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The Template of Transformation in a Changing Global Ordering From the Elite Global South--President Sheinbaum Announces 18 Operational Initiatives to Realize Plan México: Estrategia de Desarrollo Económico Equitativo y Sustentable para la Prosperidad Compartida [Plan México, A Strategy for Equitable and Sustainable Economic Development for Shared Prosperity]

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On 3 April 2025, at about the time President Trump was announcing the America First global tariff initiative and adding an important action initiative to what will be the transformation of the global ordering, President Sheinbaum of México was also announcing the steps toward the operationalization of another "México First" program--the 18 point action plan to realize the President's Plan México. President Sheinbaum "outlined the different initiatives during a 30-minute speech at the National Museum of Anthropology in Mexico City a day after United States President Donald Trump announced “reciprocal tariffs” on imports from most countries around the world, but not those from Mexico or Canada." (Mexico News Daily). This is meant to add heft to her Plan México.

Pix credit and pdf of Plan here
El Plan México tiene el objetivo de fortalecer el mercado interno y el salario; aumentar la soberanía alimentaria y energética; incrementar la producción nacional; disminuir importaciones de países con los que no se tiene tratado y fortalecer los Programas para el Bienestar. [The Plan México has as its objectives the fortification of the Mexican internal market and wages, to augment food and energy sovereignty; to increase national production; to reduce imports from states with which there are no treaty arrangements; and to fortify national wellbeing programs] (Presidenta Claudia Sheinbaum: Haremos el mejor México posible, tenemos mucho pueblo; anuncia 18 programas y acciones del Plan México)

The Plan México: Estrategia de Desarrollo Económico Equitativo y Sustentable para la Prosperidad Compartida [Plan Mexico: Strategy for Equitable and Sustainable Economic Development to Promote Shared Prosperity] was rolled out at the beginning of 2025 as a long term strategy initiative for national development in accord with national values to ensure the development of the national economy and the prosperity of its people. It was conceived as a comprehensive plan in the sense that it focused not just on economic development, but also on a broad range of social initiatives designed to enhance the capacity of the population to effectively contribute to and take advantage of the fruits of development so conceived. 

In its own way, the Plan Mexico serves as a quite interesting blend of key elements of both Chinese and U.S. templates for expectations in their respective variants of the new global ordering, but with Global South characteristics.  The key conceptual elements-- dual circulation economies, a state sovereign-centric framework (in the style of the U.S. and China) for key elements of national life (food, energy, and infrastructure), a transactional approach to foreign trade based relations, common prosperity--speak to conceptual elements common to Chinese and U.S. systems. At the same time, elements of South-centric sensibilities and traditional Mexican normative approaches are also foregrounded in the form of population specific wellbeing focused measures. These include measures for developing consumer oriented industries for an internal market, increasing construction of housing, a national minimum wage, public education and similar measures. The approach differs substantially from the strategy adopted by Canadian officials:

 While Mexican steel and aluminum, vehicles assembled in Mexico and Mexican goods that don’t comply with USMCA rules are subject to tariffs when exported to the United States, Sheinbaum on Thursday didn’t announce any retaliatory measures against imports from the U.S. Mexico’s decision to refrain from retaliating against its largest trade partner differs from the approach of Canada, where Prime Minister Mark Carney said that his government will impose “carefully calibrated and targeted counter tariffs” on the United States. (Mexico News Daily).

President Sheinbaum thus took both a conciliatory position with respect to U.S. relations grounded in the transactional win-win approach now the basis of U.S: policy, while at the same time transposing its normative foundation, with global and Mexican characteristics, onto the policy of Mexico.

“… Fortunately and thanks to the good relations we’ve established with the United States government, … there was something very important yesterday — recognition of the Mexico-United States-Canada trade agreement, which is fundamental at this time,” she said.  “Of course, there are outstanding issues on which we continue holding talks with the United States government,” Sheinbaum said, referring to the steel, aluminum and auto tariffs. “… We believe that with the dialogue we’ve established with the United States government, we’re in a position to reach a better agreement,” she said. (Mexico News Daily).

Plan Mexico's 18 point operationalization plan reflects these situational priorities Mexico appears to be positioning itself as a driving force of engagement in a changing environment.  Its flexibility and adaptability, assuming it can make good on at least a part of its plan, and that it manages to embed its narrative approaches more deeply into Global South discourse, may well be in a position to influence responses and accommodation to the changing global realities, certainly in Latin America. How Brazil responds will be interesting to observe. What the world transformed by the leadership in China and the U.S. may well produce will be a complementary/autonomous template from the Global South that incorporates pieces of both and yet seeks to be autonomous of either. That will be interesting indeed. Stay tuned. . . 

A summary of the 18 point operaitonalization plan follows below (in Spanish); the original version was posted to the President's government website and may be accessed here). The English language summary may be accessed at Mexico News Daily

 


Aquí los 18 programas y acciones del Plan México:


1. Ampliar la autosuficiencia alimentaria.

  • Aumentaremos la producción de maíz blanco de 21.3 millones de toneladas en 2024 a 25 millones de toneladas en 2025.
  • Aumentaremos la producción de frijol de 730 mil toneladas a un millón 200 mil toneladas en el 2030.
  • Aumentaremos la producción de leche, de 13 mil a 15 mil millones de litros. En particular, la leche Liconsa aumentará su compra a pequeños productores de 687 a mil 300 millones de litros.
  • Aumentaremos la producción de arroz de 221 mil 500 a 450 mil toneladas.
  • Asimismo, aumentaremos el valor agregado de productos del campo de pequeños productores, impulsando el comercio justo a través de Alimentación para el Bienestar.

El día 4 de abril en “La mañanera del pueblo” estaremos informando los programas que hemos desarrollado en estos meses para alcanzar estas metas.

 

2. Ampliar la autosuficiencia energética.

  • Entre 2025 y 2030, la producción nacional de gasolina, diésel y turbosina menos contaminantes aumentará en, al menos, 30 por ciento.
  • Reduciremos la importación de gas natural: pasaremos de producir 3 mil 834 a 5 mil millones de pies cúbicos diarios en 2030, a través de la recuperación sustentable de gas.
  • Vamos a acelerar las inversiones en generación eléctrica de Comisión Federal de Electricidad para 2025, por 3 mil 585 megawatts, de los cuales, 25 por ciento serán de fuentes renovables de energía. La meta para 2030 es de 22 mil 674 megawatts adicionales.
  • Inicio de 59 proyectos de inversión para fortalecer la Red Nacional de Transmisión y Distribución con 86 nuevas subestaciones y ampliación de 63 existentes.
  • Fortaleceremos el contenido nacional de las compras de Comisión Federal de Electricidad (CFE).
  • Aceleraremos los permisos para la generación de energía renovable, garantizando siempre que el 54 por ciento de la generación eléctrica sea pública, como lo establecen las recientes leyes aprobadas.
  • Ya inició la electrificación rural para comunidades alejadas y de alta marginación.
  • Y se mantendrán los acuerdos voluntarios, voluntarios, para el precio de la gasolina asociados con la disminución de trámites.
  • Estas acciones con detalle serán informadas en “La mañanera del pueblo” del miércoles 9 de abril.

 

3. Acelerar los proyectos de obra pública para 2025 —que consisten en lo siguiente—:

 

  • 44 mil kilómetros de mantenimiento de la Red Federal de Carreteras en 2025.
  • Inicio —de hecho, ya la mayoría ya están en marcha— de 8 proyectos de construcción y ampliación de carreteras por mil 970 kilómetros.
  • Inicio de la construcción de 11 distribuidores viales en diversas ciudades del país, todo esto en este año, 2025.
  • Construcción de 114 caminos artesanales para pueblos originarios.
  • Acelerar la licitación de 37 proyectos estratégicos de agua, que incluye: la tecnificación de distritos de riego, saneamiento de ríos, presas y obras mayores.
  • Inicio, en este mes —de hecho, el Tren Ciudad de México-a Pachuca ya inició— de la construcción de los trenes de pasajeros Ciudad de México-Pachuca y Ciudad de México-Querétaro; pronto estaremos allá en Querétaro para dar el banderazo de salida.
  • El próximo mes iniciarán las licitaciones para los trenes Querétaro-Irapuato y Saltillo-Nuevo Laredo, trenes de pasajeros.
  • Inicio en abril del Tren Maya de carga, incluido el tramo hacia Progreso, Yucatán.
  • La construcción de 178 kilómetros del Tren Interoceánico, particularmente la derivación hacia Dos Bocas, Tabasco —Paraíso, Tabasco— y también hacia Ciudad Hidalgo, Chiapas.
  • Ampliación y acciones de rehabilitación en 11 puertos del país.
  • Terminación, y esto es con inversión pública e inversión privada, terminación de los aeropuertos de Puerto Escondido y Tepic e inicio de la rehabilitación del Aeropuerto Internacional “Benito Juárez”, de la Ciudad de México.
  • Obras de mejoramiento de 60 aeropuertos que están concesionados, esta es una inversión privada, por un monto, en 2025, de 35 mil millones de pesos. Son aeropuertos que están concesionados desde hace tiempo y que van a hacer una inversión quien tiene estas concesiones.
  • Inicio de la construcción de 7 proyectos de inversión mixta en carreteras y puentes.
  • Obra de infraestructura social para escuelas, hospitales y pueblos indígenas por 33 mil millones de pesos.
  • Nueva Ley de Obra Pública que permita agilizar todos estos procesos, que ya ha sido enviada al Congreso de la Unión y que esperamos que este mismo mes sea aprobada, por Cámara de Diputados y Cámara de Senadores.
  • Tenemos estimado que, como mínimo, estas obras generarán entre 500 mil y un millón de empleos directos solamente en 2025, y serán anunciadas en “La mañanera del pueblo” de este lunes en ocho.

 

4. Acelerar la construcción de vivienda y créditos.

  • Habíamos puesto una meta de 130 mil viviendas este año, pero la hemos aumentado a 180 mil viviendas, en 2025, con Infonavit y Conavi. Es parte del proyecto de un millón de viviendas en todo el sexenio.
  • 100 mil apoyos de mejoramiento de vivienda.
  • Disminución de 4.4 millones de créditos impagables de Infonavit y FOVISSSTE.
  • Otorgamiento de 577 mil créditos para adquirir vivienda con simplificación, por parte del Infonavit; adicionales a la construcción de vivienda, 554 mil créditos.
  • Estas acciones generarán al menos otros 400 mil empleos directos en 2025.
  • El avance de estos programas se anunciarán en “La mañanera del pueblo” el 9 de abril.

 

5. Fortalecer y ampliar la fabricación nacional para el mercado interno de la industria textil, del calzado, de muebles, acero y aluminio, semiconductores, paneles fotovoltaicos, baterías, industria creativa, entre otros.

  • No es un anuncio solamente de voz. Ya hay acuerdos de inversión con diversos inversionistas, de tal manera que los Decretos para este programa, que incluyen una diversidad de acciones y medidas, se publicarán el 5 de mayo de este año.

 

6. Fortalecer y ampliar la fabricación nacional para el mercado interno de vehículos, robusteciendo innovación, investigación y desarrollo, así como eficiencia energética.

  • Tenemos ya el plan, hemos hablado con la industria automotriz. El objetivo es que la mayor parte de los vehículos que se consumen en México sean fabricados en nuestro país, con diálogo con los distintos países del mundo.
  • Y los Decretos de este programa, que están asociados también al diálogo con los Estados Unidos, serán publicados el 16 de mayo.
  • Así que el 5 de mayo, también para la industria del acero y el aluminio, es el día también que estableceremos estos decretos; y para la industria automotriz el 16 de mayo.

Imagen intermedia

 

7. Aumentar la producción nacional de la industria farmacéutica y de equipos médicos, a través de la simplificación administrativa, entre otros, de Cofepris, y la compra pública con requerimiento de planta, que va a ser incluida para la próxima licitación de medicamentos el próximo año, para que se vayan preparando. Los Decretos se publicarán este mismo mes el 28 de abril.

8. Aumentar la producción de industria petroquímica y fertilizantes en México a través de proyectos mixtos, a firmar en el primer semestre de este año, y también con proyectos privados.

9. Aumentar el contenido nacional de compras públicas a través de la nueva Ley de Adquisiciones, que ya fue aprobada en la Cámara de Diputados, está en la Cámara de Senadores, que contempla 65 por ciento de compras nacionales, de las compras de gobierno. Está por aprobarse en la Cámara de Senadores.

10. Aumentar la venta de productos nacionales en tiendas de autoservicio y departamentales a través de acuerdos voluntarios, a ser publicados a más tardar el 12 de mayo.

11. El Portafolio de Inversiones en México de acuerdos —que no han sido cancelados ninguno de ellos; al contrario, hay enorme entusiasmo por invertir en nuestro país—, ya alcanza más de 200 mil millones de dólares. Para poder acelerarlos, este 21 de abril será publicada para beneficio de la inversión en México, la ventanilla única y la simplificación estará disponible para trámites municipales, estatales y nacionales integrados.

12. Publicación de la licitación de 15 Polos de Bienestar en distintos estados de la República con sus beneficios fiscales de diverso tipo, incluido el Parque de Economía Circular en el estado de Hidalgo, a más tardar el 19 de mayo del 2025.

13. Aumentar la creación de, al menos, 100 mil empleos, a partir de bolsas de trabajo y ferias de empleo, que agradecemos mucho a los empresarios, porque hemos estado trabajando en ello. Esto inicia el lunes 23 de abril.

14. Programa de facilidades de la banca de desarrollo y banca comercial para micro y pequeñas empresas, que se anunciará en el próximo evento de banqueros, el próximo 7 de mayo, esa es la promesa del secretario de Hacienda.

15. Mayor inversión para investigación científica y tecnológica, y simplificación de tiempos para registro de patentes, a partir de la modificación de la Ley del IMPI que será enviada al Congreso, el lunes 14 de abril. En particular, incluye: el desarrollo de vehículos eléctricos, semiconductores, satélites, la creación del Laboratorio Nacional de Inteligencia Artificial y diversos programas sociales y de humanidades, entre otros.

16. Renovar permanentemente el Paquete Contra la Inflación y la Carestía de la canasta básica.

17. Mantener el aumento al salario mínimo, hasta llegar a 2.5 canastas básicas y otras prestaciones —sociales que también— laborales.

18. Garantizar y ampliar los Programas de Bienestar. Todos los Programas de Bienestar están garantizados como derechos sociales en la Constitución de la República. Además, ya, un millón de mujeres de 63 y 64 años reciben la Pensión Mujeres Bienestar; y en agosto, inicia la inscripción para las mujeres de 60 a 62 años.




"All right, let’s do it"-- Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press, NATO Headquarters Brussels, Belgium April 4, 2025

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Secretary of State Marco Rubio appears to be growing into his role in quite interesting ways.  He also provides a quite useful window into the thinking of the Trump Administration on issues in which clarity is not always held at a premium.  Secretary Rubio paused for press questions on 4 April 2025 at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The text of the exchange follows:Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press. No analysis is necessary. It is input that, given the context, may prove useful.

To my mind the most interesting bit was this--both with respect to the thinking of the Secretary of State and more importantly, the expression of the underlying attitude that will drive  future events was this:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you met with Kirill Dmitriev as well. In order to stop them from dragging their feet and dragging this on, is there anything that you said – perhaps not threats, but is there anything that you said you wanted to see concretely from the Russian side in order to —

SECRETARY RUBIO: Yes, peace. We want to see peace.

QUESTION: But specifics in terms of getting to this ceasefire first and then the negotiation —

SECRETARY RUBIO: Yeah. I mean, peace means you stop shooting at each other. I mean, it’s as simplistic as that. Now, obviously, look, there’s all kinds of conditions for a final peace, and you have to work with both sides. And I’ve said from the beginning the only way a war ends in a negotiated settlement – if it’s not an unconditional surrender, then it is both sides make concessions. We’re not going to prejudge what those concessions are because those concessions will depend on what Ukraine will accept, and Russia will accept. But we have to make concrete steps towards peace.

What we’re not interested in – and I’m not accusing them of this; I’m just telling you – what we’re not interested in is negotiations about negotiations, that we’re not going to continue this forever. So, none of it was threatening. I think it was more an explanation of: This is our timeline, and at some point it will be clear whether you want peace or you don’t want peace. And that time is coming; it’s pretty short.

At the same time, as we now have seen, members of Congress have begun to file bills to increase sanctions. So, there is going to be growing pressure from Capitol Hill to impose sanctions that we’re not going to be able to stop if, in fact, we’re not making progress towards peace. All these factors have been explained in the nicest way possible. Hopefully he’ll take that message back to Moscow and it’ll make clear that we need to begin to see real progress, or we’ll have to conclude that they’re not interested in peace. But let’s hope they are, because I think it would be better for everyone if they are interested —

*       *      *

QUESTION: Just to follow up, Mr. Secretary. Your allies here and also Ukraine, they believe that Russia is actually preparing for – to launch another campaign, some military campaign, as soon as the winter season ends. Do you have any reason to doubt that?

SECRETARY RUBIO: That they’re going to do what? I’m sorry.

QUESTION: That – that Russia is – Russian side are – they are preparing to start another military campaign.

SECRETARY RUBIO: Well then, we’ll know they’re not interested in peace.

What appears clear is that the U.S. still has an interest in driving the course of events in Ukraine, to its satisfaction; it is also clear that this has not changed since the start of the 2nd phase of the Russian invasion in 2022;  it is also clear that like the Biden Administration before it, President Trump have evidenced a taste for keeping Ukraine on a leash against the Russians and the European unbalanced as he seeks further European funding; Like Mr. Biden, Mr. Trump appears willing to make territorial concessions son Ukraine's behalf (but of course with Ukraine's consent), will be in no hurry about pathways to NATO (or blocking them) and appears to have little interest in Ukrainian EU membership. Everyone, of course, has an interest in Ukrainian natural resources, and everyone continues to treat Russia like it was the Soviet Union; pretend games tend to create their own realities on the ground. All of those are bargaining objects, of course, unless the Trump Administration bargains them away before the bargaining begins. The Secretary of State, however, was not giving much away--either way. And the Secretary was clear that it is not clear where all of this is going--other than that the Russians continue to stay in character.

What may be the most enduring emerging characterization of the leadership of Mr. Rubio, then, may have come come his own mouth: "All right, let’s do it"

 

 

Secretary Rubio delivers remarks to the press
Secretary of State Marco A. Rubio delivers remarks to the press in Brussels, Belgium.
Current Time 0:14
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 SECRETARY RUBIO:  All right, let’s do it.  I don’t have a statement.  Let’s just do it.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking questions.  Diplomacy depends on predictability, reliability, trust.  Markets are crashing around the world for the second day in a row.  The consensus is that the President’s tariffs were much higher than expected, and based on economic formulas that people do not understand.  What is your reaction, and what is the impact on Europeans?  You want them to spend more on defense —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yes.

QUESTION:  — which they are agreeing to finally, but how can they do that when their economies are crashing, and they are now —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, their – no, no, no, no, no – no, their economies are not crashing.  The markets are —

QUESTION:  But they are.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, their economies are not crashing.  Their markets are reacting to a dramatic change in the global order in terms of trade.  And so, what happens is pretty straightforward.  If you’re a company and you make a bunch of your products in China, and all of a sudden shareholders or people that play the stock market realize that it’s going to cost a lot more to produce in China, your stock is going to go down.  But ultimately, the markets – as long as they know what the rules are going to be moving forward – and as long as that’s set and you can, you can sustain where you’re going to be, the markets will adjust.  Businesses around the world, including in trade and global trade, they just need to know what the rules are.  Once they know what the rules are, they will adjust to those rules.

So, I don’t think it’s fair to say economies are crashing.  Markets are crashing because markets are based on the stock value of companies who today are embedded in modes of production that are bad for the United States.  We have to be a country that – we’re the largest consumer market in the world, and yet the only thing we export is services, and we need to stop that.  We need to get back to a time when we’re a country that can make things, and to do that we have to reset the global order of trade.

QUESTION:  Yeah, but – sir, there’s a long (inaudible).  And the other part of my question —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, the worst thing is to leave it the way it is forever.  I mean, this is – just can’t continue.  We can’t continue to be a country that doesn’t make things.  We have to be able to make things to provide jobs for Americans.  We – that’s it; it’s that simple.  China is an example.  I mean, it’s outrageous.  I mean, they don’t consume anything.  All they do is export and flood and distort markets, in addition to all the tariffs and barriers they put in place.  So, the President rightly has concluded that the current status of global trade is bad for America and good for a bunch of other people, and he’s going to reset it.  And he’s absolutely right to do it.

QUESTION:  But – let me ask you about also the predictability of relationships with allies.  The prime minister of Greenland – excuse me – the prime minister of Denmark, which at this point, owns Greenland – so Denmark, a NATO Ally, is saying that it’s unacceptable, that one country cannot annex another country.  And —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, no one’s annexed anything.  It’s going to be up to Greenlanders.  The Vice President made that clear.  He’s going to respect the self-determination of Greenlanders.  So, at some point – the Greenlanders have made clear that they want to be independent of Denmark.

QUESTION:  President —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  So that’s – Greenland – Denmark should focus on the fact that the Greenlanders don’t want to be a part of Denmark.  That’s what they should focus on.  We didn’t give them that idea; they’ve been talking about that for a long time.  Whenever they make that decision, they’ll make that decision, and then the – what we’re not going to do is let China come in now and say, offer them a bunch of money and become dependent on China.

QUESTION:  The President said he would not rule out using military force against Denmark, a NATO Ally, to take —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, he said he would not rule out – no, no, no – he said he would not rule out – he said I’m not going to rule out anything if Greenland is encroached upon by a foreign power like a China or Russia or anybody else.  But it doesn’t matter because Greenlanders are going to make a decision.  They’re the ones that want to get away from Denmark.  They’re the ones that want to be independent, not us.  We didn’t come up with that idea; they did.  And if they make that decision, then the United States would stand ready, potentially, to step in and say, okay, we can create a partnership with you.  We’re not at that stage.  But that’s what the Vice President made clear last week in his visit there.  His statement was abundantly clear.  He said we will respect the self-determination of the people of Greenland – people of Greenland – and they’re the ones that want to leave Denmark.  That wasn’t our idea.

MODERATOR:  All right, well, second question here, Missy from Washington Post.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, I’d like to ask you about the Russia-Ukraine negotiations.  Can you give us the – your – tell us about the American assessment of the conditions that Russia put forward following the – regarding the Black Sea ceasefire talks?  And also, the British and French foreign ministers said this morning that Putin was dragging his feet.  Do you agree with that, that —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Maybe – I mean, he might be.  We don’t know yet.  We’re going to find out fairly soon.  I mean, look, we are – here’s what the President wanted to do.  He wants to end this war and he wanted to test it very early in his administration.  Is it possible to end this war on terms that are acceptable, obviously, to both sides?  Because you can’t end a war unless both sides agree.  And that’s what we’re in the process of finding out.  We will know soon enough – in a matter of weeks, not months – whether Russia is serious about peace or not.  I hope they are.  It would be good for the world if that war ended, but obviously we have to test that proposition.

So we’re working through that process.  We had a visitor – Mr. Kirill was here[1] this week.  I had a chance to sit down with him.  He met with others.  He’ll take some messages back.  And the message is:  The United States needs to know whether you’re serious or not about peace.  Ultimately, Putin will have to make that decision; the Russian Federation will have to make that decision.  I think the Ukrainians have shown a willingness to enter, for example, into a complete ceasefire to create space for negotiation.  At some point here fairly soon – not six months from now – the Russians and Putin will have to make a decision about whether they’re serious for peace or not, and I hope they are serious.  It would be good for the world if that war ended.

QUESTION:  And what is – what is your assessment of the Russian conditions that were put forward?  And also, Dmitriev said, following his talks with Mr. Witkoff yesterday, that the U.S. and Russia might resume direct flights as maybe a confidence building measure.  Do you support that?  So, the —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I haven’t heard anything about direct flights.

QUESTION:  Okay.  What about —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I can tell you – but I don’t know who’s going to fly on it, because all these people are sanctioned.  But I would just tell you that – the thing I would point to you is this.  I’m not – we’re going to wait and see.  The Russians know our position in terms of wanting to end the war, and we will know from their answers very soon whether they are serious about proceeding with real peace or whether it’s a delay tactic.  If it’s a delay tactic, the President’s not interested in that.  If this is dragging things out, President Trump’s not going to fall into the trap of endless negotiations about negotiations.  We will know soon enough whether or not Russia is serious about peace.  If they are, that will be great.  Then we can move towards peace.  If they’re not, then we’ll have to re-evaluate where we stand and what we do moving forward about it, but we’ll be in no different a position than we are today or we were when he took office.  He wanted to know early in his administration: is peace possible?  We’re testing to see if the Russians are interested in peace.  Their actions – not their words, their actions – will determine whether they’re serious or not, and we intend to find that out sooner rather than later.

QUESTION:  And what about their conditions?

MODERATOR:  All right.  And let’s – Daphne —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Which conditions?

QUESTION:  They put forward additional conditions after you guys had the Black Sea ceasefire.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah.  So again, I mean, this is part of the back-and-forth of these sorts of things.  I had phone calls with foreign leaders, and then I read the readout, and it’s like, oh, we said – no, you never – (inaudible) they said something to me they never said.  I guess that’s part of the game in this place or whatever.  But look, I don’t – bottom line is, to me, at the end of the day, what’s going to matter here is whether we’re going to move towards peace or not.

If peace is real, we will know soon enough.  If they’re not interested in peace, we will know soon enough, and we’ll make decisions on the basis – I hope they are real.  There are some promising signs; there are some troubling signs.  It’s not going to be easy.  No one ever said this would be easy, but we’re going to find out sooner rather than later.  And let’s just say I’m hopeful, I remain hopeful, I need to be hopeful that peace is possible and that the Russians are serious about peace.  We want them to be serious about peace, and hopefully they are, but we’ll know sooner rather than later.

MODERATOR:  All right, Daphne, Reuters.

QUESTION:  Hi, sorry, I’m back here.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Your last name’s Reuters?  (Laughter.)

QUESTION:  (Inaudible.)

SECRETARY RUBIO:  That’s pretty cool, isn’t it?  (Laughter.)  Go ahead.

QUESTION:  On the 5 percent defense spending target, have you received pushback to this idea while you’ve been here this week?  And you mentioned yesterday up to 5 percent – was your language – what do you mean by up to 5 percent?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I said up to a path – getting up to 5 percent at some point.  I’m not saying overnight, but to get to that point, we think that’s what NATO Allies need to be spending for NATO to face the threats that itself has identified and articulated.  Here’s the good news.  The good news is everyone generally, with a couple exceptions, are spending more on defense today than they were three, four or five years ago.  That’s positive.  That trend needs to continue.  So, the trend lines are good but they need to continue.

But this is not about spending, okay?  This is not about money necessarily.  This is about capability.  In order for NATO to be stronger, it needs partners that are stronger, okay.  The United States commits a lot to NATO and continues to.  We are as involved in NATO today as we have ever been, and we intend to continue to be, but it has to be a real Alliance, and that means that our Alliance partners have to increase their own capabilities.

So, hopefully two things have led to that.  The first is the war in Ukraine, I think, has woken up a lot of people on this continent about real threats and real war.  And the other is, I think, the pressure and the statements of President Trump that have been pretty consistent about increasing their spending.  So, this whole trajectory of more defense spending began, I believe, back in 2017, 2018 under President Trump’s first term.  We want that trend to continue, and we’re hoping when the leaders meet in The Hague, that there’ll be further and firmer commitments in that direction.

I think it’s beneficial to the Alliance.  The stronger our partners in NATO are, the more capable our partners in NATO are, the stronger NATO is, and everybody should be in favor of that.

QUESTION:  And sorry, just to follow up.  So, will you try and get the official target as 5 percent rather than 2 percent?  And will the U.S. commit to 5 percent?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Sure.  We’re heading there now.  I mean, we’re going to have to spend more on national security, because we have a global footprint, and that’s the point that I think has been made and missed in a lot of places, okay.  The United States has Indo-Pacific alliance obligations as well that we’ve made.  We are currently involved in opening up the Red Sea so that global shipping for everyone, including our European partners, can become possible again.  We’re engaged in counter-drug and counter-gang interdictions in the Western Hemisphere.  There’s obviously all sorts of issues going on in different parts of the world, including we’re concerned about a resurgence of terrorist cells, whether it’s in Africa or in the Middle East.

So, the U.S. has these global obligations, and we have China that’s undergoing the largest, most expansive peacetime military expansion in history.  So, we need to confront all of these things, and we’re engaged in all of those things.  So, we’re going to have to increase defense spending in our country.  I think our commitment to NATO isn’t just 3-and-something percent spending of GDP.  It’s sustained over an extraordinary period of time, and that continues.

So, look, I think our partners know they need to do more, they’ve all indicated they want to do more, they’ve begun to do more, and that trend needs to continue.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary —

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you met with Kirill Dmitriev as well.  In order to stop them from dragging their feet and dragging this on, is there anything that you said – perhaps not threats, but is there anything that you said you wanted to see concretely from the Russian side in order to —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yes, peace.  We want to see peace.

QUESTION:  But specifics in terms of getting to this ceasefire first and then the negotiation —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah.  I mean, peace means you stop shooting at each other.  I mean, it’s as simplistic as that.  Now, obviously, look, there’s all kinds of conditions for a final peace, and you have to work with both sides.  And I’ve said from the beginning the only way a war ends in a negotiated settlement – if it’s not an unconditional surrender, then it is both sides make concessions.  We’re not going to prejudge what those concessions are because those concessions will depend on what Ukraine will accept, and Russia will accept.  But we have to make concrete steps towards peace.

What we’re not interested in – and I’m not accusing them of this; I’m just telling you – what we’re not interested in is negotiations about negotiations, that we’re not going to continue this forever.  So, none of it was threatening.  I think it was more an explanation of:  This is our timeline, and at some point it will be clear whether you want peace or you don’t want peace.  And that time is coming; it’s pretty short.

At the same time, as we now have seen, members of Congress have begun to file bills to increase sanctions.  So, there is going to be growing pressure from Capitol Hill to impose sanctions that we’re not going to be able to stop if, in fact, we’re not making progress towards peace.  All these factors have been explained in the nicest way possible.  Hopefully he’ll take that message back to Moscow and it’ll make clear that we need to begin to see real progress, or we’ll have to conclude that they’re not interested in peace.  But let’s hope they are, because I think it would be better for everyone if they are interested —

QUESTION:  Are more talks planned?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, we need to hear an answer to this.  I mean, your – talks are only – we’re going to have talks as long as talks are about something.  They can’t be talks about talks.  At the end – I think initially it was important to talk because we hadn’t talked to them in a long time, but now we’ve reached the stage where we need to make progress.  And if we’re not making progress towards peace, then we have a set of factors that we have to take into account.  But hopefully we are going to make progress towards peace.  I remain optimistic that we can.  It’ll be hard, it’ll be difficult, but I’m optimistic that we can.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, the Myanmar earthquake.  I mean, normally, in these kind of events, you would have up to 200 Americans with sniffer dogs, special equipment, experts in their field saving lives on the ground.  This has not happened because of the dismantling of USAID —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, that and the fact that it’s run by a military junta that doesn’t like us, so it’s hard for us to move around in that country.

QUESTION:  But – but aid suppliers say it’s – these events are always non-political.  They went into Syria, for example, in the Türkiye-Syria earthquake.  So, they can (inaudible) —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, we’re not the government of the world.  No, we will provide humanitarian assistance just like everybody else does, and we will do it the best we can.  But we also have other needs we have to balance that against.  We’re not walking away from humanitarian assistance.  But again, I go back – there’s a lot of other rich countries in the world.  They should all be pitching in.  We’re going to do our part.  We already have people there; we’ll have more people there.  We’ll help as much as we can.  It’s not the easiest place to work, okay?  They have a military junta that doesn’t like us, doesn’t necessarily allow us to operate in that country the way we wanted to.  That would have impeded our response no matter what.

That said, we are willing to continue to help in the humanitarian crisis.  Other countries need to do so as well.  China is a very rich country; India is a rich country.  There are a lot of other countries in the world, and everyone should pitch in.  I don’t think it’s fair to assume that the United States needs to continue to share the burden – 60, 70 percent – of humanitarian aid around the world.  We will be in the business of humanitarian aid, but we have other priorities as well that are national interest priorities of the United States, and we’re going to align all those to be properly balanced.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary —

QUESTION:  (Inaudible) of your soft power?  I mean, all of the experts in this have said the reason is not because the politics of Myanmar, but it’s because of the dismantling of USAID.  You simply couldn’t deploy —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, I don’t listen – these – so-called experts.

QUESTION:  But you simply (inaudible).

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Those are not real experts.  These are so-called experts.

QUESTION:  There was (inaudible) —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  These are people that are part of that NGO industrial complex —

QUESTION:  Well, they’re (inaudible) —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, no, these are people that make millions and hundreds of millions of dollars in these NGOs all over the world that stand up and they get flooded with U.S. taxpayer money, and then we have to spend 10 – $100 million to get $10 million to people.  We’re not doing that anymore, okay?  We have stopped.  We are no longer going to spend 10 million – $100 million dollars to get $10 million to recipients.  We’re not going to fund these global NGOs all over the world that are living off of this.  We’re not doing it.  We are prepared to help them work with governments and appropriate NGOs on the ground that are delivering assistance.

We will be there and we will be helpful.  There are a lot of other rich countries.  They should also pitch in and help, and some of them are and some of them are not.  But we are going to do our part, we’re going to continue to do our part, but it’s going to be balanced with all of the other interests we have as a country.  We are not a nation – we are the richest country in the world, but our resources are not unlimited.  They are not unlimited.  And we have a massive national debt, and we have many other priorities as well.  And it’s time to recalibrate all of that.  So we’ll be there.  We’ll be helpful as much as we can.  We’ve got other things we have to take care of as well, but we care deeply about what’s happened there.  We wish we had a more cooperative government.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary —

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, what’s your —

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, the Middle East was part of your discussion here in NATO, especially that you find support from members toward your policy of air strikes in Houthis and your maximum pressure policy toward Iran?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah.  I mean, on the Houthis, everybody wants to get their ships through the Red Sea.  We’re the only ones doing anything about it, but everyone wants to get their ships through there.  As I said, we’ve done the world a great favor by taking on this band of criminals who have unfortunately sophisticated weaponry that they can use to – I mean, they’ve attacked, what, 150, 160 merchant vessels – 174 times they’ve attacked the United States Navy?

So I think the world should be grateful to the United States for being involved in this and doing this.  Everyone thanks us for it.  I understand these nations have limited capabilities despite being very rich countries.  Nobody else can project power there and do this.  But that said, we think that mission is going to bear fruit and it’s necessary.  We can’t have a band of criminals controlling that.

In the case of Iran, I don’t know of any country in the world that’s excited about Iran ever having a nuclear weapons capability.  Some are more forceful about it than others.  We’ve had talks about that.  As you know, the President would like to figure out what’s going to happen there, but he’s also made it clear that there is not going to be a nuclear-armed Iran.  That’s not going to happen under his watch.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary —

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, what’s your message to foreign citizens who may be afraid to come to the United States because they’re concerned about potentially being detained over some minor administrative error or because they might have something on their phone – like criticism of the President or of the Israel-Gaza conflict —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, no, no, no —

QUESTION:  — and they don’t want to come into the United States now?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No – first of all, those – people that have their phones looked at and so forth, and you’ll have to – I’ll refer you to CBP to go through their processes.  But generally, it’s people that have been flagged coming in for a reason.  I would say that if you’re not coming to the United States to join a Hamas protest or to come here and tell us about how right Hamas is or to tell us about – stir up conflict on our campuses and create riots in our street and vandalize our universities, then you have nothing to worry about.  But thousands – thousands and thousands of people come into the U.S. every single day to conduct business, to travel, to do all – to visit relatives.  It happens every day, it’s very commonplace, and nobody has a problem.

I mean, if you’re coming here to create problems, you’re probably going to have a problem.  And I think that’s a good thing.  If you’re coming here to create problems – not here – the United States – you’re probably going to have a problem.  Yeah, we’re not – we’re not going to continue to be stupid enough to let people into our country who are coming here to tear things up.  Not going happen.

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, have the Russians done anything concrete to make you encouraged that they are truly interested in peace?  I mean, you talk about timeline – I know you’re not going to give a specific timeline, but are you talking weeks?  Are you talking months?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I think we’re talking weeks probably, yeah.  I mean, there’s a lot that has to happen here in the next few weeks in order for this to be real.  In terms of concrete, they’ve agreed to certain things.  I mean, I think there are things they’re not striking now that they were before.  Obviously both sides claim that the ceasefire is being violated; it’s typical with ceasefires like this.  But that said, not concrete in terms of – are we closer to peace?  We’re closer to peace simply because we’re talking to both sides, but we’re not closer to peace because we have a deal on our hands to end this conflict.

But we’re going to know soon enough.  That’s my point I make everybody – people come, oh, well, Putin, you can’t trust him.  It’s not about trusting Putin; it’s not about trusting anybody.  This is about actions.  If you’re interested in peace, you stop fighting and you lay out the conditions by which you’re willing to end a war.  And they have to be reasonable conditions, right, not crazy stuff.  If you’re interested in peace, that’s what you do.  If you’re not interested in peace, then you sort of drag it out and you come up with excuses and you – and we know that, and we’re not going to get pulled into that.  But let’s hope it doesn’t come to that.  Let’s hope it – let’s be optimistic here that that’s not the direction we’re going.  We’re prepared if it is, but let’s hope that we’re not heading in the direction of this is just a delay tactic.

MODERATOR:  All right, one more and then we wrap up.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Don’t you guys want to go home (inaudible)?

QUESTION:  Just to follow up, Mr. Secretary.  Your allies here and also Ukraine, they believe that Russia is actually preparing for – to launch another campaign, some military campaign, as soon as the winter season ends.  Do you have any reason to doubt that?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  That they’re going to do what?  I’m sorry.

QUESTION:   That – that Russia is – Russian side are – they are preparing to start another military campaign.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well then, we’ll know they’re not interested in peace.

QUESTION:  And at this very moment, they’re targeting energy sites.  Can I get your reaction to that?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Targeting what?  I’m sorry.

QUESTION:  Energy sites in Ukraine.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, again, this is – I get that that means they’re violating the ceasefire.  That’s not a good sign, but I think that will tell you this, that ultimately this is a war.  Right now, things are going to be blowing up in Ukraine and inside of Russia because there’s still a war going on.  That’s what we’re trying to end, okay?  If we have a true ceasefire, which is what we wanted, a complete ceasefire, nothing should be blowing up.  But the Russians didn’t agree to that.  They wanted a partial.

And then, obviously, when you get into these partials, it’s one of the reasons why we didn’t push for a partial – we’ll take it because it’s better than nothing – but one of the reasons why didn’t we push – why we didn’t push for a partial, because there’s always disputes about what are you hitting and what you’re not hitting.  But in the end, this is still a war, and we want it to stop.  The fact that religious sites are being hit or energy sites are being hit or civilian sites are being hit, that’s why war is a bad thing, and that’s why the President wants to end it.

As far as them conducting another campaign, well, then that will be a very clear sign, right?  If all of a sudden we wake up tomorrow and the Russians are launching a massive offensive, then I think that’s a pretty clear sign they’re not interested in peace.  That hasn’t happened yet; let’s hope it doesn’t happen.  We want to know whether they want to do peace or not, and if they do, then there’s a way there and we’re willing to help.  If they’re not, then it’s good to know early so we can adjust our policies accordingly.

MODERATOR:  All right, everybody, thank you so much.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  All right.  Thank you, guys.

MODERATOR:  And thank you, guys.

# # #


[1] Washington D.C. Secretary Rubio met with Mr. Kirill in Washington D.C.

 

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Technology and Innovation Report 2025 With Links and Brief Reflections: A.I. as a Public Productive Force

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The United Nations apparatus, like those inter-connected with the techno-bureaucracies of other large public and private institutions has a thing or two to say about Artificial Intelligence, but mostly about how it is to be consumed, who is to be consumed by it, what is to consumed, and who (or what) is to manage that platform of consumption and production.   And, in the usual course of things like this, the human is at the core--but not the human person. but the human person (and human collectives) as the central element of the productive forces  whose development must be aligned with the high quality production offered through A.I. platforms, the power over which is to be managed by and through forms and systems in which they participate. That was a point underscored in early April 2025 with the release of the Technology and Innovation Report 2025, released  the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

None of this suggests a criticism or a judgment about its "goodness" or "badness": these actors are already all too far along beyond good and evil. Instead, they are deeply embedded in the semiotics of production. That, in turn, enables one to view the efforts in terms of its objects (the semiotic "firstness"--or "thingness" into which meaning is injected, or perhaps better projected). The signification of those objects (the semiotic "secondness"  imposing names, characteristics and relational understanding of a thing with other things) within a framework in which their signified linkages are possible. The object of all of this effort (and the fancy conceptual framework) is is centered on interpretation, and therefore on the person or human  collective (this is a very human interaction) who cognitive cage makes it possible to identify and signify a thing and then bring that thing into the conceptual universe of the person to which object and signification relate (the semiotic "thirdness"). In this case, the object (AI) is signified as an instrument of human  production (its value and the point of its development) which is then ordered within the larger framework of human productivity and its managerial manifestations--its politics, economics, and sociology with reference to the human. 

Or, in the language of the United Nations apparatus and the Report Press Release (AI’s $4.8 trillion future: UN warns of widening digital divide without urgent action) explained:

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The Technology and Innovation Report 2025, released on Thursday by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), sounds the alarm on growing inequality in the AI landscape and lays out a roadmap for countries to harness AI’s potential.  The report shows that just 100 companies, mostly in the United States and China, are behind 40 per cent of the world’s private investment in research and development, highlighting a sharp concentration of power. At the same time, 118 countries – mostly from the Global South – are missing from global AI governance discussions altogether. UNCTAD Secretary-General Rebeca Grynspan underlined the importance of stronger international cooperation to shift the focus “from technology to people,” and enable countries “to co-create a global artificial intelligence framework”. * * *

The report estimates that up to 40 percent of global jobs could be affected by AI.  While the technology brings new opportunities, especially through productivity gains and new industries, it also raises serious concerns about automation and job displacement – especially in economies where low-cost labour has been a competitive advantage. But it’s not all bad news. UNCTAD’s experts argue that AI is not just about replacing jobs – it can also create new industries and empower workers. If governments invest in reskilling, upskilling and workforce adaptation, they can ensure AI enhances employment opportunities rather than eliminate them. (Press Release)

 That is both the promise and the tragedy of the UN apparatus' engagement with and exploitation of AI. A.I. is both an object and a productive force.  It's "thingness" is valuable to the extent it is related to its significance--development, which is also its thirdness, its interpretive context in which the object and its significance become relevant. The Rpoert sketches the cognitive cage in which AI is understood, and instrumentalized. First, the Report constructs the trough into which AI is poured.

AI can fast-track the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), powering smart agriculture and energy grids, optimizing production and supply chains, improving water and city planning – and more. Case studies show AI boosts productivity and improves livelihoods – if supported by the right policies and skills * * *

AI is projected to hit $4.8 trillion by 2033. That’s a 25x increase in just 10 years. * * *  (Technology and Innovation Report 2025)

Technology and Innovation Report 2025

 

It then considers the control of the trough--not just in terms of the return from the deployment of this productive force, but also in terms of AI as a machine (another ·thing") the development of which accounts fr the substantial growth of the "feed" in the "trough." The (mis)alignment of equity and markets becomes the doorway through which the focus on productive forces, that is on the unequal distribution of the benefits of production in markets, becomes the centering element of the analytics about AI. The question, then, isn't focused on A.I. as such bit on A.I. as a more productive means of developing human productive forces.

But AI development is highly concentrated. Just 100 companies funded 40% of research and development (R&D) in 2022. None of them are based in developing countries except China. The United States and China account for about 33% of AI publications and 60% of AI patents. This imbalance is also seen in AI infrastructure.* * * Skills are also key – from data literacy to expert-level AI knowledge. But these skills are unevenly distributed. * * * AI could affect 40% of jobs worldwide, with workers in advanced economies more exposed. But it’s not all about potential job loss.In advanced economies, 27% of jobs could be enhanced by AI – boosting human skills rather than replacing workers.Generative AI can unlock major productivity gains – especially in services and knowledge work. (Technology and Innovation Report 2025)

High quality job capture comes the key and A.I. the pathway. But not just to better labor exploitation, but also to an ideology of labor engagement in ways that lend themselves to the stability of capital aggregating systems (including both its liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist variants). 

Key policy priorities

Understand workforce dynamics. AI’s impact depends on a complex mix of automation, augmentation and new job creation. Policymakers must grasp these dynamics to ensure fair distribution of benefits and smooth transitions.
Accelerate AI adoption. Developing countries can speed up AI use by adapting solutions to local infrastructure, using alternative data sources, simplifying interfaces and building strategic partnerships to access key resources.
Empower workers. Inclusive AI must centre on people. That means promoting digital literacy, supporting reskilling and upskilling, and involving workers in designing AI tools for their jobs.
Promote human-complementary AI. Public R&D funding, smart procurement and tax incentives can promote AI that complements human work. Clear career paths and better job opportunities can reduce the risk of brain drain. (Technology and Innovation Report 2025)


Equalization requires national strategies. And national strategies require planning an sacrifice as national resources are bent toward the high quality productive potential of A-I.

To be competitive in an AI-driven world, developing countries must rethink industrial policy. They should shift the focus to technology, innovation and knowledge-intensive services. Developing countries must act quickly to set their AI strategies, aligning them with their own development goals. Simply following others’ paths may not meet their unique needs and priorities. Effective strategies require a whole-of-government approach, coordinating across agencies and institutions working on science, technology and innovation, as well as industry, education, infrastructure and trade. (Technology and Innovation Report 2025)

But all of this requires help--the equity over markets approach, leveraged out by the characterization of the "borderlessness" of A-I. That point is certainly true in the sense that the virtual is not territorially fixed--though it may be bounded by its modes of transmission or utility. But it can be contained, especially by states with a mind to so so, and especially or states that view A.I, not merely as a productive force but also as a critical state asset at the heart of its national security. .

AI is a borderless technology. While governments can regulate AI at the national level, global collaboration is essential to ensure it serves the public good. Today, multinational tech giants dominate AI development – driven more by profit than public interest. Without oversight, there’s little incentive to align AI with global development goals. Governments and international institutions must act to ensure AI serves people and the planet. Collaboration must be inclusive. Yet global AI governance remains fragmented and led by a handful of wealthy nations. People in developing countries will be affected by AI but have little or no say in shaping its future. The lack of representation is alarming. (Technology and Innovation Report 2025)

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All of the "usual suspects" are here nicely aligned in their stereotypical roles, and thus the normative essence of A.I. governance thirdness: the greedy and avaricious enterprise; A.I. as a  transnational object, process, means, productive force, the production of which appears beyond the control of any state; the oversized role of the private sector, or markets, in the development and exploitation of this productive force as a regulatory wrong;  the inevitable necessity for appropriate guidance by the State, or several States, or any larger public authority; the presumption that the fundamental purpose of A.I., like any other productive force, is to serve the people and planet but only as sorted out by public institutions; the political nature of A.I. as a productive force, whose development and deployment ought to be treated the way that state authority is treated--through the alignment of its development with the forms of democratic governance; the core importance of a centralizing coordination and alignment of the development of this productive force to oversee the transfer of development wealth from wealthy to developing states (the equity principle applied to the premise that the entire globe share in wealth production generated in any part of it), including the expectation of a global engagement both in the organization of the productive forces and in the distribution of its production. 


That is the set up necessary to provide the framing structure within which the leadership and guidance of the U.N. apparatus appears both natural and necessary. "The United Nations is leading efforts to close this gap. In 2025, UN Member States adopted the Pact for the Future and the Global Digital Compact, setting a series of commitments to enhance international AI governance for the benefit of humanity. UNCTAD advocates for multi-stakeholder cooperation to steer AI towards shared goals and values." (Technology and Innovation Report 2025). The trick here is the shared goals and values--a commodity far scarcer, it would seem, than the products of A.I. and far harder to come by. The proffered path is an amalgam of the current ideological initiatives of the UN system bent toward their application to the "problem" an d"opportunity" of A.I.

 Key priorities for global collaboration

  • Industry accountability framework. Companies using large-scale AI systems should disclose their impact, risks and decision-making processes – like environmental, social and governance (ESG) standards. AI certification could evolve from voluntary to mandatory, with enforcement mechanisms.
  • An inclusive approach. AI governance must balance innovation with public safety and trust. Policymakers must incorporate diverse voices, ensuring that AI policies protect vulnerable populations.
  • Shared digital infrastructure. Governments can collaborate with the private sector to develop public AI infrastructure. A global facility – modelled on how CERN was built as an international scientific research centre – could provide equitable access to AI infrastructure.
  • Open innovation. Open data and open-source models can unlock knowledge and resources, fuelling inclusive AI innovation. Interoperable, standards-based repositories can expand access and strengthen the global knowledge base through trusted, secure hubs.
  • A global AI hub. An AI-focused centre and network – modelled after the UN Climate Technology Centre and Network – could serve as a global hub for AI capacity-building, technology transfer, and technical assistance for developing countries.
  • South–South collaboration. Enhanced science and technology cooperation can help developing countries tackle common AI challenges. Trade agreements could include AI provisions, while regional institutions can promote best practices and help shape coherent strategies. (Technology and Innovation Report 2025)

None of this is either good nor bad.  One is free to create any sort of reality around A.I., within a willing community (the essence of collective meaning making), especially one that makes it easier to incorporate A.I. as suitably constructed into the cognitive cages into which it needs to be placed. In this case the cage  is production, and the interior is shaped by the conflict/alignment between the private and the public in a world in which the construction of the international system makes that conflict/alignment eternal int he sense that it, but not its resolution, is built into the bones of the system. In this sense the U.N. Report is both predictable and inevitable given its own cognitive prison. A.I. as a productive force and instrument for global equity is a peculiar bit likely important way of objectifying both the technology and its products. From this vantage one considers A.I. like a farm animal--to be fattened and to provide work for farm hands and substantial profits for the farmer, but the farmer is part of a collective, the product is directed toward the objectives toward which is is guided and in the service of public policy and the farm hands get to eat. 

Links to the Report follow below:

 


Report downloads


Downloads



Technology and Innovation Report 2025

Inclusive artificial intelligence for development (UNCTAD/DTL/TIR/2025) - 07 Apr 2025
English



Technology and Innovation Report 2025 (Overview)
(UNCTAD/DTL/TIR/2025 (Overview)) - 07 Apr 2025
English



Chapter 1: AI at the technology frontier
07 Apr 2025
English



Chapter 2: Leveraging AI for productivity and workers’ empowerment
07 Apr 2025
English



Chapter 3: Preparing to seize AI opportunities
07 Apr 2025
English



Chapter 4: Designing national policies for AI National
07 Apr 2025
English



Chapter 5: Global collaboration for inclusive and equitable AI
07 Apr 2025
English





Press release


Press Releases



7 Apr 2025 - AI’s $4.8 trillion future: UN Trade and Development alerts on divides, urges action
English | Français | Español







Drawing the Discursive Battle Lines--The People Must be Protected From Abuse!: 人民日报评论员:集中精力办好自己的事 增强有效应对美关税冲击的信心 [People's Daily Commentator: Focus on doing your own things and strengthen confidence in effectively responding to the impact of US tariffs]

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When the Administration of President Trump flamboyantly announced its implementation of a new tariffs strategy for broader objectives (to reset the basis and parameters of global trade) it also set in motion (and perhaps deliberately) an equally important discursive battle over the normalization of a core set of baseline premises on which both U.S. strategies and the evaluation of responses could be authoritatively measured and understood. 

These multiple tracks suggest the broader context in which the tariff strategy might be understood (however one ultimately decides about its value or utility).  It has been clear (at least in discourse) that tariffs are not an outcome but an instrument (however correctly or badly deployed in the minds of those with an opinion). But an instrument of what? On one sense it focuses on the classical use of tariffs--to nudge domestic production vectors, protect local industry, and manage macro-economic objectives.  In another it is meant (effectiveness is another matter) to reset trade balances (and more traditionally (though in the U.S. with a volatile history in the 19th century U.S.) as a revenue (as well as a industry sector protective) measure.  More broadly, however, the tariff instrument, at least this time around, has broader substantive ambitions. These might include resetting the basic principles of trade (grounded on a to-be-fully-developed principle of reciprocity. It also is meant to reinforce a move toward something like a liberal democratic version of the Chinese win-win principle of international relations. (unequal agreements grounded in an equivalence of value measured differently by each party). That, in turn, reinforces the effort to reboot inter-governmental relations on a transactional basis--win-win and lets-make-a-deal produce an iterative, mimetic, inductive methods of accumulating action int principle that reflects, in a curious way, the fundamental logic and approaches of markets. 

This is all fodder for the second battle front--that of discourse and the management of the forms and frameworks that are naturalized within key elements of the population as the "correct" or "legitimate" approach to thinking about and evaluating action. That is, that the narrative front provides the scale against which actions, including these actions with transformative ambitions, may be measured. The stakes in the normative battle front are, in the long run, much more important, than the effects of transformative action that are meant to have short term (if significant) effect. The staying power of these changes require a collective belief in their value, and rewiring the ground rules against which future action is assessed. The Americans have tended to be good at action oriented behaviors in this administration; the Chinese appear more adept in the narrative front. Both will have to shift resources if they mean to prevail in the long run.

Some of these strands of the quite ambitious U.S. "tariffs" project can be seen in a recent  semi-official response of the Chinese authorities to the application of the tariff regimes to China, 人民日报评论员:集中精力办好自己的事 增强有效应对美关税冲击的信心 [People's Daily Commentator: Focus on doing your own things and strengthen confidence in effectively responding to the impact of US tariffs]. China, of course, is of special interest because their relations wit the U.S. will determine the template that will be applied more universally. The way they frame their actions, and deploy their resources against each other will help shape the new transformed space within which regional convergence systems can operate, and the ground rule principles for economic interactions between the emerging economic-political trading blocs. 

 The Chinese discursive position is quite interesting:

1. The Chinese take the position, quite correctly, that the American initiative  has gone against global trends (美国政府逆世界潮流而动). But that was not meant as a factual statement, but rather as a normative judgment. The idea is to reinforce not only that the tariff initiative is aberrational, but also contrary to the global ordering on which global stability is based. The underlying objective is to reinforce the connection between deviation from consensus and illegitimacy. From the U.S. perspective, of course, the opposite would be true--that the current consensus has become irredeemably corrupted and thus illegitimate and that the principle of reciprocity--the core principle of the old now corrupted system, must be preserved through new means. 

2. The illegitimacy of this deviant behavior is then given a name--tariff abuse (滥用关税). Discursively that works well, and aligns with criticism within the United States and its allied camp grounded in traditional arguments about the value of tariffs as a strategic tool or tariffs, generally as an illegitimate measure against which world consensus has been moving. 

3. The Chinese authorities then offer four points that are meant to counter the substantive ambitions of the tariff initiative but which also provide a discursive template for countering the norm shifting ambitions of that initiative:

A. The tariff strategy is a "paper tiger."  美滥施关税将对我造成冲击,但“天塌不下来”。此次美国政府对我加征34%的关税,加上此前加征的关税,将严重抑制双边贸易,短期内不可避免地对我出口造成负面影响,加大经济下行压力。[The abuse of tariffs by the United States will have an impact on China, but "the sky will not fall". The 34% tariff imposed by the US government on China, together with the previous tariffs, will seriously suppress bilateral trade, inevitably have a negative impact on China's exports in the short term, and increase the downward pressure on the economy.]

B. The tariff strategy will only make China stronger.当前我国经济企稳向好,应对美关税冲击有底气、有信心。[At present, China's economy has stabilized and progressed, and we have the confidence to deal with the impact of US tariffs.]

C. The tariff strategy is no strategy at all and can be easily met by applying  current trade and global strategies against outlier states. 面对美滥施关税的乱拳,我们心中有数、手上有招。我们已与美国打了8年贸易战,积累了丰富的斗争经验。[In the face of the US's abuse of tariffs, we have a clear strategy in mind. We have fought a trade war with the United States for 8 years and have accumulated rich experience in that struggle. ]

D. The infection of the United States ought to be quarantined to ensure global stability and to protect the stability of other states.  坚定不移办好自己的事,以国内经济结构调整应对外部环境调整。[We will unswervingly handle our own affairs and respond to the external environment adjustment with the adjustment of domestic economic structure.]

E. When all else fails, or for win-win advantage, negotiate.   面对美方的多变易变、极限施压,我们没有关上谈判大门,但也不会心存侥幸,而是做好了应对冲击的各种准备。[In the face of the volatility and extreme pressure from the United States, we did not close the door to negotiations, but we will not be lucky, but have made various preparations to deal with the impact.]

 Abuse, containment, quarantine, appear to be the markers. It is only a matter of time before the imaginaries of disease come into play.  More effective, perhaps, will be the "paper tiger" variants that also play into the important propaganda vector that has, for a decade or more, sought to leverage the Western intellectual projects of "late stage" capitalism, decadence and the like to paint the U.S. a sa dying power, fundamentally illegitimate and consumed by its own contradictions, mow lashing out in increasingly dangerous though worthless ways. Containment of the threat before it becomes serious appears to be the essence of the discursive countermeasures. It only remains to see what or whether the U.S. responds. The difficulty, of course, is that for a transactional phenomenological state, one makes discourse in action rather than in text. That disjunction will have some interesting effects on the course of events in the next several years.

The full text of  人民日报评论员:集中精力办好自己的事 增强有效应对美关税冲击的信心 [People's Daily Commentator: Focus on doing your own things and strengthen confidence in effectively responding to the impact of US tariffs] follows below in the original CHinese and in a crude English translation.

 

人民日报客户端人民日报评论员2025-04-06 19:23浏览量998.7万

美国政府逆世界潮流而动,对包括我国在内的几乎所有贸易伙伴出台所谓的“对等关税”,我国第一时间采取了坚决有力的反制措施,引发全球高度关注。当前应客观分析美滥施关税对我影响,理性看待我国经济发展良好态势,坚定应对美这一轮遏压的信心。

(一)美滥施关税将对我造成冲击,但“天塌不下来”。此次美国政府对我加征34%的关税,加上此前加征的关税,将严重抑制双边贸易,短期内不可避免地对我出口造成负面影响,加大经济下行压力。

但要看到,中国是超大规模经济体,面对美国的关税霸凌冲击,我们具有强大的抗压能力。近年来我们积极构建多元化市场,对美市场依赖已在下降。我对美出口占全部出口的份额已从2018年的19.2%降至2024年的14.7%,对美出口下降不会对整体经济造成颠覆性影响。美国内不少产品对我依存度较高。当前美国不仅在很多消费品上离不开中国,很多投资品和中间产品也需要从中国进口,有若干品类依存度超过50%,短期内在国际市场上很难找到替代来源。在全球产供链深度交融的大背景下,中美贸易不可能完全中断。新兴市场经贸合作潜力巨大,日益成为我稳外贸的重要基础。我国是全球150多个国家和地区的主要贸易伙伴,2018年以来,我对东盟出口占比由12.8%提升到16.4%,对共建“一带一路”国家出口占比由38.7%提升到47.8%,且保持较快增长势头。国内市场缓冲空间广阔,是重要的大后方。据统计,2024年我有出口实绩的数十万家企业中,接近85%的企业同时开展内销业务,内销金额占销售总额的近75%。国家正加快打通“出口转内销”政策堵点、卡点,扩内需各项政策也在加力扩围,内需市场的容纳效应将日益显现。

(二)当前我国经济企稳向好,应对美关税冲击有底气、有信心。2017年美国挑起对华贸易战以来,无论美国怎么打、怎么压,我们始终保持发展和进步,展现了“越压越强”的韧性,这成为我们应对外部冲击的最大底气。经济循环不断改善。近年来我们持续优化供给、改善需求,畅通国内经济循环,经济内生动力明显增强。尤其是去年9月26日中央政治局会议后,随着一系列增量政策落实,国内经济持续回升向好。今年前两个月,投资、消费等国内需求增长好于预期,出口初步经受住了考验,制造业和服务业PMI持续回升,一季度有望实现5%以上的增长。科技赋能持续发力。我们抓住发展新质生产力这一最重要的供给,坚持以科技创新带动产业创新,在集成电路、人工智能、人形机器人等领域多点突破,展现了中国科技创新的巨大活力。“卡脖子”、打压遏制只会倒逼中国加快实现重点领域核心技术突破。风险缓释成效明显。近年来,我们顶住内外压力,坚持做困难而正确的事,持续化解房地产、地方政府债务、中小金融机构等重点领域风险。目前,三大风险得到有效控制,处于收敛状态。房地产市场交易和社会信心出现积极变化,一线城市回暖态势比较明显。各方预期不断改善。我国长期稳定的社会环境、不断优化的营商环境,咬定目标不放松、一张蓝图绘到底的政策连续性,为企业提供了长期稳定预期。今年以来,海内外对我国经济前景的看法明显改善,经济合作与发展组织等国际组织以及很多华尔街金融机构纷纷上调对我国经济增长的预测,看好中国资本市场,并将中国的“确定性”视为对冲美方“不确定性”的避风港。

(三)面对美滥施关税的乱拳,我们心中有数、手上有招。我们已与美国打了8年贸易战,积累了丰富的斗争经验。虽然国际市场普遍认为美滥施关税超预期,但党中央对美方对我实施新一轮经贸遏压已有预判,对其可能造成的冲击有充分估计,应对预案的提前量和富余量也打得较足。去年中央经济工作会议已经就如何应对美新一轮对华遏制打压作出全面部署,强调要充实完善政策工具箱,根据外部影响程度动态调整政策,加强超常规逆周期调节,提高宏观调控的前瞻性、针对性、有效性。今年全国两会上,我们出台的很多政策,如将今年财政赤字率确定为4%左右,运用国债资金扩大对“两新”“两重”的支持等都是超常规政策的具体体现。

未来根据形势需要,降准、降息等货币政策工具已留有充分调整余地,随时可以出台;财政政策已明确要加大支出强度、加快支出进度,财政赤字、专项债、特别国债等视情仍有进一步扩张空间;将以超常规力度提振国内消费,加快落实既定政策,并适时出台一批储备政策;以实实在在的政策措施坚决稳住资本市场,稳定市场信心,相关预案政策将陆续出台;各级政府将“一行一案”“一企一策”精准帮扶受冲击较大的行业和企业,支持企业调整经营策略,指导帮助企业在尽可能维持对美贸易的同时,开拓国内市场和非美市场。同时,我们将敦促美方纠正错误做法,以平等、尊重、互惠的方式,同中国和世界各国磋商,妥善解决贸易分歧。

(四)坚定不移办好自己的事,以国内经济结构调整应对外部环境调整。当今世界百年未有之大变局加速演进,美国关税政策进一步加剧全球政经格局走势的不确定性。作为负责任的全球大国,我们要变压力为动力,将应对美方冲击视为加快构建新发展格局、推动高质量发展、促进经济结构调整的战略机遇,以自身的稳定发展,为全球经济发展注入更多稳定性。面对高关税持续压缩对美贸易空间,我们更要把扩大内需作为长期战略,努力把消费打造成经济增长的主动力和压舱石,发挥超大规模市场优势。一方面,从需求侧入手,通过扎扎实实地推动居民增收减负,提高居民的消费能力与意愿;另一方面,从供给侧发力,加快全国统一大市场建设,改善营商环境,支持国内企业更多围绕老百姓的需求提供高质量产品和服务。

面对美方的多变易变、极限施压,我们没有关上谈判大门,但也不会心存侥幸,而是做好了应对冲击的各种准备。上下同欲者胜,风雨同舟者兴。我们有党中央的坚强领导,有集中力量办大事的制度优势,一定能够化危为机、行稳致远。正如习近平总书记所指出:“中国经济是一片大海,而不是一个小池塘”。这片大海经受得起狂风骤雨的洗礼,抵御得住贸易寒流的侵袭,终将让世人见证“海纳百川”的从容与坚定。

责任编辑:王萍萍

 

Just Published: "(In)Visible Signs of Gender-Based Volence" (Anne Wagner and Angela Condello (eds)

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(In)Visible Signs of Gender-Based Violence (Anne Wagner and Angela Condello (eds), the first volume of the law book series is now available online via Springer!
The edited volume explores the causes, forms, and cultures of gender-based violence in society, including how children are educated, how games, art and even language promote differences, stereotypes, neutrality between men and women. It is a place to reflect on the growing importance of tolerance, diversity and acceptance of others. The book focuses on many facets, whether in a confined or public space, with a series of empirical and theoretical chapters from around the world.

The volume provides key contemporary commentary on the changing dynamics of gender-based violence. It unveils a range of contexts and spaces in which gender-based violence happens, showcasing its scale and impact worldwide. The discussions presented in the book encourage a critical reflection on the global pandemic of gender-based violence, prompting a vital question about the sufficiency and effectiveness of responses to this global crisis (Professor Olga Jurasz, The Open University Law School).
Congratulations to the editors and the authors of these outstanding contributions that reflect a rich diversity of perspectives and research. The print edition will be available soon!


It's on!: President Trump issues " Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated Duties as Applied to Low-Value Imports from the People’s Republic of China Presidential Actions, Executive Orders April 8, 2025"

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Pix credit here

 This was perhaps  inevitable and the necessary  prelude either to (secret) deal making and a "cease fire" and both empires reorganize within their newly recognized borders, or the actions will be the pretext and supply the structures for  the firming of the borders between imperial domains.  

The "this" was the issuance on 8 April by the Trump Administration of the Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated Duties as Applied to Low-Value Imports from the People’s Republic of China. The full text follows below.  But, as promised the President promised a substantial punitive elevaton of tariff rates should the Chinese impose retaliatory tariffs.  And of course the Chinese  could not but impose retaliatory tariffs. The stage is now set.  Transformation of trade relations is close to the point of no return; and where, one might wonder has the WTO gone? What we know is that China continues to see its as a useful stage for projecting its  message (China initiates WTO dispute on US 'reciprocal tariffs'), smaller states still seek its protection (Canada initiates WTO dispute over US duties on cars); people are using the current situation to call for reform (A tariff crisis is exactly the right time to reform the WTO), and in the face of budget problems the WTO is considering substantial staff reductions (WTO Aims to Reduce Staffing Costs). . .


AMENDMENT TO RECIPROCAL TARIFFS AND UPDATED DUTIES AS APPLIED TO LOW-VALUE IMPORTS FROM THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I hereby determine and order:

Section 1.  Background.  In Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 (Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits), I declared a national emergency arising from conditions reflected in large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits, and imposed additional ad valorem duties that I deemed necessary and appropriate to deal with that unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security and economy of the United States.  Section 4(b) of Executive Order 14257 provided that “[s]hould any trading partner retaliate against the United States in response to this action through import duties on U.S. exports or other measures, I may further modify the [Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States] to increase or expand in scope the duties imposed under this order to ensure the efficacy of this action.”  I further declared pursuant to Executive Order 14256 of April 2, 2025 (Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China as Applied to Low-Value Imports) that duty-free de minimis treatment on articles described in section 2(a) of Executive Order 14195 is no longer available effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on May 2, 2025.

On April 4, 2025, the State Council Tariff Commission of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced that in response to Executive Order 14257, effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 10, 2025, a 34 percent tariff would be imposed on all goods imported into the PRC originating from the United States.  Pursuant to section 4(b) of Executive Order 14257, I am ordering modification of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) and taking other actions to increase the duties imposed on the PRC in response to this retaliation.  In my judgment, this modification is necessary and appropriate to effectively address the threat to the national security and economy of the United States.

Sec2.  Tariff Increase.  In recognition of the fact that the PRC has announced that it will retaliate against the United States in response to Executive Order 14257, the HTSUS shall be modified as follows.  Effective with respect to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025:  
(a)  heading 9903.01.63 of the HTSUS shall be amended by deleting “34%” each place that it appears and by inserting “84%” in lieu thereof; and
(b)  subdivision (v)(xiii)(10) of U.S. note 2 to subchapter III of chapter 99 of the HTSUS shall be amended by deleting “34%”, and inserting “84%” in lieu thereof.

Sec3.  De Minimis Tariff Increase.  To ensure that the imposition of tariffs pursuant to section 2 of this order is not circumvented and that the purpose of Executive Order 14257 and this action is not undermined, I also deem it necessary and appropriate to:  
(a)  increase the ad valorem rate of duty set forth in section 2(c)(i) of Executive Order 14256 from 30 percent to 90 percent;
(b)  increase the per postal item containing goods duty in section 2(c)(ii) of Executive Order 14256 that is in effect on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on May 2, 2025, and before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 1, 2025, from 25 dollars to 75 dollars; and
(c)  increase the per postal item containing goods duty in section 2(c)(ii) of Executive Order 14256 that is in effect on or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on June 1, 2025, from 50 dollars to 150 dollars.

Sec4.  Implementation.  The Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade Representative, as applicable, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade Commission, are directed to take all necessary actions to implement and effectuate this order, consistent with applicable law, including through temporary suspension or amendment of regulations or notices in the Federal Register and adopting rules and regulations, and are authorized to take such actions, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement this order.  Each executive department and agency shall take all appropriate measures within its authority to implement this order.

Sec5.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head     thereof; or
(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
    April 8, 2025


"Hot Damn, It's the Soggy Bottom Boys!"--The Transactional Merchant Phenomenology of the Trump Administration and the Cognitive Cage of Ideological Presumption: CEA Chairman Steve Miran Hudson Institute Event Remarks (7 April 2025).

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Pix Credit here (Oh Brother Where Art Thou? Movie 2000)

 

In the great excitement about the tariffs agit-prop--a marvelous piece of action theater catalyzing action and reaction--it was only inevitable that people still require the reassurance of cages of ideology to give them a certain comfort in the rationality of the inductive, iterative, transactions based merchant action philosophy of the Trump Administration.  And, of course, academics and other trained in the sciences of rationalizing the human, all too human, have stepped up to fill the void. One of these rationalization is worth a careful reading, if only because, in the Chinese style, it was published to the White House website as a signal of approval by the leadership core of the American political apparatus:    CEA Chairman Steve Miran Hudson Institute Event Remarks (7 April 2025).

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The remarks as especially valuable not because the President has embraced them, or believes the comprehensive premises that order the world that Mr. Miran, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers of United States, rationalizes in those remarks, but because many in the Administration, and many more outside of the Administration--desperately hungry for good "old timey" deductive principles-based rationality structures from out of which policy proceeds--very much like the Holy Spirit in the Christian Nicene Creed: "who proceeds from the Father and the Son, who with the Father and the Son is adored and glorified, who has spoken through the prophets" (Nicene Creed). That is what people crave--and rightly so given the way that deductive rationality created systems have been so deepened normalized within the constructs of human cognition that any abrupt transition to an equally old cognitive system, one increasingly embedded in the forms of virtual realities and tech interfaces with humanity, makes people nervous. People need the crutch.  They may not necessarily need the deductive framework.  But they crave its verities and its forms of accessing collective cognitive understandings of "the way things ought to work." And how better than a higher level priest of the magisterium around the president to provide this "old timey" and soothing rationalization. Not that it is wrong, but that it is deductive that is interesting in the face of the President's inductive impulses and mode of operation.


And there it is.  The President believes what he does; everyone else, it seems, does what they believe. And so Mr. Miran has come forward with the cooing noises of a bridging discourse. That is something that is both necessary as a propaganda and mass management effort, but also as a means of beginning to develop the post factor historical-ideological construction of inductive iteration that produces something that is both different and new in terms of objectives, methods, and processes, as well as values and expectations. Not that Mr. Miran is wrong or right, but that his necessary translation of the President's inductive and iterative cognitive style required a translation into the more old fashioned and comforting language of deductive principles based policy rationalization that the world has gotten used to in the last century or so. That ought to be the most interesting aspect of a deductive analysis seeking to translate into its own terms  the President's inductive impulses and mode of operation.  

For those inclined to debate the merits of this deductive rationalization, there is much here.  Especially for social scientists and their scientific approach to the substance and perhaps the principles around which  they believe it is possible to manage projections of policy.  The President, though, appears to come at this from he other end of the horse. For those interested in the constitution of Mr. Miran's conceptual universe (no judgment on my part other than that is is constructed and by that constructed becomes real in its application), see Miran, Stephen. "A User's Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System"(PDF). Hudson Bay Capital. Retrieved 16 March 2025.

 

Pix Credit (The Governor Dances, CHarles Durning, Oh Brother Where Art Thou? (2000))

The Remarks follow below.


CEA Chairman Steve Miran Hudson Institute Event Remarks

Today I’d like to discuss the United States’ provision of what economists call “global public goods,” for the entire world.  First, the United States provides a security umbrella which has created the greatest era of peace mankind has ever known.  Second, the U.S. provides the dollar and Treasury securities, reserve assets which make possible the global trading and financial system which has supported the greatest era of prosperity mankind has ever known. 

Both of these are costly to us to provide.  On the defense side, our men and women in uniform take heroic risks to make our nation and the world safer, preserving our liberties generation after generation.  And we tax hardworking Americans mightily to finance global security.  On the financial side, the reserve function of the dollar has caused persistent currency distortions and contributed, along with other countries’ unfair barriers to trade, to unsustainable trade deficits.  These trade deficits have decimated our manufacturing sector and many working-class families and their communities, to facilitate non-Americans trading with each other.

Let me clarify that by “reserve currency,” I mean all the international functions of the dollar—private savings and trade included.  I’ve often used the example that when private agents in two separate foreign countries trade with each other, it’s typically denominated in dollars because of America’s status as the reserve provider.  That trade entails savings housed in dollar securities, often Treasurys.  As a result of all this, Americans have been paying for peace and prosperity not just for themselves, but for non-Americans too.

President Trump has made it clear that he will no longer stand for other nations free-riding on our blood, sweat, and tears, whether in national security or trade.  The Trump Administration has already, in its first hundred days, moved forcefully to reorient our defense and trading relationships to place Americans on fairer ground.  The President has promised to rebuild our broken industrial base and pursue trade terms that put American workers and businesses first.

I’m an economist and not a military strategist, so I’ll dwell more on trade than on defense, but the two are deeply connected.  To see how it works, imagine two foreign nations, say China and Brazil, trading with each other.  Neither country has a currency that is trusted, liquid, and convertible, which makes trading with each other challenging.  However, because they can transact in U.S. dollars backed by U.S. Treasuries, they are able to trade freely with each other and prosper.  Such trade can only occur because of U.S. military might ensuring our financial stability and the credibility of our borrowing.  Our military and financial dominance cannot be taken for granted; and the Trump Administration is determined to preserve them.

But our financial dominance comes at a cost.  While it is true that demand for dollars has kept our borrowing rates low, it has also kept currency markets distorted.  This process has placed undue burdens on our firms and workers, making their products and labor uncompetitive on the global stage, and forcing a decline of our manufacturing workforce by over a third since its peak1 and a reduction in our share of world manufacturing production of 40%.

We need to be able to make things in this country, as we saw during Covid, when many of our supply chains could not survive without being reliant on our biggest adversary, China.  We clearly should not rely on our biggest adversary for equipment essential to keeping our population safe and secure.  Nor should our biggest adversary be allowed to benefit so much from an international security and financial architecture we finance.

There are other unfortunate side effects of providing reserve assets.  Others may buy our assets to manipulate their own currency to keep their exports cheap.  In doing so, they end up pumping so much money into the U.S. economy that it fuels economic vulnerabilities and crises.  For example, in the years running up to the 2008 crash, China along with many foreign financial institutions, increased their holdings of U.S. mortgage debt, which helped fuel the housing bubble, forcing hundreds of billions of dollars of credit into the housing sector without regard as to whether the investments made sense.  China played a meaningful role creating the Global Financial Crisis.  It took almost a decade to recover, until President Trump got us back on track in his first term.

In my view, to continue providing these twin global public goods, there needs to be improved burden-sharing at the global level.  If other nations want to benefit from the U.S. geopolitical and financial umbrella, then they need to pull their weight, and pay their fair share.  The costs cannot be solely borne by everyday Americans who have already given so much.

The best outcome is one in which America continues to create global peace and prosperity and remain the reserve provider, and other countries not only participate in reaping the benefits, but they also participate in bearing the costs.  By improving burden sharing, we can enhance resilience, and preserve the global security and trading systems for many decades into the future.

Moreover, it is critical not just for fairness, but for capacity.  We are under siege by hostile adversaries trying to erode our manufacturing and defense industrial base and disrupt our financial system; we will be able to provide neither defense nor reserve assets if our manufacturing capacity is hollowed out.  The President has been clear that the United States is committed to remaining the reserve provider, but that the system must be made fairer.  We need to rebuild our industries to project the strength needed to protect reserve status, and we need to be able to pay our bills to do so.

What forms can that burden sharing take?  There are many options, here are a few ideas:

  • First, other countries can accept tariffs on their exports to the United States without retaliation, providing revenue to the U.S. Treasury to finance public goods provision.  Critically, retaliation will exacerbate rather than improve the distribution of burdens and make it even more difficult for us to finance global public goods.
  • Second, they can stop unfair and harmful trading practices by opening their markets and buying more from America;
  • Third, they can boost defense spending and procurement from the U.S., buying more U.S.-made goods, and taking strain off our servicemembers and creating jobs here;
  • Fourth, they can invest in and install factories in America.  They won’t face tariffs if they make their stuff in this country;
  • Fifth, they could simply write checks to Treasury that help us finance global public goods.

Tariffs deserve some extra attention.  Most economists and some investors dismiss tariffs as counterproductive at best and devastatingly harmful at worst.  They’re wrong. 

One reason the economic consensus on tariffs is so wrong is because nearly all of the models that economists use to study international trade assume either no trade deficits at all, or assume that deficits are short-lived and quickly self-correct through currency adjustments.  According to standard models, trade deficits will cause the dollar to weaken, which reduces imports and boosts exports, eventually wiping out the trade deficit.  If that happens, tariffs may be unnecessary, because trade will balance itself over time and, in this view, intervening with tariffs can only make things worse.

However, that view is at odds with reality.  The United States has run current account deficits now for five decades, and these have widened precipitously in recent years, going from about 2% of GDP in the first Trump Administration to a high of nearly 4% of GDP in the Biden Administration2.  And this has happened all while the dollar has appreciated, not depreciated!

The long run is here, and the models are wrong.  One reason is that they fail to account for the U.S. provision of the global reserve currency.  Reserve status matters and, because demand for the dollar has been insatiable, it has been too strong for international flows to balance, even over five decades.

More recent economic analyses3 allow for the possibility of persistent trade deficits that resist automatically rebalancing, which is more in line with reality in the U.S.  They show that by imposing tariffs against exporting countries, the U.S. can improve economic outcomes, raise revenues, and impose huge losses for the tariffed nation, even with full retaliation.

In this sense, analysis of what economists call the “incidence” of tariffs indicates that a large share and burden of the tariffs are “paid for” by the country on which we’re applying the tariffs.  Countries that run large trade surpluses are pretty inflexible—they can’t find other sources of demand to substitute for America’s.  Instead, they have no choice but to export, and America is the largest consumer market in the world.  By contrast, America has plenty of substitution options: we can make stuff at home, or we can buy from countries that treat us fairly instead of from countries that take advantage of us.  This difference in leverage means that other countries end up bearing the cost of tariffs.

In 2018-2019, China bore the cost of President Trump’s historic tariffs through a weaker currency, meaning their citizens became poorer, with less purchasing power on the global stage.  The tariff revenue, paid for by China, was used to finance President Trump’s tax cuts for American workers and firms.  This time around, tariffs will help pay for both tax cuts and deficit reduction.

Lower taxes on Americans, financed in part by revenue provided from foreigners, will create economic growth, dynamism, and opportunity the likes of which our country has never seen, ushering in President Trump’s new Golden Age.  Deficit reduction will help lower Treasury rates, and with them mortgage rates and consumer credit card rates, stimulating an economic boom.

It is important to note here that tariffs are not levied simply to collect revenues.  For example, the President’s reciprocal tariffs are designed to address tariff and non-tariff barriers and other forms of cheating like currency manipulation, dumping, and subsidies to gain unfair advantage.  Revenue is a nice side effect, and if it is used in part for lowering taxes, it can help turbo-charge competitiveness improvements that boost U.S. exports.

Burden sharing can allow the United States to continue leading the free world for many decades.  It’s a must not only for fairness, but for feasibility.  If we don’t rebuild our manufacturing sector, we will be strained in providing the security we need for our safety and to underpin our financial markets.  The world can still have the American defense umbrella and trading system, but it’s got to start paying its fair share for them.  Thank you, and I am happy to take some questions.


[1] https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MANEMP

[2] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS?locations=US

[3] https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5008591


Betrayal and the State of Administration: President Trump--"Addressing Risks Associated with an Egregious Leaker and Disseminator of Falsehoods "

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Story time:
1968 Wharton graduate and President Donald Trump signed a directive removing security clearances held by former Penn lecturer Miles Taylor and all University affiliates on Wednesday. The April 9 presidential memo directed federal agency leaders to “suspend any active security clearances held by Miles Taylor” and accused him of “possibly violating the Espionage Act.” The memo further instructed agency heads to suspend “any active security clearances … held by individuals at entities associated with Taylor, including the University of Pennsylvania.”* * *

“Every security clearance held by someone at the University of Pennsylvania has now apparently been suspended because the current occupant of the Oval Office is angry at a public critic named Miles Taylor,” University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School professor Tobias Wolff wrote in an Instagram Threads post.Taylor formerly served as the chief of staff in the Department of Homeland Security from 2017 to 2019. During that time, he anonymously published a whistleblower opinion piece in The New York Times alleging presidential misconduct from inside the first Trump administration. In 2019, Taylor published a book — using the same alias of “Anonymous” — titled “A Warning” that expanded upon his initial article, which the White House characterized as “full of falsehoods and fabricated stories.”

The nature of administrators within hierarchies are fairly clear after thousands of years and  even more examples in virtually every culture in which a social collective organizes itself with or through an administrative apparatus. But they are human; and there are always some humans who have a delightful tendency to live down to their lowest possible expectation from time to time. 

Betrayal--personal or social, are among the thorniest of the instruments in the weapons cabinet of officials. It can be used enveloped in righteousness, or meanness, or just money. Those are all post fact judgments best made by those who judge these things.  For the betrayer and the betrayed the intensity is too strong for rational judgment, certainly at the time.  President Trump is no stranger to Betrayal--both by act and in text ( Ruminations 91: Very Brief Reflections on John Bolton's "Secret History" of Mr. Trump, and the Art of Political Burlesque).  In that reflection on Mr. Bolton's opus, I noted its long history and the template from which it perhaps drew its form and logic:

 So begins the now well-known "Secret History" (Anecdota; Greek: Ἀπόκρυφη Ἱστορία, Apókryphe Historía; Latin: Historia Arcana) of Procopius of Caesaria (Προκόπιος ὁ Καισαρεύς; born 500- died c. 565)). It was a work known for a time when it was written and then lost until republication int he 17th century. Like others of its kind, it is the work of a disgruntled academic turned functionary, who having spent a lifetime getting into the good graces of the powerful in order to excise (or at least witness) power from the position of a servant, a trained tool of the imperial machinery, produced a scathing criticism--personal and professional--of his former masters after he was cast out by the ungrateful patrons he thought he had served so well. The imperial personages who for many years were portrayed so positively, now descend into caricature.  Their political depravity mirrored (as is common in Western literary tropes of this sort) by their sexual depravity and mental incapacity (on modern versions of this form of conflation for political ends, see, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States, Zimbabwe and Malaysia (2005) Yale Journal of Law and Feminism)

Following that path so nicely paved by Mr. Bolton, it appears that Mr. Taylor also had a tale to tell about the President, especially for those predisposed to consume such offerings. But Mr. Trump has a long memory, and a refined taste for revenge, especially when served cold. He now also apparently has a longer reach.  

"The root of the problem is the president's amorality," Taylor said, accusing the president of making "half-baked, ill-informed and occasionally reckless decisions." * * * White House Staff Secretary Will Scharf accused Taylor during an Oval Office signing ceremony on Wednesday of leaking classified information while at DHS and making "outrageous claims both about (the Trump) administration and about others in it." The presidential memorandum signed by Trump targeting Taylor is "going to order the Department of Justice to investigate his activities to see what else might come up in that context," Scharf said. Trump, speaking to reporters in the Oval Office, accused Taylor of saying "all sorts of lies, bad things.""I think it's like a traitor, it's like spying," he said. "We're going to find out whether or not somebody is allowed to do that. "I think it's a very important case and I think he's guilty of treason if you want to know the truth," Trump said. "But we'll find out." Taylor, for his part, reacted to the news on X, writing: "Dissent isn't unlawful. It certainly isn't treasonous. America is headed down a dark path." (here)

Both President Trump's memory taste for pay back were very much in evidence in a Presidential Memorandum of 9 April 2025:  "Addressing Risks Associated with an Egregious Leaker and Disseminator of Falsehoods" the text of which appears below.


Addressing Risks Associated with an Egregious Leaker and Disseminator of Falsehoods

  MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES  

Miles Taylor was entrusted with the solemn responsibility of Federal service, but instead prioritized his own ambition, personal notoriety, and monetary gain over fidelity to his constitutional oath.  While serving as an administrative staff assistant at the Department of Homeland Security, Taylor stoked dissension by manufacturing sensationalist reports on the existence of a supposed “resistance” within the Federal Government that “vowed” to undermine and render ineffective a sitting President.  He illegally published classified conversations to sell his book under the pseudonym “Anonymous,” which is full of falsehoods and fabricated stories.  In so doing, Taylor abandoned his sacred oath and commitment to public service by disclosing sensitive information obtained through unauthorized methods and betrayed the confidence of those with whom he served.  Where a Government employee improperly discloses sensitive information for the purposes of personal enrichment and undermining our foreign policy, national security, and Government effectiveness –- all ultimately designed to sow chaos and distrust in Government — this conduct could properly be characterized as treasonous and as possibly violating the Espionage Act, and therefore makes such employee ineligible for access to national secrets.

In his former position, Taylor relied upon various colleagues to facilitate his unethical laundering and release of sensitive Government data to advance his false narratives.  It is therefore against America’s interests to allow those associated with Taylor to access our Nation’s secrets. 

Accordingly, I direct the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and all other relevant executive department and agency (agency) heads to immediately take all action as necessary and consistent with existing law to suspend any active security clearances held by Miles Taylor, in addition to individuals at entities associated with Taylor, including the University of Pennsylvania, pending a review of whether such clearances are consistent with the national interest.

I further direct the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with any other relevant agency heads, to take all appropriate action to review Miles Taylor’s activities as a Government employee.  This review should identify any instances where his conduct appears to have been contrary to suitability standards for Federal employees, and where his conduct appears to have involved the unauthorized dissemination of classified information.  Upon completing this review, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall prepare a report to be submitted to the President, through the Counsel to the President, with recommendations for appropriate remedial or preventative actions to be taken to protect America’s interests.

This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.


The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux

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There are all sorts of cultures.  People enjoy the culture that can be reduced to fancy dress, ballet folklorico, and cuisine. And language, of course, at least since the 19th century when it was used to (re)construct nations as states in Europe and then elsewhere (except perhaps Africa where African nations were treated more like those of the Americas. The propaganda organs built into social collectives, including its intellectuals, artists and informal performative organs now resident to a substantial extent in and as social media reinforce this approach to the essentialization, and objectivization of reductionist culture in forms that then can be aligned with the creation of all sorts of other nations. If the 19th century had its ethno-identitarian moment, the 21st century  has seen the triumph of identity nations--some old (religious communities) and some newly emergent.  Nation, culture, identity tend to swirl around each other, amplify each other, and contribute to the architecture of self and collective nationality that seems now so common as to be taken for granted.  Civilization is sometimes understood as the productive force of civilization; or that civilization is the tangible product of culture(s); in the later sense civilization is to culture as discrete territory is to empire  (interesting discussion here). And then, in a form prepared for mass consumption both for the intellectuals and the masses is the notion of clashes of civilization; not just of civilization as meta-culture or the product of aligned cultural production, one encounters the marketplace of civilization, one in which civilization collide, compete, and ultimately seek forms of mutual destruction or alignment. Globalization could be understood as a means of civilization amalgamation through the quite clever device of consensual (more or less) consensus. Territorial conquest and suppression was the traditional go-to; so was extermination or forced population movements.

All of this is quite interesting; and it helps entertain the masses and the mass of PhD students and their supervisors in the market place of knowledge. But it is hardly relevant to what one confronts today.  The globalization experiment of the later part of the late century and the first decades of this one remind one that convergence merely shifts the arena in which cultural forms--types--manifest, compete, and strive to dominate the culture/civilization. This is the age of transnational cultures--not just of civilization and culture in the traditional thick sense.  It is the age of virtual cultures and of cultural types tied to all of the difference ways in which, beneath the veneer of unity, diversity emerges. The transnational capitalist class, the transnational identity based culture/nation, etc. points to "nationality" well beyond those of ethnicity or religio-ethnicity that people have grown fond of in developing the cognitive cages of modern political groupings. One ordering looks back for inspiration to older notions of caste--not as forms of hereditary position in society (a crude manifestation of the form with its own significant problems) but of caste as cultural types (and perhaps drawing from the Confucian Legalist tradition, the 士农工商 (Shì nóng gōng shāng) the four categories--warror nobles/schlars, peasants, artisans, and merchants) reconsidered through the sociological lens of the post-modern and its consideration of the habitus

It is as difficult to be a free marketeer in a local social work department  as it is to be a socialist in an investment bank. It follows that if we are to get on with colleagues, win promotions, or achieve status, we have to accept the fundamental values of the workplace--its customs and forms of behaviors. . .  This has been the case in many societies throughout history, and it is something the ancients understood. They saw society not as an aggregation of atomized individuals, nor as Marx's economic classes . . . [nor it seems as the product of collective identity], nor as ideological parties, but as occupational groups, each of which, they believed, had its own ethos. (David Priestland, Merchant, Soldier, Sage: A History of the World in Three Castes (NY Penguin Press, 2013), Introduction)

It follows that like the rich have far more in common with the rich of other places, caste archetypes align more outside of their political culture (in terms of habitus) than they do with the members of other castes within their own political environment.  Necessary to the insight is the further one that social collectives are a cocktail of crossing cultures and that while generally one cannot be expected to adopt the ethos of multiple castes simultaneously, one can juggle multi-cultural affiliation--citizenship, ethnos, religion, sexual identity, age, etc. At the same time, that amalgamation of cultural attributes tends to define the person and their collective (though in different ways). Where things get interesting is in the matter of hierarchy within these cultural amalgams, or rather in the way that they are blended; different blending produce different cocktails of human "nature." Normally this is resolved in context. Work, family, and political environments tend to suggest the ordering of importance of cultural attributes--but it does not change them. 

The same, one can assume, applies in political spaces as well. But in those spaces there may be more "play in the joints." A civilization-culture can, from time to time, manifest a preference one or more aspects of culture to predominate in its forms of organization and governance.  These usually are translated into ideological terms--liberal democracy, Marxist-Leninism, absolute monarchy (or whatever type), and aristocratic oligarchy (again of whatever type). But each masks a caste preference attitude, and with it the ruling ethos of a government and social organization.  The West has tended to the ethos of the merchant or farmer in times of stability, and of the warrior otherwise; elsewhere the ethos of the bureaucrat, the official, as representative of a hierarch at the apex of a stable apparatus of centralized and coordinated management has tended to prevail in times of stability, in other times chaos or fracture in which the model splits up into smaller subparts until cobbled back together (Warring States periods, warlord periods, etc.). What becomes more interesting is when leadership in either system is held by a person who does not conform to type--a merchant at the head of a bureaucratic administrative order, or a bureaucrat at the head of a warrior order.  ore interesting still is to understand the importance of these ethos when leaders from rival empires interact. That interaction becomes more complicated in the face of ethos clashes. 

That might bring one, at last, to the present. It may be worth pondering the extent to which  one sees in the current conflicts and transformations a more fundamental clash--not between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninist ideologies (though that is always a crowd-pleaser), nor between progressive and conservative elements (however those terms are infused with contextually relevant meaning)--between a merchant (U.S.) and a bureaucratic (China) ethos. Acknowledging the critical importance of nuance within each system (for example if President Trump is an exemplar of the merchant mentality he not represent the central core of that ethos in the U.S. now; or between the noblesse de robe and d'epéein 17th century France), it might be useful to begin to think about those characteristics that shape and differentiates the merchant from the bureaucrat. It is also important to  remember crossovers (eg  warrior merchants). That, in turn, may help better understand the conceptual difficulties of explaining action (rather than describing them) except by reference to the cognitive cages from which they manifest themselves (eg, John Hall, "Rule by Status in Tokugawa Japan,"  J. Japanese Stud. 1(1):39-49 (1974); consider also the "Shi, nō, kō, shō" (士農工商, shinōkōshō)) and of communication and negotiation between the two quite distinct caste empires. The latter perhaps may help provide some clarity to at least a portion of the challenges of reordering global collectives between a merchant and a bureaucratic empire.  

Let's consider this from the position of a reductionist essentialization, at least as a grounding point from which more complicated elaborations, pathways, and ecologies may be  developed:

The merchant (商): transactional, risk taking, inductive, reasoning from transactional analogy, non-linear pathways, iterative behaviors, instrumentalization of rules as factors in production, production oriented, objectives based, welfare maximizing for the represented collective, instrumentalization also of theory and ideology as factors in production, autonomous subject to expectations of collective participants, focus on post facto remedy, the costs of prevention and mitigation are always balanced against the costs of remedy, assessment is measured against an objective, the hierarchy of productivity and wealth, equality among equals and peers, otherwise power relations determines the context of transnational negotiation. They are fundamentally driven by trade irrespective of its direction, with the system emerging from the expectations of trading, transactional stability is necessary but  otherwise a risk factor. The merchant views the bureaucrat as a necessity at best and as a source of oppression and mass poverty at their self-serving worst. But bureaucrats are not to be trusted.

The bureaucrat (士): systemic operative, managerial, risk averse, chaos is the enemy, order is the objective and ideology is the guide and the goal, linear decision pathways, deductive, reasoning from principle, system and structural preservation paramount, institutional preservation and solidarity with bureaucratic caste is paramount, transactions are the means of organizing production, people, production, and collective behaviors are both factors of production and a manifestation of ideology, assessment and compliance based governance grounded in assessment against an ideal, and the ideal is a visualization of an ideological pathway. They are fundamentally driven by the needs of managing a system toward proper operation to meet goals and enhance stability. The bureaucrat views the merchant as a necessity but a threat to social stability that needs careful control.  But merchants are not to be trusted.

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And that is it, really.  From these reductive essentializations it is possible to ground assessments of outlook, discourse, and action.  More importantly, it is possible to anticipate and sketch out pathways to decision making, the range of plausible impulse behaviors, and the ways in which the merchant and the bureaucrat archetypes operate within their respective cognitive cages.  Merchants and bureaucrats do not speak the same language; they do not have the same concerns, they do not share the same loyalties either to structures or operations, they approach challenges form opposite sides--one from principle and the other from action.  One builds by doing and then considers what has been built, the other conceives of the building and then conforms activities to those that advance that vision. When President Trump imposes tariffs he is signalling the invitation to negotiate from individuated win-win positions.  When General Secretary Xi responds, he is protecting the integrity of a complex model of governance, and the course of planning for socialist modernization both as theorized and as manifested in near term comprehensive planning in the domestic and transnational spheres. Their respective responses to each other's moves are necessarily misinterpreted if only because they must be translated into the language of merchants and of bureaucrats respectively.

It also, and perhaps most importantly, situates the merchant and the bureaucrat within their own oppositional environments.   

The merchant (商) is fundamentally opposed by the bureaucratic elements within the structures in which they operate.  Large enterprises approach the bureaucratic ideal, and, when large enough, become almost indistinguishable from a bureaucratic state and its ethos. Both pose the greatest challenge to the merchant type, especially when they have stables of retainers--public intellectuals, media, and others who can amplify and legitimate their own ethos. 

The bureaucrat (士) is fundamentally opposed by merchant elements within the structures that have been created and made possible only by the harnessing of well managed merchant power. But it can be a challenge to well manage merchants. They can undo the carefully structured comprehensive systems of coordination and control at the heart of the bureaucratic project.  They are a constant threat to the hegemony of the public objective. 

When they interact, the possibilities of win-win is plausible, especially since the merchant and the bureaucrat measure winning by quite distinct standards.  But the again, a lose-lose is also possible, precisely because each is incapable of understanding the other, and certainly unwilling to consider that in their own internal calculus. This is a manifestation of the semiotics of cognition as it plays out in the field of politics. It manifests like a folie a deaux, and from a semiotics perspective necessarily so, not as a condition of psychosis, but actually of its opposite, the playing out of collective dialectics on a grand scale. What emerges, of course, is also the way, now quite popular if unconscious, of philosophizing with a hammer.

 

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"At other times another means of recovery which is even more to my taste, is to cross-examine idols. There are more idols than realities in the world:[Pg xviii] this constitutes my “evil eye” for this world: it is also my “evil ear.” To put questions in this quarter with a hammer, and to hear perchance that well-known hollow sound which tells of blown-out frogs,—what a joy this is for one who has ears even behind his ears, for an old psychologist and Pied Piper like myself in whose presence precisely that which would fain be silent, must betray itself." (Frederich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols [Götzen-Dämmerung] (Anthny Ludovivi trans (1911; 1888), Preface

 And so it has.

 



What is Generated in Cuba Stays in Cuba: Cuba Blocks Repatriation of Foreign Enterprise Funds; Offering to Establish New Forms of Accounts

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 There is a certain rhythm to Cuban desperation, and a certain cycle to the relations between Cuba and foreign enterprises  that from time to time are willing to take the risk that  investment in Cuba will pay off in some positive way. That rhythm, like a marriage of badly paired partners, starts with  attraction (sometimes encouraged by home states), then high intensity courting, then the marriage and intensely crazy  early relationship, where the parties get to know each other, and then disaster, when the foreign enterprises learned to their horror that they married a gold digger who now has their claws on their assets. Hilarity follows--over and over. The 2025 version goes something like this:

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Las autoridades cubanas han comunicado a varias empresas extranjeras que no van a poder repatriar las divisas que tienen en cuentas bancarias en el país, que en algunos casos ascienden a varios millones de dólares, según ha podido saber EFE. El anuncio ha generado un fuerte malestar entre las compañías afectadas, que en algunos casos se han quejado a sus respectivos Gobiernos, según fuentes empresariales y diplomáticas con conocimiento de la situación que pidieron permanecer en el anonimato.

[Cuban authorities have informed several foreign companies that they will not be able to repatriate the foreign currency they hold in bank accounts in the country, which in some cases amounts to several million dollars, according to EFE. The announcement has generated strong discontent among the affected companies, which in some cases have complained to their respective governments, according to business and diplomatic sources with knowledge of the situation who requested anonymity.] (Gobierno bloquea la repatriación de divisas a empresas extranjeras asentadas en el país; original reporting by EFE here).

This time the gold digging has a quite interesting twist: "In exchange, Cuban authorities are offering those affected—in a series of individual meetings they call "interviews"—the opportunity to open a new type of foreign currency bank account on the island." [A cambio, las autoridades cubanas están ofreciendo a los afectados —en una serie de encuentros individuales que denominan “entrevistas”— la posibilidad de abrir en la isla un nuevo tipo de cuentas bancarias en divisas.] (Gobierno bloquea la repatriación de divisas a empresas extranjeras asentadas en el país). While some companies appear to have already internalized the risks of these sorts of Cuban maneuverings, maximizing whatever advantage can be derived form this new deal, others, still smarting over prior versions of these sorts of hold-ups are less enthusiastic.  The problem, however, is a very old one--the Cuban State has no funds, and their banking system exists only through the power of belief in the system and the willingness of others to believe with them.  But then again, the global financial system is only a few steps removed from a belief based structure, or so it might seem.  To remedy the problem, or at least to avoid collapse, the Cuban State has returned to tried and true measures--disincentives to the use of cash and dollarization. 

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In a sense this is funds capture in the interests of the State.  The Cuba State has not appropriated the funds--that sort of direct and crude method  appears to have become something like a relic of the Cuban 20th century past). Instead, the Cuban authorities have effectively sealed off the country (again) in the sense that all funds generated in Cuba must stay in Cuba or may be spent beyond it only with the approval of the State.  These enterprises, in effect, become something like a State controlled enterprise, but only with respect to those matters (and funds) of interest to the State.  But more than that, of course. Foreign enterprises are already heavily regulated and monitored in Cuba in any case. And they are also insulated form any sort of deep penetration into the Cuban economy.  What changes (again) now is that the enterprise is now more closely aligned with State financial objectives.  They have been to some extent in the past but may now be understood as instruments in the service of the State.  The quid pro quo is that these foreign enterprises may keep a bit of what they produce. Perhaps a new conceptual category is now in order--not state owned or state controlled enterprises, but something else.

The reporting by OnCuba follows.

Pix credit here (Cuba's Credit and Commerce Bank building)

 

 

Gobierno bloquea la repatriación de divisas a empresas extranjeras asentadas en el país

A cambio, las autoridades cubanas están ofreciendo a los afectados la posibilidad de abrir en la isla un nuevo tipo de cuentas bancarias en divisas, con las que teóricamente sí podrían operar sin limitaciones.

Las autoridades cubanas han comunicado a varias empresas extranjeras que no van a poder repatriar las divisas que tienen en cuentas bancarias en el país, que en algunos casos ascienden a varios millones de dólares, según ha podido saber EFE.

El anuncio ha generado un fuerte malestar entre las compañías afectadas, que en algunos casos se han quejado a sus respectivos Gobiernos, según fuentes empresariales y diplomáticas con conocimiento de la situación que pidieron permanecer en el anonimato.

“Estamos en total desacuerdo. No es el dinero del Gobierno (cubano), sino dinero de las empresas”, se quejó a EFE un empresario, que denuncia que su cuenta ha sido “congelada” y sólo puede usar esos fondos para operaciones dentro del país.

A cambio, las autoridades cubanas están ofreciendo a los afectados —en una serie de encuentros individuales que denominan “entrevistas”— la posibilidad de abrir en la isla un nuevo tipo de cuentas bancarias en divisas.

Se trata de una modalidad piloto y muy restringida —aunque algunas voces creen que su uso podría ampliarse a empresas mixtas— con la que teóricamente estas compañías sí podrían operar sin limitaciones, porque estos apuntes contables tendrán respaldo monetario.

No obstante, estas cuentas admitirán solamente capital nuevo, pues no se puede traspasar el de las cuentas previas: sólo se aceptarán transferencias del exterior.

Algunas empresas extranjeras que atraen inversión a la isla ya están empezando a abrir y operar este tipo de cuentas, de las que al parecer ya disfrutan empresas de GAESA, el conglomerado empresarial de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) que controla sectores estratégicos de la economía nacional, del turismo a las telecomunicaciones, y tiene establecimientos de comercio minorista, bancos, gasolineras e inmobiliarias, entre otros.

Entre las empresas extranjeras afectadas hay quienes ven esta medida como un paso doloroso, pero necesario. Alegan que las restricciones ya eran un hecho desde hace años y confían en que con las nuevas cuentas puedan realizar operaciones internacionales o repatriar beneficios.

Muchos empresarios, no obstante, han recibido la oferta cargados de escepticismo por el mal recuerdo de experiencias previas, como el extinto peso convertible (CUC) o la virtual Moneda Libremente Convertible (MLC), y dudan de que las condiciones actuales de esas nuevas cuentas se vayan a mantener en el futuro dada la situación de crisis en el país.

Falta de liquidez

La ventaja teórica de estas nuevas cuentas es que serían en principio inmunes a los graves problemas de liquidez de los bancos cubanos, un sector completamente estatalizado tras el triunfo de la revolución en 1959.

El sistema financiero cubano se encuentra actualmente atravesado por múltiples dificultades, desde los distintos tipos de cambio paralelos a la descapitalización y la falta de liquidez, tanto en pesos cubanos —racionada desde agosto pasado— como en divisas, con diversos grados discrecionales de limitaciones.

Las causas, como las de la grave crisis económica en que se encuentra sumida la isla desde hace más de cinco años, hay que buscarlas en la combinación de la pandemia, el endurecimiento de las sanciones estadounidenses —entre las que destaca su inclusión en la lista de países patrocinadores del terrorismo— y la aplicación de fallidas políticas económicas y monetarias.

El acceso a divisas está fuertemente limitado desde al menos el año pasado debido a que el Estado atraviesa grandes dificultades financieras y está recurriendo a los fondos en el sistema bancario para adquirir bienes básicos en el extranjero.

El Estado cubano detenta el monopolio del comercio exterior y en la actualidad importa alrededor del 80 % de lo que se consume en la isla, con prioridad en combustible y alimentos, porque la producción nacional se ha derrumbado.

En este contexto, las autoridades cubanas han iniciado procesos de bancarización —para reducir la circulación de efectivo— y de dolarización —de trámites administrativos y servicios estatales— a fin de captar un mayor volumen de divisas de la economía y poder afrontar pagos en el exterior.

*       *       *

 Government Blocks Repatriation of Foreign Currency to Foreign Companies Established in the Country
In exchange, Cuban authorities are offering those affected the possibility of opening a new type of foreign currency bank account on the island, with which they could theoretically operate without limitations.

Cuban authorities have informed several foreign companies that they will not be able to repatriate the foreign currency they hold in bank accounts in the country, which in some cases amounts to several million dollars, according to EFE.

The announcement has generated strong discontent among the affected companies, which in some cases have complained to their respective governments, according to business and diplomatic sources with knowledge of the situation who requested anonymity.

"We totally disagree. It's not the (Cuban) government's money, but the companies' money," one businessman complained to EFE, claiming that his account has been "frozen" and that he can only use those funds for operations within the country.

In exchange, Cuban authorities are offering those affected—in a series of individual meetings they call "interviews"—the opportunity to open a new type of foreign currency bank account on the island.

This is a very restricted pilot program—although some believe its use could be expanded to include joint ventures—with which these companies could theoretically operate without limitations, as these accounting entries will be backed by monetary funds.

However, these accounts will only accept new capital, as capital from previous accounts cannot be transferred: only transfers from abroad will be accepted.

Some foreign companies that attract investment to the island are already beginning to open and operate these types of accounts. Companies belonging to GAESA, the business conglomerate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), which controls strategic sectors of the national economy, from tourism to telecommunications, and has retail establishments, banks, gas stations, and real estate agencies, among others, already operate these accounts.

Among the affected foreign companies, some see this measure as a painful but necessary step. They argue that the restrictions have been in place for years and are confident that the new accounts will allow them to conduct international transactions or repatriate profits.

Many business owners, however, have received the offer with skepticism due to bad memories of previous experiences, such as the defunct convertible peso (CUC) or the virtual Freely Convertible Currency (MLC), and they doubt that the current conditions of these new accounts will be maintained in the future given the country's crisis. Lack of Liquidity

The theoretical advantage of these new accounts is that they would, in principle, be immune to the serious liquidity problems of Cuban banks, a sector that was completely state-owned since the triumph of the revolution in 1959.

The Cuban financial system is currently experiencing multiple difficulties, from disparate parallel exchange rates to undercapitalization and a lack of liquidity, both in Cuban pesos—rationed since last August—and in foreign currency, with varying degrees of discretionary limitations.

The causes, such as those of the severe economic crisis that the island has been mired in for more than five years, must be found in the combination of the pandemic, the tightening of US sanctions—most notably its inclusion on the list of state sponsors of terrorism—and the implementation of failed economic and monetary policies.

Access to foreign currency has been severely limited since at least last year because the state is experiencing significant financial difficulties and is resorting to funds in the banking system to purchase basic goods abroad.

The Cuban state holds a monopoly on foreign trade and currently imports around 80% of what is consumed on the island, with priority given to fuel and food, because domestic production has collapsed.

In this context, Cuban authorities have initiated processes of banking integration—to reduce the circulation of cash—and dollarization—of administrative procedures and state services—in order to attract a greater volume of foreign currency from the economy and be able to handle payments abroad.

Rule of Law Orthodoxy From Harvard--and Its Dissenting Voices: A Conversation Without a Unifying Frame

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Now that legal academics have been reshaped by market forces into variations of public intellectuals (including markets for career advancement and peer reputation and institutional views of the maximization of academic labor exploitation for their own ends), and for the well placed players in the public space, it is always fun to see how elite or apex forces within this self-constructed (though well recognized) status hierarchy distill orthodoxy for the rest of us. It is even more fun when there is schism among members of the apex magisterium. And all of this sends me running back to reread the passages  in Nietzsche's Twilight of the Idols (Götzen-Dämmerung)

"There are parties at the present day whose one aim and dream is to make all things adopt the crab-march. But not everyone can be a crab. It cannot be helped: we must go forward,—that is to say step by step further and further into decadence (—this is my definition of modern “progress”). We can hinder this development, and by so doing dam up and accumulate degeneration itself and render it more convulsive, more volcanic: we cannot do more." (Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 1988, 1911 Ludovico trans); Skirmishes in a War with the AGe, ¶43)).

In this case, the triggering event (as it was between 2016-2020) is the person and the personal style of candidate, then President, then former President, then defendant, then again President, Trump. Mr. Trump is at his best when he provokes; and he appears to have an enormous talent for doing that.  Whether the talent extends to more ambitious domains remains to be seen, and in any case it will be those who bother well after the current occupants of this planet are long dead, that any such judgement can, with some assurance, be made and remade to suit the times. 

The object of the provocation goes to the essence of rule of law and President Trump's relation to it. MOre specifically, the President's attack on the core self conceptions of the structures and institutions of the of enterprise of law as it is performed in courts and attended to by lawyers guided by academics (when it suites either). To this one adds the space of a substantially radical rethinking of terms and ideas about law that appear to transform meanings and assumptions that have taken the greater part of a century to perfect to this point and which, therefore, along with their positions in it, must be protected,. The response was a letter from a number of faculty at Harvard (A Letter to Harvard Law Students), followed by a counter statement by another (An Open Letter To My Students). Both letters appear below. It is not the only expression of orthodox sentiment among the higher status reaches of the American legal academic community and elite lawyer organs (see, e.g.,Academic Leadership Responds to the President Trump's Directives: Statement of Leaders of the Association of American Law Schools, "Standing Together in Support of Higher Education and the Legal Profession" and "Bar Organizations’ Statement in Support of the Rule of Law").

In its essence, the orthodox majority quite eloquently makes the case for the enterprise of law as the Great Questioner"--perhaps the best example of which is Satan before God testing Job's devotion to God and his commandants. Satan here can be understood as engaging in the undesirable by essential job of quality control, of testing system and application.  

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6 Now there was a day when the sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, and Satan came also among them. 7 And the Lord said unto Satan, Whence comest thou? Then Satan answered the Lord, and said, From going to and fro in the earth, and from walking up and down in it. 8 And the Lord said unto Satan, Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in the earth, a perfect and an upright man, one that feareth God, and escheweth evil? 9 Then Satan answered the Lord, and said, Doth Job fear God for nought? 10 Hast not thou made an hedge about him, and about his house, and about all that he hath on every side? thou hast blessed the work of his hands, and his substance is increased in the land. 11 But put forth thine hand now, and touch all that he hath, and he will curse thee to thy face. 12 And the Lord said unto Satan, Behold, all that he hath is in thy power; only upon himself put not forth thine hand. So Satan went forth from the presence of the Lord.

The application by the Harvard professoriate is what for them a compelling analogy of this holy task--now transposed to the scriptures of the Republic and the essence of its pathways to the right path and salvation. And in a Nietzschean sense, it turns what had been despised into what is an essential good to the community.  This, then, is the orthodoxy of the eternal questioner:

While reasonable people can disagree about the characterization of particular incidents, we are all acutely concerned that severe challenges to the rule of law are taking place, and we strongly condemn any effort to undermine the basic norms we have described. On our own campus and at many other universities, international students have reported fear of imprisonment or deportation for lawful speech and political activism. Whatever we might each think about particular conduct under particular facts, we share a conviction that our Constitution, including its First Amendment, was designed to make dissent and debate
possible without fear of government punishment. Neither a law school nor a society can properly function amidst such fear.

And what of the person who would question those who must question? Professor Vermeule reminds one that even  in its composite form a committed community (an interesting reconception of the ubiquity of Mark's  "Legion" (Mark 5:9))--that is, in semiotic terms, a singular community of individual believers--the questioner must be questioned. That is the essence of the dialectics of questioning. This is so, it might be posited, even as that questioner of questioners remains wholly committed to the enterprise of orthodoxy--it is just that orthodoxy is neither stagnate nor necessarily without its nuance and contradictions. 

The central vice of the collective letter, then, is that it is tendentious. It attempts to appropriate a shared ideal and turn it to sectarian ends, implicitly aiming to define anyone who disagrees as an opponent of the rule of law altogether. In doing so, it runs the grave danger of causing or at least licensing anyone who does not agree with those sectarian ends to see all talk of the rule of law as a political sham - a disillusioned and cynical view that I do not share, and that I spend considerable time trying to persuade my students not to share. The collective letter thereby risks discrediting the rule of law itself. (An Open Letter To My Students)

What is the antidote? More rather then less discourse; Less rather than more certainty that some group of the elite collective has a definitive hold or authority on the construction, application, and elaboration of the core elements of the principles of the Republic; and around its edges, disagreement even about the meaning of the terms at the heart of the political community--of its significs and certainly of its interpretation, and the limits to which both are possible.  

But the very question at issue is what is to count as “lawful and ethical,” and who gets to define what those terms mean. And that is what makes the ideological selectivity of the letter both painfully obvious and deeply corrosive of the shared ideal of the rule of law to which it appeals. Two can play at the game of ideological definition, but when they do, both will lose. (An Open Letter To My Students)

That may well work in the internal contestations among members of a community each with equal standing and the power of persuasion.  But there are other models, the premises of which run deep. "6 Then answered the LORD unto Job out of the whirlwind, and said, 7 Gird up thy loins now like a man: I will demand of thee, and declare thou unto me. 8 Wilt thou also disannul my judgment? wilt thou condemn me, that thou mayest be righteous? * * * 14 Then will I also confess unto thee that thine own right hand can save thee." (Job 40:6-8, 14). 

Do not get me wrong. All of these people are eminent; all of these people care deeply about the things they care about; some of those things they care about are our Republic, its stability, solidarity, and the values and operating premises around which collective stability and solidarity are possible;  all of these actors serve as instruments of a social order in ways that the premises of the social order itself appears to provide--until it does not. They all serve themselves by serving the social order; and they serve the social order by reflecting it as they have been taught. And they have been taught in ways that reflect not just the power of collective meaning making, but also its habitus, within the academy, and its lebenswelt, within the wider society they mean to manage, perhaps lead, but certainly serve to protect it from itself. It is in this sense that they are, we all are, instruments of and within the collective; willing instruments sometimes, and more detached  sometimes as well; instruments that can be well rewarded for the personal talents, circumstances, and choices that have created a space for them in society and assigned that space specific tasks--if one understands social and collective self-preservation, the protection of social integrity and, according to its ideology, its perfection as tasks so internalized that it becomes invisible.

 



A LETTER TO HARVARD LAW SCHOOL STUDENTS

March 29, 2025

To our students:

We are privileged to teach and learn the law with you. We write to you today—in our
individual capacities—because we believe that American legal precepts and the institutions
designed to uphold them are being severely tested, and many of you have expressed to us your
concerns and fears about the present moment.

Each of us brings different, sometimes irreconcilable, perspectives to what the law is and should
be. Diverse viewpoints are a credit to our school. But we share, and take seriously, a
commitment to the rule of law: for people to be equal before it, and for its administration to
be impartial. That commitment is foundational to the whole legal profession, and to the special
role that lawyers play in our society. As the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide: “A
lawyer is ... an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice.”

The rule of law is imperiled when government leaders:

• single out lawyers and law firms for retribution based on their lawful and ethical
representation of clients disfavored by the government, undermining the Sixth
Amendment;
• threaten law firms and legal clinics for their lawyers’ pro bono work or prior
government service;
• relent on those arbitrary threats based on public acts of submission and outlays of funds
for favored causes; and
• punish people for lawfully speaking out on matters of public concern.

While reasonable people can disagree about the characterization of particular incidents, we are
all acutely concerned that severe challenges to the rule of law are taking place, and we strongly
condemn any effort to undermine the basic norms we have described.

On our own campus and at many other universities, international students have reported fear
of imprisonment or deportation for lawful speech and political activism. Whatever we might
each think about particular conduct under particular facts, we share a conviction that our
Constitution, including its First Amendment, was designed to make dissent and debate
possible without fear of government punishment. Neither a law school nor a society can
properly function amidst such fear.

We reaffirm our commitment to the rule of law and to our roles in teaching and upholding
the precepts of a fair and impartial legal system.
Sincerely,



Bill Alford
Deborah Anker
Sabi Ardalan
Oren Bar-Gill
Elizabeth Bartholet
Christopher Bavitz
Lucian Bebchuk
Yochai Benkler
Sharon Block
Gabriella Blum
Nikolas Bowie
Molly Brady
Scott Brewer
Guy-Uriel Charles
John Coates
I. Glenn Cohen
Andrew Manuel Crespo
Christine Desan
Ryan D. Doerfler
Charles Donahue
Benjamin Eidelson
Einer Elhauge
Richard Fallon
Susan H. Farbstein
Martha Field
William Fisher
Idriss Fofana
Jody Freeman
Jacob Gersen
Jeannie Suk Gersen
Tyler R. Giannini
Ruth Greenwood
Michael Gregory

Jim Greiner
Annette Gordon-Reed
Janet Halley
Jon Hanson
Sheila Heen
Howell Jackson
Vicki Jackson
Alan Jenkins
Elizabeth Papp Kamali
Andrew Kaufman
Randall Kennedy
Duncan Kennedy
David Kennedy
Michael Klarman
Reinier H. Kraakman
Adriaan Lanni
Eloise Lawrence
Richard Lazarus
Emily Broad Leib
Jill Lepore
Lawrence Lessig
Christopher Lewis
Anna Lvovsky
Kenneth W. Mack
Bruce H. Mann
Frank Michelman
Martha Minow
Robert Mnookin
Naz K. Modirzadeh
Daniel Nagin
Alexandra Natapoff
Charles Nesson
Gerald L. Neuman

Richard Parker
Todd Rakoff
Daphna Renan
Mark J. Roe
David Rosenberg
William Rubenstein
Benjamin Sachs
Lew Sargentich
Larry Schwartztol
Carmel Shachar
Hannah Shaffer
Joseph William Singer
Holger Spamann
Carol Steiker
Henry Steiner
Nicholas Stephanopoulos
Matthew C. Stephenson
Kristen Stilt
Ronald S. Sullivan Jr.
Laurence H. Tribe
Mark Tushnet
Rebecca Tushnet
Dehlia Umunna
Rachel Viscomi
Laura Weinrib
Lucie White
David Wilkins
Mark Wu
Crystal S. Yang
Jonathan Zittrain
All 96 signatories are
members of the HLS voting
faculty (active or emeritus).

  *       *       *

An Open Letter To My Students

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Dear Students:

You may have seen a collective letter, signed jointly by more than 90 of my colleagues, titled “A LETTER TO HARVARD LAW SCHOOL STUDENTS” and addressed “to our students.” The signatories to the letter, however, also purport to speak merely “in our individual capacities.” This letter I am writing to you now, by contrast, really is my personal response and represents a dissenting view.

The subject of the collective letter, and of this one, is the rule of law — an ideal or principle to which I emphatically subscribe, although I hold with Lon Fuller that like all other legal ideals and principles the rule of law has outer boundaries and limits. As you will see, my response to the collective letter’s treatment of the rule of law is not indignation, but instead a kind of sorrow for the enterprise of law teaching and legal scholarship, a noble enterprise with an intrinsic integrity, of which Harvard in former years could rightly boast.

It would be easy to offer essentially procedural and putatively neutral objections to the collective letter. In virtue of its joint signature list, its collective voice, and its claim to portray itself as a consensus statement of those who otherwise disagree, the letter hovers ambiguously between a statement of the faculty as such and a mere aggregation of “individual” views. It condemns legal policies on which eminent lawyers in good faith observably disagree, even while portraying itself as committed to honoring “diverse” viewpoints. Worse still, it speaks only to the “fears” of some, not all, of our students, and threatens to inflame the fears of other students.

Let me expand upon the last point. Among you, the students of Harvard Law School, there is a surprisingly large and intellectually powerful contingent who are conservative in some sense or other, many of whom support the current President and the legal policies of his administration. What exactly are you supposed to think when an overwhelming supermajority of the faculty, although purporting to speak “in their individual capacities,” jointly condemn those policies? You might be forgiven for wondering if you will get a fair shake during your time at the law school. Perhaps that concern will turn out to be objectively warranted, or perhaps it won’t. But the concern in itself is entirely legitimate, and as the collective letter speaks to the “fears” of other students without asking whether those fears are objectively justifiable, it seems only fair to do the same in the other direction.

All that said, however, to limit myself to procedural objections would duck the real issue. The real issue is that the collective letter, although no doubt offered in good faith by its signatories, is shot through with selective ideological blindness. It is, I am sorry to say, a sectarian document cast as an appeal to high principle. Let us here ignore all other political controversies in recent years, and confine ourselves to those directly involving lawyers, judges, and legal representation: Where were the letter’s signatories when federal prosecutors took the unprecedented step of bringing dozens of criminal charges against a former president, who also happened to be the leading electoral opponent of the then-incumbent president? Where were the signatories when Jeff Clark, Rudy Giuliani, John Eastman, and other lawyers were disbarred or threatened with disbarment, and indeed prosecuted, for their representation of President Trump? Was this not a threat to the rule of law? Where were the signatories when radical activists menaced Supreme Court Justices in their homes, or when a mob hammered on the doors of the Supreme Court itself? Where were the signatories when the Senate Minority Leader shouted to an angry crowd outside the Court that “I want to tell you Gorsuch, I want to tell you Kavanaugh, you have released the whirlwind and you will pay the price. You won’t know what hit you if you go forward with these awful decisions”? Were these not also literal threats to the rule of law?

Now, of course, one can always say that “well those prosecutions or disbarments or protests were actually warranted, you see”; and the collective letter is careful to insert the qualifier that it only defends “lawful and ethical” representation. But the very question at issue is what is to count as “lawful and ethical,” and who gets to define what those terms mean. And that is what makes the ideological selectivity of the letter both painfully obvious and deeply corrosive of the shared ideal of the rule of law to which it appeals. Two can play at the game of ideological definition, but when they do, both will lose.

The central vice of the collective letter, then, is that it is tendentious. It attempts to appropriate a shared ideal and turn it to sectarian ends, implicitly aiming to define anyone who disagrees as an opponent of the rule of law altogether. In doing so, it runs the grave danger of causing or at least licensing anyone who does not agree with those sectarian ends to see all talk of the rule of law as a political sham - a disillusioned and cynical view that I do not share, and that I spend considerable time trying to persuade my students not to share. The collective letter thereby risks discrediting the rule of law itself.

As for my students who do not support the policies of the current administration, and who do share the fears described in the collective letter, here is my commitment to you: I will make every best effort to teach you the law, insofar as I understand it, without fear or favor. Although I will sometimes offer my own interpretation of contested concepts, like the rule of law — it is impossible to teach law without doing so — I will explain when, where, and why those interpretations are contested, and what other views of the concepts are. Most of all, I will not use tendentious definitions of contested concepts to rule your own views out of bounds, implicitly but unmistakably.

I happen to hold, with Montesquieu and against Hobbes, that at least some claims about law are justified by their real truth, not by mere authority. Errors about law have no rights. But the classroom is a uniquely structured space with definite objectives, and legal doctrine has its own inner integrity. Just as the scholastics of the Middle Ages could, while agreeing that the truth is unitary and discernible, structure their doctrinal debates so that all could participate in deliberation about truth on impartial terms, so too within the space of the classroom. Even if error has no rights, I have duties as a teacher, and one of my duties is to teach you what I take to be the truth while also respecting that a good teacher fails to teach well by smuggling conclusions into the premises, or by ruling out in advance, through implicitly sectarian definitions, the questions that must be faced and answered along the path to truth. It is precisely because I believe in truth claims about law that I hope to put errors in their best possible light, so that their eventual refutation will be all the more convincing.

To be sure, I can hardly promise to always be right about the law. I have been wrong about it more times than I care to remember. But I can promise that I see no value at all in trying to stifle your deeply held beliefs by stipulation, selective condemnation, and tendentious appropriation of shared ideals. All these I take to be the vices of the collective letter, and the reason I could not sign it.

— Adrian Vermeule

Just Published: Aldolfo Sánchez-Hidalgo (ed), "Law as Communication: Pragmatism and Rhetoric in the Theory of Legal Decision Making"

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I am delighted to pass along the announcement of the publication of a quite interesting collection of essays edited by Aldolfo Sánchez-Hidalgo (Associate Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Córdoba). It is entitled: Law as Communication:  Pragmatism and Rhetoric in the Theory of Legal Decision Making" (Springer 2025).The volume is part of the prestigious Law book series “Living Signs of Law”, edited by Anne Wagner and Sarah Marusek.

The Book webpage (here) describes the work: 

The Communicational Theory of Law (CTL) is a successful synthesis of the hermeneutic and analytical postulates, proceeding under the assumption that Law is the heritage of jurists and can be enriched by a rational and systematic reconstruction of the legal order. CTL offers an original perspective on the classic tension between normativity and institutionality, between Legal Theory and Legal Sociology, helping readers rediscover the value of Theory of Law in terms of explaining and advancing a range of legal functions.

It wouldn’t be saying too much to claim that through CTL, the contributions of the European philosophy of law from the 19th and 20th centuries (jurisprudence of concepts, legal sociology, legal positivism, institutionalism, etc.) can be reclaimed and now coordinated from a communicational and philosophy of language perspective, offering us a complete and useful Theory of Law. CTL does not avoid the problem of the idea of justice; rather, it confronts it by distinguishing between the Theory of Justice and ambital justice. As such, readers are equipped to verify the originality of the Theory of Legal Decision in the CTL framework and, thus, will find new tools for critically assessing the performance of courts and public authorities.

This book details the epistemological presuppositions on which CTL is built, but also offers new lines of critical development, which reflect CTL’s theoretical and philosophical potential. In the studies presented here, readers will find original answers to classic problems of the Theory of Law, together with examples of CTL’s practical application to the great challenges of our time, such as interculturalism, legal AI, populist demagogy, the transparency of public powers, etc. – all without forgetting the challenges of the future of Law. 

 The table of contents with links to open access chapters follows below.

 

Table of contents (18 chapters)

  • Law, Communication and AI

  • The Africa Declaration on Artificial Intelligence /La Déclaration Africaine sur l'Intelligence Artificielle

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    On 4 April 2025, a large number of African States signed The Africa Declaration on Artificial Intelligence /La Déclaration Africaine sur l'Intelligence Artificielle. The Declaration offers a framework for steps toward fulfilling a unified AI strategy. States pledged $60 billion toward infrastructure and talent development. It has been both praised and criticized, and sometimes simultaneously. Steve Mbego writing for CIO Africa declared the Africa Declaration on Artificial Intelligence "a sweeping vision document that reads like both a manifesto and a mission statement for the continent’s digital future. It’s bold. It’s comprehensive. It’s also very, very fluffy in parts." (Africa’s AI Declaration Is A Good Start, But Now Comes The Hard Part).

    It does offer up a bit of everything.  But that is both necessary and to be expected.  It offers the usual. Its core principles section emphasizes strategic development (reflecting Africa’s strategic priorities, shared values, and diverse cultural contexts), collaboration (public and private with emphasis on development with African characteristics), and safeguard oriented  objectives (centering human rights, transparency and sustainability). The objectives follow:

     2.2.1. To leverage the potential of AI to drive innovation and competitiveness to advance Africa’s economies, industries, and societies. 2.2.2. To position Africa as a global leader in ethical, trustworthy, and inclusive AI adoption. 2.2.3. To foster the sustainable and responsible design, development, deployment, use, and governance of AI technologies in Africa.

    Pix credit here
     These are all meant to provide a principled and objectives based form to the key commitments adopted in Article 3 (¶¶3.1-3.7): talent development; data protection and exploitation; development of an Africa wide architecture for computing infrastructure; developing markets, market participants (incubators, etc.)  and exploiting the incentives built into procurement programs (adopting "an “Africa-first” approach to AI procurement and leverage African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to
    facilitate cross-border scaling", ¶3.4.2 ); investing (pledging anyway) $60 billion toward these goals; and elaborating a regulatory architecture that will make all of this possible. Overseeing all of this at a continental level will be an "Africa AI Council, under the leadership of the Smart Africa Steering Committee which is co-chaired by the African Union Commission and the International Telecommunications Union, to ensure high-level engagement and strategic alignment with continental and global digital transformation efforts." (¶3.7).

    This is an ambitious project. It is also one that might create a large enough space where African States can carve a place for their own development of AI ecologies not entirely dominated b the larger players, each of which has their own agendas firmly in mind as they extend helping hands.  

    Partnership on AI saw "a growing focus on 3 core areas that were highlighted by the Declaration, President Kagame and government leaders, industry, and civil society from the continent:

    1. Digital Public / Physical infrastructure: Enhancing Africa’s digital and physical infrastructure is crucial to supporting AI development in the region. This includes significant investments in data centers, which will boost productivity, support businesses and make Africa economically competitive in the future and that challenges related to siloed datasets are overcome through greater continental alignment and open data. Our community of partners applauded these critical milestones at our breakfast convening. We also noted that as these initiatives are implemented we must ensure that interdisciplinary and public-private dialogues, which include civil society, are in place to ensure input from local researchers and citizens.
    2. Ecosystem building: There is a pressing need to foster and grow Africa’s local AI ecosystem, including through scaling startups, developing skills and growing the AI focused workforce. Discussions at the summit emphasized the importance of multistakeholderism and building an ecosystem of interdisciplinary expertise to support the sustainable growth of safe and responsible AI.
    3. Continental collaboration, alignment and integration: Overcoming regional silos and barriers to trade and AI development is necessary to foster unity across the continent, accelerate growth, intra-African collaboration and to harmonize governance frameworks. This includes putting mechanisms in place to support building local datasets." (Prioritizing Responsible AI in Africa )

    The fulfillment of this vision  will be the next task.  The text of the Declaration follows.










    For Women Scotland Ltd (Appellant) v The Scottish Ministers (Respondent) [2025] UKSC 16

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    In For Women Scotland Ltd (Appellant) v The Scottish Ministers (Respondent) [2025] UKSC 16, the U.K. Supreme Court considered the meaning of “man”, “woman” and “sex” in the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”). More specifically, the issue  focused on the legalized politics around the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018 (“ASP 2018”). 

    This legislation created gender representation targets to increase the proportion of women on public boards in Scotland. The ASP 2018 and the original statutory guidance defined “woman” as including people: (i) with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment; (ii) living as a woman; and (iii) proposing to undergo / undergoing / who have undergone a gender reassignment process. In 2020, the Appellant, a feminist voluntary organisation that campaigns to strengthen women’s rights in Scotland, challenged this guidance. The Inner House found that this statutory definition was unlawful as it involved an area of law reserved to the UK Parliament (equal opportunities) and therefore fell outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament (“FWS1”). Following FWS1, the Scottish Ministers issued new statutory guidance which is under challenge in this appeal. The new statutory guidance states that, under the ASP 2018, the definition of a “woman” is the same as that in the EA 2010. Section 212 of the EA 2010 defines “woman” as “a female of any age.” The new statutory guidance also states that a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate (“GRC”) recognising their gender as female is considered a woman for the purposes of the ASP 2018. A GRC is a document that allows trans people to change their gender legally. (official case summary )

    The issue was one of statutory interpretation--that is key to understanding both the reasoning and limitations of the opinions. At its heart, though were two issues--the first the interpretation of the text, and the second the permissibility of that interpretation within broader constitutional constraints. In interpreting EA 2010 the court then also affected the way that ASP 2018 would be applied. The Supreme Court held "that the terms “man”, “woman” and “sex” in the EA 2010 refer to biological sex. Lord Hodge, Lady Rose and Lady Simler give a joint judgment, with which the other Justices agree." (official case summary )

     The case opinions makes for quite interesting reading. The official case summary follows below.

     


     

    For Women Scotland Ltd (Appellant) v The Scottish Ministers (Respondent)

    Case summary


    Case ID

    UKSC/2024/0042

    Date published

    16 April 2025

    Parties

    Appellant(s)

    For Women Scotland Ltd

    Respondent(s)

    The Scottish Ministers

    Judgment appealed

    Press summary details


    Judgment date

    16 April 2025

    Neutral citation

    [2025] UKSC 16

    Justices

    Press summary details

    16 April 2025

    For Women Scotland Ltd (Appellant) v The Scottish Ministers (Respondent)

    [2025] UKSC 16

    On appeal from: [2023] CSIH 37

    Justices: Lord Reed (President), Lord Hodge (Deputy President), Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lady Rose and Lady Simler

    Background to the Appeal

    The issue to be determined by the Supreme Court in this appeal is one of statutory interpretation, namely the meaning of “man”, “woman” and “sex” in the Equality Act 2010 (“EA 2010”).

    This appeal arose in response to the definition of the term “woman” in the Gender Representation on Public Boards (Scotland) Act 2018 (“ASP 2018”) and associated statutory guidance. This legislation created gender representation targets to increase the proportion of women on public boards in Scotland. The ASP 2018 and the original statutory guidance defined “woman” as including people: (i) with the protected characteristic of gender reassignment; (ii) living as a woman; and (iii) proposing to undergo / undergoing / who have undergone a gender reassignment process. In 2020, the Appellant, a feminist voluntary organisation that campaigns to strengthen women’s rights in Scotland, challenged this guidance. The Inner House found that this statutory definition was unlawful as it involved an area of law reserved to the UK Parliament (equal opportunities) and therefore fell outside the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament (“FWS1”).

    Following FWS1, the Scottish Ministers issued new statutory guidance which is under challenge in this appeal. The new statutory guidance states that, under the ASP 2018, the definition of a “woman” is the same as that in the EA 2010. Section 212 of the EA 2010 defines “woman” as “a female of any age.” The new statutory guidance also states that a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate (“GRC”) recognising their gender as female is considered a woman for the purposes of the ASP 2018.

    A GRC is a document that allows trans people to change their gender legally. The Gender Recognition Act 2004 (“GRA 2004”) established that an adult can receive a GRC if they provide evidence that they have or have had gender dysphoria, have lived as their acquired gender for two years and intend to continue to do so until death.

    In 2022, the Appellant challenged the lawfulness of the new statutory guidance. The Appellant submits that the definition of a “woman” under the EA 2010 refers to biological sex, meaning that a trans woman with a GRC (a biological male with a GRC in the female gender) is not considered a woman under the EA 2010, and consequently the ASP 2018. The Respondent submits that the definition of a “woman” under the EA 2010 refers to “certificated sex”, meaning that it includes trans women with a GRC. On 13 December 2022, the Outer House dismissed the Appellant’s petition. The Appellant appealed to the Inner House. On 1 November 2023, the Inner House dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The Appellant now appeals to the Supreme Court.

    Judgment

    The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal. It holds that the terms “man”, “woman” and “sex” in the EA 2010 refer to biological sex. Lord Hodge, Lady Rose and Lady Simler give a joint judgment, with which the other Justices agree.

    Reasons for the Judgment

    The Legal Background

    Protection from sex discrimination was initially recognised in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (“SDA 1975”). The SDA 1975 made it unlawful (i) for a woman to be treated less favourably than a man because of her sex (direct discrimination) and (ii) to apply a requirement or condition which applies equally to both sexes but where the proportion of women who can comply is smaller compared to the proportion of men (indirect discrimination) [36]-[40]. The legislation also recognised and accommodated for exceptions to the general rule, for example, where people would be undressing together, living on the same premises or using sanitary facilities together, considerations of decency and privacy required separate facilities to be provided for men and women [41]-[48]. Parliament used the words “man” and “woman” throughout the SDA 1975 to distinguish between different groups on the basis of sex. There is no doubt that Parliament intended the words “man” and “woman” to refer to biological sex [51], [162].

    In response to the case of P v S and Cornwall County Council, a legal challenge brought to the European Court of Justice on the basis of gender reassignment discrimination, the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999 (the “1999 Regulations”) were introduced. The 1999 Regulations amended the SDA 1975 to include a prohibition on discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment. However, the 1999 Regulations did not amend the meaning of “man” or “woman” in the SDA 1975 [54]-[62].

    The SDA 1975 and the 1999 Regulations were repealed and replaced by the EA 2010. The EA 2010 was enacted as an amending and consolidating statute. It enacted group-based protections against discrimination based on a range of characteristics, including sex and gender reassignment [113]-[116], [142]-[149]. There is no indication that the EA 2010 modified the meaning of “man” and “woman” or “sex” from the meaning in the SDA 1975 [162]-[164]. Therefore, the context in which the EA 2010 was enacted was that the SDA 1975 definitions of “man” and “woman” referred to biological sex and trans people had the protected characteristic of gender reassignment.

    Interpretation of the GRA 2004

    Section 9(1) of the GRA 2004 establishes that trans people with a GRC are to be considered their “acquired” gender (meaning the gender reflected on their GRC) “for all purposes”. Section 9(3) allows the rule in section 9(1) to be disapplied by a provision in the GRA 2004 or “any other enactment or any subordinate legislation” [75].

    Section 9(3) does not require that legislation expressly disapplies the rule in section 9(1) or that this disapplication arises by necessary implication [99]-[104]. Section 9(3) will apply where the terms, context and purpose of the relevant legislation show that it does, because of a clear incompatibility or because its provisions are made incoherent or unworkable by the application of the rule in section 9(1) [156].

    Interpretation of the EA 2010

    There is no provision in the EA 2010 that expressly addresses the effect of section 9(1) of the GRA 2004 [158]. Therefore, a careful analysis of the provisions of the EA 2010 must be undertaken to decide whether they indicate that a biological meaning of sex is intended and/or that a certificated sex definition would render these provisions incoherent or absurd [159]-[161].

    As a matter of ordinary language, the provisions relating to sex discrimination can only be interpreted as referring to biological sex [168]-[172]. For example, the provisions relating to pregnancy and maternity (sections 13(6), 17 and 18 of the EA) are based on the fact of pregnancy and giving birth to a child. As a matter of biology, only biological women can become pregnant. Therefore, these provisions are unworkable unless “man” and “woman” have a biological meaning [177]-[188].

    Interpreting “sex” as certificated sex would cut across the definitions of “man” and “woman” and thus the protected characteristic of sex in an incoherent way [172].

    It is important that the EA 2010 is interpreted in a clear and consistent way in order that groups which share a protected characteristic can be identified by those that the EA 2010 imposes obligations on so that they can perform those obligations in a practical way [151]-[154].

    A certificated sex interpretation would also create two sub-groups within those who share the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, giving trans people who possess a GRC greater rights than those who do not. Those seeking to perform their obligations under the EA 2010 would have no obvious means of distinguishing between the two sub-groups, particularly since they could not ask whether someone had obtained a GRC as that information is private [198]-[203].

    A certificated sex interpretation would also weaken the protections given to those with the protected characteristic of sexual orientation for example by interfering with their ability to have lesbian-only spaces and associations [204]-[209].

    Additional provisions that require a biological interpretation of “sex” in order to function coherently include separate spaces and single sex services (including changing rooms, hostels and medical services) [211]-[221], communal accommodation [222]-[225], and single sex higher education institutions [226]-[228]. Similar confusion and impracticability arise in the operation of provisions relating to single sex characteristic associations and charities [229]-[231], women’s fair participation in sport [232]-[236], the operation of the public sector equality duty [237]-[244], and the armed forces [245]-[246].

    The practical problems that arise under a certificated sex approach are clear indicators that this interpretation is not correct [247]. The Court rejects the suggestion of the Inner House that “woman” and “sex” can refer to biological sex in some sections of the EA 2010, and certificated sex in others. The meaning of “sex” and “woman” must be consistent throughout the EA 2010 [189]-[197].

    The Court concludes that the provisions of the EA 2010 discussed above are provisions to which section 9(3) of the GRA 2004 applies. The meaning of the terms “sex”, “man” and “woman” in the EA 2010 refer to biological sex, as any other interpretation would render the EA 2010 incoherent and impracticable to operate [264]. Therefore, a person with a GRC in the female gender does not come within the definition of a “woman” under the EA 2010 and the statutory guidance issued by the Scottish Ministers is incorrect [266].

    Protection from Discrimination

    This interpretation of the EA 2010 does not remove protection from trans people, with or without a GRC. Trans people are protected from discrimination on the ground of gender reassignment. They are also able to invoke the provisions on direct discrimination and harassment, and indirect discrimination on the basis of sex. In the light of case law interpreting the relevant provisions, a trans woman can claim sex discrimination because she is perceived to be a woman. A certificated sex reading is not required to give this protection [248]-[263].

    References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment.

    NOTE:

    This summary is provided to assist in understanding the Court’s decision. It does not form part of the reasons for the decision. The full judgment of the Court is the only authoritative document. Judgments are public documents and are available at: Decided cases - The Supreme Court

    Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress: Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat and "The Golden Age of American Innovation"

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    Pix credit: Generated by ChatGPT (tech innovation bending space and time under the direction of political leaders)

     The White House has posted a quite interesting speech delivered 14 April 2025 by Michael John Kratsios (Princeton University and a managing director at Scale AI, and Mr. Trump's  chief technology officer during the 1st Trump Administration) and entitled "The Goldern Age of American Innovation--Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat."This was an important speech for Mr. Kratsios, one designed to set the tone for his role as the head the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) (reported in The Hill here). The speech was reported in Fortune this fairly conventional way:

    In his first public remarks since his Senate confirmation, Donald Trump’s newly-confirmed director of tech and science policy, Michael Kratsios, accused the Biden Administration of leading with a “spirit of fear” and laid out a plan for how America could do “more with less” over the next four years. * * * In emphasizing a commitment to the deregulation of business, Kratsios said the “chief barrier” to supersonic aircraft, high-speed rail or flying cars has been a “regulatory regime opposed to innovation and development.” But, he said, another focus of the Trump administration will be making “smart choices” and being “more creative” around how the government allocates its public research and development dollars. * * * Kratsios said the government could make use of prizes, advanced market commitments, and fast and flexible grants like those used during COVID, to multiply the impact of government-funded research and quicken the research process. * * * What Kratsios didn’t mention was how he plans to navigate these academia partnerships as the Trump administration simultaneously cuts grants to universities and makes sweeping cuts across various agencies, including to science departments. (Fortune)

     The remarks are worth reading for what they are--an expression of the aspirational operational coding of his function within the bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the remarks may be of far greater interest for the foundational structural premises and worldview on which they are based.  The following reflections on Mr. Kratsios speech is divided into 8 parts: 1. The Mimetic Character of the Marching Orders; 2. The Mimetic Narrative of Objective, Mimicry as a Return to a Golden Age; 3. Renewal through innovation-modernization; 4. Protecting the Productive Masses Along the American Path Against the Corruption of Left Error; 5. The First American Sutra: We are Capable of So Much More; 6. The Structures of American Modernization7. The borders of the Golden Age State Must be Protected; and 8.  The Second American Sutra: There is No Substitute for Victory.

    1. The Mimetic Character of the Marching Orders. Mr. Kratsios' remarks ought to be read in the shadow of President Trump's 26 March 2025 "A Letter to Michael Kratsios, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy," also posted to the White House website. It also follows below. The marching orders are fascinating if only because of its mimetic character; the President replays the origin story of the last golden age transformation that (sort of) worked--that of President Roosevelt near the end of his leadership, the institutional structures of which, of course, President Trump means to demolish. What is to be saved, though, are the narratives of tech. 

    "The triumphs of the last century did not happen by chance. As World War II drew towards a close, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote a letter like this one to his science and technology advisor, Vannevar Bush, charging him to explore new frontiers of the mind for the sake of national greatness and pioneer science in peacetime. . . So, just as FDR tasked Vannevar Bush, I am tasking you with meeting the challenges below to deliver for the American people" (A Letter to Michael Kratsios).

    The interesting thing here, among others, is the sort of liberal democratic Leninism that also marked Mr. Trump's golden age as engineered by the democratic Party, its leadership and its "brain trust" in the 1930s-40s:  state leadership of strategic economic development towards specific ends for which the market will served as both incubator (and risk bearer) and operational level apparatus for the realization of state policy. At its edges, it is hard to distinguish this from the fundamental premises of Chinese 3rd Plenum articulations of socialist modernization (e.g. here) but with American characteristics. And the framing questions that serve as direction?:

    First: How can the United States secure its position as the unrivaled world leader in critical and emerging technologies — such as artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and nuclear technology — maintaining our advantage over potential adversaries?

    Second: How can we revitalize America’s science and technology enterprise — pursuing truth, reducing administrative burdens, and empowering researchers to achieve groundbreaking discoveries?

    Third: How can we ensure that scientific progress and technological innovation fuel economic growth and better the lives of all Americans?  (A Letter to Michael Kratsios).
    Who better to approach these questions from the perspective and interests of the state than the person who might well had a hand in the formulation of both question and preferred approach during the 1st Administration of President Trump, when "we made unprecedented advances in America’s scientific and technological leadership." (Ibid.).

    2. The Mimetic Narrative of Objective, Mimicry as a Return to a Golden Age Return is necessarily mimetic--it is not just a striving for time traveling back to the past to pick up where  a point of interruption occurred, but also to bring forward the lebneswelt of that time before the interruption. In this case the interruption of the Democratic Party Administration of President Biden and his apparatus of "error" and "deviation." One gets back on the path--not China's Socialist path toward the establishment of a communist society, but the American Path toward "the Golden Age of American Innovation" and progress toward where ever it is that Progress takes us. Mr. Kratsios starts with the invocation of a narrative trope--"the renewal of our nation" (Remarks by Director Kratsios)-- that is almost indistinguishable from a core element of contemporary Chinese policy/principle, “中华民族伟大复兴” the great rejuvenaiton of the Chinese nation tied to what General Secretary Xi had embedded in the more general concept of the Chinese Dream. The resonance between the Chinese and American political elites at least in this respect is unavoidable. Both speak in terms of recovering past glory and returning both states to the proper pathway toward the realization of national perfection. The only difference, and it is a big one, appears to be the path toward perfection--the Chinese socialist path and the American path toward its golden age do not appear to converge at any point (at least as theory) though their objects in terms of national welfare are similar. Renewal is as strong a discursive element of the Trump Administration as it appears to be under the leadership of Xi Jinping. 

    3. Renewal through innovation-modernization. In the current era of American historical development, Mr. Kratsios tells us, it is necessary to focus on innovation within the leading fields of economic development.  "I know, and I think you know, too, that such a renewal will require the reinvigoration of American science and industry. Over the last few decades, America has become complacent, forgetting old dreams of building a wondrous future." (Remarks by Director Kratsios). Again, there is a looking back and a springing forward--a return to the ways of thinking of an earlier era ("American pioneer spirit still seeks the exploration of endless frontiers" Ibid.) the pathways of which were disrupted through corruption and misdirection.  And that pathway is marked by the objects that evidence a modernizing  embrace of innovation, and is as inevitable as the Socialist Path toward communism; it is, in Mr. Krastsios' words, a manifested destiny that is unavoidable even in the face of corruption and dangerous deviation ("our technologies, and what we do with them, will be the tools with which we will make the destiny of our country manifest in this century." Id.). And also, like the socialist path is inextricably linked to politics--and therefor to a proper alignment of public power and mass innovative capacity: 

    Yet this American hope in the possibility of progress and the power of science and technology does not allow builders and innovators to retreat from politics. Indeed, quite the opposite, which is what brings me here today. A Golden Age is only possible if we choose it. (Remarks by Director Kratsios).

    The convergence isn't one of ideology; far from it. But it suggests a convergence of form and objective within quite distinctive cognitive cages. These conceptual cages (the systems for collective shraed meaning and the baseline rationalization of the world through principles of perceiving and knowing) are similarly constructed, and the way in which such cages, when fully articulated, provide the forms, structures, frameworks and approaches both for rationalizing collective challenge, to articulate collective objectives, and to operationalize the principles around which the rationalization of collective realities are structured.  Mr. Kratsios has nicely deployed  the central elements of the American imaginary and pointed it toward quite specific ends which, given his reading, are unavoidable and inevitable if the U.S. is to realize its promise.  But. . . .and this is a big but and the focus of the rest of the remarks--to those ends the masses must be organized ("only possible if we choose it)" within the parameters for such mass management compatible with the American political-economic model-.

    4. Protecting the Productive Masses Along the American Path Against the Corruption of Left Error. One way of shining a light on the correct path is to identify error.  And in the case of the United States since 2016 that has become an easier proposition as  its elites have divided themselves, at least at the level of official discourse, between the discursive vision articulated by the Obama-Biden Administrations, and that of the 1st Trump Administration.  For those who hold to the Trump path, the Obama-Biden vision  is painted as the archetype of "left error." For the Obama-Biden camp, the Trump Administration is the epitome of "right error."  The political language is of course much more intemperate, each drawing by analogy on earlier examples of  the apotheosis of  these errors  by invoking the worst characteristics of  the totalitarian regimes of the first half of the 20th century. Mr. Kratsios does not do that; instead he invokes the more traditional and moderate language of error in its theological and perhaps ideological senses, as a deviation which if uncorrected can imperil the immortal soul of the nation. The error is all the more threatening because the masses are free to be guided either toward the light or into darkness in every generation.

    There is nothing predestined about technological progress and scientific discovery. They require the efforts and energies of men and women, the collective choice for order and truth over disorder and opinion. The last century was called the American Century, as—despite wars and domestic conflict—the United States stood at the forefront of science and technology, building the future.* * * Today we fight to restore that inheritance. As the failure of the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” approach makes clear, it is not enough to seek to protect America’s technological lead. We also have a duty to promote American technological leadership. * * * Stagnation was a choice. We have weighed down our builders and innovators. The well-intentioned regulatory regime of the 1970s became an ever-tightening ratchet, first hampering America’s ability to become a net-energy exporter and then making it harder and harder to build.* * * But we are capable of so much more. (Remarks by Director Kratsios).

    Most interesting, perhaps, is the recognition that in a political-economic system driven by markets (understood as the aggregation over time of the individual choices and decisions of autonomous individuals with collective and political-social consequences) some sort of guidance is needed; and that guidance must come, in some form and with whatever level of accommodation is can tolerate, of the core of leadership of the political order.  That is, that the operating system must be coded, and that this operating system, grounded in the choices that give it  form, direction, and analytical power (what is preferred over what is to be avoided) is inherently both collective and political.

    5. The First American Sutra: We are Capable of So Much More. Mr. Kratsios very briefly suggests the outlines of operational innovation--the forms that new or high quality productivity will both produce on on which it will move the U.S. to the next stage of its historical development. "Our technologies permit us to manipulate time and space. They leave distance annihilated, cause things to grow, and improve productivity." (Remarks by Director Kratsios). These will be deployed, Mr. Kratsios reminds us, quoting Vice President Vance, toward goals that are meant, in part, to improve the lives of the working masses: "of extending human ability so that more people can do more, and, more meaningful work"(Ibid.). But the fundamental distinction between the correct path and left error now becomes clear in the light of advancing productivity--left error "borrows from the future," the correct path requires "doing more with less"--that is both a fundamentally curious approach to sustainability, and a hint of the objectives of technological innovation within the parameters of the Trumpian golden age ideology. But note the key element here--it is not that innvation has ceased, it is that innovation has gone underground, to other places, or is otherwise misdirected, where direction ought to come from the political-policy center (the latter point one that both the Trump and Obama-Biden visions share): "Advances have not stopped, but something has gone wrong." (Ibid.).

    6. The Structures of American Modernization. If, as Mr. Kratsios suggests, the American ideological operating system requires direction (its coders and quality control functionaries) , and that this direction is both collective and political, then analysis can narrow down to the precise expression of that guidance in any stage of national historical development. Here Mr. Kratsios gets down to some directional detail: 

    "Our first assignment is to secure America’s preeminence in critical and emerging technologies. This administration will ensure that our nation remains the leader in the industries of the future with a strategy of both promotion and protection—protecting our greatest assets and promoting our greatest innovators. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

    Market driven innovation has political consequences, those consequences are the responsibility of the political hierarchy, the apex hierarchs have a responsibility for developing policy (mandatory and nudging) as a current expression and application of core principles bent toward the realization of ultimate goals. Here the political goal is to shape the market, and the direction of individual or private, activities within it, toward a metrics accessible (assuming agreement on the principles on which the metrics are based and the forms of measurement) goal--(1) preeminence, in (2) critical and emerging, (3) tech, (4) built around, (5)industries of the future, (6) through a national political strategy , (7) of promotion and protection, of (8) the critical factors of its production. It is in this objective that the failures of "left error" become most apparent to Mr. Kratsios:

    To the degree it even tried to accomplish this, the Biden administration failed on its own terms, led by a spirit of fear rather than promise. The old regime sought to protect its managerial power from the disruptions of technology, while promoting social division and redistribution in the name of equity. They secured American technology poorly, and failed to strengthen our leadership at all. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

    To overcome this left error, Mr. Kratsios suggests, the state apparatus must be burdened with three responsibilities:  

    First, we have to make the smart choices of creatively allocating our public research and development dollars. Second, we have to make the right choices in constructing a common-sense, pro-innovation regulatory regime. And third, we have to make the easy choice to adopt the incredible products and tools made by American builders and to enable their export abroad. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)
    Strategic use of research funds by the state, high quality innovation in regulatory regimes bent toward the fulfillment of policy goals, and then the aggressive export f the products of this model elsewhere (both the model of innovation and its products). These then suggest a large range of recent actions undertaken by the Trump administration against officials, institutions, and intergovernmental relations that are viewed as either remnants of left error or that are in the way of the state  undertaking these strategies as they understand them. Mr. Kratsios summarizes with respect to these three State objectives what has already been widely reported in the press: taking back and re-arranging State research funding to align with State objectives; regulatory reform also tied to State objectives and the rectification of the techno-bureaucratic establishment so that its working style will align with State objectives; and the re-invigoration of a re-imaged 19th century form of American merchant diplomacy and integrated economic order.

    7. The borders of the Golden Age State Must be Protected.  That this new golden age is not meant to be globally hegemonic is made clear by the focus, a critically important one for the Trump Administration, of borders and sovereignty.  That focus, in turn, is grounded in a cognitive order that sees adverse interests among peer states, and opportunity among the rest. 

    First, we must safeguard U.S. intellectual property and take seriously American research security. Second, we must prevent rival nations from infiltrating our infrastructure and supply chains, as well as from embedding themselves in the infrastructure of our allies. And third, we must enforce export controls and other measures that keep American frontier technologies out of competitors’ hands. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

    To those ends, there is an impulse both to project benignly into the rest in well ordered socio-commercial engagements, and to decisively construct well managed borders against the rest. In this case the object is China, the only real peer state at the moment and one which shares the core structural elements of both the rationalization of global spaces and their roles in it). 

    China in particular has grown into both a geopolitical rival and technological competitor. This threat requires us to protect our science and technology resources with heightened vigilance, and defend the vital work American researchers do in public and corporate contexts alike from misuse, theft, and disruption. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

    Border, of course, are meant to keep things people, objects, tech, etc. both in and out.  Mr. Kratsios emphasized both elements especially in the context of the Chinese relationship. Chinese products are to be kept out (these are now understood as a form of subsidized dependency--and thus  inverting the core of the project of globalization and its own imaginaries in a world view that now rejects both the possibility and the value of global convergence based in part on the gifting of national advantage as either driver of convergence or reparation). 

    8.  The Second American Sutra: There is No Substitute for Victory. Mr. Kratsios ends by bringing this tech based project back to its place within the broader elements of the Basic Line of the Trump Administration. First it requires rectification of the errors of the Obama-Biden error to restore the nation to its march along the American path to the realization and perfection of its political-economic system. That realization is measured, in turn by the strength of its ability to protect the nation and to make the lives of its masses better while perfecting the political-economic system within which, with political guidance, that is made possible: As Mr. Kratsios puts it: "the task ahead of us is to adapt to new realities without destroying the American way of life or dis-inheriting the American worker. We seek, in the most basic terms, to secure our economy, restore our middle class, and uphold America as the planet’s best home for innovators." (Remarks by Director Kratsios). And what is the measure of success? Victory!

    But there is no substitute for victory. ** * In a world so shaped by politics as well as technology, we must take action in both of these domains. We need all Americans to continue to rise to the occasion, to make full use of their talents, and to build.(Ibid.)
    To those ends the masses must unite under the leadership and guidance of the center to ensure that individual effort can be aggregated, in the fundamental working style of American markets driven organization, to "preserve the inheritance of the American Century to share with posterity, and to ensure that the technologies that give shape to our world help the American people secure the blessings of liberty we received from our forebearers * * * and drive us further into the endless frontier." (Remarks by Director Kratsios). That, anyway, is the theory and its expression.

    The text of  A Letter to Michael Kratsios, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policyand of Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreatfollow below.

     

    March 26, 2025

    Dear Mr. Kratsios:

    Scientific progress and technological innovation were the twin engines that powered the American century.  The Manhattan Project fueled the atomic era.  The Apollo Program won us the space race.  The internet connected us to a digital future.  Today, we will usher in the Golden Age of American Innovation.  We will make America safer, healthier, and more prosperous than ever before.  We will create a future of American greatness for every citizen, restoring the American Dream.

    The triumphs of the last century did not happen by chance.  As World War II drew towards a close, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote a letter like this one to his science and technology advisor, Vannevar Bush, charging him to explore new frontiers of the mind for the sake of national greatness and pioneer science in peacetime.  Dr. Bush’s response laid the groundwork for the uniquely successful American partnership of Government, industry, and academia that built the greatest and most productive nation in human history.

    But today, rivals abroad seek to usurp America’s position as the world’s greatest maker of marvels and producer of knowledge.  We must recapture the urgency which propelled us so far in the last century.  The time has come to return to our roots and renew the American scientific enterprise for the century ahead.  So, just as FDR tasked Vannevar Bush, I am tasking you with meeting the challenges below to deliver for the American people.

    First:  How can the United States secure its position as the unrivaled world leader in critical and emerging technologies — such as artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and nuclear technology — maintaining our advantage over potential adversaries?

    We need to accelerate research and development, dismantle regulatory barriers, strengthen domestic supply chains and manufacturing, spur robust private sector investment, and advance American companies in global markets.  Rival nations are pushing hard to overtake the United States, and we must blaze a bold path to maintain our technological supremacy.

    Second:  How can we revitalize America’s science and technology enterprise — pursuing truth, reducing administrative burdens, and empowering researchers to achieve groundbreaking discoveries?

    We need new paradigms for the research enterprise, including innovative models for funding and sharing scientific research, redefining how America conducts the business of discovery.  We must build an ecosystem that attracts top talent, celebrates merit, protects our intellectual edge, and enables scientists to focus on meaningful work rather than administrative box checking.  

    Third:  How can we ensure that scientific progress and technological innovation fuel economic growth and better the lives of all Americans?

    During my first term, we made unprecedented advances in America’s scientific and technological leadership.  We launched the American Artificial Intelligence Initiative, vaulting the United States to the front of the pack in the development and deployment of artificial intelligence.  Our National Quantum Initiative established the foundation for national quantum supremacy.  We created the United States Space Force and charted a new and daring course for America’s further exploration of space.  All of this buttressed our security and bolstered our prosperity, and it reaffirmed America’s place as the world’s preeminent technological superpower.

    Now, after 4 long years of weakness and complacency, we must set our sights even higher.  I am calling upon you to blaze a trail to the next frontiers of science.  We have the opportunity to cement America’s global technological leadership and usher in the Golden Age of American Innovation.  We are not just competing with other nations; we are seeking, striving, fighting to make America greater than ever before.

    Sincerely,

    Donald J. Trump

     *       *       *

     

    Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat

    THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION

    AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

    Endless Frontiers Retreat, Austin, Texas

    April 14, 2025

    THE DIRECTOR: Thank you for the kind introduction. It is a pleasure to speak to you all this evening, here in the early light of the new Golden Age of America.

    President Trump has given all of us who serve in his administration a monumental task—the renewal of our nation.

    I know, and I think you know, too, that such a renewal will require the reinvigoration of American science and industry. Over the last few decades, America has become complacent, forgetting old dreams of building a wondrous future.

    But we know the American pioneer spirit still seeks the exploration of endless frontiers. Our technologies, and what we do with them, will be the tools with which we will make the destiny of our country manifest in this century.

    Yet this American hope in the possibility of progress and the power of science and technology does not allow builders and innovators to retreat from politics. Indeed, quite the opposite, which is what brings me here today. A Golden Age is only possible if we choose it.

    ***

    There is nothing predestined about technological progress and scientific discovery. They require the efforts and energies of men and women, the collective choice for order and truth over disorder and opinion.

    The last century was called the American Century, as—despite wars and domestic conflict—the United States stood at the forefront of science and technology, building the future. With the strength of our industry and ingenuity, we created the largest middle class the world has ever seen. As President Trump said to me in his letter laying out the science and technology agenda of this administration, “The triumphs of the last century did not happen by chance.”

    Ours was the Atomic Age. Ours the victory in the Space Race. And ours the invention of the Internet, collecting and connecting the multiplicity of human knowledge.

    Today we fight to restore that inheritance. As the failure of the Biden administration’s “small yard, high fence” approach makes clear, it is not enough to seek to protect America’s technological lead. We also have a duty to promote American technological leadership.

    ***

    A gap lies between our moment and the speed of transformation America experienced midcentury. Progress has slowed. Yes, large language models astonish us, rockets still turn our eyes upward, and satellites envelop the globe. But as we look forward to America’s 250th birthday celebration next year, our progress today pales in comparison to the huge leaps of the 20th century. Consider the country of fifty years ago.

    As the nation approached its bicentennial, Americans looked forward to electricity too cheap to meter. By the end of 1972, 30 nuclear plants were operational, 55 were under construction, and more than 80 were planned or ordered. That same year, the Apollo 17 astronauts became the 11th and 12th men to walk on the moon. Five years before, the X-15 rocket plane had set a speed record for a crewed aircraft of Mach 6.7. America was flying higher, faster, and farther than ever before…

    Today, however, energy prices still burden producers and consumers alike, and the grid remains precarious. Over the past 30 years only three commercial nuclear reactors have been built and 10 have been closed. Despite spending almost twice as much on healthcare as peer nations, we have the lowest life expectancy. Apollo 17’s steps on the lunar surface have proved mankind’s last. The X-15’s record still stands, and the Concorde was decommissioned more than two decades ago. Our passenger planes are slower than they used to be. Our trains crawl compared to those in other parts of the world. Our cars do not fly

    Advances have not stopped, but something has gone wrong.  

    ***

    Stagnation was a choice. We have weighed down our builders and innovators. The well-intentioned regulatory regime of the 1970s became an ever-tightening ratchet, first hampering America’s ability to become a net-energy exporter and then making it harder and harder to build. We seem to have lost focus and vision, to have lowered our sights and let systems and structures and bureaucracies muddle us along.

    But we are capable of so much more.  

    Our technologies permit us to manipulate time and space. They leave distance annihilated, cause things to grow, and improve productivity.

    As Vice President Vance said in a recent speech, the tradition of American innovation has been one of increasing the capacities of America’s workers, of extending human ability so that more people can do more, and, more meaningful work. But unrestricted immigration, and reliance on cheap labor both domestically and offshore, has been a substitute for improving productivity with technology.

    We can build in new ways that let us do more with less, or we can borrow from the future. We have chosen to borrow from the future again and again. Our choice as a civilization is technology or debt. And we have chosen debt.

    Today we choose a better way.

    ***

    Our first assignment is to secure America’s preeminence in critical and emerging technologies. This administration will ensure that our nation remains the leader in the industries of the future with a strategy of both promotion and protection—protecting our greatest assets and promoting our greatest innovators.

    To the degree it even tried to accomplish this, the Biden administration failed on its own terms, led by a spirit of fear rather than promise. The old regime sought to protect its managerial power from the disruptions of technology, while promoting social division and redistribution in the name of equity. They secured American technology poorly, and failed to strengthen our leadership at all.

    Promoting America’s technological leadership requires three things of government. First, we have to make the smart choices of creatively allocating our public research and development dollars. Second, we have to make the right choices in constructing a common-sense, pro-innovation regulatory regime. And third, we have to make the easy choice to adopt the incredible products and tools made by American builders and to enable their export abroad.

    In a moment of strategic significance, we must be more creative in our use of public research and development money, and shape a funding environment that makes clear what our national priorities are. Whether in AI, quantum, biotech, or next-generation semiconductors, in partnership with the private sector and academia, it is the duty of government to enable scientists to create new theories and empower engineers to put them into practice. Prizes, advance market commitments, and other novel funding mechanisms, like fast and flexible grants, can multiply the impact of government-funded research.

    At a time defined by the desire to build in America again, we have to throw off the burden of bad regulations that weigh down our innovators, and use federal resources to test, to deploy, and to mature emerging technologies. We know, for example, the greatest obstacle to limitless energy in this country has been a regulatory regime opposed to innovation and development. This, too, has been the chief barrier to pushing the envelope again in transportation, whether supersonic aircraft or high-speed rail and flying cars. The time has come to review the rules on the books and to ask whom they really protect and what they really cost.

    For a future stamped with the American character, the federal government must become an early adopter and avid promoter of American technology. Our innovators make incredible breakthroughs, but consumers, government included, require products that meet their needs, not just the wide-open country of frontier technology. Our industrial might, unleashed at home, and our technical achievements from AI to aerospace, successfully commercialized, can also be powerful instruments of diplomacy abroad and key components of our international alliances. American progress in critical technologies will make us the global partner of choice and the standards setter to follow if we enable and encourage American companies to distribute the American tech stack around the world.

    ***

    This approach to promoting America’s technological leadership goes hand in hand with a threefold strategy for protecting that position from foreign rivals. First, we must safeguard U.S. intellectual property and take seriously American research security. Second, we must prevent rival nations from infiltrating our infrastructure and supply chains, as well as from embedding themselves in the infrastructure of our allies. And third, we must enforce export controls and other measures that keep American frontier technologies out of competitors’ hands.

    We face many dangers as a nation, but thanks to decades of feckless American leaders, China in particular has grown into both a geopolitical rival and technological competitor. This threat requires us to protect our science and technology resources with heightened vigilance, and defend the vital work American researchers do in public and corporate contexts alike from misuse, theft, and disruption. To safeguard our intellectual capital, we must restrict foreign access to sensitive data and strengthen oversight of international collaborators.

    Our infrastructure, supply chains, and those of our allies must be secured, too. We cannot afford to remain dependent, as we are in too many essential industries, on Chinese inputs and products, nor can we allow our closest partners to become points of insecurity by relying on Chinese-controlled critical infrastructure, whether in telecom, the grid, or AI. We must establish and secure trusted supply chains, implement public-private partnerships to enhance supply-chain resilience, and create investment incentives to reshore more critical manufacturing.

    Finally, after thirty years of subsidizing Chinese growth, it is time for us to stop helping a rival catch up with us in this race. Strict and simple export controls and know your customer rules, with an unapologetic America-first attitude about enforcing them, are central to stopping China from continuing to build itself up at our expense. We want peace between our countries, and that peace depends on keeping America’s bleeding-edge technology out of our competitor’s hands.

    ***

    The Golden Age of American innovation is on our horizon, if we choose it.

    In a changing technological environment, the task ahead of us is to adapt to new realities without destroying the American way of life or dis-inheriting the American worker. We seek, in the most basic terms, to secure our economy, restore our middle class, and uphold America as the planet’s best home for innovators.

    For many years now the temptation for the kinds of people represented in this room—builders and discoverers—has been to withdraw from politics. In the face of burdensome regulation and inefficient government and the circus of election cycles, many of you have chosen retreat of various kinds.

    But there is no substitute for victory. You and your fellow Americans cannot afford to give up on the nation. In a world so shaped by politics as well as technology, we must take action in both of these domains. We need all Americans to continue to rise to the occasion, to make full use of their talents, and to build.

    All of us must labor to preserve the inheritance of the American Century to share with posterity, and to ensure that the technologies that give shape to our world help the American people secure the blessings of liberty we received from our forebearers. I bear that responsibility in my role as the President’s Science and Technology Advisor. You bear it, too, in exercising whatever powers and responsibilities you have, whether in business, education, or the laboratory—as Americans.

    It is the choices of individuals that will make the new American Golden Age possible: the choice of individuals to master the sclerosis of the state, and the choice of individuals to craft new technologies and give themselves to scientific discoveries that will bend time and space, make more with less, and drive us further into the endless frontier.

     


    Reflections on Xia Baolong (夏宝龙) Speech delivered at the Opening Ceremony of the 2025 National Security Education Day in the Hong Kong SAR 15 April 2025-- Ensuring High-quality Development with High-level Security Continuously Composing a New Chapter in the Practice of "One Country, Two Systems" (以高水平安全护航高质量发展 不断谱写“一国两制”实践新篇章)

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    If one could reduce the impassioned speech of Xia Baolong (夏宝龙), Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, delivered at the Opening Ceremony of the 2025 National Security Education Day in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on 15 April 2025 and entitled Ensuring High-quality Development with High-level Security Continuously Composing a New Chapter in the Practice of "One Country, Two Systems" (以高水平安全护航高质量发展 不断谱写“一国两制”实践新篇章), it would be this:

    Pix King Nan of Zhou
    Currently, the practice of "One country, Two systems" has entered a new stage. The good situation in Hong Kong today has come at a great cost and should be treasured. We must consolidate and develop this good situation. However, the struggle is not yet over. Although the social situation in Hong Kong appears calm on the surface, there are still undercurrents, and the security situation remains very grave and complex. Those who are opposed to China and attempt to destabilize Hong Kong have not yet been eliminated. Some have fled abroad to make trouble, while others have whitewashed themselves and disguised as ordinary people, hiding and waiting for opportunities to stir up trouble in Hong Kong. Many people still have confused ideas, some sympathize with those who are opposed to China and attempt to destabilize Hong Kong , some justify them, and some admire, fear, worship, or fantasize about the U.S. Some people believe that as long as the economy develops, there will be no security issues. However, this is a typical case of burying one's head in the sand and deceiving oneself. In fact, countless examples demonstrate that wealth does not always bring security, prosperity or sustainability. Without security, how could Hong Kong have gone through the journey from chaos to governance? Without security, how could Hong Kong have gone through the journey from governance to greater prosperity? Without security, how could Hong Kong have a bright future? We must face the problems related to the development and security in Hong Kong, be vigilant and stay united. Every individual, group, enterprise and organization needs to work together with Hong Kong compatriots and all Chinese people to defend Hong Kong and the country, ensure high-quality development with high-level security, and promote the steady and sustained practice of "One country, Two systems".

    當前,「一國兩制」實踐進入了新階段。香港今天的良好局面來之殊為不易,是付出了巨大代價的,大家要倍加珍惜,把這個良好局面鞏固住、發展好。現在,鬥爭並沒有結束。香港社會面看似平靜,實則暗流湧動,安全形勢仍然十分嚴峻複雜。反中亂港分子並沒有被消滅,有些逃到國外興風作浪,有些撕下額頭上的標籤,偽裝成普通市民,隱匿在社會人群中伺機禍亂香港。不少人還有糊塗的想法,同情反中亂港分子者有之,為反中亂港分子開脫者有之,媚美、恐美、崇美、幻美者有之。有的人認為只要經濟發展了,就沒有安全問題了,這是典型的掩耳盜鈴、自欺欺人。事實上,富而不安、富而不強、富而不長的例子比比皆是。沒有安全哪來的香港由亂到治?沒有安全哪來的香港由治及興?沒有安全哪來的香港美好明天?大家要正視香港發展和安全面臨的問題,提高警惕、團結一致,每個人、每個社團、每個企業、每個組織,都要與香港同胞一道、與全國人民一起,保衛香港、保衛國家,打造高水平安全護航高質量發展,推進「一國兩制」實踐行穩致遠。

    The importance of this portion of the remarks cannot be underestimated, but not for its rhetorical flourishes, though they do provide a moment of interest in the linguistic turns of articulating state policy and intention. But all of this was anticipated at the start of the 2019 turmoil, during which, and almost from the start, the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office took the line that only finds refinement in the speech by its Director today (Discussed Larry Catá Backer Hong Kong Between One Country and Two Systems (2021) Chapter 20: Open-Shut (bai he 稗閤) Strategies: 习近平;止暴制乱 恢复秩序是香港当前最紧迫的任务 [Xi Jinping; Stopping the storm and restoring order is Hong Kong’s most urgent task at present] pp. 255-262).  

    What is now more evident is the conflation of anti-chaos strategies and the national security architecture, and with that the closer alignment between the national security architecture and the constitution of "One Country Two Systems." In other words, Official Xia has bluntly restated a proposition that has been more elegantly developed since 2020--that the privileges of "two systems" is entirely dependent on the proper functioning of the national security architecture; that this national security architecture can be understood as a legalized (and bureaucratized) manifestation of the "One Country" principle, and that the One Country principle determines the extent to which it is possible to realize "two systems" within Hong Kong.  Underlying all of this is the continuation of the great patriotic campaigns in Hong Kong in which the elements  of  the fundamentals of the people's democratic dictatorship serve as the framework for the remedial operation of the security apparatus--democracy for patriots, dictatorship for the rest (Mao Zedong, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship  (1949) ("The combination of these two aspects, democracy for the people and dictatorship over the reactionaries, is the people's democratic dictatorship.")). That is both fairly straightforward and easy to understand--"One Country" politically, "two systems" economically." The corollary, of course, is that foreigners have deliberately blinded themselves to this reality, one that has been made quite clear since 2019. That leaves wide open, though, the "as applied" questions--these also touch on the relationship between a national security architecture and the characteristics of "two systems" in the constitution and operation of all facets of life in Hong Kong as applied within its legal, economic, and governmental structures. Only foreigners appear to have failed to have gotten that message.  Perhaps both the bluntness and the speed of the official translation into English were meant to drive home that point.  Having said that, however, foreign powers can respond as they like--including by ramping up their programs of sanctions and propaganda in ways that may further their own interests now may easier by the deliver of the Chinese text.

    And that leaves the economic sphere at the very center of the manifestation of "two systems" within the "One Country" principle--especially where, under Marxist-Leninist New Era theory, the separation between politics and economic activity is closely aligned with the CPC Basic Line as expressed in policy. That is, that economic activity is a complement to and the expression of the evolution of public policy in the field of economic activity, and that the variety of forms of economic activity permitted  are both an acknowledgement of the requirements of a united front approach in the formative stages of the Socialist path, and in the longer run a stage in the development of a socialist economy. Official Xia also explained that connection at the end of his speech: 

    We believe that the business community and entrepreneurs can make Hong Kong their home, build their businesses, and contribute to both Hong Kong and the country with more practical actions. In the magnificent development history of Hong Kong, many world-renowned enterprises and entrepreneurs have emerged, taking concrete actions to build Hong Kong and serve the country, writing a vivid picture of patriotism and love for Hong Kong, and becoming business legends. In the current situation where the United States is exerting extreme pressure on us, there is a greater need for entrepreneurs to build and take root in Hong Kong with a strong resolve. It is hoped that Hong Kong's business community and entrepreneurs will continue to play a leading role in driving economic development, carry forward the fine tradition of patriotism and love for Hong Kong, correctly understand the relationship between their own enterprises and the development of both Hong Kong and the nation, and always uphold righteousness and never forget national interests.
    我们相信,工商界和企业家定能以港为家、倚港兴业,用更有力的实际行动建设香港、贡献国家。在香港波澜壮阔的发展史上,涌现出一大批世界知名的企业和企业家,用实干兴港、实业报国,书写了爱国爱港的生动画卷,也成就了让人津津乐道的商业传奇。在当前美国对我们极限打压的形势下,更需要企业家以“烈火金刚”的坚强品质建设香港、扎根香港。希望香港工商界和企业家继续发挥推动经济发展主力军作用,赓续爱国爱港优良传统,正确认识自身事业与香港发展、与国家发展的关系,永远不舍大义、不忘国家利益。

     What ought to be remarkable is the alignment of the contemporary view of the state of Hong Kong SAR with that of the People's Republic in the first decade after its establishment in 1949, and especially the dynamic element in Mao Zedong's New Democracy theory.  First one recalls the fundamental framework established before the establishment of the People's Republic--Mao Zedong, On New Democracy (January 1940). 

    In the new-democratic republic under the leadership of the proletariat, the state enterprises will be of a socialist character and will constitute the leading force in the whole national economy, but the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as does not "dominate the livelihood of the people", for China's economy is still very backward. * * * China's economy must develop along the path of the "regulation of capital" and the "equalization of landownership", and must never be "privately owned by the few"; we must never permit the few capitalists and landlords to "dominate the livelihood of the people"; we must never establish a capitalist society of the European-American type or allow the old semi-feudal society to survive. Whoever dares to go counter to this line of advance will certainly not succeed but will run into a brick wall. * * * Such is the economy of New Democracy.And the politics of New Democracy [peoples democratic dictatorship] are the concentrated expression of the economy of New Democracy. * * * Everybody knows that the Communist Party has an immediate and a future programme, a minimum and a maximum programme, with regard to the social system it advocates. For the present period, New Democracy, and for the future, socialism; these are two parts of an organic whole, guided by one and the same communist ideology.

    One Country, Two Systems might then be understood both as a mirroring of the initial approach to the amalgamation of patriotic forces (in Hong Kong through the national security apparatus) sensitive to the need for variation in the movement toward a unified socialist, then then communist, economics. This notion of systemic variability as a starting point for the eventual unification of forces on the socialist path is refined in Mao Zedong's gloss on New Democracy in 1953:

    The Right deviation manifests itself in three remarks:

    "Firmly establish the new-democratic social order." That's a harmful formulation. In the transition period changes are taking place all the time and socialist factors are emerging every day. How can this "new-democratic social order" be "firmly established"? It would be very difficult indeed to "establish" it "firmly"! For instance, private industry and commerce are being transformed, and if an order is "established" in the second half of the year, it will no longer hold "firm" next year. And changes are taking place in mutual aid and co-operation in agriculture from year to year too. The period of transition is full of contradictions and struggles. Our present revolutionary struggle is even more profound than the revolutionary armed struggle of the past. It is a revolution that will bury the capitalist system and all other systems of exploitation once and for all. The idea, "Firmly establish the new-democratic social order", goes against the realities of our struggle and hinders the progress of the socialist cause * * * We have proposed a step-by-step transition to socialism. This is a better formulation. When we say "step-by-step", we mean that the steps are to be spread out over fifteen years and over the twelve months in each year. Going too fast means erring to the "Left", standing still means erring too much to the Right. We must oppose "Left" and Right deviations and make a step-by-step transition until the whole process is completed.(Mao Zedong, "Refute Right Deviationist Views that Depart From the General [Basic] Line" (June 15, 1953) [Part of a speech at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Here Comrade Mao Tsetung refuted the Right opportunist views, such as "firmly establish the new-democratic social order", put forward by Liu Shao-chi and others.]

    The object, then, is the transition to socialism. The pragmatic realities, for now, is the utility of "two systems" in the service of revolutionary progress and the eventual realization of the Chinese Dream and with it the forward movement toward communism--for all of China. The emphasis then, and now under One Country Two Systems is the same--a necessary transition, one the timing of which is determined by both internal and external factors. And then all of this is bound up in a system differentiating reworking of the fundamental ordering premise of the State system--peoples democratic dictatorship. Official Xia might have been more elegant, but perhaps his audience expected the discursive approach he took.

    *       *       *

    Pix credit here

    But the most provocative, and perhaps the least interesting part of the speech will receive greater attention, if only because it reduces both Chinese and American senior officials to the discourse of toddlers for the amusements of the press organs and their masses:

    Pix credit here (Peasant Comrades Temper Your bodies Well)
      It is also a pipe dream for external forces to try to delay or even interrupt the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and bring us back to the tragic situation of being trampled upon. Washington's repeated attempts to suppress Hong Kong will only accelerate the demise of its proxies in Hong Kong which will ultimately backfire on itself. Let those American peasants wail before the 5,000-year-old civilization of the Chinese nation!
    外部勢力妄圖遲滯甚至中斷中華民族偉大復興,讓我們回到過去任人宰割的悲慘境地,那是癡心妄想!美國一而再、再而三對香港進行遏制打壓,換來的只能是其在香港的代理人的加速滅亡,最終必將反噬其自身。讓美國那些「鄉巴佬們」在中華民族五千年文明面前去哀鳴吧!

    Of course, discursively it is likely that such a response was necessary after the American Vice President Vance chose to characterize  the financial relations between the United States and China in colorful and provocative ways:  "Vance, appearing on Fox News just weeks ago, had a lot to say about the effects of globalization. But it was one phrase that drew the most attention: 'We borrow money from Chinese peasants to buy the things that Chinese peasants manufacture.'” (Economic Times). The BBC Chinese edition noted the connection (here).

    Vance, appearing on Fox News just weeks ago, had a lot to say about the effects of globalization. But it was one phrase that drew the most attention:

    “We borrow money from Chinese peasants to buy the things that Chinese peasants manufacture.”


    Pix Credit here (Hongwu Emperor)
    Part of the problem, of course, at least on the American side, is that the American Vice President might no longer adhere to the old rules that separated the sort of speech that one reserved for peers (social, economic, political, status, etc.) at cocktail parties and similar events, and the formal speech meant to be projected  to a wider audience. Of course that sort of speech in peer contexts is critically important discourse within that group--it suggests membership in a status group and an affirmation of the belief in a shared way of understanding the approach of that status caste to its responsibilities, superiority and powers. Part of it reflects a strong shift in the discursive rules of the American political elite who distinguish themselves from the disobedient masses by similar terms--the "basket of deplorables (here); or more recently describing elements of the polity as garbage (here). Yet one must consider whether that meant for internal or external consumption, or was the Vice President persisting in quite another agenda? The other part of the problem, from the Chinese side, is that a communist revolution founded on the backs of peasants and the proletariat ought perhaps to have  a little more pride in both the working class and the peeasants. Indeed, Chinese history owes much to its peasants, for example, the Hongwu Emperor of Ming Zhu Yuanzhang. Official Xia might have been more careful about joining his American counterparts in  insulting peasants in this backhanded way. Indeed, from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, one might have treated the Vice President's purported insult as a great complement, and a sig of both the power and wealth of a peasantry that could only be possible under the leadership of a communist vanguard.  But perhaps Official Xia has a different view.

    Whatever the psychology or strategy, the episode provided a moment of naughty delight, of course, for people who enjoy officially sponsored reality TV style discourse. And it provided a moment's relief from the realities that the current global political class has found unusually impossible to either grasp or resolve. Still, perhaps more important was this other bit of provocation tit for tat--a contemporary updating of the rhetoric of China's 19th century troubles and its overturning through the contemporary rhetoric of rejuvenation: 

    It is extremely naive to think that you can gain peace, respect and development by fawning on the United States, kneeling before the United States and begging for mercy from the United States. Everyone should give up the illusion. The so-called "sanctions" and "reciprocal tariffs" of the United States cannot shake the determination and will of the central government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government, nor can they scare the 1.4 billion Chinese people, including Hong Kong compatriots. They will only make us more determined to unite and more firmly safeguard national security and Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. Victory must belong to the great Chinese people!

    如果以为向美国献媚、向美国跪低、向美国求饶,就能够换来和平、换来尊重、换来发展,那是极其幼稚的。大家要丢掉幻想。美国所谓“制裁”和“对等关税”,撼动不了中央政府和香港特别行政区政府的决心意志,吓不倒包括香港同胞在内的14亿中国人民,只会让我们更加坚定地团结在一起,更加坚定地维护国家安全和香港繁荣稳定。胜利一定属于伟大的中国人民!

     After all, who in China today wants to be perceived as playing or reprising the role of the Dowager empress Cixi (慈禧); rejuvenation has its mandatory discursive tropes, and no official would be foolish enough not to perform them on a national or international stage. But, the heroics of the discursive tropes and the now well worn embrace of the Late Qing as a sort of experiential urtext can also backfire--suggesting anxiety about the triumph of revolutionary Chinese Marxist-Leninism as much as it suggests a triumphalist swagger. In this context, perhaps, it is a necessary dollop of swagger at a time of critical global change essential for internal consumption and the reassurance of the masses; externally it might be read a different way.  But that is not Official Xia's problem; it ought to be for those who were responsible for approving the text of the remarks.  And yet the remarks, coming from Official Xia rather than someone else, might well have been the message and the messenger for a conversation among leadership cores to which we are not privy.

     





    以高水平安全护航高质量发展不断谱写“一国两制”实践新篇章

    ——在香港特别行政区2025年“全民国家安全教育日”开幕典礼上的致辞

    (2025年4月15日)

    夏 宝 龙




    香港特別行政區行政長官李家超先生,女士們,先生們,朋友們:

    大家上午好。今天(編者按:4月15日)是我國第十個「全民國家安全教育日」。2014年4月15日,習近平主席在中央國家安全委員會第一次會議上,創造性提出總體國家安全觀。2015年《中華人民共和國國家安全法》頒布實施,把總體國家安全觀法律化、制度化,並將4月15日規定為「全民國家安全教育日」。在這個具有重要意義的日子裏,我很高興以視頻方式出席香港特別行政區的活動。

    忘記歷史 就意味着背叛

    過去10年,是全面貫徹落實總體國家安全觀的10年,我國國家安全工作取得歷史性成就,牢牢掌握發展和安全主動權,續寫了經濟快速發展和社會長期穩定兩大奇蹟。過去10年,也是香港在維護國家安全方面鬥爭最為激烈的10年,香港歷經由亂到治、邁向由治及興,走過了極不平凡、極不尋常的歷程。從2014年非法「佔中」到2016年「旺角暴亂」,直至2019年「修例風波」爆發,「港獨」猖獗、「黑暴」肆虐、「攬炒」橫行,國家安全受到嚴重威脅,香港被破壞得面目全非、滿目瘡痍,那種慘狀令很多人至今仍心有餘悸。危急時刻,中央果斷出手、力挽狂瀾,堅持和完善「一國兩制」制度體系,制定實施《香港國安法》,落實「愛國者治港」原則,香港局勢實現由亂到治的重大轉折。

    「修例風波」本質上是反中亂港分子和美西方外部勢力發動的港版「顏色革命」,是香港歷史上永遠抹不去的傷疤,是懸在我們頭上時時敲響的一口警鐘。忘記歷史就意味着背叛。如果忘記過去,忘記了在哪裏摔跤的、怎麼摔跤的,那以後還會遇到更大的麻煩、栽更大的跟頭。大家必須牢記「修例風波」的慘痛教訓,始終保持警醒、引以為戒、警鐘長鳴。

    ——歷史和現實告訴我們,外部勢力搞亂香港、以港遏華的圖謀不會改變,也絕不可能得逞。外部勢力對香港插手干預從未停止過,香港回歸以來發生的種種亂象,背後都有他們的影子。現在,美國對香港的遏制打壓更是無所不用其極。最近,美國炮製所謂「2025年香港政策法報告」,並對6名我國中央政府駐港機構和香港特別行政區政府官員實施所謂制裁,再次暴露其霸道霸凌的醜惡嘴臉和黔驢技窮的歇斯底里。更為荒謬的是,美國竟對從不設關稅的香港累計加徵高達145%的關稅。大家都知道,香港作為自由港,對包括美國商品在內的所有商品實行「零關稅」。

    過去10年,美國對香港貿易順差達2715億美元,香港是美國最大的貿易順差地,但美國依然對香港如此加徵關稅,簡直是蠻橫霸道、無恥之極!這讓世人更加看清,美國見不得香港好,是破壞香港人權自由、法治秩序和繁榮穩定的最大黑手,它不是要我們的「稅」,而是要我們的「命」。

    中國人民從苦難中一路走來,誰妄圖讓我們重回積貧積弱,誰就是我們的敵人。外部勢力妄圖搞亂香港,讓香港回到過去的動盪不安,那是癡心妄想!外部勢力妄圖阻礙我們過上美好生活,讓我們回到過去的一窮二白,那是癡心妄想!外部勢力妄圖遲滯甚至中斷中華民族偉大復興,讓我們回到過去任人宰割的悲慘境地,那是癡心妄想!美國一而再、再而三對香港進行遏制打壓,換來的只能是其在香港的代理人的加速滅亡,最終必將反噬其自身。讓美國那些「鄉巴佬們」在中華民族5000年文明面前去哀鳴吧!

    倘以為向美獻媚可換和平尊重 是極其幼稚

    ——歷史和現實告訴我們,中國人民從來不吃霸道霸凌那一套,包括香港同胞在內的全體中國人民是嚇不倒、壓不垮的。中國人不惹事也不怕事,施壓、威脅和訛詐不是同中國打交道的正確方式。「朋友來了有好酒,敵人來了有獵槍」,我們從來沒有怕過誰。75年前,帝國主義侵略者把戰火燒到了新中國的家門口,中國人民深知,對待侵略者,就得用他們聽得懂的語言同他們對話,這就是以戰止戰、以武止戈,用勝利贏得和平、贏得尊重,「打得一拳開,免得百拳來」。現在我國作為世界第二大經濟體、第一大工業國,正昂首闊步踏上強國建設、民族復興的新征程,無論是關稅戰、貿易戰還是其他什麼戰,我們更加沒什麼好怕的,天塌不下來。

    如果以為向美國獻媚、向美國跪低、向美國求饒,就能夠換來和平、換來尊重、換來發展,那是極其幼稚的。大家要丟掉幻想。美國所謂「制裁」和「對等關稅」,撼動不了中央政府和香港特別行政區政府的決心意志,嚇不倒包括香港同胞在內的14億中國人民,只會讓我們更加堅定地團結在一起,更加堅定地維護國家安全和香港繁榮穩定。勝利一定屬於偉大的中國人民!

    ——歷史和現實告訴我們,香港同胞素有愛國愛港優良傳統,那些背叛祖國、背叛香港的人永遠不會有好下場。香港同胞的愛國愛港傳統源遠流長,特別是近代以來,香港同胞與祖國人民心連心、手牽手,拳拳赤子心、殷殷愛國情始終不渝。在新中國成立之初,莊世平先生不懼港英當局施壓,毅然升起全香港第一面五星紅旗;抗美援朝時期,霍英東先生組織船隊突破美西方的封鎖,向祖國運送大量急需緊缺的戰略物資;改革開放後,港澳同胞率先響應,踴躍北上投資興業,創造了第一家合資企業、第一條合資高速公路、第一家五星級合資飯店等許多「全國第一」。

    關鍵時刻出賣國家利益者 絕無好下場

    今天,廣大香港同胞進一步把愛國愛港精神傳承光大,特別是面對美國等外部勢力的遏制打壓、威迫利誘,不屈不撓、堅決鬥爭。「滄海橫流,方顯英雄本色」。在大是大非面前,堅定地與國家站在一起,堅定地站在歷史正確的一邊,這是中國人應有的風骨和氣節。那些在關鍵時刻出賣國家利益、替敵人搖旗吶喊的,香港同胞不答應,全國人民也不答應,絕不會有什麼好下場,必將背負歷史的罵名。在大義大節面前,要特別清醒。

    當前,「一國兩制」實踐進入了新階段。香港今天的良好局面來之殊為不易,是付出了巨大代價的,大家要倍加珍惜,把這個良好局面鞏固住、發展好。現在,鬥爭並沒有結束。香港社會面看似平靜,實則暗流湧動,安全形勢仍然十分嚴峻複雜。反中亂港分子並沒有被消滅,有些逃到國外興風作浪,有些撕下額頭上的標籤,偽裝成普通市民,隱匿在社會人群中伺機禍亂香港。不少人還有糊塗的想法,同情反中亂港分子者有之,為反中亂港分子開脫者有之,媚美、恐美、崇美、幻美者有之。有的人認為只要經濟發展了,就沒有安全問題了,這是典型的掩耳盜鈴、自欺欺人。事實上,富而不安、富而不強、富而不長的例子比比皆是。沒有安全哪來的香港由亂到治?沒有安全哪來的香港由治及興?沒有安全哪來的香港美好明天?大家要正視香港發展和安全面臨的問題,提高警惕、團結一致,每個人、每個社團、每個企業、每個組織,都要與香港同胞一道、與全國人民一起,保衛香港、保衛國家,打造高水平安全護航高質量發展,推進「一國兩制」實踐行穩致遠。

    駐港國安公署應當發揮好監督指導協調作用

    我們相信,香港特別行政區維護國家安全機構定能堅決扛起維護國家安全的神聖使命,進一步築牢維護國家安全的堅固屏障。行政長官和特別行政區政府是香港的當家人,也是治理香港的第一責任人,應當履行好維護國家安全的憲制責任,切實解決發展改革中的矛盾和問題,妥善應對各種複雜局面,及時化解風險隱患,守住不能亂的底線。

    特別行政區國安委作為負責維護國家安全事務的專責機構,應當進一步發揮牽頭抓總、議事決策、統籌協調的職責,加強對國家安全形勢的分析研判,敢於鬥爭、主動作為,形成協同高效的維護國家安全工作格局。特別行政區立法機關、司法機關應當完善特別行政區維護國家安全的制度機制,嚴格公正司法,捍衛公平正義,切實發揮維護國家安全職能作用。駐港國家安全公署是中央政府在香港特別行政區設立的維護國家安全的專門機構,應當發揮好監督、指導、協調、支持特別行政區維護國家安全的作用,依法履職,堅定支持香港特別行政區公正執法司法,堅決防範化解各類危害國家安全的風險,以新安全格局保障新發展格局。在這裏,特別值得一提的是,在香港維護國家安全工作中,許多公職人員受到美國無理制裁,毫不畏懼、義無反顧、堅定履職,在國家利益、民族大義面前,捨小我為大我,用實際行動愛國護港,我為他們感到驕傲和自豪。

    工商界定能用更有力實際行動作貢獻

    我們相信,香港社會各界定能積極履行維護國家安全的義務,共同守護香港美好家園。維護國家主權、安全、發展利益是「一國兩制」方針的最高原則。維護國家安全,人人有責。每位香港居民都是國家安全的受益者和守護者,沒有「局外人」。香港能夠有今日之地位,是克服重重困難,一代代香港人打拼出來的。大家要發揚愛國愛港優良傳統,認清反中亂港分子的反動本性,同破壞香港、詆譭香港、搞亂香港的言行進行堅決鬥爭,各盡其責、各盡其能,共同把香港這個家園建設好。廣大青年不僅是香港的未來,也是建設國家的新鮮血液。希望你們厚植家國情懷,自覺把個人的成長成才與香港由治及興、與國家前途命運結合起來,用愛國愛港的實際行動維護國家安全,展示青春自我。

    我們相信,工商界和企業家定能以港為家、倚港興業,用更有力的實際行動建設香港、貢獻國家。在香港波瀾壯闊的發展史上,湧現出一大批世界知名的企業和企業家,用實幹興港、實業報國,書寫了愛國愛港的生動畫卷,也成就了讓人津津樂道的商業傳奇。在當前美國對我們極限打壓的形勢下,更需要企業家以「烈火金剛」的堅強品質建設香港、扎根香港。希望香港工商界和企業家繼續發揮推動經濟發展主力軍作用,賡續愛國愛港優良傳統,正確認識自身事業與香港發展、與國家發展的關係,永遠不捨大義、不忘國家利益。大家要看好香港、支持香港、投資香港,把好的資源吸引到香港、留在香港,一起為香港繁榮穩定注入更多活水,在強國建設、民族復興偉業中更好發揮作用。

    女士們、先生們、朋友們!

    歷史大勢不可阻擋,時代大潮浩蕩向前。我們堅信,無論國際風雲如何變幻,有偉大祖國作堅強後盾,有全體港人努力打拼,有高水平安全的護航,香港由治及興必將乘風破浪、砥礪前行,「一國兩制」事業一定會愈走愈穩、愈走愈好!

    謝謝大家。

    Ensuring High-quality Development with High-level Security

       Continuously Composing a New Chapter in the Practice of "One Country, Two Systems"

       Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 2025 National Security Education Day in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

       (April 15, 2025)

       Xia Baolong



    Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Mr. John Lee,

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    Dear friends,

    Good morning! Today marks the 10th National Security Education Day in China. On April 15, 2014, President Xi Jinping creatively proposed a holistic approach to national security at the first meeting of the National Security Commission. In 2015, the National Security Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated and implemented, legalizing and institutionalizing the holistic approach to national security, and April 15th was designated as the "National Security Education Day". On this day of great significance, I am delighted to attend the event in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) via video.

    Over the past decade, as we comprehensively implemented the holistic approach to national security, China has achieved historic successes in national security work, firmly grasping the initiative in development and security, and continuing the two miracles of rapid economic development and long-term social stability. This decade has also been the most intense period for Hong Kong in safeguarding national security. Hong Kong has gone through an extraordinary journey from chaos to governance and then from governance to greater prosperity. During the illegal "Occupy Central" movement in 2014, the "Mong Kok Riot" in 2016, and the violent turbulence over the amendment bill in 2019, calls for "Hong Kong independence" grew rampant, "black-clad violence" escalated, and widespread acts of destruction posed a serious threat to national security. Hong Kong was severely damaged, left unrecognizable and riddled with scars. The devastation left many people with lingering fear. At this critical moment, the Central Government took decisive action to turn the tide, uphold and improve the systems for implementing the policy of "One country, Two systems", enacting the Hong Kong National Security Law and implementing the principle of "patriots administering Hong Kong". This marked a significant turning point in Hong Kong's situation from chaos to governance. The 2019 turbulence was essentially a Hong Kong version of the "color revolution" launched by anti-China agitators and external forces in the United States and other Western forces. The turbulence left a permanent scar in Hong Kong's history, a warning bell held aloft, constantly ringing above our heads. Forgetting history means betrayal. If we forget where and how we fell in the past, we will encounter greater troubles and stumble in the future. We must remember the painful lessons of the 2019 turbulence, remain vigilant, take the lessons as warning, and keep the alarm bell ringing.

    History and reality tell us that external forces' attempts to destabilize Hong Kong and use it to contain China will not change and can never succeed. External forces have never stopped intervening in Hong Kong, and their shadow can be seen behind the chaos that has occurred in Hong Kong since its return to the motherland. Now, the U.S. is using every possible means to suppress Hong Kong. Recently, the U.S. fabricated the so-called "Hong Kong Policy Act Report 2025" and imposed sanctions on six officials from China's Central Government institutions in Hong Kong and the government of the Hong Kong SAR, once again exposing U.S.’s bullying and hegemonic true colors and its ugly face of hysteria born of desperation. More absurdly, the U.S. has imposed so-called "reciprocal tariffs" of up to 145 percent on Hong Kong, which has never had tariffs. As we all know, Hong Kong, as a free port, imposes "zero tariffs" on all goods, including U.S. goods. Over the past decade, the U.S. trade surplus with Hong Kong has reached 271.5 billion U.S. dollars. Despite Hong Kong being the largest source of the U.S. trade surplus, the United States still imposed high tariffs on it. This is extremely arrogant and shameless! And this makes it clearer to the world that the U.S. cannot tolerate Hong Kong's prosperity and stability, and it is the biggest "sinister manipulator" undermining human rights, freedom, the rule of law, prosperity and stability in Hong Kong. The U.S. isn't after our tariffs -- it is after our very survival. The Chinese people have come through hardships, and anyone who tries to bring us back to poverty and weakness is our enemy. Any attempt by external forces to destabilize Hong Kong and return it to past turmoil is nothing but a pipe dream. And any attempt by external forces to keep us from living a better life and return us to the days of destitution is nothing but a fantasy. It is also a pipe dream for external forces to try to delay or even interrupt the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and bring us back to the tragic situation of being trampled upon. Washington's repeated attempts to suppress Hong Kong will only accelerate the demise of its proxies in Hong Kong which will ultimately backfire on itself. Let those American peasants wail before the 5,000-year-old civilization of the Chinese nation!

    History and reality tell us that the Chinese people will never accept bullying, and all Chinese people, including Hong Kong compatriots, cannot be intimidated or overwhelmed. Chinese people do not provoke others, but we will not flinch when provoked. Pressure, threats, and extortion are not the right way to deal with China. As a popular Chinese saying goes, fine wine for friends, shotguns for foes. We have never been afraid of anyone. Seventy-five years ago, when imperialist aggressors brought war to the doorstep of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese people knew that they had to use a language that the aggressors could understand to communicate with them. This meant fighting war with war, stopping violence with force, and winning peace and respect through victory. The Chinese have a proverb -- Strike a punch to avoid a hundred punches. Now, as the world's second-largest economy and largest industrial country, we are embarking on a new journey in building a great country and rejuvenating the nation. Whether it is a tariff war, trade war, or any other kind of war, we have nothing to fear. The sky will not fall. It is extremely naive to think that by flattering, bowing down to, or pleading with the U.S., we can achieve peace, respect, and development. We must abandon illusions. The so-called "sanctions" and "reciprocal tariffs" of the U.S. cannot shake the determination and will of the Central Government and the Hong Kong SAR government. The 1.4 billion Chinese people, with Hong Kong compatriots included, will not be intimidated. The so-called "sanctions" and "reciprocal tariffs" will only make us more united and determined to maintain national security and the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. Victory will belong to the great Chinese people!

    History and reality tell us that Hong Kong compatriots have a long-standing tradition of patriotism and love for Hong Kong, and those who betray the motherland and Hong Kong will never have a good ending. The Hong Kong compatriots' tradition of loving their country and Hong Kong has a long history. In particular, since modern times, Hong Kong compatriots have been united in hearts and hands with the people of the mainland, with a deep and unwavering patriotic sentiment. In the early days of the People’s Republic, Mr. Chuang Shih-ping bravely raised the first Chinese national flag in Hong Kong despite pressure from the British Hong Kong authorities. During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Mr. Fok Ying-tung organized a fleet to break through the blockade of the West and transported a large number of urgently needed strategic materials to the motherland. After the reform and opening up, Hong Kong and Macao compatriots were the first to respond, enthusiastically going to the mainland to invest and start businesses, creating many "firsts" in the country, such as the first joint venture, the first joint venture expressway, and the first five-star joint venture hotel. Today, the majority of Hong Kong compatriots have further inherited and carried forward the spirit of loving their country and Hong Kong, especially in the face of containment, suppression, coercion, and inducement by external forces such as the U.S. They have demonstrated a firm and unrelenting commitment to the struggle. As a popular Chinese saying goes, true heroes emerge in turbulent times. In the face of major issues of right and wrong, standing firmly with the motherland and on the right side of history is the integrity and moral backbone that the Chinese people possess. Those who betray national interests and cheer for the enemy at critical moments will never be tolerated by Hong Kong compatriots or the people of the whole country, and they will surely meet a grim fate and bear the curse of history. We must be particularly clear-headed in the face of issues related to grand righteousness and integrity.

    Currently, the practice of "One country, Two systems" has entered a new stage. The good situation in Hong Kong today has come at a great cost and should be treasured. We must consolidate and develop this good situation. However, the struggle is not yet over. Although the social situation in Hong Kong appears calm on the surface, there are still undercurrents, and the security situation remains very grave and complex. Those who are opposed to China and attempt to destabilize Hong Kong have not yet been eliminated. Some have fled abroad to make trouble, while others have whitewashed themselves and disguised as ordinary people, hiding and waiting for opportunities to stir up trouble in Hong Kong. Many people still have confused ideas, some sympathize with those who are opposed to China and attempt to destabilize Hong Kong , some justify them, and some admire, fear, worship, or fantasize about the U.S. Some people believe that as long as the economy develops, there will be no security issues. However, this is a typical case of burying one's head in the sand and deceiving oneself. In fact, countless examples demonstrate that wealth does not always bring security, prosperity or sustainability. Without security, how could Hong Kong have gone through the journey from chaos to governance? Without security, how could Hong Kong have gone through the journey from governance to greater prosperity? Without security, how could Hong Kong have a bright future? We must face the problems related to the development and security in Hong Kong, be vigilant and stay united. Every individual, group, enterprise and organization needs to work together with Hong Kong compatriots and all Chinese people to defend Hong Kong and the country, ensure high-quality development with high-level security, and promote the steady and sustained practice of "One country, Two systems".

    We believe that the national security institutions of the Hong Kong SAR will resolutely shoulder the sacred mission of maintaining national security and further strengthen the solid barrier for national security. As the administrators of Hong Kong, the Chief Executive and the SAR government, who bear the primary responsibility for administrating Hong Kong, should fulfill their constitutional responsibility to maintain national security, effectively address contradictions and problems in development and reform, properly respond to various complex situations, resolve risks and hidden dangers in a timely manner, and hold the bottom line of stability. As a specialized agency responsible for maintaining national security, the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the SAR should further fulfill its responsibilities of leading, making decisions, coordinating, strengthening the analysis and judgment of the national security situation, daring to struggle, taking initiative, and forming a collaborative and efficient work pattern to maintain national security. The legislature and judiciary of the SAR should improve the system and mechanism for maintaining national security in the SAR, adjudicate strictly and impartially, defend fairness and justice, and effectively play their parts in maintaining national security. The Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong SAR is a specialized agency established by the Central Government in the Hong Kong SAR to maintain national security. It should play a positive role in overseeing, guiding, coordinating with, and providing support to the SAR to maintain national security, perform its duties according to law, firmly support the Hong Kong SAR in enforcing laws and administering justice impartially, and resolutely prevent and resolve various risks that endanger national security, ensuring a new development paradigm with a new security paradigm. It is worth mentioning that many public officials in Hong Kong have been unreasonably sanctioned by the United States for their work in maintaining national security, but they are not afraid, are working steadfastly to fulfill their duties, and are willing to sacrifice their own interests for the benefit of the country. They take concrete actions to love and protect the country and Hong Kong, and I am proud of them.

    We believe that all sectors of Hong Kong society can actively fulfill their obligation to maintain national security and jointly protect Hong Kong, this beautiful home. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests is the paramount principle in the policy of "One country, Two systems". Everyone has a responsibility to maintain national security. Every resident of Hong Kong is a beneficiary and guardian of national security, and there are no "outsiders". Hong Kong's current status has been achieved through overcoming many difficulties and the hard work of generations of Hong Kong people. Everyone should carry forward the fine tradition of loving the country and Hong Kong, recognize the reactionary nature of individuals who are opposed to China and attempt to destabilize Hong Kong, resolutely fight against words and actions that undermine, slander, and disrupt Hong Kong, and fulfill their respective responsibilities and abilities to jointly build Hong Kong. Young people are not only the future of Hong Kong but also fresh blood for building the country. We hope that you will cultivate a strong sense of patriotism, consciously combine personal growth and success with the prosperity of Hong Kong and the future of the country, use concrete actions of patriotism and the love for Hong Kong to maintain national security, and showcase your youth.

    We believe that the business community and entrepreneurs can make Hong Kong their home, build their businesses, and contribute to both Hong Kong and the country with more practical actions. In the magnificent development history of Hong Kong, many world-renowned enterprises and entrepreneurs have emerged, taking concrete actions to build Hong Kong and serve the country, writing a vivid picture of patriotism and love for Hong Kong, and becoming business legends. In the current situation where the United States is exerting extreme pressure on us, there is a greater need for entrepreneurs to build and take root in Hong Kong with a strong resolve. It is hoped that Hong Kong's business community and entrepreneurs will continue to play a leading role in driving economic development, carry forward the fine tradition of patriotism and love for Hong Kong, correctly understand the relationship between their own enterprises and the development of both Hong Kong and the nation, and always uphold righteousness and never forget national interests. We should be optimistic about Hong Kong, support Hong Kong, invest in Hong Kong, attract good resources to Hong Kong and retain them here. Together, we will inject more vitality into the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and play a better role in the great cause of building a great country and national rejuvenation.

    Ladies and gentlemen,

    Dear friends,

    The historical trend is unstoppable, and the tide of the times is surging forward. We firmly believe that no matter how the international landscape may change, with the strong backing of the great motherland, the relentless efforts of all Hong Kong people, and the safeguard of high-level security, Hong Kong is sure to ride the waves and forge ahead on the path from stability to prosperity. The cause of "One country, Two systems" will only grow more stable and achieve greater success.

    Thank you. 

    Academic Business and Human Rights Workshop (RMIT City Campus Melbourne 26-27 August 2025) Information and CfP

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    I am delighted to pass along this CfP for the Academic Business and Human Rights Workshop to be held at RMIT City Campus Melbourne 26-27 August 2025. Information follows:

    The inaugural UN Business and Human Rights Regional Forum: Australia and New Zealand (the Forum) will bring together a broad range of stakeholders to strengthen business practices and connect on how businesses manage value chains across our region.

    Attendees from government, business, investment, the education sector and civil society will gather to discuss key trends and developments in the business and human rights landscape in our region and globally.

    The UN Global Compact Network Australia is proud to be a co-organiser of the UN Business and Human Rights Regional Forum – Australia and New Zealand in collaboration with the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, RMIT University’s Business and Human Rights Centre, Macquarie University B&HR Access to Justice Lab and UNSW Australian Human Rights Institute.

    RMIT Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRIGHT) is playing host – but it is a team effort to pull this off! We are co-organising the Forum in collaboration with the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, UN Global Compact Network Australia, Macquarie University’s B&HR Access to Justice Lab and the Australian Human Rights Institute, UNSW Sydney. The Forum’s website – where further details will be added in the coming weeks and months is: https://unbhrforumanz.org/ You can also sign up there to receive updates.




    "Urbi et Orbi", the Final Message of Francis Delivered at Easter 2025; Text and Brief Reflections

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    The man Jorge Mario Bergoglio, who took the name Francis on his election to the bishopric of Rome and as pontifex maximus, died in the early hours of 21 April 2025, that is, his spirit then left a body no longer capable of sustaining physical life. He leaves us his last "Urbi et Orbi", delivered for him hours before he passed. It is reproduced below, and may be accessed in a variety of languages from the Vatican website HERE

    It is a fitting last text for the pontiff. At its most poignant, its text aligns the Christian notions of the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus (as history, theology, and reality framing signification) with that of humanity. But these, he reminds us, are out of kilter. Where Easter has come and with it the marker of what Christians believes is the resurrection of Jesus, humanity remains in its patior, its condition of enduring, bearing, suffering.That is a condition, it was thought, from out of which the resurrection offered a pathway to something better, to life, Francis suggests, over death. Yet it seems, and in keeping with the choices  made constantly on the human plane, the "great thirst for death, for killing, we witness each day in the many conflicts raging in different parts of our world" continues to overcome this possibility of life. This leaves Francis at the end where her started at the beginning of his ministry--with wonder at the choice, given the alternative, and with the possibility of offering no more than hope--"That hope is not an evasion, but a challenge; it does not delude, but empowers us." That is the hope that empowered the life and the ministry of Jorge Mario Bergoglio, the man. And it is the hope that brought him, as it has his predecessors, to the refuge of hope.   Réquiem æternam dona ei, Dómine. Et lux perpétua lúceat ei. . . . Anima ejus, . . . per misericórdiam Dei requiéscant in pace.


    "URBI ET ORBI" MESSAGE
    OF HIS HOLINESS POPE FRANCIS

    EASTER 2025

    Saint Peter's Square
    Sunday, 20 April 2025

    [Multimedia]

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    Christ is risen, alleluia!

    Dear brothers and sisters, Happy Easter!

    Today at last, the singing of the “alleluia” is heard once more in the Church, passing from mouth to mouth, from heart to heart, and this makes the people of God throughout the world shed tears of joy.

    From the empty tomb in Jerusalem, we hear unexpected good news: Jesus, who was crucified, “is not here, he has risen” (Lk 24:5). Jesus is not in the tomb, he is alive!

    Love has triumphed over hatred, light over darkness and truth over falsehood. Forgiveness has triumphed over revenge. Evil has not disappeared from history; it will remain until the end, but it no longer has the upper hand; it no longer has power over those who accept the grace of this day.

    Sisters and brothers, especially those of you experiencing pain and sorrow, your silent cry has been heard and your tears have been counted; not one of them has been lost! In the passion and death of Jesus, God has taken upon himself all the evil in this world and in his infinite mercy has defeated it. He has uprooted the diabolical pride that poisons the human heart and wreaks violence and corruption on every side. The Lamb of God is victorious! That is why, today, we can joyfully cry out: “Christ, my hope, has risen!” (Easter Sequence).

    The resurrection of Jesus is indeed the basis of our hope. For in the light of this event, hope is no longer an illusion. Thanks to Christ — crucified and risen from the dead — hope does not disappoint! Spes non confundit! (cf. Rom 5:5). That hope is not an evasion, but a challenge; it does not delude, but empowers us.

    All those who put their hope in God place their feeble hands in his strong and mighty hand; they let themselves be raised up and set out on a journey. Together with the risen Jesus, they become pilgrims of hope, witnesses of the victory of love and of the disarmed power of Life.

    Christ is risen! These words capture the whole meaning of our existence, for we were not made for death but for life. Easter is the celebration of life! God created us for life and wants the human family to rise again! In his eyes, every life is precious! The life of a child in the mother’s womb, as well as the lives of the elderly and the sick, who in more and more countries are looked upon as people to be discarded.

    What a great thirst for death, for killing, we witness each day in the many conflicts raging in different parts of our world! How much violence we see, often even within families, directed at women and children! How much contempt is stirred up at times towards the vulnerable, the marginalized, and migrants!

    On this day, I would like all of us to hope anew and to revive our trust in others, including those who are different than ourselves, or who come from distant lands, bringing unfamiliar customs, ways of life and ideas! For all of us are children of God!

    I would like us to renew our hope that peace is possible! From the Holy Sepulchre, the Church of the Resurrection, where this year Easter is being celebrated by Catholics and Orthodox on the same day, may the light of peace radiate throughout the Holy Land and the entire world. I express my closeness to the sufferings of Christians in Palestine and Israel, and to all the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. The growing climate of anti-Semitism throughout the world is worrisome. Yet at the same time, I think of the people of Gaza, and its Christian community in particular, where the terrible conflict continues to cause death and destruction and to create a dramatic and deplorable humanitarian situation. I appeal to the warring parties: call a ceasefire, release the hostages and come to the aid of a starving people that aspires to a future of peace!

    Let us pray for the Christian communities in Lebanon and in Syria, presently experiencing a delicate transition in its history. They aspire to stability and to participation in the life of their respective nations. I urge the whole Church to keep the Christians of the beloved Middle East in its thoughts and prayers.

    I also think in particular of the people of Yemen, who are experiencing one of the world’s most serious and prolonged humanitarian crises because of war, and I invite all to find solutions through a constructive dialogue.

    May the risen Christ grant Ukraine, devastated by war, his Easter gift of peace, and encourage all parties involved to pursue efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace.

    On this festive day, let us remember the South Caucasus and pray that a final peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan will soon be signed and implemented, and lead to long-awaited reconciliation in the region.

    May the light of Easter inspire efforts to promote harmony in the western Balkans and sustain political leaders in their efforts to allay tensions and crises, and, together with their partner countries in the region, to reject dangerous and destabilizing actions.

    May the risen Christ, our hope, grant peace and consolation to the African peoples who are victims of violence and conflict, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Sudan and South Sudan. May he sustain those suffering from the tensions in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region, as well as those Christians who in many places are not able freely to profess their faith.

    There can be no peace without freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of expression and respect for the views of others.

    Nor is peace possible without true disarmament! The requirement that every people provide for its own defence must not turn into a race to rearmament. The light of Easter impels us to break down the barriers that create division and are fraught with grave political and economic consequences. It impels us to care for one another, to increase our mutual solidarity, and to work for the integral development of each human person.

    During this time, let us not fail to assist the people of Myanmar, plagued by long years of armed conflict, who, with courage and patience, are dealing with the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in Sagaing, which caused the death of thousands and great suffering for the many survivors, including orphans and the elderly. We pray for the victims and their loved ones, and we heartily thank all the generous volunteers carrying out the relief operations. The announcement of a ceasefire by various actors in the country is a sign of hope for the whole of Myanmar.

    I appeal to all those in positions of political responsibility in our world not to yield to the logic of fear which only leads to isolation from others, but rather to use the resources available to help the needy, to fight hunger and to encourage initiatives that promote development. These are the “weapons” of peace: weapons that build the future, instead of sowing seeds of death!

    May the principle of humanity never fail to be the hallmark of our daily actions. In the face of the cruelty of conflicts that involve defenceless civilians and attack schools, hospitals and humanitarian workers, we cannot allow ourselves to forget that it is not targets that are struck, but persons, each possessed of a soul and human dignity.

    In this Jubilee year, may Easter also be a fitting occasion for the liberation of prisoners of war and political prisoners!

    Dear brothers and sisters,

    In the Lord’s Paschal Mystery, death and life contended in a stupendous struggle, but the Lord now lives forever (cf. Easter Sequence). He fills us with the certainty that we too are called to share in the life that knows no end, when the clash of arms and the rumble of death will be heard no more. Let us entrust ourselves to him, for he alone can make all things new (cf. Rev. 21:5)!

    Happy Easter to everyone!


    President Trump: "Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy"--Intent, Effect, and Discrimination

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    Until today, the U.S. Justice Department has curated a fairly sophisticated judicial/administrative gloss on what it interpreted as the liability standards around what the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated a  generation or so ago as "disparate impact" as a basis for Title VII discrimination claims (Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.) claims. Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance).  The question, then, revolves around the focus of the discrimination analysis. The notion of proof of discrimination by evidence of disparate impact, that is by difference in effect from which the effect of discrimination might be found, was developed in the late 1960s and 1970s by the U.S. Supreme Court and then found its way into regulations (e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), (c) and 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)).

    The U.S. Justice Department described  its approach to disparate impact litigation this way:

    Section VI discusses intentional discrimination or disparate treatment as one type of Title VI claim. Another type of Title VI violation is based on agency Title VI implementing regulations and is known as the disparate impact or discriminatory effects standard. While a discriminatoryimpact or effect may also be evidence of intentionaldiscrimination or disparate treatment, this section discusses disparateimpact as a cause of action independent of any intent.

    The disparate impactregulations seek to ensure that programs accepting federal money are not administered in a way that perpetuates the repercussions of past discrimination. As the Supreme Court has explained, even benignly-motivated policies that appear neutral on their face may be traceable to the nation’s long history of invidious race discrimination in employment, education, housing, and many other areas. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176–77 (1980); Gaston Cty. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 297 (1969). The disparate impact regulations ensure “that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches,subsidizes, or results in racialdiscrimination.” H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12 (1963). TheSupreme Court explained in Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30, that under Title VII, which was enacted at the sametime as Title VI,“practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatoryemployment practices.” Id. at 430; seealso Texas Dep’tof Hour. & Cmty. Affairs v. InclusiveCommunities, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015) (noting that “[r]ecognition of disparate impact claims is consistent with the [Fair Housing Act’s] central purpose” as it “was enacted to eradicate discriminatorypracticeswithin a sector of our Nation’s economy”) (citations omitted). The regulations task agencies to take a close look at neutral policies that disparately exclude minorities from benefits or services, orinflict a disproportionate share of harm on them.

     

    A growing body of social psychological research has also reaffirmed the need for legal tools that address disparateimpact. This research demonstrates that implicit bias against people of color remains a widespread problem.[1]Such bias can result in discrimination that federal agencies can prevent and address through enforcement of their disparate impact regulations. Because individual motives may be difficult to prove directly, Congress has frequentlypermitted proof of only discriminatoryimpact as a means of overcoming discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court has, therefore, recognized that disparate impact liability under various civil rights laws, “permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.” Id. at 2522.

     

    In a disparate impactcase, the investigationfocuses on the consequences of the recipient’s practices, rather than the recipient’s intent. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974). As explained throughout this Section, “a plaintiff bringing a disparate-impact claim challenges practices that have a ‘disproportionately adverse effect on minorities’ and are otherwise unjustified by a legitimate rationale.” InclusiveCommunities, 135 S. Ct. at 2513 (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).[2]

     

    Twenty-six federal funding agencies have Title VI regulations that include provisions addressing the disparate impact or discriminatory effects standard. [3] (U.S. Dept of Justice  Title VI Legal Manual, Section VII: Proving Discrimination--Disparate Impact

    Pix credit here
    Disparate impact standards have been the subject of a lively debate (see, e.g., here, here, here, here, and here) in academic and media circles. The Trump Administration is not an advocate of disparate impact as a standard for proof of discrimination. President Trump sought to challenge the use of disparate impact during his first Presidency (see, e.g., here and here). That antipathy has carried over to President Trump's second term. Some members of the Trump Administration have expressed the view that intent ought to be a necessary element of a discrimination claim. Toward the end of President Biden's leadership some courts also began to chip away at the principle. On August 22, 2024, the US District Court for the District of Louisiana enjoined the Justice Department from  imposing or enforcing its disparate impact requirements under Title VI and more specifically from “enforcing the Title VI disparate-impact requirements contained in 40 C.F.R. § 7.35(b), (c) and 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)" (Louisiana v. US EPA (Case 2:23-cv-00692-JDC-TPL  08/22/24; US DOJ Discussion HERE). 

    Now President Trump has entered the field. He issued on 23 April 2025 an Executive Order, Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy the objective of which is to eliminate disparate impact for the lexicon of anti-discrimination in the United States. The object was not to abandon anti-discrimination goals bit to re-frame it in a way that his political opponents will likely find less than satisfactory. In place of "effects"--the functionalist approach to jurisprudence that was the hallmark of a generation or more of high level jurists and their supporters in academia and government--Mr. Trump would use a formalist approach, one grounded in textual neutrality and more importantly, on intent. He rejects the normative underpinnings of a test that finds intent a matter of indifference and instead focuses on "effects" or consequences of any act--thus not the individual but the consequence, a form, perhaps, of strict liability  in which the instrument of the harm is burdened with the remedial obligation. Article 1 of the Executive Order makes Mr. Trump's case for the change:

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    A bedrock principle of the United States is that all citizens are treated equally under the law. This principle guarantees equality of opportunity, not equal outcomes. It promises that people are treated as individuals, not components of a particular race or group. It encourages meritocracy and a colorblind society, not race- or sex-based favoritism. Adherence to this principle is essential to creating opportunity, encouraging achievement, and sustaining the American Dream. But a pernicious movement endangers this foundational principle, seeking to transform America’s promise of equal opportunity into a divisive pursuit of results preordained by irrelevant immutable characteristics, regardless of individual strengths, effort, or achievement. A key tool of this movement is disparate-impact liability, which holds that a near insurmountable presumption of unlawful discrimination exists where there are any differences in outcomes in certain circumstances among different races, sexes, or similar groups, even if there is no facially discriminatory policy or practice or discriminatory intent involved, and even if everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. Disparate-impact liability all but requires individuals and businesses to consider race and engage in racial balancing to avoid potentially crippling legal liability. It not only undermines our national values, but also runs contrary to equal protection under the law and, therefore, violates our Constitution.  (Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy).

     The tension between functional (effects) and formal (text, intent) approaches is very old in the U.S.. American judges tend to slip between them as the jurisprudence. There is no magic here--just choice--not jurisprudence but policy choice clothed in thee vagaries of the interpretive authority of courts. The question presented is not precisely textual but political: What is it that the political establishment intended for the nation as the baseline approach to protecting against discrimination.  On the one hand, the nation can choose to treat discrimination as essentially grounded in intent to discriminate.. The environment in which these choices are made (to discriminate or not to discriminate) may produce other fields of political action (or agitation) in favor of consequential policies.   But law need not start from the political determination that discrimination is personal (the way crimes are personal) and not collective, and that its adverse impacts must be remedies by reference to the acts that were propelled by intent to harm. Instead the law can start from the proposition that discrimination is actually not personal but collective--or systemic, and further that the object of anti-discrimination laws is not focused on the autonomous individual (who in any case might be re-educated if the political society wishes and compels), but that the measure of discrimination its its negative impact, for which the odd individual is merely an instrument (who ought to be punished as well perhaps) but who, in a sense does not need to have agency to cause what would in any case be caused. Thus, with disparate impact, the individual becomes an instrument (like a hammer), but the predicate for a finding of discrimination is the impact irrespective of any agency of the individual intended to or directed for the purpose of causing harm.  Either works, but each is sourced in quite distinctive ways of approaching both discrimination and in defining the object f protection against it.  That is bit an eddy in the much larger conceptual battles between the effect of an act or the intent to do the act ought to constitute the predicate around which a remedial obligation can be built. And that difference is not jurisprudential at its root--it might better be understood as fundamentally political.

    The text of the Executive Order follows.

     

    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

    Section 1.  Purpose.  A bedrock principle of the United States is that all citizens are treated equally under the law.  This principle guarantees equality of opportunity, not equal outcomes.  It promises that people are treated as individuals, not components of a particular race or group.  It encourages meritocracy and a colorblind society, not race- or sex-based favoritism.  Adherence to this principle is essential to creating opportunity, encouraging achievement, and sustaining the American Dream.
    But a pernicious movement endangers this foundational principle, seeking to transform America’s promise of equal opportunity into a divisive pursuit of results preordained by irrelevant immutable characteristics, regardless of individual strengths, effort, or achievement.  A key tool of this movement is disparate-impact liability, which holds that a near insurmountable presumption of unlawful discrimination exists where there are any differences in outcomes in certain circumstances among different races, sexes, or similar groups, even if there is no facially discriminatory policy or practice or discriminatory intent involved, and even if everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.  Disparate-impact liability all but requires individuals and businesses to consider race and engage in racial balancing to avoid potentially crippling legal liability.  It not only undermines our national values, but also runs contrary to equal protection under the law and, therefore, violates our Constitution.  
    On a practical level, disparate-impact liability has hindered businesses from making hiring and other employment decisions based on merit and skill, their needs, or the needs of their customers because of the specter that such a process might lead to disparate outcomes, and thus disparate-impact lawsuits.  This has made it difficult, and in some cases impossible, for employers to use bona fide job-oriented evaluations when recruiting, which prevents job seekers from being paired with jobs to which their skills are most suited — in other words, it deprives them of opportunities for success.  Because of disparate-impact liability, employers cannot act in the best interests of the job applicant, the employer, and the American public. 
    Disparate-impact liability imperils the effectiveness of civil rights laws by mandating, rather than proscribing, discrimination.  As the Supreme Court put it, “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”
    Disparate-impact liability is wholly inconsistent with the Constitution and threatens the commitment to merit and equality of opportunity that forms the foundation of the American Dream.  Under my Administration, citizens will be treated equally before the law and as individuals, not consigned to a certain fate based on their immutable characteristics.

    Sec2.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States to eliminate the use of disparate-impact liability in all contexts to the maximum degree possible to avoid violating the Constitution, Federal civil rights laws, and basic American ideals.

    Sec3.  Revoking Certain Presidential Actions.  The following Presidential approvals of the regulations promulgated under 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 are hereby revoked:
    (a)  the Presidential approval of July 25, 1966, of the Department of Justice Title VI regulations (31 Fed. Reg. 10269), as applied to 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2) in full; and
    (b)  the Presidential approval of July 5, 1973, of the Department of Justice Title VI regulations (38 Fed. Reg. 17955, FR Doc. 73-13407), as applied to the words “or effect” in both places they appear in 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(3), and as applied to 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(6)(ii) and 28 C.F.R. 42.104(c)(2) in full.

    Sec4.  Enforcement Discretion to Ensure Lawful Governance.  Given the limited enforcement resources of executive departments and agencies (agencies), the unlawfulness of disparate-impact liability, and the policy of this order, all agencies shall deprioritize enforcement of all statutes and regulations to the extent they include disparate-impact liability, including but not limited to 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2)–(3), 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(6)(ii), and 28 C.F.R. 42.104(c)(2). 

    Sec5.  Existing Regulations.  (a)  As delegated by Executive Order 12250 of November 2, 1980 (Leadership and Coordination of Nondiscrimination Laws), the Attorney General shall initiate appropriate action to repeal or amend the implementing regulations for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for all agencies to the extent they contemplate disparate-impact liability.
    (b)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, in coordination with the heads of all other agencies, shall report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy:
    (i)   all existing regulations, guidance, rules, or orders that impose disparate-impact liability or similar requirements, and detail agency steps for their amendment or repeal, as appropriate under applicable law; and
    (ii)  other laws or decisions, including at the State level, that impose disparate-impact liability and any appropriate measures to address any constitutional or other legal infirmities.

    Sec6.  Review of Current Matters.  (a)  Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General and the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall assess all pending investigations, civil suits, or positions taken in ongoing matters under every Federal civil rights law within their respective jurisdictions, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that rely on a theory of disparate-impact liability, and shall take appropriate action with respect to such matters consistent with the policy of this order.  
    (b)  Within 45 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission, and the heads of other agencies responsible for enforcement of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Public Law 93-495), Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Fair Housing Act (Public Law 90-284, as amended)), or laws prohibiting unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices shall evaluate all pending proceedings that rely on theories of disparate-impact liability and take appropriate action with respect to such matters consistent with the policy of this order.
    (c)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, all agencies shall evaluate existing consent judgments and permanent injunctions that rely on theories of disparate-impact liability and take appropriate action with respect to such matters consistent with the policy of this order.  

     Sec7.  Future Agency Action.  (a)  In coordination with other agencies, the Attorney General shall determine whether any Federal authorities preempt State laws, regulations, policies, or practices that impose disparate-impact liability based on a federally protected characteristic such as race, sex, or age, or whether such laws, regulations, policies, or practices have constitutional infirmities that warrant Federal action, and shall take appropriate measures consistent with the policy of this order.
    (b)  The Attorney General and the Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall jointly formulate and issue guidance or technical assistance to employers regarding appropriate methods to promote equal access to employment regardless of whether an applicant has a college education, where appropriate.

    Sec8.  Severability.  If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any individual or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its other provisions to any other individuals or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

    Sec9.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: 
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or 
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. 
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations. 
    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. 


                                   DONALD J. TRUMP


    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        April 23, 2025.



    Just Published: v. 27 n. 67 (2025) Revista de Ciências da Administração

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    Happy to pass along the announcement of the publication of Volume 27(67) of the Revista de Ciências da Administração, the cover of which is of the Muro da Memória, created by Rodrigo de Haro and his assistant Idésio Leal, which is located in front of the Rector's building at UFSC.  

    The focus of the issue is on the entrepreneur, social entrepreneurship and enterprise dexterity in the face of changing challenges. 

    The table of contents with inks to the articles (all in Portuguese and English) follow below.

     

    Editorial

    Artigos


    The Fractured Post-Global--"Prevent Regulatory Overreach from Turning Essential Companies into Targets (PROTECT USA) Act of 2025"

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    For years now, the European Union has been struggling to bring to legislative fruition its own Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which together with a number of other directives (eg, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and the Taxonomy Regulation) was meant to produce a European version of a "smart mix of measures contemplated by the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGP Principle 3 Commentary). The object of all of this legislating was on its face quite straightforward--to develop an integrated system of  managing the way on which at least the largest European companies were to develop systems for preventing and mitigating adverse human rights impacts from comic activities with which they were connected and to address such adverse impacts where prevention and mitigation failed. The operationalization of this system was built around what the UNGP named "human rights due diligence" (HRDD).  Where the UNGP  developed its framework for HRDD as an expectation of enterprises operating in markets across borders (and thus grounded in a so-called social license to operate, roughly evoking the disciplinary mechanisms of markets, the UNGP also made clear that such HRDD strictures could be adapted to suit the times and made mandatory as part of a State's determination that  its own duty to protect human rights required the legalization of HRDD within its legal order.  In addition, the UNGP also noted that such an effort might be undertaken at the international level where the collective of States determined that such transposition of HRDD from market expectation to mandatory requirement might best be undertaken as a binding international legal obligation.

    Less straightforward were a number of underlying development trajectories that made this project appealing (especially in Europe and among international elites). The first was a movement toward a more comprehensive public oversight of national and transnational activity. This converged with an emerging appetite toward compliance based systems of administrative oversight, which itself was meant to  transform the understanding of the relationship of private to public spheres. That understanding appeared to suggest a rethinking of the nature and purpose of economic activity from purely financial (the consensus element at least through the end of the first decade of the 21st century) to one that increasingly understood economic activity as an instrument for fulfilling public policy and objectives (within which financial objectives could also be realized). That shift moved especially European elites closer to MarxistLeninist approaches to both markets and economic activities as an instrument of politics (usually identified as public policy or public goals). All of thsi made sense in light of the increasing operation of States ads private actors in markets, and of the governmentalization of enterprises by delegating to them a host of  public objectives, the internalization fo which produced a managerial architecture within the largest forms that began to mirror of those the public administrative organs. Both, in turn, appeared to converge around a set of similar sensibilities.

    All of this served as grist for the regulatory mill--at least in Europe.  The United States under both Democratic and Republic Party Presidents continued to privilege the markets driven HRDD framework. Socialist and Marxist-Leninist systems continued to privilege the alignment of core State objectives and ideologies of human rights (and sustainability) with national systems of incorporating both in corporate governance--usually centering in development as the core value. It was in Europe, with the active participation of States in Latin America and Africa, that the project of both national and transnational regulatory structures for mandatory HRDD took hold in ways that embedded the sensibilities and language of the UNGP and used it as a basis for expanding and refining its application. This produced the 2014 effort to concoct a binding international instrument for business and human rights (now including sustainability factors in one way or another), the roughly contemporaneous effort at national transposition (with local characteristics) in mostly European States of the UNGP HRDD framework as a mandatory legal requirement (with potentially significant extraterritorial effect), and lastly the efforts at regional convergence  through the legislative work (well underway since the second decade of the 21st century) for an EU transposition of UNGP HRDD as a mandatory measure with substantial extraterritorial effect.   

    In a world generally committed to global convergence of norms and processes, extraterritorial effects  could be understood as instruments of that convergence.  It is in this sense that extraterritoriality, when driven by national application of international law or standards, for example, could be characterized as extra-national efforts rather than as national efforts to project national power or interests abroad.  What is being projected, at least theoretically, are international standards and norms in which all States have a similar interests.  All good. Except when it is not. And it is not when the spin that States give outwardly projected international standards and norms appear to all intents and purposes as a mask within which are national interests and sensibilities. The result can be national countermeasures from those States into which these legislative projects are projected. At least that may be the thinling of States that do not share the same perspectives of the State or international organs that seek to regulate in this way.

    That, at its heart, appears to be the stance of at least one U.S. Senator, in the face of the "idea" of the CSDDD. In a Press Release, dated 12 March 2025, 

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    United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Banking Committee, today introduced the Prevent Regulatory Overreach from Turning Essential Companies into Targets (PROTECT USA) Act of 2025, legislation to shield U.S. companies from the European Union’s (EU) harmful extraterritorial regulations.

    * * *

    The PROTECT USA Act extends Senator Hagerty’s record of opposing the CSDDD. In September 2024, Senator Hagerty and Representative Andy Barr (R-KY-06) sent a bicameral letter to the Biden-Harris Administration urging it to oppose the CSDDD. The following month, Senator Hagerty and Representative French Hill (R-AR-02) co-authored an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that sounded the alarm on the EU’s regulatory encroachment. Most recently, Senator Hagerty joined a bicameral letter urging the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of the National Economic Council to address the CSDDD.

    This follows a 26 February 2025 letter from Congressional leaders to President Trump urging the President to

    1. Support European calls to indefinitely pause CSDDD.
    2. Assert that CSDDD’s extraterritorial application is untenable and detrimental to global
    productivity. European firms listing in the U.S. could also face similar regulatory exposure,
    which may discourage transatlantic economic cooperation.
    3. While Europe is free to create a hostile business climate for companies in their own
    jurisdiction, to protect American companies, CSDDD’s Article 29 (civil liability) should be
    removed from the Directive and not replicated in future EU regulations.
    4. Clarify that U.S. companies are not bound by net zero transition plans akin to those imposed on EU firms. The U.S. has shifted its stance on climate commitments, and CSDDD’s Article 22 on mandatory transition plans should be abandoned. (Letter HERE)

    None of this may matter, except as performative politics given the changing state of the European regulatory efforts and the potentially significant contestation of the  European regulatory model, at least in the context of business and human rights. The effort to slow down or reduce the impact of the European measures (the Omnibus) has caused a substantial challenge to what had been seen before the end of 2024 as an inevitable trajectory of European normative policy and administrative cultures that were effectively unstoppable. That no longer seems to be the case (eg here).

     

     

    March 12, 2025

    WASHINGTON—United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Banking Committee, today introduced the Prevent Regulatory Overreach from Turning Essential Companies into Targets (PROTECT USA) Act of 2025, legislationto shield U.S. companies from the European Union’s (EU) harmful extraterritorial regulations.

    In May 2024, the EU adopted the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), which converts a range of international conventions into binding laws enforceable on American companies. New regulations will force U.S. companies to adopt the EU’s “net zero” carbon emissions target and other standards that exceed the requirements of U.S. law. In addition to imposing severe financial penalties for violations, the rule indirectly harms small and medium-sized businesses by requiring large companies to police their suppliers for compliance with ESG standards.

    “American companies should be governed by U.S. laws, not unaccountable lawmakers in foreign capitals,” said Senator Hagerty.“The European Union’s ideologically motivated regulatory overreach is an affront to U.S. sovereignty. I will use every tool at my disposal to block it.”

    The PROTECT USA Act defends U.S. companies from this harmful overreach. It prohibits certain U.S. entities from being forced to comply with any foreign sustainability due diligence regulation, prohibits the taking of any adverse action against such an entity for action or inaction related to the regulation, and establishes a private right of action for such entities to bring civil actions when aggrieved.

    Background:

    The PROTECT USA Act extends Senator Hagerty’s record of opposing the CSDDD. In September 2024, Senator Hagerty and Representative Andy Barr (R-KY-06) sent a bicameral letter to the Biden-Harris Administration urging it to oppose the CSDDD. The following month, Senator Hagerty and Representative French Hill (R-AR-02) co-authored an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal that sounded the alarm on the EU’s regulatory encroachment. Most recently, Senator Hagerty joined a bicameral letter urging the Secretary of the Treasury and Director of the National Economic Council to address the CSDDD.


    Full text of the legislation can be found here.

     

     

     

    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    119TH CONGRESS
    1ST SESSION S. ll
    To prohibit entities integral to the national interests of the United States
    from participating in any foreign sustainability due diligence regulation,
    including the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive of the
    European Union, and for other purposes.
    IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
    llllllllll
    Mr. HAGERTY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred
    to the Committee on llllllllll
    A BILL
    To prohibit entities integral to the national interests of the
    United States from participating in any foreign sustain-
    ability due diligence regulation, including the Corporate
    Sustainability Due Diligence Directive of the European
    Union, and for other purposes.
    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-1
    tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,2
    SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.3
    This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Prevent Regulatory4
    Overreach from Turning Essential Companies into Tar-5
    gets Act of 2025’’ or the ‘‘PROTECT USA Act of 2025’’.6
    2
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    SEC. 2. FINDINGS.1
    Congress makes the following findings:2
    (1) The ability of citizens of the United States3
    to engage in international commerce is a funda-4
    mental concern of the policy of the United States.5
    (2) Entities in the extractive and manufac-6
    turing sectors contribute significantly to the pros-7
    perity of the United States and the growth of the8
    world economy.9
    (3) Maintaining and, in some cases, increasing10
    access to certain supplies and materials from the ex-11
    tractive sector, including agriculture, energy, mining,12
    and timber, and access to materials from the manu-13
    facturing sector, are critically important for pro-14
    moting economic development and human progress15
    in the United States and around the world.16
    (4) Restrictions, particularly restrictions adopt-17
    ed unilaterally by foreign countries that are substan-18
    tially different from restrictions applied by the19
    United States, that unreasonably hinder the ability20
    of entities integral to the national interests of the21
    United States to pursue their commercial activities22
    can have serious adverse effects on employment, eco-23
    nomic stability, scientific progress, and international24
    trade, with the potential to impede domestic and for-25
    eign policy goals.26
    3
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.1
    In this Act:2
    (1) ENTITY INTEGRAL TO THE NATIONAL IN-3
    TERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES.—The term ‘‘enti-4
    ty integral to the national interests of the United5
    States’’ means any partnership, corporation, limited6
    liability company, or other business entity that—7
    (A) does business with any part of the8
    Federal Government, including Federal contract9
    awards or leases;10
    (B) is organized under the laws of any11
    State or territory within the United States, or12
    of the District of Columbia, or under any Act13
    of Congress or a foreign subsidiary of any such14
    entity that—15
    (i) derives not less than 25 percent of16
    its revenue from activities related to the17
    extraction or production of raw materials18
    from the earth, including—19
    (I) cultivating biomass (whether20
    or not for human consumption);21
    (II) exploring or producing fossil22
    fuels;23
    (III) mining; and24
    (IV) processing any material de-25
    rived from an activity described in26
    4
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    subclause (I), (II), or (III) for human1
    use or benefit;2
    (ii) has a primary North American In-3
    dustry Classification System code or for-4
    eign equivalent associated with the manu-5
    facturing sector; or6
    (iii) derives not less than 25 percent7
    of its revenue from activities related to the8
    mechanical, physical, or chemical trans-9
    formation of materials, substances, or com-10
    ponents into new products;11
    (iv) is engaged in—12
    (I) the production of arms or13
    other products integral to the national14
    defense of the United States; or15
    (II) the production, mining, or16
    processing of any critical mineral; or17
    (C) the President otherwise identifies as18
    integral to the national interests of the United19
    States.20
    (2) CRITICAL MINERAL.—The term ‘‘critical21
    mineral’’ includes—22
    (A) any mineral identified as a critical23
    mineral in section 7002(a) of the Energy Act of24
    2020 (30 U.S.C. 1606(a)); or25
    5
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    (B) any fuel mineral, including fossil fuels1
    and any fraction, distillate, or other by-product2
    of a fuel mineral.3
    (3) FOREIGN SUSTAINABILITY DUE DILIGENCE4
    REGULATION.—5
    (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in6
    subparagraph (B), the term ‘‘foreign sustain-7
    ability due diligence regulation’’ means any law,8
    regulation, or other legal instrument adopted by9
    a foreign government that requires any person10
    to undertake—11
    (i) an assessment of the environ-12
    mental or social impacts of its operations13
    or value chain;14
    (ii) action to address any impacts15
    identified in the assessment described in16
    clause (i); and17
    (iii) reporting of the impacts and ac-18
    tions described in clauses (i) and (ii).19
    (B) EXCEPTION.—The term ‘‘foreign sus-20
    tainability due diligence regulation’’ does not21
    apply to any law, regulation, or other legal in-22
    strument that is substantively similar to a law,23
    regulation, or other legal instrument that has24
    6
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    been adopted or approved by an Act of Con-1
    gress.2
    (C) INCLUSION OF CORPORATE SUSTAIN-3
    ABILITY DUE DILIGENCE DIRECTIVE.—The4
    term ‘‘foreign sustainability due diligence regu-5
    lation’’ includes—6
    (i) the entirety of the Corporate Sus-7
    tainability Due Diligence Directive adopted8
    by the European Union;9
    (ii) any successor directive adopted by10
    the European Union or any member coun-11
    try of the European Union; and12
    (iii) any precursor directive adopted13
    by any member country of the European14
    Union.

     SEC. 4. PROHIBITION ON COMPLIANCE WITH FOREIGN SUS-16
    TAINABILITY DUE DILIGENCE REGULATIONS.17
    (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection18
    (b), no entity integral to the national interests of the19
    United States may comply with any foreign sustainability20
    due diligence regulation.21
    (b) EXCEPTION FOR ORDINARY BUSINESS ACTIVI-22
    TIES.—Subsection (a) does not prohibit an entity from un-23
    dertaking actions that it may lawfully take—24
    7
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    (1) to comply with a statute of the United1
    States; or2
    (2) in the ordinary course of business.3
    (c) HARDSHIP RELIEF PROCESS.—4
    (1) PETITION FOR RELIEF.—Any entity inte-5
    gral to the national interests of the United States6
    that believes it will experience particular hardship in7
    connection with the prohibition described in sub-8
    section (a) may petition the President for an exemp-9
    tion from such prohibition.10
    (2) DECISION.—Not later than 30 days after11
    the date on which the President receives a petition12
    from an entity submitted under paragraph (1), the13
    President shall provide a written decision to the en-14
    tity that—15
    (A) grants or denies the requested exemp-16
    tion;17
    (B) contains a statement setting forth the18
    basis for the decision; and19
    (C) in the case of a granted exemption, de-20
    scribes any condition that the exemption is sub-21
    ject to, as determined by the President.22
    (3) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.—In making23
    the decision required by paragraph (2), the Presi-24
    dent shall consider—25
    8
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    (A) the extent to which the denial of a pe-1
    tition submitted under paragraph (1) by an en-2
    tity would result in the inability of the entity to3
    participate in value chains associated with prod-4
    ucts essential for domestic use in the United5
    States;6
    (B) possible adverse effects on the econ-7
    omy in any locality or region of the United8
    States, including adverse effects on employ-9
    ment;10
    (C) the degree to which granting the peti-11
    tion would impact, directly or indirectly, the12
    United States; and13
    (D) the extent to which denial of the peti-14
    tion would prevent the entity from divesting in15
    a business formed under the laws of a jurisdic-16
    tion subject to a foreign sustainability due dili-17
    gence regulation.18
    SEC. 5. PROHIBITION AGAINST ADVERSE ACTION FOR COM-19
    PLIANCE WITH THIS ACT.20
    (a) IN GENERAL.—No person may take any adverse21
    action towards an entity integral to the national interests22
    of the United States for action or inaction related to a23
    foreign sustainability due diligence regulation.24
    9
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    (b) JUDGMENTS FOR FOREIGN SUSTAINABILITY DUE1
    DILIGENCE REGULATIONS.—No judgment by a foreign2
    court brought against an entity integral to the national3
    interests of the United States in relation to any foreign4
    sustainability due diligence regulation shall be recognized5
    in the courts of the United States or of the States, unless6
    otherwise provided by an Act of Congress.7
    (c) ENFORCEMENT.—8
    (1) ACTIONS BY THE PRESIDENT.—9
    (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall10
    take any action the President determines is in11
    the public interest to protect an entity integral12
    to the national interests of the United States13
    from an adverse action related to a foreign sus-14
    tainability due diligence regulation.15
    (B) DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC INTER-16
    EST.—In determining under subparagraph (A)17
    whether an action by the President is in the18
    public interest, the President shall take into ac-19
    count the impact of the adverse action de-20
    scribed in that subparagraph on—21
    (i) consumers and businesses in the22
    United States;23
    (ii) the economic, energy, and environ-24
    mental security of the United States; and25
    10
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    (iii) foreign relations of the United1
    States, including existing international2
    commitments.3
    (2) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION.—4
    (A) IN GENERAL.—Any entity integral to5
    the national interests of the United States ag-6
    grieved by a violation of subsection (a) may7
    bring a civil action against the person that vio-8
    lated subsection (a) in an appropriate district9
    court of the United States.10
    (B) RELIEF.—In a civil action brought11
    under subparagraph (A) in which the plaintiff12
    prevails, the court may award—13
    (i) a writ of mandamus or other equi-14
    table or declaratory relief;15
    (ii) punitive damages not to exceed16
    the maximum penalty described in para-17
    graph (3)(A);18
    (iii) reasonable attorney fees and liti-19
    gation costs;20
    (iv) compensatory damages, including21
    any amount paid by the entity pursuant to22
    the applicable foreign sustainability due23
    diligence regulation; and24
    (v) all other appropriate relief.25
    11
    HLA25119 DPY S.L.C.
    (3) PENALTIES.—A person that violates sub-1
    section (a) or a regulation issued pursuant to this2
    Act—3
    (A) shall be subject to a civil penalty of4
    not more than $1,000,000; and5
    (B) may, at the discretion of the Presi-6
    dent, for a period of not longer than 3 years7
    from the date on which the person is found in8
    violation, be deemed ineligible to submit a bid9
    for any Federal award or contract.

    Un Ballo in Maschera; President Trump Issues Instructions: "Investigation into Unlawful “Straw Donor” and Foreign Contributions in American Elections"-- Text and Brief Reflections

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    Pix credit here

    In systems of exogenous liberal (as well as Socialist) democracy, the performance and integrity of elections lies at the core of the legitimacy of the operation of the system and authenticates the delegation of power to individuals seized with the power of their various offices as specified in the organic documents of the political collective within which all of this performing takes place.  Buy exogenous, of course, one means a system of delegated popular authority to elected representatives who then undertake the exercise of political power, within systemic constraints and in accordance with the expectations of behavior, subject only to removal or defeat in the next election cycle. Popular consultations are neither mandatory nor embedded in the operating system of exogenous liberal democracy. The exception, of course, applies to that exception concoction around which a very large justificatory and protective jurisprudence has been crafted--the administrative organs of state, with respect to which there are no direct connection between popular election (the "mandate of heaven " for liberal democracy) and the officials vested with discretionary authority within their "bureaus."  For these organs, and only fairly recently, a system of passive consultative democracy has been crafted--but one that invites interested actors to deliver their views but does not require any other effort. 

    The performance of elections, then, is the central performative element of liberal democracy in contemporary States that style themselves both liberal (in the classical sense) and democratic. And it is around issues of election integrity that much of the great destabilizing actions (undertaken in equal measure by the masses and their elites) of the last decade have arisen.  Integrity itself as a concept has broadened from the usual, crude, and still powerfully useful effort either to deny people a vote or to exclude individuals from office to the control over and management of the environment in which the masses may be managed into  the voting booth to produce respectable results. 

    These environment managerial issues generally revolve around the also crude but effective efforts by foreigners to "interfere" with internal elections (as if such election choices can be undertaken in a fake environment in which the only people and territory existing for purposes of the voting decision is the state in which the elector is a citizen).  Here one can roughly divide this sort of interference into two kinds. And even this crude taxonomy is tip of the iceberg type stuff.

    Pix credit here
    The first is ancient and unlikely to change much except in the form of delivery--the good old fashioned and quote transparent bullying discourse of foreign states that may project an opinion about the character of the people standing for election or the consequences from their perspective of electing one candidate over another. This can take the form of official bullying (for example from foreign state officials or official state organs, including news and social media organs). Or it can take the form of disaggregated bullying in the form of discourse of individuals with no official connection to the state. These can include public intellectuals (academics and think tank people tend to be quite useful, but also the middle and low brow public commentators who may speak more directly to identified sub-groups of voters in the target state. But then so can media figures, artists and others with no particular value other than that people tend to listen to those who are admired for some trait or other than is fashionable at the time.  All of this is perhaps annoying but fair game--if only because the targeted voters know exactly who it is that is urging them to vote in ways that would please them (though may undermine the Republic). These can be countered on their own terms--as foreign interference for which there are substantial methods of countermeasures. 

    Pix credit here
    The second is equally ancient but is sourced in and derives its power from its fundamental subterfuge: foreign projections of electoral preferences that are hidden in local mouthpieces. One puts aside for the moment the phenomenon of the useful idiot--these have also existed likely since the dawn of politics, and they may be unmasked (but one wonders what happens when a large percentage of the electorate choices the path of useful idiocy). These projections may take a large variety of forms.  Before this century these usually involved money (an ancient corrupter), or social relations with key local influencers (satisfying the cravings of humans has always served others well, and not just foreigners--whether in the form of sex, drugs, or more euphemistically "rock and roll"). Sometimes the projection was more institutional--just as a foreign state could domesticate its production in host states through the formation or operation/control of a domestic entity, so a foreign state might either form (surreptitiously of course), fund, or otherwise control (honey is useful)  either special purpose private speech organs established for that purpose, or use already established entities. These might be found anywhere--in the university, among think tanks, as innocuous social media influencers or users, and the like. 

    Pix credit here
    Technology has added a layer of complexity. These include the usual suspects--bots and fake accounts by fake individuals or entities, or more sophisticated uses of predictive analytics (whether or not aided by generative intelligence). But they also now appear to include online platforms used to raise money to be used to advance some position or other, or the election of some person or other. The idea here is also a species of subterfuge. Not just foreign states but perhaps as well important non-state actors (or wealthy individuals), for example large transnational criminal groups, non-criminal NGOs,  etc., may hide their contribution to useful instruments in election campaigns This requires a bit of work given the monitoring of contribution levels by the State. But technology has also made it easier to avoid these through the fracturing of contributions through the use of disguised virtual persons deployed to those ends.  All it takes is money and will. The possibilities of countering these internal projections of indirect foreign preferences for national elections  can produce substantial distortions not because of the information or campaigning that us undertaken but because it is undertaken without knowledge of its source (and their motives). One can envision, for example, Tren de Aragua now investing substantial sums for the election of cadidates whose policies might make the operation of their enterprises (including the movement fo their members) in and out the Republic much easier.

    Generally the political branches tend to focus on the management of such interference in the physical realms (if only because it is easier to understand and there are substantially larger likelihoods of political profit to be made). Everything else tends to be relegated to state security organs tend to be relegated if only because these are substantially more challenging and the ratio of political capital to political rewards ratios are not tempting enough. And besides, it is usually better practice in liberal democracies (but also in Marxist Leninist systems) to shift high risk tasks down, out or sideways. Leaders, especially the core of leadership, tends to be substantially risk averse personally even if they appear to advance risk loving projects. 

    None of this is particularly difficult to understand or hidden. And States have sought to manage (suppression appears to be an elusive goal, what with the creativity of determined enough humans) some or another aspects of these activities. And it is to one aspect of the management of foreign interaction with domestic elections that the Trump Administration has now turned its attention. In his memorandum of 24 April 2025, Investigation into Unlawful “Straw Donor” and Foreign Contributions in American Elections, President Trump has directed his counsel and the Attorney General, inconsulattion with the Secretary of the Treasury,  "to use all lawful authority, as necessary, to investigate allegations regarding the unlawful use of online fundraising platforms to make “straw” or “dummy” contributions or foreign contributions to political candidates and committees, and to take all appropriate actions to enforce the law."

    The focus of this directive are "malign actors." How one distinguishes between acceptable foreign actors and malign ones masking their self-projections into the Republic's electoral politics remains unclear. One might assume that annoying but transparent blustering by foreign actors whether public or private, whether, for example Russia or Tren de Aragua, are not included.  Perhaps even direct or indirect participation to the extent that the political branches, in their wisdom, have deemed innocuous, are exempted.  That seems to be at least part of what is driving the directive (though one has to navigate through layers of statutory meaning making to get there):

    Federal law (52 U.S.C. 30121 and 30122) strictly prohibits making political contributions in the name of another person, as well as contributions by foreign nationals. Notwithstanding these laws designed to protect American democracy, press reports and investigations by congressional committees have generated extremely troubling evidence that online fundraising platforms have been willing participants in schemes to launder excessive and prohibited contributions to political candidates and committees. (Investigation into Unlawful “Straw Donor” and Foreign Contributions in American Elections, )

    One can hope for some clarity here. Perhaps it will come.  

    Piux credit here
    And the focus is on money or its equivalent (52 U.S. Code § 30121 - Contributions and donations by foreign national) as the "speech-act" of central interest.  But why stop there?  Perhaps this is an effort at template making. But only some sorts of money; Americans with power over these things may avoid the complicated issue of masking donations where the corrupting or foreign influence is absent. The Wall Street Journal reminded readers in 2021 that donor disclosure laws chill speech rights--but perhaps that may not matter when the rights are those of foreign sovereigns or other actors, unless perhaps if they or their entities are properly domesticated.  The issue in 2021revolved around compelled disclosure of donors, and in the case that considered the issue (compelling disclosure of certain large donors to certain NGOs), Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, the ideologically conservative majority of the court determined that mandatory contributor disclosure chilled speech, But it was a case of odd reversals. Donor proteciton was an artifact of the civil rights era when the Court resisted efforts to weaken  civil rights organizations by seeking their member lists (NAACP v. Alabama (1958)). But in the Bonta case it was conservative organizations that sought the same protection and liberal justice that objected. "In a dissent, Justice Sonia Sotomayor [joined by Justices Kagan and Breyer] suggested that the ruling could have an effect beyond the nonprofit and charitable spheres, including on campaign contributions, writing that the ruling marks reporting and disclosure requirements with a bulls-eye." (Divided court invalidates California donor-disclosure rules).  And now it seems that President Trump appears to be channeling Justice Sotomayor in yet another turn around. It may well be that what joins all these efforts is another powerful principle of this jurisprudence--intent has constitutional significance.

    Once this is "sorted", and after an appropriate time for the appreciation of the ironies,  it might then be generalized through the maze that s American election law. And, of course, as with most things "tech", the state is usually, as the expression goes, a day late and a dollar short. But there it is. Here it might be useful to direct the President's counsel and the Attorney General to the President's executive order (Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence) though not just as  a money making scheme (the crypto thing) but as a reinforcement of a basic postulate of State government that tends to be lost on its leaders (except as a talking point)--the need to coordinate among policy objectives that may be more related than a cursory place might suggest. And, indeed there is something like a glimmering here, though one potentially mired in backwards looking  politics (White House Releases New Policies on Federal Agency AI Use and Procurement; Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and Fact Sheet: Eliminating Barriers for Federal Artificial Intelligence Use and Procurement). And this is certainly not the time for a presidency of cursory glances and half perceptions. But that is the call of those with the power to make them, and they may not lose re-election on this issue alone.

    The text of the directive Investigation into Unlawful “Straw Donor” and Foreign Contributions in American ElectionsWhite House Releases New Policies on Federal Agency AI Use and Procurement; Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, and Fact Sheet: Eliminating Barriers for Federal Artificial Intelligence Use and Procurement follow.  

    April 24, 2025

    MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
                   THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
                   THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
     
    SUBJECT:       Investigation into Unlawful “Straw Donor” and Foreign Contributions in American Elections

     
    Federal law (52 U.S.C. 30121 and 30122) strictly prohibits making political contributions in the name of another person, as well as contributions by foreign nationals.
     
    Notwithstanding these laws designed to protect American democracy, press reports and investigations by congressional committees have generated extremely troubling evidence that online fundraising platforms have been willing participants in schemes to launder excessive and prohibited contributions to political candidates and committees. 
     
    Specifically, these reports raise concerns that malign actors are seeking to evade Federal source and amount limitations on political contributions by breaking down large contributions from one source into many smaller contributions, nominally attributed to numerous other individuals, potentially without the consent or even knowledge of the putative contributors.  The reports also raise concerns that such “straw donations” are being made through “dummy” accounts, potentially using gift cards or prepaid credit cards to evade detection.
     
    Further, there is evidence to suggest that foreign nationals are seeking to misuse online fundraising platforms to improperly influence American elections.  A recent House of Representatives investigation revealed that a platform named ActBlue had in recent years detected at least 22 “significant fraud campaigns”, nearly half of which had a foreign nexus.  During a 30-day window during the 2024 campaign, the platform detected 237 donations from foreign IP addresses using prepaid cards, indicating that this activity remains a pressing concern. 
    These activities undermine the integrity of our electoral process.  Therefore, I direct the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, to use all lawful authority, as necessary, to investigate allegations regarding the unlawful use of online fundraising platforms to make “straw” or “dummy” contributions or foreign contributions to political candidates and committees, and to take all appropriate actions to enforce the law.
     
    I further direct the Attorney General to report back to me through the Counsel to the President within 180 days of the date of this memorandum on the results of the investigation.
     
    This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
     
     
     
                                  DONALD J. TRUMP

     

     

    White House Releases New Policies on Federal Agency AI Use and Procurement

    WASHINGTON D.C — Today, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is delivering on President Trump’s decisive Executive Order to remove barriers to American leadership in Artificial Intelligence (AI) by releasing two revised policies on Federal Agency Use of AI and Federal Procurement. These memos were revised at the direction of the Executive Order and in coordination with the Assistant to the President on Science and Technology and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).  

    Under President Trump’s leadership, America is well positioned to maintain our global dominance in AI. To better serve the public, the Federal Government must capitalize on the advantages of American innovation while maintaining strong protections for Americans’ privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

    “President Trump recognizes that AI is a technology that will define the future. This administration is focused on encouraging and promoting American AI innovation and global leadership, which starts with utilizing these emerging technologies within the Federal Government. Today’s revised memos offer much needed guidance on AI adoption and procurement that will remove unnecessary bureaucratic restrictions, allow agencies to be more efficient and cost-effective, and support a competitive American AI marketplace,” said Lynne Parker, Principal Deputy Director of the White House OSTP.

    The Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer’s Greg Barbaccia continued, stating that “Federal agencies have experienced a widening gap in adopting AI and modernizing government technology, largely due to unnecessary bureaucracy and outdated procurement processes. OMB’s new policies demonstrate that the government is committed to spending American taxpayer dollars efficiently and responsibly, while increasing public trust through the Federal use of AI.”

    Learn more:
    OMB Memorandum M-25-21, Accelerating Federal Use of AI through Innovation, Governance, and Public Trust
    OMB Memorandum M-25-22, Driving Efficient Acquisition of Artificial Intelligence in Government
    View the Fact Sheet  
     
    Questions? Contact MBX.OMB.Media@OMB.eop.gov

     

    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:


    Section 1. Purpose. The United States has long been at the forefront of artificial intelligence (AI) innovation, driven by the strength of our free markets, world-class research institutions, and entrepreneurial spirit. To maintain this leadership, we must develop AI systems that are free from ideological bias or engineered social agendas. With the right Government policies, we can solidify our position as the global leader in AI and secure a brighter future for all Americans.
    This order revokes certain existing AI policies and directives that act as barriers to American AI innovation, clearing a path for the United States to act decisively to retain global leadership in artificial intelligence.


    Sec. 2. Policy. It is the policy of the United States to sustain and enhance America’s global AI dominance in order to promote human flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security.


    Sec. 3. Definition. For the purposes of this order, “artificial intelligence” or “AI” has the meaning set forth in 15 U.S.C. 9401(3).


    Sec. 4. Developing an Artificial Intelligence Action Plan. (a) Within 180 days of this order, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST), the Special Advisor for AI and Crypto, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), in coordination with the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB Director), and the heads of such executive departments and agencies (agencies) as the APST and APNSA deem relevant, shall develop and submit to the President an action plan to achieve the policy set forth in section 2 of this order.


    Sec. 5. Implementation of Order Revocation. (a) The APST, the Special Advisor for AI and Crypto, and the APNSA shall immediately review, in coordination with the heads of all agencies as they deem relevant, all policies, directives, regulations, orders, and other actions taken pursuant to the revoked Executive Order 14110 of October 30, 2023 (Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence). The APST, the Special Advisor for AI and Crypto, and the APNSA shall, in coordination with the heads of relevant agencies, identify any actions taken pursuant to Executive Order 14110 that are or may be inconsistent with, or present obstacles to, the policy set forth in section 2 of this order. For any such agency actions identified, the heads of agencies shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, suspend, revise, or rescind such actions, or propose suspending, revising, or rescinding such actions. If in any case such suspension, revision, or rescission cannot be finalized immediately, the APST and the heads of agencies shall promptly take steps to provide all available exemptions authorized by any such orders, rules, regulations, guidelines, or policies, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, until such action can be finalized.
    (b) Within 60 days of this order, the OMB Director, in coordination with the APST, shall revise OMB Memoranda M-24-10 and M-24-18 as necessary to make them consistent with the policy set forth in section 2 of this order.


    Sec. 6. General Provisions.
    (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

    THE WHITE HOUSE,
    January 23, 2025.

     Fact Sheet: Eliminating Barriers for Federal Artificial Intelligence Use and Procurement
    SUPPORTING AND EMBRACING AMERICAN INNOVATION: Under President
    Trump’s leadership, America is well-positioned to maintain its global dominance in artificial
    intelligence (AI) innovation. Today, the White House Office of Management and Budget, in
    coordination with the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, issued two revised
    policies to facilitate responsible AI adoption to improve public services. These policies
    fundamentally shift perspectives and direction from the prior Administration, focusing now on
    utilizing emerging technologies to modernize the Federal Government.
    • The Executive Branch is shifting to a forward-leaning, pro-innovation and pro-
    competition mindset rather than pursuing the risk-averse approach of the previous
    administration.
    • The Federal Government will no longer impose unnecessary bureaucratic restrictions on
    the use of innovative American AI in the Executive Branch.
    • By embracing AI adoption, agencies will be more agile, cost-effective, and efficient.
    • This shift will deliver improvements to the lives of the American public while enhancing
    America’s global dominance in AI innovation.
    PROMOTING RAPID AND RESPONSIBLE AI ADOPTION: M-25-21 gives agencies the
    tools necessary to embrace AI innovation, while maintaining strong protections for Americans’
    privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
    • Agencies will empower AI leaders to remove barriers to AI innovation.
    o Agency Chief AI Officer roles are redefined to serve as change agents and AI
    advocates, rather than overseeing layers of bureaucracy.
    o Chief AI Officers are tasked with promoting agency-wide AI innovation and
    adoption for lower risk AI, mitigating risks for higher-impact AI, and advising on
    agency AI investments and spending.
    • Agencies will produce an AI adoption maturity assessment to better track progress and
    needs.
    • Policies introduce a single “high-impact AI” category to track AI use cases that require
    heightened due diligence because of potential impacts on the rights or safety of the
    American people.
    • Accountability for AI will mirror the existing process for using government IT, instead of
    creating new layers of approvals.
    • Use of American AI will be maximized when seeking new AI solutions.
    DRIVING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT AI ACQUISITION: M-25-22 provides agencies
    with concise, effective guidance on how to acquire best-in-class AI quickly, competitively, and
    responsibly.
    • Agencies must support a competitive American AI marketplace, maximizing the use of
    American AI systems and services in support of American AI leadership, human
    flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security.
    • This policy recognizes the importance of competition, communicating clear and specific
    requirements that avoid vendor lock-in.
    • The new approach removes burdensome agency reporting requirements and optimizes the
    acquisition process, while continuing to protect privacy and ensure lawful use of
    government data.
    • Agencies will use performance-based techniques to best harness the rapidly developing
    AI marketplace and create an online shared repository of resources and tools to assist
    with AI procurement.
    AI WORKING FOR AMERICANS: Federal agencies are maximizing the benefits of AI to
    promote human flourishing, economic competitiveness, and national security. Illustrative
    examples include the following:
    • The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) optimizes patient care through AI tools that help
    identify and standardize Veterans’ care.
    o The VA uses AI to support the identification and analysis of pulmonary nodules
    during lung cancer screening exams. The AI functionality improves detection of these
    nodules, assisting clinicians with life-saving diagnoses.
    • The Department of Justice (DOJ) improves public safety by leveraging AI to protect the
    American public.
    o The DOJ is using AI to better understand the global drug market and the impact of
    illicit drugs on communities and individuals, in order to further drug trafficking
    investigations and protect the American public.
    • The National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) expands humanity’s ability to
    safely traverse Mars by using AI.
    o NASA is using AI on the Mars2020 Rover to help it navigate with limited direction
    from Earth, optimizing scientific discovery from the rover’s sensors and assuring it
    safely traverses the planet’s hazardous terrain.



    President Trump Issues an Executive Order: "Reforming Accreditation to Strengthen Higher Education"

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    Pix Credit ChatGPT ("produce an image in the style of a Renaissance painting of abusive action by administrators); I leave it to the reader to decide who fits which of the persons in the image--student, government official, accrediting organ, university

     

    President Trump as been quite busy during the first months in office to rid himself of the several demons that pose a  substantial threat to his agenda, as well as those that have devoted tremendous energy toward the demonization of his (past) Administration and himself personally.  Perhaps, as well,  President Trump sees in these adversaries the networked interlinking of a shared agenda not merely antagonistic to his own (and that of his faction) but also one  quite willing to, as the years between 2020 and 2024 appeared to evidence to Mr. Trump at least, to destroy him personally and perhaps his family as well.  Not that any of this is unique; merely that, like the politics of the later Roman Republican (especially after the Gracchi brothers), it tended to apply the old rules and expectations in an increasingly exaggerated way that over a short period of time both transposed and corrupted them.  That, anyway, appears to perhaps be the view.

    Among the factions that Mr. Trump might be forgiven for thinking have been arrayed against him, at an individual and institutional level, are the universities that dominate their industry and which and perhaps not without reason,, individually and collectively have been no friend to him (but see White House Initiative to Promote Excellence and Innovation at Historically Black Colleges and Universities). That, of course, is fair and is their right, one that they have exercised with great skill over the last century. In that light, in the light of politics, President Trump's actions can be seen as political revenge--that certainly is how the objects of President Trump's actions see it, and in this case especially the universities.

    And they are feeling the pinch. On 23 April 2025 President Trump issued an Executive Order,Reforming Accreditation to Strengthen Higher Education. What makes this action particularly interesting is the way that an older discourse--this time of misuse of funds and regulatory capture. 

    Regulatory capture is a phenomenon where regulators become unduly influenced by the industries they are tasked with regulating. The genesis of this theory is in George Stigler’s seminal 1971 article, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” in which he observed that “the machinery and power of the state” serve as persistent coercive forces, posing a “potential resource or threat to every industry.”[Stigler, George J. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2, no. 1 (1971): 3–21, p. 3. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160] Private sector entities have accordingly developed sophisticated means to co-opt regulatory power. Industry capture of regulatory bodies compromises regulators’ ability to safeguard the public good, in direct contravention of the democratic ideal of governance in the public interest. (Here)

    While universities and their academics have been at the forefront of studying regulatory capture, especially by large economic enterprises, to the point that it has almost descended into cliché, it becomes far more interesting when the insights are attempted to be turned against the universities themselves. In this case, the relationship is between universities and accrediting agencies. 

    The Executive Order,Reforming Accreditation to Strengthen Higher Education, obliquely points in that direction in a context that has been foregrounded by this Administration--DEI.  What makes the Executive Order more interesting, however, is its focus, not on universities, but on the accrediting structures themselves--the gatekeepers to which the primary responsibility of accrediting has been delegated. And certainly Section 3 of the Executive Order appears well pointed in that direction, both Section 3(a) that points toward accreditation requirements, and Section 3(b) that seeks to reform system from the accreditor side. These, together are embedded in what the Trump Administration names its "Student-Oriented Accreditation.

    But far more interesting (at least to some) might be justification of misuse of funds, or in the language of the merchant phenomenology of this administration, that universities so accredited, and on that basis as receptacles for federal outlays, have not been providing value for the money.

    A group of higher education accreditors are the gatekeepers that decide which colleges and universities American students can spend the more than $100 billion in Federal student loans and Pell Grants dispersed each year. The accreditors’ job is to determine which institutions provide a quality education — and therefore merit accreditation. Unfortunately, accreditors have not only failed in this responsibility to students, families, and American taxpayers, but they have also abused their enormous authority.

    Accreditors routinely approve institutions that are low-quality by the most important measures. The national six-year undergraduate graduation rate was an alarming 64 percent in 2020. Further, many accredited institutions offer undergraduate and graduate programs with a negative return on investment — almost 25 percent of bachelor’s degrees and more than 40 percent of master’s degrees — which may leave students financially worse off and in enormous debt by charging them exorbitant sums for a degree with very modest earnings potential. (Ibid., § 1).

    Reform, then, is meant to "reform our dysfunctional accreditation system so that colleges and universities focus on delivering high-quality academic programs at a reasonable price." (Id). But it remains focused, at least initially on DEI. On the other hand thereis a bit of irony here: universities have been squeezing their own internal constituencies through a strategic refining of that same concept--value for dollars, as it moves away from tenure structures and develops an expensive administrative structure to better exploit its operational resources to its own ends. 

    Most interesting of all is the underlying premise that fuels this project--the idea that one is not merely confronting regulatory capture, but abuse of power. That is the essence of Section 2 of the E.O. In this sense, the Trump Administration, and quite ironically, casts the university of the victim of the managerial failures of the accrediting gatekeepers. It is now necessary, according to them, to "hold accountable, including through denial, monitoring, suspension, or termination of accreditation recognition, accreditors who fail to meet the applicable recognition criteria or otherwise violate Federal law" (id. ¶2(a)), including by suspending or terminating accreditor status (id., §2(c )). Still, the E.O does direct federal agencies to take action against universities themselves for their own failures (id., §2(b)).

    The text of the Executive Order,Reforming Accreditation to Strengthen Higher Education, follows.

     

    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

    Section1.  Purpose.  A group of higher education accreditors are the gatekeepers that decide which colleges and universities American students can spend the more than $100 billion in Federal student loans and Pell Grants dispersed each year.  The accreditors’ job is to determine which institutions provide a quality education — and therefore merit accreditation.  Unfortunately, accreditors have not only failed in this responsibility to students, families, and American taxpayers, but they have also abused their enormous authority.

    Accreditors routinely approve institutions that are low-quality by the most important measures.  The national six-year undergraduate graduation rate was an alarming 64 percent in 2020.  Further, many accredited institutions offer undergraduate and graduate programs with a negative return on investment — almost 25 percent of bachelor’s degrees and more than 40 percent of master’s degrees — which may leave students financially worse off and in enormous debt by charging them exorbitant sums for a degree with very modest earnings potential.

    Notwithstanding this slide in graduation rates and graduates’ performance in the labor market, the spike in debt obligations in relation to expected earnings, and repayment rates on student loans, accreditors have remained improperly focused on compelling adoption of discriminatory ideology, rather than on student outcomes.  Some accreditors make the adoption of unlawfully discriminatory practices a formal standard of accreditation, and therefore a condition of accessing Federal aid, through “diversity, equity, and inclusion” or “DEI”-based standards of accreditation that require institutions to “share results on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) in the context of their mission by considering . . . demographics . . . and resource allocation.” Accreditors have also abused their governance standards to intrude on State and local authority.

    The American Bar Association’s Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (Council), which is the sole federally recognized accreditor for Juris Doctor programs, has required law schools to “demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion” including by “commit[ting] to having a student body [and faculty] that is diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity.”  As the Attorney General has concluded and informed the Council, the discriminatory requirement blatantly violates the Supreme Court’s decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 600 U.S. 181 (2023).  Though the Council subsequently suspended its enforcement while it considers proposed revisions, this standard and similar unlawful mandates must be permanently eradicated.

    The Liaison Committee on Medical Education, which is the only federally recognized body that accredits Doctor of Medicine degree programs, requires that an institution “engage[] in ongoing, systematic, and focused recruitment and retention activities, to achieve mission-appropriate diversity outcomes among its students.”  The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, which is the sole accreditor for both allopathic and osteopathic medical residency and fellowship programs, similarly “expect[s]” institutions to focus on implementing “policies and procedures related to recruitment and retention of individuals underrepresented in medicine,” including “racial and ethnic minority individuals.”  The standards for training tomorrow’s doctors should focus solely on providing the highest quality care, and certainly not on requiring unlawful discrimination.

    American students and taxpayers deserve better, and my Administration will reform our dysfunctional accreditation system so that colleges and universities focus on delivering high-quality academic programs at a reasonable price.  Federal recognition will not be provided to accreditors engaging in unlawful discrimination in violation of Federal law.

    Sec.2.  Holding Accreditors Accountable for Unlawful Actions.  (a)  The Secretary of Education shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, hold accountable, including through denial, monitoring, suspension, or termination of accreditation recognition, accreditors who fail to meet the applicable recognition criteria or otherwise violate Federal law, including by requiring institutions seeking accreditation to engage in unlawful discrimination in accreditation-related activity under the guise of “diversity, equity, and inclusion” initiatives.

    (b)  The Attorney General and the Secretary of Education shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, investigate and take appropriate action to terminate unlawful discrimination by American law schools that is advanced by the Council, including unlawful “diversity, equity, and inclusion” requirements under the guise of accreditation standards.  The Secretary of Education shall also assess whether to suspend or terminate the Council’s status as an accrediting agency under Federal law.

    (c)  The Attorney General and the Secretary of Education, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, shall investigate and take appropriate action to terminate unlawful discrimination by American medical schools or graduate medical education entities that is advanced by the Liaison Committee on Medical Education or the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education or other accreditors of graduate medical education, including unlawful “diversity, equity, and inclusion” requirements under the guise of accreditation standards.  The Secretary of Education shall also assess whether to suspend or terminate the Committee’s or the Accreditation Council’s status as an accrediting agency under Federal law or take other appropriate action to ensure lawful conduct by medical schools, graduate medical education programs, and other entities that receive Federal funding for medical education.

    Sec.3.  New Principles of Student-Oriented Accreditation.  (a)  To realign accreditation with high-quality, valuable education for students, the Secretary of Education shall, consistent with applicable law, take appropriate steps to ensure that:

    (i)    accreditation requires higher education institutions to provide high-quality, high-value academic programs free from unlawful discrimination or other violations of Federal law;

    (ii)   barriers are reduced that limit institutions from adopting practices that advance credential and degree completion and spur new models of education;

    (iii)  accreditation requires that institutions support and appropriately prioritize intellectual diversity amongst faculty in order to advance academic freedom, intellectual inquiry, and student learning;

    (iv)   accreditors are not using their role under Federal law to encourage or force institution to violate State laws, unless such State laws violate the Constitution or Federal law; and

    (v)    accreditors are prohibited from engaging in practices that result in credential inflation that burdens students with additional unnecessary costs.

    (b)  To advance the policies and objectives in subsection (a) of this section, the Secretary of Education shall:

    (i)    resume recognizing new accreditors to increase competition and accountability in promoting high-quality, high-value academic programs focused on student outcomes;

    (ii)   mandate that accreditors require member institutions to use data on program-level student outcomes to improve such outcomes, without reference to race, ethnicity, or sex;

    (iii)  promptly provide to accreditors any noncompliance findings relating to member institutions issued after an investigation conducted by the Office of Civil Rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.) or Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.);

    (iv)   launch an experimental site, pursuant to section 487A(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1094a(b)), to accelerate innovation and improve accountability by establishing new flexible and streamlined quality assurance pathways for higher education institutions that provide high-quality, high-value academic programs;

    (v)    increase the consistency, efficiency, and effectiveness of the accreditor recognition review process, including through the use of technology;

    (vi)   streamline the process for higher education institutions to change accreditors to ensure institutions are not forced to comply with standards that are antithetical to institutional values and mission; and

    (vii)  update the Accreditation Handbook to ensure that the accreditor recognition and reauthorization process is transparent, efficient, and not unduly burdensome.

    Sec.4.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                                  DONALD J. TRUMP

    THE WHITE HOUSE,

        April 23, 2025.

    “The Future of a Smart Society with Chinese Marxist-Leninist Characteristics: Reflections on “Opinions on Completing/Improving the Social Credit System” issued by the General Offices of the State Council and the CPCCC”--Study Group Presentation PPT and Summary Essay (ECLResearch Hub)

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     I was delighted to have been invited by Marianne von Bloomberg to present brief reflections on 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于健全社会信用体系的意见 [Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Social Credit System~, the first significant high level general statement on Chinese social credit and social credit systems since 2014 (crude English translation of the Opinions here) to members of the Social Credit Study Group, European China Law Research Hub University of Cologne, Germany (virtual) 29 April 2025. 

    My presentation was entitled “The Future of a Smart Society with Chinese Marxist-Leninist Characteristics: Reflections on “Opinions on Completing/Improving the Social Credit System” issued by the General Offices of the State Council and the CPCCC.” There are six opinions which together elaborate a comprehensive vision for social credit regimes.

    The presentation focused on three primary areas. The first was to consider the context from which this new pronouncement, from a high Party organ, emerged.  The second was to consider carefully the Opinions document as an integrated whole, in itself and as a function of the context from which it emerged. The last area of focus was to suggest broader themes that emerge from the document, among them the tensions between structural conflict ( 外儒内法 [Confucianism on the Outside/Legalism on the Inside]) and its normative center, which remains grounded in notions of trust (信). In that context one can consider some of the contradictions, challenges, frameworks, and structures that might emerge from this new pronouncement.  The Opinions is short but quite dense.  And it must be read in light of the core documents of the 3rd Plenum's socialist modernization  project, its focus on high quality productivity, and its objectives in elaborating a  Socialist market economy (broadly understood).

    The core of the Opinions, considered as a whole, is deeply attached to developing elaborations of Chinese Marxist-Leninism in its new era.  First, social credit must adhere to and express the ideological political-economic framework within which it is an instrument and an expression. [General Requirements [总体要求]] Within that framework, social credit will be undertaken comprehensively in all of the key areas of Chinese collective and individual organization.[Build a social credit system covering all types of entities [构建覆盖各类主体的社会信用体系] That system is, in turn, grounded in data, whose production, protection, and deployment must be coordinated through the state under the guidance of the Party and within the specifications of law created for that purpose.[Consolidate the data foundation of the social credit system [夯实社会信用体系数据基础]] All of this effort elaborates the still fundamental starting point for the elaboration of a social credit based system(s), the notion of trust, now understood in its political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions, though elaborated principally through the lens of socialist modernization (but again understanding that within socialist modernization is the principle that everything is a productive force).[Improve the trustworthiness incentive and dishonesty punishment mechanism [健全守信激励和失信惩戒机制] ] These measures directed toward those ends will fail in the absence of strong quality control measures.[Improve the supervision and governance mechanism based on credit [健全以信用为基础的监管和治理机制] ] And social credit serves no useful purpose if it is not intimately integrated into the improvement and deployment of productive forces in every sphere of social relations, but, given the imperatives of the contemporary general contradiction, which must be focused on economics and social behaviors.[Improve the marketization and socialization level of the social credit system [提高社会信用体系市场化社会化水平]] Thus understood and directed, social credit becomes useful when appropriately utilized and implemented.[Strengthen organization and implementation [加强组织实施] ] Put in this way, one might perhaps note the way in which the social credit regimes discussed will serve as template for every aspect of organized life whether within the state, private, or social sectors, and with equal application to domestic and international engagement. The challenge, of course, will be to transpose these theoretical engagements into something operational. And it is to those ends that much of the detail in the Opinion is devoted.

    The PowerPoint of the presentation and the summary essay follow below and they may be accessed from the following links: ACCESS PPT HERE: Backer-Opinions_CPCC-SC_SCS4-2025; ACCESS SUMMARY PAPER HERE: Reflections on 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于健全社会信用体系的意见.

     



















    Reflections on中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于健全社会信用体系的意见[Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Social Credit System]

    Larry Catá Backer[1]

    W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar; Professor of Law and International Affairs

    Pennsylvania State University | 239 Lewis Katz Building, University Park, PA 16802    1.814.863.3640 (direct) ||  lcb11@psu.edu

     


    1. Introduction

    With 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于健全社会信用体系的意见[Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Social Credit System] (the “Opinions”), a high level organ of the political central authorities delivered, for the first time in over a decade, a  major conceptual writing on social credit and its systems (hereafter the SCS”).  It was time. The germinal opinion,[2] established both the conceptual basis for a broad understanding of social credit, its relation to the ruling ideology, and its pathways to implementation.[3]

    By 2025, and like virtually everything else in Chinese political ideology, SCS required appropriate (socialist) modernization.[4] To understand the “Opinions,” one must understand post 3rd Plenum Socialist Modernization and especially its role, in the first instance, in the further elaboration of a High-Standard Socialist Market economy.  It is from this perspective that the reflections that follow are oriented.  Section 2 (Deus ex Machina) provides a contextual context. Section 3 then suggests broader themes and trajectories around the core themes of structure:外儒内法;[5] and norms: Trust ).[6]

    2. Deus ex Machina

     Chinese Social Credit systems was once a "thing" both in China and in the West.  The reporting and reaction was vast, intense, and ultimately of relatively short duration (my discussion in essays here: Social Credit). It served as a sort of fetish object into which societies could pour their hopes and fears of what they began to understand as the inevitability of the transformation of social relations in the face of technologically enhanced digitization of social actors and the digitalization of their inter-relations. Not that people had not seen this coming--but it was generally left to science fiction writers in the 1950s-1970s and (mostly French) philosophers (it was Foucault who reminded his audiences that individuals were necessarily going to be reduced to "populations" and "statistics") and thus of little importance other than as markers of pretension or entertainment and both. But starting in the second decade of the 21st century, what was entertainment or pretension became substantially more real as technology (finally) revealed the possibilities for translating theory into operational systems.


    In China it appeared to offer the possibilities of seamless management of people, institutions, and systems. The operational objective was built around trust.[7] For a short time at least, it was allowed to appear to point toward the perfection of a sort of regulatory system of systems. This meta system was to be grounded in big data based algorithmic analytics. These were meant to create (eventually) sets of interlocking and coordinated (through the organs of the CPC administered through state organs) platforms in which large pools of data which were to be shared by institutions across a variety of sub platforms (criminal, consumer, finance, education, judicial, social, labor, administrative, etc.). The object was to consume this data through analytics that were meant to lead to judgments (social credit scores) that would, in turn produce consequences across sub-platforms. Those judgments (scores) and consequences, in turn, were also consumed as data that then contributed to further real time consequences and scoring for its subjects.

     

    Taken together, and at its most ambitious, social credit appeared, at least initially, to harbor the ambition to design a system of systems the object of which was to prod everyone and everything to adjust their behaviors and in so adjusting move closer to the ideal  (the ideal cadre, the ideal worker, the ideal parent, the ideal student, the ideal judge, the ideal enterprise, the ideal official, etc.). The interpretation of that ideal and its fulfillment, then, would become a core objective of the political vanguard through its CPC, one grounded in its application of Marxist Leninist theory with Chinese characteristics in the face of the contemporary general contradiction at any stage in historical development.

    In a very real sense, then, one might be excused for thinking at, at least in its beginning and especially before COVID, the ideal of Chinese social credit was to create, in virtual form, the complexities of social relations, and then to use the analytics that converted physical to virtual representations of social relations to manage--and modify, various aspects of those relations, behaviors, and the like through targeted interventions.  It was, at its root, the beginning of an effort to digitize (eventually, and in its most ambitious versions) all of Chinese life and social relations, and then to digitalize these social relations through the construction of what might be understood as the hologram of Chinese life in all its respects. While similar ambitions were on display outside of China, the core difference was embedded in the difference between Marxist-Leninist and liberal democratic systems. 

    If the former the effort was meant to be undertaken under the leadership and guidance of the Communist Party of China (CPC), and to enhance the ability of such leadership and guidance to be most effective. It was centralized and  a means of enhancing the ability of the CPC to undertake its basic line.  In liberal democratic states it was driven in and through markets, by private natural and legal persons (and other collectives), in which the state (the vessel containing political authority however expressed) played a regulatory and usually antagonistic role (except to the extent the projects suited state officials of course). It was decentralized, and privatized, and driven by collective transactional interactions. In a sense, the Marxist-Leninist social credit project could be understood as essentially deductive and the liberal democratic project as inductive, in the sense that the former constructed social credit as an expression of its principles and objectives (with the State serving as the leading force), while in the later social credit initiatives contributed to the construction of principles and objectives (with the state holding up the rear).

     But that has all changed now; even in China. The experiment has fractured, and the challenge from traditional holders of authority and the pull of traditional ways of managing social relations proved too much for a quick transition. More importantly, the fractious competition among organized officials, each in their own little silos, for control of the key aspects of the system: overwhelmed the ambitions of those who might have thought it possible to develop a comprehensive system for a more or less seamless mass management. At its core, the fundamental state assets worth fighting over were quite important both to the operation of the human centric Marxist-Leninist apparatus, as it could be to the operation of its digitalized version: data, data management and use, coding, coordination, algorithms, punishments and reward, and the like. At its core, then, the “problem” of social credit was its inability to overcome the contradictions inherent in systems of law grounded in exogenous interventions and those of social credit grounded in endogenous and coded biopolitics. 

    But social credit and its systemicity has not died. Indeed, it has thrived, though after 2016 or so now well tamed within the web of social relations within which it was to serve in a decisive role. Some of it has been peeled away into other, more siloed, and less ambitious endeavors--in the form of smart cities, smart courts, smart finance, etc., and perhaps, after the 3rd Plenum of the 20th CPC Congress's further development of socialist modernization and its high quality production principle, in the form of a "smart" Party apparatus. It makes sense from the perspective of a principles lead system.  One must first develop all of the component parts of a comprehensive system before it might be coordinated into existence through the CPC's coordinating mechanisms. That preserves the structures of power relations even as it shifts its locus from officials an institutions to the algorithms and data that serve them. And one must ensure that all such component systems conform to law--reminding people (and especially senior CPCP leaders) that the ultimate element in the constitution of a comprehensive coordinated system of "smart" governance will have to involve the automation or the digitalization of law and its rule, and thus perhaps, as well to some extent, of the forms in which the CPC's guidance and leadership must take.[8]

    3. Social Credit and a Shared Future for Mankind

    All of these trajectories have found echoes in the 31 March 2025 release of 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于健全社会信用体系的意见[Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Social Credit System]. The core object remains the same--trust as the organizing object/characteristic that drives system building.[9]  Its scope and methods now reflect a new and perhaps less ambitious reality grounded in its contribution to socialist modernization (社会信用制度是市场经济基础制度 [The social credit system is the basic system of the market economy])--an object that also appears in liberal democratic states[10]  in the development of economic relations, broadly construed. At the same time, its detail suggests that social credit remains a foundational method for the management of social relations with ambitions that exceed a narrow construction of markets and economic activity. One speaks here of social credit as the means of digitally managing in innovative ways, both market relations and trust as it basic characteristic. 

    The document is organized around six opinions: (1) General Requirements [总体要求]; (2) Build a social credit system covering all types of entities [构建覆盖各类主体的社会信用体系]; (3) Consolidate the data foundation of the social credit system [夯实社会信用体系数据基础]; (4) Improve the trustworthiness incentive and dishonesty punishment mechanism [健全守信激励和失信惩戒机制]; (5) Improve the supervision and governance mechanism based on credit [健全以信用为基础的监管和治理机制]; (6) Improve the marketization and socialization level of the social credit system [提高社会信用体系市场化社会化水平]; and (7) Strengthen organization and implementation [加强组织实施]. Let's consider each very briefly.

    3.1 General Requirements [总体要求].

    These situate social credit squarely within the ideological development of Chinese Marxist-Leninism in its New Era, but also specifically as a manifestation of new and high quality productivity at the heart of socialist modernization theory as memorialized in the documents produced in the 3rd Plenum of the 20th CPC Congress in July 2024. Of particular interest perhaps was the reminder to "adhere to the general tone of work of seeking progress while maintaining stability, fully and accurately implement the new development concept, adhere to government guidance, market drive, and social co-construction, adhere to the promotion of integrity culture, adhere to the mutual integration of public credit information and market credit information, adhere to reasonable and legal credit rewards and punishments." The melding of social credit and the important objectives of the creation of a Socialist Rule of Law state are presented here as both form and object.

    3.2 Build a social credit system covering all types of entities [构建覆盖各类主体的社会信用体系].

    This part of the Opinion was divided into five parts: (1) Deepen the construction of Government credit; (2) Strengthen the credit construction of business entities;  (3) Accelerate the credit construction of social organizations; (4) Promote the credit construction of natural persons in an orderly manner; and (5) Comprehensively strengthen the credit construction of the judicial law enforcement system. This section suggests that the ambitions for social credit as outlined in the 2014 State Council paper[11] has not diminished, but that the approach to its realization is now more cautious and more deeply embedded in contemporary patterns and forms of (human centered) governance through law. In some sense it plays to the notion of 外儒内法 (Confucianism on the outside; legalism on the inside) but with Marxist-Leninist characteristics.[12]At the same time, the scope of focus remains economic transaction-oriented even as its reach touches on all critical fields of social relations--governmental (including judicial), enterprises, social organizations, and individuals (in markets at least).  The focus on judicial credit, grounded on trustworthiness, may be worth quoting in full:

    Strengthen the construction of judicial credibility of courts and procuratorates and improve judicial credibility. Increase judicial openness in accordance with the law and safeguard the people's right to know. Strengthen the credit construction of judicial law enforcement personnel, and establish a credit record and credit commitment system for law enforcement personnel. Increase the cost of false litigation, illegality and dishonesty. Strictly implement the identification procedures for dishonest persons subject to enforcement, and optimize relevant dishonest punishment measures.[13]

     

    It is only a small step to move from the internal legalism of each of these five parts of  this portion of the Opinion to the larger normative framework: government, business entities, social organizations, natural persons, and the judiciary represent the great pillars of Socialist Chinese society.  It is to their coordinated and orderly operation that the encoding of perfection, and the legalism of systems of rewards and punishments are directed.  But at the level of the Party, those legalisms are merely the instruments of the embedding of normative values that are necessary for socialist perfectionism at each stage of historical development leading (eventually) to the establishment of a communist society in and as China. While the legal state is directed toward the state apparatus and all social collectives,[14] it cannot apply to the vanguard Communist Party, whose own internal structures of legality are subject to its own authority. In this sense the delightful ambiguity appears to serve  those constituencies which center legality, as well as those constituencies that favor the coded manifestation of Party core leadership to avoid social “abnormality,” a condition that must be defined and internalized among the great centers of collective life.

    3.3.Consolidate the data foundation of the social credit system [夯实社会信用体系数据基础].

    This part is also divided into five parts: (1) Establish a comprehensive, complete and accurate credit records; (2) Strengthen the collection and sharing of credit information; (3) Establish a unified public disclosure system for public credit information; (4) Promote the open circulation of public credit information in an orderly manner; and (5) Strengthen the security protection of credit information.This is, in large measure, a reaffirmation of the old social credit core. It is effectively impossible to develop a coherent and effective social credit system—an integrated system of punishments and rewards built around the CPC’s elaboration of aspirational perfection—without the basic fuel of that system, that is, of data.  To that end the Social credit system must focus not just on data, but its construction in something like useable form, and its warehousing and distribution in ways that are structurally meaningful for access by those organs involved in the production of assessment, and of coordinated systems for the distribution of punishment and reward.

    Of critical importance here may be the focus on the coordination of digitized data flows within a central platform overseen by and through State organ(s). 

    Strengthen the “general hub” function of the national credit information sharing platform for credit information collection and sharing, adhere to sharing as the general principle and non-sharing as the exception, uniformly collect credit information in various fields, provide credit information services to relevant departments according to needs and regulations, and regularly conduct collection and sharing quality and efficiency evaluations.[15]

     

    The 3rd Plenum emphasized the need for coordination, especially in the economic field, including it seems, data and data sharing (which is to be distinguished from the organization and coordination of data platforms through markets, an idea heavily criticized in official discourse). Much of the rest of this section touches on coordination and fulfillment of existing law and regulation. The issue, of course, is coordination where various aspects of law and regulation are vested in different organs of the administrative state apparatus. 

    3.4 Improve the trustworthiness incentive and dishonesty punishment mechanism [健全守信激励和失信惩戒机制].

    This section has three subparts: (1) Strengthening incentives for trustworthy behavior, (2) Carrying out dishonesty punishment in accordance with laws and regulations; and (3) Improving the unified credit repair system. The focus, as it has been especially since 2014, remains fixed on notions of trust, trustworthiness and its performance within the larger projects of socialist modernization in economic and then social relations. That object has not changed.  But its expression and coordination with the project of building a rule of law state has modified the means toward its fulfillment, In a sense, one might think about this as a means of disciplining coders and analytics by alignment them more closely with the processes and forms of law. That still leaves open the sometimes vast spaces left to exercises of administrative discretion (to be taken up by generative A.I.?). But still, it represents a means of both coordination among objectives and a form of at least some sort of discipline in the process of moving from digitization, to digitalization of conduct and its consequences.[16]

    Of particular interest, perhaps, is the breadth of context in which systems of (lawful) punishments and rewards are to be developed. At its limit it is meant to align the social totality of the social credit system, reaching all aspects of social relations (Opinion 2) with the legalist technologies of implementation.  But these are written in the form of instructions to coders.  Government officials, and certainly lower level cadres would have very little to say about the substance of this section, with the exception of the small space for discretionary decision input which Opinion 4 largely implies is to become automatic (and those exogenous to the bureaucracy, except for the generation of data and the compliance with rewards and punishments.  This last is particularly relevant to the last of the instructions in this Opinion 4: the therapeutic mechanisms for trust/credit repair. Yet this is a task assigned to the National Development Reform Commission. That suggests an initial focus on economic behaviors, but also that the NDRC may house the coders and the analytics necessary for compliance.  

    3.5. Improve the supervision and governance mechanism based on credit [健全以信用为基础的监管和治理机制].

    It ought not to be surprising that this section is divided into six subsections: (1) Implement hierarchical and classified supervision based on credit evaluation; (2) Establish and improve the credit commitment system; (3) Promote the in-depth application of credit reports; (4) Strengthen the credit supervision of contract performance such as government signing and guiding the signing of contracts; (5) Promote credit empowerment of grassroots governance; and (6) Improve the laws, regulations and systems of the social credit system.  In a sense here is where the regulatory sausage is prepared. Administrative organs are assigned disciplinary, supervisory, and coordinating tasks. Some of the elements of smart cities are encountered, especially in the context of governmental systems of review and approval of credit based decision making. Perhaps of greater interest in this section is subpart (3):

    Promote the in-depth application of credit reports. Promote the full use of credit reports in public management fields such as market access, administrative approval, government procurement, investment promotion, and qualification review. Vigorously promote the use of special credit reports to replace certificates of illegal and irregular records. Encourage the use of credit reports in market transactions such as bidding, financing and credit, and commercial transactions.[17]

     Read narrowly, of course, it suggests maximizing the value of credit reporting within the contours of socialist modernization goals.  Read more broadly, it suggests the greater use of credit scores--that is of the determination of a judgment about the aggregate factors that went into producing that score--on a host of interactions with the state. All of this, of course, is to be undertaken in accordance with law--a law that must (in the context of the fundamental dialectics between social credit and law systems) be adapted to social credit objectives to protect the integrity of both systems. "Promote the promulgation of the Social Credit Construction Law and promote the inclusion of credit rules in relevant special laws and regulations. Strengthen comprehensive evaluation before the promulgation of credit policies to prevent the generalization and abuse of credit management measures." [推动出台社会信用建设法,推动将信用规则纳入相关专项法律法规。加强信用政策出台前的综合评估,防止信用管理措施泛化滥用。].

    3.6 Improve the marketization and socialization level of the social credit system [提高社会信用体系市场化社会化水平]

    This Opinion consists of four parts: (1) Vigorously cultivate the credit service market; (2) Deepen the promotion of credit financing and credit transactions; (3) Strengthen credit construction in the platform economy; and (4) Serve high-level opening up. This section suggests the role of private enterprises within the project of developing social credit.  It also reaffirms the reversal from the early stages where private enterprises were expected to lead; the sense now, a sense reflecting recent discussion of the relation between the private and state sectors in China.[18] This underscores a complementary and gap filling role for private enterprise under the direction of state organs charged with overall coordination. The section also suggests that the project of digitization and digitalization (the platform economy) remains a central objective under the 3rd Plenum's innovation driven approach to socialist modernization. It is also meant to align with the recent renewal of efforts to encourage foreign invest in China and project Chinese foreign investment abroad.[19] It also may be fashioned as an instrument for broadening the internal markets in the context of implementing dual circulation strategies.  This is especially important with the re-election of Donald Trump to the U.S. Presidency. 

    3.7 Strengthen organization and implementation [加强组织实施].

    This section recognizes the state of administrative governance in China, and the fundamental division, at an operational level, between the Peoples Bank of China on the one hand, and the National Development and Reform Commission on the other.  It also recognizes as it must, the more daunting task of coordinating from the top the activities of lower level actions, regulations, etc. at the provincial and local levels.  Nothing new here, but the challenge (and likely points of coordination friction) are acknowledged.[20] It will be for the core CPC leadership to sort that out as and to the extent it makes sense. But what is clear is that social credit as understood here is, in the first instance, a critical element in the construction of the new socialist market economy,[21] and in that sense is understood in a quite specific and narrow way, one confined to the Social Credit law itself, but not to the concept of social credit as something far more (potentially ambitious. .

    4.  Where Does that Leave SCS?

     

    There may be a few initial propositions worth considering in the shadow of the 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅关于健全社会信用体系的意见 [Opinions of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council on Improving the Social Credit System.

     

    1. While the Opinion devotes a substantial amount of space to the technicalities of legalism, its principal value may in the way in which it may seek to use social credit  (understood broadly as a set of ways of managing or governing) to more intimately align administrative legalism with the overall objectives based policies of the CPC itself.  That is, that the social credit methodologies may serve as a bridge between  the operations of an administrative nomenklatura and its caste of bureaucrats and officials, with the overall direction of CPC. Consider in this respect the embedding of "Eight Provisions" [八项规定] into the working architecture of state and private organs.[22]

     

    2. SCS might also be deployed as a digitalized mechanism for the elaboration of critical dialectics in the operation of the policies developed to propel the nation along the Socialist path.[23] As the General Secretary noted, there is a need for the coordination (1) of the relationship between effective markets and effective government; (2) of the relationship between aggregate supply and demand for stability of a coordinated economy; (3) of the relationship between old and new technologies of production around the concept of new and high quality production in socialist modernization; (4) of the relationship between incremental and comprehensive improvements; and (5) of the relationship between quality of production and production volume in ways that augment the frits of socialist modernization.[24] All of these are fodder for the Opinion. As I have suggested elsewhere:

     

    It finds its greatest expression aligned to another significant area of theoretical evolution—that of socialist modernization and the relationship between the development of productive forces and the guidance role of the CPC. One might speak now of the dialectical coordination of socialist modernization.  And that dialectical coordination touches all aspect of social relations in which the obligation to develop productive forces is found—in the economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political fields of social organization. In this sense, dialectical coordination serves as a nexus point for the material expression of the unity of these concepts—dialectical materialism, democratic centralism, socialist modernization, and the nature of the material expression of the leading role of the CPC.[25] 

     

    Its expression in the Opinions is straightforward and ambitious: “Build an SCS that covers all kinds of subjects, unifies institutional rules, and is co-built, co-shared and co-used. Promote the deep integration of the SCS and all aspects of economic and social development to provide a powerful pillar for accelerating the building of a unified big market, maintaining fair and orderly competition market order, and promoting high-quality development.”[26]

     

    3. SCS may be one aspect that a set of techniques that will eventually be as important for the disciplining of the Party as it is for the nation.[27] In this respect SCS forms a critical component of socialist modernization of the structures of socialist collectivity and the techniques for its discipline. As I  suggested elsewhere:

     

    The 3rd Plenum of the 20th CPC Congress made it quite clear that Chinese style socialist modernization  had moved again to the center of policy. With it, and as one of its essential elements was the objective of high quality production. Socialist modernization is meant to apply to all of the productive forces of the nation. And those productive forces all must engage in some process of self-revolution; for economic enterprises that focuses on innovation; for social collectives on high quality engagements with social and cultural practices for state organs it might focus on efficiency and technological innovation to ensure that its functions  fulfill the expectations of the CPC and the masses; and for the vanguard party, the CPC, it must necessarily focus on self-revolution.[28]

     

    4. The development of trust in the nation and the CPC, especially through the assessment and data driven mechanisms of SCS may serve China’s international policy objectives.[29] In that respect, China’s use of SCS techniques serves an international agenda that produces win-win situations with respect to alignments with certain global expectations now emerging, including for example, ESG (environmental, social and governance reporting).[30]

     

    5. The Opinion appears designed to please everyone. For the legalists and the legal academic establishment, it provides a bridge between the analytics of social credit and its focus on data, and the traditional modalities of governance (traditional at least since 1978 in its current form). For the normative and Party centered elements, it offers the mechanisms for coordinating the ecologies of perfection—in the economic, political, administrative, and social spheres. Though the focus appears to be on the economic, and with it on the traditional core of socialist modernization, it ought to be remembered that after the 3rd Plenum socialist modernization has become a broader instrument  for comprehensive change.

     

    6. Taken as a whole, one might consider the extent to which the document furthers  the CPC’s role as a cultural leader. Here it suggests the way that socialist rule of law operates even within emerging technologies. One night read the Opinion as a whole for the proposition that it suggests a culture of governance, with the Party at its core, that comprehensively articulates the forms of behavior through the lens of socialist modernization in the new era.[31] 

     

    7. Lastly, consider the elements of the Opinion. First, social credit must adhere to and express the ideological political-economic framework within which it is an instrument and an expression.[32] Within that framework, social credit will be undertaken comprehensively in all of the key areas of Chinese collective and individual organization.[33] That system is, in turn, grounded in data, whose production, protection, and deployment must be coordinated through the state under the guidance of the Party and within the specifications of law created for that purpose.[34] All of this effort elaborates the still fundamental starting point for the elaboration of a social credit based system(s), the notion of trust, now understood in its political, economic, social, and cultural dimensions, though elaborated  principally through the lens of socialist modernization (but again understanding that within socialist modernization is the principle that everything is a productive force).[35] These measures directed toward those ends will fail in the absence of strong quality control measures.[36] And social credit serves no useful purpose if it is not intimately integrated into the improvement and deployment of productive forces in every sphere of social relations, but, given the imperatives of the contemporary general contradiction, which must be focused on economics and social behaviors.[37] Thus understood and directed, social credit becomes useful when appropriately utilized and implemented.[38] Put in this way, one might perhaps note the way in which the social credit regimes discussed will serve as template for every aspect of organized life whether within the state, private, or social sectors, and with equal application to domestic and international engagement. The challenge, of course, will be to transpose these theoretical engagements into something operational. And it is to those ends that much of the detail in the Opinion is devoted.  

     

    8. And thus the essence of the Opinion, like that of the socialist modernization within which it is embedded, and through which it is both empowered and constrained, social credit is an all-around concept,  an important means of rationalizing the entirety of the project, overseen by the Communist Party of China, to develop all of the productive forces of the Chinese nation toward the ends of establishing a communist society for the nation.[39]

     

     These considerations then frame the challenges that the Opinions expose. The first touches on the significance of SCS. To a large extent, the Opinions suggest that the core utility of SCS (however understood or applied) is as a tool of discipline, and as a mechanism for accountability. These primary objectives both measure the effectiveness of SCS in any context by means of the fulfillment of the stability function which was at the center of Opinions No. 1. These can then be understood in their constitutional dimension. That, certainly is true enough. And yet, it might be taken as a basic element of Marxist-Leninism that it is a dynamic rather than a stabilizing process.  While stability is important, certainly for the fulfillment of objectives at any stage of historical development.  It is also quite clear that stability is not an end goal but a means, and risk aversion as a means of minimizing the burdens of change rather than avoiding them. In this sense SCS must be understood as a high quality innovation for the basic goal of moving society, and its productive forces, along the Socialist Path and towards its goal—the (eventual) establishment of a Communist society in China. This produces the possibility of contradiction that must be confronted.

     

    Second, it is clear that while SCS, within its webs of Socialist Legality, Socialist Modernization, and Socialist Internationalization targets the administrative apparatus, social collectives, and the masses (as individuals and in societal organs), SCS in that guide does not reach the structures, operations, and working style of the CPC itself.  That is not to say that there is no SCS for the Party; it is rather to suggest that, at least within the purview of the NDRC and the Central Bank of China, which together have been tasked with the coordination and implementation of the Opinions generally, that purview does not extend to the work of the CPC itself as a political leadership and guidance organization. That raises the issue of the way in which the CPC will itself apply the techniques and technologies of SCS to its own disciplinary and behavior projects.

     

    Third, it is not clear what is driving policy. It is possible to see in the Opinions the role of ideology in driving SCS functionality. AT the same time, it is possible to reverse polarity, and also see in SCS the driving force of ideology.  That touches, in turn on an inherent contradiction of new quality productivity within Marxist-Leninist theory. That contradiction turns of the primacy of new or high quality production at the heart of a more comprehensive understanding of New Era socialist modernization. In this sense, at least, SCS would constitute an expression of new quality production, and as a means of elevating an innovative approach to the utilization of productive forces. Nonetheless, SCS is also not just an object of socialist modernization in that sense but also its expression.  SCS is in that respect a fulfillment and the character of ideology.

     

    Fifth, the Opinions, not unexpectedly, leaves key issues unresolved. The principal issue in need of resolution touches on the definition of SCS.  SCS could be understood as a regulatory tool; or it could be treated as the methods developed to manage systems of data based rewards and punishments generally. Yet that issue also touches on a more difficult issue—that is on the issue of the strategically narrow definition of SCS as a subset of a much larger pool of related techniques and approaches to regulation, but one designed to limit the issues of coordination with Socialist legality, modernization, and internationalization in what may be inconvenient ways for the State. And, needed, one understands that SCS may be constructed from out of the cocktail of legalities to which legality may be applied.  As for everything else, other legalities may be relevant. Thus SCS is to be distinguished from, for example, smart city projects. The Opinions, however, appear to paint SCS more broadly than it appeared to have been narrowed after 2014. The inclusion of governmental SCS may be an example. On the one hand governmental credit may be defined quite broadly to include the disciplining of the entire scope of the administrative apparatus of state. And yet, the language in the original is as easily restricted to certain public institutions—hospitals, state owned enterprises, and other public mechanisms for the delivery of services  in fields in which private service providers also operate. The former would represent a broadening of SCS, and with it the application of Socialist legality.  The later would evidence the continued vitality of strategic fracture.

     

    Sixth, the extent of SCS as an ideologically relevant driving force is unclear.  Treating SCS as mere technique—as the sort of high quality productive innovation at the root of 3rd Plenum modernization—serves those who would continue to privilege the fundamental position of human administrative organs in the operation of the state. Nonetheless, SCS might also be understood as a subset, as an ideological space, within or through which the broader concepts of Socialist Legality, Socialist modernization, and Socialist Internationalism may be developed.  It is in this sense a New Era expression of both the mass line, of the operationalization of democratic centralism through the  digitalization of democratic centralism now bound up in the algorithms through which policy objectives are fulfilled, and in the digitalization of coordination which is a primary function of the central authorities with respect to the state sector and the leadership of all other forms of human  collective relations in China.   

     

    Lastly, the Opinions rase, but do not confront, the fundamental ideological issue within Chinese Marxist-Leninism of the “the problem of the problem.” This issue underlies the conceptual turmoil within which SCS itself is signified as problematic, even as it is deployed as a resolution of the problem against which it is deployed. At the root of the turmoil is dissonance. This dissonance reflects a conflict (and the contradiction, in Chinese Leninist terms) between the old humanizing techniques of control (on the one hand) and its virtual transformation (on the other hand). Connected to that is the dissonance between the pathways and linkages of digitalized regulatory environments and those attached to the human.  Even if one could confront these contradictions--and especially its core dilemma, that is in what space, real or virtual, does regulation occur—SCS represents a moving target (and again invoking the dissonance between the ideology of high quality development and the bureaucratic embrace of the superiority of stability in a Marxist Leninist environment that tends to be risk averse). SCS is a human and artificial construct over a dynamic process of the movement from the physical to the virtual and from the qualitative and exogenous to the quantitative and endogenous. That last is a contradiction the resolution may well need to wait until China enters into its next stage of historical development—that is it may be a problem for the Post-New Era Chinese Leninist theorists.

     

    5. Concluding Thoughts

     

    SCS remains very much a work in progress.  Nonetheless, a decade or more after its quite splashy appearance within the official pronouncements of the Chinese core of leadership, SCS appeared to have been sidelined. The 2025 Opinions discussed in this essay might be best, and most straightforwardly understood as a signaling that SCS is neither dead, nor has the 2014 vision been abandoned.  Nonethless, that vision now required coordination. The first of that coordination is ideological, between SCS as an expression of an ideology of regulation and of the methods by which the CPC can lead the nation on the Socialist Path, and other critical ideological developments that mark the fundamental characteristics of Chinese Marxist-Leninism in the New Era: Socialist Legality, Modernization, and Internationalization. The second of that coordination element is operational.  SCS is not so much driving change as its forms and operations are being consolidated in the form that they have taken since 2014. That does not necessarily mean that SCS will be confined to its current condition. Indeed, it is clear that SCS as a conceptual rather than operational construct is far broader and more vibrant than its appearance within the administrative apparatus. At the same time, the (re)focusing on SCS is a reminder of the critical role of SCS within the regulatory framework of virtually every collective organ (and with respect also to individuals) within China; of the critical role of data and data management for that regulatory framework; of the equally critical role of normative values built around a broader conception of trust for the activation of data based governance broadly applied; of the centrality of an apparatus to deliver value for SCS methods; of the still central need to more deeply embed SCS sensibilities and expectations within the social relations of the nation and abroad; and of the critical role that distinctions between bureaucratic and Party measures are to be understood for the fulfillment of whatever promise of SCS that the CPC deems worth pursuing. What follows is the only certainty that can be gleaned from the Opinions document—that SCS is neither being abandoned, nor is it necessarily confined to operational matters driven by other forms of regulatory structures. When to all of this is added what appears to be an emphasis on stability (within which experimentation and risk taking may be possible) but under an assessment regime that appears to be risk averse, then, for the moment at least, one can expect movement toward consolidation and coordination, rather than a focus on innovation and new forms of high quality SCS production.,



    [1] These materials represent an extended elaboration of a presentation made at a Workshop of the Social Credit Study Group, European China Law Studies Association Research Hub, University of Cologne, Germany (virtual) 29 April 2025.

    [2] State Council Notice concerning Issuance of the Planning Outline for the Establishment of a Social Credit System (2014-2020), State Council Release (2014) No. 21, https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/socialcreditsystem/ (hereafter State Council White Paper 2014). The PowerPoint is available online at https://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/podcasts/powerpoint-presentations/.

    [3] Larry Catá Backer, China's social credit system: Data-driven governance for a 'new era', Current History 118(809):209-214 (2019).

    [4] Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization (21 July 2024), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202407/t20240721_11457437.html (§II (Building a High-Standard Socialist Market Economy)¶7 “We will also improve the social credit system and related oversight institutions.”)

    [5]中国社会的政治密码:外儒内法,”  [The political code of Chinese society: Confucianism on the outside and law on the inside], https://www.wenxuecity.com/blog/202406/44445/965.html.

    [6] See Larry Catá Backer, Trust platforms: The digitalization of corporate governance and the transformation of trust in polycentric space, Regulation & Governance (2024) doi:10.1111/rego.12614.

    [7] See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Next Generation Law: Data-Driven Governance and Accountability-Based Regulatory Systems In The West, and Social Credit Regimes in China,  Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 28:123 (2018).

    [8] See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Social Revolution (社会革命) as Self-Revolution (自我革命) and the New Quality Production of CPC Modernization: 习近平深入推进党的自我革命 [Xi Jinping, Deepen the Party's Self-Revolution] (Part of a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 8, 2024)).

    [9] Larry Catá Backer, Social Credit “in” or “as” the Cage of Regulation of Socialist Legality, The China Review 24(3):71-106 (2024).

    [10] Larry Catá Backer, Trust Platforms: The Digitalization of Corporate Governance and the Transformation of Trust in Polycentric Space, Regulation & Governance (2024) doi:10.1111/rego.12614.

    [11] State Council White Paper 2014, supra.

    [12] For Context see Qin Hui 秦晖, The China Story, https://www.thechinastory.org/key-intellectual/qin-hui-%E7%A7%A6%E6%99%96/.

    [13][全面强化司法执法体系信用建设。加强法院、检察院司法公信建设,提高司法公信力。依法加大司法公开力度,保障人民群众知情权。加强司法执法人员信用建设,建立执法人员信用记录和信用承诺制度。提高虚假诉讼违法失信成本。严格失信被执行人认定程序,优化相关失信惩戒措施。]

    [14] See, e.g., China to pursue reform in sync with rule of law, NCP Website, http://en.npc.gov.cn.cdurl.cn/2024-07/25/c_1007719.htm (“The country must "see that all major reforms have a solid legal basis and that the reform achievements are elevated to law in a timely manner," according to the resolution” citing to the Resolution of the 3rd Plenum).

    [15][强化全国信用信息共享平台信用信息归集共享总枢纽功能,坚持以共享为原则、不共享为例外,统一归集各领域信用信息,根据需求按规定向有关部门提供信用信息服务,定期开展归集共享质效评估]

    [16] Marianne von Blomberg, The Social Credit System and China’s Rule of Law, in Oliver Everling (ed) The Social Credit System and China’s Rule of Law (Springer, 2020), pp. 111–137.

    [17][推进信用报告深度应用。推动在市场准入、行政审批、政府采购、招商引资、资质审核等公共管理领域充分使用信用报告。大力推行以专项信用报告替代有无违法违规记录的证明。鼓励在招标投标、融资授信、商业往来等市场交易活动中使用信用报告。].

    [18]习近平:民营经济发展前景广阔大有可为民营企业和民营企业家大显身手正当其时 [Xi Jinping: The development prospects of the private economy are broad and promising. It is the right time for private enterprises and private entrepreneurs to show their talents] and the Maturing of the two unwaverings [两个毫不动摇] policy), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/i92U-PATFdZkDkGey8ygbg.

    [19] Discussed in Larry Catá Backer, Coordinating the Two (Dual) Circulation Economy: General Secretary Xi Meetings with Foreign Business and Commercial Officials, Law at the End of the Day (30 March 2025), https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2025/03/coordinating-two-dual-circulation.html.

    [20] These might be best inderstood in the context of the 2022 encounter with social credit, 中共中央办公厅国务院办公厅印发《关于推进社会信用体系建设高质量发展促进形成新发展格局的意见》[ General Office of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council "Opinions on Promoting the Construction of a Social Credit System with High-Quality Development and Promoting the Formation of a New Development Pattern"], https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2022/content_5686028.htm.

    [21] Consider in that respect the following:     中共中央国务院关于新时代加快完善社会主义市场经济体制的意见 [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Opinions on accelerating the improvement of the socialist market economic system in the new era];      (CPC Central Committee and State Council On Creating a Healthy Environment for Entrepreneurship) 中共中央国务院关于营造企业家健康成长环境弘扬优秀企业家精神更好发挥企业家作用的意见;  中共中央办公厅印发《关于加强新时代民营经济统战工作的意见》The General Office of the CPC Central Committee issued the "Opinions on Strengthening the United Front Work of Private Economy in the New Era" ;  An All-Around Cultivation of Socialist Morality--中共中央国务院印发 [Issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]: 《新时代公民道德建设实施纲要》[The Outline of the Implementation of the Construction of the Moral Citizen in the New Era]

    [22] See, e.g., 中央党的建设工作领导小组召开会议研究部署深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育工作蔡奇主持并讲话李希出席并讲话 [The Central Party Building Leading Group held a meeting to study and deploy the study and education work on the in-depth implementation of the Central Committee's eight regulations. Cai Qi presided over the meeting and delivered a speech. Li Xi attended the meeting and delivered a speech]; see also 国家开发银行党委研究部署深入贯彻中央八项规定精神学习教育工作 [The Party Committee of the National Development Bank has studied and deployed the study and education work on the in-depth implementation of the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations], https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/EAi9wZ_RweNEo8LHtOkluQ.

    [23]习近平, 经济工作必须统筹好几对重要关系 [Xi Jinping, "Economic work must coordinate several important relationships"]. It was published to Issue 2025-1 of Qiushi [求是]

    [24] Ibid.

    [25] Larry Catá Backer,  Economic Dialectics Must be Coordinated! Brief Reflections on 习近平, 经济工作必须统筹好几对重要关系 [Xi Jinping, "Economic work must coordinate several important relationships"] and Marxist-Leninist Phenomenology in Socialist Modernization, Law at the End of the Day (15 March 2025), https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2025/03/economic-dialectics-must-be-coordinated.html. See as well, 习近平深入推进党的自我革命 [Xi Jinping, Deepen the Party's Self-Revolution] (Part of a speech at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection on January 8, 2024)).

    [26] Opinions, supra, Section 1.

    [27]习近平:健全全面从严治党体系 [Xi Jinping: Improve the system of comprehensive and strict governance of the Party], https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/W5Qqpb_RlABkYiwdHNfnZQ.

    [29]Address by Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang's at World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2025 (as published in China Daily).

    [30] Larry Catá Backer, ESG Along the Socialist Path: China's Long March to an Institutionalized ESG Reporting System; The Original Text of the New (Trial) Basic Standards 企业可持续披露准则——基本准则(试行),  Law at the Endo f the Day (7 January 2025), https://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2025/01/esg-along-socialist-path-chinas-long.html.

    [31]宋月红, 坚守党的文化领导权和中华民族的文化主体性 [Adhere to the Party's cultural leadership and the cultural subjectivity of the Chinese nation].

    [32]General Requirements [总体要求].

    [33]Build a social credit system covering all types of entities [构建覆盖各类主体的社会信用体系].

    [34]Consolidate the data foundation of the social credit system [夯实社会信用体系数据基础].

    [35]Improve the trustworthiness incentive and dishonesty punishment mechanism [健全守信激励和失信惩戒机制]

    [36]Improve the supervision and governance mechanism based on credit [健全以信用为基础的监管和治理机制]

    [37]Improve the marketization and socialization level of the social credit system [提高社会信用体系市场化社会化水平]

    [38]Strengthen organization and implementation [加强组织实施]

    [39]《红旗文稿》2024年第23 Red Flag Articles (2024:23)



     

    Just Published--Journal of Contemporary China Vol. 34(153), with Focus on China-Japan Relations: Narratives, Nationalism, and the Taiwan Issue

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     Happy to pass along an announcement by Suisheng Zhao (赵穗生), Professor (Denver) and Editor, Journal of Contemporary China (JCC) about the publication of the JCC's Vol. 34 Issue 153. The theme for this issue is "China-Japan Relations: Narratives, Nationalism, and the Taiwan Issue."

    Authors titles and links follow below.

     


     

    Journal of Contemporary China 

    Volume 34 Issue 153 May 2025

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    China-Japan Relations: Narratives, Nationalism, and the Taiwan Issue

    Examining China and Japan’s Narratives as Diplomatic Tools: Competitive Nature and International Influence

    Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

    Pages: 367-382

     

    Rare Earth and Resource Nationalism: What Happened Before and After China’s Embargo on Japan?

    Florence W. Yang

    Pages: 383-400

     

    ‘Power of One’: Situating the ‘Iris Chang Phenomenon’ in the National/Transnational Remembering of the Nanjing Massacre

    Zhang Pingfan

    Pages: 401-415

     

    Assessing Japan’s Taiwan Policy: Systemic Clarity, Political Survival and Bureaucratic Prudence

    Mong Cheung

    Pages: 416-431

     

    China as a Maritime Power and Relations with the Philippines

    China’s Discourse of Maritime Power: A Thematic Analysis

    Edward Sing Yue Chan

    Pages: 432-450

     

    Chinese Coercion, Wedge Strategies, and the U.S.-Philippine Alliance

    Robert S. Ross

    Pages: 451-471

     

    Political Resilience and Participation in Urban and Rural China (II)

    New Clientelism in Urban China: Broker-Based Evasions in Residential Property Market

    Yini Shi

    Pages: 472-488

     

    “First Democracy, Then Centralism”: The New Shape of Village Elections Under the “One-Shoulder Pole” Policy

    Tan Zhao

    Pages: 489-503

     

    Research Articles

    Constructed Community: Rise and Engines of Chinese Nationalism Under Xi Jinping

    Danna He and Wenfang Tang

    Pages: 504-526

     

    Flexible Organizational Weapon of the Party: The New Presence of Women’s Federations in Women’s NGOs in China

    Lin Nie and Jie Wu

    Pages: 527-546