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Conference: The Art of Chinese Social Media (27-28 November) School of Art, BCU, Birmingham, UK

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 I am delighted to pass along information about the upcoming Conference: The Art of Chinese Social Media. It will take place 27-28 November at the School of Art, BCU, Birmingham, UK. The organizers describe the event this way:

Welcome to The Art of Chinese Social Media! Join us at the Birmingham School of Art for two- day filled with insights, networking, and creativity. This conference seeks to explore the artistic strategies and visual cultures generated from Chinese social media to reflect broader sociopolitical dynamics in the context of Xi Jinping’s increasing digital censorship and control. How do platforms like Weibo, Douyin/TikTok, and WeChat construct new forms of artistic practice and cultural expression within the new age of ‘digital China’ and the deglobalising world? In what ways do contemporary artists and communities remediate social media to challenge power asymmetries, and foster digital democratisation through reclaiming agency and individual empowerment?

The conference welcomes contributions that can develop disciplinary perspectives and critical inquiries on the art and aesthetics of Chinese social media in the fields of visual arts, digital media, design, performing arts, and cultural studies. Part of Dr. Shiyu Gao’s Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship research project, Emerging Surveillance Culture, which explores the intersection of expanded media art and technology in the context of ‘digital China’.

The Conference Program follows.  Registration through this LINK

 

 The 18th CCVA Annual Conference
The Art of Chinese Social Media

We are pleased to announce the programme of the 18th CCVA Annual Conference, themed ‘The Art of Chinese Social Media’, will be held in School of Art, BCU, Birmingham 27th and 28th November this year. It is now open for registration.

Date: 27-28 November 2025
Venue: Lecture Theatre, School of Art, Margaret Street, Birmingham B3 3BX, UK
Registration link: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-art-of-chinese-social-media-the-18th-ccva-annual-conference-tickets-1858395965359?aff=oddtdtcreator


Day 1 — Thursday, 27 November 2025

9:30-10:00 Registration

10:00-10:15 Welcome Speech (University Representatives) 
                Conference Introduction (Conference Convenors)

10:15-11:15 Keynote Speech
Prof. Margaret Hillenbrand (University of Oxford)

11:15-12:45 Panel 1: Geopolitics of Social Media in the Transnational Perspective

- Bhavna Singh (Shaanxi Normal University), Discourse, Online Propaganda and Media Control: China’s Race against Democracy

- Prachi Aggarwal (University of Delhi), The Role of Social Media in India–China Relations: Structure and Dynamism

12:45-13:45 Lunch

13:45-15:15 Panel 2: Digital Diaspora and Urban Imaginaries in Social Media

- Biwei Cong (XJTLU), RedNotable? The City Image of China in the Age of Technological Mediation and Digital Reproduction

- Yitao Qian (SOAS, University of London), Staging Shanghai Aesthetics: A Digital Crossover of Wong Kar-wai’sBlossoms Shanghai and Duoyunxuan’s Woodblock Printing 

- Teresa Irigoyen-Lopez (University of Oxford), Virtual Qiaoxiang: The Mediated Hometown as a Site for Intergenerational Negotiations of Chinese Belonging
Coffee Break (15:15-15:45)

15:45-17:15 Panel 3: Resistance in Social Media

- Chen Xiaolingtong (University of Cologne), Visual Codes of Rejection: Feminist Aesthetics and Gendered Discourse on Xiaohongshu

- Hairong Wang (University of Edinburgh), Participating from the Margins: Hmong/Miao Cultural Expression Across Chinese and Global Social Media

- Linfei (Faye) Xu (University of Amsterdam), NutBrother’s “Hotpot Fish” and co-created playful dissent on DianPing/Chinese platforms

17:15-17:30 Closing Remark


Day 2 — Friday, 28 November 2025

09:30–10:00 Coffee & Arrival

10:00-11:00 Keynote Speech
Prof. Bingchun Meng (The London School of Economics and Political Science)

11:00–12:30 Panel 4: Art in Chinese Social Media

- Chao Yan (Birmingham City University), From Practice to Presence: How Social Media Reshapes the Chinese Artist’s Role

- Yan Zhou (PhD, University of Toronto), Media Tactics in Chinese Socially Engaged and Networked Art Practice (WeChat groups/Moments, Official Accounts, WeChatPay)

12:30-13:30 Lunch

13:30–15:00 Panel 5: Writings in Chinese Social Media

- Han Sun (University of Oxford), Between Dis/Nonappearance and Manifestation: Ghost Writing on the Wall in Contemporary China

- Marta Rosa Bisceglia (University of Bologna), Spray and Scroll: Chinese Graffiti and the Glocal Dynamics of Identity in the Digital Age

- Martina Benigni (Sapienza University of Rome), “Multimodal-multimedial Poetry Collections” on WeChat: A Case Study of The Flâneuses

15:00-15:30 Coffee Break

15:30–17:00 Panel 6: New Aesthetics in Chinese Social Media 

- Jing Wang (University of Oxford), Vertical Aesthetics: Chinese Social Media as a New Dynamics of Cinema

- Cong Chen & Xunnan Li (University of Leeds), Micro-Short Dramas in China: The Art of Immersion and Interaction in the Age of Social Media

- Jiahui Zhou (University of Edinburgh), Miao Ying and the Aesthetics of Kitsch and Sentimentality Today

17:00-17:15 Closing Remark

17:15-18:00 Wine Reception


Literary Encounter at the University of Lille Celebrating Release of Marilyn Bromberg, "Body Image Law"

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I am delighted to pass along this notice of a literary encounter from my friend and colleague  Anne Wagner (Lille):

Join us for a Literary Encounter with Marilyn Bromberg at Université de Lille! The Bibliothèque Paul Duez is delighted to host Marilyn Bromberg for a special literary event celebrating the release of her new book, Body Image Law: Revolutionising Images of Thin-Ideal Women.

📅 Date: 21 November 2025, 14h30
📍 Location: Bibliothèque Paul Duez — 1 Place Déliot, Lille
🎙️ Hosts: Anne Wagner & Jean-Christophe Duhamel

Join us in person for an engaging discussion on law, body image, and social change.
Learn more about the book here: https://www.routledge.com/Body-Image-Law-Revolutionising-Images-of-Thin-Ideal-Women/Bromberg/p/book/9781041129677. All are welcome — don’t miss this thought-provoking exchange!

Book Description, Rable of COntents and Author Bio follow.

 Book Description

This book examines the effectiveness and limitations of existing body image law, and proposes evidence-based regulatory alternatives informed by public health and psychology research.

Poor body image affects millions of people worldwide, and, despite the body positivity movement, the pressure on women in Western countries to have smaller bodies continues to cause significant harm to many. This book contributes to improving this, through drawing on evidence from research which outlines the harm excessive social media use and exposure to models with smaller bodies can cause to an individual’s body image. It explores the regulatory efforts of governments in Israel, France and Norway which passed Body Image Laws, and failed attempts to pass bills in this area in Canada, the United Kingdom, Brazil and the United States. This book analyses the outcome of BMI requirements for catwalk fashion models, warning messages on digitally altered images and prosecuting pro-anorexia content creators. It asks why the current forms of body image law do not align with significant findings from public health and psychology. This book offers a compelling, evidence-based overview of body image as it intersects with law. It argues that body image law in its current form is unlikely to be effective and makes suggestions for evidence-based approaches instead.

This book will be of interest to researchers concerned with body image and the law as it relates to public health law, social media law and advertising law and anyone who has poor body image, an eating disorder or knows someone who has.

Table of Contents 

1. Introduction

2. Body Image and Eating Disorders Generally and Associated Socioeconomic Issues

3. Theories to Explain the Connection Between Seeing Images of the Thin-Ideal and Developing Poor Body Image and Eating Disorders

4. How Social Media Impacts Body Image

5. Body Image Law: A Detailed Examination

6. Challenges Associated With Body Image Law

7. Pro-Anorexia Websites/Social Media and the Law 

8. What Might Work to Help Improve Body Image and Ways to Lower the Number of Unhelpful Images of the Thin-Ideal, Based on Evidence

9. Conclusion

 

Biography

Marilyn Bromberg, FHEA ('M'), is a mother and a dual Canadian and Australian citizen. She is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia and a practising lawyer. M was a visiting scholar at STRIPED at the T.H. Chan School of Public Health at Harvard University/Boston Children's Hospital. M has the following qualifications: PhD, LLB (Dist), BBA (Hon), Grad Cert Pop Health Studies and Grad Cert University Teaching. She also plays piano, takes singing lessons and loves being outside. M has a great passion to try to help people who have poor body image and eating disorders using research and advocacy.

2025 Absa Africa Financial Markets Index Released

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I am delighted to pass along the recently released Absa Africa Financial Markets Index. The Absa Africa Financial Markets Index was produced by OMFIF in association with Absa Group Limited. The pRess Release explained:

Progress despite global headwinds

The past 12 months have seen highs and lows around the world. Difficult macroeconomic conditions, compounded by a turbulent trade environment and geopolitical tensions, have created challenges for African economies. As a result, countries in this year’s Absa Africa Financial Markets Index have seen their progress hampered by global headwinds. While a third of countries were able to improve their overall scores, the remaining two-thirds saw their scores fall or remain unchanged. However, this is just the surface story. The detail shows important developments in a number of areas.

The index assesses financial market development across the continent through the lens of transparency, accessibility and openness. Now in its ninth year, it provides a benchmark for market infrastructure and an opportunity for policy-makers to learn from improvements across Africa. With support from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the index covers 29 economies in the region. This equates to approximately 80% of the population and gross domestic product of Africa.

Enter your details on the right to access the report.

The most interesting focus of the findings are on those instruments and actions that reflec6ted the sensibilities and objectives of the international al financial order before 2015. Not that these are either wrongheaded or irrelevant.  It is just that since 2015 and especially in the United States since 2025, the focus of financial instruments and political objectives in both liberal democratic and Marxist Leninist States has shifted primarily toward modernization (by whatever name modernization is utilized--development, stronger national economic integration, sector security and the like). Most useful, in this respect, then, is on the growth of market variation in financial products offered--greater variation suggesting depth of market and a growing consumer taste for differentiated product. Bit the object of all of this is development and development strategies and it is hoped that this might be better focused. In that respect ESG and ESG related products are a great vase in point, one that requires a bit m ore drilling down to the essence of the product offered to get a better sense of what it is that the market considers useful or at least market ready ESG instruments. That is a small quibble in light of the quite useful information digested and presented in the report, one worth considering carefully. 

Key findings:

  • While many economies faced a decline in reserves adequacy in the 12 months to June 2025, countries that prioritised tackling inefficient foreign exchange regimes fared best.
  • In total, 18 AFMI economies now offer environmental, social and governance-related or Islamic financial products, providing crucial diversification for both short- and long-term investment.
  • Despite backtracks on ESG goals globally in the past year, four AFMI countries have issued green bonds for the first time this year, taking the total number to 14.
  • Expectations for GDP growth rose in 22 countries this year despite the more challenging economic conditions.
  •  The Table of Contents and the Executive Summary of the Index follows below.

     

 








 

Revista Española de Empresas y Derechos Humanos Núm. 5 (2025): Nº5 - Octubre 2025 Just Published

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Delighted to pass along information about the publication of the latest volume of  Revista Española de Empresas y Derechos HumanosNúm. 5 (2025): Nº5 - Octubre 2025.

The volume includes some very interest9ng and powerful essays that are well worth reading. The table of contents and links to the essays follow below. The full volume of essays may be accessed HERE.

 

 

 

Innovation in Warfare Goes Gobal--Lessons Applied to Sudan

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The war between rival factions of the Sudanese Arab elite has provided evidence, again, that the techniques and modalities of violent aspects of warfare have neither ideology nor limits--they are instruments the utility of which is a function of desire and objectives by those who use them. In the case of Sudan it appears to be used to eliminate non-Arab Black Africans from contested parts of Sudan. Racial and ethnic cleansing has become the stuff of the ordinary in the wars that have emerged below the triggering points of international (and certainly U.N.) organized outrage. That was again illustrated in the context of the all of the Sudanese city of el-Fasher to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The Wall Street Journal reported that "Sudan’s civil war is taking a jarring turn in Darfur, where an Arab-led militia is now using state-of-the-art drones and execution squads to dominate the region’s Black population. . . . The group behind the violence, the Rapid Support Forces, led by Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, has previously been accused by the U.S. of pursuing a genocide of Darfur’s Black population. Two decades ago, its predecessor was involved in the killing of more than 200,000 people in Darfur." (Nicholas Bariyo, "Sudan Militia, Armed With Drones, Hunts Down Black Population of Darfur," Wall Street Journal 31 October 2025).  Of particular interest was the way in which dual purpose technologies have been used  in the conflict.

The Yale Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL, HUMAN SECURITY EMERGENCY: El-Fasher Falls to RSF: Evidence of Mass Killing, 27 October 2025) was a bit more circumspect: "“El-Fasher appears to be in a systematic and intentional process of ethnic cleansing of Fur, Zaghawa, and Berti indigenous non-Arab communities through forced displacement and summary execution,” the HRL said." (Yale report finds evidence of RSF mass killings in Sudan’s el-Fasher). Al Jazeera noted "The RSF, which has been fighting Sudan’s military for control of the country, killed at least 1,500 people over the past three days as civilians tried to flee the besieged city, the Sudan Doctors Network said on Wednesday. The group, which tracks the country’s civil war, described the situation as “a true genocide”. (here; "Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkiye and Jordan have condemned the abuses committed by the RSF in Sudan."). Goobal mass mobilizations, however, do not appear to have emerged either in the first phase years ago nor now.

 

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The U.N, reporting follows below.

 

‘Blood on the sand. Blood on the hands’: UN decries world’s failure as Sudan’s El Fasher falls

Tens of thousands of civilians – including many women and children – have been killed in Sudan since conflict erupted in April 2023. (file photo)
© Avaaz/Giles Clarke
Tens of thousands of civilians – including many women and children – have been killed in Sudan since conflict erupted in April 2023. (file photo)
By Vibhu Mishra
Peace and Security

El Fasher has “descended into an even darker hell,” senior UN officials warned on Thursday, as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia seized control of the North Darfur capital after a 500-day siege, forcing tens of thousands to flee on foot amid reports of mass executions, rape and starvation.

Briefing ambassadors in the Security Council, the UN’s top relief official Tom Fletcher said “women and girls are being raped, people being mutilated and killed – with utter impunity,” adding: “We cannot hear the screams, but – as we sit here today – the horror is continuing.

After overrunning the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) last major stronghold in Darfur which had held out for over 500 days, RSF fighters moved house to house, he said, with “credible reports of widespread executions” as civilians attempted to escape.

Nearly 500 patients and their companions were reportedly killed in the Saudi Maternity Hospital, one of numerous health facilities targeted in the fighting.

Tens of thousands of terrified, starving civilians have fled or are on the move,” Mr. Fletcher said. “Those able to flee – the vast majority women, children, and the elderly – face extortion, rape and violence on the perilous journey.

Horror spreads

Assistant Secretary-General for Africa Martha Pobee called the fall of El Fasher “a significant shift in the security dynamics,” warning that the implications for Sudan and the wider region are “profound.”

Fighting has already intensified in the Kordofan region, where the RSF captured the strategic town of Bara last week.

Drone strikes by both RSF and SAF, she said, are now hitting new targets across Blue Nile, South Kordofan, West Darfur and Khartoum. “The territorial scope of the conflict is broadening,” she cautioned.

The risk of mass atrocities, ethnically targeted violence and further violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual violence, remains alarmingly high,” Ms. Pobee told the Council.

“Despite commitments to protect civilians, the reality is that no one is safe in El Fasher. There is no safe passage for civilians to leave the city.”

The UN human rights office, OHCHR, has documented mass killings, summary executions, and ethnically motivated reprisals both in El Fasher and Bara. In the latter, at least 50 civilians were killed in recent days, including five Sudanese Red Crescent volunteers, Ms. Pobee said.

A woman searches through the burnt remains of her shelter at a displacement camp in Darfur, Sudan.
© UNICEF/Mohammed Jamal
A woman searches through the burnt remains of her shelter at a displacement camp in Darfur, Sudan.

History of atrocity in Darfur

What is unfolding in El Fasher recalls the horrors Darfur was subjected to twenty years ago,” Mr. Fletcher said, referring to the atrocities of the early 2000s that shocked the world and eventually led to International Criminal Court indictments.

“But somehow today we are seeing a very different global reaction – one of resignation,” he continued. “This is also a crisis of apathy.”

“The Sudan crisis is, at its core, a failure of protection, and our responsibility to uphold international law,” Mr. Fletcher said. “Atrocities are committed with unashamed expectation of impunity…the world has failed an entire generation.

Descent into all-out war

The conflict in Sudan began in April 2023, when a long-simmering power struggle between the SAF and RSF erupted into open war.

The RSF traces its roots to the Janjaweed militias accused of atrocities in Darfur 20 years ago, while the SAF represents the remnants of long-standing military rule from Khartoum.

Both forces once shared power after the 2019 ouster of former president Omar al-Bashir, but a dispute over integrating the RSF into the national army triggered a nationwide collapse.

What began as a contest for control of the State has since devolved into a brutal struggle marked by ethnic killings, urban siege warfare, mass displacement, and famine conditions across large parts of the country.

Sudanese refugees arrive at the border town of Adre, Chad. (file)
© UNHCR/Andrew McConnell
Sudanese refugees arrive at the border town of Adre, Chad. (file)

Regional spillover and humanitarian collapse

More than four million people have already fled into neighbouring Chad, South Sudan and the Central African Republic, straining humanitarian operations and heightening instability in already fragile border regions.

Inside Sudan, more than 24 million people – over 40 per cent of the population – are food insecure. Tawila, the main destination some 50kms away for those fleeing El Fasher, is already hosting hundreds of thousands displaced by earlier attacks.

“Our teams in Tawila are seeing traumatized people arriving showing shocking signs of malnutrition,” Mr. Fletcher said.

‘Blood on the sand. Blood on the hands’

Mr. Fletcher said the Council must act “with immediate and robust action” to stop atrocities, ensure safe humanitarian access, and halt flows of weapons fuelling the war.

“I urge colleagues to study the latest satellite imagery of El Fasher; blood on the sand,” he told ambassadors. “And I urge colleagues to study the world’s continued failure to stop this. Blood on the hands.”

 

 

Reflections on 石英, 智能社会”研究三题 【构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系】[ Shi Ying, Three Research Topics on "Intelligent Society" (Constructing an Independent Knowledge System for Chinese Philosophy and Social Sciences)]; 国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+” [Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the Implementation of the "Artificial Intelligence+" Action; ]; and 以“人工智能+”开启中国特色智能化发展新篇章; [Opening a New Chapter in China's Intelligent Development with "Artificial Intelligence+" (High-Tech Department NDRC]

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The term "artificial intelligence" has acquired a protean quality--it is at once fetish, invocation, curse, and shorthand for a range of hoped for or feared transformation not just in social relations in the physical world, but for the transformation of the mechanics of ordering reality through which social relations may be conceived and manifested.  All political and normative organs, especially those created to express and manage human social relations in accordance with whatever cognitive model they mean to manifest, believe that, having created artificial intelligence in their own image, they can, with nothing more than the flip of a textual legal-institutional switch, bend that construct to its will and enslave to as an instrument of to do with as they wish. 

An yet that fundamental premise--that humanity is at the center of all of its creations, and thus centered in control-- is only the beginning rather than the end point of analysis. That is because while humans share this notion of humanity at the center of things, human collectives express this, construct its meaning and realize that meaning through the collective organs that they establish for that purpose, in vastly different ways. Those "ways" in turn, are an expression of quite distinct ordering premises bound up in ideology--the political-economic models through which human collectives rationalize the world around them (in normative and utilitarian ways). It is the materialization of that rationality, bounded in turn on the generative human conceit, that produce the structures of hopes, fears, desires, approaches and solutions that are proffered up within a spectrum of "good" to "bad", vales that themselves reflect both the fundamental conceit and their specific rationalizing premises built into collective orders. 

And so it is with that most peculiar creation of humanity, constructed out  of generative conceit in our own image--generative intelligence and its ecologies of tech enhanced computation.  Three of the most interesting ordering regimens to have emerged both reflect and further refine three of the most significant conceptual cages for human cognitive collective building--(1) liberal democratic ordering; (2) Marxist-Leninist ordering; and (3) anarchist-fractured autonomous ordering. The first obsesses about risk impacting behaviors that adversely affects rights holders and the self-actualization of individuals organized as identity collectives. If the first em,beds risk aversion as the primary principle of governance the second embraces risk taking as the organization of collectives around markets the protection of the integrity of which provides the only basis for managing behaviors. The third starts form the opposite end of the spectrum--the collective rather than the individual--adds a purpose to collectivization (the realization of a communist society)and devotes its primary energy to the development necessary to direct all human activity towards the deployment of productive forces along a Socialist path toward its communist goal. If the first fears risk, the second embraces it, and the third embeds risk within a more complicated balancing in which risk is not the center but a factor in its analytics of development (in the Chinese sense--modernization). 

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The first has settled on a risk centered rationalization of the conceptual spaces for the generation, creation, development, interconnection and autonomy and autonomy of tech enhanced autonomous decision making and generative intelligence. Liberal democratic collective spaces like to have things done for them, but they also like to see themselves in control, especially of those who serve them, whether these servants take physical or virtual form. In the process the generative ordering of collectivity has become risk aversion. and they have become absurdly risk averse. That has become the principal ordering premise of the organization and operation of the entirety of liberal democratic society.  One grounds its ordering on the elaboration of rights, spaces, behaviors, identities the condition and forms of which must be preserved at virtually all costs.  Regulation, and systems, are all a function of the prevention, mitigation, and remediation of adverse impacts on these behaviors, identities, conditions and autonomous. Politics revolves around the generation of those things  that are the objects of impacts analysis; and the state (as well as non-state sectors) may operate only as a function of avoiding negative impact. Politics, then, becomes a function of defining categories of things, behaviors, conditions, etc. the impacts of which become the core of regulatory supervision. And those behaviors, conditions, expectation, innovation that produce negative impact (as these conditions and effects are also measured, itself another critical element of norm and technical-standards politics) may be regulated or suppressed. That, in essence, is the spirit of instruments like the EU AI Act, and various variations within the liberal democratic sphere.  

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The second takes liberal democratic spaces, as well as those spaces uncomfortable with the warm embrace of liberal democratic ordering projected form out of developed States in anther direction. This approach to generative and tech enhanced innovation, use, and projection, is grounded on the protection of autonomous decision making rather than on collective risk management. It tends to be aligned with markets driven collective formation and operation, one in which the managerial role of the State recedes before the aggregated iterative activities of autonomous individuals pursuing their own agendas, bumping up against each other, and in the aggregate producing inductive, a sense of the collective expectations, behaviors, values, and protections of the market spaces within which such autonomy is protected and operates. Here markets rather than the State take pride of place--the State itself can be reconstructed as the aggregation of a layered set of operating instructions for the maintenance of the good order of market spaces and the protection of its principles--transparency, protection of rights in property and against fraud and deception, and fairness as a collective principle. This is a space in which autonomous and generative intelligence may be developed and deployed in an environment in which producers may assess, and bear the risks of whatever it is they develop. It is a system that can operate only where the State can tax these activities enough to maintain capacity to police and operate organs in which people may resolve disputes in ways that affirm collective expectations, and one that can discipline behaviors that threaten the integrity of this iterative, inductive collectivity. It is also one in which the role can be undertaken not just be the State but by non-State actors: indigenous communities, like minded collectives, and the like.

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The third, and for my purpose today the most interesting variation is presented by the engagement of Marxist-Leninist cognitive cages with tech based and generative intelligence. Both Marxist-Leninist and liberal democratic cognitive cages center the State as the virtual personification (incarnation really) of the people whose collective constitution is necessarily privileged over the individual, to which quite different spectra of behaviors may be tolerated (and regulated in different ways). Liberal democracy encourages a managed individual self-actualization; Marxist-Leninist States encourage collective actualization through which individual self-actualization may be realized. At the center of the engagement of Marxist-Leninism with tech enhanced analytics and decision making, as well as with generative intelligence, is the fundamental principle of development. Socialist modernization is the one key principle, and the one core element, of the integrity of the system and the fiduciary obligation of the vanguard of social forces organized as a Communist Party through which the masses may be brought forward from their less developed state to one in which it is possible to combine both material wealth and cultural readiness, for the establishment of something like a classical communist state of being. Tech and AI, then, are productive forces, all productive forces are pwned by the State, the use and development of which is a central concern for the exercise of leadership and guidance by the Communist Party vanguard in accordance with core principles of Socialist democracy (Whole process people's democracy in China). That gives tech based and AI generative system both a strong political dimension (the innovation of which is a key element for Socialist modernization grounded in high quality production) and a methodological one (tech and AI as a necessary element of modernization the risks of which must be understood as a function of the benefits for collective modernization). Risk, then, is a secondary element to the development of high quality production, and high quality production is valued as a function of its contribution of modernization as that may be assessed  as against the goals of forward movement along the Socialist Path that shapes both production and the cultural development of the human (and collective humanity) preparing it for successful transitioning to Communist social organization. 

All of these streams of understanding in Marxist-Leninist engagement with tech and AI are evident in three documents that may be worthwhile to read. The is first, 石英, 智能社会”研究三题 【构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系】[ Shi Ying, Three Research Topics on "Intelligent Society" (Constructing an Independent Knowledge System for Chinese Philosophy and Social Sciences)]. It focuses on a Socialist engagement with the thinking about AI and tech- based production from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. That engagement, in turn, may be better understood by reference to two official pronouncements: The first is 国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见 (国发〔2025〕11号= [Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the Implementation of the "Artificial Intelligence+" Action; State Council Document No. 11 [2025]]; and the second is 以“人工智能+”开启中国特色智能化发展新篇章; 发布时间:2025/08/26 [Opening a New Chapter in China's Intelligent Development with "Artificial Intelligence+" (Published: 2025/08/26; Source: High-Tech Department National Development Reform Commission].

The State Council Opinions frames the issue for analysis:

In order to deeply implement the "Artificial Intelligence+" action, promote the extensive and in-depth integration of artificial intelligence with all sectors and fields of the economy and society, reshape the paradigm of human production and life, promote a revolutionary leap in productivity and a profound transformation of production relations, and accelerate the formation of a new form of intelligent economy and intelligent society characterized by human-machine collaboration, cross-border integration, and co-creation and sharing, the following opinions are hereby put forward. [为深入实施“人工智能+”行动,推动人工智能与经济社会各行业各领域广泛深度融合,重塑人类生产生活范式,促进生产力革命性跃迁和生产关系深层次变革,加快形成人机协同、跨界融合、共创分享的智能经济和智能社会新形态,现提出如下意见。]

The NDRC essay then situates the State Council Opinion within its operational development in and as modernization of both economic, cultural and human developmental. 

As another strategic deployment by the state to promote technological revolution and industrial integration following "Internet+", the "Opinions" leverages China's three core advantages: a complete industrial system, a large market size, and rich application scenarios. It constructs a spiral development paradigm of "innovation driving application, application promoting innovation," accelerating the full-chain restructuring and deep coupling of artificial intelligence with the real economy, comprehensively stimulating new momentum for industrial transformation, cultivating a new paradigm of intelligent economy, forging a key fulcrum for seizing the commanding heights of global intelligent competition, and building a new pattern of high-quality development driven by new-quality productivity. 作为继“互联网+”之后国家推动技术革命和产业融合的又一战略部署,《意见》立足我国产业体系完备、市场规模庞大、应用场景丰富三大核心优势,构建“创新带应用、应用促创新”的螺旋式发展范式,加速人工智能与实体经济全链重构、深向耦合,全面激发产业变革新动能、培育智能经济新范式,为抢占全球智能化竞争制高点锻造关键支点,构筑新质生产力驱动的高质量发展新格局。

The contrast with liberal democratic and markets driven anarchic systems could not be more starkly revealed. And it doesn't really matter. Each is true to its own cognitive processes and their resulting rationalization of the world within which collectives are organized to manage humans in accordance with their respective logic.  Soon, perhaps, a generative intelligence might do that better than the humans seeking to fulfill the promise of their respective cages of cognition manifested as political-economic ideologies of productive and human forces.  

The text of the three documents,  石英, 智能社会”研究三题 【构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系】[ Shi Ying, Three Research Topics on "Intelligent Society" (Constructing an Independent Knowledge System for Chinese Philosophy and Social Sciences)]; 国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见 (国发〔2025〕11号= [Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the Implementation of the "Artificial Intelligence+" Action; State Council Document No. 11 [2025]]; and 以“人工智能+”开启中国特色智能化发展新篇章; 发布时间:2025/08/26 [Opening a New Chapter in China's Intelligent Development with "Artificial Intelligence+" (Published: 2025/08/26; Source: High-Tech Department National Development Reform Commission] follow below in the original Chinese and in English translation.

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智能社会”研究三题

作者:石英 《光明日报》( 2025年10月25日 06版)



  【构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系】 

  根据国务院印发的《关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的指导意见》(以下简称《指导意见》)精神,到2035年我国将全面进入智能社会。“智能社会”作为社会学的核心概念和研究对象,也受到经济学、政治学、管理学、法学等社会科学学科的普遍关注,成为社会科学共同的研究热点。然而,研究中时常会遇到一些诸如概念界定和指向不清、认知歧义等问题。本文拟就智能社会的概念名称、性质特色、建设治理等基本议题展开初步探讨。

智能社会概念:信息技术走向成熟的技术社会形态

  概念是学术话语体系的基石,统一、清晰的概念也是人工智能领域国际合作交流的基础。科学理解和准确把握智能社会概念,是发展马克思主义社会学、构建中国哲学社会科学自主知识体系的重要内容。

  智能社会,是指人工智能技术广泛应用于社会生产、生活的方方面面,成为社会运行主导推动力量的社会发展阶段。作为一种技术社会形态的指称,智能社会概念显然不是指“社会”具有了“智能”,而是像石器时代、青铜时代、蒸汽时代、电力时代、互联网时代等概念一样,其名称是以某一历史时段发挥主导作用的代表性通用技术为前缀来命名的。需要注意的是,“技术+社会”与“技术+时代”的表述经常混用,但前者指称社会形态,后者强调历史阶段。“智能社会”当然也可称之为“智能时代”,但“智能时代”的指向是历史时段,不是一个技术社会形态概念。

  在媒体和学术界的讨论中,还常常可以看到“智慧社会”“数字社会”“数智社会”等不同表述,这些概念在具体应用中存在侧重点的差异:“智慧社会”表述偏实践导向,侧重于具体应用场景的智能化,如智慧城市、智慧医疗等;“数字社会”强调社会运行过程人与物的数字化虚拟映射,一定意义上可视为“智能社会”的基础和前提;“数智社会”表述则更注重综合性,强调数字化驱动和智能化应用的结合。但从更为规范和符合政策口径的角度,这些称谓正逐步统一为“智能社会”的概念表述。

  20世纪80年代,美国未来学家阿尔温·托夫勒提出“三次浪潮”理论,将人类社会划分为农业社会、工业社会、信息社会三个大的历史时段。“三次浪潮”是以主导产业来命名的产业社会形态。产业社会形态的内涵要大于技术社会形态,但其本质仍可归属于技术社会形态。智能社会是否属于信息社会之后的“第四次浪潮”?人们有不同观点。肯定者认为,从信息社会到智能社会是一种质的飞跃,意味着人类社会进入一个新的历史发展阶段;否定者则认为,智能社会仍属于信息社会,是信息社会走向成熟的阶段。在笔者看来,后一种观点更为可取。这是因为,人工智能技术本身就属于信息科学技术,而不是另一种独立的技术门类,而且一种技术社会形态从逐渐形成到成熟延续,在历史长河中不会也不应太过短暂:农业社会长达数千年;工业社会自蒸汽机革命起已历三百年,仍处于蓬勃发展时期;以计算机互联网为标志的信息技术和信息产业从20世纪后半叶起步,到人工智能走进大众视野,迄今不过半个多世纪。可以认为,智能社会是人类正式跨入信息社会的核心标志。

智能社会特征:知识经济与充满不确定性的“复杂性科学”时代

  技术在本质上反映了人类对自然界(包含自身)的认知和操控能力,技术社会形态则标志着某一历史阶段的生产力发展水平。正如有研究者所指出的,“物质、能量、信息是社会渐进发展的三大要素。这三个要素在每个历史时期都同时并存,但是每个要素的轻重和整体结构会随着社会发展而有所不同。总体上,随着时代的推进,它们从物质—能量—信息依次重要的程度在演变”。

  农业社会的生产资料和劳动对象为农具和土地,劳动者除了充分利用自己的体能,还初步学会了利用水能、风能、太阳能等自然能。农业社会的技术源于个体的劳动经验积累,对周围世界的认知和操控能力均处在物质(实物)层面。农业社会经济活动的特点可以概括为土地经济。

  工业社会随着蒸汽机革命和近代自然科学学科群的兴起而到来。技术不再只是个体拥有的经验,而是上升到科学理论,成为可以大规模复制和传播的系统知识形态。人们掌握了机械能、化学能、电能、生物能乃至核能等不同性质的能量,以及质量和能量之间相互转换并远距离传输的知识,石油、煤炭等化石燃料成为主要的能量来源。由此,人类对自然界的操控能力由物质层面上升到能量层面。工业社会的特征可以理解为能源经济。

  信息社会的到来,源自20世纪中叶科学家提出的“人工智能”目标和理论框架。从计算机诞生到互联网普及,以数据通信为核心的信息产业在20世纪90年代形成。随着算力迅速增长、大数据爆炸式积累以及机器学习算法的迭代,人工智能技术在21世纪第二个十年取得突破。自此,信息产业不再只是归属于第三产业的通信服务业,而开始成为全方位覆盖所有产业的基础性产业。数据成为重要的生产资料,意味着人类对自然界的认知和操控能力已经从物质、能量层面跃升到信息层面。

  数据信息何以能够作为生产资料、形成先进的生产力?因为信息可以转化为知识,而知识是一种潜在的巨大能量。这里,数据是信息的基础,信息是知识的基础。数据是对客观事物的符号表示,如数字、文字、图像、声音等;数据通常以离散的、无结构的形式存在,是未经加工的原始素材。信息是经过加工处理后能够为人们提供事物状况的具有特定意义的数据;信息通常具有一定的结构和组织形式,能够以图表、文档、音视频等形式呈现。知识则是在信息的基础上,经过人类的思维加工和经验积累而形成的对事物本质和规律的高层次认知成果;知识的表现形式更为复杂和多样化,包括经验、概念、原理、规则、模型等,可以以论文、书籍、专利等形式体现。因此,智能社会经济活动的特征就是知识经济。

  从物质驱动的农业社会,到能量驱动的工业社会,再到数据信息驱动的智能社会,产业升级换代的动力是技术革命,技术革命的源头是科学的进步。农业社会土地经济,生产力的提升呈加法效应——缓慢累积增长。工业社会能源经济,生产力提升呈乘数效应——快速成倍增长。而智能社会知识经济,生产力水平则呈现指数效应——爆发式增长。知识经济创造“物质极大丰富”的基础条件,智能技术“共享经济”提供“各尽所能按需分配”的可能性,智能社会的到来必将生动诠释和印证马克思关于共产主义的预言。

  与此同时,人类的信息操控能力标志着对物质的认知已经进入微观世界的量子层面。量子力学的“不确定性原理”和人工智能的发展历程都表明,我们正在由一个可计算、可预测的“简单性科学”时代正式跨入一个更加充满不确定性的“复杂性科学”时代。不确定性将进一步成为智能社会运行的显著特征。

智能社会建设:弘扬科学精神与坚守人文价值

  按照《指导意见》,到2027年我国将率先实现人工智能与6大重点领域广泛深度融合,到2030年我国人工智能全面赋能高质量发展,到2035年我国全面步入智能经济和智能社会发展新阶段。“广泛”“全面”,意味着智能社会建设不只是少数科学家和企业家的事,必须有全体国民的积极参与。

  但一方面,由于人工智能技术本身尚处于探索起步阶段,相关理论远未成熟,其科学原理存在“解释鸿沟”;另一方面,一些商业炒作营造了人工智能神话和泡沫,使得部分人群面对人工智能热潮时感到迷茫甚至无所适从:要么盲目乐观,等待天上掉馅饼,“读书无用论”“文科消亡论”思潮泛起;要么莫名恐惧,以为“潘多拉魔盒”被打开,担忧人类命运被人工智能主宰,害怕就业岗位被替代,担心生活的意义和人的主体价值丧失。凡此种种,表明普遍提升公众的人工智能素养已成为智能社会建设的当务之急。

  人工智能素养是科学素养与人文素养的综合,既包括能够熟练操作使用智能工具和终端,也包括基本了解与掌握人工智能科学知识和人文伦理。人工智能研究属于计算机科学,机器智能——“机智”的感知识别、推理判断等能力都基于数学计算,与人类“心智”有着本质区别。而社会科学领域的一些研究,却受到拟人化AI“科普”的影响,有的为AI赋予智商乃至人格,有的把AI视为法律意义上的行为主体或责任主体,以致把智能社会看作“人机社会”。应当指出,这种将人机关系并列的主张,在理论上必然导致人类主体性的弱化甚至消解,实践中也会为智能社会治理带来困惑(如智能体法律责任追究难)。诸如此类现象产生的根源,很大程度上就在于对人机关系认知的模糊,主客体不分甚至颠倒。这里既暴露出基本科学素养和科学精神的不足,也反映了以人为本的人文价值的缺失。

  诚然,智能社会的人机关系与工业社会相比在形式上有很大不同,尤其是具有独立感知、决策和行动能力的“智能体”与传统自动化机器之间已有了天壤之别。但人工智能所表现出来的所有功能,都是由人类算法所赋予的,没有也不可能改变其本质的工具属性。就是说,看似无所不能的智能体,依然只是人的局部体能、智能的放大和延伸,并进一步彰显和表征着人的主体性。在“人机协同”“人机互构”“人机共生”过程中,拥有自我意识和自由意志、能够提出问题和发出指令的人,永远是主动的一方。因此,智能社会依然是人类社会而不是人机社会。在人类社会,人是目的,人工智能是手段;人是主体,人工智能是工具。坚持人类唯一主体地位,维护以人为本的核心价值,应当成为智能社会建设的重要议题。

  智能社会不仅是技术的迭代,更是文明形态的跃升。在智能社会,人文的价值将更加凸显,人文社会科学学科的作用将更加突出。智能社会的社会科学研究,需要回归常识、回归理性,弘扬科学精神,发展批判性人工智能素养。只有让工具理性服从服务于价值理性,方能构建起智能社会“技术—制度—人文”协同发展的治理新生态。

  (作者:石英,系西北农林科技大学人文社会发展学院讲座教授) 

 

 Three Research Topics on "Intelligent Society"
Author: Shi Ying
*Guangming Daily* (October 25, 2025, Page 6)

【Constructing an Independent Knowledge System for Chinese Philosophy and Social Sciences】

According to the spirit of the "Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Implementation of the 'Artificial Intelligence+' Action" (hereinafter referred to as the "Guiding Opinions") issued by the State Council, China will fully enter an intelligent society by 2035. "Intelligent society," as a core concept and research object of sociology, has also received widespread attention from social science disciplines such as economics, political science, management, and law, becoming a common research hotspot in social sciences. However, research often encounters problems such as unclear conceptual definitions and directions, and cognitive ambiguities. This article intends to conduct a preliminary exploration of the basic issues of the concept, name, nature, characteristics, construction, and governance of intelligent society.

The Concept of Intelligent Society: A Technological Social Form Where Information Technology Matures

Concepts are the cornerstone of academic discourse systems, and unified and clear concepts are also the foundation for international cooperation and exchange in the field of artificial intelligence. A scientific understanding and accurate grasp of the concept of intelligent society is an important part of developing Marxist sociology and constructing an independent knowledge system for Chinese philosophy and social sciences.

Intelligent society refers to a stage of social development where artificial intelligence (AI) technology is widely applied to all aspects of social production and life, becoming the dominant driving force for the operation of society. As a term referring to a technological social form, the concept of an intelligent society clearly does not mean that "society" possesses "intelligence." Rather, like concepts such as the Stone Age, Bronze Age, Steam Age, Electric Age, and Internet Age, its name is prefixed with a representative general technology that played a dominant role in a particular historical period. It's important to note that the expressions "technology + society" and "technology + era" are often used interchangeably, but the former refers to a social form, while the latter emphasizes a historical stage. "Intelligent society" can certainly also be called "intelligent era," but "intelligent era" refers to a historical period, not a technological conception of social form.

In media and academic discussions, we often see different expressions such as "smart society,""digital society," and "digitally intelligent society." These concepts differ in their emphasis in specific applications: the expression "smart society" is more practice-oriented, focusing on the intelligence of specific application scenarios. The term "intelligent society" encompasses various social phenomena, such as smart cities and smart healthcare. "Digital society" emphasizes the digital virtual mapping of people and things in the social operation process, and can be considered a foundation and prerequisite for "intelligent society." The term "digital-intelligent society" focuses more on comprehensiveness, emphasizing the combination of digital driving forces and intelligent applications. However, from a more standardized and policy-compliant perspective, these terms are gradually being unified under the concept of "intelligent society."

In the 1980s, American futurist Alvin Toffler proposed the "three waves" theory, dividing human society into three major historical periods: agricultural society, industrial society, and information society. The "three waves" are industrial society forms named after their dominant industries. The connotation of industrial society is broader than that of technological society, but its essence can still be classified as technological society. Whether intelligent society belongs to the "fourth wave" after the information society is a matter of differing opinions. Those who affirm it believe that the transition from information society to intelligent society is a qualitative leap, signifying that human society has entered a new stage of historical development; those who deny it believe that intelligent society still belongs to... In the context of the information society, this represents a stage of its maturation. In my view, the latter perspective is more preferable. This is because artificial intelligence technology itself belongs to information science and technology, not a separate technological category. Furthermore, the process of a technological society gradually forming and maturing over a long historical period should not be too short: agricultural societies lasted for thousands of years; industrial societies, since the steam engine revolution, have existed for three hundred years and are still in a period of vigorous development; information technology and the information industry, marked by the computer internet, started in the latter half of the 20th century, and artificial intelligence has only been in the public eye for a little over half a century. Therefore, the intelligent society can be considered the core marker of humanity's formal entry into the information society.

Characteristics of the Intelligent Society: The Knowledge Economy and the Era of "Complexity Science" Filled with Uncertainty

Technology, in essence, reflects humanity's ability to understand and manipulate nature (including itself), while the technological society signifies the level of productivity development at a particular historical stage. As some researchers have pointed out, "Matter, energy, and information are the three major elements of gradual social development. These three elements coexist in every historical period, but the relative importance of each element and the overall structure will differ with social development." Overall, as times progress, their importance has evolved from matter to energy to information.

In agrarian societies, the means of production and objects of labor were farm tools and land. Besides fully utilizing their physical strength, laborers also learned to utilize natural energy sources such as water, wind, and solar power. Technology in agrarian societies stemmed from the accumulation of individual labor experience; their understanding and control over the surrounding world remained at the material (physical) level. The characteristics of economic activity in agrarian societies can be summarized as a land-based economy.

Industrial societies arrived with the steam engine revolution and the rise of modern natural sciences. Technology was no longer merely individual experience but rose to the level of scientific theory, becoming a systematic form of knowledge that could be replicated and disseminated on a large scale. People mastered different types of energy, including mechanical, chemical, electrical, biological, and even nuclear energy, as well as the knowledge of the conversion and long-distance transmission between mass and energy. Fossil fuels such as oil and coal became the main energy sources. Thus… Humanity's ability to manipulate nature has risen from the material level to the energy level. The characteristics of industrial society can be understood as an energy economy.

The arrival of the information society stems from the "artificial intelligence" goals and theoretical framework proposed by scientists in the mid-20th century. From the birth of the computer to the widespread adoption of the internet, the information industry, centered on data communication, took shape in the 1990s. With the rapid growth of computing power, the explosive accumulation of big data, and the iteration of machine learning algorithms, artificial intelligence technology achieved breakthroughs in the second decade of the 21st century. Since then, the information industry is no longer merely a communication service industry belonging to the tertiary sector, but has begun to become a fundamental industry comprehensively covering all industries. Data has become an important means of production, meaning that humanity's ability to understand and manipulate nature has leaped from the material and energy levels to the information level.

How can data and information serve as means of production and form advanced productive forces? Because information can be transformed into knowledge, and knowledge is a potentially enormous form of energy. Here, data is the foundation of information, and information is the foundation of knowledge. Data is the symbolic representation of objective things, such as numbers, text, images, and sounds; data usually exists in a discrete, unstructured form, as raw, unprocessed material. Information is data that, after processing, provides people with specific meaning about the state of things; information usually has a certain structure and organizational form, and can be presented in the form of charts, documents, audio, and video. Knowledge, on the other hand, is a high-level cognitive achievement of the essence and laws of things, formed on the basis of information through human thought processing and experience accumulation; the forms of knowledge are more complex and diverse, including experience, concepts, principles, rules, and models, and can be embodied in the form of papers, books, and patents. Therefore, the characteristic of economic activities in an intelligent society is a knowledge economy.

From a material-driven agricultural society to an energy-driven industrial society, and then to a data- and information-driven intelligent society, the driving force for industrial upgrading and transformation is... Technological revolutions originate from scientific progress. In agrarian societies with a land-based economy, productivity increases have an additive effect—slow, cumulative growth. In industrial societies with an energy-based economy, productivity increases have a multiplier effect—rapid, exponential growth. In intelligent societies with a knowledge-based economy, productivity levels exhibit an exponential effect—explosive growth. The knowledge economy creates the foundational conditions for "abundant material resources," while intelligent technologies and the "sharing economy" offer the possibility of "from each according to their ability, to each according to their needs." The arrival of an intelligent society will vividly interpret and confirm Marx's predictions about communism.

Simultaneously, humanity's ability to manipulate information signifies that our understanding of matter has entered the quantum level of the microscopic world. The "uncertainty principle" of quantum mechanics and the development of artificial intelligence both indicate that we are formally transitioning from an era of calculable and predictable "simple science" to an era of more uncertain "complex science." Uncertainty will further become a key factor in the operation of intelligent societies. Key Features.

Building an Intelligent Society: Promoting Scientific Spirit and Upholding Humanistic Values

According to the "Guiding Opinions," by 2027, China will take the lead in achieving extensive and deep integration of artificial intelligence with six key areas; by 2030, artificial intelligence will fully empower high-quality development; and by 2035, my country will fully enter a new stage of intelligent economy and intelligent society development. "Extensive" and "comprehensive" mean that building an intelligent society is not just a matter for a few scientists and entrepreneurs, but requires the active participation of the entire nation.

However, on the one hand, because artificial intelligence technology itself is still in its exploratory and initial stages, related theories are far from mature, and its scientific principles have an "explanational gap"; on the other hand, some commercial hype has created an artificial intelligence myth and bubble, causing some people to feel confused and even at a loss when faced with the artificial intelligence craze: either blindly optimistic, waiting for a windfall, with the rise of the "uselessness of studying" and "death of the humanities" theories; or inexplicably fearful, thinking it's a "Pandora's box." The "Pandora's box" has been opened, raising concerns about artificial intelligence dominating humanity's fate, job displacement, and the loss of meaning in life and human value. All of this indicates that improving public AI literacy has become an urgent priority in building an intelligent society.

AI literacy is a synthesis of scientific and humanistic literacy, encompassing both the ability to skillfully operate intelligent tools and terminals and a basic understanding of AI science and ethics. AI research belongs to computer science; machine intelligence—its perception, recognition, reasoning, and judgment abilities—is based on mathematical calculations and is fundamentally different from human "mind." However, some research in the social sciences has been influenced by anthropomorphic AI "popularization," with some attributing intelligence and even personality to AI, and others treating AI as a legally defined actor or responsible entity, leading to the view of an intelligent society as a "human-machine society." It should be pointed out that this approach, which places human-machine relationships on an equal footing, inevitably leads to... The weakening or even disappearance of human subjectivity can also bring confusion to the governance of intelligent societies in practice (such as the difficulty in holding intelligent agents legally accountable). The root cause of such phenomena largely lies in the ambiguity of the human-machine relationship, the blurring or even reversal of the subject-object distinction. This exposes both a lack of basic scientific literacy and scientific spirit, and reflects a deficiency in human-centered humanistic values.

Admittedly, the human-machine relationship in an intelligent society differs greatly in form from that in an industrial society, especially in the stark contrast between "intelligent agents" with independent perception, decision-making, and action capabilities and traditional automated machines. However, all the functions exhibited by artificial intelligence are endowed by human algorithms and have not, and cannot, change its essential instrumental nature. That is to say, the seemingly omnipotent intelligent agent is still merely an amplification and extension of human physical abilities and intelligence, further highlighting and representing human subjectivity. In the processes of "human-machine collaboration,""human-machine mutual construction," and "human-machine symbiosis," Humans, possessing self-awareness and free will, capable of asking questions and issuing commands, are always the proactive party. Therefore, an intelligent society remains a human society, not a human-machine society. In human society, humans are the end, and artificial intelligence is the means; humans are the subject, and artificial intelligence is the tool. Upholding the sole subjective status of humanity and maintaining the core value of human-centeredness should be a crucial issue in the construction of an intelligent society.

An intelligent society is not merely an iteration of technology, but a leap forward in civilization. In an intelligent society, the value of the humanities will be more prominent, and the role of the humanities and social sciences will be more significant. Social science research on intelligent societies needs to return to common sense and rationality, promote the spirit of science, and develop critical artificial intelligence literacy. Only by allowing instrumental rationality to serve value rationality can we build a new governance ecosystem for the coordinated development of "technology-institutions-humanities" in an intelligent society.

(Author: Shi Ying, Chair Professor, College of Humanities and Social Development, Northwest A&F University)

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国务院关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见

国发〔2025〕11号


各省、自治区、直辖市人民政府,国务院各部委、各直属机构:

为深入实施“人工智能+”行动,推动人工智能与经济社会各行业各领域广泛深度融合,重塑人类生产生活范式,促进生产力革命性跃迁和生产关系深层次变革,加快形成人机协同、跨界融合、共创分享的智能经济和智能社会新形态,现提出如下意见。

一、总体要求

以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导,完整准确全面贯彻新发展理念,坚持以人民为中心的发展思想,充分发挥我国数据资源丰富、产业体系完备、应用场景广阔等优势,强化前瞻谋划、系统布局、分业施策、开放共享、安全可控,以科技、产业、消费、民生、治理、全球合作等领域为重点,深入实施“人工智能+”行动,涌现一批新基础设施、新技术体系、新产业生态、新就业岗位等,加快培育发展新质生产力,使全体人民共享人工智能发展成果,更好服务中国式现代化建设。

到2027年,率先实现人工智能与6大重点领域广泛深度融合,新一代智能终端、智能体等应用普及率超70%,智能经济核心产业规模快速增长,人工智能在公共治理中的作用明显增强,人工智能开放合作体系不断完善。到2030年,我国人工智能全面赋能高质量发展,新一代智能终端、智能体等应用普及率超90%,智能经济成为我国经济发展的重要增长极,推动技术普惠和成果共享。到2035年,我国全面步入智能经济和智能社会发展新阶段,为基本实现社会主义现代化提供有力支撑。

二、加快实施重点行动

(一)“人工智能+”科学技术

1.加速科学发现进程。加快探索人工智能驱动的新型科研范式,加速“从0到1”重大科学发现进程。加快科学大模型建设应用,推动基础科研平台和重大科技基础设施智能化升级,打造开放共享的高质量科学数据集,提升跨模态复杂科学数据处理水平。强化人工智能跨学科牵引带动作用,推动多学科融合发展。

2.驱动技术研发模式创新和效能提升。推动人工智能驱动的技术研发、工程实现、产品落地一体化协同发展,加速“从1到N”技术落地和迭代突破,促进创新成果高效转化。支持智能化研发工具和平台推广应用,加强人工智能与生物制造、量子科技、第六代移动通信(6G)等领域技术协同创新,以新的科研成果支撑场景应用落地,以新的应用需求牵引科技创新突破。

3.创新哲学社会科学研究方法。推动哲学社会科学研究方法向人机协同模式转变,探索建立适应人工智能时代的新型哲学社会科学研究组织形式,拓展研究视野和观察视域。深入研究人工智能对人类认知判断、伦理规范等方面的深层次影响和作用机理,探索形成智能向善理论体系,促进人工智能更好造福人类。

(二)“人工智能+”产业发展

1.培育智能原生新模式新业态。鼓励有条件的企业将人工智能融入战略规划、组织架构、业务流程等,推动产业全要素智能化发展,助力传统产业改造升级,开辟战略性新兴产业和未来产业发展新赛道。大力发展智能原生技术、产品和服务体系,加快培育一批底层架构和运行逻辑基于人工智能的智能原生企业,探索全新商业模式,催生智能原生新业态。

2.推进工业全要素智能化发展。推动工业全要素智能联动,加快人工智能在设计、中试、生产、服务、运营全环节落地应用。着力提升全员人工智能素养与技能,推动各行业形成更多可复用的专家知识。加快工业软件创新突破,大力发展智能制造装备。推进工业供应链智能协同,加强自适应供需匹配。推广人工智能驱动的生产工艺优化方法。深化人工智能与工业互联网融合应用,增强工业系统的智能感知与决策执行能力。

3.加快农业数智化转型升级。加快人工智能驱动的育种体系创新,支持种植、养殖等农业领域智能应用。大力发展智能农机、农业无人机、农业机器人等智能装备,提高农业生产和加工工具的智能感知、决策、控制、作业等能力,强化农机农具平台化、智能化管理。加强人工智能在农业生产管理、风险防范等领域应用,帮助农民提升生产经营能力和水平。

4.创新服务业发展新模式。加快服务业从数字赋能的互联网服务向智能驱动的新型服务方式演进,拓展经营范围,推动现代服务业向智向新发展。探索无人服务与人工服务相结合的新模式。在软件、信息、金融、商务、法律、交通、物流、商贸等领域,推动新一代智能终端、智能体等广泛应用。

(三)“人工智能+”消费提质

1.拓展服务消费新场景。培育覆盖更广、内容更丰富的智能服务业态,加快发展提效型、陪伴型等智能原生应用,支持开辟智能助理等服务新入口。加强智能消费基础设施建设,提升文娱、电商、家政、物业、出行、养老、托育等生活服务品质,拓展体验消费、个性消费、认知和情感消费等服务消费新场景。

2.培育产品消费新业态。推动智能终端“万物智联”,培育智能产品生态,大力发展智能网联汽车、人工智能手机和电脑、智能机器人、智能家居、智能穿戴等新一代智能终端,打造一体化全场景覆盖的智能交互环境。加快人工智能与元宇宙、低空飞行、增材制造、脑机接口等技术融合和产品创新,探索智能产品新形态。

(四)“人工智能+”民生福祉

1.创造更加智能的工作方式。积极发挥人工智能在创造新岗位和赋能传统岗位方面的作用,探索人机协同的新型组织架构和管理模式,培育发展智能代理等创新型工作形态,推动在劳动力紧缺、环境高危等岗位应用。大力支持开展人工智能技能培训,激发人工智能创新创业和再就业活力。加强人工智能应用就业风险评估,引导创新资源向创造就业潜力大的方向倾斜,减少对就业的冲击。

2.推行更富成效的学习方式。把人工智能融入教育教学全要素、全过程,创新智能学伴、智能教师等人机协同教育教学新模式,推动育人从知识传授为重向能力提升为本转变,加快实现大规模因材施教,提高教育质量,促进教育公平。构建智能化情景交互学习模式,推动开展方式更灵活、资源更丰富的自主学习。鼓励和支持全民积极学习人工智能新知识、新技术。

3.打造更有品质的美好生活。探索推广人人可享的高水平居民健康助手,有序推动人工智能在辅助诊疗、健康管理、医保服务等场景的应用,大幅提高基层医疗健康服务能力和效率。推动人工智能在繁荣文化生产、增强文化传播、促进文化交流中展现更大作为,利用人工智能辅助创作更多具有中华文化元素和标识的文化内容,壮大文化产业。充分发挥人工智能对织密人际关系、精神慰藉陪伴、养老托育助残、推进全民健身等方面的重要作用,拓展人工智能在“好房子”全生命周期的应用,积极构建更有温度的智能社会。

(五)“人工智能+”治理能力

1.开创社会治理人机共生新图景。有序推动市政基础设施智能化改造升级,探索面向新一代智能终端发展的城市规划、建设与治理,提升城市运行智能化水平。加快人工智能产品和服务向乡村延伸,推动城乡智能普惠。深入开展人工智能社会实验。安全稳妥有序推进人工智能在政务领域应用,打造精准识别需求、主动规划服务、全程智能办理的政务服务新模式。加快人工智能在各类公共资源招标投标活动中的应用,提升智能交易服务和监管水平。

2.打造安全治理多元共治新格局。推动构建面向自然人、数字人、智能机器人等多元一体的公共安全治理体系,加强人工智能在安全生产监管、防灾减灾救灾、公共安全预警、社会治安管理等方面的应用,提升监测预警、监管执法、指挥决策、现场救援、社会动员等工作水平,增强应用人工智能维护和塑造国家安全的能力。加快推动人工智能赋能网络空间治理,强化信息精准识别、态势主动研判、风险实时处置等能力。

3.共绘美丽中国生态治理新画卷。提高空天地海一体化动态感知和国土空间智慧规划水平,强化资源要素优化配置。围绕大气、水、海洋、土壤、生物等多要素生态环境系统和全国碳市场建设等,提升人工智能驱动的监测预测、模拟推演、问题处置等能力,推动构建智能协同的精准治理模式。

(六)“人工智能+”全球合作

1.推动人工智能普惠共享。把人工智能作为造福人类的国际公共产品,打造平权、互信、多元、共赢的人工智能能力建设开放生态。深化人工智能领域高水平开放,推动人工智能技术开源可及,强化算力、数据、人才等领域国际合作,帮助全球南方国家加强人工智能能力建设,助力各国平等参与智能化发展进程,弥合全球智能鸿沟。

2.共建人工智能全球治理体系。支持联合国在人工智能全球治理中发挥主渠道作用,探索形成各国广泛参与的治理框架,共同应对全球性挑战。深化与国际组织、专业机构等交流合作,加强治理规则、技术标准等对接协调。共同研判、积极应对人工智能应用风险,确保人工智能发展安全、可靠、可控。

三、强化基础支撑能力

(七)提升模型基础能力。加强人工智能基础理论研究,支持多路径技术探索和模型基础架构创新。加快研究更加高效的模型训练和推理方法,积极推动理论创新、技术创新、工程创新协同发展。探索模型应用新形态,提升复杂任务处理能力,优化交互体验。建立健全模型能力评估体系,促进模型能力有效迭代提升。

(八)加强数据供给创新。以应用为导向,持续加强人工智能高质量数据集建设。完善适配人工智能发展的数据产权和版权制度,推动公共财政资助项目形成的版权内容依法合规开放。鼓励探索基于价值贡献度的数据成本补偿、收益分成等方式,加强数据供给激励。支持发展数据标注、数据合成等技术,培育壮大数据处理和数据服务产业。

(九)强化智能算力统筹。支持人工智能芯片攻坚创新与使能软件生态培育,加快超大规模智算集群技术突破和工程落地。优化国家智算资源布局,完善全国一体化算力网,充分发挥“东数西算”国家枢纽作用,加大数、算、电、网等资源协同。加强智能算力互联互通和供需匹配,创新智能算力基础设施运营模式,鼓励发展标准化、可扩展的算力云服务,推动智能算力供给普惠易用、经济高效、绿色安全。

(十)优化应用发展环境。布局建设一批国家人工智能应用中试基地,搭建行业应用共性平台。推动软件信息服务企业智能化转型,重构产品形态和服务模式。培育人工智能应用服务商,发展“模型即服务”、“智能体即服务”等,打造人工智能应用服务链。健全人工智能应用场景建设指引、开放度评价与激励政策,完善应用试错容错管理制度。加强知识产权保护、转化与协同应用。加快重点领域人工智能标准研制,推进跨行业、跨领域、国际化标准联动。

(十一)促进开源生态繁荣。支持人工智能开源社区建设,促进模型、工具、数据集等汇聚开放,培育优质开源项目。建立健全人工智能开源贡献评价和激励机制,鼓励高校将开源贡献纳入学生学分认证和教师成果认定。支持企业、高校、科研机构等探索普惠高效的开源应用新模式。加快构建面向全球开放的开源技术体系和社区生态,发展具有国际影响力的开源项目和开发工具等。

(十二)加强人才队伍建设。推进人工智能全学段教育和全社会通识教育,完善学科专业布局,加大高层次人才培养力度,超常规构建领军人才培养新模式,强化师资力量建设,推进产教融合、跨学科培养和国际合作。完善符合人工智能人才职业属性和岗位特点的多元化评价体系,更好发挥领军人才作用,给予青年人才更大施展空间,鼓励积极探索人工智能“无人区”。支持企业规范用好股权、期权等中长期激励方式引才留才用才。

(十三)强化政策法规保障。健全国有资本投资人工智能领域考核评价和风险监管等制度。加大人工智能领域金融和财政支持力度,发展壮大长期资本、耐心资本、战略资本,完善风险分担和投资退出机制,充分发挥财政资金、政府采购等政策作用。完善人工智能法律法规、伦理准则等,推进人工智能健康发展相关立法工作。优化人工智能相关安全评估和备案管理制度。

(十四)提升安全能力水平。推动模型算法、数据资源、基础设施、应用系统等安全能力建设,防范模型的黑箱、幻觉、算法歧视等带来的风险,加强前瞻评估和监测处置,推动人工智能应用合规、透明、可信赖。建立健全人工智能技术监测、风险预警、应急响应体系,强化政府引导、行业自律,坚持包容审慎、分类分级,加快形成动态敏捷、多元协同的人工智能治理格局。

四、组织实施

坚持把党的领导贯彻到“人工智能+”行动全过程。国家发展改革委要加强统筹协调,推动形成工作合力。各地区各部门要紧密结合实际,因地制宜抓好贯彻落实,确保落地见效。要强化示范引领,适时总结推广经验做法。要加强宣传引导,广泛凝聚社会共识,营造全社会共同参与的良好氛围。

国务院              

2025年8月21日 

 Opinions of the State Council on Deepening the Implementation of the "Artificial Intelligence+" Action

State Council Document No. 11 [2025]

To the People's Governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, and all ministries and commissions and directly affiliated institutions of the State Council:

In order to deeply implement the "Artificial Intelligence+" action, promote the extensive and in-depth integration of artificial intelligence with all sectors and fields of the economy and society, reshape the paradigm of human production and life, promote a revolutionary leap in productivity and a profound transformation of production relations, and accelerate the formation of a new form of intelligent economy and intelligent society characterized by human-machine collaboration, cross-border integration, and co-creation and sharing, the following opinions are hereby put forward.

I. General Requirements

Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully and accurately implementing the new development philosophy, adhering to the people-centered development approach, and leveraging my country's advantages in abundant data resources, a complete industrial system, and broad application scenarios, we will strengthen forward-looking planning, systematic layout, sector-specific policies, openness and sharing, and security and controllability. Focusing on areas such as science and technology, industry, consumption, people's livelihood, governance, and global cooperation, we will deeply implement the "Artificial Intelligence+" action, resulting in a number of new infrastructures, new technology systems, new industrial ecosystems, and new employment opportunities. We will accelerate the cultivation and development of new productive forces, enabling all people to share the fruits of artificial intelligence development and better serve China's modernization.

By 2027, we will have taken the lead in achieving extensive and deep integration of artificial intelligence with six key areas, with the application penetration rate of next-generation intelligent terminals and intelligent agents exceeding 70%. The core industries of the intelligent economy will experience rapid growth, the role of artificial intelligence in public governance will be significantly enhanced, and the open cooperation system for artificial intelligence will be continuously improved. By 2030, my country's artificial intelligence will fully empower high-quality development, with the application penetration rate of next-generation intelligent terminals and intelligent agents exceeding 90%. The intelligent economy will become an important growth engine for my country's economic development, promoting the inclusiveness of technology and the sharing of its benefits. By 2035, my country will have fully entered a new stage of intelligent economy and intelligent society development, providing strong support for the basic realization of socialist modernization.

II. Accelerating the Implementation of Key Actions

(I) "Artificial Intelligence+" Science and Technology

1. Accelerating the Scientific Discovery Process. Accelerate the exploration of new research paradigms driven by artificial intelligence, and accelerate the process of major scientific discoveries "from 0 to 1". Accelerate the construction and application of large-scale scientific models, promote the intelligent upgrading of basic research platforms and major scientific and technological infrastructure, create open and shared high-quality scientific datasets, and improve the level of cross-modal complex scientific data processing. Strengthen the interdisciplinary driving role of artificial intelligence and promote the integrated development of multiple disciplines.

2. Driving Innovation and Efficiency Improvement in Technology R&D Models. Promote the integrated and coordinated development of artificial intelligence-driven technology R&D, engineering implementation, and product launch, accelerate the implementation and iterative breakthroughs of technologies "from 1 to N", and promote the efficient transformation of innovative achievements. Support the promotion and application of intelligent R&D tools and platforms, strengthen collaborative innovation between artificial intelligence and fields such as biomanufacturing, quantum technology, and 6G, support the application of new research results, and drive technological innovation breakthroughs with new application demands.

3. Innovating Research Methods in Philosophy and Social Sciences. Promote the transformation of philosophical and social science research methods towards a human-machine collaborative model, explore the establishment of new organizational forms for philosophical and social science research adapted to the era of artificial intelligence, and broaden research horizons and observation perspectives. Conduct in-depth research on the profound impact and mechanisms of artificial intelligence on human cognitive judgment, ethical norms, etc., explore the formation of a theoretical system of "intelligent for good," and promote artificial intelligence to better benefit humanity.

(II) Industrial Development of "Artificial Intelligence+"

1. Cultivate new intelligent-native models and business forms. Encourage qualified enterprises to integrate artificial intelligence into strategic planning, organizational structure, business processes, etc., promote the intelligent development of all industrial elements, assist in the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries, and open up new tracks for the development of strategic emerging industries and future industries. Vigorously develop intelligent-native technologies, products, and service systems, accelerate the cultivation of a number of intelligent-native enterprises whose underlying architecture and operating logic are based on artificial intelligence, explore new business models, and foster new intelligent-native business forms.

2. Promote the intelligent development of all industrial elements. Promote the intelligent linkage of all industrial elements and accelerate the application of artificial intelligence in all aspects of design, pilot testing, production, service, and operation. Focus on improving the artificial intelligence literacy and skills of all employees, and promote the formation of more reusable expert knowledge in various industries. Accelerate breakthroughs in industrial software innovation and vigorously develop intelligent manufacturing equipment. Promote intelligent collaboration in the industrial supply chain and strengthen adaptive supply and demand matching. Promote AI-driven production process optimization methods. Deepen the integration and application of AI and the Industrial Internet to enhance the intelligent perception and decision-making execution capabilities of industrial systems.

3. Accelerate the digital transformation and upgrading of agriculture. Accelerate innovation in AI-driven breeding systems and support intelligent applications in planting, animal husbandry, and other agricultural fields. Vigorously develop intelligent agricultural machinery, agricultural drones, agricultural robots, and other intelligent equipment to improve the intelligent perception, decision-making, control, and operation capabilities of agricultural production and processing tools, and strengthen the platform-based and intelligent management of agricultural machinery and tools. Strengthen the application of AI in agricultural production management, risk prevention, and other fields to help farmers improve their production and management capabilities and levels.

4. Innovate new models for service industry development. Accelerate the evolution of the service industry from digitally empowered internet services to intelligently driven new service models, expand the scope of business, and promote the intelligent and innovative development of modern service industries. Explore new models combining unmanned and human services. Promote the widespread application of next-generation intelligent terminals and intelligent agents in fields such as software, information, finance, commerce, law, transportation, logistics, and trade.

(III) Enhancing Consumption Quality through "Artificial Intelligence+"

1. Expanding New Service Consumption Scenarios. Cultivate broader and richer intelligent service formats, accelerate the development of efficiency-enhancing and companion-oriented intelligent native applications, and support the opening of new service entry points such as intelligent assistants. Strengthen the construction of intelligent consumption infrastructure, improve the quality of life services such as entertainment, e-commerce, housekeeping, property management, travel, elderly care, and childcare, and expand new service consumption scenarios such as experiential consumption, personalized consumption, cognitive and emotional consumption.

2. Cultivating New Product Consumption Formats. Promote the "Internet of Everything" of intelligent terminals, cultivate an intelligent product ecosystem, vigorously develop next-generation intelligent terminals such as intelligent connected vehicles, AI mobile phones and computers, intelligent robots, smart homes, and intelligent wearables, and create an integrated, full-scenario intelligent interactive environment. Accelerate the integration and product innovation of artificial intelligence with technologies such as metaverse, low-altitude flight, additive manufacturing, and brain-computer interfaces, and explore new forms of intelligent products.

(IV) "Artificial Intelligence+" for People's Well-being

1. Creating More Intelligent Ways of Working. Actively leverage the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in creating new jobs and empowering traditional ones, explore new organizational structures and management models for human-machine collaboration, cultivate and develop innovative work forms such as intelligent agents, and promote their application in jobs with labor shortages and high-risk environments. Strongly support AI skills training to stimulate AI-driven innovation, entrepreneurship, and re-employment. Strengthen employment risk assessment for AI applications, guide innovation resources towards areas with high job creation potential, and reduce the impact on employment.

2. Promote more effective learning methods. Integrate AI into all elements and processes of education and teaching, innovate new human-machine collaborative education and teaching models such as intelligent learning companions and intelligent teachers, promote the transformation of education from knowledge transmission to ability enhancement, accelerate the realization of large-scale personalized education, improve education quality, and promote educational equity. Construct intelligent scenario-based interactive learning models to promote more flexible and resource-rich self-directed learning. Encourage and support the public to actively learn new AI knowledge and technologies.

3. Create a higher quality of life. Explore and promote high-level resident health assistants accessible to everyone, and systematically advance the application of artificial intelligence in scenarios such as assisted diagnosis, health management, and medical insurance services, significantly improving the capacity and efficiency of primary healthcare services. Promote the greater role of artificial intelligence in enriching cultural production, enhancing cultural dissemination, and facilitating cultural exchange; utilize artificial intelligence to assist in creating more cultural content with Chinese cultural elements and symbols, and strengthen the cultural industry. Give full play to the important role of artificial intelligence in strengthening interpersonal relationships, providing spiritual comfort and companionship, elderly care, childcare, disability assistance, and promoting national fitness; expand the application of artificial intelligence throughout the entire life cycle of "good housing"; and actively build a more humane and intelligent society.

(V) "Artificial Intelligence+" Governance Capacity

1. Create a new landscape of human-machine symbiosis in social governance. Systematically promote the intelligent transformation and upgrading of municipal infrastructure, explore urban planning, construction, and governance oriented towards the development of next-generation intelligent terminals, and improve the level of intelligent urban operation. Accelerate the extension of artificial intelligence products and services to rural areas, and promote inclusive intelligent services in urban and rural areas. Conduct in-depth social experiments on artificial intelligence. Safely, steadily, and systematically promote the application of artificial intelligence in the government sector, creating a new model of government services that accurately identifies needs, proactively plans services, and provides intelligent processing throughout the entire process. 1. Accelerate the application of artificial intelligence (AI) in various public resource bidding and tendering activities to improve intelligent transaction services and supervision.

2. Create a new pattern of multi-party co-governance for security. Promote the construction of a multi-faceted public security governance system oriented towards natural persons, digital persons, and intelligent robots. Strengthen the application of AI in areas such as safety production supervision, disaster prevention, mitigation and relief, public safety early warning, and social security management. Improve the level of monitoring and early warning, regulatory enforcement, command and decision-making, on-site rescue, and social mobilization, and enhance the ability to use AI to maintain and shape national security. Accelerate the promotion of AI-enabled cyberspace governance, and strengthen capabilities such as accurate information identification, proactive situation assessment, and real-time risk management.

3. Jointly draw a new picture of ecological governance for a beautiful China. Improve the level of integrated dynamic perception of air, land, sea, and space, and intelligent planning of national land space, and strengthen the optimal allocation of resource elements. Focusing on multi-element ecological environment systems such as atmosphere, water, ocean, soil, and biology, and the construction of the national carbon market, enhance AI-driven monitoring and prediction, simulation and deduction, and problem handling capabilities, and promote the construction of an intelligent and collaborative precision governance model.

(VI) Global Cooperation on "AI+"

1. Promote the inclusive sharing of AI. We will treat artificial intelligence (AI) as an international public good that benefits humanity, and build an open ecosystem for AI capacity building that is equitable, mutually trusting, diverse, and mutually beneficial. We will deepen high-level openness in the field of AI, promote the open-source accessibility of AI technologies, strengthen international cooperation in areas such as computing power, data, and talent, help countries in the Global South strengthen their AI capacity building, facilitate equal participation of all countries in the intelligent development process, and bridge the global intelligence gap.

2. Jointly build a global AI governance system. We support the United Nations in playing a leading role in global AI governance, explore the formation of a governance framework with broad participation from all countries, and jointly address global challenges. We will deepen exchanges and cooperation with international organizations and professional institutions, and strengthen the alignment and coordination of governance rules and technical standards. We will jointly assess and actively address the risks of AI applications to ensure the safe, reliable, and controllable development of AI.

III. Strengthening Basic Support Capabilities

(VII) Enhancing Basic Model Capabilities. We will strengthen basic theoretical research in AI, support multi-path technology exploration and innovation in model infrastructure. We will accelerate research into more efficient model training and inference methods, and actively promote the coordinated development of theoretical innovation, technological innovation, and engineering innovation. We will explore new forms of model applications, improve the ability to handle complex tasks, and optimize the interactive experience. Establish and improve a model capability assessment system to promote effective iterative improvement of model capabilities.

(VIII) Strengthen Data Supply Innovation. With an application-oriented approach, continuously strengthen the construction of high-quality AI datasets. Improve the data property rights and copyright system to adapt to the development of AI, and promote the legal and compliant opening of copyrighted content generated by publicly funded projects. Encourage the exploration of data cost compensation and revenue sharing based on value contribution to strengthen incentives for data supply. Support the development of technologies such as data annotation and data synthesis, and cultivate and expand the data processing and data service industries.

(IX) Strengthen the Coordination of Intelligent Computing Power. Support the tackling of AI chip innovation and the cultivation of enabling software ecosystems, and accelerate technological breakthroughs and engineering implementation of ultra-large-scale intelligent computing clusters. Optimize the national intelligent computing resource layout, improve the national integrated computing power network, fully leverage the national hub role of "Eastern Data, Western Computing," and increase the synergy of data, computing, electricity, and network resources. Strengthen the interconnection and supply-demand matching of intelligent computing power, innovate the operation model of intelligent computing power infrastructure, encourage the development of standardized and scalable computing power cloud services, and promote the inclusive, easy-to-use, economical, efficient, green, and secure supply of intelligent computing power.

(X) Optimize the Application Development Environment. Establish and construct a number of national artificial intelligence application pilot bases and build common platforms for industry applications. Promote the intelligent transformation of software and information service enterprises and restructure product forms and service models. Cultivate artificial intelligence application service providers, develop "model as a service" and "intelligent agent as a service," and create an artificial intelligence application service chain. Improve the guidelines for the construction of artificial intelligence application scenarios, openness evaluation and incentive policies, and improve the application trial-and-error tolerance management system. Strengthen intellectual property protection, transformation, and collaborative application. Accelerate the development of artificial intelligence standards in key areas and promote cross-industry, cross-domain, and international standard linkage.

(XI) Promote the prosperity of the open source ecosystem. Support the construction of artificial intelligence open source communities, promote the convergence and openness of models, tools, datasets, etc., and cultivate high-quality open source projects. Establish and improve the evaluation and incentive mechanism for artificial intelligence open source contributions, and encourage universities to include open source contributions in student credit certification and teacher achievement recognition. Support enterprises, universities, research institutions, etc., to explore new models of inclusive and efficient open source applications. Accelerate the construction of a globally open open source technology system and community ecosystem, and develop open source projects and development tools with international influence.

(XII) Strengthen the construction of talent teams. Promote AI education across all educational levels and general education throughout society; improve the layout of disciplines and majors; increase efforts in cultivating high-level talents; construct a new model for cultivating leading talents in an unconventional manner; strengthen the construction of teaching staff; and promote industry-education integration, interdisciplinary training, and international cooperation. Improve a diversified evaluation system that conforms to the professional attributes and job characteristics of AI talents, better leverage the role of leading talents, provide more space for young talents to develop, and encourage active exploration of uncharted territories in AI. Support enterprises in making good use of equity, stock options, and other medium- and long-term incentive methods to attract, retain, and utilize talents.

(XIII) Strengthen policy and legal safeguards. Improve the assessment, evaluation, and risk supervision systems for state-owned capital investment in the field of AI. Increase financial and fiscal support for the field of AI, develop and expand long-term capital, patient capital, and strategic capital, improve risk-sharing and investment exit mechanisms, and give full play to the role of fiscal funds and government procurement policies. Improve AI laws, regulations, and ethical guidelines, and promote legislation related to the healthy development of AI. Optimize the AI-related safety assessment and filing management system.

(XIV) Enhance security capabilities. Promote the development of security capabilities in model algorithms, data resources, infrastructure, and application systems; prevent risks arising from model black boxes, illusions, and algorithmic bias; strengthen forward-looking assessment and monitoring and handling; and promote the compliant, transparent, and trustworthy application of artificial intelligence. Establish and improve a monitoring, risk warning, and emergency response system for artificial intelligence technology; strengthen government guidance and industry self-regulation; adhere to inclusive and prudent, categorized and graded approaches; and accelerate the formation of a dynamic, agile, and multi-faceted collaborative governance framework for artificial intelligence.

IV. Organization and Implementation

Uphold the Party's leadership throughout the entire process of the "Artificial Intelligence+" action. The National Development and Reform Commission should strengthen overall coordination and promote synergy. All regions and departments should closely integrate with their actual situations, implement measures according to local conditions, and ensure effective implementation. Strengthen demonstration and guidance, and summarize and promote best practices in a timely manner. Strengthen publicity and guidance, and widely disseminate information to build broad social consensus and create a positive atmosphere for the participation of the whole society.

State Council

August 21, 2025.


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以“人工智能+”开启中国特色智能化发展新篇章

发布时间:2025/08/26
来源:高技术司

  近日,国务院正式印发《关于深入实施“人工智能+”行动的意见》(以下简称《意见》),标志着我国人工智能发展实现从技术突破向全要素赋能的关键跃升。作为继“互联网+”之后国家推动技术革命和产业融合的又一战略部署,《意见》立足我国产业体系完备、市场规模庞大、应用场景丰富三大核心优势,构建“创新带应用、应用促创新”的螺旋式发展范式,加速人工智能与实体经济全链重构、深向耦合,全面激发产业变革新动能、培育智能经济新范式,为抢占全球智能化竞争制高点锻造关键支点,构筑新质生产力驱动的高质量发展新格局。

  一、深刻认识“人工智能+”的丰富内涵

  当前,我国人工智能发展进入与经济社会深度融合的新阶段。深入实施“人工智能+”行动,既是对“互联网+”十年积淀的继承深化,更是面向全球智能化竞争新格局的主动突围,旨在推动人工智能从技术工具升级为重构生产要素、重塑产业范式、重组价值链条的核心引擎,加快形成与新质生产力相适配的新型生产关系,为中国式现代化筑牢智能基座。

  (一)从发展历程看,我国正经历从“互联网+”向“人工智能+”的战略跃升。自2015年《关于积极推进“互联网+”行动的指导意见》实施以来,我国通过十年深耕“互联网+”行动,为“人工智能+”奠定了坚实基础。目前,我国互联网普及率已达79.7%,网民规模达11.23亿人,已建成全球最大5G网络、覆盖41个工业大类的“5G+工业互联网”项目超1.7万个,数字经济核心企业超457万家,构建了全球最丰富的应用场景库。如果说“互联网+”的本质是“连接”,通过打破信息孤岛,提升速度和效率,带来的是“量变”;那么“人工智能+”的本质则是“赋能”,通过应用渗透让机器具备自主分析和决策能力,引发各行业范式革命,带来的是“质变”。从“互联网+”向“人工智能+”转变,既是把握发展机遇的历史选择,也是新旧动能转换的必然路径。

  (二)从作用机理看,推进“人工智能+”是生产力革命与生产关系调适的辩证统一过程。在国家战略层面推动“人工智能+”,不仅是对人工智能技术制高点展开的系统性布局,更是对技术快速发展背景下构建新型生产关系和发展新质生产力的全方位谋划。从生产力维度来看,“人工智能+”可以通过算法优化与数据要素价值释放,重构全要素生产率提升路径,有效降低传统生产要素的边际成本约束,为产业高质量发展注入新动能。从生产关系的维度来看,在人工智能技术深度赋能的过程中,需同步构建适配智能化转型的制度体系与治理框架,防范技术应用加剧发展不平衡风险,确保创新红利惠及全民。因此,在国家战略层面推动“人工智能+”是应对技术经济范式迭代的必然选择,也是通过智能技术的普及来优化资源配置效率的重要策略。

  (三)从赋能成效看,“人工智能+”的“+”是深度融合、范式变革和转型重塑的三重体现。人工智能技术与现有产业体系的深度融合,应用规模和广度前所未有,撬动传统行业的隐性价值,在存量市场中激活更大增量空间。进一步地,随着人工智能应用不断深入和对复杂问题处理能力的持续提升,传统依赖经验决策的模式将被突破,驱动生物制造、材料研发等范式发生根本性变革。更深层次地,通过对传统发展路径的解构与重构,人工智能将推动产业形态、社会治理模式向智能化新形态跃迁。与此同时,生产力的大幅度提升带来生产关系的重大调整,更多的新工种和新职业将被创造出来。这种转型重塑不仅体现在经济领域,还将深刻影响社会生活的各个方面,并引领人类社会迈向一个更加智能、高效、可持续的未来。

  二、《意见》创新性提出了人工智能高质量发展的中国方案

  《意见》的出台,标志着国家战略正式进入以人工智能深度赋能为核心的新阶段。其最大创新在于探索出了一条既引领时代前沿,又充分立足我国国情的发展道路,着力破解落地瓶颈,着力重塑发展动能,为全球人工智能发展贡献兼具中国特色和时代价值的新范式。

  (一)突出自主创新引领,以“人工智能+”打造科技高效能创新新引擎。在以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想指引下,需牢牢把握科技现代化这一“牛鼻子”,以人工智能创新群体性突破驱动产业高质量发展。《意见》提出,要加快推动“从0到1”重大科学发现进程和“从1到N”的技术落地与迭代突破,建立适应人工智能时代的新型哲学社会科学研究组织形式。下一步,要加速科研范式变革,通过以大模型为代表的人工智能技术深化科研场景赋能,在生物医药、新材料等重点领域推进通专模型融合应用。构建产学研用协同创新体系,支持共建实验室并完善技术转移机制,打通“实验室—市场”转化通道。

  (二)突出举国体制优势,以“人工智能+”提升产业高质量发展新动能。《意见》从培育智能原生新模式新业态、推进工业全要素智能化发展、加快农业数智化转型升级和创新服务业发展新模式四个方面,提出一系列人工智能驱动产业高质量发展的重要举措。与欧美等发达国家相比,我国更加注重发挥新型举国体制优势,充分调动政府、国有企事业单位和平台公司等各方主体积极性,通过公共数据授权运营、智能示范园区等方面不断拓展应用场景,有效破解技术落地“最后一公里”难题。未来,我国将在全球最大规模5G网络、全国一体化算力网、工业互联网平台等新型基础设施的支撑下,持续夯实“智改数转网联”基础,形成“基建赋能—场景开放—全链升级”的中国特色路径。

  (三)突出民生普惠导向,以“人工智能+”创造人民高品质生活新场景。《意见》系统阐述了通过“人工智能+”推动服务消费和产品消费提质升级,全面改善提升人类工作、生活和学习品质,以及有效提升社会治理、安全治理、生态治理能力。近年来,各部门各地方积极深化人工智能在智慧城市“一网统管”、基层政务“指尖减负”、应急管理智能决策等场景的应用,通过开放医疗、交通、社保等重点民生领域数据,全面推动AI普惠教育、养老等领域。未来,人工智能将重构消费产品设计、生产、销售、服务全链条,培育智能消费新业态、新场景,优化消费体验,加速释放多层次、多元化的内需潜力,有助于推动消费扩容提质。

  (四)突出开放包容治理,以“人工智能+”构建全球高水平开放新格局。《意见》提出,把人工智能作为造福人类的国际公共产品,打造平权、互信、多元、共赢的人工智能能力建设开放生态,深化人工智能领域高水平开放,探索形成各国广泛参与的治理框架。当前,国产大模型性能不断突破,我国充分依托上合组织、“一带一路”、金砖国家等机制,推广“动态敏捷、多元协同”的治理理念,大力推动开源发展,有效降低发展中国家技术应用门槛,为全球技术平权提供新选项。通过提升全球人工智能治理的规则制定权、技术话语权与道义引领力,为人类命运共同体建设注入中国智慧。

  三、做深做实“人工智能+”行动推动《意见》精准落地

  立足当前,着眼长远,应当以“人工智能+”为战略支点,细化落实《意见》各项任务,强化政策协同,优化资源配置,确保各项措施精准落地,推动全球共同应对人工智能带来的挑战与机遇,助力构建人类命运共同体。

  一是强化政策引导与扶持,持续优化人工智能产业发展环境。在《意见》总体框架下,加快完善制定各领域专项政策。加大财政资金支持力度,鼓励社会资本投入,形成多元化投融资体系。完善知识产权保护机制,激发创新活力。建立健全市场监管体系,确保市场公平竞争,营造健康有序的产业生态。细化区域发展策略,推动地方特色人工智能产业集群建设。深化产学研用协同创新,推动关键技术突破与成果转化。通过政策引导和市场机制双重驱动,加速人工智能技术在各领域的深度融合,推动产业升级与经济高质量发展。

  二是鼓励重点领域先行先试,推动人工智能应用从“点状场景突破”向“行业全面渗透”加速迈进。加大应用场景开放力度,加强人工智能企业和行业用户供需对接、联合攻关、双向奔赴。不断总结典型场景建设经验,复制推广优秀经验。在制造、医疗、教育等重点行业领域,支持行业龙头单位联合人工智能企业、科研院所等建设国家人工智能应用中试基地,汇聚行业高质量数据集,解决行业共性问题,不断降低技术应用中试成本,逐步实现规模化推广。

  三是打造新型基础设施体系,加快完善数据、模型等要素市场。建设适应人工智能发展的新型基础设施网络,推动国家级算力枢纽节点间高速直连网络建设,实现跨区域算力资源弹性调配与普惠化供给。持续推进数据要素市场化配置改革,不断完善适应人工智能发展的数据要素产权登记、流通交易、价格生成、收益分配等制度。加快打造国内人工智能开源社区,推动大模型训练数据集共享,激活多层次主体开源动力,以开源生态培育带动产业生态繁荣。

  四是构建多层次人才培养体系,全方位提高全民“智能素养”。在重点高校布局“人工智能+X”交叉学科创新中心,建设人工智能产教融合平台。推广中小学阶段人工智能通识教育,优化偏才、怪才、拔尖创新人才培养模式。加快人工智能工程师等国家职业标准建设,建立技能认证与职称评定衔接机制,破解应用层人才短缺瓶颈。加大海外人工智能高层次人才引进力度,不断完善人工智能人才服务保障制度。

  五是筑牢智能时代安全底座,锻造人工智能行业高可靠安全屏障。建立适配大模型的安全合规防御体系,守牢人工智能应用的数据、基础设施以及模型系统安全底线。尤其在教育、医疗、交通等关键领域,要进行严格的测试和验证,有效防范化解人工智能安全风险。在总体国家安全观指引下,有效构筑起“事前防范—事后追责—自主可控”三位一体的人工智能发展安全保障体系,通过强调源头管控与供应链韧性并重,为技术向善提供保障。(国家信息中心党委副书记、副主任 周  民)


Opening a New Chapter in China's Intelligent Development with "Artificial Intelligence+"
Published: 2025/08/26
Source: High-Tech Department



Recently, the State Council officially issued the "Opinions on Deepening the Implementation of the 'Artificial Intelligence+' Action" (hereinafter referred to as the "Opinions"), marking a key leap in Chinese artificial intelligence development from technological breakthroughs to full-factor empowerment. As another strategic deployment by the state to promote technological revolution and industrial integration following "Internet+", the "Opinions" leverages China's three core advantages: a complete industrial system, a large market size, and rich application scenarios. It constructs a spiral development paradigm of "innovation driving application, application promoting innovation," accelerating the full-chain restructuring and deep coupling of artificial intelligence with the real economy, comprehensively stimulating new momentum for industrial transformation, cultivating a new paradigm of intelligent economy, forging a key fulcrum for seizing the commanding heights of global intelligent competition, and building a new pattern of high-quality development driven by new-quality productivity.

I. Deeply Understanding the Rich Connotation of "Artificial Intelligence+"

Currently, Chinese artificial intelligence development has entered a new stage of deep integration with the economy and society. Deepening the implementation of the "Artificial Intelligence+" initiative is not only a continuation and deepening of the decade-long accumulation of "Internet+", but also a proactive breakthrough in the new global landscape of intelligent competition. It aims to upgrade artificial intelligence from a technological tool to a core engine for restructuring production factors, reshaping industrial paradigms, and reorganizing value chains, accelerating the formation of new production relations adapted to new-quality productive forces, and laying a solid intelligent foundation for Chinese-style modernization.

(I) From a developmental perspective, my country is undergoing a strategic leap from "Internet+" to "Artificial Intelligence+". Since the implementation of the "Guiding Opinions on Actively Promoting the 'Internet+' Action" in 2015, my country has laid a solid foundation for "Artificial Intelligence+" through a decade of in-depth development of the "Internet+" action. Currently, my country's internet penetration rate has reached 79.7%, with 1.123 billion internet users. It has built the world's largest 5G network, over 17,000 "5G+Industrial Internet" projects covering 41 major industrial categories, and has over 4.57 million core digital economy enterprises, constructing the world's richest application scenario database. If the essence of "Internet+" is "connectivity," breaking down information silos and improving speed and efficiency, resulting in "quantitative change," then the essence of "AI+" is "empowerment," enabling machines to possess autonomous analysis and decision-making capabilities through application penetration, triggering a paradigm shift across industries, resulting in "qualitative change." The shift from "Internet+" to "AI+" is both a historical choice to seize development opportunities and an inevitable path for the transformation of old and new growth drivers.

(II) From the perspective of its mechanism, promoting "AI+" is a dialectical unity of the revolution in productive forces and the adjustment of production relations. Promoting "AI+" at the national strategic level is not only a systematic layout for leveraging the high ground of AI technology, but also a comprehensive plan for building new production relations and developing new quality productive forces against the backdrop of rapid technological development. From the perspective of productive forces, "AI+" can reconstruct the path to improving total factor productivity through algorithm optimization and the release of data element value, effectively reducing the marginal cost constraints of traditional production factors and injecting new momentum into high-quality industrial development. From the perspective of production relations, in the process of deeply empowering artificial intelligence technology, it is necessary to simultaneously build an institutional system and governance framework adapted to intelligent transformation, prevent the application of technology from exacerbating the risk of unbalanced development, and ensure that the benefits of innovation reach all people. Therefore, promoting "AI+" at the national strategic level is an inevitable choice to cope with the iteration of technological and economic paradigms, and also an important strategy to optimize resource allocation efficiency through the popularization of intelligent technology.

(III) From the perspective of empowerment effectiveness, the "+" in "AI+" is a triple manifestation of deep integration, paradigm shift, and transformation and reshaping. The deep integration of artificial intelligence technology with the existing industrial system, with an unprecedented scale and breadth of application, unlocks the implicit value of traditional industries and activates greater incremental space in the existing market. Furthermore, as the application of artificial intelligence continues to deepen and its ability to handle complex problems continues to improve, the traditional model of relying on experience-based decision-making will be broken through, driving fundamental changes in paradigms such as biomanufacturing and materials research and development. At a deeper level, through the deconstruction and reconstruction of traditional development paths, artificial intelligence will drive the leap of industrial forms and social governance models towards a new intelligent form. At the same time, the significant increase in productivity will lead to major adjustments in production relations, creating more new jobs and professions. This transformation and reshaping will not only be reflected in the economic field but will also profoundly affect all aspects of social life, leading human society towards a more intelligent, efficient, and sustainable future.

II. The "Opinions" Innovative Proposal of a Chinese Solution for High-Quality Development of Artificial Intelligence

The issuance of the "Opinions" marks the formal entry of the national strategy into a new stage centered on the deep empowerment of artificial intelligence. Its greatest innovation lies in exploring a development path that both leads the forefront of the times and is fully based on my country's national conditions, focusing on breaking through implementation bottlenecks and reshaping development momentum, contributing a new paradigm with both Chinese characteristics and contemporary value to the global development of artificial intelligence.

(I) Emphasizing Independent Innovation Leadership, Building a New Engine for High-Efficiency Technological Innovation with "Artificial Intelligence+". Under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, it is necessary to firmly grasp the "key" of technological modernization and drive high-quality industrial development through collective breakthroughs in artificial intelligence innovation. The "Opinions" proposes to accelerate the process of major scientific discoveries "from 0 to 1" and the implementation and iterative breakthroughs of technologies "from 1 to N", and to establish new forms of philosophical and social science research organizations adapted to the era of artificial intelligence. The next step is to accelerate the transformation of scientific research paradigms, deepen the empowerment of scientific research scenarios through artificial intelligence technologies represented by large-scale models, and promote the integrated application of general and specialized models in key areas such as biomedicine and new materials. A collaborative innovation system integrating industry, academia, research, and application should be built, supporting the joint construction of laboratories and improving technology transfer mechanisms to open up the "laboratory-market" transformation channel.

(II) Highlighting the advantages of the national system, using "artificial intelligence+" to enhance new momentum for high-quality industrial development. The "Opinions" propose a series of important measures to drive high-quality industrial development through artificial intelligence from four aspects: cultivating new intelligent native models and new business forms, promoting the intelligent development of all industrial elements, accelerating the digital transformation and upgrading of agriculture, and innovating new models for the development of service industries. Compared with developed countries such as Europe and the United States, my country pays more attention to leveraging the advantages of the new national system, fully mobilizing the enthusiasm of various stakeholders such as the government, state-owned enterprises and institutions, and platform companies, and continuously expanding application scenarios through public data authorization and operation, intelligent demonstration parks, etc., effectively solving the "last mile" problem of technology implementation. In the future, supported by new infrastructure such as the world's largest 5G network, a nationwide integrated computing network, and industrial internet platforms, my country will continue to solidify the foundation of "intelligent transformation, data conversion, and network connectivity," forming a uniquely Chinese path of "infrastructure empowerment—scenario opening—full-chain upgrading."

(III) Emphasizing a people-centered approach, creating new high-quality life scenarios through "AI+". The "Opinions" systematically elaborate on promoting the upgrading of service and product consumption through "AI+", comprehensively improving the quality of human work, life, and learning, and effectively enhancing social governance, security governance, and ecological governance capabilities. In recent years, various departments and localities have actively deepened the application of artificial intelligence in scenarios such as "unified management" in smart cities, "finger-tip burden reduction" in grassroots government affairs, and intelligent decision-making in emergency management. By opening up data in key areas of people's livelihood such as healthcare, transportation, and social security, they have comprehensively promoted AI-enabled education, elderly care, and other fields. In the future, artificial intelligence will restructure the entire chain of consumer product design, production, sales, and service, cultivate new intelligent consumption formats and scenarios, optimize the consumer experience, accelerate the release of multi-level and diversified domestic demand potential, and help promote the expansion and improvement of consumption.

(IV) Emphasizing Open and Inclusive Governance, Building a New Global Pattern of High-Level Openness with "AI+". The Opinions propose treating artificial intelligence as an international public good benefiting humanity, creating an open ecosystem for AI capacity building based on equality, mutual trust, diversity, and win-win outcomes, deepening high-level openness in the field of AI, and exploring a governance framework with broad participation from all countries. Currently, the performance of domestically produced large-scale models is continuously breaking through. my country fully leverages mechanisms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Belt and Road Initiative, and BRICS to promote the governance concept of "dynamic agility and multi-party collaboration," vigorously promote open-source development, effectively lower the technological application threshold for developing countries, and provide new options for global technological equality. By enhancing China's rule-making power, technological discourse power, and moral leadership in global AI governance, Chinese wisdom is injected into the construction of a community with a shared future for mankind.

III. Deepening and Implementing the "AI+" Action to Ensure the Precise Implementation of the Opinions

Based on the present and looking to the future, we should take "AI+" as a strategic fulcrum, refine and implement the various tasks of the Opinions, strengthen policy coordination, optimize resource allocation, ensure the precise implementation of various measures, promote global cooperation in addressing the challenges and opportunities brought by AI, and contribute to building a community with a shared future for mankind.

First, we will strengthen policy guidance and support to continuously optimize the development environment for the artificial intelligence (AI) industry. Within the overall framework of the "Opinions," we will accelerate the formulation and improvement of specific policies for various fields. We will increase financial support, encourage social capital investment, and form a diversified investment and financing system. We will improve the intellectual property protection mechanism to stimulate innovation. We will establish and improve the market supervision system to ensure fair market competition and create a healthy and orderly industrial ecosystem. We will refine regional development strategies and promote the construction of local characteristic AI industry clusters. We will deepen collaborative innovation among industry, academia, research, and application to promote breakthroughs in key technologies and the transformation of research results. Through the dual drive of policy guidance and market mechanisms, we will accelerate the deep integration of AI technology in various fields, promoting industrial upgrading and high-quality economic development.

Second, we will encourage pilot projects in key areas to accelerate the application of AI from "breakthroughs in specific scenarios" to "comprehensive industry penetration." We will increase the openness of application scenarios, strengthen supply and demand matching, joint research, and two-way collaboration between AI enterprises and industry users. We will continuously summarize the experience of building typical scenarios and replicate and promote best practices. In key industries such as manufacturing, healthcare, and education, support will be provided for leading companies to collaborate with AI enterprises and research institutions to establish national AI application pilot bases. These bases will aggregate high-quality industry datasets, address common industry problems, continuously reduce the cost of pilot-scale technology applications, and gradually achieve large-scale promotion.

Third, a new infrastructure system will be built, accelerating the improvement of data and model markets. A new infrastructure network adapted to AI development will be constructed, promoting the construction of high-speed direct connections between national-level computing power hub nodes to achieve flexible allocation and inclusive supply of cross-regional computing resources. The market-oriented allocation reform of data elements will be continuously promoted, and the systems for data element property rights registration, circulation and trading, price generation, and revenue distribution will be continuously improved to adapt to AI development. The development of a domestic AI open-source community will be accelerated, promoting the sharing of large model training datasets, activating the open-source motivation of multiple entities, and driving industrial ecosystem prosperity through open-source ecosystem cultivation.

Fourth, a multi-level talent training system will be constructed to comprehensively improve the "intelligent literacy" of the entire population. "AI + X" interdisciplinary innovation centers will be established in key universities, and AI industry-education integration platforms will be built. General AI education in primary and secondary schools will be promoted, and the talent training models for gifted, unconventional, and outstanding innovative talents will be optimized. Accelerate the development of national occupational standards for artificial intelligence engineers, establish a mechanism linking skills certification and professional title evaluation, and address the bottleneck of talent shortage at the application level. Increase efforts to attract high-level overseas AI talent and continuously improve the AI ​​talent service and support system.

Fifth, solidify the security foundation for the intelligent era and forge a highly reliable security barrier for the AI ​​industry. Establish a security and compliance defense system adapted to large-scale models, and firmly safeguard the bottom line of data, infrastructure, and model system security for AI applications. Especially in key areas such as education, healthcare, and transportation, rigorous testing and verification should be conducted to effectively prevent and mitigate AI security risks. Under the guidance of the overall national security concept, effectively construct a three-pronged AI development security system of "prevention before the event—accountability after the event—autonomous controllability," emphasizing both source control and supply chain resilience to provide guarantees for technology for good. 

(Zhou Min, Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Deputy Director of the National Information Center)

On the Death of Richard (Dick) Bruce Cheney (January 30, 1941 – November 3, 2025)

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Richard (Dick) Bruce Cheney, who, among the many actions, occupations, and activities that marked the outward appearance of his life, served as the 46th vice president of the United States from 2001 to 2009 under President George W. Bush, died on 3 November 2025. 

There may be a temptation to remember the man that was Mr. Cheney through the prism of those actions and life events for which his was most famous, reducing his life to those instants when he achieved great heights in political life and in service, as he saw it, to the Republic (eg here).  I prefer to remember the man at that gloriously fecund moment of his life when he set himself on a personal and public path the end of which was marked on 3 November 2025. And, perhaps, there is no better measure of that moment that when the future vice president of the Republic served as vice president of the C Club of Casper College which he attended in 1963 (for a semester, having attended Yale University for several semesters before then and the University of Wyoming afterward).  Perambulations through youth ought not to invite judgment other than that they tend to set the cognitive parameters against which a person sometimes understand and measure themselves. It is not until the end of a life's path, though, that one may look at on those moments that form the person, moments that may well augur the future course for which a younger person may be unknowingly preparing. It is in contemplation of those vagaries of the stuff that forms the person, and the wonder with which a life's course meanders from birth to death, that magical combination of circumstances and active engagement of a life force within them, that one remembers the man, celebrates the life, and draws from it what lessons one can.

Perhaps there is no better measure of the man, Richard (Dick) Cheney, than in the way he remembered a colleague, former President Gerald Ford, in remarks delivered at the former President's state funeral  in December 2006. 

Nothing was left unsaid, and at the end of his days, Gerald Ford knew how much he meant to us and to his country. He was given length of years, and many times in his company we paid our tributes and said our thanks. We were proud to call him our leader, grateful to know him as a man. We told him these things, and there is comfort in knowing that. Still, it is an ending. And what is left now is to say goodbye.

That was tribute enough for the former President; and it is tribute enough for the person who delivered them in his own time.  And so in memory of both, and to mark the passing of the former vice president  I include below the full text of the "Vice President's Remarks at the State Funeral of Former President Gerald R. Ford" (30 December 2006) which in offering a tribute to the former President also permitted a look at the spirit of character of the man who gave the remarks. 

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Vice President's Remarks at the State Funeral of Former President Gerald R. Ford
The United States Capitol Rotunda

      Remembering President Gerald R. Ford (1913-2006)

8:11 P.M. EST

THE VICE PRESIDENT: Mrs. Ford, Susan, Mike, Jack, and Steve; distinguished guests; colleagues and friends; and fellow citizens:

Nothing was left unsaid, and at the end of his days, Gerald Ford knew how much he meant to us and to his country. He was given length of years, and many times in his company we paid our tributes and said our thanks. We were proud to call him our leader, grateful to know him as a man. We told him these things, and there is comfort in knowing that. Still, it is an ending. And what is left now is to say goodbye.

He first stood under this dome at the age of 17, on a high school tour in the Hoover years. In his congressional career, he passed through this Rotunda so many times -- never once imagining all the honors that life would bring. He was an unassuming man, our 38th President, and few have ever risen so high with so little guile or calculation. Even in the three decades since he left this city, he was not the sort to ponder his legacy, to brood over his place in history. And so in these days of remembrance, as Gerald R. Ford, goes to his rest, it is for us to take the measure of the man.

It's hard to imagine that this most loyal of men began life as an abandoned child, facing the world alone with his mother. He was devoted to her always, and also to the fine man who came into their lives and gave the little boy a name he would carry into history. Gerald and Dorothy Ford expected good things of their son. As it turned out, there would be great things, too -- in a journey of 93 years that would fill them with loving pride.

Jerry Ford was always a striver -- never working an angle, just working. He was a believer in the saying that in life you make your own luck. That's how the Boy Scout became an Eagle Scout; and the football center, a college all-star; and the sailor in war, a lieutenant commander. That's how the student who waited tables and washed dishes earned a law degree, and how the young lawyer became a member of the United States Congress, class of 1948. The achievements added up all his life, yet he was known to boast only about one. I heard it once or twice myself -- he said he was never luckier than when he stepped out of Grace Episcopal Church in Grand Rapids with a beautiful girl named Betty as his bride.

Fifty-eight years ago, almost to the day, the new member from Michigan's fifth district moved into his office in the Cannon Building, and said his first hello to the congressman next door, John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. They belonged to a generation that came early to great duties, and took up responsibilities readily, and shared a confidence in their country and its purposes in the world.

In that 81st Congress were four future Presidents, and others who wished for that destiny. For his part, Mr. Ford of Michigan aspired only to be Speaker of the House, and by general agreement he would have made a fine one. Good judgment, fair dealing, and the manners of a gentleman go a long way around here, and these were the mark of Jerry Ford for a quarter century in the House. It was a Democrat, the late Martha Griffiths, who said, "I never knew him to make a dishonest statement nor a statement part-true and part-false, and I never heard him utter an unkind word."

Sometimes in our political affairs, kindness and candor are only more prized for their scarcity. And sometimes even the most careful designs of men cannot improve upon history's accident. This was the case in the 62nd year of Gerald Ford's life, a bitter season in the life of our country.

It was a time of false words and ill will. There was great malice, and great hurt, and a taste for more. And it all began to pass away on a Friday in August, when Gerald Ford laid his hand on the Bible and swore to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States. He said, "You have not elected me as your President by your ballot, and so I ask you to confirm me as your President with your prayers."

What followed was a presidency lasting 895 days, and filled with testing and trial enough for a much longer stay. Even then, amid troubles not of his own making, President Ford proved as worthy of that office as any who had ever come before. He was modest and manful; there was confidence and courage in his bearing. In judgment, he was sober and serious, unafraid of decisions, calm and steady by nature, always the still point in the turning wheel. He assumed power without assuming airs; he knew how to treat people. He answered courtesy with courtesy; he answered discourtesy with courtesy.

This President's hardest decision was also among his first. And in September of 1974, Gerald Ford was almost alone in understanding that there can be no healing without pardon. The consensus holds that this decision cost him an election. That is very likely so. The criticism was fierce. But President Ford had larger concerns at heart. And it is far from the worst fate that a man should be remembered for his capacity to forgive.

In politics it can take a generation or more for a matter to settle, for tempers to cool. The distance of time has clarified many things about President Gerald Ford. And now death has done its part to reveal this man and the President for what he was.

He was not just a cheerful and pleasant man -- although these virtues are rare enough at the commanding heights. He was not just a nice guy, the next-door neighbor whose luck landed him in the White House. It was this man, Gerald R. Ford, who led our republic safely through a crisis that could have turned to catastrophe. We will never know what further unravelings, what greater malevolence might have come in that time of furies turned loose and hearts turned cold. But we do know this: America was spared the worst. And this was the doing of an American President. For all the grief that never came, for all the wounds that were never inflicted, the people of the United States will forever stand in debt to the good man and faithful servant we mourn tonight.

Thinking on all this, we are only more acutely aware of a time in our lives and of its end. And we can be certain that Gerald Ford would now ask only that we remember his wife. Betty, the President was not a hard man to read, and to his friends nothing was more obvious than the source of his great happiness. It was you. And all the good that you shared, Betty, all the good that you did together, has not gone away. All of that is forever.

There is a time to every purpose under Heaven. In the years of Gerald Rudolph Ford, it was a time to heal. There is also, in life, a time to part, when those who are dear to us must go their way. And so for now, Mr. President -- farewell. We will always be thankful for your good life. In Almighty God, we place our confidence. And to Him we confirm you, with our love and with our prayers.

END 8:20 P.M. EST

Reflections on the Victory Speech of Mayor Elect Mamdani; The Politics of Virtual Archetypes, of Avatars and Icons, Becomes Better Defined

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I wish Andrew Cuomo only the best in private life. But let tonight be the final time I utter his name, as we turn the page on a politics that abandons the many and answers only to the few. New York, tonight you have delivered. A mandate for change. ​​A mandate for a new kind of politics. A mandate for a city we can afford. And a mandate for a government that delivers exactly that. (Transcript of Zohran Mamdani’s Victory Speech)

The man, Zohran Mamdani was elected to the mayorship of New York City on 3 November 2025.  He delivered a speech to celebrate his victory. The lines above perhaps represent the most revealing element of a speech that was meant, as all political speeches are meant to do, to reveal the avatar and icon that are now no longer contained within the human person, but which have now become the form of humanity only barely contained within the body of a person (Avatars, Icons, and Adversaries--Full Text of Vice President's Harris's Remarks at the Democratic National Convention). In the process, the transformation of the human into an idea defined within the confines of the virtual space of the avatar  that serves as a conduit to the virtual as icon, also invites an equally compelling transformation of the physicality of the spaces over which that avatar-icon (in human form) has a measure of authority into a virtual reality of itself, a representation of the idea of itself that is encased in physical form but that is itself the avatar of a signification that melds together all of its parts into a singular object--one form, one will, one purpose,one idea ("And while we cast our ballots alone, we chose hope together.") (Transcript of Zohran Mamdani’s Victory Speech).  Yet there is ego in avatar, and there is a structure to the dialectic routing for which ikons serve as doorway. Mayor elect Mamdani, like Kamala Harris last year, and following a pattern now deeply embedded in culture, constructs his avatar from out of privileged shards of personal history, which are then fused into an identity that assumes a form useful as icon as a function of the inherent ideas embedded in and thorough the representations of avatar. 

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This reframing might then be useful in understanding the text of the victory speech that Mayor elect Mamdani projected out to the idea, the significance, of the masses in dialectics with which engagement is inevitable. And in this case, that engagement was undertaken in the shadow of another avatar-icon, the current sitting President of the United States ("After all, if anyone can show a nation betrayed by Donald Trump how to defeat him, it is the city that gave rise to him. And if there is any way to terrify a despot, it is by dismantling the very conditions that allowed him to accumulate power." (Transcript of Zohran Mamdani’s Victory Speech).). What is signified now, what produces the cognitive cages within with a virtual dialectics may  be undertaken, has escaped the human and encased  itself within the idea of itself--an idea that is itself the incarnation of the premises and understanding of the reality of things that in virtual spaces acquire not just value but produces judgment in the virtual with consequences over the bodies and spaces that house these avatars.  One no longer speaks about Mayor elect Mamdani the man, or President Trump, the man, or New Yok, the city, or its inhabitants, as humans. One speaks now only to the ideas and reality ordering spaces that is housed (for the moment) in the body of Mayor elect Mamdani, and President Trump, and the idea of the City of New York as well as that organism that represents the collectivity of the humanity of New York as a singularity, the body of which resides now within the avatar of the mayor elect. 

 

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Once framed in this way, and beyond the usual bromides that are required textual performances within the expectations built into victory speeches of this sort at this stage of the historical development of the U.S., engagement with Mayor Elect Mamdani's  speech given in celebration of his electoral victory becomes a richer experience. One is interested, for this purpose, not in the specific manifestation of the politics of the Mayor elect (though that will be the language and meaning-verse through which his dialectics with opposing political avatars will be undertaken), but in the underlying transformation of the forms and fundamental structures through which politics is rationalized. That transformation suggests a melding, in a modern version of its medieval forms, of the physical bodies of representatives with the idea of the thing they represent. They are not in that sense and in this Republic, leaders, but rather representatives--something that our avatars sometimes forget in the process of their transformation from human to something greater in the virtual spaces of ideas and signification. In the process, one encounters a move toward a politics that is no longer human. The idea of the human--as a singularity and more importantly as a collective object, now drives politics in ways that technology has made possible. In the holographic representation of the physical, the physical itself becomes a secondary object--one driven by its virtual self--both digitized and digitalized, operating within the parameters not of human expectations but of the coding inherent in the triumph of cognitive systems that then shape not just the virtual presentations of these political objects, but also, and only indirectly related,  the physical spaces in which they are to be manifested.  


 

It in in these spaces that the idea of Mayer Elect Mamdani will confront the idea of President Trump within the virtual landscapes of New York City, and perhaps beyond. The full text of Mayor Mamdani's speech (courtesy of the New York Times) follows below. It is from that text that one acquires a better sense not just of the well understood ideology that serves to frame the reality within which the incoming administration will function (defined as a variant of American "democratic socialism" the nuances of which are worth extracting), but also the way that this ideology is framed by the construction of identity avatar into which humans now pour themselves and in the process become something different, something virtual--a signification of their "selves" only partly represented by their bodies that are both expressions of that ideology and its consequence, and that shape both--in virtual space. 

 

 

 

Mr. Mamdani, the mayor-elect of New York City, addressed supporters at a venue in Brooklyn late Tuesday night.

Thank you, my friends. The sun may have set over our city this evening, but as Eugene Debs once said, “I can see the dawn of a better day for humanity.”

For as long as we can remember, the working people of New York have been told by the wealthy and the well-connected that power does not belong in their hands.

Fingers bruised from lifting boxes on the warehouse floor, palms calloused from delivery bike handlebars, knuckles scarred with kitchen burns: These are not hands that have been allowed to hold power. And yet, over the last 12 months, you have dared to reach for something greater.

Tonight, against all odds, we have grasped it. The future is in our hands. My friends, we have toppled a political dynasty.

I wish Andrew Cuomo only the best in private life. But let tonight be the final time I utter his name, as we turn the page on a politics that abandons the many and answers only to the few. New York, tonight you have delivered. A mandate for change. ​​A mandate for a new kind of politics. A mandate for a city we can afford. And a mandate for a government that delivers exactly that.

On January 1st, I will be sworn in as the mayor of New York City. And that is because of you. So before I say anything else, I must say this: Thank you. Thank you to the next generation of New Yorkers who refuse to accept that the promise of a better future was a relic of the past.

You showed that when politics speaks to you without condescension, we can usher in a new era of leadership. We will fight for you, because we are you.

Or, as we say on Steinway, ana minkum wa alaikum.

Thank you to those so often forgotten by the politics of our city, who made this movement their own. I speak of Yemeni bodega owners and Mexican abuelas. Senegalese taxi drivers and Uzbek nurses. Trinidadian line cooks and Ethiopian aunties. Yes, aunties.

To every New Yorker in Kensington and Midwood and Hunts Point, know this: This city is your city, and this democracy is yours too. This campaign is about people like Wesley, an 1199 organizer I met outside of Elmhurst Hospital on Thursday night. A New Yorker who lives elsewhere, who commutes two hours each way from Pennsylvania because rent is too expensive in this city.

It’s about people like the woman I met on the Bx33 years ago who said to me, “I used to love New York, but now it’s just where I live.” And it’s about people like Richard, the taxi driver I went on a 15-day hunger strike with outside of City Hall, who still has to drive his cab seven days a week. My brother, we are in City Hall now.

This victory is for all of them. And it’s for all of you, the more than 100,000 volunteers who built this campaign into an unstoppable force. Because of you, we will make this city one that working people can love and live in again. With every door knocked, every petition signature earned, and every hard-earned conversation, you eroded the cynicism that has come to define our politics.

Now, I know that I have asked for much from you over this last year. Time and again, you have answered my calls — but I have one final request. New York City, breathe this moment in. We have held our breath for longer than we know.

We have held it in anticipation of defeat, held it because the air has been knocked out of our lungs too many times to count, held it because we cannot afford to exhale. Thanks to all of those who sacrificed so much. We are breathing in the air of a city that has been reborn.

To my campaign team, who believed when no one else did and who took an electoral project and turned it into so much more: I will never be able to express the depth of my gratitude. You can sleep now.

To my parents, mama and baba: You have made me into the man I am today. I am so proud to be your son. And to my incredible wife, Rama, hayati: There is no one I would rather have by my side in this moment, and in every moment.

To every New Yorker — whether you voted for me, for one of my opponents, or felt too disappointed by politics to vote at all — thank you for the opportunity to prove myself worthy of your trust. I will wake each morning with a singular purpose: to make this city better for you than it was the day before.

There are many who thought this day would never come, who feared that we would be condemned only to a future of less, with every election consigning us simply to more of the same.

And there are others who see politics today as too cruel for the flame of hope to still burn. New York, we have answered those fears.

Tonight we have spoken in a clear voice. Hope is alive. Hope is a decision that tens of thousands of New Yorkers made day after day, volunteer shift after volunteer shift, despite attack ad after attack ad. More than a million of us stood in our churches, in gymnasiums, in community centers, as we filled in the ledger of democracy.

And while we cast our ballots alone, we chose hope together. Hope over tyranny. Hope over big money and small ideas. Hope over despair. We won because New Yorkers allowed themselves to hope that the impossible could be made possible. And we won because we insisted that no longer would politics be something that is done to us. Now, it is something that we do.

Standing before you, I think of the words of Jawaharlal Nehru: “A moment comes, but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance.”

Tonight we have stepped out from the old into the new. So let us speak now, with clarity and conviction that cannot be misunderstood, about what this new age will deliver, and for whom.

This will be an age where New Yorkers expect from their leaders a bold vision of what we will achieve, rather than a list of excuses for what we are too timid to attempt. Central to that vision will be the most ambitious agenda to tackle the cost-of-living crisis that this city has seen since the days of Fiorello La Guardia: an agenda that will freeze the rents for more than two million rent-stabilized tenants, make buses fast and free, and deliver universal child care across our city.

Years from now, may our only regret be that this day took so long to come. This new age will be one of relentless improvement. We will hire thousands more teachers. We will cut waste from a bloated bureaucracy. We will work tirelessly to make lights shine again in the hallways of NYCHA developments where they have long flickered.


Safety and justice will go hand in hand as we work with police officers to reduce crime and create a Department of Community Safety that tackles the mental health crisis and homelessness crises head on. Excellence will become the expectation across government, not the exception. In this new age we make for ourselves, we will refuse to allow those who traffic in division and hate to pit us against one another.

In this moment of political darkness, New York will be the light. Here, we believe in standing up for those we love, whether you are an immigrant, a member of the trans community, one of the many Black women that Donald Trump has fired from a federal job, a single mom still waiting for the cost of groceries to go down, or anyone else with their back against the wall. Your struggle is ours, too.

And we will build a City Hall that stands steadfast alongside Jewish New Yorkers and does not waver in the fight against the scourge of antisemitism. Where the more than one million Muslims know that they belong — not just in the five boroughs of this city, but in the halls of power.

No more will New York be a city where you can traffic in Islamophobia and win an election. This new age will be defined by a competence and a compassion that have too long been placed at odds with one another. We will prove that there is no problem too large for government to solve, and no concern too small for it to care about.

For years, those in City Hall have only helped those who can help them. But on January 1st, we will usher in a city government that helps everyone.

Now, I know that many have heard our message only through the prism of misinformation. Tens of millions of dollars have been spent to redefine reality and to convince our neighbors that this new age is something that should frighten them. As has so often occurred, the billionaire class has sought to convince those making $30 an hour that their enemies are those earning $20 an hour.

They want the people to fight amongst ourselves so that we remain distracted from the work of remaking a long-broken system. We refuse to let them dictate the rules of the game anymore. They can play by the same rules as the rest of us.

Together, we will usher in a generation of change. And if we embrace this brave new course, rather than fleeing from it, we can respond to oligarchy and authoritarianism with the strength it fears, not the appeasement it craves.

After all, if anyone can show a nation betrayed by Donald Trump how to defeat him, it is the city that gave rise to him. And if there is any way to terrify a despot, it is by dismantling the very conditions that allowed him to accumulate power.

This is not only how we stop Trump; it’s how we stop the next one. So, Donald Trump, since I know you’re watching, I have four words for you: Turn the volume up.

We will hold bad landlords to account because the Donald Trumps of our city have grown far too comfortable taking advantage of their tenants. We will put an end to the culture of corruption that has allowed billionaires like Trump to evade taxation and exploit tax breaks. We will stand alongside unions and expand labor protections because we know, just as Donald Trump does, that when working people have ironclad rights, the bosses who seek to extort them become very small indeed.

New York will remain a city of immigrants: a city built by immigrants, powered by immigrants and, as of tonight, led by an immigrant.

So hear me, President Trump, when I say this: To get to any of us, you will have to get through all of us. When we enter City Hall in 58 days, expectations will be high. We will meet them. A great New Yorker once said that while you campaign in poetry, you govern in prose.

If that must be true, let the prose we write still rhyme, and let us build a shining city for all. And we must chart a new path, as bold as the one we have already traveled. After all, the conventional wisdom would tell you that I am far from the perfect candidate.

I am young, despite my best efforts to grow older. I am Muslim. I am a democratic socialist. And most damning of all, I refuse to apologize for any of this.

And yet, if tonight teaches us anything, it is that convention has held us back. We have bowed at the altar of caution, and we have paid a mighty price. Too many working people cannot recognize themselves in our party, and too many among us have turned to the right for answers to why they’ve been left behind.

We will leave mediocrity in our past. No longer will we have to open a history book for proof that Democrats can dare to be great.

Our greatness will be anything but abstract. It will be felt by every rent-stabilized tenant who wakes up on the first of every month knowing the amount they’re going to pay hasn’t soared since the month before. It will be felt by each grandparent who can afford to stay in the home they have worked for, and whose grandchildren live nearby because the cost of child care didn’t send them to Long Island.

It will be felt by the single mother who is safe on her commute and whose bus runs fast enough that she doesn’t have to rush school drop-off to make it to work on time. And it will be felt when New Yorkers open their newspapers in the morning and read headlines of success, not scandal.

Most of all, it will be felt by each New Yorker when the city they love finally loves them back.

Together, New York, we’re going to freeze the… [rent!]Together, New York, we’re going to make buses fast and… [free!]Together, New York, we’re going to deliver universal… [child care!]


Let the words we’ve spoken together, the dreams we’ve dreamt together, become the agenda we deliver together. New York, this power, it’s yours. This city belongs to you.

Thank you.



Ready for Pre-Ordering: "Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear Dark Constitutionalism" (Martin Belov, ed., Routledge 2026)

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I am delighted to pass along the announcement of the publication of a set f brilliant essays in Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear: Dark Constitutionalism (Martin Belov, ed., Routledge 2026). In its website the work is described as follows:

This book explores the epistemological, semiotic, semantic, and heuristic dimensions of the dark emotions in constitutional and international law. We are living in times of crisis and emergency where negative emotions and dark feelings are abundant. As these have come to form the intellectual and socio-legal context for the performance of constitutional and international law, this book explores their place – especially the politics of fear, but also anger, hate, despair, and crisis – in our current constitutional polycrisis. Focusing on this ‘dark constitutionalism’, the book draws together an international and interdisciplinary range of scholars to consider the place of emotive semiotics in collective meaning making, the constitutional politics of emotions, and emotional approaches to global challenges in a time of crisis, emergency, and transition. The book thereby develops a compelling analysis of the use of negative emotions in the shaping of contemporary constitutional imaginaries, and with it a novel account of the rise of dark constitutionalism. This book will appeal to researchers and scholars working in the areas of legal theory, legal philosophy, constitutional law, international law, and socio-legal studies.

 The Table of Contents follows below. 

The draft of my contribution, Revolutionary Constitutions and their Constitutionalism: The Internalisation of Fear as Process and the Performance of Crisis in the Service of Stability, may be accessed HERE. The PPT of my presentation of that contribution may be accessed HERE. The abstract of the contribution also follows below. 

 

 Legal Imaginaries of Crisis and Fear: Dark Constitutionalism (Martin Belov, ed., Routledge 2026)

Chapter 1: The Concept of Dark Constitutionalism
Martin Belov

Chapter 2: Is it the End of the World as We Know it? Apocalyptic Narratives in Political Debates and the Heuristics of Fear
Marta Soniewicka

Chapter 3: “Nothing Spreads Like Fear”. From the Government of the Plague to the Crime of Contagion
Emilia Musumeci

Chapter 4: Constitutional Over-Belief: Affective Intensity as a Function of Legitimation
Richard Sherwin

Chapter 5: Revolutionary Constitutions and their Constitutionalism: The Internalisation of Fear as Process and the Performance of Crisis in the Service of Stability
Larry Catá Backer

Chapter 6: From Fear to Hope: Law and Emotions' Response to Global Challenges
Julia Wesołowska

Chapter 7: Politics of Fear and Social Transformation Through the Lens of Legal Politics
Mario Krešić

Chapter 8: (Re)Invention of Memory. Constitutional Narratives in Central European – Sombre or Luminous?
Mirosław Michał Sadowski

Chapter 9: Trauma, Melancholia and the Law
Sabarish Suresh

Chapter 10: Crisis Affects in the International Legal Discourse
Jean D’Aspremont

Chapter 11: Terrorism as Imaginary: Creating Politics of Fear
Vesselin Popovski

Chapter 12: Climate Alarmism and Denialism
Shalvi Ponwar

Pulsing Constitutionalism and the Dichotomy between Dark and Bright Constitutionalism as Driving Force in Constitutional Space-Time
Martin Belov

 *      *       *

 Revolutionary Constitutions and their Constitutionalism: The Internalisation of Fear as Process and the Performance of Crisis in the Service of Stability,

Larry Catá Backer:

 Abstract: The object of revolutionary constitutionalism—the fundamental basis of constitutional design and perception since the late 18th century (though with antecedents well before then), is to preserve a revolutionary settlement of a political-economic order by cultivating revolutionary dialectic (rather than suppressing them) within revolutionary structures, now memorialized in a constitutional document. The object is redirection—from the utilization of revolutionary dialectics against a post-revolutionary apparatus now in power to an instrument for the preservation and affirmation of that post-revolutionary apparatus. It becomes a mimetic device denatured and now serving an apparatus. Stability is not forever; it retains its power at least until the fundamental contradictions of this revolutionary constitutional order collapse the system. At some point, the revolutionary dialectics that produced the post-revolutionary order will itself target that ordering from the outside. What remains is the cyclicity of dialectic—fear, response-reconstruction—rather than the systems to which it furthers from one to another stage of human historical development. It is to the preservation of that emotional explosion, and its alignment with core constitutional text, that constitutions devote time and effort, usually in its preambular text, and sometimes in extraconstitutional documents with quasi-constitutional significance. If powerful enough, the emotive semiotic of constitutional explosion can affect not just its political community but those of other political communities looking for a way to rationalize and direct their own collective political emotion. The focus of this essay, then, will be on the way that emotive context is transposed from revolution to post-revolutionary constitutional text in distinctive contexts—a revolution to preserve traditional values; a communist revolution within a multi-state imperial power; a revolution with a long fuse grounded in anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism; and an ethno-revolution embedded within multilateral managerialism. To those ends the essay first looks to a powerful instance of emotive semiotics, the U.S. Declaration of Independence (1776), and its reflection in the subtextual mimetic dialectics of threat and crisis and resolution in the U.S. federal Constitution (1789). It then considers its value as a template for the constitutionalization of separation in the 21st century through the lens of the preambular texts of the Chinese (1982) and Cuban (2019) constitutions. All of these emotive revolutionary impulses are then transposed into and as the constitutional settlement within which the revolutionary is to be distilled, tamed, and contained within their respective ideological cages.


 

Linda Wood Reporting From the Eleventh session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights

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Pix Credit here

 

The eleventh session of the OEIGWG took place from 20 to 24 October 2025 in room XVI of the Palais des Nations. Recordings of the discussions are available on UN Web TV. These sessions have been a marvelous experience in both the brilliance and tragedy of these sorts of exercises at a time of substantial change.  In some respects the Treaty effort represents the accumulation of  an extraordinary amount of good intentions and positive moral reasoning. It does represent a plausible application of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, though not the only one. Yet that choice is the issue; it suggests the fulfillment of a political desire that extends back to the 1970s, combining  the essence of the now ancient New International Economic Order with the techno-bureaucratic legalism of the failed Norms project  the taste for which might have reached its zenith just as COVID augured in a new age. But perhaps most tragic is the embrace of a retro approach that both celebrates a state system that is otherwise ideologically problematic onto which is delegated  the duty to fulfill international legal obligations all the while rejecting the plausibility of private law and markets as a space for the generation of useful collective action. And of course the real tragedy is  the quite naive view--taken as something like holy writ--the the best object for the regulation of system of economic production, and of the nexus of relationships within which they are organized, through a focus on one, but not all of its components. The regulation of multinational enterprises has always most usefully served a a metaphor, or better put as the avatar representing a complex polycentric system of organizing economic activity; it is to the regulation of that system and its relationships, rather than of one of the objects  through which that system acquires its form and power, that will will eventually have to confront if what one wants to do is to privilege human rights (however defined) as a factor in the production of human undertakings. 

But that is politics, a politics that will, like other political projects before it be tested in the fires of negotiation of a final treaty text and then in the trench warfare of implementation within a system in which States can be compelled to a far less extent than the enterprises that are the object of all of this drafting.

 And thus back to the work of the OEIGWG, now starting its second decade of work. These OEIGWG treaty drafting sessions have been quite marvelously reported by Linda Wood, who has been doing a remarkable job of both engaging with and chronicling this quite interesting process (see the most recent herehere and here). So I am again delighted to pass along this marvelous reporting from Linda Wood

It was an interesting and busy week at the 11th session of the LBI.
There were new States that attended and presented for the first time.
The draft report on the eleventh session of the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights is found here.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/igwg-transcorp/session11/igwg-11th-report.pdf
The OEIGWG Chair-Rapporteur 2026 Roadmap for the implementation of HRC Decision 56/116, including the intersessional thematic consultations towards the 12th session is here;
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/igwg-transcorp/session11/igwg-11th-proposed-2026-roadmap.pdf
The updated draft legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with States updated texts on Articles 12-24.
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/igwg-transcorp/session11/igwg-11th-textual-proposals-lbi.pdf
The paper received 14 October 2025, Articles 4-11, was discussed at the LBI. However, States only gave general comments and wanted more time to consider this paper. It was agreed that all States and non-State stakeholders can make submissions by 1 February 2026. The contributions on the thirteen Chair-Rapporteur’s suggested redrafting of selected provisions of Articles 4 to 11, will be posted on the working group’s website.
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The first intersessional thematic consultation, to be held in February 2026, will be focused on: Articles 12 to 24 of the Updated draft legally binding instrument, including on the textual proposals submitted by States during the eleventh session.
The second intersessional thematic consultation, to be held in April 2026, will be focused on: Article 1 (Definitions), 2 (Statement of purpose) and Preamble.
The third intersessional thematic consultation, to be held in June 2026, will be focused on: Art. 3 (Scope) and a general overview of the text and the way forward.
Building E at the Palais des Nations is undergoing renovations as part of the Strategic Heritage Plan (SHP). The usual rooms were not available. There are also the ongoing funding issues.
The room used for the 11th session of the OEIGWG was smaller and did not have the same capacity as the 10th session, in 2024. The numbers of people who wanted to attend, were limited and changes were made to the registration process. This resulted in some who wanted to attend, being unable to.
The joint statement on behalf of Change The Law Limited and The Responsible Contracting Project for 16.1., Implementation, was presented.
Links to recordings;
1st Meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1u/k1ulns1or9
2nd Meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1kb5l3uis
3rd meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1b/k1baa85czq
4th meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1z/k1zspjijyk
5th meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1b/k1bo9mov3p
6th meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k14/k14bssvpqx
7th meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1n/k1nnub555j
8th meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k19/k19fenjwhb
Meeting 24 October 2025 with states only, there is no recording available.
9th meeting https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1s/k1s5u0806u
As previously mentioned, I believe some states require the additional support that an NGO can help with. Please contact your Mission in Geneva to see if you can assist.


Links to the documents on the OEIGWG website follow below along with the I have attached the Chair Rapporteurs suggested redrafting of selected provisions (arts. 4 to 11) of the updated draft legally binding instrument. 

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OEIGWG Chair-Rapporteur suggested redrafting of selected provisions (Articles 4 to 11)

of the Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI) to regulate, in international human

rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises,

discussed during the thematic inter-sessional consultations on (April–June 2025)

October 2025

 

This document is conceived as an annex to the summary report on the first, second and third

intersessional thematic consultations towards the 11th session of the Open-ended

Intergovernmental Working Group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises

with respect to human rights.

This document has been prepared by the Chair-Rapporteur of the OEIGWG with the assistance

of the legal experts of the OEIGWG, taking into account the “Methodology of the intersessional

thematic consultations towards the 11th session of the OEIGWG” circulated at the end of the 10th

regular session of the OEIGWG (December 2024), the development of the discussions during the

intersessional thematic consultations in 2025, and the announcement by the Chair-Rapporteur at

the end of the third thematic intersessional consultation.

The document includes: -the current text of the selected provision in the Updated draft Legally

Binding Instrument (LBI); -a background of the relevant selected provisions and the proposals

presented in relation to those provisions; -additional language that could be taken into

consideration, including with legal sources, as appropriate; -the objective of the suggested new

language for the selected provisions; and,

-the new suggested language (in blue colour) with

possible amendments aiming to reflect possible areas of convergence and/or possible solutions

to the divergences identified in the “Updated draft legally binding instrument with the textual

proposals submitted by States during the ninth and tenth session”, and during the intersessional

thematic consultations.

The redrafting of selected provisions was prepared taking into account all the comments and

suggestions from States and the rest of the stakeholders, building on the considerations outlined

above, and taking into account the potential benefits of further streamlining the text, while at the

same time ensuring that the substantive content of both articles is fully preserved and not

diminished or undermined, and bearing in mind that crosscutting issues such as definitions or

scope, will merit particular attention in the course of the discussions on Articles 1 and 3.

As reflected in the aforementioned Methodology, this document is thus presented by the Chair

under his sole responsibility, and the respective proposals with new suggested drafting language

included therein, will not have any legal status, and will not replace the “Updated draft legally

binding instrument with the textual proposals submitted by States during the ninth and tenth

sessions” as the basis for the negotiations. Nevertheless, State delegations and other relevant

stakeholders will be invited to present comments, even of a preliminary character, on the

proposals presented by the Chair-Rapporteur, as the main component of the informal and

interactive discussion foreseen in the programme of work of the 11th session of the OEIGWG.

1List of OEIGWG Chair-Rapporteur suggested redrafting

of selected provisions (Articles 4 to 11)

1. Articles 4.2.e & 5.1:Redraft to align/ensure consistency between the provisions on victim’s

right to protection from intimidation and reprisals (Art 4.2.e) and the corresponding State

duty (Art 5.1).

2. Articles 4.4 & 5.4: Redraft to align and ensure consistency between the provisions on

victim’s right to seek precautionary measures and the corresponding State duty (Art. 5.4).

3. Article 5.3: Redraft the provision on the State duty to investigate business human rights

abuses and to adopt measures against those responsible and its applicable legal

framework.

4. Article 6.1 & 6.2: Redraft the provision on the State duty to adopt measures to prevent

business human rights abuses, ensure respect for human rights, and require due diligence,

and its applicable legal framework.

5. Article 7.2: Redraft the provision on the victim’s accessibility to State agencies or

mechanisms, reduce obstacles and ensure effective remedy.

6. Article 7.3: Redraft to align and ensure consistency between the provision on access to

information and evidence, and Art. 7.2(a).

7. Article 8.1 & 8.2: Redraft the provisions on the general State duty to establish legal liability

(Art. 8.1) and its applicable legal framework (Art. 8.2).

8. Article 8.3: Redraft or consolidate the provisions on the liability of legal and natural persons

to capture different forms of possible business involvement in human rights abuses.

9. Article 8.6 bis:Improve the provisions on ensuring that parent/lead companies are held

accountable for abuses in their value chain (joint and several liability).

10. Article 9.1 & 9.2: Redraft the provisions, including in particular in relation toforum

necessitatis, while adjusting the language to the definition of “domicile” of legal persons and

clarifying other elements of connection (other proposals on Art. 9).

11. Article 9.4:Redraft or introduce a provision related to the potential misuse of forum non

conveniens to avert a denial of justice and clarify the connection factors for jurisdiction.

12. Article 10:Adjust the provisions to clarify terms for the statutes of limitation for certain

human rights abuses, period of time and applicable legal framework.

13. Art. 11.2:Improve the provision on the rule that allows the victim to choose the applicable

substantive law for their claim.

21.- Articles 4.2(e) and 5.1

Current text in the Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 4.2 “Without prejudice to Article 4.1. above, victims shall: … (e) be protected from any

unlawful interference against their privacy, and from intimidation, and reprisals, before, during and

after any proceedings have been instituted, as well as from re-victimization in the course of

proceedings for access to effective, prompt and adequate remedy, including through appropriate

protective and support services that are gender and age responsive;”.

Article 5.1 “States Parties shall protect victims, their representatives, families, and witnesses from

any unlawful interference with their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including prior,

during and after they have instituted any proceedings to seek access to effective, prompt, and

adequate remedy, as well as from re-victimization in the course of these proceedings.”.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Merge both provisions into a single formulation, in order to streamline the text and avoid

an apparent overlap or duplication. Nevertheless, maintaining separate but mirror provisions -

in a way that are explicitly connected to each other- could enhance legal certainty for all

relevant stakeholders concerned, by making their right to protection visible while at the same

time grounding it in the correlative duty of the State. This makes it possible to emphasize that

the rights of victims as set out in all subparagraphs of Art. 4.2 entail a common and positive

obligation on the part of the State (Art. 5) that includes, in this case, protection against

intimidation or reprisals. In this sense, it seems pertinent to streamline the provisions of Art. 5

while ensuring that the specific content of the rights to be protected (Art. 4) is retained.

Whether the term “victims” is the most appropriate expression for Articles 4 and 5, and

more generally for the text of the instrument as a whole, or whether it would be necessary to

employ alternative formulations to meet more precisely the objectives of the LBI. Suggested

alternatives include references to “victims, affected persons and communities” or to “rights

holders”, among others encompassing formulations. This would apply throughout the text and

therefore it was considered more appropriate to address it in a cross-cutting manner in the

article on definitions (Art. 1).

Whether the protection should extend “before” proceedings are instituted. This raises

the issue of when the State’s duty of protection begins. In that sense, texts such as the Basic

Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross

Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International

Humanitarian Law (adopted by consensus through UNGA resolution 60/147) recognizes

protection “before, during and after judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that affect the

interests of victims”.

Reformulation of provisions in a way that maximizes full protection of specific rights, in

an environment that is free from intimidation or reprisals. This would entail consolidating

a language beyond aspects limited to privacy, so as to cover a fuller range of human rights at

stake during such proceedings. It would also entail applying the protection not only to victims

themselves but also to their representatives, families and witnesses, who may also face real

risks in this context.

Additional language or sources that could also be taken into consideration:

Art. 13 CRPD: “Article 13 - Access to justice. States Parties shall ensure effective access to

justice for persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others, including through the

provision of procedural and age-appropriate accommodations, in order to facilitate their

effective role as direct and indirect participants, including as witnesses, in all legal proceedings,

including at investigative and other preliminary stages

.

3“Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to

Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”:

Article12. (…) 2. The State shall take all necessary measures to ensure the protection by the

competent authorities of everyone, individually and in association with others, against any

violence, threats, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure or any other

arbitrary action as a consequence of his or her legitimate exercise of the rights referred to in

the present Declaration”.

HRC resolution 54/24, adopted without a vote, states, among other elements, that the Council:

5. Urges States to take all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of acts of

intimidation or reprisal, whether online or offline, including, where necessary, by adopting and

implementing specific legislation and policies to promote a safe and enabling environment for

engagement with the United Nations on human rights and to effectively protect those who seek

to cooperate, cooperate or have cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and

mechanisms in the field of human rights from any act of intimidation or reprisal”.

General Comment N°3 (CAT/C/GC/3), entitled “Implementation of article 14 by States parties”,

where the Committee Against Torture stated that: “31. The State party should also take

measures to prevent interference with victims’ privacy and to protect victims, their families and

witnesses and others who have intervened on their behalf against intimidation and retaliation

at all times before, during and after judicial, administrative or other proceedings that affect the

interests of victims. Failure to provide protection stands in the way of victims filing complaints

and thereby violates the right to seek and obtain redress and remedy”.

General Comment N°33 (CEDAW/C/GC/33), on “women’s access to justice”, where the

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, stated that: “18. With regard

to the good quality of justice systems, the Committee recommends that States parties:(g)

Protect women complainants, witnesses, defendants and prisoners from threats, harassment

and other forms of harm before, during and after legal proceedings and provide the budgets,

resources, guidelines and monitoring and legislative frameworks necessary to ensure that

protective measures function effectively”.

The same general comment states that “13.The Committee has observed that the

concentration of courts and quasi-judicial bodies in the main cities, their non-availability in rural

and remote regions, the time and money needed to gain access to them, the complexity of

proceedings, the physical barriers for women with disabilities, the lack of access to high-quality,

gender-competent legal advice, including legal aid, as well as the often-noted deficiencies in

the quality of justice systems (e.g., gender-insensitive judgements or decisions owing to a lack

of training, delays and excessive length of proceedings, corruption) all prevent women from

gaining access to justice.” Therefore,“15. With regard to justiciability, the Committee

recommends that States parties: (a) Ensure that rights and correlative legal protections are

recognized and incorporated into the law, improving the gender responsiveness of the justice

system”.

Objective of the suggested new language:

Redraft to align the victim’s right to protection from intimidation and reprisals (Art 4.2.e) with the

corresponding State duty (Art 5.1).

New suggested language:

Article 4.2 “Without prejudice to Article 4.1. above, victims, their representatives, their families and

witnesses, shall:…(e) be protectedfrom any unlawful interference against their human rights and

fundamental freedoms, including against their privacy, and from intimidation and reprisals [or from

any violence, threats, harassment, retaliation, de facto or de jure adverse discrimination, pressure

or any other harm or arbitrary action], [whether online or offline], before, during and after any

administrative, judicial or other proceedings have been instituted, as well as fromre-victimization

4in the course of proceedings to seek for access to effective, prompt and adequate remedy,

including through appropriate protective and support services that take into account their specific

needs, including in a manner that are is responsive to gender and age responsive and disability-

inclusive.

Article 5.1: “States Parties shall protecttake adequate and effective measures to ensure the

protection of victims, their representatives, families and witnesses,from any unlawful interference

with their human rights and fundamental freedoms, including prior, during and after they have

instituted any proceedings to seek access to effective, prompt, and adequate remedy, as well as

from re-victimization in the course of these proceedings and guarantee their human rights and

fundamental freedoms, in line with Article 4”.

2.- Articles 4.4 and 5.4

Current text in the Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 4.4 “Victims shall have the right to request State Parties, pending the resolution of a case,

to adopt precautionary measures related to urgent situations that present a serious risk of or an

ongoing human rights abuse.

Article 5.4 “States Parties, pending the resolution of a case, shall adopt, either ex officio or on

request by the victim, precautionary measures related to urgent situations that present a serious

risk of or an ongoing human rights abuse.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Merge both provision into a single formulation, or relocating the content of both

provisions to Article 4 or to Article 7, bearing in mind that Article 6 refers to preventive

measures to be developed in domestic law in the context of human rights due diligence. In light

of the provisional yet urgent nature of all types of precautionary measures, there appears to be

reasons to retain Articles 4 and 5, without prejudice to the possibility of including -if deemed

appropriate- an explicit reference to Article 7. Such an approach would allow to underscore the

interconnection between the relevant provisions, strengthen legal clarity, avoid unnecessary

duplication, and enhance the overall consistency of the draft LBI as a whole.

Include the expression both‘judicial and non-judicial mechanisms’, bearing in mind the

reference to the expression “pending the resolution of a case”. In line with HRC resolution 17/4

on the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights, it must be noted that the access to remedy

pillar of those Guiding Principles refers to judicial mechanisms, State-based non-judicial

grievance mechanisms and non-State-based grievance mechanisms. In this context,

precautionary measures might be facilitated or adopted as agreed by the parties or

recommended by the respective State-based mechanism, consistent with applicable rules and

without prejudice to the State’s duty to ensure effective protection.

Admit precautionary measures only in situations that present ‘a serious risk of

irreparable’ human rights abuse. The concept of urgent action is intrinsically linked to the

nature and gravity of the potential or actual harm at stake, which may justify the need for the

interim but expedited relief. In this regard, two categories of risks could be identified: risks of

irreparable harm (linked to its nature) and risks of serious harm (linked to its gravity). If both

qualifiers are compounded into the formulation ‘serious risk of irreparable harm’, the threshold

to trigger precautionary measures would become considerably higher, thereby limiting the

number of situations in which such measures could be applied, even when there is a

reasonably foreseeable or plausible risk of either irreparable or serious harm, without prejudice

of the need to ensure reasonable predictability in light of the circumstances. Therefore, a

balanced formulation would be to provide for precautionary measures in situations of either

irreparable or serious harm, without requiring that both qualifiers be compounded, and without

5limiting their application exclusively to ongoing violations. This approach would preserve their

preventive function and ensure their availability whenever there is a plausible risk that grave or

irreparable harm may occur.

Add qualifiers intended to ensure that precautionary measures are available, accessible

and adequate. It could be argued that such qualifiers could serve to specify and underline the

duty of States to guarantee, “in coherence with their domestic legal and administrative

systems”, that these measures are not only formally established but also effectively within the

reach of victims and capable of providing meaningful protection. In addition, consideration

could be given to including a duty of the State to establish ‘injunctive relief by courts’,

‘dedicated institutional or legal frameworks capable at responding promptly and

effectively’ or ‘a rapid response mechanism’, thereby ensuring that States fully comply at

national level with this important duty in an adequate and effective manner. This approach

would preserve consistency and coherence, avoid unnecessary duplication, and ensure that

precautionary measures are effectively supported by appropriate institutional frameworks.

Additional language or sources that could also be taken into consideration:

American Convention on Human Rights: “Article 63 (…) 2. In cases of extreme gravity and

urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court shall adopt

such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With

respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission.”

European Court of Human Rights, Rules of the Court: “Rule 39. Interim measures

1. The Court may, in exceptional circumstances, whether at the request of a party or of any

other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which

it considers should be adopted. Such measures, applicable in cases of imminent risk of

irreparable harm to a Convention right, which, on account of its nature, would not be susceptible

to reparation, restoration or adequate compensation, may be adopted where necessary in the

interests of the parties or the proper conduct of the proceedings.”

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an

African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: “Article 27.2 In case of extreme gravity and

urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Court shall adopt such

provisional measures as it deems necessary.

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment N° 24 (2017) State

obligations in the context of business activities: Para53 “While they generally should not be

seen as a substitute for judicial mechanisms (which often remain indispensable for effective

protection against certain violations of Covenant rights), non-judicial remedies may contribute

to providing effective remedy to victims whose Covenant rights have been violated by business

actors and ensuring accountability for such violations. These alternative mechanisms should

be adequately coordinated with available judicial mechanisms, both in relation to the sanction

and to the compensation for victims.”

Objective of the suggested new language:

Redraft to align and ensure consistency between the provisions on victim’s right to seek

precautionary measures (Art. 4.4) and the corresponding State duty (Art. 5.4).

New suggested language:

Article 4.4 “Victims shall have the right to request State Parties, pending the resolution of a case,

including through judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, to adopt precautionary measures related

to urgent situations that present a serious risk of to avoid possible irreparable or serious harm, or

to cease an ongoinghuman rights abuse.

Article 5.4 “States Parties, pending the resolution of a case, shall adopt either ex officio or on

request by the victims, the precautionary measures related to urgent situations that present a

6serious risk of or an ongoing human rights abusereferred to in Article 4.4 and shall ensure that

such measures are available, accessible and adequate, including, as appropriate, through the

establishment of rapid response mechanisms as provided for in Article 16.

3.- Article 5.3

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 5.3 “States Parties shall investigate human rights abuses covered under this (Legally

Binding Instrument), effectively, promptly, thoroughly, and impartially, and where appropriate, take

action against those natural or legal persons responsible, in accordance with domestic and

international law.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

To what extent this provision should be anchored primarily in international human rights

law, and whether it should also explicitly reflect domestic legal frameworks, regarding

the State’s duty to investigate and take action. It should be noted that references to domestic

legislation might have value in specifying how international obligations are to be implemented

in light of different legal traditions and systems. In this respect, it would be preferable to frame

the provision primarily within the obligations arising from international human rights law,

particularly the duty of States to exercise due diligence when any actor, including State and

non-State actors, natural or legal person, could cause actual or potential human rights abuse,

while retaining references to the respective domestic legal framework insofar as they help to

guarantee its implementation, provided that they align and remain consistent with the

international obligations of the State.

Strengthening of national capacities for the implementation of measures of investigation

and sanction of human rights abuses. This element appears to constitute a valuable

complement to the State duty of due diligence, particularly in cases where preventive measures

have failed. Therefore, a reference to the strengthening of national capacities in this context

would be advisable, but it could be better addressed within the framework of Article 16 on

implementation.

Whether to include qualifiers that specify the manner in which investigations are to be

carried out, it is important to note that existing international standards normally refer to

investigations being conducted effectively, promptly, thoroughly and impartially, and within a

reasonable time. The inclusion of these qualifiers in the draft would therefore enhance legal

clarity and certainty, provide alignment with established standards, and contribute to

strengthening the overall level of protection afforded by the whole instrument.

Additional language or sources that could also be taken into consideration:

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment:

Article 12.Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt

and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture

has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.”

UNGA resolution 60/147, entitled Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy

and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious

Violations of International Humanitarian Law: “3. (…) (b)Investigate violations effectively,

promptly, thoroughly and impartially and, where appropriate, take action against those allegedly

responsible in accordance with domestic and international law”.

Committee against Torture’s General Comment N° 3 (2012), CAT/C/GC/3: “23.According to

article 12, States parties shall undertake prompt, effective and impartial investigations,

wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been committed in

7any territory under its jurisdiction as the result of its actions or omissions and, CAT/C/GC/3:6

as set out in article 13 and affirmed by the Committee in its general comment No. 2, ensure

that impartial and effective complaints mechanisms are established.”

Updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to

combat impunity (2005), contained in E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1: “Principle 19. Duties Of States

with regard to the Administration of Justice. States shall undertake prompt, thorough,

independent and impartial investigations of violations of human rights and international

humanitarian law and take appropriate measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in

the area of criminal justice, by ensuring that those responsible for serious crimes under

international law are prosecuted, tried and duly punished.”

Objective of the suggested new language:

Redraft and clarify the provision on the State duty to investigate business human rights abuses

and to adopt measures against those responsible and its applicable legal framework.

New suggested language:

Article 5.3 “States Parties shall investigate human rights abuses covered under this (Legally

Binding Instrument) effectively, promptly, thoroughly,and impartially and within a reasonable time,

and, whereappropriate, take action against those responsible, whether natural or legal persons

responsible,.Such investigations and actions shall be carried out in accordance with the State’s

domestic andlegal framework, in a manner consistent with the State’s international human rights

law obligations.

4.- Articles 6.1 and 6.2

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 6.1 “States Parties shall regulate effectively the activities of all business enterprises within

their territory, jurisdiction, or otherwise under their control, including transnational corporations

and other business enterprises that undertake activities of a transnational character.

Article 6.2 “State Parties shall adopt appropriate legislative, regulatory, and other measures to:

(a) prevent the involvement of business enterprises in human rights abuse;

(b) ensure respect by business enterprises for internationally recognized human rights and

fundamental freedoms;

(c) ensure the practice of human rights due diligence by business enterprises; and,

(d) promote the active and meaningful participation of individuals and groups, such as trade

unions, civil society, non-governmental organizations, indigenous peoples and community-

based organizations, in the development and implementation of laws, policies and other

measures to prevent the involvement of business enterprises in human rights abuse.”

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Whether additional language to adjust Article 6.1 is necessary, the proposal seeks to

specify the reach of legislative, regulatory and other measures to ensure due diligence by

business entities. Therefore, regarding the expression “otherwise under their control”, one

option considered was to frame it in terms of a close nexus between a business entity and a

State, for instance in the case of State-owned or State-controlled enterprises, with a

corresponding duty on the State to take measures in that regard. At the same time, it is noted

that questions of jurisdiction and questions of ownership or control of enterprises, while related,

are to be understood as distinct. It is also observed that matters concerning the overall scope

of the instrument -including how to frame the categories of enterprises covered- are more

appropriately examined in the context of article 1 on definitions and article 3 on scope. In

addition, delegations may wish to reflect on the relationship between article 6.1 and article 6.2,

8including whether article 6.1 should remain a general provision, with article 6.2 giving further

development to its content.

Whether additional language to adjust the chapeau of Article 6.2 is necessary, it is

important to avoid duplicating the content of provisions already contained in article 6.2(a) and

(b), which specifically address prevention and respect. The expression “other measures” in the

chapeau may reasonably be interpreted as covering policy measures, although there are merits

in maintaining the expression “legal and policy measures” which could be understood as

encompassing all possible measures to be taken by the State. Furthermore, under international

human rights law, the State duty to protect is generally understood as an obligation of conduct

rather than of result. Also, it should also be noted that article 6.2 concerns the regulation of

business enterprises, an area generally regarded as subject to obligations of immediate effect.

Therefore, introducing language on progressive implementation or conditioning obligations on

institutional resources may therefore generate ambiguity and legal uncertainty, especially as

no “minimum core” has been defined in this context.

On the proposal to replace “shall” with “should” in the chapeau of Article 6.2. The use

of “shall” establishes a clear and binding obligation of States, aligning the provision with existing

duties under international law. By contrast, replacing it with “should” would transform the

provision into a form of non-binding guidance or recommendation, reducing its normative

strength. Such a change could weaken the coherence of the instrument and risk lowering the

level of protection expected. Also, Guiding Principle 1 reflects the following established duty:

States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or jurisdiction by third

parties, including business enterprises. This requires taking appropriate steps to prevent,

investigate, punish and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations

and adjudication”.

Maintain or reformulate the reference to “internationally recognized” rights in Articles

6.2(b). Without prejudice of further consideration in the future, one option is to retain the

reference, as it stands to provide a useful point of orientation. Other alternative would be to

replace it with expressions such as “in conformity with the obligations of the State Party under

international law”, or through a more elaborated formulation referring, at least, to treaties to

which the State is party and to customary international law. Other options such referring to

“general principles of law”, “general international law”, “treaties to which the State is Party”

“domestic law of the State” or “customary international law”, or a more general reference such

as “human rights” and/or “fundamental freedoms” are still to be carefully considered, to the

extent possible, always with a view to reflect more accurately existing duties. As this question

applies throughout the text, it is considered more appropriate to address it in a cross-cutting

manner when addressing article 1 on definitions. Notwithstanding, for the purposes of the

current suggestion it would seem appropriate to use the expression “respect … for international

human rights law”, which is an expression used in HRC resolution 26/9.

Whether it is necessary to add language clarifying the nature and scope of human rights

due diligence referred to in Article 6.2(c). This element was addressed in the chapeau of

article 6.4, which refers to “legally enforceable requirements”. While the drafting of that

chapeau may benefit from further clarification, the principle itself is also reflected in the text.

Regarding other measures States may adopt to prevent business involvement in human rights

abuse, it was stressed during the informal thematic consultations that article 6.2 is not confined

to due diligence measures, and that the chapeau of article 6.4 expressly refers to “measures

to achieve the ends referred to in article 6.2”, which includes both due diligence and other forms

of prevention, not as a mere procedural formality, but a meaningful process that protects

stakeholders from adverse human rights impacts linked to business activities. In this regard

and in the light of recent State practices on corporate sustainability due diligence legislation,

as well as with advisory opinions by international courts, it was considered necessary to

incorporate an environmental dimension to the measures referred to in Article 6, in order to

9align its future implementation to the practice, recent legal developments and opinions

mentioned above, and most importantly to achieve the purposes of prevention of future

corporate human rights abuse.

Additional language or sources that could also be taken into consideration:

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 25 “Every citizen shall have

the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without

unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through

freely chosen representatives;”.

Human Rights Committee, General Comment N° 31 (2004), on “The Nature of the general legal

obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant”, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13: “8. The

article 2, paragraph 1, obligations are binding on States and do not, as such, have direct

horizontal effect as a matter of international law. The Covenant cannot be viewed as a

substitute for domestic criminal or civil law. However the positive obligations on States Parties

to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State,

not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by

private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they

are amenable to application between private persons or entities. There may be circumstances

in which a failure to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to violations

by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to take

appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress

the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.”

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment N° 24 (2017) on State

obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the

context of business activities, E/C.12/GC/24: “14. The obligation to protect means that States

parties must prevent effectively infringements of economic, social and cultural rights in the

context of business activities. This requires that States parties adopt legislative, administrative,

educational and other appropriate measures, to ensure effective protection against Covenant

rights violations linked to business activities, and that they provide victims of such corporate

abuses with access to effective remedies.” “16. The obligation to protect entails a positive duty

to adopt a legal framework requiring business entities to exercise human rights due diligence

in order to identify, prevent and mitigate the risks of violations of Covenant rights, to avoid such

rights being abused, and to account for the negative impacts caused or contributed to by their

decisions and operations and those of entities they control on the enjoyment of Covenant

rights. States should adopt measures such as imposing due diligence requirements to prevent

abuses of Covenant rights in a business entity’s supply chain and by subcontractors, suppliers,

franchisees, or other business partners.

Objective of the suggested new language:

Redraft and clarify the provision on the State duty to adopt measures to prevent business human

rights abuses, ensure respect for human rights, and require due diligence, and its applicable legal

framework.

New suggested language:

Article 6.1 “States Parties shall regulate, in accordance with international human rights law, the

activities of all transnational corporations and other business enterpriseswithin their territory,

jurisdiction, or otherwise under their control, whether those activities are carried out domestically

or abroad including transnational corporations and other business enterprises that undertake

activities of a transnational character.

Article 6.2 “For the purposes of Article 6.1, State Parties shall take appropriate legislative and

adopt appropriate legislative, regulatory, and othermeasures to:

(a) prevent the involvement of transnational corporations and other business enterprises in

10human rights abuse;

(b) ensure respect by transnational corporations and other business enterprises for

internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, as reflected in treaties

to which the State is a Party, in customary international law, in the general principles of law,

and in the domestic law of the State Party;

(c) require ensure that transnational corporations and other business enterprises undertake the

practice of human rights due diligence, including in relation to the protection of the

environmentby business enterprises;

(d) promote ensure the active and meaningful participation of individuals and groups, such as

including inter alia, human rights defenders, Indigenous Peoples, trade unions, civil society,

non-governmental organizations, indigenous peoples and community-based organizations,

in the development and implementation of laws, policies and other measures to prevent the

involvement of business enterprises in human rights abuse.”

5.- Article 7.2

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 7.2 “State Parties shall, consistent with its domestic legal and administrative systems:

(a) develop and implement effective policies to promote the accessibility of its relevant State

agencies to victims and their representatives, taking into account the particular needs and

interests of those victims who may be at risk of vulnerability or marginalization;

(b) progressively reduce the legal, practical, and other relevant obstacles that, individually or in

combination, hinder the ability of a victim from accessing such State agencies for the

purposes of seeking an effective remedy; and

(c) ensure that relevant State agencies can either deliver, or contribute to the delivery of,

effective remedies.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Whether the draft should retain language enabling courts to allow proceedings in

appropriate cases. It should be considered that this issue is closely connected to judicial

competence. From that perspective, it may be considered whether the more suitable placement

of such language would be under Article 9, which deals specifically with jurisdiction.

Whether Article 7.2 should be expanded to ensure that domestic laws and court

proceedings facilitate access to information from States and corporate entities,

including disclosure of finances, relations and other relevant data, as well as the

admissibility of broader categories of evidence. It has been noted that access to such

information is often indispensable for effective remedies, particularly in relation to corporate

groups and supply chains. Nevertheless, it was considered that such specific element of

access to remedy was more suitable to be addressed in Article 7.3.

Whether article 7.2(c) should contain an explicit reference to the need to guarantee the

availability of mechanisms and remedies following the determination of legal liability

under article 8. It is recalled that international and regional human rights law recognize the

right to an effective remedy as encompassing not only the possibility of reparation once liability

has been established but also access to judicial and administrative mechanisms in broader

terms.

Additional language or sources that could also be taken into consideration:

General Assembly Resolution 60/147, A/RES/60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the

Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human

Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law “VIII. Access to justice.

12. A victim of a gross violation of international human rights law or of a serious violation of

11international humanitarian law shall have equal access to an effective judicial remedy as

provided for under international law.”

Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Redraft the provision on the victim’s accessibility to State agencies, with a view to reduce

obstacles and ensure effective remedy.

New suggested language:

Article 7.2 “State Parties shall, consistent with its domestic legal principles and administrative

systems:

(a) develop and implement effective policieslegislative or other measures to promoteensure

the accessibility of its relevant judicial and not judicial mechanisms State agencies to victims

of human rights abuses in the context of business activities and their representatives, taking

into account the particular needs and interests of those victims who may be at risk of

vulnerability or marginalization;

(b) progressively reduce remove the legal, practical, and other relevant obstacles that,

individually or in combination, hinder the ability of a victim from accessing such judicial and

non-judicial mechanismsState agencies for the purposes of seeking an effective remedy;

and

ensure that relevant judicial and non-judicial mechanismsState agencies can either deliver,

or contribute to the delivery of, effective remedyies.

(c) 6.

- Article 7.3

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 7.3 “The policies referred to in Article 7.2 (a) shall address to the extent applicable to the

State agency in question:

(a) the need to ensure that procedures and facilities for accessing and interacting with such

agencies are responsive to the needs of the people for whose use they are intended,

including by providing appropriate, adequate, and effective legal aid throughout the legal

process;

(b) the need to ensure that victims have ready access to reliable sources of information, in

relevant languages and accessible formats to adults and children alike, including those

with disabilities, for victims and their representatives, about their human rights, the role

and capacity of relevant State agencies in relation to helping victims obtain an effective

remedy, the status of their claims, and appropriate support to enable them to participate

effectively in all relevant processes, including by facilitating requests for disclosure of

relevant information of business-related activities or relationships linked to a human rights

abuse;

(c) the implications in terms of access to remedy of imbalances of power as between

victims and business enterprises; and

(d) risks of reprisals against victims and others.”

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Whether article 7.3(a) should retain references to the provision of legal aid throughout

the legal process. On that element, it has been noted that such provision is to be understood

in the light of the general State-duty to ensure human rights. In some circumstances, legal aid

is necessary to guarantee that victims of corporate human rights abuses are able to obtain an

effective remedy. In this regard, it should be noted that the removal of such a reference might

run against existing obligations under international and regional human rights law.

Whether article 7.3(b) should maintain references to the facilitation of requests for

disclosure of relevant information concerning business involvement with human rights

abuses. It is important to note that mandated disclosure of business-related information may

12raise challenges, including potential inconsistency with judicial guarantees, presumption of

innocence, and due process, as well as divergences across legal systems and traditions.

Nevertheless, it is also recognized that access to information is a key element of the right to an

effective remedy, particularly in judicial and administrative proceedings.

Whether the qualifier “effective” should be removed from the concept of remedy. It is

recalled that since the very adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right to

remedy has been consistently characterized by its effectiveness. This interpretation has been

reaffirmed throughout subsequent international instruments, UN treaty bodies and regional

courts decisions.

Whether article 7.3(c) should be retained. It is noted that the draft already contains several

provisions aimed at addressing specific imbalances between victims and business enterprises

in both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. States may therefore wish to consider if it is

necessary to retain such an open reference in this paragraph. On whether article 7.3(d) should

be maintained, it is recalled that Articles 4.2(e), 5.2 and 7.4(c) of the Updated draft LBI already

stipulate measures to protect victims from reprisals before, during and after proceedings.

Introduce a subparagraph (bis) under Article 7.3, stipulating the removal of legal

obstacles, including forum non conveniens. In this regard, it is recalled that this doctrine

has often been considered an obstacle to access to remedy, given its cost, complexity and the

imbalance between victims and companies. Forum non conveniens decisions may deprive

victims of access to home State courts where effective remedy may be more accessible, and

conversely expose them to obstacles in host State courts. At the same time, regulation of forum

non conveniens naturally falls under Article 9 on adjudicatory jurisdiction, with Article 9(3) of

the current draft already addressing this issue. Finally, with regard to other suggested language

on the removal of legal obstacles, such a reference was introduced in Article 7.2.

Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Redraft to align/ensure consistency between the provision on access to information and evidence,

and Art. 7.2(a).

New suggested language:

Article 7.3 “The policies and measures referred to in Article 7.2 (a) shall address to the extent

applicable to the State agency mechanism in question:

(a) the need to ensure that procedures and facilities for accessing and interacting with such

judicial and non-judicial mechanisms agencies are responsive to the needs of the people

for whose use they are intended, including by providing appropriate, adequate, and

effective legal aid throughout the legal process;

(b) the need to ensure that victims and their representatives have ready access to reliable

sources of information, in relevant languages and accessible and gender-responsive

formats to adults and children alike, including those with disabilities, for victims and their

representatives, about their human rights, the role and capacity of relevant judicial and

non-judicial mechanisms State agencies in relation to helping victims obtain an effective

remedy, including in relation to the status of their claims, and appropriate support to

enable them to participate effectively in all relevant processes, including by facilitating

requests for disclosure of relevant information of business-related activities or

relationships linked to a human rights abuse;

(c) the implications in terms of access to remedy of imbalances of power as between

victims and business enterprises; and

(d) risks of reprisals against victims and others.”

137.

- Article 8.1 & 8.2

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 8.1.

Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish a

comprehensive and adequate system of legal liability of legal and natural persons conducting

business activities, within their territory, jurisdiction, or otherwise under their control, for human

rights abuses that may arise from their business activities or relationships, including those of

transnational character.

Article 8.2.

Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal and natural

persons referred to in this Article shall be criminal, civil, or administrative, as appropriate to the

circumstances. Each State Party shall ensure, consistent with its domestic legal and

administrative systems, that the type of liability established under this article shall be:

(a) responsive to the needs of victims as regards remedy; and

(b) commensurate to the gravity of the human rights abuse.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Whether to include a reference to “joint and several liability”. Paragraph 8.1 establishes

a general obligation for States to ensure an adequate system of legal liability, while paragraph

8.3(b) provides further detail on the matter. Introducing an explicit reference to “joint and several

liability” could enhance clarity in situations involving multiple entities, and therefore, it may be

advisable to include a cross-reference in that subparagraph. Similarly, and also with a view to

ensuring legal certainty in the interpretation of the future instrument, it may be appropriate to

consider an explicit reference to liability arising from “actions or omissions” or from “business

relationships”, even if such elements could arguably already be understood as encompassed

within the general duty set out in paragraph 8.1.

Limiting applicability to business enterprises incorporated within the State Party’s

jurisdiction. This proposal is closely related to the scope and therefore should be addressed

in article 3. Nevertheless, it may be useful to retain the expression “transnational corporations

and other business enterprises”, in line with the terminology employed in Human Rights Council

resolution 26/9. Restricting liability to incorporated entities would narrow the duty of States in

a manner inconsistent with international human rights law, which requires States to respect

and ensure the rights of all persons “within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction”

[ICCPR, Art. 2.1; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (2004), para. 10]. In

practice, irrespective of whether an entity is incorporated domestically or abroad, its operations

within the State’s territory fall under the jurisdiction of that State. Furthermore, many domestic

legal systems already require foreign companies to establish a local entity to be able to operate.

Such a limitation may therefore risk not only contradicting existing obligations but also

complicating the legal framework without adding clarity. It is also pertinent to recall that Article

11 addresses the implementation of liability regimes in domestic law, which may adequately

accommodate such concerns.

Add a reference to consistency with domestic legal and administrative systems. While

coherence with domestic frameworks is important for implementation, it is necessary to

consider whether such language might reduce the ability of the treaty to establish common

standards of liability across States Parties, thereby weakening one of its objectives of level the

playing field in the human rights-business interactions.

Remove “control” as a basis for jurisdiction. The notion of control is established in

international law, including in milestone judicial decisions of international tribunals, advisory

opinions of the ICJ and in decisions, reports or recommendations of the ILC. Within the scope

of this treaty, the concept may be especially relevant in relation to State-owned or State-

controlled enterprises, although it could also have implications regarding State responsibility

and immunity. Removing the reference could therefore limit the capacity of the instrument to

14address certain situations of transnational concern. Relevant guidance can be found in the UN

Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011), the OECD Guidelines on Corporate

Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (2024), the ILC Draft Principles on the Protection of

the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict (2022), and the ILC Articles on State

Responsibility (2001). Nevertheless, a provision could be inserted in Article 14 to ensure that

references to control, in the sense of State-owned or State-controlled enterprises, are

consistent with different aspects of State responsibility and State immunity under international

human rights law and general international law.

Replace “may” with “shall” in the chapeau of Article 8.2. A rigid formulation could

undermine recognition of the diversity of domestic approaches regarding the liability of legal

persons, particularly in the criminal sphere. Several international instruments expressly

condition this matter to the legal principles of each State. The way forward could be to preserve

a degree of flexibility, maintaining the obligation of States to establish a liability system, but at

the same time allowing them to determine the forms of liability in accordance with their own

legal principles, while maintaining consistency with relevant instruments such as the Optional

Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2000), Article 3.4; the Draft Articles on

Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity (2019), Article 6.8; and the United

Nations Convention against Corruption (2004), Article 26.1–2.

Substituting the reference to “legal principles” with “legal systems”. The expression

“legal systems” may be understood as encompassing rules, institutions and procedures, while

the term “legal principles” refers to the general legal norms that underpin the domestic

framework. Since this provision addresses the modalities of liability recognized by States, the

use of “legal principles” appears more precise and more consistent with international legal

practice, as reflected in a number of instruments, i.e. the Optional Protocol to the Convention

on the Rights of the Child (2000), Article 3.4; the Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment

of Crimes Against Humanity (2019), Article 6.8; the United Nations Convention against

Corruption (2004), Article 26.1–2; and the United Nations Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime (2000), Article 10.

Additional language or sources that could also be taken into consideration:

Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment N° 24 (2017) on State

obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the

context of business activities: “49. Ensuring corporate accountability for violations of Covenant

rights requires reliance on various tools. The most serious violations of the Covenant should

give rise to criminal liability of corporations and/or of the individuals responsible. Prosecuting

authorities may have to be made aware of their role in upholding Covenant rights. Victims of

violations of Covenant rights should have access to reparations where Covenant rights are at

stake and whether or not criminal liability is engaged

.

UN Convention Against Corruption, adopted by the General Assembly in 2003, by resolution

58/4: “Article 26. Liability of legal persons. 1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as

may be necessary, consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons

for participation in the offences established in accordance with this Convention. 2. Subject to

the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal persons may be criminal, civil or

administrative. 3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural

persons who have committed the offences. 4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that

legal persons held liable in accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate

and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.”

Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Redraft the provisions on the general State duty to establish legal liability (Art. 8.1) and its

applicable legal framework (Art. 8.2), in a manner that preserves a degree of flexibility, allowing

15States to determine the forms of liability in accordance with their own legal traditions, while

maintaining consistency with relevant instruments.

New suggested language:

Article 8.1.

Each State Party shall take effective legislative and other adopt such measures as

may be necessary to establish a comprehensive and adequate system of legal liability ofnatural

and legal persons conducting business activities within their territory, jurisdiction or otherwise

under their control, for human rights abuses and violations that may arise from their own actions

or omissions in the context of their business activities or business relationships, including those

of transnational character.

Article 8.2.

Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal and natural

persons referred to in this Article may shall be criminal, civiloradministrative, as appropriate to

the circumstances. Each State Party shall ensure, consistent with its domestic legal and

administrative systems, that the type of liability established under this article shall be:

(a) responsive to the needs of victims as regards remedy; and

(b) commensurate to the gravity of the human rights abuse.

8.

- Article 8.3

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (Updated LBI):

Article 8.3 “Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal and natural persons

shall be established for:

(a) conspiring to commit human rights abuse; and

(b) aiding, abetting, facilitating, and counselling the commission of human rights abuse.”

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Capture in the chapeau of Article 8.3 situations where two or more entities contribute to

human rights abuses. An overly rigid language could hinder domestic implementation, while

overly broad terms may create legal uncertainty. Therefore, a possible way forward could be to

use language that preserves flexibility for domestic translation in accordance with national legal

principles, while clarifying the specificities of civil, administrative and criminal liability, so that

different forms of direct and indirect involvement can be adequately covered.

Focus on sanctions for causing or contributing to human rights abuses. While deterrent

sanctions are important, it must be recalled that article 8.6 already addresses this matter.

Therefore, a solution could be to ensure coherence by avoiding duplication, while considering

whether it is useful to differentiate between sanctions for causing abuses and those for

contributing to them. With respect to the idea of adding a list of examples, there could be

reasons to prefer an open-ended approach that helps maintaining better legal certainty and

flexibility across legal systems.

Other language proposals on subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 8.3. With regard to some

of the proposals, it was considered favourably to adjust certain terminology, given that terms

such as “conspiracy”, “aiding” and “abetting” are rooted in criminal law and may not be easily

adaptable to civil or administrative contexts, and could duplicate language already found in

articles 8.1 and 8.2. A more effective approach would be to employ broader language that

captures the different ways in which business enterprises may be involved in human rights

abuses, leaving to each State, to determine, according with its legal principles, how liability

should be established in cases of causation and contribution. Furthermore, the language

presented would be more closely aligned with international standards and practices in the field

of business and human rights.

16Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Redraft or consolidate the provisions on the liability of legal and natural persons to capture

different forms of possible business involvement in human rights abuses.

New suggested language:

Article 8.3 “Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal and natural persons

referred to in Article 8.1 above, shall be established for:

(a) acts or omissions causing conspiring to commit human rights abusesor violations abuse;

or and

(b) contributing toaiding, abetting, facilitating, and counselling the commission of human

rights abuses or violations, resulting from actions or omissions that, in combination with the

activities of other legal or natural persons, cause an adverse human rights impact, or

substantially influence another legal or natural person to cause an adverse human rights

impact;”

9.

- Article 8.6 bis

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (Updated LBI):

Article 8.6: “Each State Party shall ensure that legal and natural persons held in accordance with

this Article shall be subject to effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties or other

sanctions”.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Addition of new provisions as Article 8.6.bis introducing elements related to joint and

several responsibilities with the following text: “All companies involved in human rights

abuse or violation, whether a subsidiary, a parent company, or any other business along

the value chain, shall be jointly and several responsible for human rights abuses or

violations in which they are involved”.As it was mentioned in the non-paper, this proposal,

as drafted, may be challenged on the basis of certain principles of tort law in which liability

depends on the causative nexus between human rights abuse and wrongful performance or

non-performance of functions and responsibilities assigned to particular corporate entities.

Nevertheless, a possible solution could be redrafting the proposal in that complements the

revised version of Article 8.3.b, in the sense that whenever there is a situation of human rights

abuses (or violations), both entities, the parent company or any other business along the value

chain (subsidiary, contractor or supplier) shall bear joint and several liability, unless the parent

company is able to demonstrate that it took adequate preventive measures. In this regard, the

provision focuses on legal certainty, and could be understood to complement article 6.5, which

integrates a duty of parent companies to take measures in relation to third parties with whom

a leal relationship exists (or has existed). It also builds upon recent legislative and judicial

experiences that set forth the duty of parent companies to engage proactively with its corporate

group and suppliers to prevent foreseeable harm.

Other proposals of additional provisions as Article 8.6ter, quarter, and quinquies

introducing references or elements related to direct or indirect causation or contribution

to human rights abuses or violations; the rule of exhaustion of local remedies where

adequate or effective remedies are unavailable at that level; and the recognition that

human rights due diligence does not automatically absolve the liability of a legal or

natural person for causing or contributing to human rights abuses or violations. These

proposals, among others, were properly and individually addressed in the Non-paper circulated

for the second intersessional thematic consultation towards the 11th session of the OEIGWG,

with a suggestion of reconsideration of the convenience of introducing such references in this

article without changing its focus on the establishment of legal liability.

17Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Improve the provisions on ensuring that hold parent/lead companies are held accountable for

abuses in their value chain (joint and several liability).

New suggested language:

Article 8.6.bis: “State Parties shall take all effective legislative and other measures to ensure that

their domestic law provides for the joint and several liability of business enterprises for the failure

to take adequate measures to prevent foreseeable human rights abuses that were caused or

contributed to by actions and/or omissions of legal or natural persons with whom they have a

business relationship”.

10.

- Articles 9.1 and 9.2:

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (Updated LBI):

Article 9.1. “State Parties shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction in respect of human rights abuse in cases where:

(a) the human rights abuse took place, in whole or in part, within the territory or jurisdiction of that

State Party;

(b) the relevant harm was sustained, in whole or in part, within the territory or jurisdiction of that

State Party;

(c) the human rights abuse was carried out by either

i. a legal person domiciled in the territory or jurisdiction of that State Party; or

ii. a natural person who is a national of, or who has his or her habitual residence in the

territory or jurisdiction of, that State Party; and

(d) a victim seeking remedy through civil law proceedings is a national of, or has his or her

habitual residence in the territory or jurisdiction of, that State Party.”

Article 9.2. “For the purposes of Article 9.1, a legal person is considered domiciled in any territory

or jurisdiction in which it has its:

(a) place of incorporation or registration;

(b) principal assets or operations;

(c) central administration or management; or

(d) principal place of business or activity.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Whether in Article 9.1(a) the phrase “where the human rights abuse took place” should

be clarified to avoid ambiguity in multi-actor settings, particularly where one actor’s

omission contributes to another actor’s wrongful act. While the forum of the direct

perpetrator’s act or omission is clear, the current wording may be improved to encompass the

forum where either the principal perpetrator acted or a contributing entity failed to act, especially

given the breadth of Article 1.3.

Delete “relevant” before “harm” in Article 9.1(b). With regard to this proposal, it was

observed that removing the qualifier would not change the substance, as the determination of

what constitutes “the harm” will in any event be made by the adjudicating authority applying the

jurisdictional rule.

Article 9.1(c) should refer to conduct “carried out by” or to harm “caused or contributed

to by,”. It was noted that the current wording may be read as requiring affirmative conduct and

not omissions, while in practice, parent companies or entities higher place in supply chains

may contribute to harm through failures to take reasonable preventive measures—an omission

central to Articles 6 and 8 and to human rights due diligence under the UNGPs.

18Allow victims and their families to choose to bring claims, irrespective of nationality or

domicile, before courts where the harm occurred or produced effects, where a

contributing act or omission occurred, where the perpetrator is domiciled, or where the

victim is a national or domiciled. This proposal was not considered favourably taking into

account the significant expansion of the scope of the Legally Binding Instrument allowing a

victim who is national or habitual resident of a State Party to commence proceedings in any

State Party, even where the forum State has no connection to the parties or the dispute and

where justice can be obtained in the courts closely connected to the case, contradicting

therefore the rationale of forum necessitatis.

Reintroducing in Article 9, a provision for jurisdiction over co-defendants. Such a

provision was contained in a previous version of the Legally Binding Instrument but was

removed not due to fundamental disagreement among the negotiating States, but because it

was considered unnecessary in light of the broad jurisdictional bases contained in that version

of the LBI. However, since the revised version of Article 9.1 is making that jurisdictional bases

more precise, and taking into account that business enterprises alleged to have committed

human rights abuses are often complex transnational entities whose constituent members are

closely connected by bonds of ownership and/or contracts but retain separate legal

personalities and liabilities, it was considered appropriate to reintroduce this rule in a new

paragraph under Article 9.1.

Whether article 9.2 should refer to domicile “without prejudice to any broader definition

provided in any international instrument,”. As mentioned both in the non-paper and during

the intersessional consultations, cross-referencing any broader definition of domicile,

irrespective of instrument purpose, risks undermining the coherence of the instrument. Article

14.3 already preserves the application of more favourable provisions. Defining domicile for

natural persons conducting business activities could add value only if domicile operates as a

connecting factor elsewhere in article 9.1, which is presently not the case, as nationality and

habitual residence are used instead.

Adding “principal or subsidiary” before “place of incorporation or registration,” and “or

subsidiary” before “assets or operations,” “administration or management,” and “place

of business or activity,”. As mentioned in the non-paper circulated before the third

intersessional thematic consultations towards the 11th session of the OEIGWG, the proposed

additions could create legal uncertainty and significantly expand Article 9.2. Incorporation

ordinarily occurs in a single State, while registration can occur in multiple States. Similar

principal/subsidiary qualifiers across assets, operations, administration, and places of business

would require careful definition to avoid unintended breadth.

Delete article 9.2(b), which refers to the place of “principal assets or operations,”. It was

noted that the place of “principal assets” and “principal operations” are distinct connecting

factors. Jurisdiction based solely on the presence of assets is controversial and has been

treated as exorbitant in certain regional contexts when unrelated to the dispute. At the same

time, some States seek asset-based connections to address concerns about corporate

structures that silo assets away from operating jurisdictions, potentially frustrating enforcement.

An alternative response could be to strengthen recognition and enforcement provisions, as

contemplated in earlier drafts, rather than to establish such a broad general asset-based

jurisdiction. With respect to “principal operations,” States may also wish to consider its overlap

with “principal place of business or activity” in article 9.2(d), and the comparative tendency to

treat branch operations as a basis for special, not general, jurisdiction.

Delete article 9.2(c). Regarding this proposal it was observed that defining a legal person’s

domicile by reference to “central administration or management” is widely used and reflected

in multiple instruments as an accepted connecting factor, and therefore, it was retained for

clarity and alignment with comparative practice.

19Add “on a regular basis” after “principal place of business or activity” in article 9.2(d).

The concept of a principal place of business or activity already presupposes regularity, and

therefore, it was considered that the addition would not alter the substance.

Additional language or sources that could also be taken into consideration:

The 2019 Hague Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil

or commercial matters, which bases its rule of indirect general jurisdiction on the habitual

residence of legal and natural persons. Article 3 Definitions 2.: “An entity or person other than

a natural person shall be considered to be habitually resident in the State – (a) where it has its

statutory seat; (b) under the law of which it was incorporated or formed; (c) where it has its

central administration; or (d) where it has its principal place of business

.

The EU Brussels I bis Regulation (N° 1215/2012) on jurisdiction and the recognition and

enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Article 8(1): “A person domiciled in

a Member State may also be sued: (1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts

for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected

that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable

judgments resulting from separate proceedings”.

International Law Association Resolution N° 2/2012: International Litigation and the Interest of

the Public adopting the Sofia Guidelines on Best Practices for International Civil Litigation for

Human Rights Violations: “2. International Jurisdiction Defendant’s domicile 2.1(1) The courts

of the State where the defendant is domiciled shall have jurisdiction. 2.1(2) Domicile in the

sense of paragraph 2.1(1) refers to: (a) for a natural person, her or his habitual residence; (b)

for a legal person, either the place where (i) it has its statutory seat or is incorporated (or under

the law of which it was formed; or (ii) it has its central administration; or (iii) its business, or

other professional activity, is principally carried on. 2.2 Connected claims 2.2(1) The courts of

the State where one of a number of defendants is domiciled shall have jurisdiction over all of

the defendants in respect of closely connected claims. 2.2(2) Claims are closely connected in

the sense of paragraph 2.2(1) if: (a) it is efficient to hear and determine them together; and (b)

the defendants are related. 2.2(3) Defendants are related in the sense of paragraph 2.2(2)(b),

in particular if at the time the cause of action arose: (a) they formed part of the same corporate

group; (b) one defendant controlled another defendant; (c) one defendant directed the litigious

acts of another defendant; or (d) they took part in a concerted manner in the activity giving rise

to the cause of action

.

Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Redraft the provisions Art. 9.1 and 9.2 in a manner that ensures the implementation of the doctrine

of forum necessitatis (Art. 9.1) while adjusting the language to the definition of “domicile” of legal

persons (Art. 9.2) and clarifying other elements of connection (other proposals on Art. 9).

New suggested language:

Article 9.1. “State Parties shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its

jurisdiction in respect of human rights abusesarising from acts or omissions in cases where:

(a) the human rights abuse took place, in whole or in part, within the territory or jurisdiction of that

State Party;

(b) the relevant harm was sustained, in whole or in part, within the territory or jurisdiction of that

State Party;

(c) the legal person is domiciledthe human rights abuse was carried out by either;

iii. a legal person domiciled in the territory or jurisdiction of that State Party; or

iv. a natural person who is a national of, or who has his or her habitual residence in the

territory or jurisdiction of, that State Party; and

(d) a victim seeking remedy through civil law proceedings is a national of, or has his or her habitual

residence in the territory or jurisdiction of, that State Party.

20Article 9.2. “For the purposes of Article 9.1, a legal personthe defendant is considered domiciled

in any territory or jurisdiction of the State in which it has its:

(a) where it has its statutory seatplace of incorporation or registration;

(b) under the law of which it was incorporated or formedprincipal assets or operations;

(c) where it has its central administration or management; or

(d) where it has its principal place of business or activity.

11.

- Article 9.4

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 9.4.”If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under this Article has been notified, or has

otherwise learned, of judicial proceedings taking place in another State Party relating to the same

human rights abuse, or any aspect of such human rights abuse, the relevant State agencies of

each State shall consult one another with a view to coordinating their actions.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposal(s):

Whether article 9.4 should provide that a court shall not decline its jurisdiction on the

basis that another court also has jurisdiction in accordance with article 9.1. Both in the

non-paper and during the intersessional thematic consultation, the issue of the operation of

forum non conveniens was addressed, with different views on the limits that a specific reference

or obligation may imply for its operation, including where the other parallel forum´s jurisdiction

rests on different criteria. In addition, such a rule could allow parallel proceedings whenever

two or more State Parties assume jurisdiction under article 9.1, with attendant risks of abuse

of process, forum shopping, conflicting judgments and unnecessary costs, making necessary

additional provisions on the interaction with lis pendens/coordination tools, so as to minimize

duplication while safeguarding victims’ rights.

Whether States Parties should be required to maintain a database of judicial

proceedings taking place in States Parties. This proposal includes an important tool for

information exchange, cooperation and implementation, but may be addressed more precisely

in articles 12, 13 and 16, with clear parameters on purpose, content, confidentiality and data

protection.

Whether consultations in cases of parallel proceedings should occur “through

established central authorities” rather than “between the relevant State agencies

handling the cases,”. The two formulations serve different coordination logics. Direct agency-

to-agency contacts may expedite case-specific problem-solving; central-authority channels

may ensure uniformity and record-keeping. Given that articles 12 and 13 already regulate

mutual legal assistance and international cooperation, States may wish to place any

consultation duty there, clarifying triggers, channels and safeguards, and taking note of

ongoing work at the Hague Conference on parallel proceedings.

Whether to provide for universal jurisdiction. In the non-paper it was recalled that the

proposal mirrors the language of the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy

and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious

Violations of International Humanitarian Law”, which contemplate domestic incorporation or

implementation within their domestic law, of appropriate provisions for universal jurisdiction

where applicable under international law. While that qualifier reflects the contested nature of

universal civil jurisdiction, the added phrase “over human rights violations that amount to

international crimes” may be redundant, as the qualifier already limits the scope to certain

international crimes for which universal jurisdiction is recognized.

Whether to include a forum of necessity rule. The incorporation of such a rule has been

valued as a useful jurisdictional rule where proceedings cannot be commenced in either the

21host or the home State. It has been recommended in several comparative initiatives but has

not yet been universally adopted under the argument that it may exceed what some domestic

systems permit. Therefore, a possible solution could be, to incorporate such rule in a balanced

manner that requires a sufficient connection with the alternative jurisdictional forum, the

unavailability of another forum in practice, and basic fairness guarantees—so as to balance

access to remedy and legal predictability.

Whether to provide that no legal obstacles—including forum non conveniens—should

bar initiation of proceedings unless an adequate alternative forum is available that is

likely to provide a timely, fair and impartial remedy. It is recognized that forum non

conveniens can operate as a barrier to access to justice in business and human rights cases.

The current draft (article 9.3) addresses discretionary declinature in general terms, requiring

respect for victims’ rights, but does not refer explicitly to forum non conveniens and uses other

qualifiers instead. Some systems and instruments favour removing or tightly limiting forum non

conveniens where jurisdiction is grounded on domicile; while others rely on it to manage parallel

or related proceedings. Additionally, it must be recalled that UNGP N°26 provides that “States

should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms

when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including considering ways to reduce

legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy”. In

the related commentary, it is provided that legal barriers could arise, in particular, “where

claimants face a denial of justice in a host State and cannot access home State courts

regardless of the merits of the claim”. This thus requires a provision on connecting factors with

the case that look beyond the home and host states (as currently done in the reformulation

proposed for 9) and are broader than the traditional principles of jurisdiction (territoriality and

domicile), in cases where denial of justice would otherwise result. Therefore, taking into

account the different views and domestic current legal approaches, a possible solution was

considered in strengthening the provisions on the adjudication of jurisdiction through the

different connecting factors reflected in Article 9, as well as coordinating with any lis pendens

or case-management rules to reduce duplication while preserving effective access to remedy.

Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Redraft or introduce a provision that addresses the potential abusive use of forum non conveniens

to deprive victims of a forum and avert a denial of justice, including through strengthening and

clarifying the connection factors for a State Party to assume jurisdiction. With that purpose and

taking into account the related proposals to Article 4, a new language is suggested to be located

either as Article 9.4 bis or even before, as Article 9.1 ter.

New suggested language:

Article 9.4 bis (or Article 9.1 ter): “The courts of any State Party shall have jurisdiction in respect

of a civil claim brought by a victim arising from a human rights abuse or violation covered under

this (Legally Binding Instrument) in order to avert a denial of justice if no other court is available,

the claimant cannot reasonably be expected to seize another court and there is a sufficient

connection to the State Party concerned. A sufficient connection consists in particular in:

(a) the presence or habitual residence of the claimant;

(b) the nationality of the claimant or the defendant;

(c) the presence of assets of the defendant;

(d) substantial activity of the defendant; or

(e) a civil claim based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings in the court seized of those

proceedings, to the extent that that court has jurisdiction under its own law to entertain civil

proceedings.”

2212.

- Article 10

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 10.1. “State Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that no

limitation period shall apply in relation to the commencement of legal proceedings in relation to

human rights abuses which constitute the most serious crimes of concern to the international

community as a whole, including war crimes, crimes against humanity or crimes of genocide.;”.

Article 10.2. “In legal proceedings regarding human rights abuse not falling within the scope of

Article 10.1, each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that

limitation periods for such proceedings:

(a) are of a duration that is appropriate in light of the gravity of the human rights abuse;

(b) are not unduly restrictive in light of the context and circumstances, including the location where

the relevant human rights abuse took place or where the relevant harm was sustained, and the

length of time needed for relevant harms to be identified; and

(c)are determined in a way that respects the rights of victims in accordance with Article 4.

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Regarding article 10.1, the proposal to replace the expression “human rights abuses

which constitute the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as

a whole” with “human rights abuses which constitute crimes under international law”.

Both formulations are used in international law but with different implications. The former,

inspired by the Rome Statute, may be understood in broader terms, extending to acts such as

torture, enforced disappearance, slavery or corruption, while the latter, inspired by the Basic

Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy, may be read more narrowly as referring

only to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. The way forward could

be to clarify the intended scope of the provision and the legal consequences of either

formulation, ensuring consistency with existing instruments as well as the Updated Principles

to Combat Impunity.

Qualify the obligation by adding that measures shall be adopted “in accordance with

their obligations under international law”. This proposal may narrow the scope of the

provision, limiting it to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and other crimes already

excluded from statutes of limitation under customary or treaty law. At the same time,

international practice shows a growing tendency to extend this exclusion to other gross

violations of human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law. Therefore, a balanced

approach could be to retain language that ensures both precision and flexibility, drawing on

instruments such as the 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to

War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, the Rome Statute, the Convention on Enforced

Disappearance and the Draft Articles on Crimes Against Humanity.

Extending the obligation to “cases of human rights abuses and violations where the

harm may be identifiable only after a long period of time”. As highlighted in the non-paper

circulated before the third intersessional thematic consultation towards the 11th session of the

OEIGWG, the introduction of such wording would significantly broaden the scope of article

10.1, applying the prohibition of statutes of limitation to cases beyond the most serious crimes.

Since article 10.2 already addresses such situations by requiring limitation periods to be

appropriate to the gravity of the abuse and not unduly restrictive, including in cases where harm

becomes identifiable only after a prolonged period, it may be preferable to address this issue

in that provision. This approach would maintain coherence while ensuring protection,

consistent with instruments such as the UN Convention against Corruption, the Declaration

and Convention on Enforced Disappearance, among others.

23Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Adjust the provisions to clarify terms for the statute of limitation for certain human rights abuses,

period of time and applicable legal framework.

New suggested language:

Article 10.1. “State Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure that no

limitation period shall apply in relation to the commencement of legal proceedings in relation to

human rights abuses and violations which constitute the most serious crimes of concern to the

under international law community as a whole, including war crimes, crimes against humanity or

crimes of genocide.;”.

Article 10.2. “In legal proceedings regarding human rights abuse and violation not falling within

the scope of Article 10.1, each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to

ensure that limitation periods for such proceedings:

(a) are of a duration that is appropriate in light of the gravity of the human rights abuse or violation;

(b) are not unduly restrictive in light of the context and circumstances, including the location where

the relevant human rights abuse or violation took place or where the relevant harm was sustained,

and the length of time needed for relevant harms to be identified; and

(c) are determined in a way that respects and protects the rights of victims in accordance with

Article 4.

13.

- Article 11.2

Current text in Updated draft legally binding instrument (LBI):

Article 11.2 “All matters of substance which are not specifically regulated under this (Legally

Binding Instrument) may, upon the request of the victim, be governed by the law of another State

where:

(a) (b) the acts or omissions have occurred or produced effects; or

the natural or legal person alleged to have committed the acts or omissions is domiciled.”

Background of the relevant provision(s) and related proposals:

Delete Article 11.2. In the non-paper circulated before the third intersessional thematic

consultation, it was extensively observed that deleting this provision would leave the Legally

Binding Instrument only with article 11.1 related to procedural matters, and with no rule on the

applicable law for substantive matters that are not regulated by the instrument. While this

principle is widely recognized, it is rarely codified, and thus the real added value of article 11

lies in paragraph 2. Without it, article 11 would not move beyond existing private international

law practice. Nevertheless, it was also recognized the need to assess carefully the value of

introducing a choice-of-law provision specific to business and human rights, bearing in mind

the narrow scope of Article 11.2 (limited to matters “not specifically regulated under this

instrument”) which risks overlooking differences in domestic implementation even where the

treaty regulates a substantive matter; as well the broad scope of Article 8 and the variety of

ways in which legal liability can be implemented in domestic laws of State Parties. The absence

of a clear default governing law in article 11.2 also creates uncertainty, as systemic

interpretation suggests that “another State” may include the forum itself, thereby opening the

door to unpredictability, forum shopping and duplication.

Add a reference to “affected persons and communities” alongside “victims,”. As it has

been the case for other similar proposals in the cluster of provisions from Articles 4 to 11 of the

Legally Binding Instrument, it is noted that such terminology is better addressed in the articles

on definitions, scope and implementation. Adding it only in article 11.2 could create uncertainty

as to who holds the right to request application of another law—claimants in court, or a broader

group whose interests may diverge.

24Whether to subject the choice of law, upon the request of the victim, to the law of the

forum or to permission from the forum’s courts. It was observed that the current wording

is ambiguous, given the lack of clarity whether victims hold a right to choose or merely the right

to request. Comparative models may guide reflection, i.e. Article 7 of the Rome II Regulation

on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations which clearly empowers victims to

choose between the law of the place of damage and the law of the event giving rise to the

damage, while leaving the timing of that choice to the lex fori. Likewise, the 2010 UNEP

Guidelines for Environmental Justice, Article 13(2) provides that the timing is determined by

law of the forum. Other instruments provide alternative, more cautious approaches, without a

broad choice-of-law rule but a public policy safeguard: i.e. ILA Resolution No 2/2012 and

Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 which recommend that where the

designated law affords insufficient human rights protection, forum law or another more

protective law may be applied. This more limited model could also inform the drafting of article

10, particularly regarding statutes of limitation when the designated foreign law is unduly

restrictive.

Objective of the suggested new language for the relevant provision(s):

Improve the provision on the rule that allows the victim to choose the applicable substantive law

for their claim avoid ambiguity on the time of the choice.

New suggested language:

Article 11.2 “All matters of substance which are not specifically regulated under this (Legally

Binding Instrument) may, upon the request of the victim, and subject to the legal principles of the

State Party in which the case is adjudicated, be governed by the law of another State where:

(a) the acts or omissions have occurred or produced effects; or

(b) the natural or legal person alleged to have committed the acts or omissions is domiciled.”



Greater China Legal History Seminar Series – ‘Sir George Staunton’s 1810 Translation of the Qing Penal Code’ by Prof. James St. André

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 Delighted to pass along this announcement for a quite interesting seminar, with thanks to Lutz-Christian Wollff for bringing it to my attention:

Sir George Staunton’s translation of the Qing legal code, entitled Ta Tsing Leu Lee, published in 1810, stands as a curious early artifact of Chinese-English translation for several reasons: a massive undertaking, it was prepared by a hereditary aristocrat with no formal legal training at a time when the number of direct translations from Chinese could be counted on one hand and next to nothing was known of China’s legal system. In this presentation I will attempt to explain why he attempted this amazing feat, what he accomplished and what his contemporaries thought of it, and fit his translation into the contemporary discourse on both law in Great Britain and the nascent field of sinology.

Using a variety of primary sources including his journals and letters home to family while based in Canton, I argue that Staunton’s translation can and should be read as a work which was meant to persuade its readers that the Chinese had a concept of justice, and that his end was accomplished by a variety of choices in the process of translating, editing, annotating and publishing the work. Although modern scholars now see his work as too free, it is precisely in the freedom which Staunton takes with the text that he accomplishes his aims. The reception of the translation as reflected in contemporary reviews, however, reveals that Staunton was not successful at convincing readers to accept his interpretation of what the code meant, despite the fact that they accepted his translation as accurate, a rather neat irony that speaks to the question of expert knowledge and its interpretation even today.

About the Speaker:

James St. André is Professor and Head of the Department of Translation at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, where he teaches literary translation, translation history, translation theory, and research methodology. He is also the Director of the Centre for Translation Technology. Recent publications include Conceptualising China Through Translation (Manchester University Press 2023) “Implications of Computer Code Translation for Translation Studies” (2023), and “The Translator as Cultural Ambassador: The Case of Lin Yutang.” (2023). Works relating to law and legal translation include “ ‘But do they have a notion of Justice?’ Staunton’s 1810 Translation of the Great Qing Code” (2004), “Reading Court Cases from the Song and the Ming: Fact and Fiction, Law and Literature” (2007) and “ ‘He “catch no ball” leh!’: Globalization Versus Localization in the Singaporean Translation Market” (2006), which includes a section on legal interpreting in Singapore.

Register here to attend the seminar on or before 20 November 2025, 5:00pm (HKT).

Leninism Unbound?: The U.S. Celebrates "Anti-Communism Week 2025" [2-8 November]: A Reverie on President Trump's Proclamation

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 The United States observes "Anti-Communism Week" this week. To that end, President Trump has issued a Proclamation: Anti-Communism Week, 2025 (7 November) the text of which follows below. The Proclamation ought not to be dismissed lightly. There were other commemorations at the state level (eg, Governor DeSantis (Fla) Victims of Communism Day).

Proclamation: Anti-Communism Week, 2025 contains within it a substantial and profound insight into the ways in which "Communism" is understood within at least one portion of the American elite, and with that, the way in which this understanding can then be effectively projected to define and discipline the terrains of solidarity enhancing debates within liberal democracy. Here one does not inhabit the realms of theoretical insight or of a strong alignment between words and their meanings beyond that for which they are constructed in the popular imagination. That popular imagination, in turn, and in many places, might have drifted into new understandings that become the means of encasing ideas, fears, and incarnations of those "things" which distinguish the community of believers from non-believers, and more importantly, as a means of measuring and identifying apostasy and heresy among the community of believers. It is to that extent, and within that contextual framework, that one might useful read and consider carefully the language of the Proclamation, not just for what it says, but for what it intends to mean. At the same time, the Proclamation creates a curious veiling of Leninism as a normative system of operational structuring, within and beneath the normative premises of the political economic model in whose service one can write a number of histories of "Communism" from the late 19th to the 21st centuries. That veiling, in turn, creates a space within within liberal democratic and markets Leninism  (and certainly its sensibilities) may be applied within the normative contexts of liberal democracy while distancing those practices (managerialism for example) from the oppositions, threats and challenges of incompatible and oppositional normative systems. That produces the fundamental contradiction that the Proclamation both alludes to and avoids--how does one combat oppositional systems and their normative frameworks, how does one create the means to measure taboo deviation (heresy) or apostasy (systemic rejection beyond the name of the thing rejected), how does one engage in those actions (a key thrust of the Proclamation) without making it impossible to adopt (and adapt) its attached methodological normative structures (perhaps usefully shorthanded as vanguardism) to the manifestation and development of liberal democracy itself. That is, is it possible to recognize Leninism as a critical element of the critique of the destructive element in "communism" without at the same time foreclosing the instrumentalization of Leninist sensibilities and techniques in the service of liberal democratic institutions and norms?

1. Destructive ideologies. Communism, or rather what is ascribed to its manifestation by those purporting to be "Communists" as they established dictatorships of the proletariat and then reconstituted them as the apparatus through which they would remake the world in their own image. 

Across continents and generations, communism has wrought devastation upon nations and souls.  More than 100 million lives have been taken by regimes that sought to erase faith, suppress freedom, and destroy prosperity earned through hard work, violating the God-given rights and dignity of those they oppressed. (Anti-Communism Week, 2025 )

In the process, Communism bears the burdens of its Leninist application. And by shifting the "blame" for the implementation of destruction in the name of an ideological goal it both excuses and masks the central role of Leninism, rather than the construct "Communism" in the anthologies of the 20th century.  Freed of its connection to destruct, though very much its architect (both ideological and as an operationalizing ideology constructing possibilities for progressing along a socialist path toward a "Communist" society, Leninism could be transposed into any political ideology as an ideology of management and control, as opposed to a means of managing a realization of communism in a society far from ready for it, and thus  ready for Leninist management (guidance and leadership). 

To be clear, Communism might be usefully understood as a very specific way of seeing the world and social organization, It starts from a series of premises built around the (1) nature and exploitation of productive forces (capital) (2) around which human society is both inevitably formed (and understood), and (3) through which in the course of an inevitable progression of human development, enhanced and accelerated by tech innovation (the industrial revolution in the 19th century was the available baseline) (4) that will produce the conditions within which equality (the end of class distinctions and the need for welfare to be driven by relations between people and capital) one in which people are all workers and work is de-centered as the way in which social organization is understood and elaborated. There are lots of lacunae, of course, and people have been arguing about them for some time. Among these are the invisibility of difference other than class, and more importantly, the extent that violence driven by the identified leading forces of social progress (eg, the "workers of the world;" whatever that means and it means different things to different groups at different times).

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But Communism is meant to describe a quite specific lebenswelt (lifeworld), a means of understanding the premises around which human reality can be rationalized, and then taking those premises and applying them in a linear sequential time line (like block chain, but here constructed out of stages of historical development) that points to an "ends." Leninism, on the other hand, might be understood as providing the way in which one can create normative structures for producing "right" pathways for the "best" way of realizing "Communism" and for policing and protecting those determinations.  Those normative structures do not deal with the normative premises of "Communism" as such, but rather to the value and justification for the means of realizing communism.  When attached to Communism (now perhaps better or at least more commonly labelled Marxism), Leninism might be understood to be built on the fundamental premises that any society, even one that is not yet ready to progress can be lead and guided toward a faster and more efficient realization of its inevitable end goal through the leadership and guidance  of the vanguard of social forces whose consciousness (and commitment) are already developed farther along the path toward the goal (in this case the establishment of a communist society).  To those ends, the means, virtually any means, may be understood (or the negative impacts of which may be valued or judged)) as the (individual) costs of the efficient and properly directed apparatus of transformation toward the perfection of alignment between society and the normative vision of itself which gives (in its own mind at least) legitimacy and authority to a Leninist "party" ad the justification of the employment of its means. From Soviet Marxism, one then encounters the progression (everything is always a progression) from professional revolutionaries to revolutionaries in power, to the overseers of an apparatus that both defines the normative regulatory path for society and directs people along it. 

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Reconsidered in this way one understands both the power of labeling the destruction as "Communism" (one attacks two distinct ideological bird with one stone) and also the way it misdirects that labeling, one that permits Leninism--re-imagined for any ideological political-economic system--to take hold anywhere.  More specifically, one might be forgiven for rethinking the operative first part of the Proclamation spoke to  the view that, in the name of communism, socialist Leninist parties have invoked the imperatives of necessary and inevitable change to justify a century or more of actions that are horrifying to those who claim solidarity with other political-economic models.  For liberal democracy, of course, both the normative framework and the ideology of its mechanics are to be condemned, and thus condemned, amalgamated into a single "thing". 

And that is both the promise and tragedy of and embedded in Leninism. It is both a means towards an ends and an ends in itself in terms of the normative basis of its own organization, purpose, means, and methods. Its normative schema  can be applied to any ideological project or collective enterprise--the fundamental operative premise that any system can be perfected through the leadership and guidance of an organized collective, a "brain trust," an "elite", a social, intellectual, or other group, that is dedicated to whatever objective around which it exists.  Its two critical elements have seeped into many forms of governance well beyond the "Communist universe"though it has been central to that development since 1917. The first  is that all social collectives have an ultimate ideal form and purpose that must be realized; second that this realization can be more efficiently attained or accelerated where a n organized group can take the lead and manage the process of progress.  

2. The Ruination of and that is "Communism." The Anti-Communism Week, 2025 Proclamation notes 

For more than a century, communism has brought nothing but ruin.  Wherever it spreads, it silences dissent, punishes beliefs, and demands that generations kneel before the power of the state instead of standing for freedom.  Its story is written in blood and sorrow, a grim reminder that communism is nothing more than another word for servitude. (Anti-Communism Week, 2025 Proclamation)

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What, then, has brought ruin? The question becomes more complicated.  From the perspective of liberal democracy and its fundamental norms, the alignment between the ultimate goals of Marxism, and the means used to accelerate fulfillment of those goals (expressed on and through their impacts on the bodies of individuals),  is impossible to break. 

Communism (or Marxism) is a conceptual challenge for liberal democracy (and with it, its approach to the relationship between people and productive forces). The two may aspire to similar goals, but their cognitive frameworks are incompatible, especially with respect to the nature and role of the individual and the purpose of social organization. That is important, and indeed central to competition among distinct visions for organizing and valuing political frameworks--and thus the point of that paragraph. 

Leninism, on the other hand, is an operational threat.  That operational threat emerges from the autonomous normative  structures of Leninism, one that permits the Leninist cognitive  model to be transposed virtually anywhere social collectives seek to "perfect" or at least engage in conversations about the "best" ways (there are no best ways only choices that produce benefits within a context of risk, risk mitigation, and threat to systemic integrity and solidarity) to manage their organizational and conceptual choices.  

3.  From "Communism" (Marxist-Leninism) to Heresy to Leninism Unbound. That distinction and that understanding produces the bridge to what may be the critical paragraph of the Proclamation:   

New voices now repeat old lies, cloaking them in the language of “social justice” and “democratic socialism,” yet their message remains the same:  give up your freedom, place your trust in the power of the government, and trade the promise of prosperity for the empty comfort of control.  America rejects this evil doctrine.  We remain a Nation founded on the eternal truth that liberty and opportunity are the birthrights of every person, and that no ideology, whether foreign or domestic, can extinguish them. (Anti-Communism Week, 2025 Proclamation).

This is where the Proclamation becomes interesting.  One is not focused here on "Communism" as such, though that has become the avatar within which it is possible to speak about Leninism (again because in the American imaginary the terms are either indistinguishable or the idea is that one is impossible without the other).  

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The Leninist impulse, the vocation of Lenin's "professional revolutionaries" (however one defines revolution from historical stage of development to another, and therefore however one can define revolutionary), is necessarily always looking for a cause through which it may develop itself within a meta-normative context (though in the original Lenin assumed that mass movements would produce from out of their own ranks their own vanguards to who, as professional revolutionaries, leadership would be delegated (What is to be Done,§ 4.2)). Here, the Proclamation uses old tropes (the "Red Scare" fears of 1919-23 and the early 1950s) to project onto contemporary spaces.  Here the Proclamation suggests, those new foundations of revolutionary agitation can be embedded within their own normative avatars, “social justice” and “democratic socialism," the last a reference to the recent victory of Zohran Mamdani in New York City (discussed HERE). That is neither unexpected nor new. And again, that conjoins what some might be tempted to aggregate as the "Marxist" normative impulse, with its Leninist operational principles, making them indistinguishable and suggesting that the synergies of that melding augments the horrors of its product. 

The objection, of course, is to both. Both suggest a core orienting set of social collective premises that, to put it politely, challenges the core orienting premises of both liberal democracy of as a political ideology and markets as its individual autonomy affirming transactional element. And both are vanguardist (and thus inviting a Leninist solution to the problem of its implementation) in the sense that they require substantial "consciousness raising and mandatory measures to ensure that the population "grows into" the new social "basic line."

This reasoning suggests two quite interesting ideas (perhaps just ideas not rising even to the level of insight). The first is an oldie but goodie: that external challenges always have a way of either strengthening or corrupting the articulation and understanding of the core premises from out of which it is possible both to develop the conceptual cage of a reality ordering system (through the second order generation and application of its derivative values). That dialectical process is essential for the disciplining of a political-economic model within its own ordering cages. That applies with equal force to liberal democratic (market) systems as it does to Marxist-Leninist systems. To those ends it is always necessary to develop the means (and the measure) for  distinguishing between "within the system" debates and heresy.  And then also to distinguish between heresy (the changing of elements of the normative cage) and apostasy (the abandonment of that cognitive universe in favor of another. The Trump Administration views both "social justice" and "socialist democracy" as heretical within the umbrella of liberal democracy, and implies that their vanguardism (Leninism) pushes them not just into apostasy but recasts them as the professional revolutionaries that are meant to be the death of the system itself. 

The second may be the more interesting:  it is that, even assuming that "social justice" and "democratic socialism" are not part of some sort of revived "Communist International" in modern form, Leninism itself can be a force in its own right, one that might be threatening when tied to opposing normative systems, but one that may be compatible within the operational modalities of liberal democracy and its markets. This goes beyond the usual discussions in intellectual circles between liberal democratic representative democracy and co-called Marxist vanguard democracy (eg here). It goes to the essence of "brain trust" or "expert" governance--the governance, for example of technocrats as clusters of expert vanguards, on the one hand, and the adoption by these elites of the techniques and normative sensibilities of Leninist professional revolutionaries on the other (consider here; its appeal to political conservatives here). In this sense techno-democracy (and its compliance based modalities of management) might be understood as a form of techno-Leninism; but so can the imposition of mandatory consciousness raising sensibilities of certain social justice approaches (cf., here). More radically, one wonders whether the Leninist impulse can be embedded more generally within the normative foundational premises of liberal democracy (my earlier reflections here: Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress: Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat and "The Golden Age of American Innovation"). More radically still, the embedding of some of the core norm-techniques of Leninism within private life--sometimes euphemistically labelled mangerialism, and adopting variations of democratic centralism within a hierarchically arranged vanguardist mileu focusing on objectives based leadership (consider eg here, and in its germinate contemporary form in The Managerial Revolution (1941)). These might suggest that the future of capitalism cannot escape some form or another of Leninism; perhaps neither can liberal democracy. And there is the magic of this Proclamation--one continues to focus on normative oppositions; instruments to realize these normative idealized end points, however, including the measure against which they may operate on a social collective and its body politic, can vary with the circumstance. 

 And so the fundamental question that describing the tragedy that was Marxist-Leninism's tragic century implies but avoids answering. Leninism, and its vaguer forms of vanguardism, are constructed within a normative structure that knows no limits in the service of the ideology of which they are an instrument except this: in that service the only limitation is fidelity to that ideology's ideals and objectives; just how ruthless can such an instrumental system be permitted to be in that role? History suggests one answer; perhaps there are others. 


 

 

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

This week, our Nation observes Anti-Communism Week, a solemn remembrance of the devastation caused by one of history’s most destructive ideologies.  Across continents and generations, communism has wrought devastation upon nations and souls.  More than 100 million lives have been taken by regimes that sought to erase faith, suppress freedom, and destroy prosperity earned through hard work, violating the God-given rights and dignity of those they oppressed.  As we honor their memory, we renew our national promise to stand firm against communism, to uphold the cause of liberty and human worth, and to affirm once more that no system of government can ever replace the will and conscience of a free people.

For more than a century, communism has brought nothing but ruin.  Wherever it spreads, it silences dissent, punishes beliefs, and demands that generations kneel before the power of the state instead of standing for freedom.  Its story is written in blood and sorrow, a grim reminder that communism is nothing more than another word for servitude.

In the 34 years since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed both the triumph of democracy and the persistence of tyranny in new forms.  New voices now repeat old lies, cloaking them in the language of “social justice” and “democratic socialism,” yet their message remains the same:  give up your freedom, place your trust in the power of the government, and trade the promise of prosperity for the empty comfort of control.  America rejects this evil doctrine.  We remain a Nation founded on the eternal truth that liberty and opportunity are the birthrights of every person, and that no ideology, whether foreign or domestic, can extinguish them.

As we mark Anti-Communism Week, we stand united in defense of the values that define us as a free people.  We honor the victims of oppression by keeping their cause alive and by ensuring that communism and every system that denies the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness will find their place, once and for all, on the ash heap of history.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim the week of November 2 through November 8, 2025, as Anti-Communism Week. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this seventh day of November, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fiftieth.

                             DONALD J. TRUMP

“Between the Eagle, the Bear, and the Dragon: Canadian Business and Human Rights Through the Lens of National Security;” Remarks delivered at the Canadian Forum for Business and Human Rights Inaugural Conference, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, 14 November 2025.

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I was delighted to have been asked to join a group of brilliant scholars at the Canadian Forum for Business and Human Rights Inaugural Conference, “Corporate Accountability in Canada: At the Crossroads of Scholarship, Legislation, Litigation, Policy-making, and Community Resistance.”The conference. I was organized by Dr. Akinwumi Ogunranti, an assistant professor and business advisor for the University of Manitoba Faculty of Law’s Marcel A. Desautels Centre for Private Enterprise and the Law, in collaboration with Dalhousie University’s Schulich School of Law Marine and Environmental Law Institute, and the University of Essex’s Human Rights Research and Education Centre. 



My presentation is entitled “Between the Eagle, the Bear, and the Dragon: Canadian Business and Human Rights Through the Lens of National Security;” Remarks delivered at the Canadian Forum for Business and Human Rights Inaugural Conference, “Corporate Accountability in Canada: At the Crossroads of Scholarship, Legislation, Litigation, Policy-making, and Community Resistance.” University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, 14 November 2025.

My remarks are perhaps descriptively summarized this way:
The current framework of the business and human rights projects, and with it sustainability and climate change related norms and objectives, were envisioned and elaborated at a time when national security, and waivers from general law/norm structures were increasingly viewed as obsolete and narrowly applied. Over the last decade, however, national security has become an increasingly potent concept in the business and human rights/sustainability context. To some extent it is being driven by the United States and the People’s Republic of China, each of which, from vastly different starting points, have developed structures of national security regimes trough which human rights and sustainability are realized. Europeans have also begun to attend again to national security, but with greater wariness. Canada occupies a space between these regulatory powers. Canada must both navigate around these developing frameworks while advancing its own national vision and priorities. These remarks will focus on two points. The first is the way that these national security regimes might impact Canadian firms inside and outside of Canada. Second, it will consider the Canadian national security landscape as it might begin to affect business and human rights along with sustainability efforts.
There is more here than that, of course. The remarks suggest the broad outlines of the revolutions in social organization and the way it expresses the realities it is is meant to shape as well as express. Choosing the starting point of normative structures substantially shapes the world around it. What is that starting point? States have already chosen: human rights or national security.  But even these are avatars of more fundamentally determining premises around which it is possible to order the reality within which ideas are normalized and values based "decision-making" may be undertaken as if it was to be assessed against unmovable "truths." Human rights becomes code for a cluster of ordering premises that a e grounded on a global convergence based imperative that is framed around the ordering of relations  from out of the state to all of the subjects of its power, bit now undertaken as a contextually relevant pass through of norm making generated at the international level. It serves as a living souvenir of what was thought to be natural and permanent condition of human collective reality before COVID. National security, on the other hand, serves as code for the fracture of this global ordering by shifting the ordering premise from human rights (how ever conceived). It orders the world by reference to the needs and solidarity of human collectives organized in and through states. It seeks to protect and advance that collective both within its territories through development and contextually driven collective self-actualization and beyond their territories by protecting national productive forces, including the value of its normative constructs. States that embed human rights through a national security lens see the world quite differently than those who embed national security through a human rights lens. Reality expressed in  the authority of values, norms, and pathways to engaging with "stimuli" then follows.  The United States and China are brothers in arms on this point, though they adopt quite different approaches in defense of their respective political-economic models. Europe stands at the other end; or it did before the start of the 2nd phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And Canada, like many states in the Global South, inhabit the middle--using both lenses to mediate their relationships with apex States, and in the process transforming national security and human rights into instruments of national autonomy and protection against the giants which cannot be avoided. Human rights and national security, in that context are no longer themselves, but become instruments toward other ends.

The text of the Remarks follow below along with the accompanying PowerPoint. ACCESS REMARKS HERE: Backer_REMARKS_V1.1__CFBHRconference_2025; ACCESS PPT HERE: Backer_CanadaBHR_PPT

 

 

Between the Eagle, the Bear, and the Dragon and Within the Global Flows of Economic Activity: Canadian Business and Human Rights Through the Lens of National Security

Remarks delivered at the Canadian Forum for Business and Human Rights inaugural conference

“Corporate Accountability in Canada: At the Crossroads of Scholarship, Legislation, Litigation, Policy-making, and Community Resistance.” University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, 14 November 2025

Larry Catá Backer

W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar; Professor of Law and International Affairs

Pennsylvania State University | 239 Lewis Katz Building, University Park, PA 16802    1.814.863.3640 (direct) ||  lcb11@psu.edu

 

 

Summary/Abstract:

The current framework of the business and human rights projects, and with it sustainability and climate change related norms and objectives, were envisioned and elaborated at a time when national security, and waivers from general law/norm structures were increasingly viewed as obsolete and narrowly applied.  Over the last decade, however, national security has become an increasingly potent concept in the business and human rights/sustainability context. To some extent it is being driven by the United States and the People’s Republic of China, each of which, from vastly different starting points, have developed structures of national security regimes trough which human rights and sustainability are realized. Europeans have also begun to attend again to national security, but with greater wariness. Canada occupies a space between these regulatory powers. Canada must both navigate around these developing frameworks while advancing its own national vision and priorities. These remarks will focus on two points. The first is the way that these national security regimes might impact Canadian firms inside and outside of Canada. Second, it will consider the Canadian national security landscape as it might begin to affect business and human rights along with sustainability efforts.

 

Dear Participants; dear attendees,

 

1. Setting the Stage.

 

I am delighted to be here with you today. My great thanks to the organizers and all who made this event and my presence possible.

 

This Canadian Forum for Business and Human Rights reminds us, like the U.N., Forum  on Business and Human Rights used to in its heyday, of the extraordinary power of incredibly creative and thoughtful people coming to together to think through some of the most persistent and fundamental challenges of human collective organization within  an equally fundamental commitment to the elaboration and operationalization of, and of a solidarity with, a set of generative principles about the protection of shared fundamental understandings of the dignity of the human person, and of the human person in social/political/economic/religious/and cultural communities, in whatever form understood,  expressed through the oftentimes quite substantial diversity of approach to the way in which collectives understand themselves and, on that basis, elaborate political-economic orders. Unity in diversity was the fundamental cognitive principle embedded in the UN  Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights, along with the more controversial functional premise of principled pragmatism.

 

Those sentiments are easy to pull together in and as text. Yet, more than a decade after the endorsement of the UNGP, they are proving to be more challenging to manifest in behaviors where their expression is needed most—not at the point where theory meets operationalization, but at the point where concrete decisions produce equally concrete adverse impact s. And those impacts, once thought to be centered on the human, human rights, are now understood to include  and perhaps are better centered on the environment in which humans have a duty to sustain.

 

It is in that context that I am delighted to be able to share a few thoughts with you, and perhaps then to engage in extended discussion, at this marvelous conference, on  the human  rights environment in a world that has veered sharply from a convergence model, to one deeply committed to sovereign rights, to national security, and to the instrumentalization of human rights and sustainability toward those ends. These developments are, in the longer run, neither bad nor good, but they substantially affect the structures, premises, and conditions within which it is usefully possible to discuss human rights and sustainability in the current environment, and even more difficult to discuss these for states “in the middle”—states like Canada caught between the emerging hegemons of a post-global imperial order in which everyone else must find a place if they are to survive and perhaps preserve what they can of themselves. 

 

Dear Participants; dear attendees,

 

2. Human Rights and National Security Inter-Penetrations and their Consequences

 

The current framework of the business and human rights projects, and with it sustainability and climate change related norms and objectives, were envisioned and elaborated at a time when national security, and waivers from general law/norm structures were increasingly viewed as obsolete and narrowly applied.  One need only follow the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice to see that through the end of the 20th century, it appeared that issues of national security and national peculiarities were increasingly narrowed and superseded, in a sense, by the larger principle that only through interdependence could national security be preserved.

 

That, perhaps, might have contributed to German policy that embraced dependence on  Russian oil and gas to power Germany—mutual dependence in a converging world would make it harder for anyone to break the rules, especially where that breaking involved violence. And it recentered human rights as a political mechanism by trading economic interconnection for the power to engage with States the human rights approaches of which were deficient when measured by European standards. That was very nicely encased in the EU-Cuba  Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA), which supports Cuba's economic modernization but insists ion a framework for dialogue about capacity and human rights.

 

Yet even as the European West, as a human rights orthodoxy,  hurtled more enthusiastically toward the manifestation of this position of strength through dependence, and thus of its faith in a world the values-principles based cognitive cage of which would be populated by all States, the normative rug was pulled out from under it. And that conceptual rug was pulled out from under it by precisely those forces of fracture—forces coming from the Global South, the Marxist-Leninist States, and the newly normatively tumultuous United States—that by 2022 and the 2nd invasion of Ukraine by Russia, suggested that the normative starting pint of a unitary glob al standard for social collectives, one built in part around human rights, had now become a set of competing visions of fundamental ordering including the ordering, understanding, and realization of human rights and sustainability objectives, that were contextual, historically driven, and shaped by quite distinct and incompatible value norm systems around which post-global empire was being organized. That organization—The Chinese Belt & Road Initiative, the America First Initiative, and the European rear guard Brussels Effect regulatory projects, defined the first tier reorganization of the normative structures of global order, and with it of human rights and sustainability. 

 

Especially over the last several decades, national security has become an increasingly potent concept in the business and human rights/sustainability context. And the concept of nation al security has broadened as well, intensifying both its politics and connections to issues of human rights and sustainability. In Canada, for example,  the Public Safety Canada website[1] describes national security as focuses first on the protection of the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad through multi-faceted endeavors that require cooperation “across a diverse range of initiatives and programs.” These include anti-hate initiatives, bias sensitivity, diversity and identity,  counter terrorism, counter proliferation (weapons), protection of critical infrastructure, cyber security, multilateral defense and preparedness (e.g. Five Eyes partnering), countering foreign interference e, information sharing within the State apparatus, and research security.

 

These also produce a politics, the scope and nature of which is evidenced in the shifting notions of national security embedding  in public facing documents of the U.S. National Security Strategy[2] from 2006 through 2024 and now beyond. The changes reflect not only changes in the nature and source of threat, but also in the definition of threat and the mechanisms that may be deployed to meet these threats, and to some extent project U.S. power outward to serve those ends.  These extend increasingly to human rights and sustainability, leveraging its normative framing toward national security ends, but at the same time importing its politics into the national security arenas. The changing breadth and orienting principles of identifying national security concerns and approaches to meeting those concerns are apparent, for example in a comparison of the approaches of the Trump and Obama-Biden administrations with respect to Climate change.[3]

 

It is within these trajectories of policy and legality that one might usefully consider, for example, the way that each of the areas  of concern to Canadian national security produce an environment where the interpenetration and alignment of human rights legalities, and the development of standards for and the administration of national security regimes are unavoidable.  The consequences are unavoidable in the current environment: the structuring of a mutual weaponization--national security regimes as a means of furthering the objectives of compliance and diligence based human rights regimes applied in business in the legal and private spheres; and human rights as a means of furthering and amplifying sanctions and markets constraining regimes. The process is incomplete, and its complexities are only now being confronted. All of these areas have substantial implications for economic activity and the generation of human rights impacts, both positive and negative.

Consider, for example, the issue of supply chain due diligence, human rights obligations of private actors under legal and markets driven (private law) regimes, and the growing interface of both with national security and sanctions regimes of states engaged in multi-vector warfare. The issue has surged to the foreground in the course of the Russo-Ukrainian war since its start in 2014 and the tactic used by Russia in its invasion of Ukraine after 2022.[4]

The weaponization of sanctions regimes, and the heightening of barriers to trade touching on sensitive technologies, and related objects and processes (know-how for example) have been at the center of non-military engagement with Russia (and indirectly China and Iran). These are, in turn, aligned with the development of more intensely applicable regimes of culpability of market actors based on diligence driven complicity notions (as a compliance vector under formal legal or markets based private law diligence and prevention-mitigation-remedial regimes) grounded in complicity.[5] Its challenges are particularly acute where everyday objects and technologies can move within complex global production (primary and secondary market) chains to produce downstream effects that may be human rights harming and that may also reduce the effectiveness of sanctions regimes in conflict situations.

To some extent this trajectory of policy/action predates the UNGPs and its sensibilities/language and is part of the larger conversation about the values and sources of leadership and guidance through which international economic activity may be undertaken, managed, protected, Those trajectories have not been driven by the more esoteric  conversation within the U.N. apparatus in Geneva or New York, but rather by the needs and ideologically necessary imperatives of the United States and the People’s Republic of China, each of which, from vastly different starting points, have developed structures of national security regimes trough which human rights and sustainability are realized. That places both the U.S. and China at the peripheries of the business and human rights context centered in the U.N.. apparatus; at the same time it suggests a re-centering of the business and human rights framework toward the security-sanctions model.

 

That, in turn produces a substantial challenge not just for States, in their elaboration of a principles and structural framework, but also for economic enterprises that must navigate these elaborations. Among the larger challenges for enterprises are those touching on the purpose and character of economic enterprises, the activities in which they engage, and their compliance conseqeunces. For the first, the conversation between national security and human rights feeds the development of a movement away from the autonomy of private markets, and of the relationship between states and private markets. For both, though to different ends, the enterprise and the economic activities which they generate are increasingly understood as instruments of the State or of public purpose. Economic enterprises move  away from a model of personal autonomy in spaces free of state interference in individual choices, to one in which the enterprise is better characterized, in part, as a privatized  unit of the State administrative apparatus through which policy is fulfilled (human rights) or state objectives realized (national security).

 

For the second, one starts with a notion that economic activity is free of State interference and a core human right of autonomy in economic choices and activity, to one increasingly in which the space so allocated to free choice exists only in those spaces that exist beyond the primary needs of States to fulfill human rights policy through economic actors, or to be bound by the limits and sensibilities and deployed to the ends of nation al security (modernization in China)  and the protection of national productive forces against foreign interference in the United States. It is in that context, then, that one might begin to understand both the trajectories and breadth of the ways in which the conception of the UNGP 2nd Pillar corporate responsibility to respect has been shrinking and if not shrinking, then changing.

 

For the third, the increasing administrative superstructure on business or economic activity shifts the focus of business from the generation of wealth through that activity to the fulfillment of compliance oriented directives from the State. This is neither bad or good, but it does affect the way in which the cultures of economic activity, and the expectations for behaviors and valuing effort, shift. That produces another, and not necessarily “bad” shift in the way in which the core and peripheries of economic activity are elaborated.   Where once the production of wealth through economic activities, with national security and human rights compliance stood at the peripheries, now human rights and national security compliance (in law and operations) occupy the center and the value enhancing objectives of economic activities move to the peripheries. That is that wealth production assumes a different conceptual framework in which it is both measured and assessed as a function of its advancement of national security and human rights—however the two are aligned—and that, indeed, it is national security and human rights that now constitute the center of the value of production, the remainder being left to value produced that can be measured in money.

 

Dear Participants, Dear attendees

 

3. From Interpenetration to Instrument—Human Rights Sanctions and the Human Rights Project

 

These very brief and preliminary thoughts that invites consideration of the larger question which they suggest—does human rights and sustainability drive national security measures and structures, or is the reverse true—that national security sensibilities and principles drive the framing and prioritization of national human rights measures?

 

Perhaps one way at starting to consider that question revolves around the issue of human rights and sustainability related sanctions regimes. That then brings to the open the issue of peripheries. More simply stated: are States that drive a national security privileging approach to mandatory human rights related measures at the periphery of human rights normativity, or are human rights/sustainability normative projects necessarily at the periphery of national security, within which is serves as one but not a core factor.

 

The American one might be usefully framed both by its 2024 NAP and its signature BHR sanctions project, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). UFLPA occupies a space at the center of several critical trajectories.  One of them is the human rights and sustainability positive efforts at "just transitions" to non-carbon based transport. Another is the collision of human rights impacts assessments where there may be substantial disagreement about the measuring stick--this is especially acute with respect to Chinese policy in Xinjiang, and intensified because of the passions invested in the principles and judgments from all stakeholder sides.  And the third is the effects of national interests in the calculation of human rights impacts as well as the choices of sanctions focus. In the latter case, it is interesting, for example, that though the allegations range across a broad set of human rights impacts, UFLPA focuses on forced labor. 

Compliance under UFLPA is built around the creation of a rebuttable presumption that goods from Xinjiang are produced with forced labor.  Compliance, then, involves one of two choices--(1) procure goods or services elsewhere (and ensure there are no connections to Xinjiang); or (2) rebut the presumption. Without irony, UFLPA provides that one way to rebut the presumption is to show that the goods etc. have no connection to Xinjiang. The other is to conduct due diligence on products that have a connection to Xinjiang, including inquiries from the relevant administrative agency to show that the goods were not produced with forced labor.

Overall, the government’s enforcement strategy counsels that to comply businesses should engage in heightened due diligence in order to identify potential supply chain exposure to companies operating in XUAR and connected to abuse of Uyghur and other Muslim minority laborers. Compliance, then, is grounded in an intimate connection between the administration of sanctions regimes and its operationalization through systems of mandatory due diligence. Rather than generalize HRDD systems, possible under the UNGP framework, the opposite occurs: the U.S. focus on sanctions regimes, rather than on regimes of mandatory human rights due diligence measures, limits the use of mandatory measures to those specific and functionally differentiated activities with respect to which the State may have a special interest. As for the rest, private markets driven compliance and perhaps policy is in order. Even under the Biden Administration’s 2024 U.S. National Action Plan, that framework is embraced—capacity building and nudging of and in markets and the reservation of mandatory measures in and through sanctions-based regimes.

 

The effect is to position the U.S. and its approach, at the periphery of the now decades long effort driven by international institutions and their allies, to forge an global orthodoxy centered on, around and driven by internationally forged human rights/sustainability principles and objectives to which all must be bent.[6] To that point, however, it is possible to accept the orthodoxy of the UNGP, without embracing a principle uniform solidarity with one or more institutional or popular instruments of interpretation. From the perspective of orthodoxy, of course, that is heresy (in the ancient sense of choosing for oneself)--a fatal deviation from the correct or true path. It would follow, then, that perspective matters in assessing the value and viability of approaches to BHR systems, even among states that embrace its principles. The question, then, reduces itself from interpretive plausibility to collective discipline. Of course the disciplinary power of law is obvious, and thus perhaps a great temptation for those who, having determined the "right" interpretation, would turn to the mechanisms of law. But even without the power of law it is possible to assert disciplinary  by other means--for example capacity building,[7] or indirect legality,[8] or techno-bureaucratic compliance and accountability systems.[9]

 

For China the framing is somewhat different though it gets to substantially the same place. China would invert these once stable orientations of center and periphery[10]. That is essentially the point of the essay. In that reorientation, China occupies the center and its political-economic model the lodestar against which international or global standards must be developed and policed. To this way of looking at the world, the European-North American conversations around human rights represents a periphery. This peripheral construction of norms and application do not align either with the aspirations, context or historical conditions of the rest of the world. China would offer an alternative, one grounded on the imperatives of Marxist Leninist theory refined substantially from its crude Soviet forms and made more flexible so easier transposition to developing and post-colonial states. That, anyway, is the theory; but in some respects it parallels that of liberal democratic leadership.  True as well that this proffer is strategically projected against the current core of global liberal democratic leadership--but it is offered as an alternative with aspirations of leadership in its own right.  If successful, the object is to flip the current assumptions about center and periphery in business and human rights (among other policy structures).  At the end of the process, however, the rest of the global community remains located along the rim of a system still connected by spokes to a central ordering hub.

 

At the same time, the Chinese approach also offers another perspective on the nature effect of the interpenetration of sanctions mechanisms and human rights. Chinese human rights in the context of economic activities tends to privilege development, and collective welfare. It tends to balance the value of development to a community, and the utility of a project as a function of public objectives against the harms that may impact individuals. It tends to understand the value and role of civil and political rights,  first as collective, and second as a consequence of a successful forward movement to realize economic, social, and cultural rights (in the inverse of liberal democratic approaches from the U.S. side). In the context in which collective value is strong that balancing may tilt analysis toward compensatory remedies rather than prevention strategies.

 

Nonetheless, in many cases the practices of Chinese and liberal democratic business and human rights tends toward the same range of results.  The current objectives of Chinese Marxist Leninist business and human rights principles tends to favor legal compliance (domestic and foreign investment); to minimize risk (including human rights risks abroad); and to emphasize development and environmental concerns. But it also privileges and may well operate its human rights/sustainability policy from and through the lens of national security, broadly defined to include the protection of national aspirations for development, and a strong distaste for projection of foreign national regulatory measures (including human rights related and HRDD system requirements) into China and on its activities.  Chinese sanctions mirror of the liberal democratic West but also emphasize measures against foreign espionage, broadly defined, the protection of state secretes (even more broadly defined), and an energetic system of blocking measures that target either foreign projection of rule and behavior preferences into China or that affect Chinese interests abroad.

 

To this is added the global inclination to deploy sanctions based regimes on individuals and institutions. These are usually attached, directly or indirectly to national security interests (especially now that those interests tend to serve as the defining architecture of national interests). The U.S. Global Magnitsky Sanctions program is well known,[11] as is its intimate connect ion with U.S. nation al security framework. Thart has been clear irrespective e of the political principles of U.S. Presidential Administrations. All have sought to “target those connected to serious human rights abuse, corrupt actors, and their enablers, represents the best of the United States' values and enduring commitment to promoting respect for human rights and combatting corruption around the world,”[12]  with reference to the U.S. National Security Policy. The difference over the years has been the trajectories and interpretation of both national interests/threats and the definition of adverse impact. What is not different is the interpenetration of national security into sanctions based human rights protective legal/administrative measures.

 

And what of the rest of the world in this division of And the rest of thew world, including Canada? One imagines that they do what they have done since Thucydides recounted the limited options of Miletus encountered the Athenian diplomats during the Peloponnesian War—they resist and may be consumed, or they do what they can to survive, to watch; and eventually choose sides. Europeans have also begun to attend again to national security, but with greater wariness. And Canada found itself between China, the U.S. and Europe, but with its own history of hum an rights engagements that more deeply put it in the middle. Indeed, Canada might be said to occupy a space between these regulatory powers.  Canada must both navigate around these developing frameworks while advancing its own national vision and priorities.

 

That leaves the engines or objects of all of this conceptual activity—the enterprises through which economic activity is undertaken. For them, navigating compliance regimes becomes the centering function of their operations.  That centers, in turn, the functions of human rights due diligence (HRDD) systems. Yet the HRDD that emerges from these discussion are not those framed in 2011 in UNGP Principles 17-21, but rather those framed by 1st Pillar elaborations of expectations and policies for which HRDD becomes the instrument. Where those compliance regimes explain in polycentric spaces, and especially where these systems are incompatible or inconsistent, then one moves from the centrality of HRDD systems, to those of the coordinating provisions of UNGP Principle 23 (hierarchies of compliance) and Principle 24 (severity and prioritization of addressing impacts). Impacts, though, also acquire a new complexion under a national security driven human rights compliance based regime: hierarchy and severity might now be measured against priority in national security that then shapes the severity of impacts otherwise.

 

Dear Participants; dear attendees

 

4. Canada in the Middle.

 

It is with that in mind that these remarks will end by briefly focusing on two points. The first is the way that these national security regimes might impact Canadian firms inside and outside of Canada. Second, it will consider the Canadian national security landscape as it might begin to affect business and human rights along with sustainability efforts.

 

The Government of Canada through its public facing communications appears to try to take a middle ground respecting sanctions and in or through human rights lenses.[13] Canada also has its own version of a Global Magnitsky Law,[14] but it also seeks to serve as a vessel, a conduit, through which international norms, laws, and expectations are also fulfilled. The tripod of Canadian policy on sanctions, then, is built on  United Nations Act (UNA), the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA), and its version of Global Magnitsky (Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (JVCFOA)). Canadian institutions take the position that they must balance human rights and national security. This was articulated a while ago in the speech of the Hon. Anne Mactavish before the International Commission of Jurists in Ottawa in 2013. At the same time, the Canadian governments  communication on “Canada’s Approach to Advancing Human Rights” does not suggest a connection either to national security or sanctions. It speaks instead, to its adoption of key international instruments, and the promotion of capacity building and solidarity around  the orthodox conception and framing of human rights.

 

That suggests placing national security at the peripheries of human rights, and conceiving of sanctions as instrumental rather than normative elements. And, indeed, the political culture of Canada suggests that while the three are coordinated, human rights drives the others.[15] At the same time, it is also well known that Canada occupies a space between larger powers—normative powers, economic, political, military, and ideological powers. The predilections, sensibilities and human rights-national security cognitive cages of these were briefly described earlier. Canada, may preserve what it can of itself, and that most acutely within its territories and among its instrumentalities. Canada may maintain the lively debate about the context and manifestations of its own self most powerfully within itself, and then seek to project that outward through its state apparatus, through the efforts of its people, and its economic, social, civil, and political actors.

 

Yet it must engage in that activity mindful of the realities of an emerging global structure in which the old and comforting presumption of collective movement toward convergence has been shattered; a world in which the ideological and perception lenses of powerful actors with which Canada must deal may no longer be compatible with Canadian values but with which Canada must interact, and sometimes quite intimately. Canadian companies will be pulled into the compliance universe of States, like the United States and China, which, at the head of larger reconstructed collectives of like-minded States, are refashioning the spaces within which normative solidarity may be built and evidenced in  action.  The effects on Canadian enterprises, and on the application of Canadian values is unavoidable. And these center on the core issues of the organization of normative cores and peripheries among human rights and human rights protective regimes, and national security, with sanctions as an instrumental bridge between.

 

The shape of those challenges are already emerging. These include contests of value priorities with the United States, and the difficulty of fulfilling Canadian legal and compliance expectation in relationships with China. But it also includes the challenges of an instrumentalization of both human  rights and sanctions as tools that advance national interest and ideals, or perhaps their opposite producing a situation in which the instrument is valued but its application contested. That “middleness” shapes the complexities facing Canadian enterprises as well. That was noted above but acquires a Canadian face that adds further complexity.

 

Dear Participants; dear attendees

 

5. Flexibility, Conflict, and the Challenge of  Normative Peripheries in National Security and Human Rights Orders.

 

The key challenge for Canada, and indeed, all States,  in the emerging spaces of human rights, national security and sanctions, then, is to develop and rationalize a system of balancing. Canada may be able to engage in the discussions but the drivers of change and the formulation of ordering structures lie elsewhere. That engagement will help determine the very core principles of human rights in or as national security, and national security in or through a human rights lens, a conversation that at the moment, and at least for some, threatens the entirety of the human rights and sustainability project itself, or conversely would drown the protection of national security within an ether of inchoate and self-contradictory regimes of human rights. Choosing the centering element, human rights or national security has both substantial normative effects and operational implications. The U.S. and China provide glimpses of the differences, especially when compared to the international institutional and European approaches.

 

But Canada cannot live in its own head space—even as it seeks to project that meaningfully on global discussions. In the absence of balancing, the likelihood of conflict, and its negative human rights impacts may well move to the center of Canadian policy and normative debates. Like all other States, even the most powerful, Canada must navigate a national security-human rights universe  where values are factors in the development of relationships that may require compromise. Yet those values are worth debating and promoting, even as Canada protects itself in a world in which sovereign control increasingly becomes both central to national solidarity and contingent. 

 

What that leaves Canada, then, is the protection of its own values and ways of manifesting them in and as human rights through the fundamental and transactional notions of Chinese win-win and America First transaction arrangements. These center unequal  value transaction, or rather transactions in which there are no common values against which transactions are assessed.  The instrumentalization of ways of looking at the world are meant to advance very real actions and reduce resistance to action as well as the power of counteractions that challenge the attainment of State objectives. Human rights, sustainability, and national security now play a central role in the politics of these efforts in a world in which convergence has lost its luster. It is in this fractious context that Canada stands between the Eagle, the Dragon and the Bear, in a field of contestation in which human rights and national security vie for the ordering premise of national relations and human collective self-conception.

 

Where does that leave economic enterprises operating in national and transitional spaces? First it presents these actors with the challenges of operation in a conceptual spaces that are dynamic and contested. It substantially reduces the scope of discretionary decision making but in ways that may be different depending on national security and human rights driven performance rules and expectations. It presents enterprises with a host of situations where human rights privileging regimes  may make impossible compliance with national security rules and expectations. Mandatory human rights due diligence systems built on a European model and embraced to some extent in Canada, for example, may run up against the prohibitions and expectations of national security driven regulatory systems in China and the U.S., even where these also serve to advance human rights related policies.   

 

These trajectories then create incentives to reinforce the fracture of what had once been convergence based human rights advancing strategies in global economic policy. The reduction of challenges of dealing with incompatible compliance regimes may force investment and global supply chains to seek refuge within clusters of States that coordinate their compliance regimes within a shared values structure and to shift engagement with the from investment related relationships to those limited to transactions in goods  under terms negotiated between States.  It is in this way perhaps, that current developments reinforce the movement toward the solidification of Belt & Road and American First groups as the future referents on the emerging post-global “global” order.  

 

Thank you!

 



[2] Required to be produced under the Goldwater–Nichols Act and submitted annually to Congress, though submission has not been consistent with that intent.

[3] 2015, 2017, and 2022 NSS.

[9] e.g. here

[11] Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Sanctions: The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act; https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10576

[14]Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law), S.C. 2017, c. 21,Assented to 2017-10-18

[15]Eg here from 2008.

 

 

 






 









 

Announcement of Event organized by OHCHR’s Business and Human Rights Section on The Urgency of Helpdesks on Business and Human Rights (24 November 2025)

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 I have written in the past about the effort of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to create a sort of guidance apparatus for enterprises attempting to navigate the flexible borders and pathways of the UNGP, and especially those around human rights due diligence systems (see, (1) Establishing Effective Helpdesks on Business and Human Rights: Initial Consideration of the Challenges and Opportunities Suggested in OHCHR Human Rights Helpdesk Proposal(2) Establishing Effective Helpdesks on Business and Human Rights 26 June 2024, 14-15h Palais des Nations, Room XXII (in-person only) and Call for Inputs; (3) Coalition for Peace & Ethics: Input Statement for OHCHR UNGP Helpdesk Initiative.

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The project is an important contribution to the soft efforts to develop methods of capacity building around human rights due diligence specifically and the UNGP more generally.  At the same time while this guidance will be informed, it ought not necessarily be taken as authoritative, even if it is persuasive. The reason is simple: the UNGP was framed in a way to develop substantial flexibility and variation in its approaches. Within its construction and normative premises a host of choices may be made in conformity with the spirit and letter of the principles.  The U.N. and its apparatus, like the special procedures hovering around the interpretive enterprise (most critically the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights), like other interested actors, has developed a quite public set of political objectives around what may "best" be extracted from the UNGP and how it might "best" be instrumentalized toward those politically chosen ends. These are informed by the normative premises that shape the work of officials, especially those connected to the UN's Geneva apparatus (and those who want to be seen as useful to that apparatus). Those premises and the way they are translated into choices for fulfillment may not be universally shared, nor need they be! Still, all fair; all good faith efforts to advance normative agendas--and all perhaps persuasive--but not binding. Still capacity building that is informed by the limits and agendas of the capacity providers is always to be welcomed in advancing the UNGP project. And indeed, there is no reason that other organizations may not also institute their own Help Desk projects. Perhaps that is a project that the UN OHCHR might also champion. And, indeed, automating the help Desk function--including providing translation based services might well provide a basis for future development that focuses on capacity building rather than instruction on politically preferred choices or approaches. 

With that as background I am delighted to pass along an invitation sent by the marvelous Ben Shea, Human Rights Officer, Business and Human Rights Section, Thematic Engagement, Special Procedures and Right to Development Division, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights around an event designed to further effort to make the UNGP Help Desk a reality. 

It is my pleasure to invite you to an event organized by OHCHR’s Business and Human Rights Section on The Urgency of Helpdesks on Business and Human Rights, taking place on Monday, 24 Nov. 2025 @ 13:30 - 14:30 in Palais des Nations, Room VIII (Building A, 3rd floor).

This event will officially launch the OHCHR Business and Human Rights Helpdesk, a free, confidential resource available to all stakeholders to seek official OHCHR positions on the meaning and application of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). Please join us to learn more about the initiative and our plans, and to share your views on how the helpdesk can best serve States, business, civil society, rights holders and others.

Feel free to share this invitation with your colleagues and networks, and please kindly RSVP in advance to confirm your attendance.

Please consider participating if you can.  

Announcing PUblication of Issue 156 Vol 34 The Journal of Contemporary China

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I  am delighted to pass along a message from Professor Suisheng Zhao (赵穗生), and Editor of the Journal of Contemporary China (JCC) announcing the publication of Volume 34, Issue 156 (November 2025). The Issue may be viewed and the full text of the articles accessed online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjcc20/current.

The Table of Contents of the November 2025 issue of The Journal of Contemporary China follows below, with links. There are quite interesting articles on (1) Political Loyalty vs. Meritocracy in Contemporary Chinese Bureaucracy; (2) China’s Evolving Position on the Russo-Ukrainian War and Partnership with Russia (Part II, Part I in the September issue), and (3) China and Africa: Soft Power, Grand Strategy, and International Alignment (Part I).

 

 

Volume 34, Issue 156, November 2025 issue of The Journal of Contemporary China (JCC) is now published.

If the library of your institution subscribes to the JCC, you can view the full text of the article and others online at:http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjcc20/current.

For your convenience, below is the Table of Contents of the November 2025 issue of The Journal of Contemporary China.

 

Journal of Contemporary China 

Volume 34, Issue 156, November 2025

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Political Loyalty vs. Meritocracy in Contemporary Chinese Bureaucracy

 

Philip Saunders & Joel Wuthnow

Pages 919-933

 

Yingyao Wang

Pages 934-948

 

Minhui Zhou, Fubing Su & Ran Tao

Pages 949-970

 

Teng Si & Luyi Chen

Pages 971-990

 

China's Evolving Position on the Russo-Ukrainian War and Partnership with Russia (II)

 

Suisheng Zhao

Pages 991-1007

 

Yu Xu & Xiru Zhao

Pages 1008-1025

 

China and Africa: Soft Power, Grand Strategy, and International Alignment (I)

 

Yabo Wu

Pages 1042-1064

 

Mitsura Salaudeen & Steve Guo

Pages 1026-1041

 

Research Articles

 

Francisca Da Gama & Kim Bui

Pages 1065-1080

 

Dak Lhagyal

Pages 1081-1096


A Transformative Moment for the Politics of Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Rule of Law Building:The Norway Pension Fund Global System Temporarily Goes Dark

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It seems that the enthusiasm of Europeans around "doing something"  in the Israel-Hamas War that would signal their own predilections but cost them little has now produced something of a revolution in the operation of the Norway Pension Fund Global and its now deeply embedded system of investing in accordance with its Ethics Guidelines and to use its shareholder status to seek changes to corporate governance an actions as active shareholders. I have noted the approach taken by the Norwegian Pension Fund Global over a series of posts, most recently  (1) The Israel Cases Continue to Evolve the Jurisprudence of the Norway Pension Fund Global: Norges Banks Excludes Caterpillar and a Number of Israeli Banks from the Investment Universe of the Pension Fund Global; (2) Russians, "Settlers", and Corruption: The Norway Pension Fund Global Announces Three Decisions. The Noewegian position might have been thought to have aligned Norwegian thinking with that of certain elements in China on the global "Jewish Question" politely euphemized  as the "National problem" of a Jewish majority Israeli State among hostile neighbors (Bricolage: 习近平主席在十四届全国人大一次会议闭幕会上的重要讲话让海外华侨华人信心倍增 [President Xi Jinping’s important speech at the closing session of the 14th National People’s Congress has doubled the confidence of overseas Chinese] and 犹太利益集团势力庞大 美国无底线盲撑以色列 [The Jewish interest groups are powerful and the United States blindly supports Israel without any bottom line]).

That revolution was reported this way by IPE.com:

This summer, a furore erupted around the SWF because of its investment in companies linked to Israel’s war in Gaza as well as its occupation of the West Bank, which led to a hasty series of divestments, including the exclusion of the major US company Caterpillar— with the latter drawing disapproval from the US State Department.

On Tuesday, the Norwegian parliament voted in favour of a number of government proposals on the management of the GPFG, based on action that Stoltenberg had argued in a 23 October speech was necessary to preserve the fund’s nature as a financial investor, while living up to Norway’s international obligations. Parliament told the government to ensure the GPFG continued as a broadly diversified, global fund, with the aim of achieving the highest possible return at an acceptable risk, also requesting the government to review the fund’s ethical framework.

They also voted for the GPFG’s Council on Ethics to suspend recommendations on observation and exclusion, and for Norges Bank – which manages the fund via Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) – to hold off making decisions based on the old guidelines until a new ethical framework has been decided.

It seems that, as Global Capital Reported, that Norway's principles have a price which when high enough, may be too high to support.

The problem, perhaps, was not so much principle as it was a balancing of principle where that balancing was expressed through norms but realized through political decisionmaking around which Norway foud itself opposed by the United States--or more precisely by that sector of global markets in which U.S. companies operated and U.S. interests are implicated. In any case there is nothing particularly sacred or even robust about the Norwegian position--Norway has been irritated with,
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to use the old language
, "Jewish stubbornness" on the matter of Israel for some tome. Yet whatever one thinks about the issue of Israel and more importantly on the question of who bears responsibility for the deaths in Gaza, and its character (the popular view is that is the responsibility of the Jews, but another view is that it is Hamas itself that, having built their military apparatus atop civilian structures and having used the population to further its military aims including the holding of hostages as they engaged in  an all out war, bear primary responsibility for both Gazan casualties and for the manipulation of aid to further suffering; a third view suggests collusion in the latter efforts by the apparatus of the United Nations and their allies (including the murder of Gazans by Hamas and its allies for "collaboration"--but all of this will be sorted out in the public sphere eventually, one way or another), the markets have spoken, and they have spoken louder than  it is possible for those who manage segments of the investment universe to contain, manage or change to suit their own political/normative tastes and judgments. 

Aslak Skancke, Chief Advisor to the Council on Ethics of the Government Pension Find of the Kingdom of Norway sent this notice to people on the NPFG listserve:

On November 4, the Norwegian Parliament asked the government to review the Fund’s ethical framework. In response, the Ministry of Finance has introduced temporary ethical guidelines and amended the management mandate. These changes will remain in effect until a new ethical framework is established.  During this interim period, the Council on Ethics will continue to monitor the fund’s investments to identify companies that contribute to or are responsible for production or behavior that violates the guidelines.  The Council will not make recommendations on observation or exclusion but will inform Norges Bank about companies it identifies for potential ownership engagement. Norges Bank will not make decisions on observation or exclusion but will follow up with companies through its regular ownership practices in accordance with the management mandate.  As a result, you should expect that notifications regarding exclusions or observations will be limited to revocations of existing exclusions.
The Government issued the following Press Release: The Government Follows Up on the Parliament’s Decision Regarding the Ethical Framework for the Pension Fund (Press release | No: 50 |Date: 7/11/2025)

On November 4, the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) requested that the government review the ethical framework for the Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG).Today, the King in Council appointed a public committee that will evaluate the ethical framework and other aspects relating to the responsible management of the GPFG.

"This review is necessary to safeguard the pension fund and key considerations. We must find a balance between the principles the fund is meant to uphold. The committee has important work ahead," said Minister of Finance Jens Stoltenberg.

The current ethical guidelines were last amended by the Ministry of Finance in 2021, following broad support by the Parliament. A unanimous Parliament affirmed that the fund has two equally important ethical objectives. One is to generate returns and safeguard values for current and future generations, and the second, to ensure the fund is not invested in companies that cause or contribute to serious violations of ethical norms. The committee’s mandate underlines how Norway is currently facing its most serious security policy situation since World War II. Companies’ value chains are increasingly complex, often involving a wide network of subcontractors from multiple countries. Moreover, the distinction between military and civilian technology has become more blurred.

"It is increasingly difficult to draw a clear line and to determine what constitutes a contribution to serious violations of fundamental ethical norms. We all benefit from having a framework that reflects the reality we currently live in," said Stoltenberg. The committee will assess and propose changes to the ethical framework and relevant aspects regarding the responsible management of the pension fund.

Committee Members:

  • Svein Gjedrem, economist (Chair); Annie Bersagel, director; Alexander Wright Cappelen, professor; Marius Emberland, professor; Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, professor; Hanne Eggen Røislien, researcher; Arthur Sletteberg, CEO; Ulf Sverdrup, professor; Karen Helene Ulltveit-Moe, professor

 Change is certainly coming; and it is likely to spill over from the Israel issue to other far more significant normative conversations. We shall see. In the meantime,the Pension Fund Global goes dark as Norway reconsiders the best way that instrument can be used ti project Norwegian power in transnational private spaces. That after all is what this is all about (Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Rule of Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets).

 

The Triumph of the Transactional: UN Security Council Adoptis U.S. Drafted UN Security Council Resolution on the Situation in the Middle East

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It appears that the United States has at least temporarily out maneuvered the Russian and and Chinese in developing a framework for the temporary establishment of a cessation of hostilities in Gaza under the framework of a state of some sort for Palestinians, one which presumably would be and remain Jew free. 
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The UN Security Council adopted a resolution on Monday that endorses a peace plan for Gaza put forward by United States President Donald Trump and a temporary international force in the enclave following two years of war. Resolution 2803 (2025) received 13 votes in favour, and none against, with permanent members China and Russia abstaining. The text welcomes the Comprehensive Plan announced by President Trump on 29 September. The first phase of the 20-point plan led to the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel days later. The resolution also welcomes the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP) “as a transitional administration” in Gaza that will coordinate reconstruction efforts. It authorizes the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza “to deploy under unified command acceptable to the BoP”. Countries will contribute personnel to the force “in close consultation and cooperation” with Egypt and Israel.  (UN Security Council authorizes temporary international force for Gaza).

"The text, which was revised several times as a result of high-stakes negotiations, "endorses" the US president's plan, which allowed for a fragile ceasefire between Israel and Hamas to take hold on October 10 in the war-wracked Palestinian territory." (Le Monde) For my commentary on the United States Plan see  (1) America First as a Template for the Global: Text of the U.S. Cease-Fire Plan for Gaza; (2) America First--Text of President Trump's Address to the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem - October 13, 2025; (3) "The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity" Dialogical Reflections on the Tractability of the Intractable. The endorsement represents a triumph of the transactional elements of the United States in its new era of historical development, one that embraces the cognitive qualities of the "merchant" and dismisses the older narratives of the "official" in framing  a ceasefire where the cognitive divide between the parties remains vibrant and unbridgeable ("They Shoot Horses Don't They?". . . . The "Jewish Problem" in "Palestine" as Performed by the State Inmates of that Asylum of Politics).

 And, indeed, one sees in the differences between the American position (successful this time around) and that of the Chinese and Russians the disjuncture between merchant and functionary approachs (generally here: The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"--The Cognitive Cages of the New Apex Post-Global and the Condition of the U.S. and China in their Folie à Deux). This was nicely captured in reporting by Stefano Vaccara (Security Council Approves US Resolution for International Force in Gaza:  Trump's plan passes: Resolution 2803 for the stabilization force (ISF) receives 13 votes in favor; Russia and China abstain without vetoes):

 Russia abstained, warning that the plan risks undermining the prospect of “two peoples, two states” and gives the international force powers of “peace enforcement” that would turn it into a party to the conflict, despite the fact that, as Moscow pointed out, none of the potential contributing countries has said it is willing to take on such a mandate. The Russian delegation also denounced the danger that the resolution could become a cover for political-military “experiments” conducted by the United States and Israel in the Occupied Territories, citing previous initiatives by Washington that, in its view, ended with results opposite to those declared.

China justified its abstention by denouncing the text as “vague” on the structure and powers of the Peace Council and the International Stabilization Force, arguing that the resolution offers “too little visibility to the Palestinians” and does not sufficiently reaffirm either Palestinian sovereignty or the two-state principle. Beijing also criticized the negotiation process as “hasty and lacking in consultation” and contested the limited role envisaged for the United Nations.

And one sees in the triumph of the "merchant" transactional framework the essence of the America First approach--one that builds transactional relationships and approaches issues from the centering perspective of the United States then connected to the welfare of those with whom the Americans deal.  "This will not be a traditional UN mission: it is an autonomous multinational force, composed of military contingents provided by countries that will have to accept a common chain of command. According to media reports, cited among others by the New York Times, countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Qatar, Turkey, and Azerbaijan have already expressed preliminary willingness, but only in the face of clear authorization from the Council, which has now been given." (Security Council Approves US Resolution for International Force in Gaza). And the leadership of this effort falls squarely to the Americans , operationalized through its relationships with its partners in MENA. That these partners are a boisterous bunch is irrelevant--it is the coalescing around the transaction, and the hopes of its mutual benefit that produces the AmericaFirst variation of the Chinese Belt & Road win-win approach that has, to thsi point, driven the process forward--one transaction at a time. 

The Remarks at the UN Security Council Stakeout Following the Adoption of a U.S. Drafted UN Security Council Resolution on the Situation in the Middle East both follows below.

 

 

6 MINUTE READ
November 17, 2025

Ambassador Mike Waltz
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
New York, New York

AS DELIVERED

Thank you, Mr. President.

Colleagues, for two agonizing years, Gaza—home to over two million souls—has been a crucible of conflict, a hell on earth, where Hamas’ brutality and terror met Israel’s fierce response, leaving rubble where schools once stood and graves where playgrounds thrived. The death toll climbs into the tens of thousands, hunger gnaws at the vulnerable, and hope flickers like a candle in a storm. But colleagues, here today—November 17th—we stand at a crossroads. Today, we have the power to douse the flames and light a path to peace.

That path is the draft United Nations Security Council resolution before us—a bold, pragmatic blueprint born from President Trump’s 20-point Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, forged in the fires of diplomacy with Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, [Jordan], Türkiye, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Those countries stood with President Trump—right back here in this very chamber, right in this room. They stood with him during the UN General Assembly High Level Week just eight weeks ago and they have now publicly stood for this resolution. Over a dozen European heads of state, including the EU, the Secretary-General, and Mahmoud Abbas stood with President Trump then at Sharm El-Sheikh after he presented his plan to the Israeli Knesset. So colleagues I ask you before this vote: with this kind of support, I ask you if the region most affected, the Arab nations, the Muslim majority nations, the Palestinians, and the Israelis can accept this resolution, how could anyone be against it? There is an old saying where I come from: “you can’t be more Catholic than the Pope.” And I ask everyone today, are you more righteous in this cause than those who must live with it and will ultimately benefit from this plan for peace?

This resolution, colleagues, is no mere paper promise; it’s a lifeline. The resolution endorses a hard-won ceasefire. And I thank Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. I thank my dear friend Jared Kushner who forged what so many people said was impossible. The living hostages released. There is still more absolutely to go with families suffering, but we have a ceasefire that is holding. Their plan has already silenced the guns and freed 45 hostages in this fragile, fragile first step. And let me be clear—the United States remains committed to ensuring that the remains of the last three hostages held by Hamas must come home.

The resolution authorizes the International Stabilization Force—a strong coalition of peacekeepers, many from Muslim-majority nations like Indonesia, Azerbaijan, and others—to deploy under a unified command. These brave souls will secure Gaza’s streets, they will oversee demilitarization, they will protect civilians, and they will escort aid through safe corridors, all while Israel phases out its presence and a vetted Palestinian police force takes on a new role.

At the heart of this plan, colleagues. lies the Board of Peace, a transitional administration with an international, coordinating reconstruction financing from a dedicated trust fund—backed by the World Bank itself—to rebuild shattered lives. Homes, hospitals, schools—that’s what we will see with this resolution. Not talking points, but actual deliverables. And crucially, per the carefully negotiated language in the 20 Point Plan, this resolution charts a possible pathway for Palestinian self-determination, after the Palestinian Authority has completed the necessary reforms, where rockets will give way to olive branches and there is a chance to agree on a political horizon. It dismantles Hamas’ grip, it ensures Gaza rises free from terror’s shadow, prosperous and secure.

Now colleagues, we hear critics whispering of challenges—Russia has had a counter-draft, we hear concerns over mandates—but, colleagues, hesitation here is the true enemy. We’ve seen ceasefires crumble before; we cannot repeat the definition of insanity here by doing the same thing that was done before. And by returning to the same frameworks and same talking points that will doom us to repeat this horror all over again. Delaying will cost lives: and every day without this force, aid trucks lie idle, children starve, and extremists regroup to try and maintain control. So colleagues, voting yes today isn’t just endorsing a plan; it’s affirming our shared humanity. It’s telling Gaza’s and Israel’s mothers that the world has not forgotten them.

Adopting this resolution today will prove the United Nations can still be a beacon, and not just a bystander.

Colleagues, the eyes of history—and humanity—are upon us—right here, right now. A vote against this resolution is a vote to return to war. Time is not on the side of peace. This is not the time for endless debate and lawyering. The clock is ticking, like a timebomb. So, let us vote for this resolution not as a compromise, but as a covenant. For the children of Gaza. And for peace that endures. And for a Middle East reborn.

Mr. President, I thank you.

###

 

6 MINUTE READ
November 17, 2025

Ambassador Mike Waltz
U.S. Representative to the United Nations
New York, New York

AS DELIVERED

Good evening, everyone, and thank you for joining us for what is truly a historic moment at the United Nations.

Today marks a turning point—not just for Gaza, not just for the Middle East, but for what international cooperation under President Trump’s leadership can achieve when we choose diplomacy over destruction, when we choose stability over suffering, and peace over perpetual conflict.

Today, the United Nations proved it can be great again.

The United Nations today proved it can be a beacon for peace, not just a bystander.

The United Nations Security Council has just adopted the United States sponsored resolution on Gaza that does something we haven’t seen in generations: it provides a real, actionable pathway to lasting peace for Palestinians and Israelis.

And I would encourage everyone around the world, and I would certainly encourage the media to read the entire resolution. Read the whole thing. It is truly a victory for everyone who believes in a future where the Palestinian people can determine their own destiny, and where they can have a future free of the grip of Hamas terrorists.

This is what the United Nations was created to do: to make pathways for real, tangible, and actionable peace.

So, let me be clear: this resolution, and the progress it represents, would not have been possible without President Trump’s bold leadership and his vision. Folks, just weeks ago, literally just weeks ago, the Middle East was mired in conflict. Hostages remained in tunnels, in captivity. Palestinians in Gaza suffered in a hell on earth as the war raged on.

Then President Trump secured a historic peace deal—with the critical support of Qatar, Egypt, and Türkiye. Hostages came home to their families, and we are still working to bring home the remaining three hostages who remain in Gaza. But we’ve also seen massive humanitarian aid began flowing into Gaza, an average of 660 trucks per day since the ceasefire. So, we saw the region in chaos just weeks ago. It took its first real step towards peace.

And today, the United Nations solidified that into international law. Today, the Security Council built on that foundation.

And I want to thank our partners and allies on the Council for their support, who stood with us in this moment. But particularly the support from our regional partners. From our Arab partners and the Muslim majority countries. It has been absolutely indispensable. I can’t overemphasize it.

The United States, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Türkiye stood together in support of this resolution and President Trump’s plan. Then you have the endorsement from the gathering at Sharm el-Sheikh, where over 20 countries, over a dozen from Europe, including the European Union, supported this comprehensive approach, and demonstrated that the region is ready for change.

Folks, the region is tired of the same old talking points, the same old solutions that have never worked. The region is ready to break the cycle of violence. And what we saw here is once the Arabs, Muslim majority nations, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel indicated that we could move forward, with the plan laid forth in this resolution, we then turned to the Council and said: How could you stand against it?

So, what does the resolution actually do? I just want to take a moment to lay out a couple of key points:

First, the Security Council has endorsed President Trump’s historic 20-Point Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict;

It welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace as a transitional administration for Gaza that will oversee and support a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for day-to-day government services;

It underscores the critical importance of humanitarian assistance for the people of Gaza;

And it authorizes an International Stabilization Force to stabilize the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, including the destruction and prevention of rebuilding the military, terror, and offensive infrastructure. It also ensures the decommissioning from Hamas and its partners.

All of this will allow for a Gaza Strip that is finally free of Hamas’ terror and reign.

This resolution represents the first real step in generations towards forging a lasting peace for Gaza, for Palestinians, for Israelis, and for the entire region. And I want to be clear, the United States made it clear, President Trump, Secretary Rubio, my good friend Jared Kushner, Special Envoy Witkoff, we all made it clear that a vote against this resolution was a vote to return to war.

So, thanks to our actions here today, and President Trump’s bold, cleareyed leadership, a stable, a safe, and a prosperous future in the Middle East is now finally within reach.

Thank you.

###

Larry Catá Backer, "Smart Court, Smarter Party: A Necessary but Incomplete Interpenetration" [智慧法院,智慧党:必要但不完全的相互渗透] (European China Law Research Hub)

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Over the last several years, the folks over at the European Chinese Law Research Hub (with thanks to Marianne von Blomberg, Editor ECLR Hub, Research Associate, Chair for Chinese Legal Culture, University of Cologne) have published a set of summaries of marvelous and cutting edge work on Chinese law, policy and theory. For their next postings they have started a series "Smart Courts and Smart Governance in China" which reflects  the work shared at a conference workshop held at the University of Cologne this past summer. The have been kind enough to start with my contribution to that effort, Smart Court, Smarter Party: A Necessary but Incomplete Interpenetration [智慧法院,智慧党:必要但不完全的相互渗透。]

 Von Blomberg does an excellent job summarizing the gist f the argument.  Perhaps the central point of which is this one: 

Struggle to realize the overall assignments of the new era

为实现新时期总任务而奋斗 (1978)

Chinese governance is structured around interpenetration—the mutual embeddedness of Party and State institutions. Historically, this interpenetration has been managed through personal-bureaucratic forms: overlapping roles, dual appointments, and ideological campaigns. In the digital age, however, interpenetration is reconfigured through data flows, predictive modeling, and feedback loops.

The smart court, then, is not just a site of dispute resolution but a generator of political data—inputs and outputs that reflect the health of Party ideology and administrative discipline. To oversee such a system, the Party must itself become a digitally competent, analytically capable, and ideologically precise actor.

This is no small task. It means building a digitally-enhanced Party apparatus that can assess court behavior, monitor ideological conformity, and even model the likely impact of judicial decisions—all without becoming a mere appendage of the technologies it deploys.

The smart court exemplifies both the achievements and the contradictions of China’s New Era. On the one hand, it reflects the success of socialist modernization: the integration of productivity-enhancing technologies into governance. On the other hand, it surfaces a contradiction between human-led ideological guidance and machine-augmented decision-making. Two key contradictions define the current moment. First, the contradiction between the leadership of the Party and its capacity to lead in a tech-driven environment. Second, the contradiction between technology as instrument and technology as autonomous force. Both must be addressed if the CPC is to retain its position as the core of the political-economic order.

Pix credit here ("Turn Philosophy into a Sharp Weapon of the Masses)
中国的治理结构围绕着相互渗透——党和国家机构的相互嵌入——而构建。历史上,这种相互渗透是通过人事官僚形式来管理的:角色重叠、双重任命和意识形态宣传。然而,在数字时代,相互渗透正通过数据流、预测模型和反馈循环进行重构。

因此,智慧法院不仅是解决争端的场所,也是政治数据的生成器——其输入和输出反映了党的意识形态和行政纪律的健康状况。为了监督这样一个系统,党自身必须成为一个具备数字化能力、分析能力和意识形态精准性的行动者。

这绝非易事。这意味着要构建一个数字化增强的党政机构,能够评估法院行为、监控意识形态一致性,甚至模拟司法判决的潜在影响——所有这些都不能使其沦为所部署技术的附属品。

智慧法院既体现了中国新时代的成就,也揭示了其矛盾之处。一方面,它反映了社会主义现代化的成功:将提高生产力的技术融入治理之中。另一方面,它也暴露了人为主导的意识形态指导与机器辅助决策之间的矛盾。当前形势下存在两大关键矛盾。首先,是党的领导能力与其在技术驱动环境下的领导能力之间的矛盾。其次,是技术作为工具与技术作为自主力量之间的矛盾。如果中国共产党想要继续保持其在政治经济秩序中的核心地位,就必须解决这两个矛盾。

I am cross posting the essay below. The original ECLRH post may be accessed HERE. ACCESS PAPER HERE: Backer_SmartRegulation_ECLSA2025_v2

 And as a plug for the marvelous work at the European Chinese Law Research Hub: if you have observations, analyses or pieces of research that are not publishable as a paper but should get out there, or want to spread event information, calls for papers or job openings, or have a paper forthcoming- do not hesitate to contact Marianne von Bloomberg.


 

 

Smart Court, Smarter Party: A Necessary but Incomplete Interpenetration

By Larry Catá Backer

 
This is contribution #1 in our series SMART COURTS AND SMART GOVERNANCE IN CHINA, outcome of our workshop in July 2025 at Cologne University.

The idea of “smart courts” has become a globally shared ambition. From the European Commission’s “Digitalisation of Justice” toolbox to the U.S. judiciary’s call for more efficient digital infrastructures, and with examples emerging from Egypt to Tanzania, the movement to enhance the judicial function with technology is a planetary phenomenon. Yet, as I explored during the workshop Smart Courts in Comparative Perspective at the University of Cologne this July, no national project invites as much theoretical scrutiny—and perhaps as much political resonance—as China’s.

China has given this movement a name—or at least rebranded the product of the alignment of technology and the courts: Smart courts, zhihui fayuan智慧法院. The name suggests an alignment on the ground that is both linguistic and textual in the operational spaces of courts. Over the last decade or so, and through its Supreme People’s Court, Chinese officials have led a national effort to modernize the judicial system through the use of emerging technologies. Like other modernization pathways elsewhere, the goals include enhancing access to justice and ensuring that access provides pathways toward just outcomes. Since December 2024, these efforts also include an artificial intelligence platform to help judges improve work efficiency.

But names sometimes are a distraction.  And that appeared to be the case with Chinese smart courts. The name became a vessel into which people could pour their larger fears about the transformations they feared most—that the people would no longer be their own masters but would serve technology even as technology appeared to serve them. It is no surprise, then, as Susan Finder relates in her examination of the Supreme People’s Court 2024 Work Report to the National People’s Congress, that the term “smart courts” appears to have been dropped.

Nevertheless, “smart courts” have become not merely a symbol of digital reform but a mirror reflecting deeper ideological and systemic transformations. What appears at first to be a techno-administrative modernization effort quickly reveals itself to be an exercise in high-stakes governance theory. The central question I pursued: Can a digitally advanced judiciary maintain alignment with a ruling party that is not itself digitally transformed? In other words, can a smart court operate effectively without a smart Party?

From Robot Courts to Zombie States?

The study of “smart” or “intelligent,” or “wise” courts  can be approached from a large number of perspectives. I start from the ordering premise that these “smart” courts can be understood as an object, and also as a symbol or signified conception, and lastly as the set of objects and behaviors that produces its own meaning through its own dialectical phenomenology—that being by doing. This amalgamation of objects and symbols is a matter central to the continued evolution, in human society, of the notion and practice of judging, and of institutions of judging to which it is both attached and to which it lends meaning. But an object and symbol of what?

The term “smart court” evokes both utopian promise and dystopian anxiety. While the ambition of the People’s Republic of China has been to develop courts that are faster, more accessible, and more consistent, the term has also sparked deeper fears—especially outside China—of robot judges, automated justice, and dehumanized legality. This isn’t merely science fiction. Rather, as I suggested during my talk, these fears can be metaphorically grouped into a three-course cautionary tale.

First, courts risk being consumed by the very technology meant to assist them. Their core identity shifts from a site of judgment to a platform for automated processing. Second, courts may begin to consume their stakeholders—litigants, judges, and lawyers—by reducing them to data points in algorithmic workflows. Third, courts may consume themselves, becoming mechanisms of predictive governance rather than instruments of legal deliberation.

Such risks are not unique to China. But within China’s governance model, they raise particularly intense contradictions—especially the one between technology-led modernization and Marxist-Leninist political control.

Semantics Matter: What Is “Smart”?

Much of the misunderstanding about smart courts, I argue, stems from the loaded semantics of “smartness” itself. In English, “smart” blends quick wit, technological capacity, and sometimes pain (its etymology rooted in “to sting”). In Chinese, however, the distinction is sharper. Zhìnéng (智能) points to technical capability—what we associate with AI and data-driven systems. Zhìhuì (智慧), by contrast, suggests discernment, judgment, and wisdom.

This duality—between instrumental intelligence and human wisdom—is crucial. Smart courts, if they are to serve justice rather than mere efficiency, must retain a core of hui: the human capacity to judge wisely. In the Chinese political imagination, this is ideally embodied by the judge and the collective judiciary. But what happens when the source of wisdom—traditionally human—is threatened by ever-smarter systems?

Tech as Instrument, or as Actor?

China’s digital judiciary remains in a transitional phase—digitisation more than full digitalisation. The emphasis is still on improving efficiency: filing systems, access to records, online hearings. Yet, the horizon is shifting. Predictive analytics, caselaw modeling, and AI-assisted adjudication point to an emerging reality where tech not only facilitates justice but begins to shape its substance.

This introduces a profound conceptual tension. As technology moves from being “smart” (responsive and efficient) to potentially “wise” (autonomous and analytical), it also shifts from being a tool to being an actor. This challenges long-standing assumptions about who—or what—gets to decide within a legal system.

The Smart Court Needs a Smart Party

This transformation becomes most consequential in China, where courts are not isolated institutions but deeply embedded within a Party-led governance model. The CPC is not just a political overseer but the ideological architect of the judiciary’s function. Here, smart courts demand something deeper: a smart Party.

By “smart,” I mean a Party apparatus that itself incorporates digital technologies not only in surveillance and administration, but in its very processes of leadership, assessment, and ideological guidance. Without such a transformation, an asymmetry emerges: the courts grow in techno-capacity, while the Party lags in digital adaptability. That gap threatens to destabilize the very premise of Party-led governance.

Rethinking Interpenetration: Court and Party

Chinese governance is structured around interpenetration—the mutual embeddedness of Party and State institutions. Historically, this interpenetration has been managed through personal-bureaucratic forms: overlapping roles, dual appointments, and ideological campaigns. In the digital age, however, interpenetration is reconfigured through data flows, predictive modeling, and feedback loops.

The smart court, then, is not just a site of dispute resolution but a generator of political data—inputs and outputs that reflect the health of Party ideology and administrative discipline. To oversee such a system, the Party must itself become a digitally competent, analytically capable, and ideologically precise actor.

This is no small task. It means building a digitally-enhanced Party apparatus that can assess court behavior, monitor ideological conformity, and even model the likely impact of judicial decisions—all without becoming a mere appendage of the technologies it deploys.

The smart court exemplifies both the achievements and the contradictions of China’s New Era. On the one hand, it reflects the success of socialist modernization: the integration of productivity-enhancing technologies into governance. On the other hand, it surfaces a contradiction between human-led ideological guidance and machine-augmented decision-making. Two key contradictions define the current moment. First, the contradiction between the leadership of the Party and its capacity to lead in a tech-driven environment. Second, the contradiction between technology as instrument and technology as autonomous force. Both must be addressed if the CPC is to retain its position as the core of the political-economic order.

Ultimately, one must come to understand, or at least consider the plausibility, of a principle that under New Era Chinese Marxist-Leninism, the state apparatus can only be as “smart,” intelligent” and “wise” as it is in the capacity and operations of the Party to do likewise. In the presence of asymmetry two fundamental contradictions must be addressed. The first is the contradiction between the leadership of the Party and its capacity to lead. The second is between the techno-instruments through which Party capacity is undertaken and the ability of the Party apparatus to steer, guide, assess, control and utilize these instruments in the performance of its own duties and responsibilities. The fundamental issue of instrumentalization and capacity remains undisturbed—the more autonomous the technology, the greater the risk that  the relationship between instrument and its wielders will be reversed, at least in part. In the absence of a capacity to understand and manage those contradictions, either organs better capacitated to wield techno-instrumentalized applications and processes will drive human collective systems, or human collective systems may become an instrument through which techno-wisdom  intelligence may realize its own vision for techno-human perfectibility.  

Implications Beyond China

While my analysis focuses on the Chinese context, the underlying challenges are global. Whether in Europe, the U.S., or elsewhere, legal systems face similar dilemmas: How to preserve human judgment in algorithmic environments? How to ensure accountability when decisions are guided by machine learning? How to maintain institutional integrity when data becomes both input and output? China’s smart court project offers a provocative case study. It forces us to confront not only what technology can do for justice, but what it might do to justice—and who, in the end, will be wise enough to decide.

About the Author
Larry Catá Backer is the W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law and International Affairs at Pennsylvania State University. His work focuses on Chinese governance, transnational law, and political theory.

Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) Hearing :"China’s War on Religion: The Threat to Religious Freedom and Why it Matters to the United States"

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Pix credit here ()ing; Shuili Ritual Painting)

 I have been following the work of the  Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) for some time.  Essays HERE: CECC. CECC serves as an important venue for the dissemination of official positions of the United States on its relationship with China.  Its prior leaders includes current Secretary of State Rubio.  It is also an official space in which debates or positions that might be taken by the State, or what may serve as encouragement for private action, might be developed.   

CECC has a fairly comprehensive range of issues on which it focuses.  CECC issue areas include Access to JusticeBusiness and Human RightsCivil SocietyCriminal JusticeDevelopments in Hong Kong and MacauEthnic Minority RightsFreedom of ExpressionFreedom of ReligionFreedom of Residence and MovementHuman Rights Violations in the U.S. and GloballyHuman TraffickingInstitutions of Democratic GovernanceNorth Korean Refugees in ChinaPopulation ControlPublic HealthStatus of WomenThe Environment and Climate ChangeTibetWorker Rights; and Xinjiang.

Among the more important issues of interest to CECC has been a cluster of related issues and actions which are categorized as falling within the category "Freedom of Religion."One of the key points of divergence between liberal democratic, theocratic, and Marxist Leninist approaches to social organizaiton touches on the matter of religion.  Theocratic systems, of course, center a specific religion and its grounding premises for social, economic, moral, and ritual ordering. It sees and understands the world from the perspective of religious beliefs, performances and the expectations that are drawn from it. Religion, and the specific one foregrounded, define and frame the reality within which it is possible to rationalize the world and order individual and collective human  life appropriately. The core beliefs of that religion must be vigorously protected from internal corruption and external threat. Apostasy merges with treason; difference is gauged by reference to the system of behavior and belief expectations built into the religious system; and sometimes that produces the theology (expressed through law and practice, as well as the resulting social custom), of toleration, but sometimes not.

Liberal democratic systems, after centuries of warfare and violence--often brutal--that in the end failed to extirpate heresy, corruption, apostasy and rival religious lebenswelt (also bent on privileged domination as the generative premises around which reality and social relations must be ordered), produced both exhaustion and compromise. That exhaustion and compromise created a complicated affair--one the one hand it encouraged the sort of minority cleansing, indeed refined it, in ways that the resulting ordered world now believes is naughty and wrong, but from which they profited in terms of stability through segregation, relocaton,  and sometimes extermination (e.g., the wars of the Protestant Reformation, the constant passive aggressive instrumentalization of Jews, and like theocratic states (to this day), the "infidelization" of the other). But from out of that blood offering to the various gods served by them, including, later, the gods of reason and scientism, emerged a stability grounded in the de-naturing of the religious aspects of communal life  (de-sacralization) and the template for what--after a series of more bloodshed, violence and inter-religious social segregation--produced two more or less workable premises . The first was grounded on the formal de-prioritization of religion in for formal performances of political and economic life. Certainly the forms of state religion were maintained, but, with sometimes more and sometimes less performative theatrics and ritual, an ecology of religious communities was recognized, tolerated, and then, more or less equalized in their relation to the state. In the process, the ethics, morals, and values of religion (sometimes from the dominant religion, sometimes in the form of a cocktail of related beliefs, sensibilities and expectation) were transposed from out of the sacred and into the political (though of course also reflecting the religious views to whicvh connection could be made). And the second was grounded in market ideologies, or at least its mechanics. Religions, like other objects, could be understood as commodities (in this case of tastes, beliefs, values, and performances) in competition with other similar commodities (including non-religion) in markets for adherents. That implied two significant changes from theocratic systems. One touched on the increasing protection of entry and exit from religious communities; that is people could consume, embrace, or reject any form of religious community proffered for their review and "purchase." Apostasy might remain a religious concept but the State and its power would not be used to police it, nor would the State tolerate private measures to enforce or coerce continued belonging to one religious community or another. The other more tightly regulated State preference for one or another of religious systems "in the market" for belief.  

 Marxist-Leninist systems appear, in various degrees that change over time and appear differently from one local context to another, to combine portions of both theocratic and liberal democratic approaches. Sometimes religion is suppressed entirely; sometimes it is tolerated but adherence results in certain political. economic, and/or social burdens. And sometimes the Marxist-Leninist vanguard is more or less indifferent, at least to the extent that whatever it is that is going on in and as a religious community does not interfere with the or challenge the leadership, aims, policies, and expectations of the political vanguard organized as and operating within the leading Communist Party. Yet this creates a problem. If the fundamental ordering principle of a Marxist Leninist State is the conception of the nation as a collective organized as and around a vanguard (Communist Party), and if its leadership and guidance must necessarily extent to all aspects of economic, social, cultural, and political life, then the issue of the recognition, but less the tolerance of religious communities autonomous of that leadership and subject to its guidance becomes, to some greater or lesser degree, problematic. One solution, drawing ironically on a similar (though temporary) resolution in medieval Europe, was to ensure that religious communities might be tolerated, but they must be subject to regulation by the State. That regulation might be substantially intrusive including the power to review and approve the selection of ministers of the faith (e.g., China-Vatican Agreement), and of the preaching, sermonizing, and theological development of those religious communities where these might be deemed to threaten the political order, that is the core premises and expectations of collective organizaiton, under a Marxist-Leninist political-economic model. At the limit, a Marxist-Leninist system that finds itself threatened can suppress religious communities that cannot otherwise be "digested" within the larger framework within which collective life is to be organized.  Where religious communities resist or seek to exist beyond the reach of the political-economic model, the response of the state will be as harsh, and perhaps as ruthless, as that expected from similar threats to theocratic systems. These then acquire "Chinese characteristics" that go back to the founding premises of the Empire now made relevant within a Marxist-Leninist structural and normative context. 

It is in this context that one can see how the fundamental approaches of liberal democratic (American version) and Marxist-Leninist) Chinese system on matters of religion might not be both incompatible, but also serve as a point of division into which intervention and political responses are almost inevitable. The issue becomes more complicated still, where actions present fundamental incompatibilities with both theocratic and liberal-democratic systems, and where the suppression (from an outsider perspective) or system protection/solidarity mechanisms (from an insider perspective)  becomes violent and coercive. (displacements, confinement, re-education, etc.). It is with that in mind that one might more usefully approach the now long standing  and quite substantial gap between the core values of theocratic, liberal democratic and Marxist-Leninist states not just appear, but also appear to make responses inevitable. That is, to some extent, because the "effects" of one system in matters of religion can be deeply felt in others (e.g., Falun Gong), and is intensified where religious difference is tied to ethnic division and perhaps to some extent, identity) (e.g., Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang). 

That the the arena in which CECC has been vigorously projecting its views and values in the marketplace for public opinion and social/`political action for some time.  While the practices of theocratic states appears to be less worrisome to the Americans and American values for some reason (except perhaps when one speaks to Jewish values in multi-religious in Israel), the practices of Marxist-Leninist States in that respect tend to trigger the American political (and religious) classes to a far greater and more immediate effect. Thus the organization and formatting of the CECC hearing, , held 20 November 2025.

 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has intensified its drive for absolute control over religion, insisting that believers subordinate conscience and conviction to the Party and to General Secretary Xi Jinping. This is not incidental to the PRC’s domestic agenda or international influence; it is a core feature of Party rule, reflected in sweeping regulations on religion and detentions, surveillance, and harassment targeting believers and groups operating outside official bounds. The hearing will spotlight escalating repression targeting all of China’s diverse religious communities and examine why the CCP’s assault on freedom of religion matters for the United States. (CECC Press Release/Concept Note

The Opening Statements and Witness Testimony, along with the Hearing "Concept Note" follows below. All may be accessed HERE. along with links to the video recording of the Hearing.

  

 

Thursday, November 20, 2025 - 9:30am - Thursday, November 20, 2025 - 11:30am
106 Dirksen Senate Office Building

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has intensified its drive for absolute control over religion, insisting that believers subordinate conscience and conviction to the Party and to General Secretary Xi Jinping. This is not incidental to the PRC’s domestic agenda or international influence; it is a core feature of Party rule, reflected in sweeping regulations on religion and detentions, surveillance, and harassment targeting believers and groups operating outside official bounds. The hearing will spotlight escalating repression targeting all of China’s diverse religious communities and examine why the CCP’s assault on freedom of religion matters for the United States.

The hearing will focus on: (1) CCP policies and tactics for coercive control of religion and their impact on individuals and communities; (2) Transnational repression used to censor and punish diaspora religious communities and individual believers abroad; (3) the nexus between religious freedom and national security, and the strategic importance of religious freedom diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific; and (4) policy recommendations for a robust U.S. response.

The hearing will be livestreamed via the CECC’s YouTube Channel

 

Opening Statements

Senator Dan Sullivan, Chair

[Statement]

Representative Christopher Smith, Co-Chair

[Statement]

Witnesses

Ambassador Sam Brownback: Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom (2018-2021), Governor of Kansas (2011-2018), U.S. Senator (1996-2011)

[Testimony]

Ismail “Ma Ju” Juma: Hui Muslim human rights advocate 

[Testimony]

Bhuchung Tsering: Leader, International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) Research and Monitoring Unit

[Testimony]

Bob Fu: Founder and President, ChinaAid

[Testimony]

Grace Jin Drexel: Daughter of Pastor Ezra Jin

[Testimony]


 

America First as Markets Based State Protected Economic Determinism: Reflections on the 28-point peace plan for Ukraine backed by the United States, according to a copy seen by Reuters

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Allegory of the first partition of Poland, showing Catherine the Great of Russia (left), Joseph II of Austria (middle) and Frederick the Great of Prussia (right) quarrelling over their territorial seizures. Pix credit here

 I have been writing a bout about both the transformative turn in American Presidential sensibilities from the "bureaucrat" type to that of the "merchant" type, connecting that to its ancient caste/culture manifestations in ancient cultures (here). I have suggested the ways in which America First represents the expression of a merchant lens  on matters of state that, from that lens, appears in the guide of markets/transactional challenges.  I have also written a bit about the 2nd phase of the Russo-Ukrainian War, a war effectively lost in its 1st phase commenced on the 100th anniversary of the start of the (self) destruction of Europe in 1914 ( Russia-Ukraine2022).  I have been suggesting from the start that neither Europe nor the US had the will anymore to sustain its old ambitions and drive toward the sort of imperial hegemonies (now expressed through global production rather than through territorial control) that were based on ordering relations within its spheres of convergence. The American merchant presidency discounted the value of territory as irrelevant either to deal making or to its own territorial security--at least as far as Europe was concerned; and they had little taste the observance of the old 17th-19th century expectations around the management of the borderlands separating a semi-Asiatic and brittle quasi-European Russia and the Anglo-American-Euro hegemony once manifested in territorial borders. The Europeans, in a constant state of self-actualization requiring waves of self destruction and re creation, each variation of which proving more challenging than the last increasingly came to represent the borderlands of a hegemony the hub of which had moved decidedly to the Western shores of the Atlantic. 

From this, what follows is something like an overwhelming sense of sadness, one made more acute by the enormity of the loss that will only much later come to be appreciated by those who have yet to be born. 

 

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Within these old parameters, one the theme emerged. That was the theme of dissipation which, like syphilis, lurked for decades unfelt within a body politic outwardly directly toward a (post-1945 normative which was belied by the decrepitude to that body politic oozing out of that body as a result of the accumulation of the  sins of dissipation, the pustules of which exploded in an unavoidable way after August 1914) in ways that were outwardly and spectacularly luxurious and inwardly violently pathological (one need only consider the frolic in Europe and the U.S. that marked the 1960s-early 1980s politically). Not that other parts of the world fared much better; indeed, the resonance form this core of hegemonic power  were felt in culturally and contextually appropriate ways all over the world (including within the South Asian and Chinese imperia, and Global South cultural/hegemonic spheres), producing the destabilization of the "insides" of social and political orderings that the settlement of 1945 appeared to have made irrelevant, but which merely pushed underground the continuation of the process of decay that was made irrevocable with that e gunshot in Sarajevo in 1914.  

In this context the breakup of that last Euro-Asian Empire, that of the Soviets, and its satellites, merely continued the process of decay the process of the putrification of which was evidenced by a return to the good old fashioned values for humanity has long claimed a universal hegemony, one whicvh, unlike most of the positive values at the forefront of formal efforts at normative global convergence actually had a unifying effect globally--mass killings in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia (among other places but those stood out in legacy media), etc. And through it all what had seemed a certainty--the "settlement of Europe" in its new configuration under a US-Soviet, and then US umbrella--provided a  foundation for stability in which Europe could be free to engage in political self-actualization of its higher virtues. And so it did, outwardly, for a while.

 The start of the Russo-Ukrainian war of 1914-2026 brought this cognitive reverie to a halt (though it took until the 2nd phase of the war in 2022 to bring this home to European elites so deeply invested in their dreaming that they did not see the continuation of what they had started in 1914 now move toward another, and perhaps decisive, stage. Ukraine was a test as much for Europe as it was for the United States, but with quite different stakes. 

For Europe, the question of Ukraine revolved around the nature and continuity of Europe as an object, a culture, a territory, an idea, and a space for political solidarity of values. Europe having come to the brink of self destruction during the most violent of its millennium long "Warring States" period, was given the opportunity to (re)build itself not just as an idea but as a concrete manifestation of its own normative values. But even that proved too much, it seems. First those values have been contested from the 1940s with no end in sight. Second European communities have been unable to resist the temptation to reassert ancient conflicts and make resolution complicated. Third, after the 1980s Europe appeared to abandon the idea of itself as a unit of stable solidarity for one on which Europe would dissolve into (and lead, of course) the transition from a State to a globally ordered system, a community of all states  engage in the Elysian fields of UN based international institutions, within which borders would disappear, values would converge, and a string system of fatal co-decency would make the idea of the state system eventually dissolve in the way that European hegemony dissolved from 1914, but with less violent episodes. But it is always easy to forget that those Elysian fields are traditionally reserved for the dead. Russia was certainly not Europe--perhaps Europe adjacent, though with great capacity to contribute to European style arts and letters. But Ukraine occupied a space that had been on the borderlands of Europe after the transformation of the Roman Empire into its own virtual representation now carried forward by ways of settler migrants that remade the territories in which they displaced the older orders to produce something more in their own image. Was it part of Europe? Could Europe be defended? Was Europe now dependent on a hegemon more interested in itself than in European needs?  Could they prevail on that hegemon? But to what ends--they liked the idea of defending Ukrainian borders--to a point, but less the idea of integrating Ukraine into Europe. They liked the idea of valiant defense but hated the inconvenience of warfare. So conflicted hedging was the only viable alternative to find a nexus point of some sort between European virtues and European realities. That only further spotlighted the advanced state of European dissipation, made clearer still  by the returning waves of settler migrants now turned into instruments of destabilization, and a stubborn incapacity to assert a will to determine their own fate and the form that their survival (and perhaps thriving) in a "new" Europe might produce. None of this will affect the European heartland much--at first.  But it confirms a trajectory which does appear to lead up, however one orients that vector.

For the Americans, the question revolved around a two hundred year process of de-colonization its its most intimate cultural-normative senses--from Europe and the European problematic. It has also been the convenient (far away) physical space in which the Americans could confront who they were and who they wanted to be going forward. Whatever that is, it is clear that it will not either have a European feel or even one that  even vaguely resembles the sensibilities of two centuries of careful crafting from the elites on whose shoulders contemporary zealotry hurls itsef forward, a movement that never stops to ask the question--should we? America First, by whatever name American Presidents since Barack Obama--the fist President to recognize and perhaps capitalize on what would emerge as an enormous break with the past, a past which ended its continuous run with the Presidency of George Bush II)--have chosen to mollify the American masses by suggesting that no break was occurring  (only the fulfillment of whatever it is that they extracted from the past).  Until Donald Trump. Perhaps it took a merchant, unschooled, inelegant, and deeply disconnected with the thick webs of individual and institutional forces that managed to maintain continuity since 1871(perhaps in part the American version of the Chinese literati) to give voice  in a petulant and sometimes mean, but also naively innocent (in a religious sense) of the realities that he could not understand why everyone around him could not see (they saw of course, but were horrified sometimes by the raw reality exposed--they preferred their transformation more orderly and nicely wrapped in discursive whipped cream).  The natural tendency was hedging--also between American values (though the tolerance for violence appears to be contextual--much lower than in Africa but perhaps higher than in MENA, or at least some MENA violence sites) and the American interest in making money one transaction at a time. 


 

It is no surprise, then, that the "merchant hegemon" led by President Trump and his team, might be said to  care less about abstractions and the intensely felt problematics of the political official. Merchants believe that in the marketplace for power one survives for as long as one can, give one's will, and in that context sovereignty and the larger question of Europe and political ordering become not merely remote but incomprehensible. The lumpen elements of American society, perhaps represented best in a dressed up and better educated sort of way by elements within the Presidential entourage, might agree, as do those who will be long dead by the time the bill comes due for the true cost of their transactional approach. Not that merchant mentality or transactional approaches to global ordering is bad--it is just that one ought to be quite clear headed about the actual costs and benefits of transaction not just in the short term but for the survivors of all of this deal making.   

Both European and American merchant princes, then, are interested in preserving and expanding the scope and operational capacity of deal making. For them, at this point, Russia matters, the EU might have, had it consolidated enough to speak with a single voice,  and Ukraine exists merely as a space in and through which transactions may be undertaken. To facilitate deals one must sacrifice the less important. That sacrifice includes everything--values, conduct, and old principles. The Americans had a merchant president of that sort once before--in Franklin Delano Roosevelt one also incarnated an American sensibility ready to deal away the barbarities of the Stalinist Soviets (at least as measured by what then were ostensibly U.S. values, except perhaps in the salons of the rich and among political zealots well ahead of their time) and equally willing to trade territory, sovereignty, displace peoples, and cut deals to create the space necessary to build his transactional (global markets driven aggregation of public and private power) that survived in one form or another for a relatively long while (as those things are measured in human terms). 

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That is all that is left to read the Russian document put forward as an American initiative, designed to "end" the conflict in Ukraine--ending Ukraine with it as well, and perhaps Europe as well. Its 2 provisions expand Russian transactional space, but with it also returns territories to a reactionary second order imperial apparatus that has yet to cross the time barrier between the 19th ad the 21st centuries.  It will in due course, but it is unlikely to happen pacifically. Ukraine becomes the Poland of the 21st Century, and like Poland, continues to undergo partitions and absorption to suit the tastes and needs of empires that matter at the time the partitions occur. For the Ukrainians there is little to do but accept the reality of rejection by Europe, the unwillingness of other states to extend political solidarity with it. . . and migration. Perhaps as part of the deal President Trump will create a Ukrainian adjustment program bringing talent back to America. . . . . Or we are back to the world of "Mr. Jones" where a Democratic elite in 1933 was well disposed to overlook Stalinist "policy" for their own transactional ends. 

For the United States this is just another deal. But for Europe another marker of the pathway it embraced in that glorious summer of August 1914. We have al realized in this document that state of a "man without qualities" (Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften)--one whose who has no character except as a reflection of responses to the stimuli around him.  But what a deal. The American guarantees are worthless:

10. The U.S. guarantee:

a. The U.S. to receive compensation for the guarantee;
b. If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee;
c. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn;
d. If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg then, the security guarantee will be considered null and void.

The transactions potential, however is priceless for the U.S.:

12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:

a. Creation of Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries including technology, data centers, and AI efforts.
b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which includes its pipelines and storage facilities.
c. A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Mineral and natural resource extraction.
f. A special financing package will be developed by The World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts.

The Europeanization of Ukrain is given short shrift (¶ 119. And Russia is again open for busoness with all of its actions forgiven and "forgotten" (¶¶ 13, 26). This is only a transaction that a merchant can make. We will see if there is transactional gold at the end of this rainbow.  For Europe, on the other hand, there is a reminder that the path they set out on in August 1914 has yet to run its course, and they continue to drive it in the direction it is going.   


The 28 points of the draft US deal (Draft of US-backed peace proposal for Ukraine), follows below with thanks to Reuters for publishing it. 

  

Draft of US-backed peace proposal for Ukraine



Nov 21 (Reuters) - Here is the text of a draft version of the 28-point peace plan for Ukraine backed by the United States, according to a copy seen by Reuters
 

1. Ukraine's sovereignty to be reconfirmed.
 

2. There will be a total and complete comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered resolved.
 

3. There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbours and NATO will not expand further.
 

4. A dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States, will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment to ensure global security and increase the opportunities for connectivity and future economic opportunity.
 

5. Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees.
 

6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be capped at 600,000.
 

7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to pass in its bylaws not to accept Ukraine at any point in the future.
 

8. NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine.
 

9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.
 

10. The U.S. guarantee:

a. The U.S. to receive compensation for the guarantee;
b. If Ukraine invades Russia, it forfeits the guarantee;
c. If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a robust coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be restored and recognition for the new territory and all other benefits from this agreement will be withdrawn;
d. If Ukraine fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg then, the security guarantee will be considered null and void.

11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will get short-term preferred market access to the European market while this issue is being evaluated.
 

12. Robust Global Redevelopment Package for Ukraine including but not limited to:

a. Creation of Ukraine Development Fund to invest in high-growth industries including technology, data centers, and AI efforts.
b. The United States will partner with Ukraine to jointly restore, grow, modernize, and operate Ukraine's gas infrastructure, which includes its pipelines and storage facilities.
c. A joint effort to redevelop areas impacted by the war to restore, redevelop and modernize cities and residential areas.
d. Infrastructure development.
e. Mineral and natural resource extraction.
f. A special financing package will be developed by The World Bank to provide financing to accelerate these efforts.

13. Russia to be re-integrated into the global economy:
a. Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.
b. The United States will enter into a long-term Economic Co-operation Agreement to pursue mutual development in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal projects in the Arctic as well as other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.
c. Russia to be invited back into the G8.

14. Frozen funds will be used as follows:
$100 billion of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a US-led effort to reconstruct and invest in Ukraine. The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture. Europe will match this $100 billion contribution to increase the investment available to rebuild Ukraine. The European funds that are frozen will be released. The balance of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russia investment vehicle that will pursue joint United States Russia projects in areas to be defined. This fund will aim to strengthen the relationship and increase joint interests to build a strong motivation not to return to conflict.



15. A joint US-Russian Security taskforce will be established to promote and enforce compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement.
 

16. Russia will legislatively enshrine a non-aggression policy towards Europe and Ukraine.
 

17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation control treaties, including the START I Treaty.
 

18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state under the NPT (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).
 

19. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be restarted under supervision of the IAEA, and the produced power shall be equitably in a 50-50 split between Russia and Ukraine.
 

20. Both countries commit to education programs in schools and throughout their society that promotes the understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminates racism and bias:

a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules of religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities.
b. Both countries agree to repeal all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.
c. All Nazi ideology or activity should be renounced and forbidden.
21. Territories:
a. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk to be recognized De-Facto as Russian, including by the United States.
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to be frozen at the contact line, which would mean a De-Facto recognition at the contact line.
c. Russia to give up other agreed upon territories they control outside of the five regions
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk region that they currently control, and this withdrawal area will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

22. Once future territorial arrangements have been agreed, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this obligation.

23. Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine's use of the Dnieper River for purposes of commercial activities and agreements will be reached for grain shipments to move freely through the Black Sea.

24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve open issues:

a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on the principle of 'all for all'.
b. All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children.
c. There will be a family reunification program
d. Provisions will be made to address the suffering of victims from the conflict.

25. Ukraine to hold elections in 100 days.
 

26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions during the war and agree not to pursue claims or further settle grievances.

27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, Chaired by President Donald J. Trump. There will be penalties for violation. 

28. Upon all sides agreeing to this memorandum, a ceasefire will be immediately effective upon both parties withdrawing to the agreed upon points for the implementation of the agreement to begin.

Announcing Publication of Vol. 38 Issue 8 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law (Translation, Interpretation, and the Quest for Justice in Plural Societies.”)

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Happy to pass along this announcement from the remarkable Anne Wagner:

We are pleased to announce the release of Volume 38, Number 8 of the International Journal for the Semiotics of Law — a special issue dedicated to “Translation, Interpretation, and the Quest for Justice in Plural Societies.” This issue brings together a rich collection of articles and commentaries exploring how translation and interpretation shape legal understanding, access to justice, and cultural diversity within legal systems. Expertly curated by Guest Editors Marie-Claire Foblets, Anthony Good, Michele Graziadei, and Jonathan Bernaerts, the issue offers interdisciplinary perspectives from leading scholars across the globe. Congratulations to our Guest Editors!! 🎊

The full issue is now available online — discover the articles, dive into the debates, and join the conversation. Access the issue here: https://link.springer.com/journal/11196/volumes-and-issues/38-8

There are 19 excellent article sin the issue, titles and links to which follow below along with the text of the Introduction Chapter, Translation and the Search for Justice in Contexts of Religious and Cultural Diversity: A Persistent and Complex Challenge (Marie-Claire Foblets and Michele Graziadei), and with it an introduction to the Cultural and Religious Diversity under State Law across Europe database project (CUREDI). 

CUREDI is a freely accessible online database project that aims to systematically compile a repository of legal data, mainly drawing from case law relating to cultural and religious diversity and, more specifically, to the way in which this diversity is recognised, to varying degrees, within the national legal systems of European countries. By systematically collecting and storing relevant case lawFootnote 3 for each of the countries covered by the database, CUREDI seeks to give greater visibility to some of the work carried out in recent years by domestic courts across Europe in their effort to accommodate increasing cultural and religious diversity, and to highlight the way they proceed to seek fair solutions, often in highly controversial cases that raise pressing issues. .

 The translation issues considered include: (1) the4 search for equivalents where there are no equivalents; (2) translating international law into domestic legal orders; (3) the use of translation and simultaneous interpretation by courts and administrative authorities; (4) interdisciplinary translation where one must translate from the specialized language of one field to another; and (5) translation of authoritative decisions from one language to another. 

Volume 38, Issue 8

Special Issue: Translation, Interpretation, and the Quest for Justice in Plural Societies

Issue Editors:
  • Marie-Claire Foblets,
  • Anthony Good,
  • Michele Graziadei,
  • Jonathan Bernaerts
19 articles in this issue

 *       *       *

 Translation and the Search for Justice in Contexts of Religious and Cultural Diversity: A Persistent and Complex Challenge (Marie-Claire Foblets and Michele Graziadei).

1 Introduction

‘The language of Europe is translation.’ That aphorism, coined by the late Umberto Eco, very aptly expresses the reality of today’s European societies. It is a phrase that has also been the subject of much commentary and interpretation,Footnote 1 but that is not the debate we are interested in here. For the purposes of this special issue, Eco’s quotation offers a concise description of an omnipresent core feature of European daily reality, a reality that also constitutes the broader context within which the contributions to this special issue are situated.

To explain how the contributions in this issue have been selected and organised, we proceed in three steps: first, we outline a collective research project still in progress that has been the inspiration for this special issue; second, we explain the method we have adopted in compiling this rather eclectic collection of individual contributions; and finally, we provide some brief concluding remarks.

2 The Cultural and Religious Diversity under State Law across Europe database project (CUREDI)

2.1 Overview

The genesis of this special issue dates back to late 2023, when most of the authors represented here agreed to contribute, each from their particular area of expertise, to the annual conference of a major ongoing collective project, the Cultural and Religious Diversity under State Law across Europe database project (CUREDI). Because of the many translation-related questions that had been arising on a regular basis in the course of the CUREDI work, the decision was made to devote the 2023 conference to translation issues. Below, we address, separately, what this project entails and why we have such a keen interest in translation.

CUREDI is an initiative of the Law & Anthropology Department at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany.Footnote 2 The basic idea that inspired the project is linked to the empirical observation that, in recent years, the number of court cases throughout Europe brought by individuals or groups from distinct cultural or religious minorities seeking recognition of their identity in various areas of life has increased exponentially. European societies are now home to a growing number of socio-cultural communities (both ‘long-standing minorities’ and recently arrived ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities). As a result, decision-makers at all levels of the public sector (national, regional, local), including those in the judiciary, are regularly confronted with the question of how to deal with institutions, traditions, concepts, practices, beliefs, and sensitivities that are not (yet) familiar to them. The way in which cultural and religious diversity is defined in legal texts and the conditions under which it can be recognised are, for obvious reasons, rooted in the history and concrete experiences of each country. In practice, however, the judiciary is increasingly called upon to deal with diversity issues that are not adequately addressed in the existing legislative framework or case law. In such cases, especially when the issue is perceived as highly sensitive, both politically and socially, the legitimacy of what the judiciary does may be disputed. The challenge in such cases is to strike the right balance between the different interests at stake: on the one hand, respect for the law of the state and, on the other, consideration of the claims made by members of minorities who want their culture and what they assert to be their rights to be granted adequate recognition under state law. This search for the right balance between at times highly complex clashes of interests – clashes that raise the question of how much diversity can be guaranteed without putting at risk social cohesion in a democratic legal order – constitutes a serious challenge that involves not only judges, but also speaks to an increasingly wide range of social actors and stakeholders, many of whom engage in public debates about this quest. One highly sensitive issue in this regard concerns the expression of minority identity in the public sphere. Cases relating to religious and personal symbols, religious education in public schools, the organisation of public cemeteries and burials, religious dietary requirements in prisons and schools, and ritual slaughter, to name but a few, are regularly on the agenda in Europe and give rise to heated debates, often fuelled by existing tensions between opposing groups and ideological and political positions.

In sum, CUREDI is a freely accessible online database project that aims to systematically compile a repository of legal data, mainly drawing from case law relating to cultural and religious diversity and, more specifically, to the way in which this diversity is recognised, to varying degrees, within the national legal systems of European countries. By systematically collecting and storing relevant case lawFootnote 3 for each of the countries covered by the database, CUREDI seeks to give greater visibility to some of the work carried out in recent years by domestic courts across Europe in their effort to accommodate increasing cultural and religious diversity, and to highlight the way they proceed to seek fair solutions, often in highly controversial cases that raise pressing issues. Information on each decision and judgment is presented in a standardised format which includes, in addition to basic information on the case, a detailed report on the judicial reasoning, with an emphasis on the legal arguments and techniques used to support the decision; where applicable, the use of expert witnesses by the court; and a detailed description of the court's balancing of the rights and interests at stake. These reports, accompanied by targeted commentary, are written by experts (CUREDI partners) who are thoroughly familiar with the situation in the country to which their report relates.

CUREDI draws on a network of scientific research teams across Europe with recognised interest and expertise in this field. The repository is still under development, but we have nevertheless considered it to be sufficiently advanced to be publicly accessible, which it has been since early December 2024.Footnote 4

Ultimately, the goal is to show how, gradually, domestic (for the most part national, but also regional) legal systems are accommodating the reality of increasing cultural and religious diversity in today’s Europe and the claims for recognition that come with it. The information focuses on the arguments used in court to justify claims and, concomitantly, on the part of the court, to grant or, conversely, reject a particular request. Whenever possible, reference is also made to the empirical evidence that legislators and/or judges have relied on to reach their conclusions (e.g., recourse to experts).

The aim of the project is, of course, not merely to accumulate data. Once a sufficient number of critical documents are available, the repository will enable comparisons to be made between countries in at least three ways: first, by helping to identify striking disparities or, conversely, similar developments between countries in dealing with cases directly or indirectly related to cultural and religious diversity and/or highlight specific developments and, where possible, explain these disparities or developments; second, by highlighting innovative and creative solutions that have been proposed in individual cases; and third, of course, by providing the necessary links to other existing databases covering topics relevant to CUREDI.

A significant achievement of the CUREDI project, as we see it, is the fact that all the documentation will be available in English. The original languages in which judicial decisions are formulated within the different domestic systems across Europe are the official languages of the countries concerned. This, of course, is completely understandable. The consequence, however, is that those who are not proficient enough in the language in which the decision is written are unable to follow, let alone to understand, the reasoning behind the decision, or even to be aware of the existence of these decisions. The only conceivable possibility for such users is, therefore, to have access to a reliable translation. From the very start of the CUREDI project, translation into English of the data to be collected was the obvious choice. English has indeed gradually, since around the 1950s, established itself as the main lingua franca of Europeans, not officially – it only counts as one among the many official languages recognised at the EU level – but in practice.Footnote 5 Moreover, in the medium term, for the purposes of the CUREDI project, translation into a single language is a prerequisite for comparing the approaches adopted by the respective domestic systems to issues of diversity.

Hence, while the choice of English for a project such as CUREDI was somewhat inevitable, in practice this choice has been accompanied by considerable translation issues along the way.

It suffices here to give two illustrations of such issues for which solutions had to be found. The first illustration relates to the selection of keywords in English, which are intended to facilitate the search for decisions that are of relevance to the users. A list of basic keywords provides a simple but powerful search tool: users can simply enter one or more terms in the search field. They are then directed to all entries in the database that contain these search terms (in the commentary, the summary of the judgment, etc.).Footnote 6 A condition for the search tool to achieve its goal, however, is that the selected English terms be accurate translations of the legal terminology used in the original language of each of the rulings that are the subject of a comment. This constitutes a major challenge: in the interests of systematisation, uniformity, and mutual understanding, it is necessary to accurately translate into formal legal English all topics and terms falling within the scope of the database. Where terms have no equivalent in English, such as kippa, kirpan, hijab, etc., the choice was made not to translate them but rather to provide a comprehensive glossary (see below), with a view to ensuring the greatest possible precision and, consequently, a more accurate description of the issues examined.

The second illustration relates precisely to this initial agreement among the partners to provide the user with such a glossary,Footnote 7 i.e., a list of brief definitions of terms that require clarification and/or explanation because, due to national specificities, either the concept does not exist in some contexts or its meaning is not necessarily identical in the legal languages of the other countries included in the project. The first attempts to formulate such definitions were extremely enriching in terms of the discussions they sparked among the partners, but in the end they were also, in a decisive way, quite sobering: they indeed raised more questions than could possibly be satisfactorily answered by a glossary, to such an extent that the idea of the glossary was temporarily shelved. For the time being, it was decided that the authors themselves would, in their own comments, propose the English-language equivalents of terms and concepts that they deem necessary and useful, and not rely on pre-established definitions that may not be accurate enough for their purposes and therefore could give rise to misinterpretations. These two examples do not exhaust the list of translation issues that the CUREDI partners have encountered so far, but they may suffice to demonstrate the extent to which such issues are central to a project that seeks to build a body of documentation on specific legal matters that regularly arise across jurisdictions in Europe, but where the answers vary considerably depending on the country context and, sometimes within a single domestic context, on a specific court’s approach. Reasonings are not self-explanatory, let alone transposable from one (domestic) context to another, and linguistic translation alone is not sufficient to grasp the very (legal) relevance of a particular approach or solution as it was developed and applied in a concrete case. For each case (selected court decisions) that is examined closely, it is also important to examine, as far as possible of course, the dynamics and realities that the late Professor Rodolfo Sacco called ‘legal formants’ [9]. According to Sacco, in order to understand how legal reasoning translates what arises in real life situations, one must also take the trouble to include as much relevant information about the case as possible in one's analysis.

The analysis of legal reasoning in cases involving culture and religion often highlights considerably sensitive, politically loaded, controversial issues of ethics, morality, and values that inevitably influence court decisions, whether implicitly or explicitly. The systematic documentation of a large number of such cases, as envisaged by the CUREDI project, shows how in some instances the broader societal context impacts the legal reasoning when it comes to adjudicating in concrete situations. This is particularly true when laws are formulated in an open manner or drafted in very general terms,Footnote 8 and it is then up to the court or administration responsible for dealing with a specific case to interpret them.Footnote 9

CUREDI brings together a critical mass of documents showing how similar situations can lead to to very different outcomes, for example between two supreme courts, as was the case with decisions handed down by the Spanish and French supreme courts on full-face veils.Footnote 10 Given the often highly sensitive nature of claims relating to minority protection, when courts engage in a ‘balancing exercise’ between the protection of minority rights and other interests, decisions are often strongly criticised by those who disagree with the approach and who therefore sometimes go so far as to question the legitimacy of the judicial decision-making process: the court is criticised for engaging in a ‘political’ balancing of rights and interests rather than a strictly ‘legal’ or ‘deductive’ one.Footnote 11 To understand why religious and/or cultural factors are taken into consideration in some specific cases more than in others,Footnote 12 it may be important to follow Sacco’s suggestion and to broaden the scope of questions to be raised when analysing a case: Who brought the case before the courts? Is this a strategic dispute and, if so, what is the objective behind the strategy? Did the court call on experts and, if so, was it influenced by their opinions? To what extent are the parties aware of the range of arguments that may be relevant to support their claim? What is the role of precedent? In documenting cases involving religious symbols, cultural defence, unregistered marriages, polygamy, etc., CUREDI endeavours, as far as possible, to reconstruct the particularities of the broader context that may help explain the legal reasoning in a specific case.

2.2 A Conference Dedicated to Translation

Annual CUREDI conferences provide an opportunity to discuss, with the input of all partners who participate in the meeting, what is to be gained by working together with partners from across Europe on issues related to cultural and religious diversity. As our work on CUREDI progressed, translation issues arose with increasing frequency and in relation to a wide range of aspects, not least methodological, that are linked to the request – which is also a conditio sine qua non– that in their shared efforts to comment on rulings and, to the extent possible, to proceed to comparisons, partners can draw on reliable data. Partners have, for example, regularly encountered cases where certain practices, traditions, or beliefs have been misrepresented, particularly due to incorrect translations. It was in light of these kinds of findings that the idea arose to devote the 2023 CUREDI conference to translation. The aim was to enable the partners involved in the project to exchange views, in greater depth and with the help of concrete examples, on the various translation-related issues they face when composing their commentaries on the cases. Partners (who are also the authors of the comments on the court rulings under study), are indeed responsible for ensuring that the quality of their commentaries is not compromised by the fact that they have to produce, in English (which is not the mother tongue for many of them), comments on court decisions that were not initially written in English nor intended to be read by a foreign audience.

Four of the six authors of major articles in this special issue were participants in the conference, while several of the commentators also participated.

3 The Structure of the Special Issue: Five Aspects of Translation

For the conference itself, we initially identified four aspects of translation that we wanted to focus on; we have since expanded that to five. We summarise them very briefly here, as they also explain the choice of topics covered in the contributions selected for this special issue.

One contribution, however, by Michele Graziadei, does not fit neatly into any of the five aspects. It is far broader in historical scope, and provides a succinct and highly useful historical meta-overview that serves as an overall frame for the other contributions. Drawing from the broad field of comparative law, Graziadei reflects on the paradoxical status of legal translation, which, despite its growing sophistication, still suffers from a lack of epistemological legitimacy in some quarters. His contribution invites us to take legal translation seriously not only as a matter of technique, but also as a site of first-rate jurisprudential challenges that translators take on when they act as intermediaries between legal systems, with the power to shape the meaning and trajectory of law itself.

Following that come the contributions that illustrate one or more of the five perspectives identified.

3.1 The Search for Equivalents

One major translation challenge involves certain concepts that do not have an equivalent in English, and whose translation is therefore subject to debate. The difficulty of finding a way to convey the meaning of a concept, institution, or practice in a language that does not have an adequate term is well known to comparatists. In Europe, such situations have become more common with the immigration of relatively large communities from all over the world: it may be identity documents issued in the official language of the country of origin that need to be translated or, in private international law, for example, the precise scope of foreign judicial decisions whose effects are to be recognised in the country of the new residence of the parties that must be decided upon, to name but two situations.

An example of the latter situation, which has been and continues to be the subject of heated debate among experts in international family law, is how to translate certain forms of marriage dissolution that are unknown in Europe. One typical example is the dissolution of marriage on the sole initiative of the husband, which is still a very common way of ending a marriage and is fully accepted in the domestic law of countries whose family law is based on Islam.Footnote 13 Does the term ‘repudiation’ adequately reflect the meaning to be given to the dissolution of marriage in such a case? The question then is whether the dissolution of marriage by unilateral repudiation can actually be translated as ‘divorce’. By using, indiscriminately, the term ‘repudiation’, it is very likely that the couple will be refused recognition in Europe of the dissolution of their marriage abroad on the grounds that the woman presumably had no say in the matter and that therefore the principle of equality between men and women has been violated [14]. The reality, however, is more nuanced: in Islamic family law, some forms of marriage dissolution can be initiated by the womanFootnote 14 and/or are accompanied by sufficient guarantees to neutralise the violation of the principle of non-discrimination between spouses.Footnote 15 These nuances are not reflected in the use of the term repudiation. And resorting to the term ‘divorce’, to simplify matters, does not offer a solution either, as it risks obscuring the fact that, as is still frequently the case, the wife has not actually been heard and the dissolution of marriage is pronounced without her consent.

Another example, also related to family law as it is applied in many Islamic countries and widely discussed in the literature, is the institution of kafalah [21]. The purpose of kafalah is to allow a Muslim adult (or adults, the kafil) to assume responsibility for the care and appropriate upbringing of someone else’s child (the makful), for any number of reasons. Kafalah should not be confused with adoption (which is prohibited in Islam), as it does not legally sever the ties with the child’s biological parents, but is more akin to a form of foster care. Since a kafalah decision is usually made by a judge in the child’s country of origin, whereas the kafil who takes over from the biological parents often lives in Europe, the decision must be granted (legal) recognition in the country of habitual residence (in Europe) of the kafil. For the child to come and live in Europe, he or she must therefore also be granted a residence permit. This is where the problem arises: until recently, only adoption gave a child the right to come and live with his or her (adoptive) parents in Europe. A kafalah was not sufficient; legally speaking, it was not to be put on an equal footing with adoption.Footnote 16 With the number of such situations increasing, however, European countries have started accepting that a kafalah decision can open the way to family reunification, except of course in cases that clearly do not have the primary purpose of caring for a child, but are merely trying to circumvent the relatively strict rules that apply to family reunification.Footnote 17

Anthony Good’s contribution to this special issue demonstrates how complicated situations can be when a term proves untranslatable.Footnote 18 Drawing on his extensive experience as an expert witness in refugee status determination procedures in the U.K., Good examines the impact of the use of interpreters on legal processes. He describes the roles played by interpreters in facilitating intercultural communication between asylum applicants and the administrative and legal actors responsible for assessing or defending their claims. Much of the confusion and many of the barriers to communication created by the involvement of interpreters reflect the inherent untranslatability of particular notions, leading to a situation where different interpreters may give different though equally legitimate translations of, for example, certain kinship terms, creating apparent ‘inconsistencies’ in the resulting translated accounts. Given the centrality of notions of credibility in asylum decision-making, even quite trivial divergences over such matters may prove crucial.

3.2 Translating International Law into Domestic Legal Systems

A very specific form of translation is linked to the situation in Europe where, for issues that specifically concern religious and cultural diversity and its protection under state law, two international courts have jurisdiction. Through their case law they monitor, each within its own respective areas of competence and in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, how states align their domestic policies with their international obligations, either as Member States of the European Union (and therefore bound by the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, hereafter: CJEU) or as members of the Council of Europe (which falls within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, hereafter: ECtHR). Since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009, the protection of human rights in Europe has been closely followed by both courts.Footnote 19 With the CJEU as a player,Footnote 20 a new dynamic has thus emerged within a Europe that is now integrated into a multi-level European human rights architecture characterised by inherent interaction between the national level and the supranational level of both the ECtHR and the CJEU.Footnote 21

This dynamic interaction between different decision-making levels can be seen as a vast translation undertaking: it encompasses the most diverse facets of an exercise that is at once extremely ambitious and highly complex. Describing this process of bringing national-level laws and policies into alignment with the two European courts as a ‘vast translation undertaking’ may seem unusual, as it is not literally a translation exercise like the first two perspectives discussed above (although it certainly does involve literal translation). It does, however, highlight several complications that are inherent to translation in the more classical sense of the term.

One such complication regards the discrepancies among states in the way they align their diversity policies to international rulings. A closer look at how certain international court decisions are ‘translated’ into a country's legal system shows not only striking divergences among jurisdictions, but also that they do not automatically produce the result expected by the parties that brought the case before the international court. This is obviously true in cases where the application is deemed inadmissible or simply rejected. But it may also be the case when, for example, one of the two courts decides to leave a wide margin of appreciation to the local authorities to deal with a specific situation. The task of transposing a rule of international law in such cases – whether drawing on human rights law or, more specifically, European Union law – falls to the authorities against which the action was initially brought, which seems paradoxical since it risks rendering recourse to international courts largely pointless. This is the main argument that Kristin Henrard advances in her contribution to this special issue.

Henrard critically assesses the discretion that the European regional courts leave to states when translating international norms into domestic law and practice. Human rights indeed leave room for a variety of ways of implementation, thus granting national authorities, including national courts, a degree of freedom when translating international norms in a way that is tailored to the local circumstances. However, the effective protection of fundamental rights requires international courts to adopt a sufficiently elevated level of scrutiny. Early on, the ECtHR granted states a certain margin of appreciation when assessing whether the limitations were proportionate to the legitimate aim invoked. This, however, implied that the Court adopted a lower level of scrutiny, which risked jeopardising the effective protection of human rights. The article identifies and expands on a range of criticisms of the ECtHR for granting such a margin of appreciation and how it is applied. The CJEU, for its part, seemed not to follow the ECtHR’s broad margin of appreciation in its early jurisprudence on religious themes, but in several more recent cases concerning manifestations of Islam, it has embraced the broad margin of appreciation as well. The article concludes with a call for the European regional courts to embrace their supervisory role and provide more guidance to national authorities and courts, thereby narrowing their margin of appreciation.

One contribution in this special issue – that of Tobias Berger– stands out in that the complications with translation discussed therein take place outside the European context. Berger’s article, which details attempts by a European agency to promote human rights and the rule of law through non-state justice institutions in Bangladesh, serves a special and unique role in this issue: it reminds the reader that even the most basic principles of international law, however uncontroversial they may appear at first glance, in casu, human rights and the rule of law, cannot be translated, no matter where, without having to take into consideration what in social and cultural anthropology is studied under the term ‘vernacularisation’, meaning the decisive role of context in shaping meaning. The term ‘vernacularisation’, borrowed from linguistics, was taken up by the late American anthropologist Sally Engle Merry in the 1990s and has since been used by many anthropologists to describe the multifarious local dynamics behind the translation of certain overarching legal concepts in local settings, as well as the processes and strategies of transformation that are linked to adaptation to local conditions.Footnote 22 The discussions that accompanied the introduction of the term ‘vernacularisation’ for the analysis of concepts related to legal practice have, in our view, lost none of their topicality and relevance, both within and outside Europe.Footnote 23

Berger’s contribution analyses Europe as an actor that seeks to engage different legal and cultural systems around the world and have its legal principles translated into non-European settings. More precisely, it focuses on recent attempts by the European External Action Service to promote human rights and the rule of law through non-state justice institutions in Bangladesh. The central question in his contribution is how and under what conditions European understandings of human rights and the rule of law are translated. The article develops a theoretical account of such translation processes by drawing on scholarship in political science and legal anthropology. It then turns to the long trajectory of European engagements with non-state justice institutions that originated in processes of European colonial expansion and its correlative efforts to alter legal systems throughout much of the world.

3.3 The Use of Translation and Simultaneous Interpretation by Courts and Administrative Authorities

Third, an extremely important aspect of the judicial process when considering issues of diversity is the use of translation and simultaneous interpretation by courts and/or the parties to a dispute. The offer of translation services is part of the right to a fair trial; it does not, however, come without application issues that are at times very challenging.Footnote 24 In some cases, it is the lack of trust between the translator and one party to the dispute that can distort the process, for example, when the latter for lack of confidence refrains from expressing him- or herself as openly as necessary for a proper understanding of the claim. In other cases, it is the need to reduce to its very essence what the judge wants to know about a specific practice or context that may make a party to a dispute fear that they have not been given the opportunity to make themselves properly understood. Another common complication that is associated with the use of translators (whether professional or not) is the blurring of the dividing line between literal translation and interpretation, especially if the judge, not knowing the other language, is unable to check the content (let alone the quality) of what is being translated [35] and where the translator goes beyond literal translation [36, 37]. It also happens that the judge, seeing that the translator seems to be well acquainted with the cultural context in which a dispute arises, feels tempted to take advantage of the situation and puts a few additional questions to him or her, thereby catapulting the translator into the position of an expert, which is not his or her responsibility.

All the complications mentioned above, in particular the fact that some words have no equivalent in another language and therefore require a more detailed explanation or description, or a periphrasis, and the concomitant risk of using false equivalents or false comparisons, etc., obviously also come into play, if not to a greater extent, in a context of simultaneous interpretation, since the interpreter who finds him- or herself in such a situation does not have the time required to weigh up the various options available and propose one translation rather than another for a particular term. Professional experience, gained over many years, will certainly make him or her a better interpreter, but the right to translation and interpretation does not extend to the right to an experienced translator or interpreter.

To illustrate some of the obstacles to ensuring that a translation is of sufficient quality to fulfil the right to a fair trial, the contribution of Patrícia Jerónimo looks at the case of Portugal. European legal standards on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings were significantly improved with the adoption of Directive 2010/64/EU, as evidenced by recent developments in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and in the domestic legislation and case law of EU Member States. Portugal is a good illustration of these developments, while also providing nuance to the overall picture. After initially dismissing the need to introduce any changes to its legal framework, Portugal finally amended its Code of Criminal Procedure in 2023 to comply with the Directive, and its courts have seen an exponential rise in litigation related to linguistic assistance in recent years. There is, however, considerable disparity in the case law of different appellate courts, and there are also still some unresolved issues, such as the time frame to plead the nullity arising from the failure to appoint an interpreter, the measures to ensure the quality of the interpretation and translation provided, and the training of judges, prosecutors, and judicial staff on the particularities of working in multilingual settings more broadly. Analysing the case law and the views expressed by judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and legal interpreters/translators during group and individual interviews, Jerónimo’s article examines the legal developments prompted by Directive 2010/64/EU at the international/supranational European level and in the Portuguese legal system, and discusses the persistence of linguistic obstacles to equal access to justice and an effective right to a fair trial in Portugal.

This approach also relates to translation and interpretation in other legal settings, such as administrative and legislative contexts. A central issue in administrative contexts is the varying degree of official-language proficiency among persons belonging to linguistic minorities. While some of them can navigate administrative procedures in the official language, others depend on the use of their minority language to effectively communicate. Human resources within public administrations might support minority language communication, while the lack thereof can necessitate the involvement of translation services.

Jonathan Bernaerts's contribution takes the reader ‘into the field’ of administrative practice, albeit in the very specific context of a language minority that is not immediately in a dire situation, but precisely because of this illustrates that problems of language use can arise even in such a situation. Bernaerts undertakes a critical examination of how the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in Europe and its Advisory Committee address the effects of varying degrees of official-language proficiency of persons belonging to linguistic minorities and the impact of relying on translators. It evaluates the relevant standards concerning minority language use and translation in this context: are they regarded merely as communicative necessities, or is the value of their symbolic meaning to the relevant communities also taken into consideration? Drawing on empirical data from administrative interactions with the Sorbian minority in Germany, Bernaerts’s article illustrates the practical implementation of the FCNM and related advisory opinions.

3.4 Interdisciplinary Translation

Undoubtedly the most demanding form of translation is the translation into legal thinking and reasoning of data or knowledge that draws from another academic discipline, and which we will refer to here, for simplicity's sake, as interdisciplinary translation. Within this special issue, interdisciplinary translation is most clearly illustrated in the contributions of Anthony Good, Tobias Berger, and Jonathan Bernaerts (although the tensions inherent in this interdisciplinary exercise are apparent in all of the contributions). On issues of religious and cultural diversity, most of the relevant knowledge to be translated into legal thinking comes from experts active in the fields of social and cultural anthropology,Footnote 25 religious studies or, in some cases, areas studies, cultural criminology, sociology, or cross-cultural psychology. For the most part, these experts develop their profound familiarity with some communities or religions on the basis of in-depth empirical fieldwork. Thus far in Europe, the use of cultural expertise is still relatively unusual, with the possible exception of the U.K.Footnote 26 In recent years, however, things seem to be slowly falling into place for the use of cultural expertise – by and before courts – to develop in certain countries.

Interdisciplinary translation in the context of judicial practice is highly challenging in both directions: for the expert, who has in-depth knowledge of the empirical reality that is the subject of the dispute, it is a matter of reporting in an accessible, impartial, and targeted manner on the subject for which he or she has been called upon as an expert. And for the judge, who is the adjudicator, it is a matter of finding out which elements of knowledge to draw from the information provided by the expert in order to reach a decision that is optimally inspired by that knowledge while remaining within the limits of what the law allows the court to do with it. What undoubtedly adds to the difficulty for the judge is anthropology’s methodology and anti-positivist epistemology. Ethnographic data are qualitative in nature and can therefore not be generalised; the information available to the anthropologist is usually based on his or her own direct observations and on other people’s explanations and descriptions as gleaned through interviews. What is more, anthropologists – just as other experts – may contradict one another on how to interpret a given practice or belief, or they place the emphases on different elements. All of this can cast doubt on the ‘scientific’ nature of the information that anthropologists can provide.Footnote 27

3.5 Translation in the Literal Sense

Finally, there is translation in the most literal sense – the translation of national court decisions from the original language into English. In order to gain a correct understanding of how a court has been seeking to ‘grasp’ more precisely the element of diversity that is at stake in a concrete dispute and how it may be granted recognition in the domestic legal system, it is important that the documentation compiled on the decision reflect how the judge actually expressed himself or herself on the issue. Authors who provide comments for the CUREDI database project are therefore asked to select excerpts from the decision that relate to the judge's reasoning on that specific issue and to translate them into English.Footnote 28 This can be particularly challenging, as it is indeed essential that the translation reflect this reasoning very accurately. In order to enable users who are proficient in both languages to check how the judge expressed him- or herself in the official language, the selected passages are also reproduced in the original language.

Moreover, in their own CUREDI commentaries the authors must express themselves in English, which is for most of them not their first language. This assumes that they feel sufficiently confident to translate local terminologies into concepts that are understandable for analysis and that both explain and go beyond the specific context. This presents a serious challenge.

It therefore seemed obvious to us to include in this issue a contribution illustrating – through very concrete examples – some of these challenges. The realities of the European Union, with 24 official languages, dictate that English be the common language in which mostly non-native speakers of English (and a few native speakers) communicate about the daily tasks of deliberation and drafting of legal and policy documents. Yet English and its conceptual framework, when it comes to the law, is rooted in the Anglo-American common law tradition, whereas the European continental legal systems, which have contributed most significantly to the EU legal order, are based in the Roman civil law tradition and its distinctive concepts and terms.

Translation theory, and in particular the emerging field of legal linguistics (jurilinguistics), has provided some tools for addressing the practical challenges of working across different languages and legal terminologies. Homi Bhabha, for example, speaks of translation as a ‘third space’ [44; see also 45, 46]. This concept of a third space provides practical solutions, but it can also at times obstruct the path with solecisms, false friends and occasional ‘Gallicisms’ that, when unchecked, can lead to misunderstandings. Unfortunately, the author who was tasked with providing a contribution illustrating the many pitfalls and difficulties that come with translation in the literal sense within the very specific context of the European Union was unable, due to circumstances beyond their control, to complete the article, and we did not have time to commission another author to provide the text. For this reason, we do not have an article to accompany this specific dimension of translation.

3.6 Supplementary Commentaries

There are certainly other translation-related issues that deserve to be raised. However, in order to avoid endless digressions and the risk of losing sight of the main issues, we have opted to focus the special issue on the abovementioned key areas. But to enrich and enlarge the perspective, each of the core contributions is supplemented by two commentaries written by authors who are experts in the topic at hand, have read the contributions carefully, and have been invited to take their own look at one or another of the aspects addressed in the core contribution assigned to them. They have each done so in their own way, sometimes referring to their own similar experiences, sometimes offering an alternative analysis to that proposed by the author of the core contribution. One example of such an alternative analysis is the commentary on Tobias Berger’s article by the eminent legal scholar Brian Tamanaha. He looks at the data presented in Berger’s paper from a different perspective and suggests alternative interpretations which, he notes, are always possible. While the diversity of perspectives may at first glance seem confusing, it should ultimately be seen as enriching the range of interpretations. None of the authors in this special issue would claim to be right at all costs; they respect each other's analytical approaches to the data. Brian Tamanaha’s commentary is insightful in its own way and can therefore be seen as complementary to Berger’s analysis.

The aim of pairing commentators with authors of the major articles has not been to provoke controversy but, on the contrary, to allow a wider group of scholars and/or practitioners, all in their own way engaged in translation issues in their multiple senses, to become involved in the discussion and, together, offer a richer palette of approaches.

4 Conclusion

What emerges clearly from the contributions to this special issue is that translation is not just a technical or background activity. On the contrary, the contribution that accurate translation can make and the role it can play in the search for balanced and sustainable solutions to issues of religious and cultural diversity in societies marked by such diversity cannot be overstated, neither legally nor socially. Whether it involves translating judicial decisions into another language, implementing international norms within national frameworks, ensuring effective communication in multilingual courtrooms or in administrative contexts, or incorporating insights from other disciplines, translation is a core part of legal reasoning and practice today.

Looking at translation in this broader sense reveals how much is at stake when law encounters different cultural, religious, or normative systems. These encounters often bring to light tensions and uncertainties, but they also create opportunities for legal systems to become more inclusive, flexible, and responsive. The challenges of translation are not only about language; they involve how legal meaning is constructed, how authority is expressed, and how justice is perceived by those involved.

The CUREDI project aims to make these challenges visible by documenting and analysing legal cases where questions of cultural or religious diversity are at the forefront. In doing so, it highlights how judges and legal actors across Europe deal with these questions in different ways, and how translation (in its many forms) is often part of that process. The case law collected and commented on through CUREDI provides a basis for comparing legal approaches, identifying patterns, sharing good practices, and learning from one another, but it also helps us recognise the limits and risks involved when key terms or values do not travel easily across legal and cultural boundaries.

The contributions gathered here show that translation is never neutral. It can simplify or distort, clarify or obscure, depending on how it is done. This is why it needs to be approached with care and reflection. Translation, in legal settings, always involves choices – about when to translate, which meanings to prioritise, which terms to adopt, which perspectives to take into consideration. These choices have real consequences for people’s rights and for how just and accessible legal processes feel to those who rely on them.

This special issue therefore invites readers – whether they be legal practitioners, translators, scholars, or policy-makers – to think of translation not as a secondary concern, but as something that cuts to the heart of how law operates in society, and even more so in the context of plural societies. It also calls for stronger support for the infrastructures that make good legal translation possible: high-quality interpreting and translation services, interdisciplinary training, clearer legal standards, and more dialogue between national and international legal systems.

Ultimately, it is in the acts of translation, often contested but always necessary, that the quest for justice in plural societies is simultaneously enacted, challenged, and reimagined. This set of contributions offers both a map of the terrain and a set of tools for navigating it.


Zoom Seminar: "The China Effect: Rethinking Development in Latin America and the Caribbean" (3 December 2025)

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Delighted to pass along this announcement:

The Center for Chinese-Mexican Studies (Cechimex) of the School of Economics at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), together with the Center for Peace ane Deverlopment and Security Context of the University of Oklahoma are organizing a joint international seminar by Zoom next Wednesday, December 3, 2025 on "THE CHINA EFFECT: RETHINKING DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN".

The goal of the seminar is to examine the conceptual and strategic policy implications of shifting socioeconomic and global power dynamics, particularly the rise of China in Latin America and the Caribean (LAC) and the intensifying US-China confrontation, on LAC and the wider Global South.

The seminar will have an interesting group of heterogeneous colleagues, including (CST time and online vía Zoom):

INTRODUCTION: 9-9.10am
SESSION 1: 9.10-10.40AM

Moderator: Firat Demir, University of Oklahoma & Security in Context
KEVIN GALLAGHER, Boston University and Global Development Policy Center
CELIO HIRATUKA, State University of Campinas
ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS, Graduate School of Economics, UNAM and CECHIMEX

SESSION 2: 10.45am-12.30pm

Moderator: Enrique Dussel Peters, Graduate School of Economics, UNAM and CECHIMEX
RHYS JENKINS, School of Global Development, University of East Anglia
JORGE CARRILLO VIVEROS, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte
EVAN ELLIS, Latin American Studies, The U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

The course is public and free of cost; you can directly assist at the following Zoom link:
https://cuaed-unam-mx.zoom.us/j/89916605224; ID de reunión: 899 1660 5224

The seeds planted at the start of the leadership of Xi Jinping have grown and are starting to bear fruit; what sort of fruit remains to be seen, of course, so one can look forward ot the discussion.

For those with a historical bent and a taste for the irony that only historical snapshots can produce, I Include below a Press Release of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2014 on the visit by Xi Jinping to Fidel Castro in Cuba and their thoughts on the future of China LAC relations.



On July 22, 2014, President Xi Jinping kindly visited the revolutionary leader Fidel Castro of Cuba in Havana.

Xi Jinping came to the residence of Fidel Castro, and the two people exchanged views on the China-Cuba relations, the international situation and other issues of common concern in an intimate and friendly atmosphere.

Xi Jinping said, I am very glad to meet with you again, your honored Comrade Fidel. When I visited Cuba in 2011, I called on you and we had a long-time conversation. Today, seeing you hale and vigorous, I feel very pleased. You are the founder of the cause of Cuban revolution and construction, and also the founder of the China-Cuba relationship. You are admired deeply by the Cuban people and have also earned respect from the Chinese people. We will not forget the significant contributions you have made to the development of the bilateral relations.

Xi Jinping stressed, the purpose of my current visit to Cuba is to inherit and carry forward the China-Cuba traditional friendship jointly established by Comrade Fidel and the older generations of Chinese leaders, so as to inject new impetus into the bilateral friendly and cooperative relations. Xi Jinping also briefed on the visit to Latin America and his attendance of the BRICS Summit and the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit.

Fidel Castro welcomed Xi Jinping's visit to Cuba. He said that he cherishes the memory of friendly exchanges with China, and believes that the Cuba-China relations will yield more fruitful results under the leadership of President Xi Jinping and the Cuban leaders. Fidel Castro expressed that the international pattern is now undergoing profound changes, and the group rise of emerging market countries and numerous developing countries exerts significant and far-reaching influence over the world. China is a great country, and China's development will definitely play an important role in promoting the world peace and development. He is paying close attention to the current visit of President Xi Jinping to Latin America and is glad to see the BRICS Summit and the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Summit convene successfully and yield important and positive achievements. This will vigorously strengthen the solidarity and cooperation among developing countries, and promote the reform of the international governance system. He believes that the cooperation among the BRICS countries will be deepened continuously and wishes that the Latin America-China relations will make greater progress.

Fidel Castro invited Xi Jinping to visit the courtyard and the farm. Seeing the seeds of moringa oleifera and mulberry presented by China have grown into trees with luxuriant foliage, both people were very happy. Fidel Castro told Xi Jinping that the cultivation of moringa oleifera and mulberry is being promoted in Cuba, which helps to solve the problems of grain supply and livestock feed. Xi Jinping said that I have specially brought more seeds of moringa oleifera and mulberry this time and hope they will thrive and become a new manifestation of the China-Cuba friendship. This April, the China-Cuba moringa oleifera science and technology cooperation center was established in China's Yunnan Province, and today the China-Cuba moringa oleifera science and technology cooperation center is unveiled in Havana. China is willing to enhance agricultural cooperation with Cuba to jointly improve this sector and safeguard grain security.

At parting, Xi Jinping said to Fidel Castro that your 88th birthday is coming in a few days and I wish you a long, healthy and happy life. Fidel Castro asked Xi Jinping to convey his good wishes to the Chinese people, wishing China prosperity and strength and the Chinese people happiness and wellbeing.

Wang Huning, Li Zhanshu, Yang Jiechi and others attended the above events.


Rituals of Consubstantiation--Reflections on President Trump, "Thanksgiving Day 2025; A Proclamation from the White House"

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President Trump has, like many Presidents before (and likely after) the time of their office holding, issued a Proclamation: Thanksgiving Day 2025. It is comfortably ordinary in its sentiments, especially when in the extraordinary times in which the Republic now finds itself, it is perhaps the ordinary and the comforting that is desired, if only for the time it takes offer the sacrifice and consume the ritual meal that is the Republic's observance of this most welcome HolyDay. 

Pix credit here (Rockwell, 1943)

And so, in what has come to be a time honored tradition for American presidents with respect to all holy days of obligation on the political calendar of this Republic, President Trump has heralded the coming of Thanksgiving. I use those terms in their ancient senses since that is precisely what the President has undertaken through proclamation--that is a public calling out (usually by a herald, crier, or other servant of a household tasked with that office) of that which must be made known to those who may be within earshot. On this holy day of obligation is one is expected (if one can) to avoid labor for others and to attend a feast-gathering of some sort of human community or collective (traditionally a family, but one's family today is what one makes it, by whatever means and through the realization of whatever principle  that is achieved) for the purpose of giving thanks to those people or powers who merit or expect this public expression. It is, then, not a national day for mourning but for thanks, for expressing gratitude where gratitude is merited in accordance with whatever belief system is required to rationalize that conclusion in a way that accords with the objective (one felt rather than thought)--to acknowledge  appreciation for something (tangible or intangible) that might be thought kind or otherwise positive. 

Pix credit here (Addams Family Values)
Commentators remind us, generally, that "Commensality - eating and drinking at the same table - is a fundamental social activity, which creates and cements relationships. It also sets boundaries, including or excluding people according to a set of criteria defined by the society." (here). That statement reminds us that mood and objective make for the signification of a thing--one can stress both the negative (exclusion) or the positive (inclusion) within the inevitable human condition of the contradiction of collectivity, that some one or something is always left out (one perspective) or has every intention to avoid (another perspective) the ritual, and with it an acknowledgement of its norms. Solidarity, within human communities, then, more often than not, and especially within the construction of cultural and political community, necessarily, as the Chinese Marxist-Leninists more bluntly put t at the heart of their normative ideological constructs, between patriotic and destructive/foreign elements. 

Americans often tend to show thanks through food--a ritualized meal with symbolic meaning (gratitude) grounded in memory (and reenactment) to make physical the symbolic acts of coming together to consume food (and not each other) (on the semiotics of eating generally eg here).  And Thanksgiving is often seen as a pinnacle of the cycle of days devoted to giving thanks for both the bounty of the Republic and of the sacrifices made by many and in many different ways, to bring that Republic forward to the state of development in which it finds itsef, one hopefully (at least by enough people) to suggest forward movement on the Republic's inevitable path toward the deal of itself. In this case, like many others, the object is ritual solidarity among a community (on the politics of this sort of solidarity among modern indigenous Bolivian communities here). The central element of the ritual is the sacrifice of the produce of the Earth, which is then cooked and ingested by those who take part in the ritual and for whom the ritual consumption makes the meal something more than  what it may appear to an outsider.  It is an act of consubstantiation (a semiotic unity) rather than transubstantiation (a conversion of a thing into its representation) and the more powerful for it--we are what we eat in the sense that we partake of the body of the nation even as we consume its ritual manifestations in food. It is a wonderfully semiotics concept (which religion got to first)--the idea that an object (tangible) and its signification (also an object but intangible) can co-exist simultaneously within the space space/time. That, in essence is the communion, of sorts, of the ritual ingestion of the body of the Republic in an act that reveals its essence--a thankfulness for being here and in it. 

President Trump's Proclamation 2025 invokes a consubstantiation of a different sort, perhaps. One starts with divinam voluntatem (God wills it)--that invocation of an exogenous source from which the  auctoritas (influence and social position sometimes as a reflection of sometimes as a function of office) and potestas (formal institutional lawful power) associated with a perceived imperium of the office of the Present of the United States might be invoked by the human temporarily and currently serving as the human manifestation of that representative role. 

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And what is invoked? Ecce homo--the divine humanity inscribed on all things, good and bad (Eccl. 5:8-9; "If thou seest the oppression of the poor, and violent perverting of judgment and justice in a province, marvel not at the matter: for he that is higher than the highest regardeth; and there be higher than they. Moreover the profit of the earth is for all: the king himself is served by the field."). President Trump focuses on blood sacrifice: from out of carnage and perhaps evil (as those things are understood from time to time), something bountiful emerges. In the President's words (or at least the words of those whose sacrifice produced those words: "From the pilgrims who settled our continent and the patriots who won our independence on the battlefield to the pioneers who tamed the west and the warriors who have preserved our freedom in distant lands, the spirit of gratitude and grit embodied by those who celebrated the first Thanksgiving more than 400 years ago have stood at the very heart of what it means to be an American." (Proclamation: Thanksgiving Day 2025). The Presidency, and indeed, the Republic, is a vessel, within which "In every generation since, this spirit of reverence, trust, and gratitude has preserved our way of life and made America the strongest, greatest, and most resilient Nation the world has ever known." (Ibid.).

The President follows this rationalizing normative foundation with, also customary, an annual assessment of the progress from one annual meal sacrifice to another:  "This year, God has bestowed abundant blessings all across our land and indeed the entire world. As we give thanks to Him, we continue to advance our Nation through strong leadership and commonsense policy." The consubstantiation of the President and the divine; of the Republic and the person, is as old as the formation of ancient political collectives.  It is, in that sense, comforting. Some, though, might have though the spirit of the divine was more democratically dispersed among all of God's children gathered around the ritual meal.  And, indeed, that is a message inherent in the words put out by the President--all ritual observances require an intermediary through which it is possible to amplify the divine word. The Presidency, then, assumes a double representative characteristic--it is at once a space incarnating the people and also one transmitting the divine. 

And so the President reminds the people of this Republic--each gathered together to perform their portion of the national ritual sacrifice of flesh made idea and a manifestation of the solidarity of the Republic through shared norms invoked in food offerings consumed as are the ideas they represent--that as "we prepare to celebrate 250 glorious years of American independence, this Thanksgiving, we summon the faith, resolve, and unflinching fortitude of the giants of American history who came before us.  We vow to build a future that echoes their sacrifice.  Above all, we offer our endless gratitude to Almighty God for His love, grace, and infinite blessings."  

Best wishes to those who celebrate by partaking in a meal that reminds us that we consume not just food, but also we consume the idea that the food embodies made more potent by the rituals of its ingestion that become part of the food as well--feeding body, spirit, and community  

 

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BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

In 1789, just years after America’s triumph over tyranny in the Revolutionary War, President George Washington established the first National Day of Thanksgiving, declaring “the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful for His benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favor.”  Decades later, in the midst of the bloody Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln implored the Nation to join in unity for “a day of Thanksgiving and Praise to our beneficent Father who dwelleth in the Heavens.”  In every generation since, this spirit of reverence, trust, and gratitude has preserved our way of life and made America the strongest, greatest, and most resilient Nation the world has ever known.

From the pilgrims who settled our continent and the patriots who won our independence on the battlefield to the pioneers who tamed the west and the warriors who have preserved our freedom in distant lands, the spirit of gratitude and grit embodied by those who celebrated the first Thanksgiving more than 400 years ago have stood at the very heart of what it means to be an American.

This year, God has bestowed abundant blessings all across our land and indeed the entire world.  As we give thanks to Him, we continue to advance our Nation through strong leadership and commonsense policy.  As a result, the American economy is roaring back, we are making progress on lowering the cost of living, a new era of peace is sweeping around the world, our sovereignty is being swiftly restored, and the American spirit is coming back greater and more powerful than ever before.

As we prepare to celebrate 250 glorious years of American independence, this Thanksgiving, we summon the faith, resolve, and unflinching fortitude of the giants of American history who came before us.  We vow to build a future that echoes their sacrifice.  Above all, we offer our endless gratitude to Almighty God for His love, grace, and infinite blessings.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim Thursday, November 27, 2025, as a National Day of Thanksgiving.  I encourage all Americans to gather, in homes and places of worship, to offer a prayer of thanks to God for our many blessings. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fifth day of November, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and fiftieth.

                              DONALD J. TRUMP

The American Leninist-Vanguardist Republic: Text of President Trump's Executive Order, "Launching the Genesis Mission," and the Press Release "President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery"

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 We are all Leninists now. Leninism is now so deeply embedded in the premises of societal organization that it has simply disappeared from consciousness to become the basis for what now passes for collective consciousness itself. Everywhere.

This is neither bad nor good. It is, however, unavoidable in this stage of the historical development of liberal democracy it appears. 

Perhaps it was inevitable. The inevitability was clear enough in 1918 with the collapse of the Russian Imperial machinery. But what was inevitable was not Marxist revolution. No. What was inevitable and initially feared was the overthrow of ancient forms of caste/hierarchies  masquerading as everything from theocracy to monarchies, oligarchies, aristocratic regimes and liberal democracy (all of which as Aristotle never tied of trying to explain to those who would not listen, or if they were listening were doing so strategically for their own advantage). That overthrow was not meant to produce something better. Well, maybe not exactly nothing better--it produced a more suitable discursive environment in which what came next, what was feared, could be insinuated into the bones of virtually every system of power then strong enough to thrive. It produced new forms of caste power, of modalities of leadership and guidance--better suited to the age of large first stage industrialization, and the foundations of systems that would, ultimately, be ideal for the merger of technology and control.

What was feared in 1918 and thereafter was not Marxism, or the movement toward (eventually) the establishment of communist societies, the shock troops of which would be a motley collection of the poor and eventually collective identity collectives. Bismarck had shown the possibilities of suborning the poor and using them to buttress older systems; but then so did the Americans from a cleaner and more tech advanced perspective in the 19th century, especially after the destruction of the gentry plantation structures  and their replacement by the technologies of factory style human robotization of the later initial period of industrialization). Still, the Bolsheviks had demonstrated, again, both the frailty of old power orders, and the power of ideas to manage and use the poor (workers)--and the ambitious (intellectuals, for example). These, as always, could (and do) serve as the canon fodder to be deployed for this effort; these are the willing offerings of the necessary blood sacrifice , the horrors of which plays so well (discursively, of course) within societies whose members had already be primed to absorb the sacrifice with the appropriate cultural and value ordering premises, and so primed, and so motivated, would become the vehicles for the triumph of the new caste reordering for societies now primed toward the acceptance of that instrumental inevitability for the birth of new power orders that now appeared to be the antithesis of themselves.

What was feared enough to produce a quite brilliant reaction and fundamental change of course, was what eventually (and with a head nod to Rousseau) elaborated as a variety of forms of caste vanguardsm, one built around the pioneering work of Soviet professional revolutionaries. Vanguardism was quite correctly perceived as both threat and opportunity at least outside of the Bolshevik realms by those holding onto the cognitive premises around which power was arranged and could be deployed in whatever horrible way suited those whose hands never really got dirty, societal herdmasters; what was feared with the rise of the professional revolutionary, and with them, the arrangement of power within the forms and technologies of Leninism. Vanguardisms, and especially vanguards enhanced by and through technology, appears to offer the same threat--and the same possibilities--as did bourgeois  revolutionaries of the 17th and 18th centuries to those who had profited from centuries of technologies of power the decrepitude of which, enhanced by the blindness of arrogance and the "Forbidden City effect" of increasingly retreating into their fantasy pleasure spaces (discussed here; Forbidden Cities).

That the Russian Leninist vanguard was able to topple the older regimes with what appeared to be the effort of a 10 year old blowing out birthday candles, suggested that while the Soviet form of Leninist vanguardism was a threat--the use of Leninist vanguardism was also an opportunity. It was an opportunity that could be refashioned to suit the political-economic models that were emerging in recognizable form by 1919. The Soviets, heading a more developmentally backward state (their word, similar with early Chinese Marxist-Leninist before the Japanese War), focused on class struggle. The rest, in a far ore advanced state of development (in the Chinese Leninist sense of modernization), focused on the utilization of the "brain trust" as the principle means of advancing a new (now Leninist) vanguard ruling group. 

Pix Credit Here (Movie, "Oh Brother Where Art Thou")
On that basis liberal democracy was able to lay the foundations of its approach to Leninist vanguardism to suit its stage of historical development, around which it consigned old power caste categories ( race, sex, birth, etc,) to the dust bin of history, while retaining its forms and structures of authority (of course) and raised up new technologies of governing, one based on the deployment of knowledge production as an instrument suited to the needs of those who "make the rules"--and the technological of the rule system itself, producing, in some respects a factory floor model of "law" and its "rule" that also became a function of the new power-laboring classes--the expert, the intellectual, and the well training official, all now the new shock troops of caste power manged through the mechanics of liberal democracy and guided by those with the power to manage knowledge production through the control of the resources necessary for its elaboration and the realization of tech and knowledge fueled "goals." That, in turn required a governance apparatus different from that necessary to control peasants and workers along a Socialist Path; it required an apparatus of the oxen of knowledge producers (well rewarded at their higher levels) pulling the cart of development toward values infused wealth (welfare) maximization, the forms and objectives of which have also been an object of brain trust development, for which purposes the State retained a critical importance as the holder of the authority to "make things happen." In that respect as well the difference between Soviet/Chinese Leninist pathways and those of liberal democracy converged as to form, at least. But it also required new means of in-taking human capital (merit, loyalty, patriotism, solidarity, etc., whatever works in context), and a new means of expressing the democratic character of the enterprise of aligned knowledge-power systems. A nice post-Bolshevik variant might be understood within the structures of the International Labor Organization--consisting of representation of workers, enterprises, and the state. Knowledge based consultative democracy is another, as is supervisory regulation, and other knowledge based mechanisms for deploying knowledge, including the knowledge of managing behaviors, sentiments, and the politics of those not sufficiently embedded in the mechanisms of knowledge-power-management. 

And, of course, brain trusts plus technology--whether it is of intellectuals, of the leading forces of social development, or of anything else--answer only to themselves and their own logic. In the context of tech driven brain trust vanguardism of the liberal democratic sort one does not  encounter some sort of sad re-enactment of the cruder forms of totalitarianism of the last century. Though that false analogy appears to drive much of what passes for discussion and analysis among the fearful, the lazy, and those effectively out of the loop and not ready for tech based disciplinary "re-education." There is something new; it is new because the technologies are new, and with it, the approaches to understanding the "meaning" of core social collective premises become new as well. One moves from total control to total management; and one moves from a totalizing absence of personal liberty to its mediation by reference to public policy goals, aspirations, ideals and objectives.  Many global societies have been engaging in dress rehearsals for this new form of managed freedom and liberty for some time; and the politics of identity in the liberal democratic sphere, and that of patriotism and the avoidance of "chaos" have fueled the same control trajectories in Marxist Leninist States, to different effect in the ground. Brian trust vanguardism, like its post-Soviet Marxist cousin, manages and with technology, it may well manage so seamlessly that the difference between management and control will be a function of the determination of how much discretion left to humans  marks the diffe4rence between social solidarity principles and totalitarian disciplinary structures. In both cases, though, deviation from the vision and desires of the vanguard become harder as the politics of social collectives shifts from the masses to its leaders who manifest "the best of us." 

Pix credit here (Éminence Grise, Jean-Léon Gérôme (1873))

 The brain trust concept has become ubiquitous in liberal democracy, and so deeply embedded that it is now virtually impossible  to avoid the concept and its value as an inevitable solution to everything without rejecting the contemporary premises on which liberal democracy has been reordered since 1918. Consider this opening snippet from the Magazine of Columbia University: "Columbia’s Mind, Brain, and Behavior Initiative is assembling the best thinkers in the world to study the most complex object in the known universe." (The Brian Trust). One cannot imagine a world in which the brain trust is not a central element of power--aligning knowledge production with power, and the desires of power with knowledge production in a closed loop self-referencing structure within which one provides both tests who "for knows better" and then assumes that knowledge in the service of power  effectively trumps traditional politics either from the top, or more interesting, from the bottom. At the same time it aligns knowledge production with the production of law. Rule of law, in this sense, begins to assume the closed loop characteristics of productivity measures on the factory of floor of politics, directed now to the maximization of the realization of what expert knowledge--the brain trust, always eager to please those who make their new found status-power possible--makes possible. And the productivity of expert knowledge makes possible what power can conceive and desire. 


Pix Credit here (Cenerentola, Jean Pierre Ponnelle production, finale Act 1)

Tutti [All]
(meno Dandini) [except Dandini]
Andiamo, andiamo a tavola. [Come on; let's go to the table]
Si voli a giubilar. [Let's fly to rejoice in the feast]

Dandini
Oggi che fo da Principe [Today while I can still act the part of the Prince]
Per quattro io vuo' mangiar. [I will eat for four] (Cenerentola Finale Act 1)

The marriage is particular effective and visible in the context of tech and law making--as development and deployment according to rule grounded in the efforts of éminence grise yoked to that task. See, e.g., (1) U.N. Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Offers Platform to Build Safe Systems and Open Call for Candidates: (2) Reflections on Brainstorming Roundtable Hosted by Surya Deva, UN Special Rapporteur for Development (29 Nov 2023): "business models for inclusive sustainable development". The United States has been no stranger to these trends, and in a sense has led them since before Lenin managed to articulate his version of revolutionary vanguardim in "What is to be Done?" (1901-02). This has emerged from out of the shadow win the new era of historical development of the Republic especially in the relationship between tech based innovation of productive forces and the role of the state in directing, managing, and guiding that development (Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress: Remarks by Director Kratsios at the Endless Frontiers Retreat and "The Golden Age of American Innovation"). 

In that consideration of the emerging US AI and tech policy there was an element of Chinese style modernization, and with it, the techniques and sensibilities of a revolutionary vanguard: 

6. The Structures of American Modernization. If, as Mr. Kratsios suggests, the American ideological operating system requires direction (its coders and quality control functionaries) , and that this direction is both collective and political, then analysis can narrow down to the precise expression of that guidance in any stage of national historical development. Here Mr. Kratsios gets down to some directional detail: 

"Our first assignment is to secure America’s preeminence in critical and emerging technologies. This administration will ensure that our nation remains the leader in the industries of the future with a strategy of both promotion and protection—protecting our greatest assets and promoting our greatest innovators. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

Market driven innovation has political consequences, those consequences are the responsibility of the political hierarchy, the apex hierarchs have a responsibility for developing policy (mandatory and nudging) as a current expression and application of core principles bent toward the realization of ultimate goals. Here the political goal is to shape the market, and the direction of individual or private, activities within it, toward a metrics accessible (assuming agreement on the principles on which the metrics are based and the forms of measurement) goal--(1) preeminence, in (2) critical and emerging, (3) tech, (4) built around, (5)industries of the future, (6) through a national political strategy , (7) of promotion and protection, of (8) the critical factors of its production. It is in this objective that the failures of "left error" become most apparent to Mr. Kratsios:

To the degree it even tried to accomplish this, the Biden administration failed on its own terms, led by a spirit of fear rather than promise. The old regime sought to protect its managerial power from the disruptions of technology, while promoting social division and redistribution in the name of equity. They secured American technology poorly, and failed to strengthen our leadership at all. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

To overcome this left error, Mr. Kratsios suggests, the state apparatus must be burdened with three responsibilities:  

First, we have to make the smart choices of creatively allocating our public research and development dollars. Second, we have to make the right choices in constructing a common-sense, pro-innovation regulatory regime. And third, we have to make the easy choice to adopt the incredible products and tools made by American builders and to enable their export abroad. (Remarks by Director Kratsios)

Strategic use of research funds by the state, high quality innovation in regulatory regimes bent toward the fulfillment of policy goals, and then the aggressive export f the products of this model elsewhere (both the model of innovation and its products). These then suggest a large range of recent actions undertaken by the Trump administration against officials, institutions, and intergovernmental relations that are viewed as either remnants of left error or that are in the way of the state  undertaking these strategies as they understand them. Mr. Kratsios summarizes with respect to these three State objectives what has already been widely reported in the press: taking back and re-arranging State research funding to align with State objectives; regulatory reform also tied to State objectives and the rectification of the techno-bureaucratic establishment so that its working style will align with State objectives; and the re-invigoration of a re-imaged 19th century form of American merchant diplomacy and integrated economic order. (Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress)

The project now continues. On 24 November, President Trump issued a Press Release: President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery. The Genesis Mission Press Relase described an earlier issued Executive Order: Launching the Genesis Mission.

The announcement builds on President Trump’s Executive Order Removing Barriers to American Leadership In Artificial Intelligence and advances his America’s AI Action Plan released earlier this year—a directive to remove barriers to innovation, reduce dependence on foreign adversaries, and unleash the full strength of America’s scientific enterprise. Secretary Wright has designated Under Secretary for Science Darío Gil to lead the initiative. The Genesis Mission will mobilize the Department of Energy’s 17 National Laboratories, industry, and academia to build an integrated discovery platform.  The platform will connect the world’s best supercomputers, AI systems, and next-generation quantum systems with the most advanced scientific instruments in the nation. Once complete, the platform will be the world’s most complex and powerful scientific instrument ever built. It will draw on the expertise of roughly 40,000 DOE scientists, engineers, and technical staff, alongside private sector innovators, to ensure that the United States leads and builds the technologies that will define the future. (Energy Department Launches ‘Genesis Mission’ to Transform American Science and Innovation Through the AI Computing Revolution)

 The Executive Order describes the project as "a national effort to accelerate the application of AI for transformative scientific discovery focused on pressing national challenges." (Launching the Genesis Mission, §2(a)). 

[It] recognizes the need to invest in AI-enabled science to accelerate scientific advancement. In this pivotal moment, the challenges we face require a historic national effort, comparable in urgency and ambition to the Manhattan Project that was instrumental to our victory in World War II and was a critical basis for the foundation of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its national laboratories. (Ibid., §1)
It is meant to harness the best minds toward objectives that strengthen the Republic as that is understood by those in power in a State directed project that harnesses national productive forces toward those ends: "The Genesis Mission will dramatically accelerate scientific discovery, strengthen national security, secure energy dominance, enhance workforce productivity, and multiply the return on taxpayer investment into research and development, thereby furthering America’s technological dominance and global strategic leadership." (Ibid., § 1). All of this is to be overseen by the core of leadership in (or of) the Republic, Michael Kratsios the "Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST) [who] shall provide general leadership of the Mission." (Ibid., § 2(c)) and operationalized under the leadership of the Secretary of Energy (Ibid., §2(b).

No fault here. But also a very nice sign both of the deep penetration of Leninist vanguardism as an essential element of techno-liberal democracy and with it the way in which the State, even in markets driven cultures, may deploy national productive forces, including human productive elements to suit its purposes, purposes that are manifested and realized through an interaction between knowledge producers and power holders. Perhaps left in its wake, and perhaps necessarily so, are the discursive ropes that once served to animate the Republic's sense of itself, even as it was changing from 1919. 

And what is the measure of success? Victory!

But there is no substitute for victory. ** * In a world so shaped by politics as well as technology, we must take action in both of these domains. We need all Americans to continue to rise to the occasion, to make full use of their talents, and to build. (Ibid.)
To those ends the masses must unite under the leadership and guidance of the center to ensure that individual effort can be aggregated, in the fundamental working style of American markets driven organization, to "preserve the inheritance of the American Century to share with posterity, and to ensure that the technologies that give shape to our world help the American people secure the blessings of liberty we received from our forebearers * * * and drive us further into the endless frontier." (Remarks by Director Kratsios). (Liberal Democratic Leninism in the Era of Artificial Intelligence and Tech Driven Social Progress)

 To those ends, the American Science and Security Platform (Platform) will be developed. It will serve as "the infrastructure for the Mission with the purpose of providing, in an integrated manner and to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with law" (Ibid., § 3(a)) with the following capabilities:

(i) high-performance computing resources, including DOE national laboratory supercomputers and secure cloud-based AI computing environments, capable of supporting large-scale model training, simulation, and inference;

(ii) AI modeling and analysis frameworks, including AI agents to explore design spaces, evaluate experimental outcomes, and automate workflows;

(iii) computational tools, including AI-enabled predictive models, simulation models, and design optimization tools;

(iv) domain-specific foundation models across the range of scientific domains covered;

(v) secure access to appropriate datasets, including proprietary, federally curated, and open scientific datasets, in addition to synthetic data generated through DOE computing resources, consistent with applicable law; applicable classification, privacy, and intellectual property protections; and Federal data-access and data-management standards; and

(vi) experimental and production tools to enable autonomous and AI-augmented experimentation and manufacturing in high-impact domains.

To what ends? Within 60 days of the date of the order, the Energy Secretary and their staff is to "identify and submit to" Mr. Kratsios, the APST, "a detailed list of at least 20 science and technology challenges of national importance" what might be fodder for the Platform created under § 3. These are to "span priority domains consistent with National Science and Technology Memorandum 2 of September 23, 2025." (Launching the Genesis Mission, §4(a)). These are to include: "(i) advanced manufacturing; (ii) biotechnology; (iii) critical materials; (iv) nuclear fission and fusion energy; (v) quantum information science; and (vi) semiconductors and microelectronics.

In this project, the State is also to serve a coordinating and amplification role.  

The Secretary, in coordination with the APST and the Special Advisor for AI and Crypto, shall establish mechanisms for agency collaboration with external partners possessing advanced AI, data, or computing capabilities or scientific domain expertise, including through cooperative research and development agreements, user facility partnerships, or other appropriate arrangements with external entities to support and enhance the activities of the Mission, and shall ensure that such partnerships are structured to preserve the security of Federal research assets and maximize public benefit.(Launching the Genesis Mission, §5(c)).

This, then, is how liberal democratic techno-vanguardism works at the start of the second quarter of this century, and in the process re-shapes the Republic. Make no mistake, this is not a partisan project but rather one that the Republic's leadership has been working towards for more than a century. It aligns with the times and with the Republic's political economic model n a form relevant to the contradictions that threaten its forward movement along the American progressive pathway. In this form, the Republic's Leninism, long in gestation and dedicated to countering and overcoming the threat of Soviet Marxist class struggle Leninist vanguardism, now appears to assume a more prominent and coordinating role, a role of leadership and guidance over non-state productive forces, and in the name of national security and the safeguarding of the State from instability and chaos to assume a larger role in the management of non-state assets and the autonomous decision making of individuals that are its subjects. In the process both the nature and practice of brain trust liberal democracy and the relationship between individuals, the state and its law changes to suit the times. 

And one of its great markers--the abandonment of the risk avoidance foundational premises underlying both the United Nations and European approaches to Artificial Intelligence. In that one sees that second dialectic, between law and technology, in which knowledge production and the needs of one drives and tends to shape the approach of the other. In the case of the United Nations and European éminences grise, knowledge production is grounded in risk avoidance which is then tied to and informed against a reading of constitutional traditions that serve to shape the nature and limits of that production (and use) of knowledge. In the case of the United States, the Leninist brain trust shapes law to facilitate a production of knowledge in the service of other identified fundamental challenges, one which reshapes and devalues risk as a constitutional (and therefore legal) value in shaping the law of high quality production in the service of the State, and from the State to the private sector.  

Both President Trump's Executive Order, Launching the Genesis Mission, and his Press Release on the Genesis Mission, President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery, follows below. Make of it what you will from and through whatever cognitive lens suits. 

Pix credit here

 

President Trump Launches the Genesis Mission to Accelerate AI for Scientific Discovery

Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order launching The Genesis Mission, a bold national initiative that aims to accelerate scientific breakthroughs using AI. Inspired by the legacy of the Apollo Program, The Genesis Mission brings together the unmatched power of our National Laboratories’ supercomputers and top scientific minds to transform the way science and research are conducted.

This whole-of-government approach represents a historic mobilization of resources, tasking the Department of Energy to integrate its world-class supercomputers and datasets into a unified, closed-loop AI platform. Integrating this data, The Genesis Mission leverages the power of AI to automate experiment design, accelerate simulations, and generate predictive models that accelerate federal research and development productivity.

The Executive Order directs the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology to spearhead coordination with key federal agencies, including the National Science Foundation (NSF), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and National Institutes of Health (NIH) as AI unlocks scientific findings from datasets spanning from energy, health, and manufacturing.

“President Trump is taking a revolutionary approach to scientific research, harnessing the power of AI to propel America into the Golden Age of Innovation. The Genesis Mission connects world-class scientific data with the most advanced American AI to unlock breakthroughs in medicine, energy, materials science, and beyond,” said Michael Kratsios, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and Director of the White House of Science and Technology Policy.

 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

Section1.  Purpose.  From the founding of our Republic, scientific discovery and technological innovation have driven American progress and prosperity.  Today, America is in a race for global technology dominance in the development of artificial intelligence (AI), an important frontier of scientific discovery and economic growth.  To that end, my Administration has taken a number of actions to win that race, including issuing multiple Executive Orders and implementing America’s AI Action Plan, which recognizes the need to invest in AI-enabled science to accelerate scientific advancement.  In this pivotal moment, the challenges we face require a historic national effort, comparable in urgency and ambition to the Manhattan Project that was instrumental to our victory in World War II and was a critical basis for the foundation of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its national laboratories.

This order launches the “Genesis Mission” as a dedicated, coordinated national effort to unleash a new age of AI‑accelerated innovation and discovery that can solve the most challenging problems of this century.  The Genesis Mission will build an integrated AI platform to harness Federal scientific datasets — the world’s largest collection of such datasets, developed over decades of Federal investments — to train scientific foundation models and create AI agents to test new hypotheses, automate research workflows, and accelerate scientific breakthroughs.  The Genesis Mission will bring together our Nation’s research and development resources — combining the efforts of brilliant American scientists, including those at our national laboratories, with pioneering American businesses; world-renowned universities; and existing research infrastructure, data repositories, production plants, and national security sites — to achieve dramatic acceleration in AI development and utilization.  We will harness for the benefit of our Nation the revolution underway in computing, and build on decades of innovation in semiconductors and high-performance computing.  The Genesis Mission will dramatically accelerate scientific discovery, strengthen national security, secure energy dominance, enhance workforce productivity, and multiply the return on taxpayer investment into research and development, thereby furthering America’s technological dominance and global strategic leadership.

Sec. 2.  Establishment of the Genesis Mission.  (a)  There is hereby established the Genesis Mission (Mission), a national effort to accelerate the application of AI for transformative scientific discovery focused on pressing national challenges.

(b)  The Secretary of Energy (Secretary) shall be responsible for implementing the Mission within DOE, consistent with the provisions of this order, including, as appropriate and authorized by law, setting priorities and ensuring that all DOE resources used for elements of the Mission are integrated into a secure, unified platform.  The Secretary may designate a senior political appointee to oversee day-to-day operations of the Mission.

(c)  The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST) shall provide general leadership of the Mission, including coordination of participating executive departments and agencies (agencies) through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and the issuance of guidance to ensure that the Mission is aligned with national objectives.

Sec. 3.  Operation of the American Science and Security Platform.  (a)  The Secretary shall establish and operate the American Science and Security Platform (Platform) to serve as the infrastructure for the Mission with the purpose of providing, in an integrated manner and to the maximum extent practicable and consistent with law:

(i)    high-performance computing resources, including DOE national laboratory supercomputers and secure cloud-based AI computing environments, capable of supporting large-scale model training, simulation, and inference;

(ii)   AI modeling and analysis frameworks, including AI agents to explore design spaces, evaluate experimental outcomes, and automate workflows;

(iii)  computational tools, including AI-enabled predictive models, simulation models, and design optimization tools;

(iv)   domain-specific foundation models across the range of scientific domains covered;

(v)    secure access to appropriate datasets, including proprietary, federally curated, and open scientific datasets, in addition to synthetic data generated through DOE computing resources, consistent with applicable law; applicable classification, privacy, and intellectual property protections; and Federal data-access and data-management standards; and

(vi)   experimental and production tools to enable autonomous and AI-augmented experimentation and manufacturing in high-impact domains.

(b)  The Secretary shall take necessary steps to ensure that the Platform is operated in a manner that meets security requirements consistent with its national security and competitiveness mission, including applicable classification, supply chain security, and Federal cybersecurity standards and best practices.

(c)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary shall identify Federal computing, storage, and networking resources available to support the Mission, including both DOE on-premises and cloud-based high-performance computing systems, and resources available through industry partners.  The Secretary shall also identify any additional partnerships or infrastructure enhancements that could support the computational foundation for the Platform.

(d)  Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary shall:

(i)   identify a set of initial data and model assets for use in the Mission, including digitization, standardization, metadata, and provenance tracking; and

(ii)  develop a plan, with appropriate risk-based cybersecurity measures, for incorporating datasets from federally funded research, other agencies, academic institutions, and approved private-sector partners, as appropriate.

(e)  Within 240 days of the date of this order, the Secretary shall review capabilities across the DOE national laboratories and other participating Federal research facilities for robotic laboratories and production facilities with the ability to engage in AI-directed experimentation and manufacturing, including automated and AI-augmented workflows and the related technical and operational standards needed.

(f)  Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary shall, consistent with applicable law and subject to available appropriations, seek to demonstrate an initial operating capability of the Platform for at least one of the national science and technology challenges identified pursuant to section 4 of this order.

Sec. 4.  Identification of National Science and Technology Challenges.  (a)  Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary shall identify and submit to the APST a detailed list of at least 20 science and technology challenges of national importance that the Secretary assesses to have potential to be addressed through the Mission and that span priority domains consistent with National Science and Technology Memorandum 2 of September 23, 2025, including:

(i)    advanced manufacturing;

(ii)   biotechnology;

(iii)  critical materials;

(iv)   nuclear fission and fusion energy;

(v)    quantum information science; and

(vi)   semiconductors and microelectronics.

(b)  Within 30 days of submission of the list described in subsection (a) of this section, the APST shall review the proposed list and, working with participating agency members of the NSTC, coordinate the development of an expanded list that can serve as the initial set of national science and technology challenges to be addressed by the Mission, including additional challenges proposed by participating agencies through the NSTC, subject to available appropriations.

(c)  Following development of the expanded list described in subsection (b) of this section, agencies participating in the Mission shall use the Platform to advance research and development aligned with the national science and technology challenges identified in the expanded list, consistent with applicable law and their respective missions, and subject to available appropriations.

(d)  On an annual basis thereafter, the Secretary shall review and update the list of challenges in consultation with the APST and the NSTC to reflect progress achieved, emerging national needs, and alignment with my Administration’s research and development priorities.

Sec. 5.  Interagency Coordination and External Engagement.  (a)  The APST, through the NSTC, and with support from the Federal Chief Data Officer Council and the Chief AI Officer Council, shall convene relevant and interested agencies to:

(i)    assist participating agencies in aligning, to the extent permitted by law, their AI-related programs, datasets, and research and development activities with the objectives of the Mission in their respective areas of expertise, while avoiding duplication of effort across the Federal Government and promoting interoperability;

(ii)   identify data sources that may support the Mission’s aim;

(iii)  develop a process and resourcing plan in coordination with participating agencies for integrating appropriate and available agency data and infrastructure into the Mission, to the extent permitted by law and subject to available appropriations, including methods under which all agencies contributing to the Mission are encouraged to implement appropriate risk-based security measures that reflect cybersecurity best practices;

(iv)   launch coordinated funding opportunities or prize competitions across participating agencies, to the extent permitted by law and subject to available appropriations, to incentivize private-sector participation in AI-driven scientific research aligned with Mission objectives; and

(v)    establish mechanisms to coordinate research and development funding opportunities and experimental resources across participating agencies, ensuring agencies can participate effectively in the Mission.

(b)  The APST shall coordinate with relevant agencies in establishing, consistent with existing authorizing statutes and subject to available appropriations, competitive programs for research fellowships, internships, and apprenticeships focused on the application of AI to scientific domains identified as national challenges for the Mission, to include placement of program participants at DOE national laboratories and other participating Federal research facilities, with the purpose of providing access to the Platform and training in AI-enabled scientific discovery.

(c)  The Secretary, in coordination with the APST and the Special Advisor for AI and Crypto, shall establish mechanisms for agency collaboration with external partners possessing advanced AI, data, or computing capabilities or scientific domain expertise, including through cooperative research and development agreements, user facility partnerships, or other appropriate arrangements with external entities to support and enhance the activities of the Mission, and shall ensure that such partnerships are structured to preserve the security of Federal research assets and maximize public benefit.  To facilitate these collaborations, the Secretary shall:

(i)    develop standardized partnership frameworks, including cooperative research and development or other appropriate agreements, and data-use and model‑sharing agreements;

(ii)   establish clear policies for ownership, licensing, trade-secret protections, and commercialization of intellectual property developed under the Mission, including innovations arising from AI-directed experiments;

(iii)  implement uniform and stringent data access and management processes and cybersecurity standards for non-Federal collaborators accessing datasets, models, and computing environments, including measures requiring compliance with classification, privacy, and export-control requirements, as well as other applicable laws; and

(iv)   establish procedures to ensure the highest standards of vetting and authorization of users and collaborators seeking access to the resources of the Mission and associated research activities, including the Platform and associated Federal research resources.

(d)  The APST, through the NSTC, shall, to the extent appropriate, identify opportunities for international scientific collaboration to support activities under the Mission.

Sec. 6.  Evaluation and Reporting.  (a)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, and on an annual basis thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report to the President, through the APST and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, describing:

(i)    the Platform’s operational status and capabilities;

(ii)   progress toward integration across DOE national laboratories and other participating Federal research partners, including shared access to computing resources, data infrastructure, and research facilities;

(iii)  the status of user engagement, including participation of student researchers and any related training;

(iv)   updates on research efforts and outcomes achieved, including measurable scientific advances, publications, and prototype technologies;

(v)    the scope and outcomes of public-private partnerships, including collaborative research projects and any technology transitions or commercialization activities; and

(vi)   any identified needs or recommendations for authorities or interagency support to achieve the Mission’s objectives.

Sec. 7.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Energy.

                             DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    November 24, 2025.

CfP: Special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation - titled Omnibus Legislation and EU Regulatory Reform: Between Efficiency and Constitutional Integrity

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I am delighted to pass along this call for papers for a Special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation, the theme of which is "Omnibus Legislation and EU Regulatory Reform: Between Efficiency and Constitutional Integrity." Its guest editor is Alberto Alemanno, Jean Monnet Professor in European Union Law at HEC Paris.

Here is the description:

The European Union is undergoing a fundamental transformation in how it makes law. Responding to calls for simplification and competitiveness – echoed and amplified by demands from the US Administration –, the EU Commission has embraced omnibus legislation as the principal mechanism for systematic regulatory reform. Omnibus acts, which amend multiple legal instruments across disparate regulatory domains in a single legislative package, have evolved from rarely-used technical consolidation tools into vehicles for substantive deregulatory policy change. Since January 2025, the Commission has embarked on an unprecedented wave of omnibus legislation, with multiple packages spanning across sustainability (Omnibus I), investment (Omnibus II), agriculture (Omnibus III), single market rules (Omnibus IV), defense (Omnibus V), and chemicals (Omnibus VI). The EU Parliament quiescently accepted the use of this legislative technique by putting the Omnibus I package to a vote. Looking ahead to 2026, more than half of planned proposals are packaged as omnibuses, covering areas as diverse as digital regulation - which was presented today -, environmental policy, food and feed safety, automotive standards, energy products, taxation, and citizenship.


This proliferation of omnibus legislation fundamentally changes the procedural and substantive framework through which regulatory change occurs in the EU. While the omnibus might not be incompatiblewith the EU legal order, its current practice raises significant questions about constitutional integrity, procedural safeguards, fundamental rights protection, and the balance between efficiency and legality in EU lawmaking. The academic literature on omnibus legislation under EU law remains notably limited. While comparative scholarship has extensively examined omnibus practices in national systems (e.g. United States, Canada, Israel, and EU Member States), the supranational dimension has been largely overlooked.


This Special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation- titled Omnibus Legislation and EU Regulatory Reform: Between Efficiency and Constitutional Integrity - seeks to address this gap by providing the first systematic scholarly analysis of EU omnibus legislation at a time when it is becoming a central instrument of regulatory reform. We welcome contributions that are critical, supportive, or ambivalent regarding omnibus techniques, including work that identifies circumstances in which omnibus legislation can be designed compatibly with constitutional safeguards and robust protection levels. Ultimately, the Union's legitimacy depends on the reviewability and accountability of its acts, including those that purport to simplify and “cut red tape”. Even the most ambitious simplification agendas must unfold within, never outside, the discipline of law.

The full CfP follows below.

 


The European Union is undergoing a fundamental transformation in how it makes law. Responding to calls for simplification and competitiveness – echoed and amplified by demands from the US Administration –, the EU Commission has embraced omnibus legislation as the principal mechanism for systematic regulatory reform. Omnibus acts, which amend multiple legal instruments across disparate regulatory domains in a single legislative package, have evolved from rarely-used technical consolidation tools into vehicles for substantive deregulatory policy change. Since January 2025, the Commission has embarked on an unprecedented wave of omnibus legislation, with multiple packages spanning across sustainability (Omnibus I), investment (Omnibus II), agriculture (Omnibus III), single market rules (Omnibus IV), defense (Omnibus V), and chemicals (Omnibus VI). The EU Parliament quiescently accepted the use of this legislative technique by putting the Omnibus I package to a vote. Looking ahead to 2026, more than half of planned proposals are packaged as omnibuses, covering areas as diverse as digital regulation - which was presented today -, environmental policy, food and feed safety, automotive standards, energy products, taxation, and citizenship.


This proliferation of omnibus legislation fundamentally changes the procedural and substantive framework through which regulatory change occurs in the EU. While the omnibus might not be incompatiblewith the EU legal order, its current practice raises significant questions about constitutional integrity, procedural safeguards, fundamental rights protection, and the balance between efficiency and legality in EU lawmaking. The academic literature on omnibus legislation under EU law remains notably limited. While comparative scholarship has extensively examined omnibus practices in national systems (e.g. United States, Canada, Israel, and EU Member States), the supranational dimension has been largely overlooked.


This Special issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation- titled Omnibus Legislation and EU Regulatory Reform: Between Efficiency and Constitutional Integrity - seeks to address this gap by providing the first systematic scholarly analysis of EU omnibus legislation at a time when it is becoming a central instrument of regulatory reform. We welcome contributions that are critical, supportive, or ambivalent regarding omnibus techniques, including work that identifies circumstances in which omnibus legislation can be designed compatibly with constitutional safeguards and robust protection levels. Ultimately, the Union's legitimacy depends on the reviewability and accountability of its acts, including those that purport to simplify and “cut red tape”. Even the most ambitious simplification agendas must unfold within, never outside, the discipline of law.


Guest Editor: Alberto Alemanno


Topics

We invite contributions addressing (but not limited to): 

- Constitutional and Procedural Dimensions

--Compatibility of omnibus legislation with EU constitutional principles (proportionality, legal certainty, institutional balance)
--Adequacy of existing procedural safeguards in Better Regulation frameworks and their prospective reform
--Comparative analysis with omnibus practices in Member States and third countries
--Role of inter-institutional agreements in constraining bundling practices
--Effects of omnibus techniques on the transparency, predictability and contestability of EU rulemaking

- Substantive Policy Impacts
--Sectoral case studies of specific omnibus packages (sustainability, digital, environment, agriculture, chemicals, defense, investment, etc.) and their consequences for protection levels
--Impact on regulatory protection levels across policy domains
--Distributional effects and stakeholder impacts of omnibus reforms
--Relationship between omnibus legislation and the EU's international regulatory influence (e.g. Brussels effect, EU external action, common commercial policy, etc)
--Role of EU agencies, committees and other expert bodies in designing, implementing and monitoring omnibus reforms
- Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review
--Charter implications of systematic protection-level reduction
--Justiciability and reviewability of omnibus acts
--Evidentiary requirements for proportionality review in bundled legislation, including the role of impact assessments, evaluations and scientific advice
--The legal nature of impact assessment and relationship with public consultations in the context of omnibus packages
--Role of national courts in reviewing omnibus-based derogations
- Democratic Legitimacy and Participation
--Article 11 TEU implications of restricted consultation practices
--Role of the European Parliament in scrutinising omnibus proposals
--Access to justice and standing for affected stakeholders
--Transparency and accountability in omnibus lawmaking
--Interactions between omnibus legislation, better regulation agendas and narratives of simplification, “cutting red tape” or reducing regulatory burdens

- Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives
--Historical evolution of omnibus techniques in EU and comparative context, including crisis-driven and emergency omnibus legislation
--Theoretical frameworks for evaluating legislative bundling
--Lessons from single-subject rules and anti-omnibus provisions elsewhere
--Future trajectories: normalization, constitutionalization, or abandonment?
--Normative benchmarks and design principles for legitimate omnibus lawmaking in a multi-level, risk-regulatory legal order



Submission Information


Deadline for abstracts (500 words): 24 December 2025
Notification of acceptance: 12 January
Full paper submission: 31 March 2026
Expected publication: December 2026


Abstracts should outline the research question, theoretical and/or methodological approach, main argument, and (where relevant) empirical material or case studies, in no more than 500 words.


Full papers should generally be between 8,000 and 10,000 words, including footnotes, and must comply with the EJRR author guidelines. All submissions will be subject to double-blind peer review in accordance with EJRR’s standard procedures. We particularly encourage submissions from early-career researchers, including PhD candidates and postdoctoral scholars. Abstracts and inquiries should be sent to: wirajendi@hec.fr