developments on global, regional or national level
  • Focused on legal, regulatory, policy developments
  • Submissions should not be focused on individual cases, and should be solution-oriented
  • Max 2 pages
  • Preferably in English, or in French or Spanish
  • The Working Group will exercise discretion on publication
  • Submissions are posted as received, and not edited
All submissions should be sent to forumbhr@ohchr.org.
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Italy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) From a Historical and European Context: Reading Flora Sapio: La Querelle sull’Italia nella Nuova Via della Seta. Cronaca di Un’Adesione Annunciata… 40 anni fa ["The Family Fight About Italy in the New Silk Road: A Chronicle of an Agreement Announced ... 40 years ago"]

April 2, 2019, 1:51 pm
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Recently there was much coverage of the visit to Italy of Xi Jinping and the execution of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two countries that appeared to some to signal a new relationship between Italy and China (English language coverage here, here, here, here, and here).  This move, in turn, had some people worrying about the possibility that Italy was now moving into the orbit of the Chinese economic empire usually denominated as the Belt and Road Initiative.

Of course, hysteria of that sort plays well in the management of the masses in all countries concerned.  But as Flora Sapio suggests, in a essay recently published (in Italian), La Querelle sull’Italia nella Nuova Via della Seta. Cronaca di Un’Adesione Annunciata… 40 anni fa ["The Family Fight About Italy in the New Silk Road: A Chronicle of an Agreement Announced  ... 40 years ago"], that the realities of Chinese trade with Italy specifically, and Europe in general is a far more complicated and nuanced affair. The question isn't so much about trade, but about both the structures within which trade occurs and the discourse within with its principles are developed and applied. And, indeed, it is only then that one might be able to speak to trade as a political, social, and moral enterprise. These are tasks that await us all even as the two largest economies of Earth work diligently to makes facts on the ground with respect to all of this, and the rest of us struggle to catch up.  

I have reposted the original essay (Italian) along with my crude English translation below.  The original may be accessed HERE. 


La Querelle sull’Italia nella Nuova Via della Seta. Cronaca di Un’Adesione Annunciata… 40 anni fa
Flora Sapio:

Le visite in Italia di alte personalità politiche della Repubblica Popolare Cinese non sono una novità. Pur senza voler rievocare la lunga storia dei rapporti commerciali tra l’Italia e la Cina, la storia più recente vede i due paesi legati a doppio filo da circa quarant’anni. Nell’aprile del 1978 l’allora Comunità Economica Europea firmava il suo primo accordo con la Repubblica Popolare Cinese. Dopo pochi mesi l’Italia concludeva un proprio accordo culturale con la Cina.

Dopo le visite di Hua Guofeng nel 1979 e di Zhao Ziyang nel 1984, proprio nel 1987 Li Xiannian – allora membro del Comitato Centrale del Partito Comunista Cinese – si recava in visita a Venezia, dove ammirava la casa di Marco Polo. La visita era compiuta in concomitanza con l’entrata in vigore del trattato bilaterale di investimento tra Italia e Cina (BIT) concluso due anni prima. A questa visita avrebbero fatto seguito le visite di Jiang Zemin e Hu Jintao – entrambi segretari generali del Partito, nonché Presidenti della Repubblica Popolare Cinese – che vedevano la conclusione di una serie di accordi volti a incrementare il commercio e gli investimenti tra i due paesi.

Nondimeno le visite di Li Xiannian, Jiang Zemin e Hu Jintao non hanno suscitato tanto scalpore quanto è stato, invece, per la visita del Presidente Xi Jinping, tenutasi a Roma e a Palermo dal 21 al 26 marzo scorso. La visita di Xi ha attratto una quantità e varietà di commenti, editoriali, interviste, analisi e pezzi di opinione senza precedenti.

L’occasione immediata per la nascita di un dibattito pubblico sui rapporti tra Italia e Cina è stata fornita dall’ingresso formale del nostro paese nella Nuova Via della Seta, sancito dalla firma di un Memorandum di Intesa.

Presentare un quadro puntuale di ciascuna delle opinioni e delle analisi sull’adesione dell’Italia alla One Road one Belt (OBOR) è impresa ardua, e non è questa l’occasione per farlo. Ma non sembra esagerato affermare che sulla firma del Memorandum di Intesa si è scatenata una vera e propria querelle.

Alle posizioni di quanti hanno sottolineato gli aspetti obiettivamente vantaggiosi dell’adesione italiana alla Nuova Via della Seta sono stati contrapposti timori, scetticismi e incertezze. Più importante delle specifiche posizioni espresse nel corso del dibattito è stato l’emergere di orientamenti divergenti. Definire questi orientamenti sulla base delle categorie “pro-Cina” o “anti-Cina” non è corretto in un panorama socio-politico come quello italiano, ove l’esistenza di opinioni talvolta speculari non gioca la stessa funzione riscontrabile in altri contesti socio-politici.

Le opinioni e le vedute più ottimiste hanno posto in risalto come l’adesione dell’Italia alla Nuova Via della Seta aprirà ulteriormente il secondo mercato più grande del mondo all’export italiano, fornendo anche l’occasione di nuovi scambi accademici, culturali e artistici. Le posizioni maggiormente scettiche hanno paventato timori di squilibri nella bilancia commerciale, di un potenziale ed eccessivo indebitamento dell’Italia nei confronti della Cina, nonché di interferenze nella governance domestica. Alcuni settori dell’opinione pubblica hanno espresso delusione per la marginalità del ruolo di alcune regioni del Meridione d’Italia nel quadro degli accordi e delle trattative concluse con Pechino.

Nel complesso, il dibattito ha posto in risalto fattori di rilevanza strettamente domestica e attivi sul breve periodo. Di volta in volta la discussione pubblica sulla Nuova Via della Seta si è concentrata su sé stessa, subendo brusche virate, prima di focalizzarsi sull’attimo in cui i due Presidenti avrebbero apposto le proprie firme in calce al Memorandum di Intesa. Senza osare uno sguardo molto in là nel futuro, né voltarsi indietro verso il passato.

Queste sono solo alcune caratteristiche di un dibattito obiettivamente molto articolato e complesso, che meriterebbe uno studio attento. Le particolarità della querelle sulla Nuova Via della Seta però non vanno confuse con la  strategia del “sistema Italia” verso la Cina.

Per la Repubblica Popolare cinese la Nuova Via della Seta è una politica di respiro globale, che si gioca sul lungo periodo. Rispetto alla Nuova Via della Seta, l’Italia si muove su di un piano multilaterale, entro una prospettiva di lungo periodo.

La Via della Seta prima della Via della Seta

L’adesione dell’Italia alla Nuova Via della Seta si è sommata agli storici rapporti di cooperazione con i partner Europei e di Oltreoceano. Allo stesso modo, la firma del Memorandum di Intesa va collocata in  un tessuto di rapporti commerciali, politici e culturali, pazientemente ordito dal nostro paese fin dagli anni ‘70. La firma del Memorandum di Intesa appare come un passo coerente con uno dei percorsi che l’Italia scelse di intraprendere quarant’anni fa, cui hanno contribuito tutti i governi succedutisi dal 1978, seppur in misura e con orientamenti diversi.

Tra la fine degli anni ‘70 e i primissimi anni ‘80 lo scetticismo circa la continuità e il potenziale della Politica di Apertura e Riforma (gaige kaifang 改革开放) erano molto diffusi. L’incredulità nei confronti delle riforme lanciate da Deng Xiaoping era causata dai bruschi cambiamenti di direzione che la politica interna cinese aveva subito fin dal 1949. A scommettere sul reciproco potenziale dei rapporti con la Cina erano in pochi. L’Italia scelse di riconoscere la Repubblica Popolare Cinese nel 1970, alla vigilia di quel riavvicinamento sino-americano che avrebbe permesso di lì a poco alla Cina di entrare nelle Nazioni Unite. Già negli anni seguenti si erano sviluppati contatti per scambi commerciali e culturali.

Nel 1978 il quarto governo Andreotti aveva scelto di avviare rapporti di collaborazione scientifica, tecnica e culturale tra i due paesi. Due anni dopo, nel 1980, il nostro Presidente Sandro Pertini si recava in visita ufficiale a Pechino, dove incontrava Deng Xiaoping.

In continuità con il passato

L’avvio dei rapporti di collaborazione tra Italia e Cina ha, giorno dopo giorno, prodotto cambiamenti nelle nostre città, che gli sguardi più acuti non hanno mancato di notare. Il grande pubblico ha acquisito consapevolezza del ruolo della Cina solo negli ultimi anni, quando l’intensificazione dei flussi di investimento, commerciali e turistici ha dato al cambiamento dimensioni maggiormente visibili.

Ma già trent’anni fa, sia nelle città del Nord che nei capoluoghi del Sud, chi conduceva attività produttive, commerciali, o forniva consulenze professionali era consapevole del ruolo che la Cina si apprestava a svolgere. Né poteva dirsi all’oscuro degli eventi talvolta tragici che hanno punteggiato la storia più recente della Repubblica Popolare.
Cos’è cambiato, dunque, con l’ingresso dell’Italia nella Nuova Via della Seta?

Il Memorandum di Intesa non ha un valore giuridicamente vincolante. La firma del Memorandum si  rivela piuttosto come l’atto posto a chiosa, e a continuazione, di una fittissima serie di accordi vincolanti, che il nostro paese ha concluso con la Cina fin da prima del lancio dell’iniziativa della Nuova Via della Seta.

Anche qui, la continuità sul lungo periodo è innegabile. L’Iniziativa della Nuova Via della Seta è stata annunciata nel 2013 dal Segretario Generale del Partito Comunista Cinese Xi Jinping durante una visita ufficiale in Kazakistan. In poco meno di cinque anni, l’iniziativa ha visto l’adesione di circa 68 paesi e territori. Ma, ancor prima che l’Italia compisse l’atto formale di adesione alla Nuova Via della Seta, tra i due paesi esisteva un trattato bilaterale di investimento.

Il trattato è stato stipulato nel 1985, ed è entrato in vigore nel 1987. Il trattato è il vero fondamento dell’adesione dell’Italia alla Nuova Via della Seta. In assenza del trattato, il nostro paese non avrebbe potuto godere dello scambio commerciale, accademico, culturale e artistico con la Cina. La firma di un trattato bilaterale di investimento nel 1985 non ha precluso l’esistenza di rapporti tra l’Italia e altri paesi. Il trattato del 1985, infatti, è solo uno tra i 179 trattati bilaterali o multilaterali di investimento e/o libero scambio stipulati dall’Italia, o di cui l’Italia è parte in qualità di Membro dell’Unione Europea.

I trattati bilaterali di investimento e di libero scambio hanno l’effetto concreto di “eliminare” qualsiasi tipo di frontiera, muro, limite o confine tra due paesi. Permettono alle aziende di entrambi i paesi di commerciare e di investire liberamente nei reciproci territori, ricevendo parità di trattamento. La finalità del trattato del 1987 infatti è incoraggiare, promuovere, e proteggere gli investimenti delle aziende cinesi in Italia, e delle aziende italiane in Cina. Il trattato del 1987 stabilisce la piena uguaglianza di trattamento degli imprenditori italiani e cinesi, siano essi imprenditori privati, fondi di investimento della Repubblica Popolare Cinese, o anche imprese multinazionali di proprietà privata o dello Stato.

Quindi, con il trattato l’Italia si è impegnata a trattare gli investitori individuali o le imprese cinesi che intendono investire in Italia allo stesso modo degli investitori individuali o le imprese italiane, applicando le medesime norme di legge tanto ai soggetti cinesi quanto ai soggetti italiani. La Cina ha assunto un impegno analogo riguardo gli investitori italiani, impegnandosi a trattare gli investitori e le imprese italiane secondo le norme di legge vigenti per gli investitori e le imprese cinesi.

Il trattato, e la successiva adesione alla Nuova Via della Seta, non pregiudicano la protezione dei settori considerati strategici per l’economia nazionale italiana, e per quella cinese. In ogni caso, l’Italia mantiene il potere sovrano di poter decidere, in piena libertà, come proteggere i settori realmente strategici per la nostra sicurezza nazionale. A dimostrazione di ciò, proprio durante la visita di Xi Jinping il Presidente Mattarella firmava un decreto che aumentava i poteri di salvaguardia da utilizzare a difesa di asset strategici per l’interesse nazionale.

Italia e Cina: partner strategici dal 2004

L’esistenza di rapporti di investimento che vanno avanti dal 1987 ha permesso la formazione di un partenariato strategico tra Italia e Cina. Il partenariato è stato concluso nel 2004, nove anni prima che il Segretario Generale del Partito Comunista Cinese Xi Jinping lanciasse l’iniziativa della Nuova Via della Seta.

Lo strumento principale del partenariato strategico è il Comitato Governativo Italia-Cina. Il Comitato è presieduto dai Ministri degli Esteri del governo italiano e cinese, e ha finora tenuto ben nove riunioni. Il Partenariato Strategico è solo uno degli strumenti che l’Italia può scegliere di utilizzare per portare un contributo nazionale alla Nuova Via della Seta. Infatti, in seno al Comitato è possibile avviare tutta una serie di piani e programmi di cooperazione, coerenti con gli obiettivi della Nuova Via della Seta. L’Italia ha utilizzato queste opportunità. A titolo di esempio, cito solo alcuni degli accordi e dei piani finora varati dal Comitato:

il Piano d’Azione per il rafforzamento della cooperazione economica, commerciale, culturale e scientifico-tecnologica tra Italia e Cina 2017-2020;

il Programma Esecutivo di Cooperazione Scientifica e Tecnologica tra Italia e Cina 2016 – 2018;

la Strategia Italiana in Cina per la Scienza e la Tecnologia;

i finanziamenti alla ricerca collaborativanel quadro del Protocollo di Intesa tra il Ministero degli Affari Esteri e della Cooperazione Internazionale (MAECI) e la Federazione Nazionale Cinese per le Scienze Naturali (NSCF).

Fin dal 2004, il Partenariato Strategico ha anticipato alcune delle tematiche che sarebbero balzate agli occhi del grande pubblico solo nel marzo del 2019.

In primo luogo, il nostro paese ha preso l’impegno di coordinare le proprie politiche di governo con le politiche del governo cinese già 15 anni fa. Il coordinamento coinvolge i settori aeronautico e aerospaziale, infrastrutturale e dei trasporti, dell’energia, dell’agricoltura, della sanità, della tutela ambientale, dell’informazione, e dell’innovazione.

In secondo luogo, l’impegno dell’Italia  a rimuovere le barriere tariffarie e non tariffarie agli investimenti diretti cinesi in Italia, e all’importazione di merci cinesi ha ormai tre lustri.

In terzo luogo, la scelta del nostro paese di intensificare la cooperazione per la realizzazione di una rete di trasporto trans-europea (TEN-T), e incrementare i flussi turistici in ingresso, gli scambi culturali e scientifici, e i trasferimenti di tecnologia è stata compiuta ben prima del marzo 2019. Compiere una scelta non necessariamente implica la sua attuazione concreta, ma pone le fondamenta per una futura azione.

Le istituzioni finanziarie internazionali lungo la Nuova Via della Seta

Realizzare la visione  della Nuova Via della Seta richiede ingenti risorse finanziarie. Per reperire i capitali necessari ad attuare i progetti infrastrutturali, ma anche le iniziative volte a favorire una più stretta integrazione tra popoli, Pechino ha creato tre nuove istituzioni finanziarie internazionali: il Fondo per la Via della Seta, la Banca Asiatica per gli Investimenti in Infrastrutture e il Consorzio Interbancario dell’Associazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai.

Di queste istituzioni, e del ruolo che l’Italia gioca in esse, si è parlato poco durante la querellesul Memorandum di Intesa.

L’Italia non partecipa al Fondo per la Via della Seta, poiché questo fondo di investimento è controllato interamente dalla Repubblica Popolare Cinese. Né il nostro paese è coinvolto nell’Associazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai, poiché la cosiddetta SCO è un’organizzazione regionale, che comprende laCina, il Kazakistan, il Kirghizistan, la Russia, il Tajikistan, l’Uzbekistan, il Pakistan e l’India. Il suo Consorzio Interbancario è un’organizzazione nata per finanziare i progetti infrastrutturali realizzati dagli stati membri.

Invece, l’Italia è tra i membri della Banca Asiatica per gli Investimenti in Infrastrutture (BAII). La BAII è un’istituzione finanziaria multilaterale con sede a Pechino, composta da 68 Stati membri effettivi, e fondata nel gennaio del 2016. Si tratta di un’istituzione che finanzia progetti solo nei settori rurali, dell’energia, della protezione ambientale, dei trasporti e delle telecomunicazioni, delle risorse idriche, dello sviluppo urbano e della logistica.

Essa è partner della Banca Mondiale, e ha concluso accordi di cooperazione con istituzioni bancarie regionali nei continenti asiatico, africano, americano ed europeo. Quindi è un’istituzione finanziaria internazionale profondamente inserita nel sistema della finanza globale, e tenuta a giocare in base alla regolamentazione internazionale.

Cosa meno nota al grande pubblico, la maggior parte dei finanziamenti della BAII è rivolta ai progetti infrastrutturali realizzati nei Paesi asiatici. Solo il 15% può essere investito in progetti aventi luogo in Europa. Anche su questo tipo di investimenti esistono regole precise, che vogliono che i progetti infrastrutturali agevolino il commercio e la connettività con i Paesi asiatici, ad esempio mediante la costruzione di porti, impianti elettrici, gasdotti, oleodotti, ecc.

La BAII è governata da uno Statuto autonomo (Articles of Agreement) e da un quadro normativo interno. Lo Statuto è un trattato internazionale, che consente alla BAII di operare nel quadro del diritto internazionale, ma anche delle norme di soft law. Il quadro normativo interno della BAII è in gran parte pubblico.

Il nostro paese è diventato membro della BAII nel 2016, tre anni prima della firma del Memorandum di Intesa. Il versamento dei contribuenti italiani alla BAII ammonta a una quota in conto capitale per 2.571.800.000 dollari statunitensi. Questa quota di capitale però è stata effettivamente versata solo per il suo 20%,1) benché per il periodo 2016–2019 fosse stato previsto un onere complessivo di 515 milioni.2)


L’Italia ha acquisito solo il 2,50% dei voti presso il Consiglio di Amministrazione della BAII. Questa quota di voti è inferiore alle quote detenute dalla Germania (4,19%), Francia (3,21%), ma superiore alle quote detenute dagli altri membri dell’Unione Europea. La maggioranza dei voti presso la BAII è detenuto dalla Cina, con il 26,58%. In seconda posizione si colloca l’India, con il 7,63%, e in terza la Russia, con il 6,01% dei voti.

Il nostro paese può ottenere solo il  15 % del totale dei finanziamenti concessi dalla BAII. Questi fondi però sono da dividere con gli altri 23 membri Europei della BAII, così come deciso in base al potere di voto dei singoli Stati. Eventuali finanziamenti ottenuti dalla BAII devono essere utilizzati dalle imprese del nostro Paese per compiere investimenti infrastrutturali in Asia. Gli investimenti in Europa sono possibili solo se agevolano il commercio con altri paesi della Nuova Via della Seta, o se migliorano i collegamenti tra le rispettive infrastrutture fisiche e digitali.

Date le quote possedute dall’Italia, e le condizioni a cui possono essere concessi prestiti, la tanto paventata “trappola del debito” sembra essere molto lontana.

Conclusione: Dati, dati, dati

I timori del grande pubblico, però, non si sono concentrati sugli investimenti diretti cinesi e sui meccanismi finanziari della Nuova Via della Seta – tematiche oscure ai più. Gli scenari più pessimisti sollevati dal grande pubblico hanno paventato, analogamente ad alcune delle vedute espresse durante il dibattito domestico, un forte disavanzo delle esportazioni italiane verso la Cina.

Avere dati precisi circa i flussi di import-export tra Italia e Cina è piuttosto complesso, ma è certo che l’Italia importi dalla Cina più di quanto le nostre imprese non riescano a vendere nel gigante asiatico. O almeno tale era lo stato di cose fino a prima della firma del Memorandum di Intesa. Da mettere in conto è l’esistenza di differenze obiettive tra le dimensioni del sistema economico italiano, e quelle dell’economia cinese, ormai seconda economia del mondo.

In mancanza di dati accessibili al pubblico, completi, disaggregati per anno, regione e comparto dell’economia, un’analisi esaustiva dei flussi di investimento e di import-export non è possibile. Né è possibile formulare previsioni attendibili sull’andamento futuro dei flussi di investimento. Però è pur sempre possibile prevedere un’ulteriore intensificazione e una crescita dei rapporti instaurati 40 anni fa, nonché dei benefici che il “sistema Italia” continuerà a godere.

In definitiva, la via che ha condotto alla firma del Memorandum di Intesa è stato costruita nel tempo, passo dopo passo, da tutti gli uomini e le donne che hanno fatto la storia delle relazioni tra Italia e Cina. Se il Memorandum di Intesa invia un segnale univoco, esso indica la volontà del nostro Paese, e della Cina, di proseguire nelle relazioni che ormai mantengono da quarant’anni.
Sapio, La Querelle sull’Italia nella Nuova Via della Seta PDF
Immagine: Pertini e Deng Xiaoping nel 1980
Laureata in Scienze Politiche all’Università di Napoli l’Orientale e dottorata presso l’Università La Sapienza, Flora Sapio è esperta in politica, istituzioni e diritto della Cina contemporanea, ed ha condotto ricerche in Cina e a Hong Kong. I quattro libri di cui è autrice o curatrice sono apparsi per i tipi di Brill, Edward Elgar, Routledge e Cambridge University Press. I suoi commenti ed articoli di opinione sulla Cina, la responsabilità sociale di impresa, e le differenze tra il sistema istituzionale della Cina ed il Castro-Marxismo dei Caraibi sono disponibili su Law at the End of the Day, nonché sui blog di università britanniche ed australiane.

1. Aticolo 3, LEGGE 22 giugno 2016, n. 110 Ratifica ed esecuzione dell’Accordo istitutivo della Banca Asiatica per gli Investimenti in Infrastrutture, con Allegati, fatto a Pechino il 29 giugno 2015. (16G00122) (GU n.145 del 23-6-2016).
2. Articolo 4, LEGGE 22/2016, cit.


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The Family Quarrel About Italy in the New Silk Road: A Chronicle of an Agreement Announced  ... 40 years ago
Flora Sapio:

The visits to Italy of high political personalities of the People's Republic of China are nothing new. Without wanting to recall the long history of trade relations between Italy and China, the most recent history sees the two countries closely linked for about forty years. In April 1978 the then European Economic Community signed its first agreement with the People's Republic of China. After a few months, Italy concluded its own cultural agreement with China.

After the visits of Hua Guofeng in 1979 and Zhao Ziyang in 1984, in 1987 Li Xiannian - then a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party - visited Venice, where he admired the home of Marco Polo. The visit was carried out in conjunction with the entry into force of the bilateral investment treaty between Italy and China (BIT) concluded two years earlier. This visit was followed by visits by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao - both general secretaries of the Party and Presidents of the People's Republic of China - who oversaw the conclusion of a series of agreements aimed at increasing trade and investment between the two countries.

Nevertheless the visits of Li Xiannian, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao did not cause as much of a stir when compared to that caused by  the visit of President Xi Jinping, held in Rome and Palermo from 21 to 26 March [2019]. Xi's visit attracted an unprecedented amount and variety of comments, editorials, interviews, analyzes and pieces of opinion.

The immediate cause for the emergence of a public debate on relations between Italy and China was provided by the formal entry of our country into the New Silk Road, memorialized by the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding [between the two states with respect to BRI].

Presenting a detailed overview of each of the opinions and analyzes on Italy's accession to the One Road one Belt (OBOR [or BRI]) is a difficult task, and this is not the occasion to do so. But it does not seem an exaggeration to say that a real controversy was unleashed on the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding.

The positions of those who underlined the objectively advantageous aspects of the Italian adhesion to the New Silk Road have been opposed by fears, skepticisms and uncertainties. More important than the specific positions expressed during the debate was the emergence of divergent [ideological] orientations. Defining these orientations on the basis of the categories "pro-China" or "anti-China" is not correct in a socio-political scenario such as the Italian one, where the existence of sometimes specular opinions does not play the same function that can be found in other socio- politicians.

The most optimistic views and scenarios have highlighted how Italy's adherence to the New Silk Road will further open the world's second largest export market to Italy, also providing an opportunity for new academic, cultural and artistic exchanges. The most skeptical positions have fueled fears of trade imbalances, and of potential and excessive indebtedness of Italy towards China, as well as of [Chinese] interference in [Italian] domestic governance. Some sectors of public opinion have expressed disappointment at the marginality of the role of some regions of the South of Italy in the framework of agreements and negotiations concluded with Beijing.

Overall, the debate highlighted factors that are strictly domestic and dynamic in the short term. From time to time the public discussion on the New Silk Road has focused on itself, undergoing sharp turns, before focusing on the moment in which the two Presidents would have affixed their signatures at the end of the Memorandum of Understanding document. Without daring to look very far into the future, nor look back at the past.

These are just some of the features of an objectively very articulated and complex debate, which deserves careful study. The peculiarities of the controversy on the New Silk Road, however, should not be confused with the strategy of the "Italian system" towards China.

For the People's Republic of China, the New Silk Road is a global policy, which is played over the long term. Compared to the New Silk Road, Italy moves on a multilateral level, within a long-term perspective [of its own].

The Silk Road before the Silk Road

Italy's accession to the New Silk Road added another layer to the historic cooperation relations with European and overseas partners. Similarly, the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding must be placed in a fabric of commercial, political and cultural relations, patiently woven by our country since the 1970s. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding appears as a step consistent with one of the paths that Italy chose to undertake forty years ago, to which all the governments that have succeeded since 1978 have contributed, albeit to different extents and with different orientations.

Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s skepticism about the continuity and potential of [China’s] Opening and Reform Policy (gaige kaifang 改革开放) was widespread [in Italy]. The incredulity towards the reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping was caused by the abrupt changes of direction that Chinese domestic politics had undergone since 1949. Few people bet on the mutual potential of relations with China. Italy chose to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1970, on the eve of that Sino-American rapprochement that would allow China to enter the United Nations shortly thereafter. Already in the following years, contacts for commercial and cultural exchanges had developed.

In 1978 the fourth Andreotti government had chosen to initiate relations of scientific, technical and cultural collaboration between the two countries. Two years later, in 1980, our President Sandro Pertini paid an official visit to Beijing, where he met Deng Xiaoping.

In continuity with the past

The start of collaborative relations between Italy and China has, over time, produced changes in our cities, which one cannot fail to notice. The general public has become aware of China's role only in recent years, when the intensification of investment, commercial and tourist flows has given the change more visible dimensions.

But already thirty years ago, both in the cities of the North and in the capitals of the South, those who carried out productive and commercial activities or provided professional advice were aware of the role that China was preparing to play. Nor were they unaware of the sometimes tragic events that punctuated the most recent history of the People's Republic.

So what has changed with the entry of Italy into the New Silk Road?

The Memorandum of Understanding has no legally binding value. The signing of the Memorandum turns out to be rather the act of a commentary and a continuation of a dense series of binding agreements, which our country has concluded with China since before the launch of the New Silk Road initiative.

Here too, continuity over the long term is undeniable. The New Silk Road Initiative was announced in 2013 by the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping during an official visit to Kazakhstan. In less than five years, the initiative has seen the participation of some 68 countries and territories. But, even before Italy completed the formal act of joining the New Silk Road, a bilateral investment treaty existed between the two countries.

The treaty was signed in 1985, and entered into force in 1987. The treaty is the real foundation of Italy's adhesion to the New Silk Road. In the absence of the treaty, our country could not have enjoyed the commercial, academic, cultural and artistic exchange with China. The signing of a bilateral investment treaty in 1985 did not preclude the existence of relations between Italy and other countries. The 1985 treaty, in fact, is only one of the 179 bilateral or multilateral investment and / or free trade treaties entered into by Italy, or of which Italy is part as a Member of the European Union.

Bilateral investment and free trade treaties have the concrete effect of "eliminating" any type of border, wall, boundary or border between two countries. They allow companies from both countries to trade and invest freely in each other's territories, receiving equal treatment. The purpose of the 1987 treaty is indeed to encourage, promote, and protect the investments of Chinese companies in Italy, and of Italian companies in China. The 1987 treaty establishes the full equality of treatment of Italian and Chinese entrepreneurs, be they private entrepreneurs, investment funds of the People's Republic of China, or even privately owned or state-owned multinational companies.

Therefore, with the treaty, Italy committed itself to treating individual investors or Chinese companies that intend to invest in Italy in the same way as individual investors or Italian companies, applying the same laws to both Chinese subjects and Italian subjects . China has made a similar commitment to Italian investors, pledging to treat Italian investors and companies according to the laws in force for Chinese investors and companies.

The treaty, and the subsequent adhesion to the New Silk Road, do not affect the protection of sectors considered strategic for the Italian national economy, and for the Chinese one. In any case, Italy maintains the sovereign power to be able to decide, in full freedom, how to protect the truly strategic sectors for our national security. To demonstrate this, during the visit of Xi Jinping President Mattarella signed a decree that increased the safeguarding powers to be used to defend strategic assets for the national interest.

Italy and China: Strategic Partners Since 2004

The existence of investment relationships that have been ongoing since 1987 has allowed the formation of a strategic partnership between Italy and China. The partnership was concluded in 2004, nine years before the Chinese Communist Party Secretary General Xi Jinping launched the New Silk Road initiative.

The main instrument of the strategic partnership is the Italy-China Government Committee. The Committee is chaired by the Foreign Ministers of the Italian and Chinese government, and has so far held nine meetings. The Strategic Partnership is just one of the tools that Italy can choose to use to bring a national contribution to the New Silk Road. Indeed, within the Committee it is possible to launch a whole series of cooperation plans and programs, consistent with the objectives of the New Silk Road. Italy has used these opportunities. As an example, I quote only some of the agreements and plans so far launched by the Committee:

the Action Plan for strengthening economic, commercial, cultural and scientific-technological cooperation between Italy and China 2017-2020;

the Executive Program of Scientific and Technological Cooperation between Italy and China 2016 - 2018;

the Italian Strategy for Science and Technology in China;

funding for collaborative research in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) and the Chinese National Federation for Natural Sciences (NSCF).

Since 2004, the Strategic Partnership has anticipated some of the issues that would have become matters of public passion only in March 2019.

First, our country has made a commitment to coordinate its governmental policies with the policies of the Chinese government 15 years ago. Coordination involves the aeronautical and aerospace, infrastructure and transport, energy, agriculture, health, environmental protection, information, and innovation sectors.

Secondly, Italy's commitment to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers to Chinese direct investments in Italy, and to the importation of Chinese goods is now three decades old.

Thirdly, our country's decision to intensify cooperation for the construction of a trans-European transport network (TEN-T), and to increase incoming tourist flows, cultural and scientific exchanges, and technology transfers was completed well before March 2019. Making a choice does not necessarily imply its concrete implementation, but lays the foundation for future action.

International financial institutions along the New Silk Road

Realizing the vision of the New Silk Road requires huge financial resources. To find the capital needed to implement infrastructure projects, but also initiatives to promote closer integration between peoples, Beijing has created three new international financial institutions: the Silk Road Fund, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Inter-bank Consortium of the Shanghai Cooperation Association.

Of these institutions, and of the role that Italy plays in them, little has been said during the course of the formation of the Memorandum of Understanding.

Italy does not participate in the Silk Road Fund, as this investment fund is controlled entirely by the People's Republic of China. Nor is our country involved in the Shanghai Cooperation Association, as the so-called SCO is a regional organization, which includes China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and India. Its Interbank Consortium is an organization created to finance infrastructure projects implemented by member states.

Instead, Italy is among the members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The AIIB is a multilateral financial institution based in Beijing, composed of 68 effective Member States, and founded in January 2016. It is an institution that finances projects only in the rural sectors, energy, environmental protection, the transport and telecommunications, water resources, urban development and logistics.

It is a partner of the World Bank, and has concluded cooperation agreements with regional banking institutions on the Asian, African, American and European continents. It is therefore an international financial institution that is deeply embedded in the global finance system and is required to play on the basis of international regulation.

Less known to the general public, most AIIB funding is aimed at infrastructure projects implemented in Asian countries. Only 15% can be invested in projects sited in Europe. Even on this type of investment there are precise rules, which require that infrastructure projects facilitate trade and connectivity with Asian countries, for example through the construction of ports, electrical systems, gas pipelines, oil pipelines, etc.

The AIIB is governed by an autonomous Statute (Articles of Agreement) and by an internal regulatory framework. The Statute is an international treaty, which allows the AIIB to operate within the framework of international law, but also of the soft law norms. The internal regulatory framework of the AIIB is largely transparent.

Our country became a member of AIIB in 2016, three years before the Memorandum of Understanding was signed. The payment of Italian taxpayers to the BAII amounts to a capital share for 2,571,800,000 US dollars. However, this share of capital was actually paid only for its 20%, 1) although for the 2016-2019 period a total charge of 515 million had been foreseen.2)

Italy acquired only 2.50% of the votes at the AIIB Board of Directors. This share of votes is lower than the shares held by Germany (4.19%), and France (3.21%), but higher than the shares held by other members of the European Union. The majority of AIIB votes is held by China, with 26.58%. In second place is India, with 7.63%, and in third place Russia, with 6.01% of the votes.

Our country can get only 15% of the total funding granted by the AIIB. These funds, however, are to be shared with the other 23 BAII European members, as decided based on the voting power of the individual states. Any funding obtained from the BAII must be used by companies in our country to make infrastructure investments in Asia. Investments in Europe are possible only if they facilitate trade with other countries of the New Silk Road, or if the connections between the respective physical and digital infrastructures improve.

Given the shares held by Italy, and the conditions under which loans can be granted, the much-feared "debt trap" seems at the moment to be a distant possibility.

Conclusion: Data, data, data

The fears of the general public, however, did not focus on Chinese direct investments and the financial mechanisms of the New Silk Road - obscure issues for most people. The most pessimistic scenarios raised by the general public mirrored some of the views expressed during the domestic debate, centering on the potential for a large deficit in Italian exports to China.

Having accurate data on import-export flows between Italy and China is rather complex, but it is certain that Italy imports more from China than our companies can sell in the Asian giant. Or at least that was the state of affairs until before the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding. To be taken into account is the existence of objective differences between the dimensions of the Italian economic system, and those of the Chinese economy, now the world's second largest economy.

In the absence of data accessible to the public, complete, broken down by year, region and sector of the economy, an exhaustive analysis of investment flows and import-export is not possible. Nor is it possible to make reliable forecasts on the future trend of investment flows. But it is still possible to foresee a further intensification and growth of the relationships established 40 years ago, as well as the benefits that the "Italian system" will continue to enjoy.

Ultimately, the path that led to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding was built over time, step by step, by all the men and women who made the history of relations between Italy and China. If the Memorandum of Understanding sends a univocal signal, it indicates the will of our country, and of China, to continue in the relations that by now have been maintaining for forty years.


Sapio, La Querelle on Italy in the New Silk Road PDF
Image: Pertini and Deng Xiaoping in 1980

With a degree in Political Science from the University of Naples, the Oriental and a PhD from La Sapienza University, Flora Sapio is an expert in politics, institutions and contemporary Chinese law, and has conducted research in China and Hong Kong. The four books of which she is the author or curator have been published by Brill, Edward Elgar, Routledge and Cambridge University Press. Her comments and opinion articles on China, corporate social responsibility, and the differences between China's institutional system and the Castro-Marxism of the Caribbean are available on Law at the End of the Day, as well as on the blogs of British universities and Australia.

1. ↑ Article 3, LAW 22 June 2016, n. 110 Ratification and execution of the Establishment Agreement of the Asian Bank for Investments in Infrastructures, with Attachments, done in Beijing on June 29, 2015. (16G00122) (GU n.145 dated 23-6-2016).
2. 4 Article 4, LAW 22/2016, cit.

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New Guiding Cases From China Relating to Belt and Road Initiative--Emerging Jurisprudence for a New Globval Trade Regime?

April 3, 2019, 7:16 pm
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(Pix Credit HERE)


Guiding cases have been issued by the Chinese Supreme People's COurt since 2011.  The Guiding Cases, official summaries with rationales,  are issued in accordance with provisions adopted by the SPC in 2010 that established a system of case guidance to aid judges in the disposition of cases.  Though China is a civil law country, it was deemed necessary to aid in the exercise of interpretive function to provide a set of cases to guide interpretation. Guiding cases are to serve as a reference for judges when they adjudicate similar cases. Implementing regulations issued in 2015 require judges to refer to relevant guiding cases when adjudicating a claim which is deemed to fall within the "similar case" category. In such a case the judge is expected to reference the relevant guiding case for its persuasive reasoning rather than as binding precedent. 

China has recently announced the issuance of a set of new guiding cases with relevance to Chinese approaches to the legal consequences of obligations of parties within the Belt and Road Initiative.  The cases include the following (with links to official cite 仅限中文):

  1. 中化国际（新加坡）有限公司诉蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司国际货物买卖合同纠纷案(Sinochem International (Singapore) Co., Ltd. v. ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd.)
  2. 浙江隆达不锈钢有限公司诉A.P.穆勒-马士基有限公司海上货物运输合同纠纷案 (Zhejiang Longda Stainless Steel Co., Ltd. v. AP Muller – Maersk Co., Ltd)
  3. 安徽省外经建设（集团）有限公司诉东方置业房地产有限公司保函欺诈纠纷案 (Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (Group) Co., Ltd. Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd)
  4. 交通运输部南海救助局诉阿昌格罗斯投资公司、香港安达欧森有限公司上海代表处海难救助合同纠纷案 (Nanhai Rescue Bureau of the Ministry of Transport v. Achang Gross Investment Co. Hong Kong Anda Ossen Co., Ltd. Shanghai Representative Office)
  5. 中国建设银行股份有限公司广州荔湾支行诉广东蓝粤能源发展有限公司等信用证开证纠纷案 (China Construction Bank Corporation Guangzhou Liwan Branch v. Guangdong Lan Yue Energy Development Co., Ltd. and other letters of credit issue dispute)
  6. 阿斯特克有限公司申请设立海事赔偿责任限制基金案 (Astek Co., Ltd. applied for the establishment of a maritime liability limitation fund case)

These guiding cases are important for two principal reasons.  First they begin to flesh out the structures of implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative.  And Second they begin to outline the principles and approaches to trade and trade dispute  under the Chinese alternative vision of global trade. For both reasons the cases are an important element for companies and states involved in any aspect of BRI.  

The full original text of the Guiding cases follow from the original Chinese website (仅限中文i), followed by a crude English translation (to give readers the gist). For further information or discussion, and case analysis, please contact Larry Catá Backer and Flora Sapio.




 
指导案例107号
中化国际（新加坡）有限公司诉蒂森克虏伯冶金产品
有限责任公司国际货物买卖合同纠纷案
（最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过2019年2月25日发布）
2019-02-25 11:12:24 | 来源：最高人民法院
　　裁判要点

　　1.国际货物买卖合同的当事各方所在国为《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的缔约国，应优先适用公约的规定，公约没有规定的内容，适用合同中约定适用的法律。国际货物买卖合同中当事人明确排除适用《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的，则不应适用该公约。

　　2.在国际货物买卖合同中，卖方交付的货物虽然存在缺陷，但只要买方经过合理努力就能使用货物或转售货物，不应视为构成《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》规定的根本违约的情形。

　　相关法条

　　《中华人民共和国民法通则》第145条

　　《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》第1条、第25条

　　基本案情

　　2008年4月11日，中化国际（新加坡）有限公司（以下简称中化新加坡公司）与蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司（以下简称德国克虏伯公司）签订了购买石油焦的《采购合同》，约定本合同应当根据美国纽约州当时有效的法律订立、管辖和解释。中化新加坡公司按约支付了全部货款，但德国克虏伯公司交付的石油焦HGI指数仅为32，与合同中约定的HGI指数典型值为36-46之间不符。中化新加坡公司认为德国克虏伯公司构成根本违约，请求判令解除合同，要求德国克虏伯公司返还货款并赔偿损失。

　　裁判结果

　　江苏省高级人民法院一审认为，根据《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的有关规定，德国克虏伯公司提供的石油焦HGI指数远低于合同约定标准，导致石油焦难以在国内市场销售，签订买卖合同时的预期目的无法实现，故德国克虏伯公司的行为构成根本违约。江苏省高级人民法院于2012年12月19日作出（2009）苏民三初字第0004号民事判决：一、宣告蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司与中化国际（新加坡）有限公司于2008年4月11日签订的《采购合同》无效。二、蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司于本判决生效之日起三十日内返还中化国际（新加坡）有限公司货款2684302.9美元并支付自2008年9月25日至本判决确定的给付之日的利息。三、蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司于本判决生效之日起三十日内赔偿中化国际（新加坡）有限公司损失520339.77美元。

　　宣判后，德国克虏伯公司不服一审判决，向最高人民法院提起上诉，认为一审判决对本案适用法律认定错误。最高人民法院认为一审判决认定事实基本清楚，但部分法律适用错误，责任认定不当，应当予以纠正。最高人民法院于2014年6月30日作出（2013）民四终字第35号民事判决：一、撤销江苏省高级人民法院（2009）苏民三初字第0004号民事判决第一项。二、变更江苏省高级人民法院（2009）苏民三初字第0004号民事判决第二项为蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司于本判决生效之日起三十日内赔偿中化国际（新加坡）有限公司货款损失1610581.74美元并支付自2008年9月25日至本判决确定的给付之日的利息。三、变更江苏省高级人民法院（2009）苏民三初字第0004号民事判决第三项为蒂森克虏伯冶金产品有限责任公司于本判决生效之日起三十日内赔偿中化国际（新加坡）有限公司堆存费损失98442.79美元。四、驳回中化国际（新加坡）有限公司的其他诉讼请求。

　　裁判理由

　　最高人民法院认为，本案为国际货物买卖合同纠纷，双方当事人均为外国公司，案件具有涉外因素。《最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法〉若干问题的解释（一）》第二条规定：“涉外民事关系法律适用法实施以前发生的涉外民事关系，人民法院应当根据该涉外民事关系发生时的有关法律规定确定应当适用的法律；当时法律没有规定的，可以参照涉外民事关系法律适用法的规定确定。”案涉《采购合同》签订于2008年4月11日，在《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》实施之前，当事人签订《采购合同》时的《中华人民共和国民法通则》第一百四十五条规定：“涉外合同的当事人可以选择处理合同争议所适用的法律，法律另有规定的除外。涉外合同的当事人没有选择的，适用与合同有最密切联系的国家的法律。”本案双方当事人在合同中约定应当根据美国纽约州当时有效的法律订立、管辖和解释，该约定不违反法律规定，应认定有效。由于本案当事人营业地所在国新加坡和德国均为《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》缔约国，美国亦为《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》缔约国，且在一审审理期间双方当事人一致选择适用《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》作为确定其权利义务的依据，并未排除《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的适用，江苏省高级人民法院适用《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》审理本案是正确的。而对于审理案件中涉及到的问题《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》没有规定的，应当适用当事人选择的美国纽约州法律。《〈联合国国际货物销售合同公约〉判例法摘要汇编》并非《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》的组成部分，其不能作为审理本案的法律依据。但在如何准确理解《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》相关条款的含义方面，其可以作为适当的参考资料。

　　双方当事人在《采购合同》中约定的石油焦HGI指数典型值在36-46之间，而德国克虏伯公司实际交付的石油焦HGI指数为32，低于双方约定的HGI指数典型值的最低值，不符合合同约定。江苏省高级人民法院认定德国克虏伯公司构成违约是正确的。

　　关于德国克虏伯公司的上述违约行为是否构成根本违约的问题。首先，从双方当事人在合同中对石油焦需符合的化学和物理特性规格约定的内容看，合同对石油焦的受潮率、硫含量、灰含量、挥发物含量、尺寸、热值、硬度（HGI值）等七个方面作出了约定。而从目前事实看，对于德国克虏伯公司交付的石油焦，中化新加坡公司仅认为HGI指数一项不符合合同约定，而对于其他六项指标，中化新加坡公司并未提出异议。结合当事人提交的证人证言以及证人出庭的陈述，HGI指数表示石油焦的研磨指数，指数越低，石油焦的硬度越大，研磨难度越大。但中化新加坡公司一方提交的上海大学材料科学与工程学院出具的说明亦不否认HGI指数为32的石油焦可以使用，只是认为其用途有限。故可以认定虽然案涉石油焦HGI指数与合同约定不符，但该批石油焦仍然具有使用价值。其次，本案一审审理期间，中化新加坡公司为减少损失，经过积极的努力将案涉石油焦予以转售，且其在就将相关问题致德国克虏伯公司的函件中明确表示该批石油焦转售的价格“未低于市场合理价格”。这一事实说明案涉石油焦是可以以合理价格予以销售的。第三，综合考量其他国家裁判对《联合国国际货物销售合同公约》中关于根本违约条款的理解，只要买方经过合理努力就能使用货物或转售货物，甚至打些折扣，质量不符依然不是根本违约。故应当认为德国克虏伯公司交付HGI指数为32的石油焦的行为，并不构成根本违约。江苏省高级人民法院认定德国克虏伯公司构成根本违约并判决宣告《采购合同》无效，适用法律错误，应予以纠正。

　　（生效裁判审判人员：任雪峰、成明珠、朱科）



 
Guidance Case No. 107
Sinochem International (Singapore) Co., Ltd. v. ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd.
(Issued by the Supreme Court Judicial Committee discussed February 25, 2019)

2019-02-25 11:12:24 | Source: Supreme People's Court

Referee points

　　 1. The countries where the parties to the international sale of goods contracts are parties to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods shall apply the provisions of the Convention in priority, and the provisions of the contract shall apply to the provisions of the contract. The parties to an international contract for the sale of goods shall expressly exclude the application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and shall not apply the Convention.

 　　 2. In the international sale of goods contract, although the goods delivered by the seller are defective, as long as the buyer can use the goods or resell the goods with reasonable efforts, it should not be regarded as a fundamental breach of contract under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. situation.



Related law

 Article 145 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China
Articles 1 and 25 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods

 Basic case


　 April 11, 2008, Sinochem International (Singapore) Limited (hereinafter referred to as Sinochem Singapore) and ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the German Krupp company) signed a purchase petroleum coke. " Procurement Contract, stipulates that this contract shall be concluded, governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws in force in New York State at the time. Sinochem Singapore paid the full amount of the contract , but the KGI index delivered by Krupp AG was only 32 , which is inconsistent with the typical HGI index of 36-46 as stipulated in the contract . Sinochem Singapore believes that Krupp AG has constituted a fundamental breach of contract and requested an order to terminate the contract, requiring the German Krupp company to return the purchase price and compensate for the loss.


Referee result

 According to the first instance of the Jiangsu Higher People's Court, according to the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the KGI index of the petroleum coke provided by Krupp AG is far below the contractual standards, which makes it difficult for petroleum coke to be sold in the domestic market. At the same time, the expected purpose of the merger could not be realized, so the behavior of the German Krupp company constituted a fundamental breach of contract. Jiangsu Provincial Higher People's Court (2009) Su Min San Chu Zi No. 0004 civil judgments in 2012, December 19: First, declare ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd. and Sinochem International (Singapore) Limited April 11, 2008 signed the "purchase contract" null and void. Second, Japan ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd. effective date of this decision within thirty days of the return of Sinochem International (Singapore) Ltd to pay the purchase price of $ 2,684,302.9 and self-determined payment of 25 September 2008 to this decision Interest on the day. 3. ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd. compensated Sinochem International (Singapore) Co., Ltd. for loss of USD 520,339.77 within 30 days from the effective date of this judgment .



After the verdict was pronounced, the German Krupp Company refused to accept the judgment of the first instance and appealed to the Supreme People's Court, arguing that the first-instance judgment was wrong in applying the law to the case. The Supreme People's Court held that the facts of the first-instance judgment were basically clear, but some of the laws were incorrectly applied and the responsibility was improperly determined and should be corrected. Supreme People's Court (2013) Min Si Zhong Zi No. 35 civil judgments on June 30, 2014: First, remove Jiangsu Province Higher People's Court (2009) Su Min San Chu Zi No. 0004 civil judgments first. Second, change the Jiangsu Provincial Higher People's Court ( 2009 ) Su Min San Chu Zi No. 0004 Civil Judgment No. 2 for ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd. to compensate Sinochem International within 30 days from the effective date of this judgment ( Singapore) Limited loan losses of $ 1,610,581.74 and paid from the date of payment of the September 25, 2008 to determine the interest of this judgment. III. Change of Jiangsu Higher People's Court ( 2009 ) Su Min San Chu Zi No. 0004 Civil Judgment No. 3 for ThyssenKrupp Metallurgical Products Co., Ltd. to compensate Sinochem International within 30 days from the effective date of this judgment ( Singapore) Co., Ltd. reserves a loss of $ 984,42.79 . 4. Dismissed other claims from Sinochem International (Singapore) Co., Ltd.


Referee reason

The Supreme People's Court held that this case is a dispute over international sales contracts, both parties are foreign companies, and the case has foreign-related factors. Article 2 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on the Application of the Law applicable to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-related Civil Relations (1): “The foreign-related civil relations that occurred before the implementation of the law applicable to foreign-related civil relations shall be relevant laws and regulations when foreign-related civil relations that should apply the law; when the law does not require to be determined by reference to the provisions of civil relations with foreigners law applicable to the "case involving the" purchase contract "was signed in 2008, April 11, at. Before the implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Foreign-related Civil Relations Law, Article 145 of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China when the parties sign the Purchase Contract states: “ The parties to a foreign-related contract may choose to apply the contract dispute. The law, unless otherwise stipulated by the law. If the parties to the foreign-related contract have no choice, the law of the country with the closest connection with the contract shall apply. "The parties in the case agreed in the contract that they should be concluded and governed according to the laws in force in New York State at the time. And explain that the agreement does not Anti law, shall be deemed valid. Since the countries in which the parties are located in Singapore and Germany are both parties to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the United States is also a party to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and both parties have consistently chosen to apply the United Nations International Sales of Goods during the trial. As a basis for determining its rights and obligations, the Contract Convention does not exclude the application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. It is correct that the Higher People's Court of Jiangsu Province applied the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods to hear the case. Where there is no provision in the case concerning the handling of the case in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the laws of the State of New York, selected by the parties, shall apply. The "Compilation of Case Laws of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" is not part of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and cannot be used as a legal basis for the trial of this case. However, it can be used as an appropriate reference in how to accurately understand the meaning of the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.

 The typical CGI index of the petroleum coke agreed by the parties in the “Procurement Contract” is between 36 and 46 , while the KGI index actually delivered by Krupp AG is 32 , which is lower than the typical value of the HGI index agreed by both parties . Value, does not meet the contractual agreement. The Jiangsu Higher People's Court found that the German Krupp Company constituted a breach of contract.

 Whether the above-mentioned breach of contract by Krupp AG constitutes a fundamental breach of contract. First, from the content parties in the contract of the chemical and physical properties of petroleum coke must meet the specifications agreed see, damp rate contract petroleum coke, sulfur content, ash content, volatile matter content, size, heat, hardness (HGI Values) and other seven aspects have been agreed. From the current facts, Sinochem Singapore only believes that the HGI index does not meet the contractual agreement for the petroleum coke delivered by Krupp AG , but Sinochem Singapore has no objection to the other six indicators. In combination with the witness testimony submitted by the parties and the statement of the witness appearing in court, the HGI index indicates the grinding index of the petroleum coke. The lower the index, the greater the hardness of the petroleum coke and the more difficult the grinding. However, the statement issued by the School of Materials Science and Engineering of Shanghai University submitted by Sinochem Singapore does not deny that the petroleum coke with HGI index of 32 can be used, but only that its use is limited. Therefore, it can be concluded that although the petroleum coke HGI index does not conform to the contractual agreement, the petroleum coke still has value in use. Secondly, during the first trial of this case, Sinochem Singapore Company re-sold the petroleum coke through active efforts to reduce losses, and it clearly stated the petroleum coke in the letter to the German Krupp company. The resale price is “ not below the market reasonable price ” . This fact indicates that the petroleum coke can be sold at a reasonable price. Third, comprehensive consideration of the judgments of other countries on the basic breach of contract provisions of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, as long as the buyer can use the goods or resell the goods with reasonable efforts, or even make some discounts, the quality is not a fundamental breach of contract. . Therefore, it should be considered that the German Krupp company 's behavior of delivering a petroleum coke with an HGI index of 32 does not constitute a fundamental breach of contract. The Jiangsu Higher People's Court found that the German Krupp Company constituted a fundamental breach of contract and the judgment declared that the "purchase contract" was invalid, and the applicable law was wrong and should be corrected.


(Effective referee judges: Ren Xuefeng, Cheng Mingzhu, Zhu Ke)
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指导案例108号
浙江隆达不锈钢有限公司诉A.P.穆勒-马士基
有限公司海上货物运输合同纠纷案
（最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过2019年2月25日发布）
2019-02-25 11:17:14 | 来源：最高人民法院
　　裁判要点

　　在海上货物运输合同中,依据合同法第三百零八条的规定，承运人将货物交付收货人之前，托运人享有要求变更运输合同的权利，但双方当事人仍要遵循合同法第五条规定的公平原则确定各方的权利和义务。托运人行使此项权利时，承运人也可相应行使一定的抗辩权。如果变更海上货物运输合同难以实现或者将严重影响承运人正常营运，承运人可以拒绝托运人改港或者退运的请求，但应当及时通知托运人不能变更的原因。

　　相关法条

　　《中华人民共和国合同法》第308条

　　《中华人民共和国海商法》第86条

　　基本案情

　　2014年6月，浙江隆达不锈钢有限公司（以下简称隆达公司）由中国宁波港出口一批不锈钢无缝产品至斯里兰卡科伦坡港，货物报关价值为366918.97美元。隆达公司通过货代向A.P.穆勒-马士基有限公司（以下简称马士基公司）订舱，涉案货物于同年6月28日装载于4个集装箱内装船出运，出运时隆达公司要求做电放处理。2014年7月9日，隆达公司通过货代向马士基公司发邮件称，发现货物运错目的地要求改港或者退运。马士基公司于同日回复，因货物距抵达目的港不足2天，无法安排改港，如需退运则需与目的港确认后回复。次日，隆达公司的货代询问货物退运是否可以原船带回，马士基公司于当日回复“原船退回不具有操作性，货物在目的港卸货后，需要由现在的收货人在目的港清关后，再向当地海关申请退运。海关批准后，才可以安排退运事宜”。2014年7月10日，隆达公司又提出“这个货要安排退运，就是因为清关清不了，所以才退回宁波的，有其他办法吗”。此后，马士基公司再未回复邮件。

　　涉案货物于2014年7月12日左右到达目的港。马士基公司应隆达公司的要求于2015年1月29日向其签发了编号603386880的全套正本提单。根据提单记载，托运人为隆达公司，收货人及通知方均为VENUS STEEL PVT LTD，起运港中国宁波，卸货港科伦坡。2015年5月19日，隆达公司向马士基公司发邮件表示已按马士基公司要求申请退运。马士基公司随后告知隆达公司涉案货物已被拍卖。

　　裁判结果

　　宁波海事法院于2016年3月4日作出(2015)甬海法商初字第534号民事判决，认为隆达公司因未采取自行提货等有效措施导致涉案货物被海关拍卖，相应货损风险应由该公司承担，故驳回隆达公司的诉讼请求。一审判决后，隆达公司提出上诉。浙江省高级人民法院于2016年9月29日作出（2016）浙民终222号民事判决：撤销一审判决；马士基公司于判决送达之日起十日内赔偿隆达公司货物损失183459.49美元及利息。二审法院认为依据合同法第三百零八条，隆达公司在马士基公司交付货物前享有请求改港或退运的权利。在隆达公司提出退运要求后，马士基公司既未明确拒绝安排退运，也未通知隆达公司自行处理，对涉案货损应承担相应的赔偿责任，酌定责任比例为50%。马士基公司不服二审判决，向最高人民法院申请再审。最高人民法院于2017年12月29日作出（2017）最高法民再412号民事判决：撤销二审判决；维持一审判决。

　　裁判理由

　　最高人民法院认为，合同法与海商法有关调整海上运输关系、船舶关系的规定属于普通法与特别法的关系。根据海商法第八十九条的规定，船舶在装货港开航前，托运人可以要求解除合同。本案中，隆达公司在涉案货物海上运输途中请求承运人进行退运或者改港，因海商法未就航程中托运人要求变更运输合同的权利进行规定，故本案可适用合同法第三百零八条关于托运人要求变更运输合同权利的规定。基于特别法优先适用于普通法的法律适用基本原则，合同法第三百零八条规定的是一般运输合同，该条规定在适用于海上货物运输合同的情况下，应该受到海商法基本价值取向及强制性规定的限制。托运人依据合同法第三百零八条主张变更运输合同的权利不得致使海上货物运输合同中各方当事人利益显失公平，也不得使承运人违反对其他托运人承担的安排合理航线等义务，或剥夺承运人关于履行海上货物运输合同变更事项的相应抗辩权。

　　合同法总则规定的基本原则是合同法立法的准则，是适用于合同法全部领域的准则，也是合同法具体制度及规范的依据。依据合同法第三百零八条的规定，在承运人将货物交付收货人之前，托运人享有要求变更运输合同的权利，但双方当事人仍要遵循合同法第五条规定的公平原则确定各方的权利和义务。海上货物运输具有运输量大、航程预先拟定、航线相对固定等特殊性，托运人要求改港或者退运的请求有时不仅不易操作，还会妨碍承运人的正常营运或者给其他货物的托运人或收货人带来较大损害。在此情况下，如果要求承运人无条件服从托运人变更运输合同的请求，显失公平。因此，在海上货物运输合同下，托运人并非可以无限制地行使请求变更的权利，承运人也并非在任何情况下都应无条件服从托运人请求变更的指示。为合理平衡海上货物运输合同中各方当事人利益之平衡，在托运人行使要求变更权利的同时，承运人也相应地享有一定的抗辩权利。如果变更运输合同难以实现或者将严重影响承运人正常营运，承运人可以拒绝托运人改港或者退运的要求，但应当及时通知托运人不能执行的原因。如果承运人关于不能执行原因等抗辩成立，承运人未按照托运人退运或改港的指示执行则并无不当。

　　涉案货物采用的是国际班轮运输，载货船舶除运载隆达公司托运的4个集装箱外，还运载了其他货主托运的众多货物。涉案货物于2014年6月28日装船出运，于2014年7月12日左右到达目的港。隆达公司于2014年7月9日才要求马士基公司退运或者改港。马士基公司在航程已过大半，距离到达目的港只有两三天的时间，以航程等原因无法安排改港、原船退回不具有操作性为抗辩事由，符合案件事实情况，该抗辩事由成立，马士基公司未安排退运或者改港并无不当。

　　马士基公司将涉案货物运至目的港后，因无人提货，将货物卸载至目的港码头符合海商法第八十六条的规定。马士基公司于2014年7月9日通过邮件回复隆达公司距抵达目的港不足2日。隆达公司已了解货物到港的大体时间并明知涉案货物在目的港无人提货，但在长达8个月的时间里未采取措施处理涉案货物致其被海关拍卖。隆达公司虽主张马士基公司未尽到谨慎管货义务，但并未举证证明马士基公司存在管货不当的事实。隆达公司的该项主张缺乏依据。依据海商法第八十六条的规定，马士基公司卸货后所产生的费用和风险应由收货人承担，马士基公司作为承运人无需承担相应的风险。

　　（生效判决审判人员：王淑梅、余晓汉、黄西武）



 
Guidance Case No. 108
Zhejiang Longda Stainless Steel Co., Ltd. v. AP Muller – Maersk Co., Ltd.
(Issued by the Supreme Court Judicial Committee discussed February 25, 2019)
2019-02-25 11:17:14 | Source: Supreme People's Court

Referee points

 In the contract for the carriage of goods by sea , in accordance with the provisions of Article 308 of the Contract Law, the shipper has the right to request a change of the contract of carriage before the carrier delivers the goods to the consignee, but the parties still have to comply with Article 5 of the Contract Law. The prescribed principle of fairness determines the rights and obligations of the parties. When the shipper exercises this right, the carrier may also exercise a certain right of defense. If the change of the contract for the carriage of goods by sea is difficult to achieve or will seriously affect the normal operation of the carrier, the carrier may refuse the shipper's request to change the port or return the goods, but should promptly notify the shipper of the reasons for the change.


Related law

Article 308 of the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China
Article 86 of the Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China

 Basic case



　　 June 2014, Zhejiang Lunda Stainless Steel Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to Lunda company) by the Ningbo Port China exports a number of stainless steel seamless product to the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka, customs value of the goods is $ 366,918.97. Lunda company by forwarding to the AP Moller - Maersk Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Maersk) booking, goods involved in the same year on June 28 loaded shipping containers shipped within 4, when the company shipped Lunda asked to do electrical discharge treatment . July 9, 2014, Lunda said the company e-mail to the company by Maersk freight forwarding, find the goods required to change the wrong destination or returned to Hong Kong. Maersk Company replied on the same day that it was unable to arrange for the change of port because the goods arrived at the port of destination less than 2 days. If it is necessary to return the goods, it must be confirmed with the destination port and then reply. On the next day, the freight forwarder of Ronda Company asked whether the goods could be returned to the original ship. Maersk Company replied on the same day that “the original ship returned is not operational. After the goods are unloaded at the port of destination, the current consignee needs to be at the port of destination. after customs clearance, local customs apply again returned after the approval of the customs, we can arrange matters returned. " July 10, 2014, Lunda company also proposed "to arrange for the goods returned, is not clear because the clearance, so it returned to Ningbo, there are other ways to do." Since then, Maersk has not responded to the mail.

 Involved in cargo arrival at destination in about July 12, 2014. Maersk should Lunda requirements of the company in January 29, 2015 numbered 603,386,880 issued its full set of original bills of lading. According to the bill of lading, the shipper is Ronda, the consignee and the notifying party are VENUS STEEL PVT LTD , the port of departure is Ningbo, China, and the port of discharge is Colombo. May 19, 2015, the company Lunda mail, Maersk Line has been told by Maersk require the applicant returned. Maersk then informed Ronda that the goods involved in the case had been auctioned.

 Referee result

 Ningbo Maritime Court (2015) Ningbo Haifa Shang Chu Zi No. 534 civil judgments on March 4, 2016, that the Lunda company for its own delivery and other effective measures are not taken to be auctioned goods involved lead to customs, the corresponding risk of cargo damage should The company assumed that the claim of Ronda Company was rejected. After the judgment of the first instance, Ronda filed an appeal. Zhejiang Higher People's Court on September 29, 2016 to (2016) Zhe Min Zhong No. 222 civil judgments: verdict revoked; Maersk company on the date of service of the decision within ten days Lunda company for damages of $ 183,459.49 goods and interest. The court of second instance held that according to Article 308 of the Contract Law, Longda Company had the right to request to change port or return shipment before Maersk Company delivered the goods. After the company submitted the return request, Maersk Company did not expressly refuse to arrange the return shipment, nor did it notify Ronda to handle it by itself. It should bear the corresponding liability for the damage caused by the case, and the discretionary responsibility ratio is 50% . Maersk Company refused to accept the judgment of the second instance and applied to the Supreme People's Court for retrial. Supreme People's Court on December 29, 2017 (2017) and then up to France and China No. 412 civil judgment: revocation of a second trial; upheld the verdict.


Referee reason

The Supreme People's Court held that the provisions of the Contract Law and the Maritime Law relating to the adjustment of maritime transport relations and ship relations are the relationship between common law and special law. According to the provisions of Article 89 of the Maritime Law, the shipper may request the termination of the contract before the ship sails at the port of loading. In this case, Longda Company requested the carrier to return or change the port during the maritime transport of the goods involved. Since the maritime law does not stipulate the shipper’s right to change the contract of carriage in the voyage, the contract law can be applied to the third hundred and zero. Eight provisions concerning the shipper’s request to change the rights of the contract of carriage. Based on the basic principles of the law applicable to the common law, the special law applies in Article 308 of the Contract Law. This article stipulates that in the case of a contract for the carriage of goods by sea, it should be subject to the basic value orientation of the maritime law. And mandatory restrictions. The shipper’s right to change the contract of carriage in accordance with Article 308 of the Contract Law shall not result in the unfairness of the interests of the parties in the contract of carriage of goods by sea, nor shall the carrier violate the obligation to arrange reasonable routes to other shippers, Or deprive the carrier of the corresponding right of defense to perform changes to the contract of carriage of goods by sea.

The basic principle stipulated in the general provisions of the contract law is the standard of contract law legislation, which is the standard applicable to all areas of contract law, and also the basis for the specific system and norms of contract law. According to Article 308 of the Contract Law, the shipper has the right to request a change of the contract of carriage before the carrier delivers the goods to the consignee, but the parties still have to follow the fairness principle stipulated in Article 5 of the Contract Law. Party's rights and obligations. Sea cargo transportation has special characteristics such as large transportation volume, pre-planned voyage, and relatively fixed routes. Shippers' requests for port change or return are sometimes not only difficult to operate, but also hinder the normal operation of the carrier or ship to other cargoes or The consignee brings greater damage. In this case, it is unfair if the carrier is required to unconditionally obey the shipper’s request to change the contract of carriage. Therefore, under the contract of carriage of goods by sea, the shipper is not entitled to exercise the right to request a change without restriction, and the carrier is not in any case unconditionally obeying the shipper’s request for a change. In order to reasonably balance the interests of the parties in the contract of carriage of goods by sea, the carrier also has a certain right of defense while the shipper exercises the right to change the requirements. If the change of the transportation contract is difficult to achieve or will seriously affect the carrier's normal operation, the carrier may refuse the shipper's request to change the port or return the goods, but should promptly notify the shipper of the reasons for the failure to perform. If the carrier’s defense against the failure to enforce the cause is established, the carrier’s failure to comply with the shipper’s instructions to return or change the port is not inappropriate.

The goods involved in the case were transported by international liners. In addition to carrying the four containers consigned by Ronda, the cargo ships carried a large number of goods consigned by other cargo owners. Goods involved in the June 28, 2014 on board the ship to reach the port of destination in about July 12, 2014. Lunda company on July 9, 2014 before the company returned or changed requirements Maersk Hong Kong. Maersk has been in the voyage for more than half of the time. It only takes two or three days to reach the destination port. It is impossible to arrange for the change of the port due to the voyage and other reasons. The original ship is returned without operationality. It is in line with the facts of the case. The defense was established. Maersk It is not inappropriate for the company not to arrange for a return or change to Hong Kong.


After Maersk Company transported the goods involved to the port of destination, the unloading of the goods to the port of destination was carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 86 of the Maritime Law. Maersk on July 9, 2014 reply from the company arrived at the port of destination Lunda less than the 2nd through the mail. Ronda has been aware of the general time of arrival of the goods and knows that the goods involved are not picked up at the port of destination, but did not take measures to deal with the goods involved in the case for up to eight months to be auctioned by the customs. Although Ronda has claimed that Maersk has not fulfilled its cautious obligation to manage the goods, it has not proved that Maersk has the fact that the goods are improperly handled. Ronda’s claim is unfounded. According to the provisions of Article 86 of the Maritime Law, the costs and risks incurred by Maersk Company after unloading shall be borne by the consignee, and Maersk shall not bear the corresponding risks as the carrier.

 (Effective judges: Wang Shumei, Yu Xiaohan, Huang Xiwu)
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指导案例109号
安徽省外经建设（集团）有限公司诉
东方置业房地产有限公司保函欺诈纠纷案
（最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过2019年2月25日发布）
2019-02-25 11:19:21 | 来源：最高人民法院
　　裁判要点

　　1.认定构成独立保函欺诈需对基础交易进行审查时，应坚持有限及必要原则，审查范围应限于受益人是否明知基础合同的相对人并不存在基础合同项下的违约事实，以及是否存在受益人明知自己没有付款请求权的事实。

　　2.受益人在基础合同项下的违约情形，并不影响其按照独立保函的规定提交单据并进行索款的权利。

　　3.认定独立反担保函项下是否存在欺诈时，即使独立保函存在欺诈情形，独立保函项下已经善意付款的，人民法院亦不得裁定止付独立反担保函项下款项。

　　相关法条

　　《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》第8条、第44条

　　基本案情

　　2010年1月16日，东方置业房地产有限公司（以下简称东方置业公司）作为开发方，与作为承包方的安徽省外经建设（集团）有限公司（以下简称外经集团公司）、作为施工方的安徽外经建设中美洲有限公司（以下简称外经中美洲公司）在哥斯达黎加共和国圣何塞市签订了《哥斯达黎加湖畔华府项目施工合同》（以下简称《施工合同》），约定承包方为三栋各十四层综合商住楼施工。外经集团公司于2010年5月26日向中国建设银行股份有限公司安徽省分行（以下简称建行安徽省分行）提出申请，并以哥斯达黎加银行作为转开行，向作为受益人的东方置业公司开立履约保函，保证事项为哥斯达黎加湖畔华府项目。2010年5月28日，哥斯达黎加银行开立编号为G051225的履约保函，担保人为建行安徽省分行，委托人为外经集团公司，受益人为东方置业公司，担保金额为2008000美元，有效期至2011年10月12日，后延期至2012年2月12日。保函说明：无条件的、不可撤销的、必须的、见索即付的保函。执行此保函需要受益人给哥斯达黎加银行中央办公室外贸部提交一式两份的证明文件，指明执行此保函的理由，另外由受益人出具公证过的声明指出通知外经中美洲公司因为违约而产生此请求的日期，并附上保函证明原件和已经出具过的修改件。建行安徽省分行同时向哥斯达黎加银行开具编号为34147020000289的反担保函，承诺自收到哥斯达黎加银行通知后二十日内支付保函项下的款项。反担保函是“无条件的、不可撤销的、随时要求支付的”，并约定“遵守国际商会出版的458号《见索即付保函统一规则》”。

　　《施工合同》履行过程中，2012年1月23日，建筑师 Jose Brenes和Mauricio Mora出具《项目工程检验报告》。该报告认定了施工项目存在“施工不良”“品质低劣”且需要修改或修理的情形。2012年2月7日，外经中美洲公司以东方置业公司为被申请人向哥斯达黎加建筑师和工程师联合协会争议解决中心提交仲裁请求，认为东方置业公司拖欠应支付之已完成施工量的工程款及相应利息，请求解除合同并裁决东方置业公司赔偿损失。2月8日，东方置业公司向哥斯达黎加银行提交索赔声明、违约通知书、违约声明、《项目工程检验报告》等保函兑付文件，要求执行保函。2月10日，哥斯达黎加银行向建行安徽省分行发出电文，称东方置业公司提出索赔，要求支付G051225号银行保函项下2008000美元的款项，哥斯达黎加银行进而要求建行安徽省分行须于2012年2月16日前支付上述款项。2月12日，应外经中美洲公司申请，哥斯达黎加共和国行政诉讼法院第二法庭下达临时保护措施禁令，裁定哥斯达黎加银行暂停执行G051225号履约保函。

　　2月23日，外经集团公司向合肥市中级人民法院提起保函欺诈纠纷诉讼，同时申请中止支付G051225号保函、34147020000289号保函项下款项。一审法院于2月27日作出（2012）合民四初字第00005-1号裁定，裁定中止支付G051225号保函及34147020000289号保函项下款项，并于2月28日向建行安徽省分行送达了上述裁定。2月29日，建行安徽省分行向哥斯达黎加银行发送电文告知了一审法院已作出的裁定事由，并于当日向哥斯达黎加银行寄送了上述裁定书的复印件，哥斯达黎加银行于3月5日收到上述裁定书复印件。

　　3月6日，哥斯达黎加共和国行政诉讼法院第二法庭判决外经中美洲公司申请预防性措施败诉，解除了临时保护措施禁令。3月20日，应哥斯达黎加银行的要求，建行安徽省分行延长了34147020000289号保函的有效期。 3月21日，哥斯达黎加银行向东方置业公司支付了G051225号保函项下款项。

　　2013年7月9日，哥斯达黎加建筑师和工程师联合协会做出仲裁裁决，该仲裁裁决认定东方置业公司在履行合同过程中严重违约，并裁决终止《施工合同》，东方置业公司向外经中美洲公司支付1号至18号工程进度款共计800058.45美元及利息；第19号工程因未获得开发商验收，相关工程款请求未予支持；因G051225号保函项下款项已经支付，不支持外经中美洲公司退还保函的请求。

　　裁判结果

　　安徽省合肥市中级人民法院于2014年4月9日作出（2012）合民四初字第00005号民事判决：一、东方置业公司针对G051225号履约保函的索赔行为构成欺诈；二、建行安徽省分行终止向哥斯达黎加银行支付编号为34147020000289的银行保函项下2008000美元的款项；三、驳回外经集团公司的其他诉讼请求。东方置业公司不服一审判决，提起上诉。安徽省高级人民法院于2015年3月19日作出（2014）皖民二终字第00389号民事判决：驳回上诉，维持原判。东方置业公司不服二审判决，向最高人民法院申请再审。最高人民法院于2017年12月14日作出（2017）最高法民再134号民事判决：一、撤销安徽省高级人民法院（2014）皖民二终字第00389号、安徽省合肥市中级人民法院（2012）合民四初字第00005号民事判决；二、驳回外经集团公司的诉讼请求。

　　裁判理由

　　最高人民法院认为：第一，关于本案涉及的独立保函欺诈案件的识别依据、管辖权以及法律适用问题。本案争议的当事方东方置业公司及哥斯达黎加银行的经常居所地位于我国领域外，本案系涉外商事纠纷。根据《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》第八条“涉外民事关系的定性，适用法院地法”的规定，外经集团公司作为外经中美洲公司在国内的母公司，是涉案保函的开立申请人，其申请建行安徽省分行向哥斯达黎加银行开立见索即付的反担保保函，由哥斯达黎加银行向受益人东方置业公司转开履约保函。根据保函文本内容，哥斯达黎加银行与建行安徽省分行的付款义务均独立于基础交易关系及保函申请法律关系，因此，上述保函可以确定为见索即付独立保函，上述反担保保函可以确定为见索即付独立反担保函。外经集团公司以保函欺诈为由向一审法院提起诉讼，本案性质为保函欺诈纠纷。被请求止付的独立反担保函由建行安徽省分行开具，该分行所在地应当认定为外经集团公司主张的侵权结果发生地。一审法院作为侵权行为地法院对本案具有管辖权。因涉案保函载明适用《见索即付保函统一规则》，应当认定上述规则的内容构成争议保函的组成部分。根据《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》第四十四条“侵权责任，适用侵权行为地法律”的规定，《见索即付保函统一规则》未予涉及的保函欺诈之认定标准应适用中华人民共和国法律。我国没有加入《联合国独立保证与备用信用证公约》，本案当事人亦未约定适用上述公约或将公约有关内容作为国际交易规则订入保函，依据意思自治原则，《联合国独立保证与备用信用证公约》不应适用。

　　第二，关于东方置业公司作为受益人是否具有基础合同项下的初步证据证明其索赔请求具有事实依据的问题。

人民法院在审理独立保函及与独立保函相关的反担保案件时，对基础交易的审查，应当坚持有限原则和必要原则，审查的范围应当限于受益人是否明知基础合同的相对人并不存在基础合同项下的违约事实或者不存在其他导致独立保函付款的事实。否则，对基础合同的审查将会动摇独立保函“见索即付”的制度价值。

　　根据《最高人民法院关于贯彻执行〈中华人民共和国民法通则〉若干问题的意见（试行）》第六十八条的规定，欺诈主要表现为虚构事实与隐瞒真相。根据再审查明的事实，哥斯达黎加银行开立编号为G051225的履约保函，该履约保函明确规定了实现保函需要提交的文件为：说明执行保函理由的证明文件、通知外经中美洲公司执行保函请求的日期、保函证明原件和已经出具过的修改件。外经集团公司主张东方置业公司的行为构成独立保函项下的欺诈，应当提交证据证明东方置业公司在实现独立保函时具有下列行为之一：1.为索赔提交内容虚假或者伪造的单据；2.索赔请求完全没有事实基础和可信依据。本案中，保函担保的是“施工期间材料使用的质量和耐性，赔偿或补偿造成的损失，和／或承包方未履行义务的赔付”，意即，保函担保的是施工质量和其他违约行为。因此，受益人只需提交能够证明存在施工质量问题的初步证据，即可满足保函实现所要求的“说明执行保函理由的证明文件”。本案基础合同履行过程中，东方置业公司的项目监理人员Jose Brenes和Mauricio Mora于2012年1月23日出具《项目工程检验报告》。该报告认定了施工项目存在“施工不良”、“品质低劣”且需要修改或修理的情形，该《项目工程检验报告》构成证明存在施工质量问题的初步证据。

　　本案当事方在《施工合同》中以及在保函项下并未明确约定实现保函时应向哥斯达黎加银行提交《项目工程检验报告》，因此，东方置业公司有权自主选择向哥斯达黎加银行提交“证明执行保函理由”之证明文件的类型，其是否向哥斯达黎加银行提交该报告不影响其保函项下权利的实现。另外，《施工合同》以及保函亦未规定上述报告须由AIA国际建筑师事务所或者具有美国建筑师协会国际会员身份的人员出具，因此，Jose Brenes和Mauricio Mora是否具有美国建筑师协会国际会员身份并不影响其作为发包方的项目监理人员出具《项目工程检验报告》。外经集团公司对Jose Brenes和Mauricio Mora均为发包方的项目监理人员身份是明知的，在其出具《项目工程检验报告》并领取工程款项时对Jose Brenes和Mauricio Mora的监理身份是认可的，其以自身认可的足以证明Jose Brenes和Mauricio Mora监理身份的证据反证Jose Brenes和Mauricio Mora出具的《项目工程检验报告》虚假，逻辑上无法自洽。因外经集团公司未能提供其他证据证明东方置业公司实现案涉保函完全没有事实基础或者提交虚假或伪造的文件，东方置业公司据此向哥斯达黎加银行申请实现保函权利具有事实依据。

　　综上，《项目工程检验报告》构成证明外经集团公司基础合同项下违约行为的初步证据，外经集团公司提供的证据不足以证明上述报告存在虚假或者伪造，亦不足以证明东方置业公司明知基础合同的相对人并不存在基础合同项下的违约事实或者不存在其他导致独立保函付款的事实而要求实现保函。东方置业公司基于外经集团公司基础合同项下的违约行为，依据合同的规定，提出实现独立保函项下的权利不构成保函欺诈。

　　第三，关于独立保函受益人基础合同项下的违约情形，是否必然构成独立保函项下的欺诈索款问题。

　　外经集团公司认为，根据《最高人民法院关于审理独立保函纠纷案件若干问题的规定》（以下简称独立保函司法解释）第十二条第三项、第四项、第五项，应当认定东方置业公司构成独立保函欺诈。根据独立保函司法解释第二十五条的规定，经庭审释明，外经集团公司仍坚持认为本案处理不应违反独立保函司法解释的规定精神。结合外经集团公司的主张，最高人民法院对上述涉及独立保函司法解释的相关问题作出进一步阐释。

　　独立保函独立于委托人和受益人之间的基础交易，出具独立保函的银行只负责审查受益人提交的单据是否符合保函条款的规定并有权自行决定是否付款，担保行的付款义务不受委托人与受益人之间基础交易项下抗辩权的影响。东方置业公司作为受益人，在提交证明存在工程质量问题的初步证据时，即使未启动任何诸如诉讼或者仲裁等争议解决程序并经上述程序确认相对方违约，都不影响其保函权利的实现。即使基础合同存在正在进行的诉讼或者仲裁程序，只要相关争议解决程序尚未做出基础交易债务人没有付款或者赔偿责任的最终认定，亦不影响受益人保函权利的实现。进而言之，即使生效判决或者仲裁裁决认定受益人构成基础合同项下的违约，该违约事实的存在亦不必然成为构成保函“欺诈”的充分必要条件。

　　本案中，保函担保的事项是施工质量和其他违约行为，而受益人未支付工程款项的违约事实与工程质量出现问题不存在逻辑上的因果关系，东方置业公司作为受益人，其自身在基础合同履行中存在的违约情形，并不必然构成独立保函项下的欺诈索款。独立保函司法解释第十二条第三项的规定内容，将独立保函欺诈认定的条件限定为“法院判决或仲裁裁决认定基础交易债务人没有付款或赔偿责任”，因此，除非保函另有约定，对基础合同的审查应当限定在保函担保范围内的履约事项，在将受益人自身在基础合同中是否存在违约行为纳入保函欺诈的审查范围时应当十分审慎。虽然哥斯达黎加建筑师和工程师联合协会做出仲裁裁决，认定东方置业公司在履行合同过程中违约，但上述仲裁程序于2012年2月7日由外经集团公司发动，东方置业公司并未提出反请求，2013年7月9日做出的仲裁裁决仅针对外经集团公司的请求事项认定东方置业公司违约，但并未认定外经集团公司因对方违约行为的存在而免除付款或者赔偿责任。因此，不能依据上述仲裁裁决的内容认定东方置业公司构成独立保函司法解释第十二条第三项规定的保函欺诈。

　　另外，双方对工程质量发生争议的事实以及哥斯达黎加建筑师和工程师联合协会争议解决中心作出的《仲裁裁决书》中涉及工程质量问题部分的表述能够佐证，外经中美洲公司在《施工合同》项下的义务尚未完全履行，本案并不存在东方置业公司确认基础交易债务已经完全履行或者付款到期事件并未发生的情形。现有证据亦不能证明东方置业公司明知其没有付款请求权仍滥用权利。东方置业公司作为受益人，其自身在基础合同履行中存在的违约情形，虽经仲裁裁决确认但并未因此免除外经集团公司的付款或者赔偿责任。综上，即使按照外经集团公司的主张适用独立保函司法解释，本案情形亦不构成保函欺诈。

　　第四，关于本案涉及的与独立保函有关的独立反担保函问题。

　　基于独立保函的特点，担保人于债务人之外构成对受益人的直接支付责任，独立保函与主债务之间没有抗辩权上的从属性，即使债务人在某一争议解决程序中行使抗辩权，并不当然使独立担保人获得该抗辩利益。另外，即使存在受益人在独立保函项下的欺诈性索款情形，亦不能推定担保行在独立反担保函项下构成欺诈性索款。只有担保行明知受益人系欺诈性索款且违反诚实信用原则付款，并向反担保行主张独立反担保函项下款项时，才能认定担保行构成独立反担保函项下的欺诈性索款。

　　外经集团公司以保函欺诈为由提起本案诉讼，其应当举证证明哥斯达黎加银行明知东方置业公司存在独立保函欺诈情形，仍然违反诚信原则予以付款，并进而以受益人身份在见索即付独立反担保函项下提出索款请求并构成反担保函项下的欺诈性索款。现外经集团公司不仅不能证明哥斯达黎加银行向东方置业公司支付独立保函项下款项存在欺诈，亦没有举证证明哥斯达黎加银行在独立反担保函项下存在欺诈性索款情形，其主张止付独立反担保函项下款项没有事实依据。

　　　（生效裁判审判人员：陈纪忠、杨弘磊、杨兴业）



 
Guidance Case No. 109
Anhui Foreign Economic Construction (Group) Co., Ltd.
Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd.
(Issued by the Supreme Court Judicial Committee discussed February 25, 2019)
2019-02-25 11:19:21 | Source: Supreme People's Court

Referee points

　　 1. When it is determined that the formation of an independent letter of guarantee fraud requires review of the underlying transaction, the principle of limitation and necessity should be adhered to. The scope of the examination should be limited to whether the beneficiary knows that the counterpart of the underlying contract does not have the fact of default under the underlying contract and whether there is any benefit. People know that they do not have the right to request payment.

 　　 2. The default situation of the beneficiary under the basic contract does not affect its right to submit documents and make claims in accordance with the provisions of the independent guarantee.

　　 3. If there is any fraud under the independent counter-guarantee letter, even if the independent guarantee has a fraudulent situation and the payment is made in good faith under the independent guarantee, the people's court may not decide to stop the payment under the independent counter-guarantee letter.

 Related law

 Articles 8 and 44 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Foreign-related Civil Relations Law


Basic case

　　 January 16, 2010, Oriental Land Real Estate Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Oriental Land Company) as a developer, and Anhui Foreign Economic Construction as the contractor (Group) Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Foreign Economic Corporation), as the construction side Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Central America Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Foreign Economics Central America Company) signed the “Construction Contract for the Costa Rica Lakeside Project” (hereinafter referred to as the “Construction Contract”) in San Jose, Costa Rica, stipulates that the contractor is three Construction of a 14-storey mixed commercial and residential building. Foreign Economic Corporation on May 26, 2010 to Anhui Branch of China Construction Bank Corporation (hereinafter referred to as CCB Anhui Branch) apply, and transfer to the Bank of Costa Rica as the opening line to the company as a beneficiary of the Oriental Land opened compliance The letter of guarantee is guaranteed to be the Huafu project on the shores of Costa Rica. May 28, 2010, the Costa Rican bank to open a number G051225 performance bond, the guarantor for the Anhui Branch of China Construction Bank, the principal is a foreign economic company, the beneficiary Oriental Land Company, the guarantee amount of $ 2.008 million, valid until October 2011 12, after postponed to February 12, 2012. Letter of guarantee: Unconditional, irrevocable, mandatory, pay-as-you-go guarantee. The execution of this letter of guarantee requires the beneficiary to submit two copies of the supporting documents to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the Central Office of the Bank of Costa Rica, indicating the reasons for the execution of the letter of guarantee, and the beneficiary’s notarized statement states that the request was notified to the foreign Central American company for breach of contract. Date, accompanied by a letter of guarantee and an amendment that has been issued. CCB Anhui Branch also issued a counter-guarantee letter numbered to the Bank of Costa Rica with the number 341-47020000289 , and promised to pay the amount under the guarantee within 20 days after receiving the notice from the Costa Rican bank. Counter guarantee is "unconditional, irrevocable, at any time asked to pay" and agreed "to comply with the International Chamber of Commerce Publication No. 458" Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees "."



"Construction Contract" fulfillment process, January 23, 2012, the architect Jose Brenes and Mauricio Mora issued "project inspection reports." The report identified a situation where the construction project had “ poor construction ” and “ poor quality ” and needed to be modified or repaired. February 7, 2012, foreign companies to the Central American Oriental Land Company to be submitted to arbitration request the applicant to the Joint Association of Engineers and Architects of Costa Rica Dispute Resolution Center, the Oriental Land Company believes arrears should be paid the amount of construction has been completed for the works And the corresponding interest, request to terminate the contract and ruling the Oriental Real Estate Company to compensate for the loss. February 8, Oriental Land Company of Costa Rica submitted to the bank statement of claim, notices of default, breach of contract statement, "project inspection reports" and other guarantees payment documents, required to perform guarantee. February 10, Costa Rica Bank issued a message to China Construction Bank branch in Anhui, said the Oriental Land Company filed a claim payments 2.008 million US dollars under G051225 No. Bank Guarantee, Costa Rica Bank then asked the CCB Anhui Branch to be on February 16, 2012 The above payment was made a few days ago. February 12, the company should apply for foreign economic relations in Central America, the Administrative Court of the Republic of Costa Rica second lawsuit the court to order interim measures of protection injunction, ruled that Costa Rica banks to suspend the implementation of resolution G051225 performance bond.

 　　 February 23, Foreign Economic Corporation filed a lawsuit to guarantee fraud dispute Hefei Intermediate People's Court, No. G051225 apply for suspension of payment guarantees, payments under number 34147020000289 Guarantee. Court of First Instance on 27 February made (2012) co-Min Si Chu Zi No. 00005-1 ruled that ruling to suspend payments under guarantees and No. G051225 number 34147020000289 Guarantee, and on February 28 to reach the Anhui Branch of China Construction Bank The above ruling. February 29, China Construction Bank branch in Anhui send the message to the Bank of Costa Rica informed the Court of First Instance ruled that the subject has been made on the same day sent a copy of the above ruling to the bank in Costa Rica, Costa Rican bank receipt of the above on March 5 A copy of the ruling.

　　 March 6, Administrative Litigation Court of the Republic of Costa Rica in Central America second court foreign economic relations company to apply preventive measures lost, the lifting of the ban on interim measures of protection. March 20, at the request of Costa Rica Bank, China Construction Bank branch in Anhui extended the expiration date of the guarantee number 34147020000289. March 21, the Costa Rican bank paid the money under the number G051225 Guarantee to the east property companies.

 　　 July 9, 2013, the Costa Rican Association of architects and engineers to make a joint arbitration award, the arbitral award recognized the Oriental Land Company in the execution of this serious breach of contract, and the decision to terminate "construction contract", Oriental Land Company to foreign economic relations in Central America the company paid Nos. 1 to 18 project progress payments totaling $ 800,058.45 plus interest; No. 19 project developers for failing to obtain acceptance for projects related to failing to support the request; due to the lower number G051225 guarantee payment had been made, it does not support foreign economic relations in The request of the American company to return the guarantee.


Referee result

 Hefei Intermediate People's Court (2012) co-Min Si Zi No. 00005 civil judgments on April 9, 2014: First, the Oriental Land Company acts constitute fraud claims against No. G051225 Performance Bond; Second, China Construction Bank in Anhui Province The branch terminated the payment of $ 2008000 under the bank guarantee number number 3414702000028 to the Costa Rican bank ; 3. Dismissed other claims from the foreign economic group company. Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. refused to accept the judgment of the first instance and filed an appeal. Anhui Provincial Higher People's Court on March 19, 2015 (2014) Wan Min Er Zhong Zi No. 00389 civil judgments: rejected the appeal and upheld the original verdict. Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. refused to accept the judgment of the second instance and applied to the Supreme People's Court for retrial. Supreme People's Court (2017) and then up to France and China Civil Judgment No. 134 on December 14, 2017: First, remove Anhui Province Higher People's Court (2014) Wan Min Er Zhong Zi No. 00389, Hefei Intermediate People's Court ( 2012 ) He Min Si Chu Zi No. 00005 Civil Judgment; Second, dismiss the foreign company's litigation request.

 Referee reason

 The Supreme People's Court held that: First, the identification basis, jurisdiction and application of the law regarding the independent letter of guarantee fraud cases involved in this case. The parties to the dispute in this case, Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. and Costa Rica Bank’s permanent residence are located outside the country. This case is a foreign-related commercial dispute. According to Article VIII "foreign-related civil relations law applicable to the People's Republic of China,""qualitative civil relations with foreigners, the court shall apply the law" provisions, foreign group companies as foreign economic relations in Central America in the country of the parent company, is involved in the undertaking The applicant was opened, and the application for the CCB Anhui Branch opened a pay-as-you-go anti-guarantee letter to the Costa Rican bank, and the Costa Rican bank transferred the performance bond to the beneficiary Oriental Real Estate. According to the text of the letter of guarantee, the payment obligations of the Bank of Costa Rica and the Anhui Branch of CCB are independent of the basic transaction relationship and the legal relationship of the letter of guarantee application. Therefore, the above guarantee can be determined as a pay-as-you-go independent guarantee. The above-mentioned counter-guarantee guarantee can be determined as a reference. Pay the independent counter-guarantee letter. The foreign economic group company filed a lawsuit in the court of first instance on the grounds of letter of guarantee fraud. The nature of the case was a letter of credit fraud. The independent counter-guarantee letter requested to be stopped shall be issued by the CCB Anhui Branch, and the location of the branch shall be deemed to be the place where the infringement result claimed by the foreign economic group company. The court of first instance as the court of infringement has jurisdiction over the case. As the letter of guarantee in the case states that the Uniform Rules for Pay-As-You-Go Protection Letters shall apply, it shall be determined that the contents of the above-mentioned rules constitute an integral part of the dispute guarantee. According to Article 44 "foreign-related civil relations law applicable to the People's Republic of China,""Tort Liability, applicable to tort law" provides the "Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees" bond fraud involved were not identified criteria should be applied laws of People's Republic of China. China has not acceded to the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit. The parties to this case have not agreed to apply the above-mentioned conventions or to include the relevant contents of the Convention as a letter of guarantee for international transactions. According to the principle of autonomy of will, the UN Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Letters of Credit. Should not be applied.


Secondly, whether Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. as a beneficiary has prima facie evidence under the basic contract proves that its claim has a factual basis.



When the people's court hears the independent guarantee letter and the counter-guarantee case related to the independent guarantee, the review of the basic transaction shall adhere to the limited principle and the necessary principle. The scope of the review shall be limited to whether the beneficiary knows that the relative person of the basic contract does not have a basic contract. The fact of default under the item or the fact that there is no other payment resulting in the independent guarantee. Otherwise, a review of the underlying contract will shake the system value independent bond "first demand" in.

 According to Article 68 of the Supreme People's Court's Opinions on the Implementation of the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (Trial), fraud is mainly manifested in fictional facts and concealing the truth. According to the facts of the re- examination , the Bank of Costa Rica opened a performance bond numbered G051225 , which clearly stated that the documents required to be submitted for the realization of the letter of guarantee were: a document indicating the reasons for the execution of the letter of guarantee, and a notification to the Central American company to execute the letter of guarantee request. The date, the original of the letter of guarantee and the amendments that have been issued. Foreign Economic Corporation proposition East Property's conduct constituted fraud under separate Guarantee shall submit evidence of Oriental Land Company has one of the following acts when independence guarantees: 1. the claim submission of false or forged documents; 2. The claim is completely unfounded and credible. In this case, the guarantee guarantees “ the quality and patience of the materials used during the construction period, the losses caused by compensation or compensation, and/or the failure of the contractor to perform the obligations ” , which means that the guarantee guarantees the construction quality and other breach of contract. Consequently, the beneficiary simply submit preliminary evidence to prove the existence of construction quality problems, to meet the guarantee to achieve the required "documents executed instructions Guarantee reason." Case basis for performance of the contract, the Oriental Land Company's project supervisors Jose Brenes and Mauricio Mora on January 23, 2012 issued "project inspection reports." The report identified the construction project as “ poor construction ” and “ poor quality ” and required modification or repair. The “Project Engineering Inspection Report” constitutes prima facie evidence of the existence of construction quality problems.


The parties in this case should submit the “Project Engineering Inspection Report” to the Costa Rican Bank in the “Construction Contract” and under the guarantee letter. Therefore, Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. has the right to submit “ certification execution ” to the Costa Rican Bank. type bond reasons "of supporting documents, whether to submit the report to the Bank of Costa Rica does not affect the realization of the rights of its guarantee. In addition, the Construction Contract and the letter of guarantee do not stipulate that the above report must be issued by AIA International Architects or an international member of the American Institute of Architects. Therefore, whether Jose Brenes and Mauricio Mora have the International Membership of the American Institute of Architects It does not affect the project supervision report issued by the project supervision personnel as the contractor. Foreign Economic Corporation of Jose Brenes and Mauricio Mora are the Employer project supervisors identity is knowingly, when it issued "project inspection reports," and receive project funds and supervision of Jose Brenes identity Mauricio Mora is recognized, evidence which is sufficient to prove itself recognized Jose Brenes and Mauricio Mora supervision of the identity of evidence to the contrary Jose Brenes and Mauricio Mora issued a "project inspection report" false, can not logically self-consistent. Because the foreign economic group company failed to provide other evidence to prove that Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. has no factual basis or submitted false or forged documents, the Oriental Real Estate Company has a factual basis for applying to the Costa Rican Bank for the realization of the guarantee.



In summary, the "Project Engineering Inspection Report" constitutes the prima facie evidence of the breach of contract under the basic contract of the foreign economic group company. The evidence provided by the foreign economic group company is insufficient to prove that the above report is false or forged, and it is not enough to prove that Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. knows The counterparty of the underlying contract does not have the fact of default under the underlying contract or does not have other facts that result in the payment of the independent guarantee. Based on the breach of contract under the basic contract of Foreign Economic Group Corporation, Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd., according to the provisions of the contract, proposes that the realization of the rights under the independent guarantee does not constitute a letter of guarantee fraud.

Third, whether the default situation under the basic contract of the beneficiary of the independent letter of guarantee will necessarily constitute a fraudulent payment under the independent guarantee.

Foreign Economic Group believes that according to Article 12, Item 3, Item 4 and Item 5 of the Supreme People's Court Regulations on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Independent Guarantee Letter Disputes (hereinafter referred to as the Judicial Interpretation of the Independent Guarantee Letter), Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. The company constitutes an independent letter of fraud. According to the provisions of Article 25 of the judicial interpretation of the independent guarantee, the court explained that the foreign economic group company still insisted that the handling of this case should not violate the spirit of the judicial interpretation of the independent guarantee. In conjunction with the claims of the Foreign Economic Group Corporation, the Supreme People's Court further explained the relevant issues concerning the judicial interpretation of the independent guarantee.


The independent guarantee is independent of the basic transaction between the principal and the beneficiary. The bank issuing the independent guarantee is only responsible for reviewing whether the documents submitted by the beneficiary meet the requirements of the terms of the guarantee and have the right to decide whether to pay or not. The guarantee obligation of the guarantee bank is not entrusted. The impact of the right of defense under the underlying transaction between the person and the beneficiary. As a beneficiary, Orient Real Estate Co., Ltd., when submitting prima facie evidence of the existence of engineering quality problems, does not affect the realization of its letter of guarantee rights even if it does not initiate any dispute resolution procedures such as litigation or arbitration and confirms the breach of contract by the above procedures. Even if there is an ongoing litigation or arbitration procedure in the underlying contract, as long as the relevant dispute resolution procedure has not yet made the final determination of the underlying transaction debtor's failure to pay or compensation, it does not affect the realization of the beneficiary's guarantee right. In other words, even if the effective judgment or arbitral award determines that the beneficiary constitutes a breach of contract under the underlying contract, the existence of the fact of default does not necessarily constitute a sufficient and necessary condition for the “ fraud ” of the letter of guarantee .


In this case, the guarantee of the guarantee is the quality of construction and other breach of contract, and there is no logical causal relationship between the fact of default of the beneficiary's failure to pay the project and the quality of the project. Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. as the beneficiary, its own underlying contract The breach of contract in the performance does not necessarily constitute a fraudulent claim under the independent guarantee. The independent protection letter judicial interpretation of the provisions of Article 12, paragraph 3, the conditions for the identification of the independent guarantee fraud is limited to "the court judgment or arbitral award determines that the underlying transaction debtor has no payment or liability " , therefore, unless otherwise agreed in the letter of guarantee,基础合同的审查应当限定在保函担保范围内的履约事项，在将受益人自身在基础合同中是否存在违约行为纳入保函欺诈的审查范围时应当十分审慎。 Although the Costa Rican Association of United Architects and engineers make an arbitral award, the Oriental Land Company finds breach of contract during the performance of the contract, but these arbitration proceedings in 2012 Nian 2 Yue 7 launch date by the Foreign Economic Corporation, Oriental Land Company did not make a counterclaim , 2013 Nian 7 Yue 9 arbitration day made the decision only finds Oriental Land company for breach of the company's request for foreign economic issues, but not recognized by the presence of Foreign Economic Corporation and other breach of payment or exempt from liability. Therefore, it cannot be determined according to the content of the above arbitral award that Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. constitutes the letter of guarantee fraud under Article 12, Paragraph 3 of the Judicial Interpretation of the Independent Guarantee.

In addition, the facts of the dispute between the two parties on the quality of the project and the statement on the quality of the project in the Arbitration Award made by the Center for Dispute Resolution of the Association of Architects and Engineers of Costa Rica can be corroborated by the Foreign Construction Central American Company in the Construction Contract. The obligations under it have not been fully fulfilled. In this case, there is no situation in which Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd. confirms that the underlying transaction debt has been fully fulfilled or that the payment due event has not occurred. The existing evidence also does not prove that Orient Real Estate Company knows that it has no right to pay and still abuses its rights. As a beneficiary, Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd., its own breach of contract in the performance of the basic contract, although confirmed by the arbitral award, did not exempt the group company from payment or liability. In summary, even if the judicial interpretation of the independent guarantee letter is applied in accordance with the claim of the foreign economic group company, the case does not constitute a letter of guarantee fraud.

 Fourth, regarding the issue of the independent counter-guarantee letter related to the independent guarantee in this case.

Based on the characteristics of the independent guarantee, the guarantor constitutes the direct payment responsibility to the beneficiary outside the debtor, and there is no right of defense between the independent guarantee and the main debt, even if the debtor exercises the right of defense in a dispute resolution procedure, and It does not of course give the independent guarantor the benefit of the defence. In addition, even if there is a fraudulent claim by the beneficiary under the independent guarantee, it cannot be presumed that the guarantee bank constitutes a fraudulent claim under the independent counter-guarantee letter. Only when the guarantee bank knows that the beneficiary is fraudulent and pays in violation of the principle of good faith, and asserts the amount under the independent counter-guarantee letter to the counter-guarantee bank, can the secured bank constitute a fraudulent claim under the independent counter-guarantee letter.

The foreign economic group company filed the lawsuit on the grounds of letter of guarantee fraud, which should prove that the Costa Rican bank knew that there was an independent letter of guarantee fraud in the case of Dongfang Real Estate Co., Ltd., and still paid in violation of the principle of good faith, and then acted as a beneficiary to pay for the independent counter-guarantee. A request for a claim is made under the letter and constitutes a fraudulent claim under the counter-guarantee letter. At present, the foreign economic group company can not only prove that the Costa Rican bank has fraudulently paid the amount of the independent guarantee letter to the Oriental Real Estate Company, nor has it proved that the Costa Rican bank has fraudulent claims under the independent counter-guarantee letter, and its claim to stop the independent counter-guarantee. There is no factual basis for the amount under the letter.

(Effective referee judges: Chen Jizhong, Yang Honglei, Yang Xingye)
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指导案例110号
交通运输部南海救助局诉阿昌格罗斯投资公司、
香港安达欧森有限公司上海代表处
海难救助合同纠纷案
（最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过2019年2月25日发布）
2019-02-25 11:21:12 | 来源：最高人民法院
　　裁判要点

　　1. 《1989年国际救助公约》和我国海商法规定救助合同“无效果无报酬”，但均允许当事人对救助报酬的确定可以另行约定。若当事人明确约定，无论救助是否成功，被救助方均应支付报酬，且以救助船舶每马力小时和人工投入等作为计算报酬的标准时，则该合同系雇佣救助合同，而非上述国际公约和我国海商法规定的救助合同。

　　2. 在《1989年国际救助公约》和我国海商法对雇佣救助合同没有具体规定的情况下，可以适用我国合同法的相关规定确定当事人的权利义务。

　　相关法条

　　《中华人民共和国合同法》第8条、第107条

　　《中华人民共和国海商法》第179条

　　基本案情

　　交通运输部南海救助局（以下简称南海救助局）诉称：“加百利”轮在琼州海峡搁浅后，南海救助局受阿昌格罗斯投资公司(以下简称投资公司)委托提供救助、交通、守护等服务，但投资公司一直未付救助费用。请求法院判令投资公司和香港安达欧森有限公司上海代表处（以下简称上海代表处）连带支付救助费用7240998.24元及利息。

　　法院经审理查明：投资公司所属“加百利”轮系希腊籍油轮，载有卡宾达原油54580吨。2011年8月12日0500时左右在琼州海峡北水道附近搁浅，船舶及船载货物处于危险状态，严重威胁海域环境安全。事故发生后，投资公司立即授权上海代表处就“加百利”轮搁浅事宜向南海救助局发出紧急邮件，请南海救助局根据经验安排两艘拖轮进行救助，并表示同意南海救助局的报价。

　　8月12日2040时，上海代表处通过电子邮件向南海救助局提交委托书，委托南海救助局派出“南海救116”轮和“南海救101”轮到现场协助“加百利”轮出浅，承诺无论能否成功协助出浅，均同意按每马力小时3.2元的费率付费，计费周期为拖轮自其各自的值班待命点备车开始起算至上海代表处通知任务结束、拖轮回到原值班待命点为止。“南海救116”轮和“南海救101”轮只负责拖带作业，“加百利”轮脱浅作业过程中如发生任何意外南海救助局无需负责。另，请南海救助局派遣一组潜水队员前往“加百利”轮探摸，费用为：陆地调遣费10000元；水上交通费55000元；作业费每8小时40000元，计费周期为潜水员登上交通船开始起算，到作业完毕离开交通船上岸为止。8月13日，投资公司还提出租用“南海救201”轮将其两名代表从海口运送至“加百利”轮。南海救助局向上海代表处发邮件称，“南海救201”轮费率为每马力小时1.5元，根据租用时间计算总费用。

　　与此同时，为预防危险局面进一步恶化造成海上污染，湛江海事局决定对“加百利”轮采取强制过驳减载脱浅措施。经湛江海事局组织安排，8月18日“加百利”轮利用高潮乘潮成功脱浅，之后安全到达目的港广西钦州港。

　　南海救助局实际参与的救助情况如下：

　　南海救助局所属“南海救116”轮总吨为3681，总功率为9000千瓦（12240马力）。“南海救116”轮到达事故现场后，根据投资公司的指示，一直在事故现场对“加百利”轮进行守护，共工作155.58小时。

　　南海救助局所属“南海救101”轮总吨为4091，总功率为13860千瓦（18850马力）。该轮未到达事故现场即返航。南海救助局主张该轮工作时间共计13.58小时。

　　南海救助局所属“南海救201”轮总吨为552，总功率为4480千瓦（6093马力）。8月13日，该轮运送2名船东代表登上搁浅船，工作时间为7.83小时。8月16日，该轮运送相关人员及设备至搁浅船，工作时间为7.75小时。8月18日，该轮将相关人员及行李运送上过驳船，工作时间为8.83小时。

　　潜水队员未实际下水作业，工作时间为8小时。

　　另查明涉案船舶的获救价值为30531856美元，货物的获救价值为48053870美元，船舶的获救价值占全部获救价值的比例为38.85%。

　　裁判结果

　　广州海事法院于2014年3月28日作出(2012)广海法初字第898号民事判决:一、投资公司向南海救助局支付救助报酬6592913.58元及利息；二、驳回南海救助局的其他诉讼请求。投资公司不服一审判决，提起上诉。广东省高级人民法院于2015年6月16日作出（2014）粤高法民四终字第117号民事判决:一、撤销广州海事法院（2012）广海法初字第898号民事判决;二、投资公司向南海救助局支付救助报酬2561346.93元及利息；三、驳回南海救助局的其他诉讼请求。南海救助局不服二审判决，申请再审。最高人民法院于2016年7月7日作出（2016）最高法民再61号民事判决: 一、撤销广东省高级人民法院（2014）粤高法民四终字第117号民事判决；二、维持广州海事法院（2012）广海法初字第898号民事判决。

　　裁判理由

　　最高人民法院认为，本案系海难救助合同纠纷。中华人民共和国加入了《1989年国际救助公约》（以下简称救助公约），救助公约所确立的宗旨在本案中应予遵循。因投资公司是希腊公司，“加百利”轮为希腊籍油轮，本案具有涉外因素。各方当事人在诉讼中一致选择适用中华人民共和国法律，根据《中华人民共和国涉外民事关系法律适用法》第三条的规定，适用中华人民共和国法律对本案进行审理。我国海商法作为调整海上运输关系、船舶关系的特别法，应优先适用。海商法没有规定的，适用我国合同法等相关法律的规定。

　　海难救助是一项传统的国际海事法律制度，救助公约和我国海商法对此作了专门规定。救助公约第十二条、海商法第一百七十九条规定了“无效果无报酬”的救助报酬支付原则，救助公约第十三条、海商法第一百八十条及第一百八十三条在该原则基础上进一步规定了报酬的评定标准与具体承担。上述条款是对当事人基于“无效果无报酬”原则确定救助报酬的海难救助合同的具体规定。与此同时，救助公约和我国海商法均允许当事人对救助报酬的确定另行约定。因此，在救助公约和我国海商法规定的“无效果无报酬”救助合同之外，还可以依当事人的约定形成雇佣救助合同。

　　根据本案查明的事实，投资公司与南海救助局经过充分磋商，明确约定无论救助是否成功，投资公司均应支付报酬，且“加百利”轮脱浅作业过程中如发生任何意外，南海救助局无需负责。依据该约定，南海救助局救助报酬的获得与否和救助是否有实际效果并无直接联系，而救助报酬的计算，是以救助船舶每马力小时，以及人工投入等事先约定的固定费率和费用作为依据，与获救财产的价值并无关联。因此，本案所涉救助合同不属于救助公约和我国海商法所规定的“无效果无报酬”救助合同，而属雇佣救助合同。

　　关于雇佣救助合同下的报酬支付条件及标准，救助公约和我国海商法并未作具体规定。一、二审法院依据海商法第一百八十条规定的相关因素对当事人在雇佣救助合同中约定的固定费率予以调整，属适用法律错误。本案应依据我国合同法的相关规定，对当事人的权利义务予以规范和确定。南海救助局以其与投资公司订立的合同为依据，要求投资公司全额支付约定的救助报酬并无不当。

　　综上，二审法院以一审判决确定的救助报酬数额为基数，依照海商法的规定，判令投资公司按照船舶获救价值占全部获救财产价值的比例支付救助报酬，适用法律和处理结果错误，应予纠正。一审判决适用法律错误，但鉴于一审判决对相关费率的调整是以当事人的合同约定为基础，南海救助局对此并未行使相关诉讼权利提出异议，一审判决结果可予维持。

　　（生效裁判审判人员：贺荣、张勇健、王淑梅、余晓汉、郭载宇）



 
Guidance Case No. 110
Nanhai Rescue Bureau of the Ministry of Transport v. Achang Gross Investment Co.,
Hong Kong Anda Ossen Co., Ltd. Shanghai Representative Office
Shipwreck rescue contract dispute

(Supreme People's Court Judicial Committee discussed and approved 2019 Nian 2 Yue 25 release date)
2019-02-25 11:21:12 | Source: Supreme People's Court

Referee points

　　 1. " 1989 International Convention on Salvage," and our maritime salvage contract provisions " no cure no pay " , but allows the determination of both parties to a salvage reward can be agreed. If the parties expressly agree that the rescued party shall pay remuneration regardless of whether the rescue is successful or not, and that the rescued ship’s horsepower per hour and labor input are used as the standard for calculating remuneration, the contract is a employment assistance contract instead of the above-mentioned international conventions and China. A bailout contract stipulated by the Maritime Law.

 　　 2. In the case that the International Convention on Relief in 1989 and the Maritime Law of China have no specific provisions on employment assistance contracts, the relevant provisions of China's contract law may be applied to determine the rights and obligations of the parties.


Related law

 Articles 8 and 107 of the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China
Article 179 of the Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China



Basic case

 The South China Sea Rescue Bureau of the Ministry of Transport (hereinafter referred to as the South China Sea Rescue Bureau) alleged that: After the “ Gabriel ” round was stranded in the Qiongzhou Strait, the Nanhai Rescue Bureau was commissioned by Achang Gross Investment Company ( hereinafter referred to as the investment company ) to provide assistance, transportation and protection. Waiting for services, but the investment company has not paid the bailout fee. The court was ordered to order the investment company and the Hong Kong Anda Ossen Co., Ltd. Shanghai Representative Office (hereinafter referred to as the Shanghai Representative Office) to pay the rescue fee of 7,240,998.24 yuan and interest.

 The court found through trial that the “ Gabriel ” wheel of the investment company was a Greek tanker carrying 54580 tons of Cabinda crude oil . 2011 Nian 8 Yue 12 Ri 0500 at around near the Qiongzhou Strait North Channel aground, and the goods on board the ship at risk, a serious threat to the environment safe waters. After the accident, immediately authorized investment company Shanghai representative office to " Gabriel " round stranded matters issued an urgent message to the South China Sea Rescue Bureau, the South China Sea Rescue Bureau were requested relief arrangements based on experience two tugs, and agreed to offer South China Sea Rescue Bureau.

 　　 8 Yue 12 Ri 2040 , the Shanghai representative office in South China Sea Rescue Bureau to submit a power of attorney by e-mail, commissioned by the South China Sea Rescue Bureau sent a " South China Sea rescue 116" round and " South China Sea rescue 101" turn to the scene to help , " Gabriel ," rounds out the light Commitment, regardless of whether it can successfully assist in the light, agree to pay at a rate of 3.2 yuan per horsepower hour . The billing cycle is for the tugboat to start from the time of the standby duty station to the Shanghai representative office, and the tugboat returns. The original duty is on standby. The “ Nanhai Rescue 116” and “ Nanhai Rescue 101” rounds are only responsible for towing operations. If there is any accident during the “ Gabriel ” wheel deviation operation, the South China Sea Rescue Bureau is not responsible. In addition, please ask the Nanhai Rescue Bureau to send a group of diving members to the " Gabriel " round of exploration, the cost is: land transfer fee of 10,000 yuan; water transportation fee of 55,000 yuan; operating fee of 40000 per 8 hours Yuan, the billing cycle starts when the diver boardes the traffic ship, and leaves the traffic ship ashore until the operation is completed. On August 13 , the investment company also proposed to rent the " Nanhai Rescue 201" round to transport its two representatives from Haikou to the " Gabriel " round. The South China Sea Rescue Bureau sent an email to the Shanghai Representative Office saying that the “ Nanhai Rescue 201” round rate is 1.5 yuan per horsepower hour , and the total cost is calculated based on the rental time.

At the same time, in order to prevent further deterioration of the dangerous situation and cause marine pollution, the Zhanjiang Maritime Safety Administration decided to take measures to force offloading and de-loading the " Gabriel " round. By Zhanjiang Maritime Bureau organization, 8 Yue 18 Ri " Gabriel " round off the successful use climax tide shallow, after the safe arrival destination Qinzhou Port.

The actual assistance of the South China Sea Rescue Bureau is as follows:

The total capacity of the Nanhai Rescue Bureau's “ Nanhai Rescue 116” is 3681 , and the total power is 9000 kW ( 12,240 hp). After the " Nanhai Rescue 116" round arrived at the scene of the accident, according to the instructions of the investment company, the " Gabriel " round was guarded at the scene of the accident , working a total of 155.58 hours.

 South China Sea Rescue Bureau belongs to " the South China Sea rescue 101" round gross tonnage is 4091 , the total power of 13860 kW ( 18,850 hp). The round returned to the scene of the accident. The South China Sea Rescue Bureau claimed that the total working time of the round was 13.58 hours.

The South China Sea Rescue Bureau's “ Nanhai Rescue 201” has a total tonnage of 552 and a total power of 4,480 kW ( 6093 hp). On August 13 , the ship transported two shipowners to board the stranded ship, working for 7.83 hours. On August 16 , the ship transported relevant personnel and equipment to the stranded ship, and the working time was 7.75 hours. On August 18th , the relevant personnel and baggage were transported to the barge, and the working time was 8.83 hours.

 The diving team did not actually work in the water, and the working time was 8 hours.

 It was also found that the salvage value of the vessel involved was $ 305,31856 , the salvage value of the cargo was $ 480,538,700 , and the salvage value of the ship accounted for 38.85% of the total salvage value .

 Referee result

 Guangzhou Maritime Court in 2014 Nian 3 Yue 28 to May (2012) wide Haifa Chu Zi 898 No civil judgments : First, the investment company pay to salvage the South China Sea Rescue Bureau 6592913.58 million and interest; Second, dismissed the other claims of the South China Sea Rescue Bureau request. The investment company refused to accept the first-instance judgment and filed an appeal. Guangdong Provincial Higher People's Court in 2015 Nian 6 Yue 16 to May ( 2014 ) Guangdong Supreme Min Si Zhong Zi 117 No civil judgments : First, remove (Guangzhou Maritime Court 2012 ) wide Haifa Chu Zi 898 number of civil judgments ; Second, investment The company paid the rescue fee of 2,561,134.93 yuan and interest to the Nanhai Rescue Bureau ; 3. Dismissed other claims from the Nanhai Rescue Bureau. The South China Sea Rescue Bureau refused to accept the second instance judgment and applied for retrial. Supreme People's Court in 2016 Nian 7 Yue 7 a day to make ( 2016 ) and then up to France and China 61 No. Civil Judgment : 1. Cancellation of the Guangdong Provincial Higher People's Court ( 2014 ) Guangdong Gao Famin Si Zhong Zi No. 117 Civil Judgment; 2. Maintaining the Civil Judgment of the Guangzhou Maritime Court ( 2012 ) Guanghai Fa Chu Zi No. 898 .

Referee reason

The Supreme People's Court held that this case is a shipwreck rescue contract dispute. The People’s Republic of China has acceded to the International Convention on Relief of 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the bailout convention), and the purposes established by the bailout convention should be followed in this case. Since the investment company is a Greek company, the “ Gabriel ” round is a Greek-based tanker. This case has foreign-related factors. The parties concerned unanimously chose to apply the laws of the People's Republic of China in the lawsuit, and the law of the People's Republic of China shall be applied to hear the case in accordance with the provisions of Article 3 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the Application of Foreign-related Civil Relations Law. China's maritime law, as a special law to adjust the relationship between maritime transport and ships, should be applied first. If there is no stipulation in the Maritime Law, the provisions of the relevant laws of China's contract law shall apply.

Shipwreck rescue is a traditional international maritime legal system. The bailout convention and China’s maritime law have made special provisions. Article 12 of the Salvation Convention and Article 179 of the Maritime Law stipulate the principle of “ no effect and no remuneration ” for the payment of salvage remuneration, Article 13 of the Salvation Convention, Article 180 of the Maritime Law and the one hundred and eighty Article 13 further stipulates the evaluation criteria and specific commitments of remuneration on the basis of this principle. The above-mentioned clauses are specific provisions for the shipwreck rescue contract for the parties to determine the salvage compensation based on the principle of “ no effect and no remuneration ” . At the same time, both the bailout convention and the Chinese maritime law allow parties to agree on the determination of salvage remuneration. Therefore, in addition to the “ no effect and no remuneration ” bailout contract stipulated in the bailout convention and China’s maritime law , an employment bailout contract can be formed according to the agreement of the parties.

 According to the facts ascertained in this case, the investment company and the Nanhai Rescue Bureau have fully negotiated that the investment company should pay the remuneration regardless of the success of the rescue, and if there is any accident during the “ Gabriel ” round of the shallow operation, the South China Sea rescue The bureau does not need to be responsible. According to the agreement, there is no direct connection between the acquisition of the remuneration of the South China Rescue Bureau and the actual effect of the rescue. The calculation of the salvage remuneration is based on the fixed rate and cost agreed upon per hour of horsepower and labor input. As a basis, it is not related to the value of the property being rescued. Therefore, the bailout contract involved in this case does not belong to the “ no effect and no remuneration ” bailout contract stipulated in the bailout convention and China’s maritime law , but is an employment bailout contract.

There are no specific provisions on the payment terms and standards for remuneration under the employment assistance contract, the bailout convention and the Chinese Maritime Law. The first and second instance courts adjust the fixed rate agreed upon by the parties in the employment assistance contract in accordance with the relevant factors stipulated in Article 180 of the Maritime Law, which is an error in applicable law. This case shall be based on the relevant provisions of China's contract law, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be standardized and determined. The South China Sea Rescue Bureau relies on its contract with the investment company to require the investment company to pay the agreed salvage payment in full.

To sum up, the court of second instance, based on the amount of salvage compensation determined in the first instance judgment, in accordance with the provisions of the Maritime Law, the investment company is ordered to pay salvage remuneration in proportion to the value of the salvage value of the ship in the total value of the salvage property, and the applicable law and the result of the treatment are wrong. correct. The first-instance judgment applies a legal error, but in view of the fact that the first-instance judgment adjusts the relevant rate based on the contractual agreement of the parties, the Nanhai Rescue Bureau has not challenged the relevant litigation rights, and the judgment of the first instance can be maintained.

(Effective referee judges: He Rong, Zhang Yongjian, Wang Shumei, Yu Xiaohan, Guo Zaiyu)
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指导案例111号
中国建设银行股份有限公司广州荔湾支行诉广东
蓝粤能源发展有限公司等信用证开证纠纷案
（最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过2019年2月25日发布）
2019-02-25 11:22:58 | 来源：最高人民法院
　　裁判要点

　　1.提单持有人是否因受领提单的交付而取得物权以及取得何种类型的物权，取决于合同的约定。开证行根据其与开证申请人之间的合同约定持有提单时，人民法院应结合信用证交易的特点，对案涉合同进行合理解释，确定开证行持有提单的真实意思表示。

　　2.开证行对信用证项下单据中的提单以及提单项下的货物享有质权的，开证行行使提单质权的方式与行使提单项下货物动产质权的方式相同，即对提单项下货物折价、变卖、拍卖后所得价款享有优先受偿权。

　　相关法条

　　《中华人民共和国海商法》第71条

　　《中华人民共和国物权法》第224条

　　《中华人民共和国合同法》第80条第1款

　　基本案情

　　中国建设银行股份有限公司广州荔湾支行（以下简称建行广州荔湾支行）与广东蓝粤能源发展有限公司（以下简称蓝粤能源公司）于2011年12月签订了《贸易融资额度合同》及《关于开立信用证的特别约定》等相关附件，约定该行向蓝粤能源公司提供不超过5.5亿元的贸易融资额度，包括开立等值额度的远期信用证。惠来粤东电力燃料有限公司（以下简称粤东电力）等担保人签订了保证合同等。2012年11月，蓝粤能源公司向建行广州荔湾支行申请开立8592万元的远期信用证。为开立信用证，蓝粤能源公司向建行广州荔湾支行出具了《信托收据》，并签订了《保证金质押合同》。《信托收据》确认自收据出具之日起，建行广州荔湾支行即取得上述信用证项下所涉单据和货物的所有权，建行广州荔湾支行为委托人和受益人，蓝粤能源公司为信托货物的受托人。信用证开立后，蓝粤能源公司进口了164998吨煤炭。建行广州荔湾支行承兑了信用证，并向蓝粤能源公司放款84867952.27元，用于蓝粤能源公司偿还建行首尔分行的信用证垫款。建行广州荔湾支行履行开证和付款义务后，取得了包括本案所涉提单在内的全套单据。蓝粤能源公司因经营状况恶化而未能付款赎单，故建行广州荔湾支行在本案审理过程中仍持有提单及相关单据。提单项下的煤炭因其他纠纷被广西防城港市港口区人民法院查封。建行广州荔湾支行提起诉讼，请求判令蓝粤能源公司向建行广州荔湾支行清偿信用证垫款本金84867952.27元及利息；确认建行广州荔湾支行对信用证项下164998吨煤炭享有所有权，并对处置该财产所得款项优先清偿上述信用证项下债务；粤东电力等担保人承担担保责任。

　　裁判结果

　　广东省广州市中级人民法院于2014年4月21日作出（2013）穗中法金民初字第158号民事判决，支持建行广州荔湾支行关于蓝粤能源公司还本付息以及担保人承担相应担保责任的诉请，但以信托收据及提单交付不能对抗第三人为由，驳回建行广州荔湾支行关于请求确认煤炭所有权以及优先受偿权的诉请。建行广州荔湾支行不服一审判决，提起上诉。广东省高级人民法院于2014年9月19日作出（2014）粤高法民二终字第45号民事判决，驳回上诉，维持原判。建行广州荔湾支行不服二审判决，向最高人民法院申请再审。最高人民法院于2015年10月19日作出（2015）民提字第126号民事判决，支持建行广州荔湾支行对案涉信用证项下提单对应货物处置所得价款享有优先受偿权，驳回其对案涉提单项下货物享有所有权的诉讼请求。

　　裁判理由

　　最高人民法院认为，提单具有债权凭证和所有权凭证的双重属性，但并不意味着谁持有提单谁就当然对提单项下货物享有所有权。对于提单持有人而言，其能否取得物权以及取得何种类型的物权，取决于当事人之间的合同约定。建行广州荔湾支行履行了开证及付款义务并取得信用证项下的提单，但是由于当事人之间没有移转货物所有权的意思表示，故不能认为建行广州荔湾支行取得提单即取得提单项下货物的所有权。虽然《信托收据》约定建行广州荔湾支行取得货物的所有权，并委托蓝粤能源公司处置提单项下的货物，但根据物权法定原则，该约定因构成让与担保而不能发生物权效力。然而，让与担保的约定虽不能发生物权效力，但该约定仍具有合同效力，且《关于开立信用证的特别约定》约定蓝粤能源公司违约时，建行广州荔湾支行有权处分信用证项下单据及货物，因此根据合同整体解释以及信用证交易的特点，表明当事人真实意思表示是通过提单的流转而设立提单质押。本案符合权利质押设立所须具备的书面质押合同和物权公示两项要件，建行广州荔湾支行作为提单持有人，享有提单权利质权。建行广州荔湾支行的提单权利质权如果与其他债权人对提单项下货物所可能享有的留置权、动产质权等权利产生冲突的，可在执行分配程序中依法予以解决。

　　（生效裁判审判人员：刘贵祥、刘敏、高晓力）


Guidance Case No. 111
China Construction Bank Corporation Guangzhou Liwan Branch v. Guangdong
Lan Yue Energy Development Co., Ltd. and other letters of credit issue dispute
(Supreme People's Court Judicial Committee discussed and approved 2019 Nian 2 Yue 25 release date)
2019-02-25 11:22:58 | Source: Supreme People's Court

Referee points

 　　 1. Whether the holder of the bill of lading obtains the property right and the type of property acquired due to the delivery of the bill of lading depends on the contract. When the issuing bank holds the bill of lading according to the contract between the issuing bank and the applicant for the issuing of the certificate, the people's court shall, in conjunction with the characteristics of the letter of credit transaction, reasonably interpret the contract and determine the true meaning of the bill of lading held by the issuing bank.

　　 2. The issuing bank has the pledge of the bill of lading and the goods under the bill of lading in the documents under the letter of credit, and the issuing bank exercises the pledge of the bill of lading in the same way as the pledge of the movable property of the bill of lading, ie the bill of lading Under the item, the price of the goods will be discounted, sold, and auctioned.



Related law

 Article 71 of the Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China
Article 224 of the Property Law of the People's Republic of China
Article 80 , paragraph 1, of the Contract Law of the People's Republic of China


Basic case

 China Construction Bank branch in Guangzhou Liwan (hereinafter referred to as Construction Bank branch in Guangzhou Liwan) and Guangdong Guangdong Blue Energy Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to Guangdong Blue Energy Company) in 2011 Nian 12 Yue signed a "Trade Financing Line Contract" and "About Open Relevant annexes to the L/C and other relevant agreements stipulate that the bank will provide Lan Yue Energy Company with a trade financing limit of not more than 550 million yuan, including the opening of a forward letter of credit equivalent. Huilai Yuedong Electric Fuel Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Yuedong Electric Power Co., Ltd.) and other guarantors signed a guarantee contract. 2012 Nian 11 months, the blue energy companies to Guangdong Construction Bank branch in Guangzhou Liwan apply to open 8592 million in long-term credit. In order to open a letter of credit, Lanyue Energy Company issued the “Trust Receipt” to the CCB Guangzhou Liwan Branch and signed the “Margin Pledge Contract”. The "Trust Receipt" confirms that from the date of receipt of the receipt, CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch will obtain the ownership of the documents and goods under the above-mentioned letter of credit, CCB Guangzhou Liwan Branch actee and beneficiary, Lan Yue Energy Company as trust goods trustee. After the letter of credit was opened, Lan Yue Energy Company imported 164,998 tons of coal. CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch accepted the letter of credit and loaned 84,868,552.27 yuan to Lanyue Energy Co., Ltd. , which was used by Lanyue Energy to repay the letter of credit of CCB Seoul Branch. After the CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch fulfilled its obligation to issue certificates and pay, it obtained a full set of documents including the bill of lading involved in the case. Lan Yue Energy Company failed to pay the redemption order due to the deterioration of its operating conditions. Therefore, CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch still holds the bill of lading and related documents during the trial. The coal under the bill of lading was seized by the People's Court of the Port Area of ​​Fangchenggang City, Guangxi due to other disputes. Construction Bank branch in Guangzhou Liwan filed a lawsuit requesting an order Blue Guangdong energy company repay the principal amount of the letter of credit advances to the China Construction Bank branch in Guangzhou Liwan 84,867,952.27 Yuan and interest; confirm that CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch has ownership of 164,998 tons of coal under the letter of credit , and preferentially pay off the debts under the above-mentioned letters of credit for the disposal of the property; guarantors such as Yuedong Power assume the guarantee responsibility.

 Referee result

 Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, Intermediate People's Court in 2014 Nian 4 Yue 21 made (May 2013 ) Golden Spike France Minchuzi first 158 No. civil judgments, support Construction Bank branch in Guangzhou Liwan Guangdong on Blue Energy guarantor debt service and undertake corresponding security responsibility The petition, but the receipt of the trust receipt and the bill of lading could not be against the third party, dismissed the claim of the CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch for requesting confirmation of coal ownership and priority repayment. CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch refused to accept the first-instance judgment and filed an appeal. Guangdong Provincial Higher People's Court in 2014 Nian 9 Yue 19 to May ( 2014 ) Yue Gao Fa Min Er Zhong Zi 45 No. civil judgment, rejected the appeal and upheld the original verdict. CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch refused to accept the second-instance judgment and applied to the Supreme People's Court for retrial. Supreme People's Court in 2015 Nian 10 Yue 19 made (May 2015 ) Min Ti Zi of 126 No. civil judgments, Liwan, Guangzhou Branch of China Construction Bank support for the case involving letters of credit under the bill of lading proceeds from the disposal of goods that have priority claim, dismissed its The case involves a claim for ownership of the goods under the bill of lading.

 Referee reason

The Supreme People's Court held that the bill of lading has the dual attributes of the creditor's right certificate and the title certificate, but it does not mean that whoever holds the bill of lading will of course have ownership of the goods under the bill of lading. For holders of bills of lading, whether they can acquire property rights and what type of property rights are obtained depends on the contractual agreement between the parties. CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch fulfilled the obligation of issuing documents and payment and obtained the bill of lading under the letter of credit. However, because the parties did not transfer the ownership of the goods, it could not be considered that the CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch obtained the bill of lading and obtained the goods under the bill of lading. ownership. Although the "Record Receipt" stipulates that CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch obtains the ownership of the goods and entrusts Lan Yue Energy Company to dispose of the goods under the bill of lading, according to the statutory principle of property rights, the agreement cannot be effective because it constitutes a guarantee. However, although the agreement on the guarantee can not be effective, but the agreement still has the effect of the contract, and the “Special Agreement on Opening a Letter of Credit” stipulates that the Lan Yue Energy Company defaults, the CCB Guangzhou Liwan Branch has the right to dispose of the letter of credit. According to the overall interpretation of the contract and the characteristics of the letter of credit transaction, it indicates that the true meaning of the party is to establish the bill of lading by the circulation of the bill of lading. The case is in line with the written pledge contract and property rights disclosure required for the establishment of the right pledge. The CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch is the holder of the bill of lading and enjoys the right of pledge of the bill of lading. The pledge of the bill of lading rights of CCB Guangzhou Liwan Sub-branch may be resolved in accordance with the law in the implementation of the distribution procedure if it conflicts with other creditors’ rights to liens and movable property rights to the goods under the bill of lading.


(Effective referee judges: Liu Guixiang, Liu Min, Gao Xiaoli)
  
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指导案例112号
阿斯特克有限公司申请设立海事赔偿责任限制基金案
（最高人民法院审判委员会讨论通过2019年2月25日发布）
2019-02-25 11:24:16 | 来源：最高人民法院
　　裁判要点

　　海商法第二百一十二条确立海事赔偿责任限制实行“一次事故，一个限额，多次事故，多个限额”的原则。判断一次事故还是多次事故的关键是分析事故之间是否因同一原因所致。如果因同一原因发生多个事故，且原因链没有中断的，应认定为一次事故。如果原因链中断并再次发生事故，则应认定为形成新的独立事故。

　　相关法条

　　《中华人民共和国海商法》第212条

　　基本案情

　　阿斯特克有限公司向天津海事法院提出申请称，其所属的“艾侬”轮收到养殖损害索赔请求。对于该次事故所造成的非人身伤亡损失，阿斯特克有限公司作为该轮的船舶所有人申请设立海事赔偿责任限制基金，责任限额为422510特别提款权及该款项自2014年6月5日起至基金设立之日止的利息。

　　众多养殖户作为利害关系人提出异议，认为阿斯特克有限公司应当分别设立限制基金，而不能就整个航次设立一个限制基金。

　　法院查明：涉案船舶韩国籍“艾侬”轮的所有人为阿斯特克有限公司，船舶总吨位为2030吨。2014年6月5日，“艾侬”轮自秦皇岛开往天津港装货途中，在河北省昌黎县、乐亭县海域驶入养殖区域，造成了相关养殖户的养殖损失。

　　另查明，“艾侬”轮在本案损害事故发生时使用英版1249号海图，该海图已标明本案损害事故发生的海域设置了养殖区，并划定了养殖区范围。涉案船舶为执行涉案航次所预先设定的航线穿越该养殖区。

　　再查明，郭金武与刘海忠的养殖区相距约500米左右，涉案船舶航行时间约2分钟；刘海忠与李卫国等人的养殖区相距约9000米左右，涉案船舶航行时间约30分钟。

　　裁判结果

　　天津海事法院于2014年11月10日作出（2014）津海法限字第1号民事裁定：一、准许阿斯特克有限公司提出的设立海事赔偿责任限制基金的申请。二、海事赔偿责任限制基金数额为422510特别提款权及利息（利息自2014年6月5日起至基金设立之日止，按中国人民银行确定的金融机构同期一年期贷款基准利率计算）。三、阿斯特克有限公司应在裁定生效之日起三日内以人民币或法院认可的担保设立海事赔偿责任限制基金（基金的人民币数额按本裁定生效之日的特别提款权对人民币的换算办法计算）。逾期不设立基金的，按自动撤回申请处理。郭金武、刘海忠不服一审裁定，向天津市高级人民法院提起上诉。天津市高级人民法院于2015年1月19日作出（2015）津高民四终字第10号民事裁定：驳回上诉，维持原裁定。郭金武、刘海忠、李卫国、赵来军、齐永平、李建永、齐秀奎不服二审裁定，申请再审。最高人民法院于2015年8月10日作出（2015）民申字第853号民事裁定，提审本案，并于2015年9月29日作出（2015）民提字第151号民事裁定：一、撤销天津市高级人民法院（2015）津高民四终字第10号民事裁定。二、撤销天津海事法院（2014）津海法限字第1号民事裁定。三、驳回阿斯特克有限公司提出的设立海事赔偿责任限制基金的申请。

　　裁判理由

　　最高人民法院认为，海商法第二百一十二条确立海事赔偿责任限制实行事故原则，即“一次事故，一个限额，多次事故，多个限额”。判断一次还是多次事故的关键是分析两次事故之间是否因同一原因所致。如果因同一原因发生多个事故，但原因链没有中断，则应认定为一个事故。如果原因链中断，有新的原因介入，则新的原因与新的事故构成新的因果关系，形成新的独立事故。就本案而言，涉案“艾侬”轮所使用的英版海图明确标注了养殖区范围，但船员却将航线设定到养殖区，本身存在重大过错。涉案船舶在预知所经临的海域可能存在大面积养殖区的情形下，应加强瞭望义务，保证航行安全，避免冲撞养殖区造成损失。根据涉案船舶航行轨迹，涉案船舶实际驶入了郭金武经营的养殖区。鉴于损害事故发生于中午时分，并无夜间的视觉障碍，如船员谨慎履行瞭望和驾驶义务，应能注意到海面上悬挂养殖物浮球的存在。在昌黎县海洋局出具证据证明郭金武遭受实际损害的情形下，可以推定船员未履行谨慎瞭望义务，导致第一次侵权行为发生。依据航行轨迹，船舶随后进入刘海忠的养殖区，由于郭金武与刘海忠的养殖区毗邻，相距约500米，基于船舶运动的惯性及船舶驾驶规律，涉案船舶在当时情形下无法采取合理措施避让刘海忠的养殖区，致使第二次侵权行为发生。从原因上分析，两次损害行为均因船舶驶入郭金武养殖区之前，船员疏于瞭望的过失所致，属同一原因，且原因链并未中断，故应将两次侵权行为认定为一次事故。船舶驶离刘海忠的养殖区进入开阔海域，航行约9000米，时长约半小时后进入李卫国等人的养殖区再次造成损害事故。在进入李卫国等人的养殖区之前，船员应有较为充裕的时间调整驾驶疏忽的心理状态，且在预知航行前方还有养殖区存在的情形下，更应加强瞭望义务，避免再次造成损害。涉案船舶显然未尽到谨慎驾驶的义务，致使第二次损害事故的发生。两次事故之间无论从时间关系还是从主观状态均无关联性，第二次事故的发生并非第一次事故自然延续所致，两次事故之间并无因果关系。阿斯特克有限公司主张在整个事故发生过程中船员错误驶入的心理状态没有变化，原因链没有中断的理由不能成立。虽然两次事故的发生均因“同一性质的原因”，即船员疏忽驾驶所致，但并非基于“同一原因”，引起两次事故。依据“一次事故，一次限额”的原则，涉案船舶应分别针对两次事故设立不同的责任限制基金。一、二审法院未能全面考察养殖区的位置、两次事故之间的因果关系及当事人的主观状态，作出涉案船舶仅造成一次事故，允许涉案船舶设立一个基金的认定错误，依法应予纠正。

　　（生效裁判审判人员：王淑梅、傅晓强、黄西武）

Guidance Case No. 112
Astek Co., Ltd. applied for the establishment of a maritime liability limitation fund case
(Supreme People's Court Judicial Committee discussed and approved 2019 Nian 2 Yue 25 release date)
2019-02-25 11:24:16 | Source: Supreme People's Court

Referee points

 Article 211 of the Maritime Law establishes the principle of “ one accident, one limit, multiple accidents, multiple limits ” for the limitation of liability for maritime claims . The key to judging an accident or multiple accidents is to analyze whether the accidents are caused by the same cause. If multiple accidents occur for the same reason and the cause chain is not interrupted, it shall be considered as an accident. If the cause chain is interrupted and an accident occurs again, it should be considered as a new independent incident.

 Related law

 Article 212 of the Maritime Law of the People's Republic of China

Basic case

 Astek Co., Ltd. filed an application with the Tianjin Maritime Court, claiming that its “ Ai ” round received a claim for aquaculture damage claim. For non-personal injury losses caused by the accident, Aspen Turk Co., Ltd. as the owner of the application round Limitation of Liability for Maritime Fund, the limits of liability to 422,510 Special Drawing Rights and the sum since 2014 Nian 6 Yue 5 Interest from the date of the establishment of the fund to the date of establishment of the fund.

 Many farmers have raised objections as interested parties and believe that Astike Co., Ltd. should set up a restricted fund separately, instead of setting up a restricted fund for the entire voyage.

The court found that the owner of the vessel involved in the Korean “ Ai ” round was Astike Co., Ltd., with a total tonnage of 2030 tons. 2014 Nian 6 Yue 5 days, " Ai Lennon " round the way from Qinhuangdao cargo bound for the port of Tianjin, into the farming region in Changli County, Hebei Province, Leting County waters, resulting in losses related to aquaculture farmers.

 It was also found that the " Ai Wei " round used the English version of No. 1249 in the event of the damage in this case . The chart has indicated that the aquaculture zone has been set up in the sea area where the accident occurred, and the scope of the culture zone has been delineated. The ship involved in the case crosses the breeding area for the route pre-set by the voyage involved.

 It was further found that Guo Jinwu and Liu Haizhong's breeding area are about 500 meters apart , and the sailing time of the ship involved is about 2 minutes; Liu Haizhong and Li Weiguo and other people's breeding areas are about 9000 meters away, and the sailing time of the ship involved is about 30 minutes.

Referee result

Tianjin Maritime Court in 2014 Nian 11 Yue 10 to May ( 2014 ) Zi Jin Haifa limit 1 Hao civil ruling: First, permit restrictions apply for the fund for maritime claims liability Aspen Turk Co. raised. Second, limit the amount of liability for maritime claims fund 422 510 Special Drawing Rights and interest (interest since 2014 Nian 6 Yue 5 day stop until the establishment of the fund, financial institutions, according to People's Bank of China to determine the one-year benchmark lending rate calculated over the same period) . 3. Astike Co., Ltd. shall establish a maritime liability limitation fund within three days from the date of the entry into force of the ruling by the renminbi or a court-approved guarantee (the renminbi amount of the fund shall be converted into RMB according to the special drawing right on the effective date of this ruling. Method calculation). If the fund is not established within the time limit, it shall be processed according to the automatic withdrawal of the application. Guo Jinwu and Liu Haizhong refused to accept the first-instance ruling and appealed to the Tianjin Higher People's Court. Tianjin Higher People's Court in 2015 Nian 1 Yue 19 a day to make ( 2015 ) Tianjin Gao Min Zhong Zi four 10 Hao civil ruling: dismiss the appeal and upheld the original ruling. Guo Jinwu, Liu Haizhong, Li Weiguo, Zhao Laijun, Qi Yongping, Li Jianyong and Qi Xiukui refused to accept the second instance ruling and applied for retrial. Supreme People's Court in 2015 Nian 8 Yue 10 a day to make ( 2015 ) Min Shen Zi 853 No. civil ruling, arraignment the case, and in 2015 Nian 9 Yue 29 made (May 2015 ) Min Ti Zi of 151 No civil ruling: First, remove the Tianjin Higher People's Court ( 2015 ) Gao Min Tsu four Final Word No. 10 Civil Ruling. 2. Revocation of the Tianjin Maritime Court ( 2014 ) Jinhai Law Limited Word No. 1 Civil Ruling. 3. Rejecting the application for the establishment of a maritime liability limitation fund proposed by Astike Co., Ltd.

 Referee reason

 The Supreme People's Court held that Article 221 of the Maritime Law establishes the principle of accidents for the limitation of maritime claims, that is, " one accident, one limit, multiple accidents, multiple limits " . The key to judging one or more accidents is to analyze whether the two accidents are caused by the same reason. If multiple accidents occur for the same reason, but the cause chain is not interrupted, it should be considered an accident. If the cause chain is interrupted and there are new reasons for intervention, the new cause constitutes a new causal relationship with the new accident and forms a new independent accident. As far as this case is concerned, the English version of the chart used in the " Ai Wei " round clearly marked the scope of the breeding area, but the crew set the route to the breeding area, which itself has major faults. In the case that the vessel involved in the case may have a large-scale aquaculture area in the sea area where the foresight is to be carried out, the obligatory obligation should be strengthened to ensure safe navigation and avoid damage caused by collision with the farming area. According to the trajectory of the ship involved in the case, the ship involved in the case actually entered the breeding area operated by Guo Jinwu. In view of the fact that the damage occurred at noon, there was no nighttime visual impairment. If the crew carefully performed their expectations and driving duties, they should be able to notice the presence of suspended culture floats on the surface of the sea. In the case that the Changli County Marine Bureau issued evidence to prove that Guo Jinwu suffered actual damage, it can be presumed that the crew did not fulfill the cautious obligatory obligation, resulting in the first infringement. According to the trajectory of the voyage, the ship then entered the breeding area of ​​Liu Haizhong. Since Guo Jinwu and Liu Haizhong's breeding area are adjacent to each other, about 500 meters apart , based on the inertia of the ship's motion and the law of ship driving, the ship involved in the case could not take reasonable measures to avoid it. Liu Haizhong’s breeding area caused the second infringement to take place. From the analysis of the reasons, the two damages were caused by the negligence of the crew before the ship entered the Guo Jinwu breeding area, and the cause chain was not interrupted. Therefore, the two infringements should be recognized as one time. accident. The ship sailed away from the breeding area of ​​Liu Haizhong and entered the open sea, sailing about 9000. After about half an hour, the meter entered the breeding area of ​​Li Weiguo and others and caused another damage accident. Before entering the breeding area of ​​Li Weiguo and others, the crew should have more time to adjust the psychological state of driving negligence, and in the case of pre-knowing that there is a breeding area in front of the voyage, it is necessary to strengthen the obligatory obligation to avoid causing damage again. The ship involved in the case apparently failed to fulfill the obligation to drive cautiously, resulting in the second damage accident. There was no correlation between the two accidents in terms of time and subjective state. The second accident was not caused by the natural continuation of the first accident. There was no causal relationship between the two accidents. Astek Co., Ltd. advocated that the psychological state of the crew entering the wrong state during the whole accident did not change, and the reason why the chain of reasons did not break could not be established. Although the occurrence of both accidents was caused by “the same nature ” , that is, the crew’s negligent driving, it was not based on “the same reason ” and caused two accidents. According to the principle of “ one accident, one limit ” , the ship involved in the case should set up different liability limitation funds for the two accidents. The courts of the first and second courts failed to comprehensively examine the location of the aquaculture area, the causal relationship between the two accidents, and the subjective state of the parties. The ship involved in the case only caused an accident and allowed the vessel involved in the case to establish a fund with a wrong determination, which should be corrected according to law.

(Effective referee judges: Wang Shumei, Fu Xiaoqiang, Huang Xiwu)
 
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17th Annual Symposium, “Religion, Racism and Religious Racism: The Color of Faith Discrimination”--Africana Studies Department at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte

April 7, 2019, 12:54 pm
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25 and April 26, 2019, the Africana Studies Department at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte will host its 17th Annual Symposium, “Religion, Racism and Religious Racism: The Color of Faith Discrimination.” The symposium will open on April 25 with a moderated discussion with Babalorixá Gustavo Melo Cerqueira titled “Religious Racism in Brazil: Evangelical Extremism Against African Diaspora Faiths.” On April 26, the event will continue with five hour-long panels, as well as a special midday presentation by Dr. Abbas Barzegar, Director of Research and Advocacy at the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR).

The opening event on April 25 will be held in the auditorium at UNC Charlotte’s Center City Campus. The remainder of the symposium will be held at UNC Charlotte’s Main Campus in Atkins Library Room 143 (space is limited). 

The opening event will be live streamed on Youtube. The other presentations will be accessible by video conference for registered attendees. The Conference Notw follows.
 
 

17th Annual Africana Studies Department Symposium
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
April 25-26, 2019
In an era of increasing awareness and conversation about the many facets and forms of racial discrimination, the role of religion as a motivation for racism and the manifestation of racism as religious discrimination are often under-examined. However, it is clear that religion and racism are closely linked.

In many circumstances, white nationalist/white supremacist groups represent themselves as religious organizations and ground their claims of racial superiority or opposition to interracial mixing in their faith. These groups also frequently espouse discriminatory views against both racial and religious minorities. Likely as a result of these links, hate crimes based on religious discrimination might disparately impact racial minorities or might incorrectly target individuals who fit a stereotype of how the attacker perceives members of that religious group.

Restrictions on religious freedom also frequently stem from racial bias. For example, policies banning certain types of hairstyles, head-coverings, or other religious attire in schools and public places often begin as a response to concerns about minority immigrants. Similarly, growing limitations on certain religious practices, such as the ritual slaughter of animals and circumcision, have a disparate impact on racial or ethnic minorities. Furthermore, laws and policies addressing religious-based terrorism frequently stereotype racial minorities as having a greater propensity for violent crime.

Through the discussion of these and related topics, this symposium seeks to unpack the relationship between religion and racism. We invite proposals exploring any aspect of the relationship between religion and racism or any aspect of “religious racism.”

Suggested topics include:
● Discrimination against the religions of indigenous and minority populations
● Religion and immigrant/migrant rights
● Religion and white nationalism
● Race and anti-Muslim bias/policies
● Race, religion, and the use of the term “terrorism”
● The “religious freedom” to engage in racism
● Hate crimes against racial and religious minorities
● Race discrimination and religious attire

We welcome submissions pertaining to any religions; however, we particularly encourage submissions related to African diaspora and African indigenous faiths as well as the impact of religious discrimination on people of African descent.

We encourage submissions pertaining to international and comparative topics. U.S.-centered submissions will receive full consideration; however, we seek a diverse and global discussion on religion and racism.

Abstracts (max. 500 words) should be sent to Dr. Danielle N. Boaz at dboaz@uncc.edu, along with a short bio (max. 150 words) by Feb 25, 2019. Notifications will be provided by March 1, 2019.
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Participate!! OHCHR Accountability and Remedy Project III Questionnaires

April 7, 2019, 1:51 pm
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The Human Rights Council adopted resolution 38/13 by consensus in July 2018.  The Resolution welcomed the work of OHCHR to improve accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse. The Resolution also requested OHCHR to continue its work in this area and enter a third phase of the Accountability and Remedy Project (ARP III) (generally HERE), specifically:
“to identify and analyse challenges, opportunities, best practices and lessons learned with regard to non-state-based grievance mechanisms that are relevant for the respect by business enterprises for human rights, . . . and to submit a report thereon to be considered by the Human Rights Council at the 44th session.” (OP 9) (ARP III Project Website)
In November 2018, OHCHR posted an Open Process Questionnaire (available in English, French, and Spanish), which may be completed by anyone who has knowledge of and/or experience with non-State-based grievance mechanisms. 

In February 2019, OHCHR released questionnaires targeted to different stakeholders.  The deadline for responses is 30 April 2019. These may be accessed here:

These complement our open process questionnaire, which is open for response by anyone who has knowledge of and/or experience with non-State-based grievance mechanisms. All of these questionnaires will be available until 30 April 2019 and are on our ARP III website.

Images from the Open Process Questionnaire follows below.  You are encouraged to participate, whatever status or position you or the entity you are in a position to represent occupy.


















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CORRIGENDUM: 2019 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, 25-27 November 2019 /

April 8, 2019, 10:50 am
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2019 UN Forum on Business and Human Rights, 25-27 November 2019
Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland

It is our pleasure to announce the theme of this year’s Forum and the call for session proposals. Under the overall theme “Time to act: Governments as catalysts for business respect for human rights”, the 2019 Forum will focus on the need for more coherent and concrete action by States, including effective regulation, improved policy coherence, and leading by example in the various roles States have as economic actors. In doing so, the Forum is calling on all States to demonstrate progress, commitments and plans to implement the State duty to protect and strengthen accountability for business-related human rights impacts.

Call for session proposals: interested parties are invited to submit session proposals linked to the Forum’s overall theme. Submission deadline: 3 May.

For more information on the theme, how to submit session proposals, and other ways to engage in the 2019 Forum, see www.ohchr.org/2019ForumBHR .

Registration will open in due course.

To receive updates about the Forum, follow @WGBizHRs on Twitter.

Versiones en Français y Español sigue a continuación.




2019 Forum des Nations Unies sur les entreprises et les droits de l’homme, 25-27 Novembre 2019

Palais des Nations, Genève, Suisse

Nous avons le plaisir d’annoncer le thème du Forum de cette année et l’appel de propositions de session.

Sous le thème général « Il est temps d’agir: Les gouvernements en tant que catalyseurs du respect des droits de l’homme par les entreprises », le Forum de 2019 mettra l’accent sur la nécessité pour tous les Gouvernements d’une action plus cohérente et concrète, y compris à travers de l’adoption d’une réglementation efficace, une meilleure cohérence politique et en montrant l’exemple dans les différents rôles des États en tant qu'acteurs économiques. Ce faisant, le Forum appelle tous les états à démontrer leurs progrès, leurs engagements et leurs plans pour la mise en œuvre de leur obligation de protéger et de renforcer la reddition de comptes en matière de droits de l’homme et des entreprises.

Appel à propositions des sessions: les parties intéressées sont invitées à soumettre des propositions de sessions liées au thème général du Forum. Date limite de soumission: 3 Mai.

Pour plus d'informations sur le thème, la façon de soumettre des propositions de session et d'autres façons de participer au Forum 2019, voirhttps://www.ohchr.org/FR/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/2019ForumBHR.aspx .

Les inscriptions débuteront en temps voulu.


Pour recevoir des mises à jour sur le Forum, suivez @WGBizHRs sur Twitter.



On vous prie de nous communiquer si vous désirez supprimer votre adresse e-mail de notre liste de distribution si vous ne voulez pas recevoir de nouvelles sur le Forum et le Groupe de travail sur les entreprises et les droits de l’homme via l’adresse forumbhr@ohchr.org (avec pour objet “Liste de distribution”)
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Foro de Naciones Unidas 2019 sobre las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos, 25-27 de noviembre de 2019

Palacio de las Naciones, Ginebra, Suiza

Nos complace anunciar el tema del Foro de este año y la convocatoria de propuestas de sesiones.

Bajo el tema general "Es hora de actuar: los gobiernos como catalizadores del respeto de los derechos humanos por la empresas", el Foro de 2019 se centrará en la necesidad de que los Estados adopten medidas más coherentes y concretas, entre ellas una reglamentación eficaz, una mayor coherencia de las políticas y un liderazgo basado en el ejemplo en las diversas funciones que desempeñan los Estados como agentes económicos. De esta manera, el Foro insta a todos los Estados a que demuestren progresos, compromisos y planes para cumplir con el deber de los Estados de proteger y fortalecer la rendición de cuentas por las consecuencias sobre los derechos humanos relacionados con la actividad empresarial.

Convocatoria de propuestas de sesiones: Todas las partes interesadas están invitadas a presentar propuestas relacionadas con el tema general del Foro. Plazo límite para la presentación de propuestas de sesiones: 3 de mayo

Para obtener más información sobre el tema, cómo presentar propuestas de sesiones y otras formas de participar en el foro de 2019, véasehttps://www.ohchr.org/SP/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/2019ForumBHR.aspx

El periodo de inscripción comenzará más adelante.

Para recibir actualizaciones sobre el Foro, siga @WGBizHRs en Twitter.



Le rogamos que nos comunique si desea eliminar su dirección de correo electrónico de la lista de distribución para no recibir noticias sobre el Foro y el Grupo de Trabajo sobre empresas y derechos humanos mediante un correo electrónico a forumbhr@ohchr.org (indicando “Lista de correo” en el asunto)
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Dr. Valeska Geldres-Weiss: "Women, Empowerment and Leadership in Chile"--Presentation at the 4th People of Color Scholarship Conference

April 8, 2019, 6:52 pm
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I am very pleased to be able to make available the PowerPoint presentation made by Dr. Valeska Geldres-Weiss, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Business of the Universidad de la Frontera (Chile), which was presented at the 4th People of Color Scholarship Conference hosted by American University's Washington College of Law 21-24 March 2019.  For more information on the 4th NPOC see HERE. Great thanks to American's Dean Camille Nelson for the vision to realize this important gathering.

Dean Geldres-Weiss's presentation was made as part of a panel entitled "Promoting Democracy in Developing World: Up Close and Personal," which included Katayoon Beshkardana (American); F.E. Guerra-Pujol (University of Central Florida); Alima Joned (University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur); Lubna Nasser (DIGNITY-Danish Institute Against Torture);Christiana Tah (private practice), and moderated by Padideh Ala’i (American). The Panel Description provides:
 
  1. The panelists will reflect on their work in the promotion of democracy in their native countries and discuss the practical limitations and challenges to the democratic ideal that they have experienced. Alima Joned will offer her perspectives based on her experience as a law professor in Malaysia and a practicing lawyer in Washington, DC. As one who grew up in post independent Malaysia, Alima would reflect on the country’s transformation from a subsistent economy to a modern one and the challenges and successes of Malaysia in building a functioning democracy. For her part, Christiana Tah will share her experience as former Attorney General and Minister of Justice of Liberia to draw home the difficult challenge of fostering democracy and the rule of law in a post- conflict environment. Christiana will also mull over the role of U.S. and other donor countries, multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations and their agenda in Liberia. Lubna Nasser will speak about her experience as a human rights activist in Jordan and challenges to democratic ideals in that context. Katayoon Beshkardana will discuss inadequacy of laws and democratic procedures in addressing the tragedy of women self-immolation and honor killings in Iran. Dean Valeska Geldres will speak about her work on the role of women in academic and leadership positions in Chile.

Her presentation was particularly valuable for its exploration of the role and trajectory of the participation of women within key sectors of the knowledge industries in Latin America, with particular focus on Chile. In her presentation, Dean Geldres-Weiss shared her experience as the only female dean at her university in its 37 years of operation. She also explored the work of female deans of Chilean Law Schools who work to advance women in leadership positions in the academic field and to achieve greater gender equality for effective democracy across social scales and contexts.

Dr. Geldres-Weiss' Conference Bio follows along with the PPT of her presentation.




Conference Bio: Dr. Valeska V. Geldres is the Dean of Faculty of Law and Business at La Frontera University in Chile. She is the first Dean at the faculty from 2014 (her second tenure as dean). Also, she was de first woman president of the “Chilean Association of Senior Staff of Management Business and Enterprise Schools” (ASFAE), which includes 31 public and private universities. Currently, she is working with the Association as “Past President”, after two periods as its President (2014-2018).Since 2018, she has been leading a group of women deans of Chilean Law Schools (total of 6 public and privet universities). The focus of the working group is to strengthenthe role of a woman in academic and leadership positions.She is Associate Professor of Marketing, she earned her Ph.D. in Business Administration and Marketing from Universidad de Sevilla (Spain) and an integrated B.A. in Business Administration from Universidad Austral (Chile). Also completed a postdoctoral program at the University of Sao Paulo (Brazil). Her research is focused in international business, firm ́s internationalization, firm ́s export, export innovation, and human capital internationalization. She publishes in international journals and works with researcher from Europe, Latin America and USA. At NPOC19, Valeska Geldres-Weiss will share her experience as the only female dean at her university in 37 years of its history. Also, she will tell the story of the female deans of Chilean Law Schools who work to advance women in leadership positions in the academic field and achieve greater gender equality for effective democracy across social scales and contexts.

 
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"Government “Social Credit” Scores for Individuals in China and the West: Smarter Governance or Social Control?"--Presentation at Ohio State University 12 April 2019

April 9, 2019, 7:15 pm
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Looking forward to this.

backerTitle: Government “Social Credit” Scores for Individuals in China and the West: Smarter Governance or Social Control?
Date: Friday, April 12, 12:10-1:15 p.m.
Location: Moritz College of Law, Drinko Hall, Room 344 [Note that this location is different from the ones that we have used in the past].
Speaker: Professor Larry Catá Backer, W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law and International Affairs, Penn State Law School
Registration: https://osu.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_77FopxU9f5sEt4V





Friends from the Columbus area most welcome. In presentation is part of a larger project in which a group of us explore the ways that legal regimes of accountability and responsibility extended beyond the state challenge the settled ideology of state based law as the primary means of expressing binding choices of a regulated community. The challenges of data driven governance has produced a tendency toward either convergence or parallel contextually relevant development in national approaches to the construction of a regulatory architecture in China and the U.S. Our larger project undertakes  a study of those challenges as they converge or move in parallel. To that end we are considering the way that regulators (in the public and private sectors) have responded to these challenges (compliance versus regulation, and markets versus planning), we theorize what may be new forms of law making, and then explore this new form's its connection to the management of economic activity within both the Belt and Road and the America First Initiative. It all starts here.

PowerPoints for the presentation follow tomorrow; description follows below; related paper may be accessed here.





Description: Lenders have for many years employed credit scores to assess individuals and the level of risk that they pose. Today, governments are adopting “social credit” scoring systems that serve a similar function.

Social credit itself refers generally to a new mode of data-driven governance through which data analytics are used to create and operate algorithms that provide a basis for rewards and punishments for targeted behaviors. More specifically, it references the specific project of the Chinese state to create a comprehensive legal and regulatory mechanism grounded in data-driven metrics that they have named “social credit.” The phenomenon is not limited to China, however. In the West as well, data-driven governance systems are transforming the regulatory landscape.

In this presentation, Professor Larry Catá Backer will discuss this new form of data-driven social governance. He will examine the implementation challenges that it faces and will consider the resonances of China’s social credit initiatives in the West. He will explore whether accountability regimes grounded in behavior standards enforced through data-driven analytics may soon change the focus of public law from constitution and rule of law to analytics and algorithm.

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PowerPoints for "Government “Social Credit” Scores for Individuals in China and the West: Smarter Governance or Social Control?"--Presentation at Ohio State University 12 April 2019

April 11, 2019, 4:36 am
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Latin American Research Review: Links to Articles in Vol 54(1)

April 13, 2019, 8:01 pm
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Happy to pass along the links to what looks like some very interesting new work from the latest issue of the Latin American Research Review.

The Latin American Research Review (LARR) is the academic journal of the Latin American Studies Association. LARR publishes original research and review essays on Latin America, the Caribbean, and Latina/Latino studies. It covers the social sciences and the humanities, including the fields of anthropology, economics, history, literature and cultural studies, political science, and sociology.

The journal reviews and publishes papers in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. All papers, except for book and documentary film review essays, are subject to double-blind peer review.





Vol. 54, No. 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Politics and International Relations

Sociology

Economics

Anthropology

Literature and Cultural Studies

Anjo Negro: As fundações racistas do Estado no Brasil
Marta Fernández, Vinícius Santiago ​

Special Collection: Societal Responses to Criminal Governance in Latin America

Collusion and Cynicism at the Urban Margins
Katherine Sobering, Javier Auyero​

Book Review Essays



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On the Ouster of Sudan's Former Leader Omar al-Bashir: Sideways Reflections on Popular Agitation, Democracy, and Separation of Powers

April 14, 2019, 8:43 am
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Omar al-Bashir has been removed from the position he made for himself as the head of an apparatus that "ruled the North African nation with an iron fist for 30 years" (Sudan's military has ousted President Omar al-Bashir. How did it come to this? And what's next?).   

Most of the stories coming out of the international press have taken the usual approach--noting the length of Mr. al-Bashir's leadership, his behavior respecting the peoples of what is now South Sudan, his leadership playing footsie with organizations sometimes or eventually labelled terrorist, the indictment by the International Criminal Court, the way in which many states that so piously utter blatherings about law and justice flouted both in ignoring ICC obligations to which they were committed, and the inevitable process of decay that age and the belief in one's own propaganda produces.

But something far more interesting may be at play, beneath the revolving door of like minded individuals who form part of the interlocking ruling groups that continue to dominate the state apparatus. 
Tens of thousands of protesters have been rallying across the country of 43 million for weeks calling for democracy, jobs and an end to corruption. Thursday's televised address from the defence minister announcing two years of military rule, ostensibly followed by free elections, is unlikely to satisfy their demands. They want a civilian-led technocratic government put in place for four years to try and bring the country together and organize new elections. (Sudan's military)).
This "something" may suggest some interesting movement in the sort of constitutional theory that may become more influential among developing states, one in which China may play a leading role. What follows are brief reflections on the implications of this subsurface movement. 

1.   One sees a remarkably similar pattern across a number of jurisdictions separated by level of development, culture, politics, religion, and social organization, a similar set of motivations. Popular agitation, indifferent to the fundamental structures of social and cultural organization (for the most part), is not sparked by the sort of abstract angst on which elites center their own internal conflicts.  For populations who are ruled rather than ruling, abstract principles applied in a predictable and fair way (understood in culturally contextual terms) tens to be matters of indifference.  Instead, agitation does not tend to start with respect to principles but (recall the earliest moments of the Arab Spring, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution and the like) with economic grievances.  There are exceptions (where for example for reforming elite seeks to strip a population of long held and otherwise acceptable cultural and social structures with no appearance of corresponding gains).  In either case, what starts as agitation to relieve grievances for and then push for political change in an effort to install a government more amenable to changing the economic challenges that caused the agitation in the first place.  There is little difference here in the case of Sudan.

2. Economic grievance tend to be grounded not in quibbles about the way in which a society has organized its economic, political or other activities, but in its implementation. People throughout history have had a high tolerance for substantial variation in the concoction of abstract principles in ways that produce orthodoxies of the most variegated sort when it comes to the organizations of their societies, cultures, religions, economies and the like (e.g., here).  The government  (or its leader) must be replaced not because there is any great grievance with the way things are ordered--but wit respect to the way things are operated.That appears to apply in the Sudan as well.  The classical markers--jobs and corruption--are here in full view.  And this is not surprising for a regime in power and substantially undisturbed in its current form since the 1980s.  But what does the call for "democracy" mean. It is at this point that people (especially in the West) will tend to read into statements exactly what they want. This is an important point--especially where agitation is leveraged through inward projections of foreign power, and that attention is paid only when those powers hear  their "trigger words." For the West it is democracy.  The leaders of organized mass agitation are not ignorant, and they understand that it is necessary to perform for those who they may need or against whom they may need protection. So do their leaders.  As a consequence, the statements are full of expressions of the organization of elections (in a few years) rather than of anything having to do with the origins of the agitation.

3.  What does democratic change mean in the context of Sudan? That is a question that can neither be asked in a vacuum, nor inspired by the sort of theoretical models that get sun out of academic conferences and the resulting thick web of words that are meant to serve as some sort of Jungian normative kollektives Unbewusstes (collective unconscious).  But perhaps some meaning may be visible among the interventions of those who seek to assert some sort of influence.  What pops out are not notions of elections and vigorous upper middle class schoolroom debates over the wonky intimacies of policy, but rather  about a "civilian-led technocratic government" (notice the notion is on civilian led rather than controlled arrangement). And as well the talk centers on a "patriotic group of experts" that would solve problems.  The problems then are not about normative democracy but of the construction of an administrative apparatus that is responsive to popular needs popularly determined.

4. But if that is where this is going, then it also suggests something that has been floating just below the surface of many discussions of popular agitation in states that are not rich and developed enough to indulge their normative reflexivity like the bored children of the economically independent. It suggests a view of the role of government as essentially administrative, and also as a reliable site for the fair (understood in traditional and customary ways) of private disputes. The application of these ideas of course varies with context. But the fundamental understanding of its application does not. That understanding--that politics is deeply embedded in (usually traditional, however dressed up to meet the needs of modernity) social, cultural and religious norms, but not in government--suggests, in turn, a different model of the way that power may be separated.  That model is organized around a premise that all political authority is vested in a leadership group (religious (Iran), vanguard party (China), or traditional group (elsewhere)) who are charged with the development and deployment of political authority through choices, while the government is understood as a site for the implementation of political choices.

5. What this may suggest is that another conception of separation of powers appears to be developing in states that have never fit comfortably within the socio-cultural complex on which the structures of orthodox liberal democracy are dependent. But these changes are occurring beneath the surface, at a level of unconscious self reflexivity.  It is occurring behind the reactions of a global community that expects only the appearance of change but which has also discounted change in Sudan ("'Military takeover is not the appropriate response to the challenges facing Sudan and the aspirations of its people,' Moussa Faki Mahamat, the chairperson of the African Union, said Thursday" (Sudan's military)). It is occurring behind the spectacle of revolving door leaders that serve as the face of the leadership collective that has dominated Sudan since its independence ("Gen. Awad Mohammed Ibn Auf, the vice-president and defence minister who was appointed by Bashir before announcing the president's removal on state TV, is "very much a symbol of the regime," said Ahmed Soliman, a research fellow at the U.K.-based think-tank Chatham House." (Sudan's military)). It is occurring behind the appearance of alignment to principles of separation of powers long deemed an essential feature of modern normative constitutionalism ("Tens of thousands of protesters have been rallying across the country of 43 million for weeks calling for democracy, jobs and an end to corruption. . . . "These aren't just issues of economic hardship; it's the culmination of anger at the regime," Soliman said. "It's rooted in institutional corruption ... [and] huge spending on the security services at the expense of basic services"(Sudan's military)). What the protestors are looking for, and what they are eventually unlikely to get in a way that satisfies, is a technical reconstriction of the state apparatus.
 "We assert that the people of Sudan will not accept anything less than a civil transitional authority composed of a patriotic group of experts who were not involved with the tyrannical regime," the Sudanese Professional Association, an umbrella group of unions behind recent protests, said in a statement after the military's announcement. (Sudan's military)).

6. It is easy enough to suggest that this shift in core conceptions of separation of powers is as illegitimate as the group of people that tend to control the politics, economics, society and culture of developing states.  It is as easy to suggest that these shifts might be ascribed to a strained of theocratic constitutionalism that is also among liberal democracies but that represents another potential variation in the expression of democratic theory (Theocratic Constitutionalism: An Introduction to a New Global Legal Ordering).  

And there is a certain power to those arguments.  Their power, however, may be grounded in at least two quite distinct claims.  The first is to the illegitimacy of the ruling group that adopts organizing principles of governance.  The second is to the illegitimacy of a principle of separation of powers that deviates from the orthodox conception of the insertion of all political power within the state and its division along functional lines among state stakeholders.  

7. With respect to the first, it is tempting to conflate the choice of foundational organizational principles and the character of the governing group to embrace the view that the legitimacy of one depends on the character or legitimacy of the other.  This is the same sort of argument that suggests that Thomas Jefferson's ideals could only be as legitimate as Mr. Jefferson's character (slave holder, the keeper of slave-concubines, etc.).  This personification of ideas mixes notions drawn from a bizarre application of principles of intellectual property law (an abstract ownership of ideas) with a pseudo-originalist hermeneutics that ideas are inevitably impregnated forever with the sensibilities, not of the the times and cultures that produce them, but of the people specifically connected with their first articulation.  It may not be possible to detach entirely a set of cultural or political practices from the normative principles through which they are constructed and in the service of which they operate.  I have made that argument myself with reference to the institution of the judiciary (Between the Judge and the Law — Judicial Independence and Authority with Chinese Characteristics). But there is a fundamental difference between the cultural barnacles attached to institutionsand institutional practices, on the one hand, and the origin or use baggage that people insist on reading into the connection between an idea and the individual or historically contingent social and cultural space within it was first produced or thereafter embraced by some "leading group" or other. 

8. With respect to the second, I have already suggested the possibility that democratic orthodoxy, including its premises respecting the allocation of political powers (all within the state apparatus) and its separation (with the state apparatus along functional lines) does not describe the entire universe of possible legitimate ordering structures for democratic societies (From Constitution to Constitutionalism). More specifically I have considered the way that Chinese political theory has begun to elaborate normative approaches to the idea of separation of powers within constitutionally legitimate structures (Party, People, Government, State). What Chinese theorists have been developing is a notion, grounded in democratic ideals, that suggest that there is nothing sacred about an idea that all political power must, ought or naturally winds up, within a government.  They have begun to construct a theory that suggests both the technocratic character of the state apparatus and its administrative culture. Lastly, they have suggested that political democracy can be undertaken through institutional organs that are not necessarily identical to or defined against the state.

For states that have found the project of transposing the ideals and cultural practices of the Anglo-Hispanic-European world difficult because of its disjunctions with tradition, practice and culture, the possibilities of achieving democratic legitimacy (and with it cultures grounded in anti-corruption, predictability, fairness, and compatibility with contextually centered language of politics and society) the Chinese path opens a possibility of another way.  Where such developing states already have deep political cultures that are grounded on the division between a ruling or vanguard element and the apparatus of state (especially for example in theocratic and some traditional cultures), then the possibility of theorizing culturally suitable variations to the Chinese model may be quite tempting. China itself may by its example add weight to an insight that posits that while the arguments from normative orthodoxy play well in many venues, what Sudan (like China) suggests, is that the power of orthodoxy is a political choice rather than the inevitable working out of a progress from barbarity to civilization. 

9. And that raises the final question, one of the growing importance of China as a new center of constitutional and democratic theory for states that do not align culturally with those of the traditional (at least for the last century or so) thought leaders of political theory. The operative element of the question is grounded in the character of China's Belt and Road Initiative as a political and cultural, as well as an economic project. The objects are developing states that are seeking stability and legitimacy by navigating through or around the normative structures of law, politics, and economics, that for the most part appear to be inserted from beyond, and that may be successfully embedded through global structures of education.  Consider Azerbaijan: "People-to-people contacts, as a non-ignorable component of the Belt and Road Initiative, are boosted by China and Azerbaijan via linking people of the two countries in cultural exchange, education, humanitarian dialogue and tourism cooperation. China and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding to stimulate tourism between the two countries." (Belt and Road Initiative to provide immense opportunities to bring China, Azerbaijan closer: Hajiyev (April 2019)).

If it is possible to theorize a legitimizing separation of powers structure grounded in the separation of politics from administration, one in which the government is not the  place where political authority is located, and if the Chinese model can be transposed beyond its Marxist Leninist framework, and if that process of universalizing a distinct approach to separation of powers may be accelerated through programs of education-socialization through the mechanisms of the Belt and Road Initiative, then  might it be possible to see in the Sudan the glimmerings of the possibilities of an alternative constitutional orthodoxy emerging for developing states outside the West?       
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Joel Slawotsky: "The Longer-Term Ramifications of China’s BRI Jurisprudence"

April 15, 2019, 6:58 pm
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Joel Slawotsky, of the Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, and the Law and Business Schools of the College of Management, Rishon LeZion, Israel has guest blogged for "Law at the End of the Day"  on issues relating to globalization, international law and relations, and corporate liability under international law. He has served as Guest Editor of the Sovereign Wealth Fund special issue of Qatar University International Review of Law (IRL) (2015).

He has very kindly produced a marvelously insightful essay: The Longer-Term Ramifications of China’s BRI Jurisprudence, which follows below. In this essay he argues that the United States vision of governance and American legal principles have been incorporated globally but that this driving influence may be challenged by a China which is undertaking various steps to similarly advance its vision of governance. The BRI courts may serve as a powerful transmitter of China’s alternative vision. And by training foreign lawyers and offering legal assistance to other nations, China is masterfully engaging in the same conduct that proved successful to the United States.

While China’s impact on global governance is at an incipient stage, the ability to shape law norms and values will only increase over time.




 

The Longer-Term Ramifications of China’s BRI Jurisprudence

Joel Slawotsky

 

 


Thank you Larry for allowing me to post my thoughts generated by your excellent and insightful essay New Guiding Cases From China Relating to Belt and Road Initiative--Emerging Jurisprudence for a New Global Trade Regime? regarding China’s guiding cases with respect to the BRI project. Specifically, as you astutely noted, these court rulings will “begin to outline the principles and approaches to trade and trade dispute “under the Chinese alternative vision of global trade." (emphasis added). This is a vastly under-explored topic but one potentially equally (or more) significant than the BRI infrastructure itself and an integral component of China’s BRI stratagem towards China’s great rejuvenation and eventual hegemonic leadership. While China has an alternative vision for trade; China also has an alternative vision of numerous aspects of global and domestic governance including legal norms, values and contexts. From national sovereignty, intervention, privacy rights and state-driven economics, China’s vision is an alternative. (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (January 2017).
“China favors ‘an alternative political and economic system.’ Echoing these sentiments, an eminent Chinese jurist has urged judges to ‘absolutely’ not embrace ‘false’ Western concepts such as judicial independence, separation of powers and constitutionalism.”(Slawotsky, The Clash of Architects: Impending Developments and Transformations in International Law).
By no means is this a critique of China since it simply is a realistic understanding of China’s alternative vision. China’s promotion of this alternative understanding is no different than the United States pushing Western notions of rights and values onto allies and developing nations. Indeed, China has criticized the existing U.S.-led governance institutions as being proxies for advancing the U.S. agenda.

While BRI courts may seem like a secondary or non-significant development, should BRI litigation become a successful dispute resolution model, the Chinese vision at least with respect to commercial disputes, will likely be seen as an alternative or competing legal model in numerous jurisdictions. And that is crucial - once recognized as an acceptable alternative model in one context, gaining respectability and acceptability in other non-commercial contexts is much easier. At a minimum, nations intertwined with the BRI will be impacted and will have a self-interest to align values with China’s vision. Accordingly, if successful, the BRI courts will play an important role promoting China’s alternative vision and China’s global ascendancy.

Interestingly, China’s model is already in competition with the Western model and has impacted Western development offers. The Chinese view of the relationship between law and development does not correlate with Western notions of the “rule-of-law” and is proffered as a model to “countries and nations who want to speed up their development” (Seppänen, Chinese Legal Development Assistance: Which Rule fo Law? Whose Pragmatism?). But Western donor states are already embracing some aspects of Chinese development policies. Ibid.

Is the impact on Western development offers a harbinger of the future? The foundational theme of this essay is whether China could – over the longer-term – serve as an “attractive alternative model” with respect to domestic and/or global governance. The United States has served as the role model and many nations have emulated American notions of legal norms. The reason allied countries (and some non-allies as well) have looked up to the United States stems from the fact the U.S. has been the Chief Architect (i.e., hegemon) of global governance post WW2. In the aftermath of WW2, the United States emerged as the hegemon and for example, the United States Constitution has served as a source for other sovereigns’ constitutional development (Influence of U.S. Constitution Abroad). Another exemplar, Delaware corporate law (“the global business law court”) has been a source of law to numerous nations (United States Influence on the Australian Legal System).

The infusion of U.S. tenets of law into domestic legal systems has also naturally enforced globally the U.S. vision of rights, sovereignty and due process. The conceptualization of legal terms has also been promoted through various mechanisms – and to varying extents – by U.S. led institutions such as the WTO, IMF and World Bank. Wisely, China has established alternative institutions and established initiatives such as the AIIB and the BRI which could serve to advance China’s model (Slawotsky, The National Security Exception in US-China FDI and Trade).

And of course the existing Western understandings of rights, sovereignty and due process are not fixed. Developing and exporting Chinese law norms, if successfully developed, is one of the most potent soft power weapons China can develop that will help it cross the Rubicon to hegemonic leadership. If Chinese legal understandings were infused in other domestic systems as well as global governance institutions, this would help enforce the Chinese vision.

As BRIs architect and leader, a successful BRI will greatly benefit China who will reap significant economic gains, dominate crucial trade links, and will positively impact the internationalization of the Yuan (SCMP, Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ strategy is showing the way to a new world order) and may provide military advantages as well (China’s Special Forces To Station In Zimbabwe, Build Secret Underground Military Base).

However, despite these superlative benefits, the BRI is not an end to itself but a means towards a greater goal. The BRI is one of multiple brilliant Chinese stratagems to achieve an important end – the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. “The Chinese nation…has achieved the historic leap of rising to our feet, getting rich and getting powerful.” (China has reached a turning point in its history, Xi says).

China’s immense BRI project is inextricably linked with China’s foreign policy (Our Bulldozers, Our Rules) and is the lynchpin of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream) constituting an important component of China’s long-term strategic plan to regain dominance in Asia and prestige in the world. 

One aspect that can greatly assist China in this endeavor is incorporation of Chinese understandings of law. With the potential of resolving disputes among dozens of sovereigns arising from thousands of commercial disputes in the coming years, China stands to develop a substantial case law on dispute resolution (here). The successful implementation of BRI resolved litigation under the auspices of Chinese courts could serve not only to challenge the U.S.-led Western dominance in dispute resolution but as an conduit of legal norms and values. By astutely establishing special courts to mediate, arbitrate and litigate BRI-related commercial disputes (International commercial courts eye expanded role). Chinese courts may develop a critical mass of BRI jurisprudence that is viewed as fair and incorporates (at least initially) basic Western notions of procedural and substantive due process. Crucially, by linking the economies of dozens of nations, and having BRI commercial disputes resolved within the rubric of the BRI courts, Chinese legal norms will inherently become incorporated into the BRI decisions and possibly migrate to an extent into other systems as well. Taken to its logical conclusion, Chinese law, over the long-term, could ultimately be viewed as a real alternative (or even superior) to the U.S.-led paradigm with respect to property, process, rights and other basic legal norms and procedures. At a minimum, even if not completely successful, developing case-law on disputes and having these decisions rendered by Chinese courts will proximately cause China’s imprint on global governance to significantly strengthen.

Moreover, BRI’s law-making potential must also be viewed in the context of China’s other globally influential initiatives such as China’s program of training lawyers from numerous jurisdictions. “Publicly available information indicates that hundreds of foreign lawyers, judges, and government officials have attended legal training courses in China” (Seppänen, Chinese Legal Development Assistance: Which Rule fo Law? Whose Pragmatism?).
“Legal forums, seminars, and training courses offer an opportunity for the Chinese government to try and convince elites in developing countries of the legitimacy of the Chinese approach to the rule of law and human rights—that is, to seek to increase the government’s “soft power,” thereby advancing Chinese economic and political interests. Even if the participants in these forums and courses will not find the Chinese government’s ambivalent approach to the rule of law and human rights ideologically appealing, they may accept it is as a legitimate alternative among many—at least the trains run on time in China.” (Ibid.).
Therefore, much as the United States offered programs to promote its notions of rights and democracy post WW2, (as Secretary of State George C. Marshall remarked in 1947), “Our policy [] purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.” (emphasis added)

Indeed, China’s alternative vision is already competing for influence among the elites in various nations and some Chinese visions are in fact perceived as “competitive ideas”. “China’s influence abroad is not merely of an economic nature but that it increasingly shapes law and policy elsewhere.” (The Chinese social credit system: A Model for other countries?).

Western thoughts are also being shaped by practical considerations of competition. United States and other Western policymakers must evaluate the attractiveness of their programs with the Chinese offers. In this fashion, China influences policymaking in Western donor states who compete with china over economic and legal development.
“In certain ways, Western donor states also are adopting some aspects of Chinese development policies. Western donor states and international organizations are relaxing political and economic conditions, and they have begun to emphasize the ability of developing countries to choose their own development models, even with regard to their legal institutions.” (Seppänen, Chinese Legal Development Assistance: Which Rule fo Law? Whose Pragmatism?).
This is a startling development when one considers that the narrative until recently had been that China would move towards Western concepts and embrace Western notions. (See, Joel Slawotsky: "Principled Realism: Thoughts on the New National Security Strategy").

There are manifestations of the “Chinese model” in other contexts as well. The Chinese model values economic stability as a supreme value. Rather than risking the radical fluctuations inherent in a free-market economy, China’s state-centric capitalism relies on a vigorous state-owned and controlled sector. Ostensibly this serves to smooth out the wild swings inherent with the free market. While even Chinese scholars concede that reform of Chinese SOEs is needed, and serious questions exist regarding transparency of government statistics, the Chinese economy has proven extremely robust with a vast amount of real growth over the last 20 years. Moreover, this performance has been achieved without sharp recessions or large scale downturns. Proving Chinese economic resilience is the fact that China is apparently slowing (China Trade Numbers Raise Red Flags on Embryonic Economic Recovery) but not reeling from the ongoing trade disputes with the United States (China’s March trade surplus soars past expectations, Beijing data show). Despite predictions that a trade war would speak a Chinese economic downturn, Chinese state planners have so far managed apparently to engineer a soft landing with the most recent statistics in fact indicate renewed economic growth (IMF raises its 2019 growth forecast for China).

The Chinese state-centric economic model may be viewed as an attractive alternative. Western populations are somewhat disillusioned from completely private markets and a lack of state involvement in economic affairs. The most visible sign is the populism and discontent against perceived economic inequality and excessive corporate power. Even in the home of shareholder-value capitalism there is a strong push by the “socialist wing” of the Democratic Party looking for more government planning. 2020 Presidential hopeful Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed socialist, and others such as freshmen House Members Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaibas, are members of “Democratic Socialists of America” and espouse a model that militates substantially in favor of governmental involvement and governmental control/intervention. Whether this movement gains traction or withers remains to be seen. Yet the fact that the platform garners support reflects disenchantment and a search for an alternative economic model.

Another indicator that governmental involvement in the economy may be increasing is the willingness of Western nations to buy shares in private corporations. Most Western nations were moving towards privatizing state-owned sectors and corporations in the 1980s-2000s and the mantra was to separate the government from the economy. While this generally remains the theme, there are indications of push-back. To be sure, state-centric economic governance is not foreseeable short-term, but depending upon circumstances, this may become a potential alternative. Empowering governments to intervene in markets is the fact that states can be involved in capital markets globally.
“What distinguishes this sovereign activity from its mid-20th Century form is the willingness of states not only to limit their control of internal economies, but also to invest their financial wealth outside their national borders. In this respect, states assume the very role of the private economic actors that they once feared so much. The 21st Century is witnessing a dramatic rise in the willingness of states to project economic power both at home and in host states through the same economic vehicles that threatened the states’ power in the 20th Century…. Consequently, some states seem to have become, to some extent, pools of national economic wealth, the power of which matches or exceeds their traditional sovereign power.” LarryCata´ Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19 Transnatl. L. & Contemp. Probs. 3, 10-11 (2010)(emphasis added).
We are currently in an era of hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China. Strategic sectors and “pillar industries” such as weapons, energy, power generation and communications and particularly emerging technology businesses such as AI and robots are often led by private sector corporations whose shares are publicly-traded. Control and ownership of important corporations is a potential national security issue since emerging technology as well as other power levers can be used defensively as well as offensively.
“States and corporations are now capable of deploying forces in the field—sometimes states hire corporations that serve as mercenary armies that protect its own operations as well as those of the institutions of the state from sub-national and supra-state threats.” Larry Cata Backer, The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law: Non-State Enterprises inPolycentric Asymmetric Global Orders, 31 BYU J. Pub. L. 1, 50 (2016).
Share ownership of critical corporations by foreign governments enables foreign governments to exercise influence and possible control over another state (election hacking or promotion of a favored candidate) - or at a minimum - become embedded in vital economic sectors. Therefore, corporate share ownership and national security are now inexorably linked. Governments are likely to increase investments in stock markets as the nascent hegemonic rivalry becomes increasingly linked to economic and technological supremacy. In one example, the Finish Government – through a sovereign investment fund - has bought a stake in Finnish national champion Nokia (here).

In another exemplar, Germany is planning to acquire stakes in national industrial champions.
Germany could take stakes in companies to prevent foreign takeovers in some key technology areas, Economy Minister Peter Altmaier said on Tuesday, presenting a new industrial strategy he said was necessary for the country's cohesion. The pivot to a more defensive industrial policy is driven by German concerns about foreign — particularly Chinese — companies acquiring German know-how and eroding the manufacturing base on which much of Germany's prosperity is built. (Germany ready to buy stakes in automakers, other companies to protect them)
Accordingly, we are possibly in the embryonic states of Western nations seeking to own or control business enterprises – a hallmark of the Chinese model. Thus China, even if inadvertently, has already “offered an attractive alternative.”

A leap towards a Chinese model – at least in certain respects – may not even be too much of a hurdle. For example, China’s developing Social Credit Scoring ratings system has similarities to Western-style reviews of various services. Indeed, “[i]t might be possible to integrate the SCS into the [Chinese] legal system.” (The Social Credit System and China's Rule of Law). Although numerous problems exist, and would need to be addressed such as defining trust and correcting mistakes and appealing determinations, id., China’s SCS may become an integral part of Chinese domestic governance and eventually influence or be incorporated at various levels by other nations.

To be sure, many of the current aspects of the SCS appear distinctly incompatible to the Western perspective. However:
“Some of the aspects of the Chinese system are not part of the Western rating systems; yet, they are not completely alien to the West.”(The Chinese social credit system: A Model for other countries?).
Some might compare China’s blacklists to Western background checks and ‘no-fly lists’ or the UKs football banning orders which includes temporary passport holding. Some EU nations also collect and circulate details of insolvent debtors. Part of criminal punishments mat also include driving suspensions and other social punishments. (The Chinese social credit system: A Model for other countries?).

Given China’s immense and growing international influence, the SCS may become an attractive regulatory mechanism in Western states (particularly should China modify its SCS to remedy the existing lapses.)
“The Social Credit System may show that China now ‘appears to have ascended to the position of principal global driving force in political theory and action’, with ‘the potential to change law and government as we know them in China and beyond’.”(Ibid).
The ability of Chinese model to become an attractive model should not be under-estimated. China has already scored several impressive victories such as the push-back by U.S. allies against US pressure with respect to 5G as well as Italy’s embrace of the BRI despite U.S. attempts to convince Italy otherwise (reminiscent of the U.S. failure to convince allies not to join China’s AIIB).
“In a move certain to cause consternation among American officials and leaders of the European Union, Italy appears poised to help China extend its vast global infrastructure push deeper into Western Europe, part of Beijing’s sweeping plan to advance its economic interests and influence around the world.” (Italy May Split With Allies and Open Its Ports to China’s Building Push).
Demonstrating this emerging factor vividly is the Huawei 5G controversy. The United States has argued that Huawei should be banned from deployment of 5G because of security risks. Allies such as Britain, Germany and Poland are all being lobbied with varying degrees of pressure to choose the United States over China with respect to 5G. The U.S. position is that nations must select either the U.S. or China and openly stating that allies selecting China will find their U.S. partnerships at risk.

While some U.S. allies have banned Huawei (here) and others are considering such bans, push-back is evident. For example, UK national security officials have stated that concerns over Huawei’s 5G are overblown and security threats can be contained (Huawei risk can be managed, say UK cyber-security chiefs).  Other U.S. allies are similarly raising doubts about banning Huawei as nations seek to hedge their bets and balance relationships with both China and the United States.
“The German government looks likely to avoid an outright ban of Huawei Technologies' equipment and allow the Chinese company to participate in its high-speed communications infrastructure in some form, as the country seeks to balance its relationships with the U.S. and China.” (Germany follows UK in casting doubt on US Huawei ban)

The prospect of substantial investment opportunity in China (Canada’s vast pension fund is sticking with China even as political tensions mount)  and of economic partnership with China is a powerful elixir.
“If forced to take sides in the high-stakes geopolitical rivalry and trade war between the United States and China, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad would prefer the economic largesse of Beijing.” (I’d side with rich China over fickle US: Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad)


Therefore, the risks over the longer-term of U.S. allies aligning with China cannot be discounted. The factor is directly linked to China’s economic ascendancy. U.S. allies’ self-interested embrace of China, should it gain critical mass, would constitute a transformative geo-strategic shift imperiling the hegemonic status of the United States. The BRI courts (as well as other developments noted above) is an important step in this trajectory.


Conclusion

The United States vision of governance and American legal principles have been incorporated globally (and this has well-served the interests of the United States). China is wisely undertaking various steps to similarly advance its vision of governance. The BRI courts may serve as a powerful transmitter of China’s alternative vision. And by training foreign lawyers and offering legal assistance to other nations, China is masterfully engaging in the same conduct that proved successful to the United States.


While China’s impact on global governance is at an incipient stage, the ability to shape law norms and values will only increase over time. China has very different notions and a vision of law that is dramatically at odds with the present U.S.-led Western vision.
The more free-wheeling Silicon Valley model once seemed unquestionably the best approach, with stars from Google to Facebook to vouch for its superiority. Now, a re-molding of the internet into a tightly controlled and scrubbed sphere in China’s image is taking place from Russia to India. . . . .Moreover, crucially, the non-mention let alone de-emphasis on human rights and promotion of democratic notions of governmental legitimacy also demonstrates the irreconcilable vision of international law.” (In ideological battle with U.S., China wins over allies with its censored vision of the internet)



While different, an alternative offered by China may be palatable and over the longer-term even embraced. After all in certain respects, Chinese vision is about a means to an end – and the end is the same goal as in Western nations. Such ends include public security, criminal deterrence, protection of important industries and domestic champions through state ownership and state-centric economic intervention. Whether based upon self-interest and strategic alignment or endeavoring to imitate a successful model or being required to as part of participating in global economic governance, China’s alternative vision may become a viable option. Developing case-law under the rubric of the BRI is an important milestone in this endeavor.



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The Pivot Toward the Caribbean: Announcement of Permission to Sue Anyone Using American Property Confiscated by Cuba and the Larger Trump Administration Strategy Coordinating Policy Against Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela

April 16, 2019, 11:30 am
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In an anticipated move (U.S. allows lawsuits related to confiscated property in Cuba) Reuters (reporting by Matt Spetalnick; writing by Susan Heavey) today today reported that the Trump Administration will announce a series of quite strong actions against the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela.
The Trump administration will allow lawsuits in U.S. courts for the first time against foreign companies in communist-ruled Cuba that use properties confiscated from Cuban Americans and other U.S. citizens during the revolution that began in the 1950s, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday. The move, which will be announced on Wednesday, could expose U.S., European and Canadian companies to legal action, dealing a blow to Cuba's efforts to attract more foreign investment. It is also another sign of Washington's efforts to punish Havana over its support for Venezuela's socialist President Nicolas Maduro. (Trump to Allow U.S. Lawsuits Against Foreign Firms Doing Business in Cuba: Official)
This, in part, represents not merely a pivot of the Trump administration toward the Caribbean (with Mexico on the periphery but there centered on migration), but also is meant to reduce what may be a perceived threat of Chinese and Russian penetration in an area now deemed sensitive to U.S. interests. It also serves (as it must given the logic of American politics) as a revelation of the  policy aspects of the American 2020 presidential campaign.

While much of the commentary that will be published in the next several weeks will focus on rehashing already tired polemics about US-Cuba relations, the nature of neo-colonial exploitation in Cuba before 1959 (though not of neo-colonial dependence thereafter--that is always off the table), the extent of European offense at the action (and the Europeans, easily enough offended especially when caught in their own webs of principles loosely applied, will be especially offended since they have been the most eager to turn a blind eye to the source of assets with which they have been engaging with Cuba) there is a larger picture that ought not to escape attention.

That larger picture has not been hidden by the American Administration, and indeed, derives in large measure from policy thrusts already nicely developed in the National Security Strategy that most commentators continue to pretend either does not exist or does not matter. That policy (ironically enough):
1. Takes Latin American regionalism seriously; 

2. In the case of Cuba-Venezuela-Nicaragua (and of course the rest of the ALBA bloc), it also takes Latin American regionalism as threatening (e.g., Mr. Bolton's references to the three as a troika of tyranny);

3.   Will coordinate countermeasures against unfriendly regions in ways that profit from coordination and synergy.
4.  One cannot read the actions anticipated to be formally announced tomorrow without also considering how they coordinated with a series of rapid fire recent decisions including actions to (a)  reduce aid to Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala; (b) recognize the Guaidó administration in Venezuela and take active measures to hobble the Madura regime; (c) sanctions against Nicaraguan officials; and (d) close the Mexican border. 
More tomorrow after the official announcements on the specifics.  What follows are the clues to the scope and character of this new pivot.  They include the reporting by Reuters including a history of its "Alerts History" connected to the change in Cuba policy;" and a recent "on background" interview of two American officials that took place in New York  on 8 April 2019 at the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council.






Alerts History
  • 16-Apr-2019 12:25:19 PM - TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TO ALLOW U.S. LAWSUITS AGAINST ALL FOREIGN FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN CUBA WITH CONFISCATED PROPERTY - SENIOR U.S. OFFICIAL
  • 16-Apr-2019 12:27:33 PM - TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TO ANNOUNCE ON WEDNESDAY A HALT TO FUTURE WAIVERS OF TITLE 3 AND START OF ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE 4 PROVISIONS OF HELMS-BURTON ACT - U.S. OFFICIAL
  • 16-Apr-2019 12:28:10 PM - TRUMP SECURITY ADVISER BOLTON TO ANNOUNCE NEW SANCTIONS ON CUBA, VENEZUELA AND NICARAGUA IN SPEECH ON WEDNESDAY- U.S. OFFICIAL
  • 16-Apr-2019 12:31:01 PM - ALLOWING U.S. LAWSUITS AGAINST FOREIGN FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN CUBA IS PART OF TRUMP’S ROLLBACK OF OBAMA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH HAVANA - U.S. OFFICIAL
  • 16-Apr-2019 12:33:15 PM - ALLOWING CUBA-RELATED U.S. LAWSUITS WILL ONLY CAUSE A “BUMP” IN BUSINESS WORLD BUT WILL HAVE ECONOMIC IMPACT AND SHOW U.S. RESOLVE - U.S. OFFICIAL
  • 16-Apr-2019 12:35:46 PM - U.S. AWARE OF EUROPEAN OPPOSITION TO THE MOVE; EUROPEANS ENTITLED TO SUE OR FILE WTO COMPLAINTS BUT WILL FAIL - U.S. OFFICIAL


Trump to allow U.S. lawsuits against foreign firms doing business in Cuba-official - Reuters

16-Apr-2019 12:58:06 PM

To view this story on Eikon, click here

WASHINGTON, April 16 (Reuters) - The Trump administration will allow lawsuits in U.S. courts for the first time against all foreign companies doing business in communist-ruled Cuba using properties confiscated from Cuban Americans and other U.S. citizens, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday.

The move, which will be formally announced on Wednesday, could expose U.S., European and Canadian companies to legal action and deal a blow to Cuba's efforts to attract more foreign investment.

President Donald Trump's national security adviser John Bolton on Wednesday will also announce new sanctions on Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Trump is acting on a threat issued in January to allow a controversial law that has been suspended since its creation in 1996, permitting U.S. citizens to sue foreign companies over property seized in the 1960s by the Cuban government.

The State Department plans to allow to go into effect a provision known as Title III of the Helms-Burton Act. It had been fully waived by every president over the past 23 years due to opposition from the international community and fears it could create chaos in the U.S. court system with a flood of lawsuits.

The complete lifting of the ban could allow billions of dollars in legal claims to move forward in U.S. courts and likely antagonize Canada and U.S. European partners, whose companies have significant business holdings in Cuba.

It could also affect some U.S. companies that began investing in the island, an old Cold War foe, since former President Barack Obama began a process of normalizing relations between the two countries from the end of 2014.

U.S.-Cuban relations have nosedived since Trump became president, partially rolling back the detente initiated by Obama and reverting to Cold War rhetoric. A six-decade U.S. economic embargo on Cuba has also remained officially intact.


(Reporting by Matt Spetalnick
Writing by Susan Heavey)
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U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.
New York, New York
Telephone (917) 453-6726 • E-mail: council@cubatrade.org
Internet: http://www.cubatrade.org • Twitter: @CubaCouncil Facebook: www.facebook.com/uscubatradeandeconomiccouncil LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/company/u-s--cuba-trade-and-economic-council-inc-

The following are excerpts from an “on background” interview by the Economic Eye On Cuba© with two senior-level officials in the Trump Administration.

Question: The [Nicolas] Maduro Administration remains in control of Venezuela; the [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration remains in control of [Republic of] Cuba. Do you believe there has become an optical challenge for the Trump Administration- promising too much too quickly?
Senior Official One: I wish that everyone would take seriously our statements about Cuba and Venezuela. I think that there is a belief, or maybe a hope, that President Trump is bluffing and we don’t have a strategy. We’re not and we do. There is an overall strategy, but good strategies change with the realities of the landscape; we’d be pretty stupid to maintain a plan when the situation on the ground changes. President Trump is adapting to the conditions- but, and let me stress, that does not mean he is deviating from the goal- a better Cuba and a better Venezuela. This is our backyard- we take that seriously.
Senior Official Two: Some people here in Washington believed that the ‘stars aligned’ during the [George W.] Bush Administration- we had, I mean they had [The Honorable] Otto Reich [recess appointment- Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 2002-2003 and United States Ambassador to Venezuela 1986-1989] among others. But, what was expected never really materialized. I remember the nearly 1,000 businessmen attending that food show [U.S. Food & Agribusiness Exhibition in 2002] in Havana. They never were proactive.
For President Trump, the stars have aligned, and Venezuela is the tool that we believe can provide change within two countries which have a long and complicated history with the United States. We have the team in place that every president should want- committed to the goal and capable of implementing a strategy rather than just talking about implementing a strategy. First, using sanctions to remove an illegitimate leader who has made a mess of his country. Anyone defending what Maduro has done to his citizens has to have their head examined. Second, while we do not expect immediate political change in Cuba because of our direct sanctions on Venezuela and direct and indirect sanctions upon Cuba, we believe that at least one result will be changes to the Cuban economy because of what the [Juan] Guaido Administration is doing regarding oil exports to Cuba- and we are helping Interim President Guaido achieve his goal of no longer subsidizing the Cuban regime. Cuba will have to adjust to losing 30% or more of its heavily-subsidized oil imports, and that means permitting more of a market-based economy. They won’t like it, but their ability to derail it is pretty fast moving beyond their control.

Question: The Obama Administration was viewed has having weaponized the OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control of the United States Department of the Treasury], has the Trump Administration “nuclearized” the OFAC and what about the impact upon third countries, particularly smaller countries, and how OFAC sanctions impact the ability of the Trump Administration to corral assistance, including from the EU [Brussels, Belgium-based European Union], Canada, Japan, China and Russia?
Senior Official One: I’m not certain I would agree with the characterization that we have “nuclearized” the OFAC. The OFAC is a tool in the arsenal of the United States. Can sanctions be coercive? Yes, they can be. The Trump Administration is using the OFAC in several ways, but two are primary. First, if a country wants to engage with the United States- their companies, their banks, etc., then we expect certain behaviors- such as supporting human rights and democracy and good governance and good behavior. So, the OFAC plays a huge role in our relationship with Syria, Iran, North Korea, Russia, China, Cuba and Venezuela. Second, some governments just don’t get it- killing your citizens, permitting your citizens to suffer, raping- stealing from the treasury, remaining in office for decades absent free and fair elections- all of those are wrong. The United States, and this president, is doing what we believe is right.
Senior Official Two: I will echo those statements and add this regarding the impact upon our allies. We want their help and we need their help. The United States does not want to be alone- and we aren’t alone in Venezuela or Syria or North Korea or Iran or Russia or China. Cuba is another matter. The EU, Canada and Japan can and should be more helpful regarding Cuba- and we believe they will be. As for smaller countries, we are working with them so they can not only mitigate any impact, but thrive once Mr. Maduro has departed Venezuela. Secretary [of State Mike] Pompeo has been pretty clear about our support for countries in this hemisphere.

Question: With respect to the implementation of Title III [authorizing lawsuits] of the [Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad Act) of 1996] Libertad Act, thus far, at least publicly, members of the EU and other countries have not been supportive of decisions by the Trump Administration taken in 2018 and thus far in 2019. What makes you believe they will be helpful?
Senior Official Two: I can’t, won’t get into details as to our private conversations, but countries whose companies are active in Cuba understand they will gain far more from a Cuba that makes political changes and changes to its economy than they do from what Cuba looks like today. I’m guessing that you are indirectly asking about the claims?

Question: Yes, specifically the 5,913 certified claimants. To date, statements by the Trump Administration and briefings focus more about political change to Cuba than about settling the US$1.9 billion [US$1,902,202,284.95] in certified claims against Cuba. The Libertad Act, specifically Title III and Title IV [visa prohibitions on executives and their families], have a focus upon certified claims, yet the Trump Administration is not focusing upon the certified claimants- no meetings, etc.
Senior Official One: I want to push back against that characterization. President Trump has not forgotten about the claimants- and I reference both certified and not certified. The tools of the Libertad Act are numerous, and the State Department has updated the Cuba Restricted List twice, each time expanding the number of entities that are affiliated with the Cuban military. Our goal is to discourage transactions with these entities- do any U.S. companies really want to engage with a Cuba dominated by the military rather than civilians? What would U.S. companies say if [Bethesda, Maryland-based] Marriott [International] and [Fort Worth, Texas-based] American Airlines were owned by the Pentagon and flight attendants wore military uniforms and all revenues went to the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff controlled [Bentonville, Arkansas- based Wal-Mart? That’s not a good model for us and not for Cuba and not for any country.

Question: But what about a bilateral negotiation to settle the certified claims? If the certified claims are settled, then would not be more likely for the United States to have the support of the EU, Canada, Japan, and others for further changes in Cuba?

Senior Official Two: I disagree with your premise that resolving the certified claims is most important; I would argue that democracy and human rights are more important. This does not mean that we are not focused on the claims; we are. The Obama Administration wasn’t. If the Cubans want to send a certified check for US$1.9 billion, we will deposit it and then distribute it.

Question: Then why not agree to a negotiation? The expropriation of the Texaco [White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation with a certified claim valued at US$56,196,422.73] refinery in 1960 was pretty much the foundation for where the relationship is today. Why not focus on the foundation? Why not meet with the largest certified claimants? Why not permit the certified claimants to have officially- approved negotiations? The Obama Administration failed to use its time to do so; now the Trump Administration can make a deal; the President is focused upon deals- this would be settling a nearing sixty-year-old problem. That has to be enticing?
Senior Official One: We are not there yet. And, while the seizure of the refinery was wrong, was illegal, the three regimes [General Fidel Castro, General Raul Castro, Mr. Miguel Diaz-Canel] since have done other things that are far worse. But, I agree that the Obama Administration failed to use its time to extract concessions from Cuba or to condition the presence of U.S. companies upon changes to how Cuba pays workers and what U.S. companies could do in Cuba. That was a missed opportunity. As for the idea of certified claimants, as a group, seeking to negotiate a settlement for the monies owed to them- if the Cuban government agreed to it, we would consider it. If our international partners want to help, terrific. We are always open to help with solving problems. The Cubans have an embassy in Washington; we have an embassy in Havana. Each has plenty of space for negotiations. They have our telephone number and email.
Senior Official Two: It’s been suggested- and written that the Trump Administration is not seeking a resolution to the many issues keeping the United States from having a normal relationship with Cuba; that the goal is to perpetuate issues for political purposes. That’s not accurate. There are so many more important issues in the world facing the United States- so, the more problems that can be resolved, the better for this country and for the world. This president likes moving issues from the in-box to the out-box to the resolved-box.

Question: What is the position of the Trump Administration towards the certified claims settlement proposal [link] created in December of 2018?
Senior Official One: It was creative, but there are some problems with its approach. First, the normal process is for the negotiation to be government-to-government. The proposal adds a private sector dynamic- Mr. [Kenneth] Feinberg, if I remember correctly, as basically a special negotiator. Second, we’ve thus far seen no evidence that the Cuban government wants to negotiate.

Question: Has the Trump Administration connected, directly or indirectly, with the Diaz-Canel Administration for the purpose of opening a channel for negotiating a settlement for the certified claims?
Senior Official One: Neither of us can comment upon any direct or indirect communications relating to the claims. Good effort though.
Question: Can you appreciate that from the perspective of the United States business community, it seems that every issue but the certified claims is a priority for the Trump Administration? Which runs counter to the deal-making image of the President.
Senior Official Two: I don’t know if we are going to have an answer for you that you seem to want- certainly, prior to the issues now facing the citizens of Venezuela, there may have been a moment for a dialogue, or more accurately, a negotiation process to take root. And, remember that we have the unresolved issue of the attacks upon our diplomats- and diplomats from other countries. That is a consequential impediment to any negotiation process.

Question: But, isn’t there an ability to de-link issues; I think “siloing” is the term, so that everything doesn’t stop?
Senior Official One: We are prepared to, use your term, “silo.” The Cubans are not too interested at the moment. They need to want to resolve issues. What we mostly hear is how they are victims- they want US$900 billion from the United States. That’s crazy talk.

Question: Can you understand if the Cuban government was reticent now to initiate negotiations regarding the certified claims given the vitriol from the Trump Administration? Could the Trump Administration not seek to engage in a victory-lap until the negotiations were complete and a settlement was announced? Doesn’t there need to be a bit of political space- a quiet period so that the Cuban government feels that the negotiations are about a settlement rather than a public relations moment for the Trump Administration?
Senior Official Two: Remember- the United States did not take nearly 6,000 pieces of property and assets from Cuba; companies and individuals in the United States are the victims. All administrations operate on multiple tracks- some you see, some you don’t. What they did was wrong; if they want to make it right, we are prepared to listen.

Question: If the Diaz-Canel Administration back-channeled or front-channeled an openness to have a face-to-face, bilateral negotiation to settle the 5,913 certified claims, and only the 5.913 certified claims, would the Trump Administration be prepared to have senior-level representatives sit across the table and negotiate?
Senior Official Two: There is quite a bit to that question. That would be quite a diplomatic bomb throwing. As we said earlier, I’m not certain we are there yet- meaning, well, that would be a shocker. Frankly, there might be considerable pressure from our friends in other countries to engage- which we might. However, there is tremendous distance between an overture and a negotiation. Having said that, if there was a sincere outreach, we would respond.

Question: So, a negotiation is not off-the-table? Is not a non-starter? The Trump Administration would negotiate agree to a negotiation even if the government of Cuba said that it is limited to the 5,913 certified claimants?
Senior Official One: I am starting to see that we are moving from an oval to a circle with your questions. Let’s end here: If there is a succinct outreach from the Cubans, whether directly or indirectly, President Trump will respond. Again, our goal is to resolve issues, not perpetuate them.

Question: There is a rumor that the Trump Administration has asked Panama and other countries to de-flag vessels used to transport oil from/to Cuba and Venezuela.
Senior Official One: No comment. Senior Official Two: No comment.
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Announcement of Changes in US Policy Toward Cuba and the Caribbean Region: Remarks of US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo; Speech of John Bolton (anuncia nuevas sanciones para Venezuela, Cuba y Nicaragua) 17 April 2019

April 17, 2019, 4:39 pm
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URL (English Only)

In an earlier post I discussed the anticipated announcement by American officials of a new set of sanctions against Cuba and other Caribbean states (here). I suggested that these must be understood as part of a broader and more comprehensive pivot towards Latin America (generally) and the Caribbean (specifically). It no longer makes sense to speak of a policy toward Cuba; the US has managed to begin to develop a coordinated policy on a regional basis.   

On 17 April, additional elements of this new policy were announced in speeches and remarks by US Secretary of State Pompeo and John Bolton, the 27th National Security Advisor of the United States.  What follows are (1) videos of Mr Pompeo and Mr Bolton remarks; (2) the text of the Remarks of Secretary Pompeo; (3) the State Department notice of additional sanctions against Nicaragua;  (4) and some reporting that summarizes the actions taken by the US government; and (5) video of Mr. Pompeo's remarks about US Latin American policy delivered in Chile.  Technical provisions and official pronouncements follow when available.  

A few points may be helpful in reading through the materials; (1) the references to the Monroe doctrine were not accidental, but they were directed as much against our European allies as it was against our competitors (Chine, Russia) and enemies (Iran) as identified in the National Security Strategy; (2) there is an expected reaction from our European allies, which is I suspect meant to be encouraged especially if lodged before the WTO; (3) any WTO action would further a related strategy of the Trump administration to contribute to the shrinking of the authority and reach of these multilateral institutions;  (4) the Trump Administration increasingly views certain forms of Latin American regionalism as imperialist is forma and function, the current round of sanctions is an indirect push against ALBA (Alianza Biolivariana) and its socialist regional trade and integration objectives; (5) the Trump Administration has, like the Chinese, Cubans and Iranians, embraced the primacy of the ideological component of their engagement in the region; the anti-communist discursive tropes are not decoration;  (6) there is a strong element of internal communication to these policies and the speeches that announced them; the administration is looking as intently at the 2020 US elections as it is to the integrity of the region and the protection of the integrity of a like minded group of states on the US's Southern flank; and (7) the Global Magnitsky framework is becoming the centerpiece of the projection of American values and power in its relation with adversaries; (8) economic sanctions are increasingly focused on global financial flows; but expect reaction in the form of crytocurriencies (the Venezuelan regime of Maduro was too clumsy to attempt it with any sort of success, but the future has yet to be written); and (9) litigation in the private sector will appear to provide a sideways pressure on vulnerable European allies; it represents an acknowledgement of the power of private markets and private commercial as an instrument of policy; the Europeans will likely be the first to feel the effects.  






Ironically enough, the most comprehensive description of the changes to a coherent US policy in the Caribbean (and the response to Russian and Chinese projections of power in that region), the luncheon speech delivered 17 April 2019 by John Bolton at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables Florida with members of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association to mark the 58th anniversary of the botched U.S.-backed invasion (deliberately chosen to underline the reset to US-Cuba relations form the US side and likely to be taken as a provocation on the Cuban side) is as yet unavailable in English.  The only video of the speech that I have been able t find to date was, again irony, one posted by a Nicaraguan news outlet with a Spanish voice over. The link follows: 


 

Bolton anuncia nuevas sanciones para Venezuela, Cuba y Nicaragua URL (solo en Español;  Spanish Language Translation Only)


As I mentioned in a prior post these movements are part of a broader vision of a coherent US policy toward Latin America in general, and the Caribbean region more specifically. A sense of that policy (broadly focused on Latin America and more specifically focused on its regions) could be gleaned from Secretary Pompeo's 12 April 2019 remarks on U.S.-Latin American policy, in Santiago, Chile.  More importantly, this new pivot to Latin America is undertaken in the shadow of the challenge posed by emerging Chinese relations.

URL (English language)





Remarks
Washington, DC
April 17, 2019

SECRETARY POMPEO: Good morning, everyone. Welcome. I’m here to announce an important decision regarding the United States policy towards Cuba.

In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, also known as Libertad. Until Title III of that act, United States citizens who had their property confiscated by the Castro regime were given the right to file suit against those who traffic in such properties.

But those citizens’ opportunities for justice have been put out of reach for more than two decades. For now more than 22 years, every president, every secretary of state has suspended Title III in the hope that doing so would put more pressure on the Cuban regime to transition to democracy.

But just as we did in regard to moving our embassy to Jerusalem, the true capital of Israel, or designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for what it is, a terrorist organization, the Trump administration recognizes reality. We see clearly that the regime’s repression of its own people and its unrepentant exportation of tyranny in the region has only gotten worse because dictators perceive appeasement as weakness, not strength.

President Obama’s administration’s game of footsy with the Castros’ junta did not deter the regime from continuing to harass and oppress the heroic Ladies in White, a group of women dedicated to peacefully protesting the regime’s human rights abuses.

More broadly, the regime continues to deprive its own people of the fundamental freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. Indeed, according to NGO reports, Cuban thugs made more than 2,800 arbitrary arrests in 2018 alone. In the run-up to the country’s recent sham constitutional referendum, one that enshrined the Communist Party as the only legal political party in Cuba, the regime harassed, beat, and detained leaders and – opposition leaders and activists. Three hundred and ten people were arbitrarily detained according to the Cuban Commission on Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

Cuba’s behavior in the Western Hemisphere undermines the security and stability of countries throughout the region, which directly threatens United States national security interests. The Cuban regime has for years exported its tactics of intimidation, repression, and violence. They’ve exported this to Venezuela in direct support of the former Maduro regime. Cuban military intelligence and state security services today keep Maduro in power.

Sadly, Cuba’s most prominent export these days is not cigars or rum; it’s oppression. Detente with the regime has failed. Cozying up to Cuban dictators will always be a black mark on this great nation’s long record of defending human rights.

For these reasons, I’m announcing that the Trump administration will no longer suspend Title III. Effective May 2nd, the right thing to bring – the right to bring an action under Title III of the Libertad Act will be implemented in full. I have already informed Congress of my decision.

Implementing Title III in full means a chance at justice for Cuban Americans who have long sought relief for Fidel Castro and his lackeys seizing property without compensation. For the first time, claimants will be able to bring lawsuits against persons trafficking in property that was confiscated by the Cuban regime. Any person or company doing business in Cuba should heed this announcement.

In addition to being newly vulnerable to lawsuits, they could be abetting the Cuban regime’s abuses of its own people. Those doing business in Cuba should fully investigate whether they are connected to property stolen in service of a failed communist experiment. I encourage our friends and allies alike to likewise follow our lead and stand with the Cuban people.

As I said throughout my trip to South America this last week, the Trump administration is committed to helping grow the wave of democracy, good governments, and openness, which is steadily building throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. On my trip last week, I saw these positive changes firsthand, and told our friends and allies that we’re with them. We’re on the side of what’s right and what is just.

Today we are holding the Cuban Government accountable for seizing American assets. We are helping those whom the regime has robbed get compensation for their rightful property. And we’re advancing human rights and democracy on behalf of the Cuban people.

Now I will turn it over to Western Hemisphere Assistant Secretary Kim Breier to take some of your questions this morning. Thank you all.

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Media Note
Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
April 17, 2019

Today, the United States has affirmed its commitment to use all economic and diplomatic tools to promote accountability for the Ortega regime and to support the Nicaraguan people in their quest for freedom.

The United States has sanctioned Laureano Ortega and Banco Corporativo SA (Bancorp), pursuant to Executive Order 13851, which President Trump signed November 27, 2018. Because of this action, their U.S. assets are frozen and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from transactions with Laureano Ortega and Bancorp.

Laureano Ortega, son of President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo, is a key enabler of the Ortega regime’s corruption. On the regime’s behalf, he has sought international financial support and foreign investment. In doing so, he has placed the interests of his family and his personal fortune ahead of the interests of the Nicaraguan people by engaging in corrupt business deals. Bancorp has served as the personal slush fund for the Ortega family and the instrument for corrupt deals with Nicolas Maduro and his former regime in Venezuela.

We urge the Ortega regime to restore democratic order in Nicaragua and heed the calls of Nicaraguans clamoring for early free, fair, and transparent elections. The regime must also abide by the commitments it has already made, including under the Inter-American Democratic Charter. We call on Nicaragua to unconditionally and fully release arbitrarily detained persons and protect the fundamental human rights of its citizens. We will continue to promote accountability for those who have demonstrated a blatant disregard for human rights and fomented violence in support of the Ortega regime.

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Trump's Cuba hawks try to squeeze Havana over Venezuela role
Zachary Fagenson, Matt Spetalnick, Lesley Wroughton


MIAMI/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Trump administration on Wednesday imposed new sanctions and other punitive measures on Cuba and Venezuela, seeking to ratchet up U.S. pressure on Havana to end its support for Venezuela’s socialist president, Nicolas Maduro.

Speaking to a Cuban exile group in Miami, U.S. national security adviser John Bolton said the United States was targeting Cuba’s military and intelligence services, including a military-owned airline, for additional sanctions and was tightening travel and trade restrictions against the island.

Bolton’s speech followed the State Department’s announcement on Wednesday that it was lifting a long-standing ban against U.S. citizens filing lawsuits against foreign companies that use properties seized by Cuba’s Communist government since Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution.

President Donald Trump’s decision, which the State Department said could unleash hundreds of thousands of legal claims worth tens of billions of dollars, drew swift criticism from European and Canadian allies, whose companies have significant interests in Cuba.

The Cuban government, which could be hindered in attracting new foreign investment, denounced it as “an attack on international law.”

Taking aim at Venezuela, Bolton said the United States was also imposing sanctions on the country’s central bank to prohibit access to dollars by an institution he described as crucial to keeping Maduro in power. Bolton also announced new sanctions on Nicaragua.

While accusing Cuba of propping up Maduro with thousands of security force members in the country, Bolton also warned “all external actors, including Russia,” against deploying military assets to support the Venezuelan leader.

“The United States will consider such provocative actions a threat to international peace and security in the region,” Bolton said, noting that Moscow recently sent in military flights carrying 35 tons of cargo and a hundred personnel.

However, Cuba appears unlikely to be budged by demands to dump Maduro, a longtime ally of Havana, and Maduro has also shown little sign of losing the loyalty of his military despite tough oil-related U.S. sanctions on the OPEC nation.

Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel responded defiantly. “No one will rip the (fatherland) away from us, neither by seduction nor by force,” he said on Twitter. “We Cubans do not surrender.”

FILE PHOTO: A supporter of Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro holding a copy of the Venezuelan constitution and flags of Venezuela and Cuba, takes part in a gathering in support of his government outside the Miraflores Palace in Caracas, Venezuela January 26, 2019. REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins/File Photo

ROLLING BACK OBAMA-ERA DETENTE

Amid Venezuela’s political and economic crisis, opposition leader Juan Guaido invoked the constitution in January to assume the interim presidency. The United States and most Western countries have backed Guaido as head of state. Maduro, backed by Cuba, Russia and China, has denounced Guaido as a U.S. puppet.

Bolton, a longtime Cuba hardliner, was frequently interrupted by applause in his address to veterans of the U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion on the 58th anniversary of the failed operation to overthrow Castro. His speech was a sequel to one late last year branding Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua a “troika of tyranny.”

Bolton’s announcements included further measures to roll back parts of the historic opening to Cuba, an old Cold War foe, under his predecessor, Barack Obama.

The Obama administration’s approach, he said, “provided the Cuban regime with the necessary political cover to expand its malign influence.”

Among the Cuba measures announced by Bolton was reinstatement of limits on U.S. citizens sending remittances to Cuba at $1,000 per person per quarter. Remittances have surged since Obama started easing restrictions, becoming an important part of the economy and fuelling growth of the private sector.

“Restricting remittances that can be sent to Cubans will directly hurt the Cuban people,” said Ben Rhodes, a former Obama adviser who negotiated the 2014 diplomatic breakthrough with Havana. “This is a shameful and mean-spirited policy.”

Bolton said the United States would also further restrict “non-family” travel to Cuba and cited military-owned Cuban airline Aerogaviota among five entities being added to the U.S. sanctions blacklist.

The Trump administration has previously sought to curtail Venezuela’s subsidized oil shipments to Cuba.

Also on Wednesday, Bolton announced sanctions on Nicaragua’s Bancorp, which he called a “slush fund,” and on Laureano Ortega, a son of President Daniel Ortega for what he described as “vast corruption.”

Trump’s toughened stance on Cuba as well as Venezuela and Nicaragua has gone down well among Cuban Americans in south Florida, an important voting bloc in a political swing state as he looks toward his re-election campaign in 2020.

Trump has added Cuba hawks to top posts. Bolton brought in Mauricio Claver-Carone, known as staunchly anti-Castro and an outspoken critic of Obama’s rapprochement with Havana, as his top Latin America adviser.

Cuba's President Miguel Diaz-Canel (L) shakes hands with Venezuela's President Nicolas Maduro during the 16th Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America-Peoples Trade Agreement (ALBA-TCP) Summit in Havana, Cuba, December 14, 2018. Ernesto Mastrascusa/Pool via REUTERS

However, the risk, some former U.S. officials say, is that Trump’s team will overdo the targeting of Cuba in their anti-Maduro campaign and alienate some European and Latin American allies who have good relations with Havana but are also needed by Washington to maintain pressure on Venezuela.

Over the objections of key allies, Trump decided to allow a law that has been suspended since its creation in 1996 to be fully activated, permitting Cuban-Americans and other U.S. citizens to sue companies doing business in Cuba over property seized in decades past by the Cuban government.

Until now, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act had been fully waived by every president over the past 23 years.

Among the foreign companies heavily invested in Cuba are Canadian mining firm Sherritt International Corp and Spain’s Melia Hotels International SA. U.S. companies, including airlines and cruise companies, have forged business deals in Cuba since the easing of restrictions under Obama.

It was unclear, however, how such property claims, some of which involve complex legal matters, will fare in U.S. courts.

The European Union said it will “consider all options at its disposal to protect its legitimate interests.”

Chrystia Freeland, minister of foreign affairs for Canada, which has coordinated with Washington on Venezuela, said: “Canada is deeply disappointed with today’s (U.S.) announcement.”

Kim Breier, U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, said a U.S. government commission has certified nearly 6,000 claims for property confiscated in Cuba with a current value of about $8 billion and that there could be up to 200,000 uncertified claims worth tens of billions of dollars if pursued.
Reporting by Zachary Fagenson in Miami and Matt Spetalnick and Lesley Wroughton in Washington; Additional reporting by Makini Brice, David Alexander and Doina Chiacu in Washington; Sarah Marsh and Marc Frank in Havana; Philip Blenkinsop and Jan Strupczewski in Brussels; Julie Gordon in Ottawa; writing by Matt Spetalnick; Editing by Mary Milliken and Lisa Shumaker

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U.S. restricts travel, remittances to Cuba as part of a new policy under Trump

By Nora Gámez Torres
April 17, 2019 01:00 PM, Updated 1 hour 1 minute ago 


The Trump administration is tightening restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, reversing the engagement policies of the Obama era while increasing pressure on the island’s government in response to its support of the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela.

The changes were announced during a speech by National Security Advisor John Bolton at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables Wednesday afternoon.

“In no uncertain terms, the Obama administration’s policies toward Cuba have enabled the Cuban colonization of Venezuela today,” National Security Advisor John Bolton said Wednesday during a speech at the Biltmore Hotel in Coral Gables. The changes were designed to reverse “the disastrous Obama-era policies, and finally end the glamorization of socialism and communism,” he added.

Travel to Cuba will now be limited to family visits, restricting those deemed as “veiled tourism,” said a high-ranking official who spoke on condition of anonymity. That could signal the end of cruises, which started to operate during the Obama years because of an expansion of the categories of travel allowed.

Read more here: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article229341009.html#storylink=cpy

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Travel by Cuban Americans to reunite with relatives on the island will remain unchanged and the new limits on remittances will be “generous … because we don’t want to hurt the families,” said a senior administration official who asked to remain anonymous in order to explain the reasons behind the changes. Former President George W. Bush was broadly criticized in 2004 when he restricted those visits to three per year and imposed tight limits on remittances.

Bolton said remittances will be limited to $1,000 per person every three months, compared to the unlimited remittances allowed by the Obama administration “under the assumption that capital inflows would benefit the Cuban people. Yet, the situation for Cubans has in fact worsened.”


The U.S. Treasury Department also will suspend Obama-era authorizations that allowed Cuban companies and banks to perform “U-turn” transactions in third countries that passed indirectly through the U.S. banking system. Bolton said that allowed the Cuban government to evade U.S. sanctions and obtain access to hard currencies.

In addition, the State Department will add five companies to its list of restricted entities, including Aerogaviota, an airline controlled by Gaviota, a group of tourism-relative companies controlled by the Cuban armed Forces. Those measures are in addition to the full implementation of the Helms-Burton law, which will allow lawsuits in federal courts seeking compensation for properties confiscated by the Cuban government after 1959. The step was formally announced by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Wednesday morning and scheduled to take effect on May 2.

Read more here: https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article229341009.html#storylink=cpy


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Bolton also noted the recent sanctions against 44 tankers and six companies involved in delivering Venezuelan oil to Cuba, designed to impact the subsidies that Maduro provides to Havana. And he accused the Cuban government of training Maduro’s repressive forces and inspiring the establishment of colectivos and other pro-government paramilitary groups in Venezuela.

Aside from reversing some of the changes put in place by the Obama administration, the new Trump policies on Cuba were designed to signal to the Cuban government that “its support for Maduro will cost it,” said the senior administration official who asked for anonymity. “And we will continue with the sanctions. Our policy has two pillars: Constancy and consistency.”


Bolton also announced new sanctions against the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan governments, which alongside Cuba make up what he’s called “the troika of tyranny.”

The Treasury Department will sanction the Central Bank of Venezuela, which has helped the Maduro regime to sell gold for hard currencies, and the Corporative Bank of Nicaragua, used by Daniel Ortega as his “slush fund.” It will also impose sanctions on his son, Laureano, and wife and Vice President Rosario Murillo, accused by U.S. officials of corruption in a Nicaraguan investment company.

“These steps against the Central Bank of Venezuela should be a strong warning to all foreign actors, including Russia, against deploying military units in Venezuela to shore up the Maduro regime,” Bolton said.

The presidential adviser announced the policy changes during a speech that wove together several threads, starting with a contrast between Trump and Obama policies that was warmly welcome by an audience of Cuban exiles who felt betrayed by the engagement policies of the previous White House.

“To justify its policy of normalizing relations with Cuba, President Obama said Cuba quote ‘poses no genuine threat.’ Tell that to the American diplomats who were attacked in Havana. Tell that to the terrorized people of Venezuela. The reality is that the Obama government sought to normalize relations with a tyrannical dictatorship,” Bolton said. He reminded his audience that Trump met with opposition activists like the Ladies in White and called the late Fidel Castro “a brutal dictator.”

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* * *


* * *

But the message of the Trump administration, as it prepares for the 2020 presidential election, was direct:

“Let me be clear: The Trump administration will NEVER, EVER abandon you,” Bolton said. “We will need your help in the days ahead. We must all reject the forces of communism and socialism in this Hemisphere—and in this country.”

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↧

Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN): Cuba and its Global Footprint in the Shadow of Global Embargo by the US

April 18, 2019, 8:00 am
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I have been writing about the new set of sanctions directed against Cuba, but as part of a wider pivot toward the Caribbean region and Latin America generally (see here, and here). But sanctions are not constructed by attaining rhetorical heights in speeches. It is created one state and one enterprise ata time.  To that objective it is left to the administrative apparatus of the United States, constrained by the laws and regulations under which it may undertake this task, to identify those actors who are meant to be swept into the sanctions programs announced by high administrative and elected officials.

That task has been memorialized in the US Treasury Department's  Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN) Human Readable Lists
 As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs." Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. Click here for more information on Treasury's Sanctions Programs.  

Note the list is constantly updated.  But in the wake of the pivot toward Latin America, the list in effect on the day of the announcement of the new American policy toward the region 17 April 2019) I thought it might prove useful to provide the list for Cuba, if only as a baseline for what will likely follow. These are generated by authority of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515. Also included are the list of companies subject to Cuba related sanctions (SDN List Sorted by OFAC Sanctions Program).

The most interesting aspect of the list is that it serves as a nice illustration of the deep and complex network of economic relationships that must be unraveled when one targets specific states, people or enterprises. More importantly, it provides as least a rough mapping of the scope of Cuban global economic engagement and the enterprise forms within which it is undertaken. Note in that context as well the state that are included and those that are missing.  That suggests both the targeted nature of the sanctions (and thus its inability to provide a comprehensive mapping of Cuban activity) and the difficulty of actually teasing out the full extent of economic relations. As well, not listed here are the companies to which Cuba or its listed companies may be associated with (some of this is available)--that would deepen the scope of Cuban global engagement even more.




SDN List by Country
NOTE: The SDNs are listed by country of residence or incorporation. There are, however, SDNs with no fixed residence or country of incorporation. These entities are listed at the end of the Country List under the heading of "Undetermined". It is advisable to check both the Country list and the Undetermined list when searching for an SDN.


ANGOLA 
 
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
ARGENTINA
 
CRYMSA - ARGENTINA, S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina [CUBA].

CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUBATUR (a.k.a. EMPRESA DE TURISMO NACIONAL Y INTERNACIONAL), Buenos Aires,
Argentina [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA]. 
 
EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA DE TURISMO NACIONAL Y INTERNACIONAL (a.k.a. CUBATUR), Buenos Aires,
Argentina [CUBA].

HAVANATUR S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR, S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

HAVANATUR, S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

LEVERAGE, S.A., San Martin 323, Piso 14, Buenos Aires, Argentina [CUBA]. 
 
THE BAHAMAS
 
HAVANATUR BAHAMAS LTD., East Bay Street, Nassau, Bahamas, The [CUBA].
 
 
BARBADOS
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA]. 
 
 
BULGARIA
 
CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA]. 
 
CANADA
2904977 CANADA, INC. (a.k.a. CARIBE SOL; a.k.a. HAVANTUR CANADA INC.), 818 rue
Sherbrooke East, Montreal, Quebec H2L 1K3, Canada [CUBA].
 
 CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

CARIBE SOL (a.k.a. 2904977 CANADA, INC.; a.k.a. HAVANTUR CANADA INC.), 818 rue
Sherbrooke East, Montreal, Quebec H2L 1K3, Canada [CUBA].

COBALT REFINERY CO. INC., Saskatchewan, AB, Canada [CUBA].

CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
 EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

GALAX INC. (a.k.a. GALAX TRADING CO., LTD.), 5250 Ferrier Street, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada [CUBA].

GALAX TRADING CO., LTD. (a.k.a. GALAX INC.), 5250 Ferrier Street, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada [CUBA].

HAVANTUR CANADA INC. (a.k.a. 2904977 CANADA, INC.; a.k.a. CARIBE SOL), 818 rue
Sherbrooke East, Montreal, Quebec H2L 1K3, Canada [CUBA].

HOLA SUN HOLIDAYS LIMITED, 146 Beaver Creek Road, Richmond Hill, Ontario L4B
1C2, Canada [CUBA].

INTERNATIONAL COBALT CO. INC., Saskatchewan, AB, Canada [CUBA].
 
LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
PRENSA LATINA CANADA LTD., 1010 O Rue Ste. Catherine, Montreal PQ H303 IGI,
Canada [CUBA]. 
 
"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
 
CHILE
 
GUAMATUR S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR CHILE S.A.), Avenue 11 de Septiembre 2155,
Edificio Panoramico, Torre C, Oficina 805, Providencia, Santiago, Chile [CUBA].

HAVANATUR CHILE S.A. (f.k.a. GUAMATUR S.A.), Avenue 11 de Septiembre 2155,
Edificio Panoramico, Torre C, Oficina 805, Providencia, Santiago, Chile [CUBA]. 
 
CUBA

AERO-CARIBBEAN (a.k.a. AEROCARIBBEAN AIRLINES), Havana, Cuba [CUBA].

AEROCARIBBEAN AIRLINES (a.k.a. AERO-CARIBBEAN), Havana, Cuba [CUBA].

CIMEX (a.k.a. CIMEX CUBA; a.k.a. COMERCIO INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR; a.k.a.
CORPORACION CIMEX S.A.), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y 2,
Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

CIMEX CUBA (a.k.a. CIMEX; a.k.a. COMERCIO INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR; a.k.a.
CORPORACION CIMEX S.A.), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y 2,
Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

COMERCIO INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR (a.k.a. CIMEX; a.k.a. CIMEX CUBA; a.k.a.
CORPORACION CIMEX S.A.), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y 2,
Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

CORPORACION CIMEX S.A. (a.k.a. CIMEX; a.k.a. CIMEX CUBA; a.k.a. COMERCIO
INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y
2, Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

CUBANACAN (a.k.a. CUBANACAN GROUP; a.k.a. EL GRUPO CUBANACAN), Calle 68 e/5ta A,
Apartado 16046, Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

CUBANACAN GROUP (a.k.a. CUBANACAN; a.k.a. EL GRUPO CUBANACAN), Calle 68 e/5ta A,
Apartado 16046, Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

EL GRUPO CUBANACAN (a.k.a. CUBANACAN; a.k.a. CUBANACAN GROUP), Calle 68 e/5ta A,
Apartado 16046, Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

GENERAL NICKEL SA (a.k.a. LA COMPANIA GENERAL DE NIQUEL), Cuba [CUBA].

HAVANATUR S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR, S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

HAVANATUR, S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

LA COMPANIA GENERAL DE NIQUEL (a.k.a. GENERAL NICKEL SA), Cuba [CUBA].

MELFI MARINE CORPORATION S.A. (a.k.a. MELFI MARINE S.A.), Calle Oficios No. 410
e/Luz y Acosta, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Anillo del Puerto e/Pote y Linea
del Ferrocarril, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Oficios 104 Havana Vieja,
Havana, Cuba; Oficina 7, Edificio Senorial, Calle 50 Apartado 31, Panama City 5,
Panama [CUBA].

MELFI MARINE S.A. (a.k.a. MELFI MARINE CORPORATION S.A.), Calle Oficios No. 410
e/Luz y Acosta, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Anillo del Puerto e/Pote y Linea
del Ferrocarril, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Oficios 104 Havana Vieja,
Havana, Cuba; Oficina 7, Edificio Senorial, Calle 50 Apartado 31, Panama City 5,
Panama [CUBA].

MOA NICKEL SA, Cuba [CUBA].

NETHERLANDS CARIBBEAN BANK N.V., Kaya WFG (Jombi) Mensing 14, P.O. Box 3895,
Willemstad, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; 5ta. Ave. No. 6407 esq. a 66,
Miramar, Municipio Playa, La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

RI, Su Yong, Cuba; DOB 25 Jun 1968; nationality Korea, North; Gender Male;
Secondary sanctions risk: North Korea Sanctions Regulations, sections 510.201
and 510.210; Passport 654310175; Korea Ryonbong General Corporation Official
(individual) [NPWMD] (Linked To: KOREA RYONBONG GENERAL CORPORATION).

SERCUBA (a.k.a. WWW.SERCUBA.COM), Gral. Gomez #105 e/ Maceo e Independencia,
Camaguey, Cuba; Calle 29 #5218 e/ 52 y 54 Edif. Cimex, Cienfuegos, Cuba;
Libertad s/n, e/ Honorato del Castillo y Maceo, Ciego de Avila, Cuba; Calle 6
#408 esq. 3ra. Ave. Miramar Playa, La Habana, Cuba; Edif. Las Novedades altos
Ave. Frank Pais e/ Segunda y Aven. Figueredo. Rpto. Jesus Menendez. Bayamo,
Granma, Cuba; Crombet s/n e/ Los Maceos y Moncada, Guantanamo, Cuba; Frexes #216
e/ Maceo y Martires, Holguin, Cuba; Ave. 1ro. De Mayo s/n. Moa, Holguin, Cuba;
Vicente Garcia #28 e/ Julian Santana y Francisco Vega, Tienda La Nueva, Las
Tunas, Cuba; Calle 40 esq. Playa. Varadero, Matanzas, Cuba; Calle Ayuntamiento
e/ Medio y Rio, Matanzas, Cuba; Gerardo Medina #633, Pinar del Rio, Cuba;
Independencia #171 Sur, altos, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba; Felix Pena #565 e/ Jose A.
Saco y Aguilera, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Carretera Central Km. 298 Banda
Esperanza, Villa Clara, Cuba; Calle 39 e/ 30 y 32 Altos del Servi Cupet "El
parque", Isla de la Juventud, Cuba [CUBA].

WWW.SERCUBA.COM (a.k.a. SERCUBA), Gral. Gomez #105 e/ Maceo e Independencia,
Camaguey, Cuba; Calle 29 #5218 e/ 52 y 54 Edif. Cimex, Cienfuegos, Cuba;
Libertad s/n, e/ Honorato del Castillo y Maceo, Ciego de Avila, Cuba; Calle 6
#408 esq. 3ra. Ave. Miramar Playa, La Habana, Cuba; Edif. Las Novedades altos
Ave. Frank Pais e/ Segunda y Aven. Figueredo. Rpto. Jesus Menendez. Bayamo,
Granma, Cuba; Crombet s/n e/ Los Maceos y Moncada, Guantanamo, Cuba; Frexes #216
e/ Maceo y Martires, Holguin, Cuba; Ave. 1ro. De Mayo s/n. Moa, Holguin, Cuba;
Vicente Garcia #28 e/ Julian Santana y Francisco Vega, Tienda La Nueva, Las
Tunas, Cuba; Calle 40 esq. Playa. Varadero, Matanzas, Cuba; Calle Ayuntamiento
e/ Medio y Rio, Matanzas, Cuba; Gerardo Medina #633, Pinar del Rio, Cuba;
Independencia #171 Sur, altos, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba; Felix Pena #565 e/ Jose A.
Saco y Aguilera, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Carretera Central Km. 298 Banda
Esperanza, Villa Clara, Cuba; Calle 39 e/ 30 y 32 Altos del Servi Cupet "El
parque", Isla de la Juventud, Cuba [CUBA].
 
 
CZECH REPUBLIC
 
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
 
FRANCE
 
CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
COMERCIALIZACION DE PRODUCTOS VARIOS (a.k.a. COPROVA; a.k.a. COPROVA SARL),
Paris, France [CUBA]. 
COPROVA (a.k.a. COMERCIALIZACION DE PRODUCTOS VARIOS; a.k.a. COPROVA SARL),
Paris, France [CUBA].

COPROVA SARL (a.k.a. COMERCIALIZACION DE PRODUCTOS VARIOS; a.k.a. COPROVA),
Paris, France [CUBA].
 
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
HAVANATUR, 54 Rue Richelieu, Paris, France [CUBA].
 
"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
 
GERMANY
CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
TROPIC TOURS GMBH (a.k.a. TROPICANA TOURS GMBH), Lietzenburger Strasse 51,
Berlin, Germany [CUBA].

TROPICANA TOURS GMBH (a.k.a. TROPIC TOURS GMBH), Lietzenburger Strasse 51,
Berlin, Germany [CUBA].
 
"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
 
GREECE 

NORDSTRAND MARITIME AND TRADING COMPANY, 33 Akti Maouli, Pireas (Piraeus) 185-
35, Greece [CUBA].
 
 
GUYANA

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
 
HAITI

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
 
ITALY
 
CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

COTEI, Milan, Italy [CUBA].

CUBAN CIGARS TRADE, Italy [CUBA].

CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA]. 
"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
 
JAMAICA
 
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
 
JAPAN
 
CRUZ, Juan M. de la, Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Director, Banco Nacional de Cuba (individual) [CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

ETCO INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, LIMITED, Kawabe Building, 1-5 Kanda Nishiki-Cho,
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].
 
 "BNC" (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
 
North Korea
 
CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA]. 

LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
 
LIECHTENSTEIN

NORDSTRAND LTD., Liechtenstein [CUBA]. 
MEXICO
CASA DE CUBA, Spain; Mexico [CUBA].
 
CIMEX, Emerson No. 148 Piso 7, Mexico, D.F. 11570, Mexico [CUBA].
 
CUBACANCUN CIGARS AND GIFT SHOPS, Cancun, Mexico [CUBA].

CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUBANATUR, Baja California 255, Edificio B. Oficina 103, Condesa, Mexico, D.F.
06500, Mexico [CUBA].
 
CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
CUMEXINT, S.A., 1649 Adolfo Prieto, Colonia del Valle, Mexico City, Mexico
[CUBA].
 
EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
GUTIERREZ REYES, Jose, Vinales Tours, Oaxaca 80, Roma, Mexico, D.F., Mexico
(individual) [CUBA].
 
LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
PRELASA, Mexico [CUBA].
 
VINALES TOURS, Cancun, Mexico; Guadalajara, Mexico; Mexico City, Mexico;
Monterey, Mexico; Roma, Mexico [CUBA]. 
 
 
NETHERLANDS
 
CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANACAN INTERNATIONAL B.V, Visseringlaan 24, 2288 ER Rijswijk, Zevenhuizen,
Netherlands; Registration ID 27134614 (Netherlands) [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
NIREF, Boezembolcht 23, Rotterdam, Netherlands [CUBA].
 
 
NETGHERLANDS ANTILLES
 
 
NETHERLANDS CARIBBEAN BANK N.V., Kaya WFG (Jombi) Mensing 14, P.O. Box 3895,
Willemstad, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; 5ta. Ave. No. 6407 esq. a 66,
Miramar, Municipio Playa, La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].
 
 
PANAMA
 
BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA (a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA]. 
BOUTIQUE LA MAISON, 42 Via Brasil, Panama City, Panama [CUBA].
 
CECOEX, S.A., Panama City, Panama [CUBA].

CIMEX, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

COMERCIAL CIMEX, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

CORPORACION CIMEX, S.A., Panama [CUBA].
 
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
EDYJU, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
HAVANATUR S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR, S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

HAVANATUR, S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA]
 
INTERCONSULT, Panama [CUBA].
 
KAVE, S.A., Panama [CUBA].
 
MELFI MARINE CORPORATION S.A. (a.k.a. MELFI MARINE S.A.), Calle Oficios No. 410
e/Luz y Acosta, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Anillo del Puerto e/Pote y Linea
del Ferrocarril, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Oficios 104 Havana Vieja,
Havana, Cuba; Oficina 7, Edificio Senorial, Calle 50 Apartado 31, Panama City 5,
Panama [CUBA].

MELFI MARINE S.A. (a.k.a. MELFI MARINE CORPORATION S.A.), Calle Oficios No. 410
e/Luz y Acosta, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Anillo del Puerto e/Pote y Linea
del Ferrocarril, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Oficios 104 Havana Vieja,
Havana, Cuba; Oficina 7, Edificio Senorial, Calle 50 Apartado 31, Panama City 5,
Panama [CUBA].
 
NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

NORIEGA, Manuel Antonio, Panama (individual) [CUBA]. 
PANAMERICAN IMPORT AND EXPORT COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Panama [CUBA].
 
SERVINAVES, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

SIEIRO DE NORIEGA, Felicidad, Panama (individual) [CUBA].
 
TROBER, S.A. (a.k.a. TROVER, S.A.), Edificio Saldivar, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

TROVER, S.A. (a.k.a. TROBER, S.A.), Edificio Saldivar, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].
 
"BNC" (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA]. 
 
PERU
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
 EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
 
POLAND

CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
 
RUSSIA
 
CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
 
SPAIN 
BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA (a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].
 
 CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

CASA DE CUBA, Spain; Mexico [CUBA].

CIMEX (a.k.a. COMPANIA DE IMPORTACION Y EXPORTACION IBERIA), Spain [CUBA].

CIMEX IBERICA, Spain [CUBA].
 
COIBA (a.k.a. COMERCIAL IBEROAMERICANA, S.A.), Spain [CUBA].

COMERCIAL DE RODAJES Y MAQUINARIA, S.A. (a.k.a. CRYMSA), Jose Lazaro Galdeano 6-
6, Madrid 28016, Spain [CUBA].

COMERCIAL IBEROAMERICANA, S.A. (a.k.a. COIBA), Spain [CUBA].

COMPANIA DE IMPORTACION Y EXPORTACION IBERIA (a.k.a. CIMEX), Spain [CUBA].

CRYMSA (a.k.a. COMERCIAL DE RODAJES Y MAQUINARIA, S.A.), Jose Lazaro Galdeano 6-
6, Madrid 28016, Spain [CUBA].

CUBAEXPORT, Spain [CUBA].

CUBAFRUTAS, Spain [CUBA].

CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUBATABACO, Spain [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].
 
EDICIONES CUBANAS, Spain [CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE TURISMO DE CUBA, Spain [CUBA].
 
LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

NAVIERA MARITIMA DE AROSA, S.A., Paseo de Pereda 36, Apartado 141, Santander
39004, Spain [CUBA].
 
PESCABRAVA, S.A., Spain [CUBA].

PRENSA LATINA, Spain [CUBA].
 
VIAJES GUAMA, S.A., Spain [CUBA].
 
 "BNC" (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].
 
 
SWITZERLAND
 
BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA (a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA]. 
DELVEST HOLDING COMPANY (a.k.a. DELVEST HOLDING, S.A.), Case Postale 236, 10 Bis
Rue Du Vieux College 12-11, Geneva, Switzerland [CUBA].

DELVEST HOLDING, S.A. (a.k.a. DELVEST HOLDING COMPANY), Case Postale 236, 10 Bis
Rue Du Vieux College 12-11, Geneva, Switzerland [CUBA].
 
NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].
 
"BNC" (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
ANGLO-CARIBBEAN CO., LTD. (a.k.a. AVIA IMPORT), Ibex House, The Minories, London
EC3N 1DY, United Kingdom [CUBA].
 
AVIA IMPORT (a.k.a. ANGLO-CARIBBEAN CO., LTD.), Ibex House, The Minories, London
EC3N 1DY, United Kingdom [CUBA].
 
CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUBANACAN U.K. LIMITED, Unit 49 Skylines Village, Limeharbour, Docklands, United
Kingdom; Registration ID 2720485 (United Kingdom) [CUBA]. 
 
EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].
 
ETCO INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES LTD., Devonshire House, 1 Devonshire Street,
London, United Kingdom [CUBA]. 
 
HAVANA INTERNATIONAL BANK, LTD., 20 Ironmonger Lane, London EC2V 8EY, United
Kingdom [CUBA].
 
 
UNITED STATES
 
HAVANATUR S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR, S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

HAVANATUR, S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].
 
UNDETERMINED
 
ANA I (a.k.a. SAND SWAN) (P3QG3) General Cargo 2,595DWT 1,116GRT Cyprus flag
(Sand & Swan Navigation Co. Ltd.) (vessel) [CUBA].
 
HERMANN (CL2685) General Cargo 2,597DWT 1,098GRT Cuba flag (Compania Navegacion
Golfo S.A.) (vessel) [CUBA].
 
LA COMPANIA TIENDAS UNIVERSO S.A. (a.k.a. WWW.CUBA-SHOP.NET) [CUBA].
 
MAR AZUL (CL2192) Tug 212GRT Cuba flag (Samir de Navegacion S.A.) (vessel)
[CUBA].
 
SAND SWAN (f.k.a. ANA I) (P3QG3) General Cargo 2,595DWT 1,116GRT Cyprus flag
(Sand & Swan Navigation Co. Ltd.) (vessel) [CUBA]. 
 
TIFON (CL2059) Tug 164GRT Cuba flag (Samir de Navegacion S.A.) (vessel) [CUBA].
 
WWW.CUBA-SHOP.NET (a.k.a. LA COMPANIA TIENDAS UNIVERSO S.A.) [CUBA].
 
__________
 
 
SDN BY PROGRAMS: CUBA

2904977 CANADA, INC. (a.k.a. CARIBE SOL; a.k.a. HAVANTUR CANADA INC.), 818 rue
Sherbrooke East, Montreal, Quebec H2L 1K3, Canada [CUBA].

AERO-CARIBBEAN (a.k.a. AEROCARIBBEAN AIRLINES), Havana, Cuba [CUBA].

AEROCARIBBEAN AIRLINES (a.k.a. AERO-CARIBBEAN), Havana, Cuba [CUBA].

ANA I (a.k.a. SAND SWAN) (P3QG3) General Cargo 2,595DWT 1,116GRT Cyprus flag
(Sand & Swan Navigation Co. Ltd.) (vessel) [CUBA].

ANGLO-CARIBBEAN CO., LTD. (a.k.a. AVIA IMPORT), Ibex House, The Minories, London
EC3N 1DY, United Kingdom [CUBA].

AVIA IMPORT (a.k.a. ANGLO-CARIBBEAN CO., LTD.), Ibex House, The Minories, London
EC3N 1DY, United Kingdom [CUBA].

BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA (a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

BOUTIQUE LA MAISON, 42 Via Brasil, Panama City, Panama [CUBA].

CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

CARIBE SOL (a.k.a. 2904977 CANADA, INC.; a.k.a. HAVANTUR CANADA INC.), 818 rue
Sherbrooke East, Montreal, Quebec H2L 1K3, Canada [CUBA].

CASA DE CUBA, Spain; Mexico [CUBA].

CECOEX, S.A., Panama City, Panama [CUBA].

CIMEX, Emerson No. 148 Piso 7, Mexico, D.F. 11570, Mexico [CUBA].

CIMEX (a.k.a. COMPANIA DE IMPORTACION Y EXPORTACION IBERIA), Spain [CUBA].

CIMEX (a.k.a. CIMEX CUBA; a.k.a. COMERCIO INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR; a.k.a.
CORPORACION CIMEX S.A.), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y 2,
Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

CIMEX CUBA (a.k.a. CIMEX; a.k.a. COMERCIO INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR; a.k.a.
CORPORACION CIMEX S.A.), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y 2,
Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

CIMEX IBERICA, Spain [CUBA].

CIMEX, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

COBALT REFINERY CO. INC., Saskatchewan, AB, Canada [CUBA].

COIBA (a.k.a. COMERCIAL IBEROAMERICANA, S.A.), Spain [CUBA].

COMERCIAL CIMEX, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

COMERCIAL DE RODAJES Y MAQUINARIA, S.A. (a.k.a. CRYMSA), Jose Lazaro Galdeano 6-
6, Madrid 28016, Spain [CUBA].

COMERCIAL IBEROAMERICANA, S.A. (a.k.a. COIBA), Spain [CUBA].

COMERCIALIZACION DE PRODUCTOS VARIOS (a.k.a. COPROVA; a.k.a. COPROVA SARL),
Paris, France [CUBA].

COMERCIO INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR (a.k.a. CIMEX; a.k.a. CIMEX CUBA; a.k.a.
CORPORACION CIMEX S.A.), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y 2,
Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

COMPANIA DE IMPORTACION Y EXPORTACION IBERIA (a.k.a. CIMEX), Spain [CUBA].

COPROVA (a.k.a. COMERCIALIZACION DE PRODUCTOS VARIOS; a.k.a. COPROVA SARL),
Paris, France [CUBA].

COPROVA SARL (a.k.a. COMERCIALIZACION DE PRODUCTOS VARIOS; a.k.a. COPROVA),
Paris, France [CUBA].

CORPORACION CIMEX S.A. (a.k.a. CIMEX; a.k.a. CIMEX CUBA; a.k.a. COMERCIO
INTERIOR, MERCADO EXTERIOR), Edificio Sierra Maestra, Avenida Primera entre 0 y
2, Miramar Playa, Ciudad de la Habana, Cuba; and all other locations worldwide
[CUBA].

CORPORACION CIMEX, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

COTEI, Milan, Italy [CUBA].

CRUZ, Juan M. de la, Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Director, Banco Nacional de Cuba (individual) [CUBA].

CRYMSA (a.k.a. COMERCIAL DE RODAJES Y MAQUINARIA, S.A.), Jose Lazaro Galdeano 6-
6, Madrid 28016, Spain [CUBA].

CRYMSA - ARGENTINA, S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina [CUBA].

CUBACANCUN CIGARS AND GIFT SHOPS, Cancun, Mexico [CUBA].

CUBAEXPORT, Spain [CUBA].

CUBAFRUTAS, Spain [CUBA].

CUBAN CIGARS TRADE, Italy [CUBA].

CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE (a.k.a. CUFLET; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUBANA AIRLINES (a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

CUBANACAN (a.k.a. CUBANACAN GROUP; a.k.a. EL GRUPO CUBANACAN), Calle 68 e/5ta A,
Apartado 16046, Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

CUBANACAN GROUP (a.k.a. CUBANACAN; a.k.a. EL GRUPO CUBANACAN), Calle 68 e/5ta A,
Apartado 16046, Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

CUBANACAN INTERNATIONAL B.V, Visseringlaan 24, 2288 ER Rijswijk, Zevenhuizen,
Netherlands; Registration ID 27134614 (Netherlands) [CUBA].

CUBANACAN U.K. LIMITED, Unit 49 Skylines Village, Limeharbour, Docklands, United
Kingdom; Registration ID 2720485 (United Kingdom) [CUBA].

CUBANATUR, Baja California 255, Edificio B. Oficina 103, Condesa, Mexico, D.F.
06500, Mexico [CUBA].

CUBATABACO, Spain [CUBA].

CUBATUR (a.k.a. EMPRESA DE TURISMO NACIONAL Y INTERNACIONAL), Buenos Aires,
Argentina [CUBA].

CUFLET (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

CUMEXINT, S.A., 1649 Adolfo Prieto, Colonia del Valle, Mexico City, Mexico
[CUBA].

DELVEST HOLDING COMPANY (a.k.a. DELVEST HOLDING, S.A.), Case Postale 236, 10 Bis
Rue Du Vieux College 12-11, Geneva, Switzerland [CUBA].

DELVEST HOLDING, S.A. (a.k.a. DELVEST HOLDING COMPANY), Case Postale 236, 10 Bis
Rue Du Vieux College 12-11, Geneva, Switzerland [CUBA].

EDICIONES CUBANAS, Spain [CUBA].

EDYJU, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

EL GRUPO CUBANACAN (a.k.a. CUBANACAN; a.k.a. CUBANACAN GROUP), Calle 68 e/5ta A,
Apartado 16046, Ciudad de La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE AVIACION (a.k.a. CUBANA AIRLINES), 32 Main Street, Georgetown,
Guyana; 24 Rue Du Quatre Septembre, Paris, France; Belas Airport, Luanda,
Angola; Dobrininskaya No. 7, Sec 5, Moscow, Russia; Corrientes 545 Primer Piso,
Buenos Aires, Argentina; Frankfurter TOR 8-A, Berlin, Germany; 1 Place Ville
Marie, Suite 3431, Montreal, Canada; Parizska 17, Prague, Czech Republic; Paseo
de la Republica 126, Lima, Peru; Piarco Airport, Port au Prince, Haiti; c/o
Anglo-Caribbean Shipping Co. Ltd., Ibex House, The Minories, London EC3N 1DY,
United Kingdom; Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica; Melchor
Ocampo 469, 5DF, Mexico City, Mexico; Calle 29 y Avda Justo Arosemena, Panama
City, Panama; Grantley Adams Airport, Christ Church, Barbados; Madrid, Spain
[CUBA].

EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS Y MARISCOS (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE;
a.k.a. "CARIBEX"), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

EMPRESA DE TURISMO NACIONAL Y INTERNACIONAL (a.k.a. CUBATUR), Buenos Aires,
Argentina [CUBA].

ETCO INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES LTD., Devonshire House, 1 Devonshire Street,
London, United Kingdom [CUBA].

ETCO INTERNATIONAL COMPANY, LIMITED, Kawabe Building, 1-5 Kanda Nishiki-Cho,
Chiyoda-Ku, Tokyo, Japan [CUBA].

GALAX INC. (a.k.a. GALAX TRADING CO., LTD.), 5250 Ferrier Street, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada [CUBA].

GALAX TRADING CO., LTD. (a.k.a. GALAX INC.), 5250 Ferrier Street, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada [CUBA].

GENERAL NICKEL SA (a.k.a. LA COMPANIA GENERAL DE NIQUEL), Cuba [CUBA].

GUAMATUR S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR CHILE S.A.), Avenue 11 de Septiembre 2155,
Edificio Panoramico, Torre C, Oficina 805, Providencia, Santiago, Chile [CUBA].

GUTIERREZ REYES, Jose, Vinales Tours, Oaxaca 80, Roma, Mexico, D.F., Mexico
(individual) [CUBA].

HAVANA INTERNATIONAL BANK, LTD., 20 Ironmonger Lane, London EC2V 8EY, United
Kingdom [CUBA].

HAVANATUR, 54 Rue Richelieu, Paris, France [CUBA].

HAVANATUR BAHAMAS LTD., East Bay Street, Nassau, Bahamas, The [CUBA].

HAVANATUR CHILE S.A. (f.k.a. GUAMATUR S.A.), Avenue 11 de Septiembre 2155,
Edificio Panoramico, Torre C, Oficina 805, Providencia, Santiago, Chile [CUBA].

HAVANATUR S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR, S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

HAVANATUR, S.A. (a.k.a. HAVANATUR S.A.), Gerardo Medina No. 633, e/Avenue
Borregos y Carretera de Vinales, Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Edificio Sierra Maestra,
Calle 1era e/ 0 y 2, Miramar, Playa, Ciudad Habana, Cuba; Avenue 40 esq. 41
#4101, Cienfuegos, Cuba; 1ra. Rotonda Cayo Coco, Moron, Ciego de Avila, Cuba;
Monteagudo e/Cuba y Carretera Central, Camaguey, Cuba; Frexes no. 172 e/Morales
Lemus y Narciso Lopez, Holguin, Cuba; Calle 8 no. 56 e/1era. y 3ra. Rpto., Vista
Allegre, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Hialeah, FL, United States; Maipu 464, Piso 10,
Buenos Aires 1006, Argentina; Panama City, Panama; Avenue 3era e/ 33 y 34,
Varadero, Cuba; C.U.I.T. 30-68074603-2 (Argentina) [CUBA].

HAVANTUR CANADA INC. (a.k.a. 2904977 CANADA, INC.; a.k.a. CARIBE SOL), 818 rue
Sherbrooke East, Montreal, Quebec H2L 1K3, Canada [CUBA].

HERMANN (CL2685) General Cargo 2,597DWT 1,098GRT Cuba flag (Compania Navegacion
Golfo S.A.) (vessel) [CUBA].

HOLA SUN HOLIDAYS LIMITED, 146 Beaver Creek Road, Richmond Hill, Ontario L4B
1C2, Canada [CUBA].

INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE TURISMO DE CUBA, Spain [CUBA].

INTERCONSULT, Panama [CUBA].

INTERNATIONAL COBALT CO. INC., Saskatchewan, AB, Canada [CUBA].

KAVE, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

LA COMPANIA GENERAL DE NIQUEL (a.k.a. GENERAL NICKEL SA), Cuba [CUBA].

LA COMPANIA TIENDAS UNIVERSO S.A. (a.k.a. WWW.CUBA-SHOP.NET) [CUBA].

LA EMPRESA CUBANA DE FLETES (a.k.a. CUBAN FREIGHT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. CUFLET),
Pyongyang, Korea, North; Moscow, Russia; Barcelona, Spain; Rostock, Germany;
Genoa, Italy; Syczecin, Poland; Rotterdam, Netherlands; Mexico; Buenos Aires,
Argentina; Montreal, Canada; Varna, Bulgaria [CUBA].

LEVERAGE, S.A., San Martin 323, Piso 14, Buenos Aires, Argentina [CUBA].

MAR AZUL (CL2192) Tug 212GRT Cuba flag (Samir de Navegacion S.A.) (vessel)
[CUBA].

MELFI MARINE CORPORATION S.A. (a.k.a. MELFI MARINE S.A.), Calle Oficios No. 410
e/Luz y Acosta, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Anillo del Puerto e/Pote y Linea
del Ferrocarril, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Oficios 104 Havana Vieja,
Havana, Cuba; Oficina 7, Edificio Senorial, Calle 50 Apartado 31, Panama City 5,
Panama [CUBA].

MELFI MARINE S.A. (a.k.a. MELFI MARINE CORPORATION S.A.), Calle Oficios No. 410
e/Luz y Acosta, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Anillo del Puerto e/Pote y Linea
del Ferrocarril, La Habana Vieja, Habana, Cuba; Oficios 104 Havana Vieja,
Havana, Cuba; Oficina 7, Edificio Senorial, Calle 50 Apartado 31, Panama City 5,
Panama [CUBA].

MOA NICKEL SA, Cuba [CUBA].

NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. "BNC"),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

NAVIERA MARITIMA DE AROSA, S.A., Paseo de Pereda 36, Apartado 141, Santander
39004, Spain [CUBA].

NETHERLANDS CARIBBEAN BANK N.V., Kaya WFG (Jombi) Mensing 14, P.O. Box 3895,
Willemstad, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles; 5ta. Ave. No. 6407 esq. a 66,
Miramar, Municipio Playa, La Habana, Cuba [CUBA].

NIREF, Boezembolcht 23, Rotterdam, Netherlands [CUBA].

NORDSTRAND LTD., Liechtenstein [CUBA].

NORDSTRAND MARITIME AND TRADING COMPANY, 33 Akti Maouli, Pireas (Piraeus) 185-
35, Greece [CUBA].

NORIEGA, Manuel Antonio, Panama (individual) [CUBA].

PANAMERICAN IMPORT AND EXPORT COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Panama [CUBA].

PESCABRAVA, S.A., Spain [CUBA].

PRELASA, Mexico [CUBA].

PRENSA LATINA, Spain [CUBA].

PRENSA LATINA CANADA LTD., 1010 O Rue Ste. Catherine, Montreal PQ H303 IGI,
Canada [CUBA].

SAND SWAN (f.k.a. ANA I) (P3QG3) General Cargo 2,595DWT 1,116GRT Cyprus flag
(Sand & Swan Navigation Co. Ltd.) (vessel) [CUBA].

SERCUBA (a.k.a. WWW.SERCUBA.COM), Gral. Gomez #105 e/ Maceo e Independencia,
Camaguey, Cuba; Calle 29 #5218 e/ 52 y 54 Edif. Cimex, Cienfuegos, Cuba;
Libertad s/n, e/ Honorato del Castillo y Maceo, Ciego de Avila, Cuba; Calle 6
#408 esq. 3ra. Ave. Miramar Playa, La Habana, Cuba; Edif. Las Novedades altos
Ave. Frank Pais e/ Segunda y Aven. Figueredo. Rpto. Jesus Menendez. Bayamo,
Granma, Cuba; Crombet s/n e/ Los Maceos y Moncada, Guantanamo, Cuba; Frexes #216
e/ Maceo y Martires, Holguin, Cuba; Ave. 1ro. De Mayo s/n. Moa, Holguin, Cuba;
Vicente Garcia #28 e/ Julian Santana y Francisco Vega, Tienda La Nueva, Las
Tunas, Cuba; Calle 40 esq. Playa. Varadero, Matanzas, Cuba; Calle Ayuntamiento
e/ Medio y Rio, Matanzas, Cuba; Gerardo Medina #633, Pinar del Rio, Cuba;
Independencia #171 Sur, altos, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba; Felix Pena #565 e/ Jose A.
Saco y Aguilera, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Carretera Central Km. 298 Banda
Esperanza, Villa Clara, Cuba; Calle 39 e/ 30 y 32 Altos del Servi Cupet "El
parque", Isla de la Juventud, Cuba [CUBA].

SERVINAVES, S.A., Panama [CUBA].

SIEIRO DE NORIEGA, Felicidad, Panama (individual) [CUBA].

TIFON (CL2059) Tug 164GRT Cuba flag (Samir de Navegacion S.A.) (vessel) [CUBA].

TROBER, S.A. (a.k.a. TROVER, S.A.), Edificio Saldivar, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

TROPIC TOURS GMBH (a.k.a. TROPICANA TOURS GMBH), Lietzenburger Strasse 51,
Berlin, Germany [CUBA].

TROPICANA TOURS GMBH (a.k.a. TROPIC TOURS GMBH), Lietzenburger Strasse 51,
Berlin, Germany [CUBA].

TROVER, S.A. (a.k.a. TROBER, S.A.), Edificio Saldivar, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

VIAJES GUAMA, S.A., Spain [CUBA].

VINALES TOURS, Cancun, Mexico; Guadalajara, Mexico; Mexico City, Mexico;
Monterey, Mexico; Roma, Mexico [CUBA].

WWW.CUBA-SHOP.NET (a.k.a. LA COMPANIA TIENDAS UNIVERSO S.A.) [CUBA].

WWW.SERCUBA.COM (a.k.a. SERCUBA), Gral. Gomez #105 e/ Maceo e Independencia,
Camaguey, Cuba; Calle 29 #5218 e/ 52 y 54 Edif. Cimex, Cienfuegos, Cuba;
Libertad s/n, e/ Honorato del Castillo y Maceo, Ciego de Avila, Cuba; Calle 6
#408 esq. 3ra. Ave. Miramar Playa, La Habana, Cuba; Edif. Las Novedades altos
Ave. Frank Pais e/ Segunda y Aven. Figueredo. Rpto. Jesus Menendez. Bayamo,
Granma, Cuba; Crombet s/n e/ Los Maceos y Moncada, Guantanamo, Cuba; Frexes #216
e/ Maceo y Martires, Holguin, Cuba; Ave. 1ro. De Mayo s/n. Moa, Holguin, Cuba;
Vicente Garcia #28 e/ Julian Santana y Francisco Vega, Tienda La Nueva, Las
Tunas, Cuba; Calle 40 esq. Playa. Varadero, Matanzas, Cuba; Calle Ayuntamiento
e/ Medio y Rio, Matanzas, Cuba; Gerardo Medina #633, Pinar del Rio, Cuba;
Independencia #171 Sur, altos, Sancti Spiritus, Cuba; Felix Pena #565 e/ Jose A.
Saco y Aguilera, Santiago de Cuba, Cuba; Carretera Central Km. 298 Banda
Esperanza, Villa Clara, Cuba; Calle 39 e/ 30 y 32 Altos del Servi Cupet "El
parque", Isla de la Juventud, Cuba [CUBA].

"BNC" (a.k.a. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA; a.k.a. NATIONAL BANK OF CUBA),
Zweierstrasse 35, Zurich CH-8022, Switzerland; Avenida de Concha Espina 8,
Madrid E-28036, Spain; Dai-Ichi Bldg. 6th Floor, 10-2 Nihombashi, 2-chome, Chuo-
ku, Tokyo 103, Japan; Federico Boyd Avenue & 51 Street, Panama City, Panama
[CUBA].

"CARIBEX" (a.k.a. CARIBBEAN EXPORT ENTERPRISE; a.k.a. EMPRESA CUBANA DE PESCADOS
Y MARISCOS), Paris, France; Milan, Italy; Moscow, Russia; Madrid, Spain;
Cologne, Germany; Downsview, Ontario, Canada; Tokyo, Japan [CUBA]. 
 

                       


                           
                       
                     


                   


                   
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