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John Ruggie on the Framework for a New Business and Human Rights Treaty: "Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors,"

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I have been considering the recent moves by the Human Rights Council to begin considering a treaty  to replace/amplify/substitute/supersede the Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights that the HRC has itself only recently and unanimously endorsed.  See Larry Catá Backer, The Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights at a Crossroads: The State, the Enterprise, and the Spectre of a Treaty to Bind them All (July 5, 2014).

It is in this context that the insights of John Ruggie continue to be especially important.  See HERE and HERE.  John G. Ruggie, is the chair of the Institute for Human Rights and BusinessInternational Advisory Board, and is the Berthold Beitz Professor in Human Rights and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Affiliated Professor in International Legal Studies at Harvard Law School. From 2005-2011 he served as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights (and HERE). In June 2014 he received the Harry LeRoy Jones Award of the Washington Foreign Law Society, honoring “an individual who has made an outstanding contribution to the development and application of international law.”

His most recent essay, Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors, follows. It appeared originally as a Commentary for the Institute for Human Rights and Business.

The most valuable insight from the essay can be drawn from the larger picture Professor Ruggie paints.  It is clear that the great ideological differences that marked the Cold War years has not disappeared--they have merely been transformed to fir into the new realities of international relations.  At its heart is the key and fundamental difference among states in this respect:  on one side are aligned states whose political and economic orders are grounded in the premise that social, economic and cultural rights are the pathway to the development of civil and political rights.  Within this group there are powerful states who believe that such rights are better understood as obligations of states rather than as inherent in individual human dignity as a force to constrain state action. (Discussed in Backer, Larry Catá, China's Corporate Social Responsibility with National Characteristics: Coherence and Dissonance with the Global Business and Human Rights Project (June 9, 2014)). On the other are states, for the most part developed states, for which a central element of social, political and economic organization are centered on civil and political rights, from out of which social, economic and cultural rights may be attained. (Comparison in Backer, Larry Catá, Privatization, the Role of Enterprises and the Implementation of Social and Economic Rights: A Comparison of Rights-Based and Administrative Approaches in India and China (March 24, 2014). George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, 2013). There are three points of conflicts among these world views in the construction of transnational systems of norms for business and human rights. First is the role of the state (as a central element of normative and enforcement systems or as one of many stakeholders and operators of that system).  Second, centers on the content of those norms, an area within which there remains substantial divergence among the community of nations and between them and global human rights stakeholder communities.  And third, the role of public international bodies as an autonomous source of legislation and implementation, or merely as the inter governmental construct serving only in a ministerial capacity. Professor Ruggie wisely suggests caution and compromise--principled pragmatism--if the object is to accommodate these distinct views in a workable system.  For those who view the treaty exercise as just another front in the great battle among these divergent world views for supremacy, the these efforts will, like those of the past, produce failure in the status of the dis-equilibrium that passes as the status quo. And this leads ultimately to underline the value of Professor Ruggie's final point--the need to preserve and intensify the work of operationalizing the Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights even as the international community confronts its demons int he context of the current discourse on the construction of a treaty for business and human rights.



John G. Ruggie
Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors
In June of this year, a group of countries led by Ecuador succeeded in persuading the UN Human Rights Council to initiate negotiations aimed at regulating the conduct of multinational corporations. Preparations are now under way in Geneva and national capitals. In our highly tumultuous world such a development generates few headlines, but its importance for the everyday lives of people all around the globe, and possibly also for economic development prospects as well as corporate profits, can be utterly profound.
Therefore, it deserves close attention and serious debate. In this note I offer unsolicited—though I hope not unwelcome—advice to the initiative’s sponsors, based on my forty years of engagement with these issues as a scholar and practitioner, and put forward in the spirit of George Santayana’s famous dictum that those who do not learn from the past are doomed to repeat it. The note begins with some background, points out several key challenges the initiative’s sponsors face, and concludes with suggestions for how those challenges might be addressed.

Background

In 1973-74, I was a newly-minted assistant professor of international relations at Berkeley. Global governance was (and remains) my chosen field. Together with a Yugoslav colleague, I was conducting research on the New International Economic Order debates, the attempt by developing countries to employ the platform of the United Nations to reshape the world economy toward a more statist and, they believed, therefore more equitable path. [1]
A core element in this program was the regulation of multinational corporations. An Economic and Social Council resolution mandated the creation of an advisory group of eminent persons. The UN Secretariat prepared a comprehensive and impressive background report, Multinational Corporations in World Development [2] Substantive hearings with leading world experts were convened in Geneva, some of which I attended as an observer. Not long thereafter, the newly established UN Commission on Transnational Corporations launched negotiations on a code of conduct to govern multinationals.[3]
A UN Centre for Transnational Corporations was established to service these various activities. Initially I followed the code of conduct negotiations with great interest, though it soon waned as they became deadlocked. The cause is typically attributed to the clash between the developing countries’ preference for a mandatory instrument and OECD countries’ insistence on voluntary measures. But that is only part of the story. Two other factors were determinative. One was the refusal by the Group of 77 of developing countries to include the conduct of all business enterprises within the scope of the code, including national firms and state-owned enterprises. Another was that the OECD countries considered the G-77 proposals regarding host governments’ treatment of multinationals to be inadequate, above all the modalities of determining compensation in case of nationalization. The Soviet Union and its East European satellite states generally supported the G-77 while insisting that the code of conduct would not apply to their multinationals because they did not pose the problems of profit-driven Western firms.
Tentative compromises were struck on a number of issues and the G-77 ultimately conceded that they would accept a voluntary code. But on the main divisive matters, prolonged negotiations seemed only to harden the position of each side rather than facilitating compromise. By the mid 1980s the ground under the negotiations had shifted. Developing countries were now competing with one another to attract foreign direct investment funds, as they had been forced to borrow heavily on international capital markets in the aftermath of the 1979 oil-price crisis induced by OPEC. The negotiations were formally abandoned in the early 1990s, the Commission as well as the Centre abolished.
Over time, renewed pressure for such a treaty instrument has come most persistently from activists, and more intermittently from developing countries. The most recent instance was called the Norms on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, drafted by a working group of a subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights, the institutional predecessor of the Human Rights Council.[4]
At its 2004 session, the Commission declined to adopt the text, pointedly noting in a resolution that it “has not been requested by the Commission and, as a draft proposal, has no legal standing.”[5] A recent civil society survey sums up the overall record to date: “All these efforts met with vigorous opposition from TNCs and their business associations, and they ultimately failed"[6] Not to be deterred, in September 2013 Ecuador proposed that the Human Rights Council establish an intergovernmental working group (IGWG) to negotiate “an international legally binding framework on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” A “treaty alliance” of some 600 NGOs formed to support it.[7] In a sharply divided vote, the Council approved the proposal on June 26, 2014. Negotiations are expected to convene sometime in mid-2015, and to meet for one week annually for an indefinite duration.
Will this latest attempt to impose binding international law obligations governing transnational corporations turn out to be another instance of the classic dysfunction of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different outcome? Or might the negotiations come to reflect more deeply on this prior record and try to chart a more productive direction? We may get some inkling soon, as the opening moves by the treaty sponsors will have a decisive impact on the direction the negotiations will take. According to the rules of the game they basically get to choose the rules, and they are currently discussing what their approach will be.
What is my message to the treaty sponsors? That success is not guaranteed by listening to the advice offered here, but failure is if they don’t. In the upcoming negotiations, as in any other, countries on all sides will pursue what they believe to be in their individual interests as well as their views of what constitutes the collective interest. That’s a given, and it will shape the range of possibilities. But beyond that, the sponsors come into these negotiations with baggage that ensures failure unless it is adequately addressed right at the outset. Below, I outline the main challenges they face, and then offer some suggestions for how they might be addressed.

Key Challenges

The successful development of any international legal instrument requires a certain degree of consensus and good faith assumptions among states. The decision to establish the IGWG was highly controversial, and there is a significant risk that the divisions created during the negotiations around the resolution will persist. The key challenges for treaty sponsors are a weak political mandate, the proposed treaty’s unworkable scope and scale, and the sponsors’ as well as many supporters’ own record with regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)—unanimously endorsed by the Council in June 2011, and the only authoritative guidance the Council and its predecessor, the Commission, have issued for states and business enterprises on their respective obligations in relation to business and human rights. [8]
  1. Weak Political Mandate The treaty sponsors have the thinnest of political mandates. In addition to Ecuador, the resolution proposing the IGWG was co-sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba, South Africa, and Venezuela. The vote was twenty in favor, fourteen against, with thirteen abstentions. Thus, the proposal did not win the support of a majority of Council members, only a plurality. The home countries of the vast majority of the world’s transnational corporations were opposed. The European Union and the United States not only voted against the resolution, describing it as polarizing and counterproductive; both also stated that they would not participate in the negotiating process. Although China voted in the affirmative, in explaining its vote it laid down tough conditions which make it clear that its support should not be taken for granted. [9] Apart from the sponsors, all Latin American members, including Brazil, abstained. The largest bloc of affirmative votes came from African members—nine in all.
    In stark contrast, the day after the deeply divided vote on the Ecuador proposal the Council adopted a second resolution, introduced by Argentina, Ghana, Norway, and Russia. It extends the mandate of the inter-regional expert working group the Council established in 2011 to promote and build on the UNGPs, and requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to facilitate a consultative process with states, experts, and other stakeholders exploring “the full range of legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses.” [10] This resolution was adopted by consensus, requiring no vote. There may be a message to the treaty sponsors in the difference between these two outcomes.
  2. Scope of Proposed Treaty The resolution establishing the IGWG assigns it the mandate “to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” [11]
    A footnote defines “other business enterprises” in a way that is intended to exclude national companies. Thus, to illustrate, the language of the proposed treaty would have covered international brands purchasing garments from the factories housed in the collapsed Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh, but not the local factory owners producing those garments and employing the more than 1,100 workers who died and the 2,500 injured.
    The core sponsors of the resolution may have found this formulation to be useful in putting together their voting coalition. But it poses two enormous impediments to future progress. First, an exclusive focus on transnational corporations has always triggered strong opposition from their home countries, of which there are now many more, and from a greater diversity of countries, than in the past, as well as from international business. In this instance, it has also dampened the enthusiasm of civil society organizations for the initiative. As Arvind Ganesan of Human Rights Watch wrote when the resolution was adopted: “A fundamental flaw lies in Ecuador’s insistence that the treaty focus on multinational companies, even though any company can cause problems and most standards, including the UN [guiding] principles, don’t draw this artificial distinction.” [12] Virtually all subsequent NGO statements have raised a similar objection, because for victims the corporate form of the abuser is irrelevant.
    Second, the definition of “other business enterprises” contained in the resolution makes no sense either in logical or legal terms. Here is what it says: “’Other business enterprises’ denotes all business enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities, and does not apply to local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law.” To begin with, there is no meaningful distinction between “transnational corporations” and “enterprises that have a transnational character.”
    So the term “other business enterprises” is redundant and plays a purely rhetorical role in the resolution, perhaps intended to convey the impression that business enterprises other than transnational corporations are contemplated within the scope of the treaty. More importantly, transnational corporations’ subsidiaries are typically required to incorporate under “relevant domestic law,” often in joint ventures, including with state-owned enterprises or other corporate forms that classify as local businesses. And at the same time, a growing number of local companies conduct business across borders, and thus may be said to have a transnational character. How do all these structures and relationships get disentangled? Given the extraordinary level of sophistication these days in what corporate legal strategists call “legal entity optimization” of firms, this definition is unlikely to survive the first round of critical scrutiny and go on to serve as the basis of any viable treaty instrument.  
  3. Scale of Proposed Treaty The proposed treaty is not addressed to specific human rights abuses. Rather, it seeks to establish an overarching international legal framework—a global constitution of sorts—governing transnational corporate conduct under international human rights law. The idea of establishing such an overarching legal framework through a single treaty instrument may seem like a reasonable aspiration. But as I have argued previously, neither the international political or legal order is capable of achieving it in practice. [13] The crux of the challenge is that while business and human rights may be a single label, it is not so discrete an issue-area as to lend itself to a single set of comprehensive and actionable treaty obligations.
    Politically, business and human rights exhibits extensive problem diversity, institutional variation, and conflicting interests across and within states. This challenge only increases as the number of home countries of multinationals grows (note, for instance, China’s remarks, quoted earlier). On the legal side, the International Law Commission documented nearly a decade ago that the predominant trend in international legalization is the fragmentation of international law into separate and increasingly autonomous spheres. Its seminal report to the UN General Assembly concludes that “no homogenous hierarchical meta-system is realistically available” within the international legal order to resolve detailed differences among the separate spheres, noting that this would have to be worked out more discretely in the realm of practice.[14]
    The category of business and human rights is a case in point: it encompasses too many complex areas of national and international law for a single treaty instrument to resolve across the full range of internationally recognized human rights.[15]
    Any attempt to do so would have to be pitched at such a high level of abstraction that it would be largely devoid of substance, of little practical use to real people in real places, and with high potential for generating serious backlash against any form of further international legalization in this domain—as we already began to witness in the recent Council IGWG debate.
    This is not an argument against further legalization, but for carefully crafted international legal instruments—“precision tools” as I have called them—building on existing foundations and focused on specific governance gaps that other means are not reaching.[16] I am well aware of what some call the “expressive” function of law, in contrast to its problem-solving role. But the field of international human rights does not lack for expressive texts; what is in short supply are specific actionable paths capable of generating cumulative progress.[17]
  4. Record in Implementing UNGPs A final challenge facing treaty sponsors concerns the relationship between their initiative and the UNGPs, endorsed just three years ago. Every country that spoke in the IGWG debate, including Ecuador, stressed the importance of implementing and building on the UNGPs. Yet the main criticism of the treaty proposal by the U.S., the European Union, and others characterized it as a distraction from, if not an outright attempt to undermine, the UNGPs. How could this be so? Here is the problem: most states that voted in favor of initiating treaty negotiations have done little if anything to implement and promote the UNGPs within their own countries, regions, or globally. In contrast, other developing nations, many OECD countries, public and private international agencies, and hundreds of companies have been moving on this front, albeit not always as rapidly and robustly as one might wish, while a growing number of NGOs and workers organizations have developed increasingly detailed policy and legal reform proposals based on the UNGPs.
    Going forward, the fact that many of the most ardent treaty proponents have done least to act on the UNGPs poses a fundamental challenge for treaty advocates. Given Ecuador’s own conjecture that a treaty may be a decade or more away, what do they plan to offer in the interval to achieve practical progress on the ground? Will they now take steps toward instituting the UNGPs—as an interim measure if nothing else? Will they explain how the treaty is intended to build on and strengthen the foundation established by the UNGPs? If not, they will fuel the suspicion voiced by opponents that the treaty initiative has less to do with achieving practical improvements in business and human rights than it does with using this sensitive issue in the pursuit of other international political aims.

    Suggested Next Steps

    If Ecuador and its supporters hold fast to their current positions then their effort can lead to only one of two possible outcomes. Either the negotiations drag on for a decade or more and follow the path of the 1970s code of conduct negotiations; or they manage to persuade enough developing countries to adopt such a treaty text, but which home countries of most transnational corporations do not ratify and, therefore, are not bound by. Either outcome would represent another dead end, delivering nothing to individuals and communities adversely affected by corporate conduct.
    On the assumption—and in the hope—that this is not their intent, what are some steps the treaty sponsors could take to put the negotiations on a more constructive path? I briefly enumerate seven.
    1. Having the right chair of the IGWG is critical to obtain any agreement around these very complex issues. It is the prerogative of the sponsors to chair the process themselves, but they would be wise to consider appointing a respected third party, say, a former Secretary-General or High Commissioner, with the latitude to focus on consensus-building rather than the pursuit of strong national positions.
    2. The agenda for IGWG meetings should encourage presentation of all views, including by stakeholders who see no need for an overarching treaty or any other kind. All regions should be involved in the preparations well in advance and have the same right to help shape the agenda.
    3. The mandate calls on the IGWG to address the human rights conduct of “transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” The sponsors would be well advised to take those terms literally, in their ordinary language sense, and include “all other business enterprises” within the scope of the negotiations, rather than trying to base the drafting exercise on a meaningless distinction between “transnational corporations” and “corporations that have a transnational character.”
    4. The Guiding Principles succeeded because states, business, and a significant segment of civil society each felt a sense of ownership in them. Therefore, every effort should be made to include civil society and business in consultations. The full range of civil society representatives should be invited to participate, including human rights defenders that play an important role in promoting corporate respect for human rights and corporate accountability for human rights violations. Representation of business should not be limited to the accredited international business associations but also include individual firms, from all regions.
    5. Business and human rights comprises an enormously complex set of issues, and one cannot expect delegations to work those out without a clearer sense of what an international instrument could conceivably look like. Basic research into relevant precedents/models, needs, scope and other such information is critical to support productive negotiations. It is imperative that research is initiated early in the process, and that it is based on a broad range of perspectives and inputs, including expertise in corporate law and international investment law.
    6. Everyone agrees that even with the best of political will it would take long time to develop a viable international instrument. Therefore, it should be made clear from the outset not only that this initiative is intended to complement and build on the UN Guiding Principles, but also how.
    7. Finally, there is a need for all states, in all regions, to step up efforts to implement the UNGPs. Where the UNGPs are being acted upon and developed further they help reduce the overall incidence of corporate-related human rights harm and provide for sources of non-judicial remedy that did not exist before. No future treaty, real or imagined, can substitute for the need to achieve further progress in the here and now. Privileging the long-term goal of formulating an international treaty without a commitment to acting on the UNGPs today has little value for victims in the short and medium term.


    [1] See Branislav Gosovic and John Gerard Ruggie, “On the Creation of a New International Economic Order: Issue-Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly,” International Organization, 30 (Spring 1976); and "The 'New International Economic Order': Origins and Evolution of the Concept,” International Social Science Journal, 28 (Autumn 1976).
    [3] See Tagi Sagafi-nejad, The UN and Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct to Global Compact (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
    [4] UN Document E/CN.4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev. 2 (26 August 2003).
    [5] UN Document E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116 (20 April 2004).
    [6] “Corporate Influence on the Business and Human Rights Agenda of the United Nations,” Working paper issued by Misereor, Global Policy Forum, and Brot für die Welt,” June 2014, p. 5,  http://www.globalpolicy.org/home/221-transnational-corporations/52638-new-working-paper-corporate-influence-on-the-business-and-human-rights-agenda-of-the-un.html.
    [7] http://www.treatymovement.com/. It is noteworthy that the major global human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, did not join the alliance, reflecting doubts about the timing and efficacy of the Ecuador proposal.
    [8] For the full text see UN document A/HRC/17/31. The UNGPs rest on three pillars: the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication; an independent corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved; and greater access by victims to effective remedy, judicial and non-judicial. They comprise thirty-one principles, each with commentary elaborating its meaning and implications for law, policy, and practice. And they encompass all internationally recognized rights, and apply to all states and all business enterprises. I elaborate on the thinking and activities that produced the UNGPs in my book, Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (New York: W.W. Norton, 2013).
    [9] China’s delegate stated that their affirmative vote was based on the following “understanding”: that the issue of a business and human rights treaty is complex; that differences exist among countries in terms of their economic, judicial, and enterprise systems, as well as their historical and cultural backgrounds; and that it will be necessary, therefore, to carry out “detailed and in-depth” studies, and for the treaty process itself to be “gradual” and “inclusive.” See http://webtv.un.org/search/ahrc26l.22rev.1-vote-item3-37th-meeting-26th-regular-session-human-rights-council/3643474571001?term=humanrightscouncil&sort=date.
    [10] UN Document A/HRC/26/L.1/Rev.1.
    [11] UN Document A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev. 1.
    [12] Arvind Ganesan, “Dispatches: A Treaty to End Corporate Abuses,” available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/01/dispatches-treaty-end-corporate-abuses.
    [13] See “A Business and Human Rights Treaty? International legalisation as precision tools,” http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/business-and-human-rights-treaty-international-legislation-as-precision-tools.html.
    [14] See International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,” UN Document A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006). Of course, there is the category of jus cogens, the name given to norms of general international law that permit no derogation under any circumstances. But even leaving aside various doctrinal and practical challenges, jus cogens norms do not encompass the broad spectrum of human rights harms with which businesses may be involved.
    [15] For starters, I count human rights law, labor law, anti-discrimination law, health and safety law, privacy law, consumer protection law, environmental law, anti-corruption law, humanitarian law, criminal law, investment law, trade law, tax law, property law and, not least, corporate and securities law.
    [16] See John Gerard Ruggie, “Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda,” American Journal of International Law, 101 (October 2007).
    [17] This is why I have suggested that one obvious focus for such an instrument would be the worst of the worst: business involvement in gross human rights abuses, such as genocide, extrajudicial killings, and slavery as well as forced and bonded labor. In the case of natural persons, broad consensus exists on the underlying prohibitions, which generally enjoy greater extraterritorial application in practice than other human rights standards. But further specificity is required as to what steps states should take with regard to business enterprises. Such an instrument would have the secondary effect of heightening state and corporate awareness business and human rights issues more generally, much as the Alien Tort Statute did before the U.S. Supreme Court restricted its extraterritorial applicability in the recent Kiobel case. (See “A Business and Human Rights Treaty?” supra, fn. 13). 

Unveiling Priorities: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein of Jordan delivers his opening statement

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The new United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein of Jordan delivered his opening statement to the 27th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council.  

 (Pix AP; FILE - Jordan's ambassador to the United Nationas, Prince Zeid Raad al-Hussein, speaks to the media during a news conference in New York.)
The new United Nations high commissioner for human rights is a Jordanian prince, longtime diplomat, and the first Arab and Muslim to hold the influential position.

Prince Zeid Raad al-Hussein assumed the four-year, Geneva-based job a week ago, replacing South African jurist Navi Pillay after winning unanimous support from the U.N. General Assembly in June.

The 50-year-old Zeid, educated in the United States and Britain, has been Jordan's ambassador to the U.N. twice in the last 14 years, with a three-year break when he served as Amman's top envoy in Washington.

He has been a strong advocate for international justice, playing a key role in the creation of the International Criminal Court. (Prince Zeid, Veteran Jordanian Envoy, Begins UN Rights Post, Voice of America 8 Sept. 2014)

The statement follows.  It is interesting in two respects.  First is the connection between the first part of the statement, representing the personal views of the new High Commissioner (hus aspirations and what he brings to the tasks of office), and the second part of the statement that is more formal and better represents the evolved institutional view of the agency over which he presides but does not rule (that later part begins with "The mandate of my Office "). The personal statement is most interesting for its endorsement, implicitly, of the code of conduct to be adopted by the permanent members of the UN Security Council regarding use of veto, in situations where atrocities are ongoing and where those facts are well founded. This is to be considered 25 September 2014.  It is another subtle chess move in a complex game, a big target of which is the isolation of Israel through the determinations of committee fact findings and the constraining of the likelihood of a U.S. veto to counter the political moves in Geneva.  But it might as well be used against China in its internal actions against its Muslim populations.  It is unlikely to be used against Iran in its slow motion religious cleansing of its Ba'hais. But that speculation will be satisfied in the near future future. 

The mandate section of the Statement is worth reading for a sense of the issues that will likely receive heightened attention for the coming year.  There are few surprises, but also great potential for significant push back.  The war between Jews and Muslims, principally among Israel and Palestine,  remains of central interest to the powers in Geneva. Tentative,attentive is paid to the Russian entanglement in Ukraine, but also to the delicts of Western states that have recently been popularized in the global press. Sadly, the laundry list approach to human rights wrongs may as well so a dis service to the important task of the Human Rights Council which appears to conflate and homogenize such actions, and which tends to make it difficult to discern a necessary systemicity in thew work of the OHCHR.  Perhaps an evolution from the current practice is in order.  That is not (and perhaps necessarily not) reflected in the laundry list that suggests the range of tasks before the OHCHR.  It will be interesting to see how the  referenced agendas are developed and how the relationships between states and the non-state actors, increasingly important to thew work of the Human Rights Council system, are developed.






United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
Geneva, 8 September 2014
Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Human Rights Council,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

Mr. President, I thank you for your warm welcome for which I am truly grateful. Twenty years ago, I was exposed to a cruel, pointless, war. I was serving with the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, and learnt then a number of simple lessons. Violence at the extreme is so callous, so sickening and beyond the absurd, the human mind can barely edit into comprehensible thoughts what it sees. No war is worse than another in this regard; all wars, big and small, reveal factories spewing the same wickedness. And yet, astonishingly, the authors of the crimes themselves, and their supporting communities, will always believe their actions were somehow necessary, even if they knew they were also wrong. Indeed, every individual, political party, association, ethnic, sectarian, or national group, or government discriminating and inflicting violence on others, believes that when doing so they are excused, or absolved, by circumstance or history.

Our tragedy, our curse, as human beings, is therefore hauntingly simple: every evil can be rationalised to the point where some logic – resting on a narrow argument usually devoid of context and filled with fear – is expanded deliberately in the mind of the killer, the torturer, the bigot and chauvinist, and becomes for them the entire truth. It is a perverted truth, of course; so twisted, that up has become down, and the liars believe fanatically in the lie they have created.

Another lesson for me, twenty years ago, was equally clear: there is no justification ever, for the degrading, the debasing or the exploitation of other human beings – on whatever basis: nationality, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, disability, age or caste.

Yet today, the international news -- however it is streamed to us -- is still filled with the sobbing of victims, of the oppressed, of the poor alongside the remains and the ashes of the killed. This remains a most pathetic stain on humanity’s record of achievement.

We must therefore persevere together until we bend the course of humanity’s future into a destination more hopeful and enlightened, in which human decency is the only currency of human interaction, and is valued above and beyond material wealth or cleverness alone. After all, the world is not in need of an even greater number of highly intelligent people, nor politically powerful or extremely rich people; many of them are consequential, yes, but they alone will not save us. To rescue this blue, marble-looking sphere, our planet, we need – and here we must agree with His Holiness Pope Francis -- we need more compassionate, profoundly considerate and wise people piloting our collective fate, and they must be courageous too.

Today I am deeply honoured to be with you, the distinguished members of the UN Human Rights Council. I look forward to working again with those friends I have known for many years, and to meeting you all in person over the succeeding weeks. I similarly hope we will collaborate and do good work together over the next few years.

In this vein, I am privileged to follow the course set firmly by my predecessors, almost all of whom I have known personally – some very closely – and all of whom I have held in the highest esteem. They were all human rights defenders of the first rank, exceptional and courageous, and motivated by the unequalled courage of those who risk their future and their families to confront injustice when they see it.

Here I would like to make a simple point: courage is the first human virtue, revered the world over, the very virtue we value the most as human beings. The courageous individual is not he or she who wields great political power or points a gun at those who do not – that is not courage. The courageous individual is he or she who has nothing to wield but common sense, reason and the law, and is prepared to forfeit future, family, friends and even life in defence of others, or to end injustice. In its most magnificent form, the courageous individual undertakes this exertion, without ever threatening or taking the life of someone else, and certainly not someone defenceless.

As the Viennese thinker Stefan Zweig wrote, after having lived through one world war and fled another, "Our greatest debt of gratitude is to those who in these inhuman times confirm the human in us." Human rights defenders are such courageous people, and we must do everything we can to protect them, and celebrate them. The UN is often slow to recognise this. Captain Mbaye Diagne of Senegal was probably the most courageous man who ever served with the UN, but until recently was never recognized by the UN headquarters for his sacrifice. He saved possibly a thousand people in Rwanda in the spring of 1994, and lost his life doing so, and never hurt anybody.

By contrast, the Takfiris who recently murdered James Foley and hundreds of other defenceless victims in Iraq and Syria – do they believe they are acting courageously? Barbarically slaughtering captives? What virtue are they demonstrating exactly? They reveal only what a Takfiri state would look like, should this movement actually try to govern in the future. It would be a harsh, mean-spirited, house of blood, where no shade would be offered, nor shelter given, to any non-Takfiri in their midst. In the Takfiri world, unless your view is identical to theirs – and theirs is extremely narrow and unyielding - you forfeit your right to life. In the Takfiri mind, as we have seen in Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Kenya, Somalia, Mali, Libya, Syria and Iraq, and throughout the world where they have attacked innocent people, including on 9/11, there is no love of neighbour -- only annihilation to those Muslims, Christians, Jews and others (altogether the rest of humanity) who believe differently to them.


Mr. President,

It humbles me to know I am to follow the course that Navi Pillay and her predecessors have mapped out for the Office, working together with the previous Human Rights Commission and now the Council. I first met Navi Pillay many years ago while we were both engaged with the International Criminal Court, and her personal dedication to the Court, together with that of the Secretary-General, will be reflected and extended further by the Office over the next four years, while I am High Commissioner.

Navi Pillay was one of the greatest senior officials the UN has ever had, and one of the most able, formidable High Commissioners for Human Rights. That she could annoy many Governments – and she did – was clear; but she believed deeply and movingly in the centrality of victims, and of those who are discriminated against. They needed her vocal chords, her lungs and her pen, and she made everyone listen. I pledge to continue along the same path: to be as firm, yet always fair; critical of states when necessary, and full of praise when they deserve it.

But I do also believe that we must all be humble, and that while we continue to shorten our patience with those who discriminate against and abuse others, we should also lengthen our memories. The UN itself is not beyond reproach, and I know this first hand. Context and history are also important, and in this vein I welcome the panel discussion on historical memory being organized by the Cuban delegation during this session.

It is important – very important – that we continue to strengthen the human rights pillar of the UN system, and to that end, the Secretary General's Rights Up Front initiative deserves our firmest support, especially if we are to integrate our efforts in the field well with other parts of the UN family, for the sake of ending permanently the bitterest of human suffering.

Before I begin my update, I wish to emphasise one other point. A ministerial-level meeting will be held in New York on 25 September, on the need for a code of conduct to be adopted by the permanent members of the UN Security Council regarding use of veto, in situations where atrocities are ongoing and where those facts are well founded. This is not a call to have the UN Charter rewritten, but a call for the permanent members to exercise a moratorium in very specific circumstances involving atrocity crimes. I applaud the Government of France for taking the lead over this, and thank it for inviting me to participate on the 25th. When the veto is exercised for the sole purpose of blocking action by the Security Council, with no alternative course of action offered, and when people are suffering so grievously ­– that is also a form of cruelty.
The mandate of my Office encompasses all human rights, for all people. Its priorities span discrimination; the rule of law and ending impunity; poverty; violence; continuing efforts to improve international human rights mechanisms; and widening the democratic space. In recent months, OHCHR’s concerns have been numerous. They have included severe acts of discrimination in many regions; widespread violations of economic and social rights due to failures of governance and other concerns; apparent violations of human rights in the context of counter-terrorism; sexual violence; attacks motivated by stereotypes and hatred of many kinds; over-incarceration; the death penalty, and many other issues.

But my first address to this Council takes place at a time when conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa regions, in particular, are escalating dramatically. In Syria, more than 190,000 identified persons were killed between March 2011 and April this year, according to an analysis released by OHCHR last month. According to UNHCR, more than 3 million Syrians have fled their country and 6.5 million more are internally displaced: in other words, almost half the people in Syria have fled their homes. Those wounded, orphaned, missing, detained, "disappeared", displaced, malnourished, deprived of healthcare and denied other critical services add to the incalculable human cost of this conflict.

The latest report by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic brings fresh evidence that this ancient civilisation has devolved into a slaughterhouse, where children are tortured in front of their parents or executed in public, amid wanton killing and destruction. That report will be fully explored in the course of an interactive dialogue during this session.

Spreading outwards from its initial anchorage in the chaos of the Syrian conflict, the Takfiri or so-called ISIL group that currently in effect controls large swathes of northern Iraq has demonstrated absolute and deliberate disregard for human rights. The scale of its use of brute violence against ethnic and religious groups is unprecedented in recent times, as the Special Session of this Council made clear last week.

I solemnly remind this Council that widespread or systematic attacks on segments of the civilian population because of their ethnic background or religious beliefs constitute a crime against humanity, for which those responsible must be held accountable. I would also like to stress that international law requires that both the State and armed groups take all measures to minimise the impact of violence on civilians, respect the principles of distinction and proportionality when carrying out military operations, and ensure that civilians can leave areas affected by violence in safety and dignity.

From a human rights perspective, it is clear that the immediate and urgent priority of the international community should be to halt the increasingly conjoined conflicts in Iraq and Syria. In particular, dedicated efforts are urgently needed to protect religious and ethnic groups, children – who are at risk of forcible recruitment and sexual violence – and women, who have been the targets of severe restrictions.

The second step, as my predecessor consistently stressed, must be to ensure accountability for gross violations of human rights and other international crimes. Impunity can only lead to further conflict and abuses, as revenge festers and the wrong lessons are learned. Accountability, and public acknowledgment of the wrongs that victims have suffered, is important to ensuring that crimes will not be repeated, and the only way to begin to repair a sense of common community in these devastated societies. Iraq, with its new prime minister, should consider accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The third task – and despite the international community's failure to ensure the first two, I do not believe it is too early to envisage this – must be to take a step back and look at how and why these crises erupted. Underlying patterns of violations and discrimination, including corrupt and discriminatory political systems that disenfranchised large parts of the population, created an inflammable backdrop. Leaders who oppressed or violently attacked independent actors of civil society; institutions that failed to include broadly inclusive participatory processes; a comprehensive failure to promote and protect economic and social rights, as well as civil and political rights – such factors, alongside years of conflict, discouraged the development of tolerant and moderate civil society movements, while the only dissident groups that did flourish underground were extremist ones.

Another example of the need to end persistent discrimination and impunity is the Israel-Palestine conflict, with the recurring violence and destruction evident in the repetition of crises in Gaza. The most recent outbreak of armed conflict has had a particularly devastating toll in death, suffering and destruction, compounding what was an already precarious situation due to the blockade imposed by Israel in 2007. As of last week, preliminary estimates are that 2,131 Palestinians had been killed during the latest crisis in Gaza, including 1,473 civilians, 501 of them children. 71 Israelis had also been killed, including 4 civilians.

Current and future generations of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, have a right to live normal lives in dignity: without conflict, without a blockade, indeed without the wide range of daily human rights infringements that are generated by military occupation, illegal settlements, excessive use of force, home demolitions, and the Wall that continues to be constructed across the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The seven-year blockade must end, and there must be effective accountability for transgressions committed by all parties. On this point, I note that Israelis have a right to live free and secure from indiscriminate rocket fire.

I trust that this Council's Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory will be able to acquit its task of creating clarity about facts with full engagement from both sides. It is also imperative that all parties to the conflict in Gaza fully comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law.

Since this Council last convened, the situation in Libya has deteriorated very rapidly, and represents a growing threat to regional security. Multiple armed groups are indiscriminately shelling heavily populated areas through the use of heavy artillery and even aircraft, leading to the death and injury of civilians, including children. Living conditions for civilians in Tripoli and Benghazi have steadily deteriorated, with food, fuel and electricity in diminishing supply. Health facilities have been severely affected by the violence, and common criminality is on the rise. I urge the parties involved in these hostilities to cease all violations of international law and end the fighting.

We remain concerned about the situation in Ukraine. OHCHR's latest monthly report gives a full picture of current human rights challenges, especially in the east, where at least 3000 people have been killed since mid- April this year. The Council will specifically deal with this situation later in the session, and an official OHCHR report will be presented at that time. I must, however, reiterate that every effort must be made by both the Ukrainian government and the armed groups – as well as by neighbouring States, including the Russian Federation – to protect civilians in this deplorable conflict, and to ensure compliance with international law.

In the Central African Republic, a near-total absence of State control over most parts of the country continues to facilitate impunity for violations. Ex-Séléka and anti-Balaka forces continue their attacks, with the civilian population the main victims. The international Commission of Inquiry on CAR has already concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that all sides of the conflict have perpetrated serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law since January 2013. In its second phase, the Commission will carry out investigations beyond Bangui. 68 OHCHR staff members will participate in the Human Rights Component of the UN peacekeeping mission, a further indication of how the Rights Up Front agenda is taking shape.

In South Sudan, despite a recent lull in fighting, we have continued to observe serious human rights violations by both parties to the conflict. There will be detailed discussion of this situation during a panel discussion on 24 September. Regarding the Democratic Republic of Congo, I was appalled to learn recently that more than one in three men surveyed in the North Kivu province admitted that he had committed sexual assault. I have been tremendously inspired by the work of Dr. Denis Mukwege, who has noted how “the bodies of women became the battlefield of conflict” in the DRC. This underscores the need for the Government to implement recommendations regarding women's human rights and preventing sexual violence. A report on the DRC will also be presented at this session of the Council.

May I say also that I have been deeply impressed by the work of this Council's Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I hope the General Assembly and Security Council will give this report their fullest attention, and take steps to ensure accountability for those who have perpetrated crimes against humanity.

Moreover, I attach great importance to the investigation on Sri Lanka mandated by this Council, on which OHCHR will report later in the session. I encourage the Sri Lankan authorities to cooperate with this process in the interests of justice and reconciliation. I am alarmed at threats currently being levelled against the human rights community in Sri Lanka, as well as prospective victims and witnesses. I also deplore recent incitement and violence against the country's Muslim and Christian minorities.

Excellencies,

In the resonant words of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Societies that uphold human rights are more resilient, more sustainable and thus more secure. In raising an independent voice that can advocate for the voiceless, in identifying violations and gaps in States' protection, and assisting with technical capacity building, OHCHR is, in a very real sense, working to benefit all Member States.

I am determined to further strengthen that highly constructive engagement with Member States on both bilateral and multilateral human rights issues, and I encourage Member States to propose new methods of engagement, including transparent and cross-regional gatherings in informal settings. In strengthening their national human rights capacities and infrastructures, I will count on our close cooperation and partnership with UN Country Teams worldwide, as well as regional human rights mechanisms, bilateral donors and other stakeholders active at country level, particularly national human rights institutions.

OHCHR’s mandate is to ensure that universal human rights norms are upheld, making no distinction between countries, and dealing impartially and forcefully with all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Those universal norms are further clarified thanks to the persistent work of the independent, expert-led human rights mechanisms. As the custodians of human rights norms, the Treaty Bodies are uniquely qualified to grapple with challenging issues; theSpecial Rapporteurs are the eyes and ears of this Council. Both are practical sources of expert guidance for national policies, laws and practice, while the Universal Periodic Review is an unprecedented tool to maintain a constant review of human rights developments in all member States.

Like my predecessors, I will give utmost importance to the findings of all these human rights mechanisms. I will seek to ensure that greater priority is given to implementation of recommendations made by the UPR, the Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures, for real impact on human rights on the ground. I will also be focusing on working with my United Nations counterparts for greater integration of these recommendations into their country programmes. Regarding resolution 68/268 on Treaty Body strengthening, the past six months have seen significant follow-up to this landmark document, and I will pay careful attention to its implementation by States and by the Treaty Bodies themselves.

But the work done by OHCHR, by the Special Procedures, by Treaty Bodies, this Council itself, and indeed, by Member States, could never be achieved without the greater efforts of civil society actors. We need their continuing support and contributions to realise progress. I encourage the Council to strengthen its constructive engagement with civil society actors, and to ensure that their voices can be raised safely and without reprisals.

Freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly are rights that enable people to share ideas, form new thinking, and join together with others to claim their rights. It is through the exercise of these public freedoms that we make informed, considered and intelligent decisions about our development. To restrict them undermines progress. We must acknowledge the value of civic contribution, build the capacity of marginalised voices, ensure a place at the table for civil society actors, and safeguard their activities – including the activities of those who cooperate with this Council, its Special Procedures and Commissions of Inquiry. I take this opportunity to echo the Secretary-General’s condemnation of acts of reprisal against individuals by reason of their engagement with the United Nations.

Excellencies,

In a year from now, the Sustainable Development Goals will replace the Millennium Development Goals. The SDGs will be negotiated over the coming twelve months, and have the potential to transform the very notion of development.

The MDGs popularized the powerful message that development is more than free markets and economic growth. It is about how healthy people are, what kind of education they enjoy, whether they have access to food and live in a healthy environment. However, the MDGs were blind to inequity and incomplete: it has become clear that the new goals must integrate the human rights agenda, including the right to development across the board.

The enduring effects of the global economic crisis have challenged the realization of economic and social rights. They have exacerbated inequalities and deprived many of jobs, adequate health care, education, social protection programmes, housing, clean water and food. The impact of the crisis and austerity measures has been particularly acute for the most vulnerable and marginalized in society.

The SDGs need to aim not only for freedom from want – including the rights to health, education, decent work, food, water and sanitation – but equally, freedom from fear; and here I would highlight rights relating to access to justice, personal security and an equal voice and right to participate in public affairs. Perhaps no recent phenomenon could illustrate the indivisibility and interrelatedness of human rights better than the Ebola outbreak that is currently affecting several West African countries. The lack of adequate infrastructure for a life of dignity – including hospitals and sanitation – and conditions leading to distrust and civil disengagement with authorities, have compounded the effects of this terrible epidemic, placing human lives in grave danger as well as undermining peace and security, and development.

Discrimination and inequalities of all kinds prevent people from achieving their full potential, and the SDGs must aim to overcome them. We also need a renewed global partnership to create an enabling environment for the right to development – not only through international aid and technology transfer, but also by reducing existing inequities in global governance, and by aligning trade, finance and investment policy explicitly and systematically with human rights standards and principles.

Finally, the goals will only make a difference to people if progress can be effectively monitored – and if decision-makers can be held to account for shortcomings. An important effort needs to be made to construct an accountability framework for the SDGs, with indicators that can measure the actions and omissions of private business and public authorities, and flag where implementation is faltering. Clearly, this accountability framework should aim at maximum involvement by civil society and the general public.

OHCHR has been particularly concerned by the human rights situation of migrants around the world. From the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and the deserts of the United States of America, we continue to see countless avoidable deaths of migrants in the course of their journeys; brutal forms of human trafficking; ill-treatment at borders; and prolonged detention in deplorable conditions. Many migrants, including documented migrants, also suffer forced labour or dangerous, exploitative or degrading working conditions, and these violations against migrants are frequently characterised by the victim's inability to gain redress from State officials.

Along the borders of Europe, including most recently in the Spanish autonomous city of Melilla, reports allege forced returns, pushbacks and ill treatment of migrants by security forces. Italian coastguards have assisted more than 100,000 migrants arriving by sea this year, but despite that good work, almost 1900 people have died crossing the Mediterranean, and more must be done by the EU and its member states to deal with this tragic situation.

In Gulf Cooperation Council countries, attempts to develop better governance regarding labour migration from Asia have stalled, and exploitative control over migrant workers by their employers remains the dominant model. Conditions for migrant workers in the fishing industry in Thailand were recently made notorious by media reports, but that industry is not unique. I am also concerned by the shooting of Bangladeshi strawberry pickers in Greece after they had asked for months of back pay.

I must emphasise that the detention of asylum seekers and migrants should only be applied as a last resort, in exceptional circumstances, for the shortest possible duration and according to procedural safeguards. Australia's policy of off-shore processing for asylum seekers arriving by sea, and its interception and turning back of vessels, is leading to a chain of human rights violations, including arbitrary detention and possible torture following return to home countries. It could also lead to the resettlement of migrants in countries that are not adequately equipped. In Cyprus, migrants, including children, are routinely detained for periods that exceed 18 months, in prison-like conditions.

I am also concerned by reports of detention in the United States of America of some of the more than 50,000 unaccompanied children who have arrived there since October 2013. They have been fleeing violence and deprivation in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras; some are as young as five years old. While the underlying causes of their flight involve poverty and inequality, the proximate trigger is their urgent fear of gang violence targeted specifically against children, as potential members of such gangs.

These root causes in the countries of origin and destination must be tackled in a concerted manner, at the regional level. Furthermore, the abuses suffered by these children in transit – including killings, kidnappings, disappearance, extortion, sexual violence and detention – are shocking and must be addressed. The impunity enjoyed, at every step of the journey, by those who profit from smuggling these children is unacceptable.

The treatment of non-nationals must observe the minimum standards set by international law. Human rights are not reserved for citizens only, or for people with visas. They are the inalienable rights of every individual, regardless of his or her location and migration status. A tendency to promote law enforcement and security paradigms at the expense of human rights frameworks dehumanises irregular migrants, enabling a climate of violence against them and further depriving them of the full protection of the law.

Mr. President,

The extraordinary range and significance of the topics that I have just outlined underscore the breadth of OHCHR’s mandate and the importance of the work done by its staff – often in very difficult circumstances, particularly in a number of our field offices. In the years to come I look forward to enriching the deeply valuable relationship between OHCHR and this Council. My Office will be open to dialogue with all stakeholders; and within the limits of our resources, we will extend every possible assistance to States, to heighten their protection and promotion of human rights.

Mr. President, I thank you.
 

Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund: Recommendations from 2010, 2012 and 2014 regarding the companies Repsol S.A. and Reliance Industries Limited

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This Press Release from the Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund Global:

Today, the Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global has published three recommendations regarding Repsol S.A. and Reliance Industries. The companies were partners in a joint venture which was conducting oil exploration activities in Block 39 in the Peruvian Amazon. Block 39 is located in an area which is thought to overlap the territories of indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation.

On 1 December 2010 the Council on Ethics recommended the exclusion of the companies Repsol YPF (now Repsol S.A) and Reliance Industries Limited from the Government Pension Fund Global. In the Council’s view, the exploration activity undertaken by the companies in Block 39 would increase the risk that any indigenous peoples who may be living in voluntary isolation within the block would come into contact with outsiders, leading to potentially serious consequences for these peoples’ life, health and way of living. This would constitute an unacceptable risk of the companies contributing to serious and systematic human rights violations.

On 25 May 2012, the Ministry of Finance requested that the Council on Ethics update its recommendation of 1 December 2010. The Council concluded that the grounds for exclusion were still present.

On 3 April the Council on Ethics revoked the recommendation to exclude the companies from the Fund. Repsol had informed the Council that the company had entered into an agreement to sell its share in the joint venture and confirmed that there is currently no ongoing activity in the block. The foundation on which the recommendation on exclusion was built is therefore no longer present.

The Council’s recommendation not to exclude the companies was submitted to the Ministry of Finance before the Ministry had made a decision on the previous recommendation to exclude them. The Ministry has taken note of the Council’s recommendation.

The recommendations are available in English and Spanish HERE.

The Council's 2014 recommendation follows. The most interesting part of the opinion is that the Council continues to hold its position that contact with indigenous peoples which seek to remain isolated may constitute an unacceptable risk of contributing to violations of human rights sufficient to merit exclusion.




To the Ministry of Finance
3 April 2014
UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recommendation concerning Repsol S.A. and Reliance Industries Limited


Contents


1 Summary 1
2 Background 1
3 Changes in the joint venture for block 39 3
4 The Council on Ethics’ assessment 3
5 Recommendation 3


1 Summary

The Council on Ethics no longer recommends the exclusion of the companies Repsol S.A. (Repsol)1 and Reliance Industries Limited (Reliance) from the investment universe of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG). On 1 December 2010, the Council on Ethics issued a recommendation to exclude Repsol and Reliance from the GPFG because of the risk of contributing to serious or systematic violations of human rights in connection with the exploration for oil and gas in Peru. The Ministry of Finance has yet to conclude on this case.

The companies have taken part in a joint venture that has explored for oil and gas in block 39 in the Peruvian Amazon. Repsol has informed the Council on Ethics that the company has sold its share in the joint venture and that there is currently no ongoing activity in the block.

At the core of the Council’s recommendation lies the question of whether or not there is a risk that indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation – so-called uncontacted indigenous peoples –live in block 39. On the basis of an overall assessment of available information, the Council concluded in its recommendation that there is a probability that indigenous people live in voluntary isolation in block 39 and that continued exploratory activity in the block entails an unacceptable risk of the company contributing to human rights violations insofar as it exposes them to contact. The Council also maintained that the uncertainty concerning the presence or otherwise of the uncontacted indigenous peoples in the block was due to the fact that necessary scientific studies had not been carried out to clarify their existence.

The Ministry of Finance requested an update on the recommendation in May 2012. In its letter to the Ministry of 20 June 2012, the Council on Ethics upheld its recommendation to exclude Repsol and Reliance.

Now that Repsol has sold its share in the joint venture, the risk of the company contributing to human rights violations in block 39 is no longer present. The foundation on which the recommendation on exclusion was built is therefore no longer present. As concerns Reliance, the Council will consider the risk of contributing to human rights violations when a new joint venture is established and activities in the block begin anew. The Council on Ethics does not presently recommend excluding the company from the GPFG.

2 Background

Repsol is an international integrated oil and gas company listed on the Madrid stock exchange. As of the end of 2013, the GPFG held shares in the company worth NOK 2.47 billion, amounting to 1.24 per cent of the company.

Reliance is listed on a number of stock exchanges in India and operates in the oil, gas and petrochemical industries. As of the end of 2013, the GPFG held shares in the company worth
NOK 618.7 million, amounting to 0.22 per cent of the company.

Repsol and Reliance have been partners in a joint venture that explores for oil and gas in Block 39 in the Peruvian Amazon. Repsol is the operator. Repsol has explored the block since the middle of the 1990s and was awarded 55 per cent of the concession in 2991. Reliance holds a 10 per cent share through its subsidiary, Reliance Exloration and Production DMCC. PetroVietnam holds 35 per cent of the block.

On 1 December 2010, the Council on Ethics recommended that Repsol and Reliance be excluded from the GPFG due to an unacceptable risk of contributing to violations of human rights. At the core of the case was the question of whether or not there live indigenous people in voluntary isolation in Block 39.2

The Council wrote the following on this matter:

‘The question of the existence of uncontacted indigenous peoples in Block 39 is clearly controversial. In this regard the Council finds it noteworthy that neither the government nor the companies have initiated systematic scientific studies with the aim of verifying the existence of isolated indigenous peoples in this area […]. The Council’s task is to assess the risk of future breaches of the Fund’s guidelines. As part of this assessment the Council must adopt a position on whether it is probable that uncontacted indigenous peoples live in block 39. Based on an overall assessment of the available information, the Council concludes that there is a probability that uncontacted peoples are present in the block. The existing uncertainty emanates from the lack of necessary and thorough on-the-ground investigations aimed at determining the presence of these peoples. Insofar as necessary investigations have not been carried out, the Council on Ethics will let this count against those who gain from the question remaining unresolved.’3

As concerns the question of human rights violations, the Council operated under the understanding that it is scientifically undisputed that contact between extraneous people and uncontacted indigenous peoples will lead to the introduction of new diseases, which poses a serious threat to their existence.

‘In light of the fatal and long-term consequences caused by any contact with the outside world, the Council considers that provoking any such contact, which furthermore is unwanted on the part of the indigenous peoples, is tantamount to serious violations of human rights. This is in accordance with the assessment of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which determined that forced or undesired contact with uncontacted indigenous peoples violates their human rights.’4

The Council also concluded that there could be no doubt that the companies’ activities in block 39 contributed to increase the risk that any uncontacted indigenous groups living in the block would come into contact with extraneous people. The Council also found that Repsol’s contingency plans would be insufficient to avoid contact insofar as the very presence of workers posed the biggest threat to the uncontacted. ‘In the Council’s view, it seems to be virtually impossible to combine concern for the uncontacted indigenous peoples’ life and health with oil exploration in block 39, insofar as this takes place within their territories.’5 On these grounds, the Council on Ethics recommended excluding Repsol and Reliance from the GPFG as ownership of these companies would imply an unacceptable risk of contributing to serious violations of human rights.

On the request of the Ministry of Finance, the Council on Ethics provided an update of the case on 20 June 2012.6 The Ministry requested that the case be reconsidered in light of ‘signs that authorities in Peru have changed their attitude towards the question of indigenous peoples’. The Council on Ethics concluded that the political developments in Peru concerning indigenous peoples did not seem to be of any consequence for this particular case. ‘Consequently the Council finds no reason to do otherwise than to uphold the recommendation on the exclusion of Repsol YPF and Reliance Industries’.7

3 Changes in the joint venture for block 39
 
In a meeting with members of the Council on Ethics in February 2014, Repsol informed the Council that it had entered into an agreement to sell its share in the joint venture in Block 39. The sale depends on the Peruvian Government’s approval. Repsol also confirmed that all operations in the block had ceased.8 News articles have later announced that the private company Perenco has purchased Repsol’s share in the joint venture.9

The Council on Ethics assumes that the sale and handover of Repsol’s share will be approved. Whether or not the agreement that regulates the partners’ roles and responsibilities in the joint venture will be changed following the inclusion of a new partner and operator is currently unknown, as is the degree to which this may have consequences for Reliance.

4 The Council on Ethics’ assessment

The Council on Ethics has assessed whether the grounds for recommending the exclusion of Repsol and Reliance remain, given that Repsol has sold its share of the joint venture. Repsol can no longer be considered to contribute to possible violations of human rights in block 39 insofar as it no longer is a partner in the joint venture. Consequently the grounds for recommending Repsol’s exclusion are no longer present.

To the Council’s knowledge there has been no new information shedding light on the existence or otherwise of uncontacted indigenous peoples in block 39. In this regard the situation remains unchanged. As there is currently no exploratory activity taking place in the block, and since the organisation of the new joint venture is as yet unknown, the grounds for Reliance’s exclusion has also changed. The Council on Ethics does not currently recommend the exclusion of the company from the fund. The Council will nevertheless reassess the risk of the company contributing to human rights violations when the new joint venture is established and activity in the block starts anew.

5 Recommendation
 
The Council on Ethics no longer recommends excluding Repsol S.A. and Reliance Industries Limited from the investment universe of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global.


Notes

1. Formerly Reposol YPF.

2.  Indigenous people living in voluntary isolation (also known as uncontacted indigenous people) have not developed social relationships to other members of society and have taken a voluntary and conscious choice to live without contact with the outside world.

3.  The Council on Ethics’ recommendation on the exclusion of Repsol YPF and Reliance Industries Limited from the GPFG, 1 December 2010

4. See footnote 3.

5. See Footnote 3.


6. Letter from the Ministry of Finance to the Council on Ethics of 25 May 2012 concerning the recommendation on exclusion.

7. Letter from the Council on Ethics to the Ministry of Finance of 20 June 2012 concerning the recommendation on exclusion.

8. Meeting between representatives of Repsol and the Council on Ethics on 12 February 2014 and e-mail from Repsol to the Council on Ethics dated 10 March 2014.

9. See for example http://upsidedownworld.org/main/peru-archives-76/4744-repsol-sells-oil-stake-in-isolatedindigenous-peoples-territory-in-peruvian-amazon.

Chapter 7 (Law Beyond Law ― Social Norms, Contract Communities, and Disclosure Regimes): From "Elements of Law" to "Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States"--Building an Introductory Course to the Legal Curriculum for the 21st Century

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(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)

Since 2010, I have been posting on the development of a new course I have been developing for our first year law school students, "Elements of Law." The course originally had a quite modest objective--to introduce law students to legal research and reasoning through case law, statutory interpretation, and legal history, processes, and institutions. I chose to broaden its objectives within these specific parameters and development a framing and concepts course that would provide a deep foundation to law students on the legal system they were undertaking to study.
--Elements of Law 3.0: On the Relevance of a First Year Law Course Designed to Frame the Law School Curriculum).
--Developing a New Course--"Elements of Law"
--"Elements of Law" Course 2.0: A Framework Course for the U.S. Law Curriculum,
Grounded in the principles of the sociology of law, the course has morphed into an effort to introduce students to law as a self-referencing system with its own particular structures, premises, constraints and language, with its own logic and taboos and its own means of understanding the world. That systemicity (cf. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Chichester : John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1999) is then a critical element in the way in which the legal system (in this case of the United States) interacts with the world, both as a legal and as a socio-economic-political actor. The course has also expanded from its original narrow and technical focus, to a broader focus on principles and the use of language and logic to build and operate a system of law. That broadening has made it possible to offer the course not just to first year law students, but also to graduate students in the social sciences and in international affairs, as a grounding in the legal systems that are important in their respective fields.

This and the posts that follow produces some of the materials I will be presenting to the class. I offer these materials in hopes that they may prove of use and that you might share comments, perspectives and suggestions as I develop those materials on this site. Thanks.

This post includes a draft of Chapter 7 (Law Beyond Law ― Social Norms, Contract Communities, and Disclosure Regimes).
 
 
 
Chapter 7

Law Beyond Law ― Social Norms, Contract Communities,
and Disclosure Regimes


I. Introduction.

            We have been considering the formal structures of law systems in the United States.  These included two related strands of judge administered law—common law and equity.  These are themselves complex interweaving of substantive law based on interactions between social norms and dispute resolution structures, of procedural methodologies—from the culture of precedent and deductive reasoning from cases, to the development of fairness based defenses, and of remedies. Beyond these two strands, we were introduced to the great modern structures of law making in the United States.  The first was statutory law—we considered the culture of statutory law making in the United States as more inclined toward statutory complication rather than to integrated legal code development.  That had significant consequences for the role of the courts in statutory interpretation and application, providing the opening by which statutes could be glossed through the application a a variant of common law judging techniques. Lastly, we considered regulation, a form of law making that is both highly specialized, and also lodged in agencies disconnected from direct accountability to an electorate. . Issues of jurisdiction and of conflict of interest in combining legislative, executive and judicial authority in regulating agencies were explored.  With this chapter we consider the last strand of U.S. law and governance sources—the acceptance of systems of rule making, governance, that does not emanate from the state.  This includes both influential sources of law making and private governance through non-state organizations. But in this century it has also come to mean more than that.  As a methodology, a technique, of assessment and monitoring, the mechanics of data gathering and the consequences of assessment have themselves become methods of regulating behavior that have the effect of law.

We will consider non-state law/governance systems in three respects: (1) as a source of influence on positive law, common law and equity; (2) as a source of law binding on the community that adopts it; and (3) as a series of techniques that have the functional effect of law by their ability to change behavior.

II. Chapter Readings

·      Gunther Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 Yale Journal of International Law 435 (2000).
·      Melvin Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms,[1] 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1252, 1255-64 (1999).
·      Michael Reed, “From the ‘Cage’ to the ‘Gaze’? The Dynamics of Organizational Control in Late Modernity,” in Regulation and Organizations: International Perspectives 17 (Glenn Morgan & Lars Engwall eds., 1999). READ 28-31.
·      Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978. (Graham Burchell, trans. New York: Picador Palgrove Macmillan, 2007). READ pp. 87-110; 115-120.
·      Larry Catá Backer, “From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations,” Georgetown J. International Law, 39(4):591-653 (2008). Available http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112882[2]
__________


III. Law Beyond Law ― Social Norms, Contract Communities, and Disclosure Regimes

            Over the course of the last several weeks the student has been introduced to the principle forms in which most political communities recognize what they would define as “law.” We first considered the frameworks within which communities tend to think about law (manifestation of justice, overarching principles, procedural fairness, accessibility, and highly contextual but layered understanding of the substantive meaning of just laws). We then explored the form and legal “cultures” of the principal forms of law in the American Republic. That required both a look back to origins to expose the essence of the nature of each form of law, and an understanding of the political context in which each has developed. We started with common law, an institutionalized form of customary law mediated through courts. We then considered statutes, a more instrumental and political expression of popular will through delegated structures of authority vested in government. We ended with an examination of administrative regulation. This form was particularly interesting for two reasons. First it introduced the student to the problem of democratic accountability for chains of delegated law making authority. Administrative regulations are a form of instrumental law-making delegated from legitimately elected representatives of popular power to appointed officials within increasingly complex administrative and managerial bureaucracies that simultaneously make, enforce and determine individual violations of its own rules. Second, these administrative regulations represented, like the movement form algebra to calculus, a shift from episodic intervention in the management of human conduct through commands, to seamless systems of organizing and managing human activity on a constant basis.

            To the command aspects of statute were added the techniques of surveillance to more minutely manage human behavior in selected activities of importance to the state. The concept and use of surveillance in and as law was useful as a framework for introducing students to several aspects of law that have emerged in the last half century. First, was the idea that the nature of regulation has been changing, from one based on commands and prohibitions, or one based on risk management and allocation for certain conduct, to one based on the seamless management of behavior centered on specific groups of human activities―financial markets, labor-management relations, product safety, activities that might affect environmental conditions, and the like. Those changes in the objectives of regulation have required a change in approach to regulation itself. First it helped shift the locus of regulation from legislatures to administrative agencies, as generalist legislatures increasingly sought to delegate management oriented regulatory projects to organizations staffed by experts who could devote substantially all their time to the object of regulation. Second, that move to management also required increasing reliance on the techniques of information gathering to better manage the behaviors that were the object of regulation. As a consequence the techniques of implementation, rather than the formal commends of formal regulation become increasingly important. As a further consequence what might be characterized as regulatory implementation techniquesincreasingly operate functionally as law. Third, this movement toward seamless management through what had been the techniques of operationalizing implementation opened the door to the idea that an organization could create methods that function like law without actually having to engage formally in conventional law making. Last, if it is possible to conceive of regimes of functional law without formal law, created and operated by states, it might also be possible to conceive of regimes of functional law in any form created and operated by non-state organizations, especially in those areas of governance (transnational) where state power is weakest.

            Thus, from common law to administrative regulation, the student could begin to see the spectrum of legal forms now at the disposal of the U.S. political community. Additionally, the student could observe in the movement from form to function in law making an increasing acceptance of the idea that law was changing from a system of command and risk allocation to one of behavior management in which the state could “make” law without adhering to the traditional “forms” of law. The answer to our initial question, what is law, then serves as an organizing framework for considering the growing range of forms, from (1) a passive system of socially based dispute resolution techniques with substantive content developed through within a slowly dynamic system of behavior rules extracted from the aggregate decisions of courts applying rules by close analogy to prior application, through (2) more proactive enactments meant to modify or steer behaviors and develop commands that furthered political policy objectives in the form of statutes, to (3) systems of behavior rules extracted from the articulation and application of complex sets of comprehensive rules by agencies that, in their own way, mimic the behaviors of common law but deliberately with statutorily defined objectives.

            Twenty years ago, though, our treatment of formal administrative regulations would have rounded out the typical introduction to the forms of law (and their attendant cultures). Law, we would have understood, was necessarily a product of, or a structuring of custom articulated through, one of a number of public national governmental institutions―courts, legislatures, administrative agencies and the like. The idea that there could be law beyond these forms or legitimate governance understandable as “legal” in nature removed from the state or deviating much form these forms, would have been incomprehensible to those in the business of law. But just as the move from medieval to early pre-modern periods in Europe consolidated the power of the state and the connection between states, governments, and legal structures (plus their substance)―so (1) the rapid development of globalization, (2) the proliferation of human activity that constantly crossed borders, and (2) the increasing taste for the management of defined fields of human activity on a constant and ongoing basis, has de-centered both the state and law from its mooring in government and in the traditional structures of law. For this class the student is introduced to the very new and emerging structures of governance without law and sometimes without government itself (e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview and Application of Interactions Between Law-State and Governance-Corporate Systems[34]). This picks up and expands the possibilities and consequences of monitoring and information based regulatory regimes of the administrative state with which we ended out last class.

            Our first reading, from Gunther Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 Yale Journal of International Law 435 (2000), focuses on one of the most conventional, yet powerful, mechanisms for the production of rules outside of the state.  It is meant to introduce students to the American Law Institute (ALI), one of the most influential non governmental institutions for the production of compilations of law, one that has come to be relied on by courts and legislatures in shaping and reforming U.S. law—both its common law and its statutory law. The ALI is quite self conscious of its role—an institution that does not legislate, but in the process of restating law, contributes to its production.

The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve the law. The Institute (made up of 4000 lawyers, judges, and law professors of the highest qualifications) drafts, discusses, revises, and publishes Restatements of the Law, model statutes, and principles of law that are enormously influential in the courts and legislatures, as well as in legal scholarship and education. ALI has long been influential internationally and, in recent years, more of its work has become international in scope.

By participating in the Institute's work, its distinguished members have the opportunity to influence the development of the law in both existing and emerging areas, to work with other eminent lawyers, judges, and academics, to give back to a profession to which they are deeply dedicated, and to contribute to the public good.[35]

The success of the ALI is due in no small measure in the overlap between those elements of the judiciary, legal academy, and leading lawyers, who by their positions, held key roles within the structures of government responsible for the production and implementation of law. “ALI's incorporators included Chief Justice and former President William Howard Taft, future Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, and former Secretary of State Elihu Root. Judges Benjamin N. Cardozo and Learned Hand were among its early leaders.”[36]  It chose to save the U.S. legal system by reconstructing it.  Its character, then, is not law, but it can inform law.  In this sense does it work as a social norm, or does it become law, in effect, to the extent it is applied as if it were law?  Consider these questions in the context of the following case:

__________


The TORO COMPANY, et al.
v.
KROUSE, KERN & COMPANY, INC., et al.
No. 86–2800.
827 F.2d 155 (7thCir. 1987)

Opinion

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

In this diversity case, we are asked to review the judgment of the district court which held that the defendant accounting firm and individual accountants were not liable for alleged negligence to the plaintiff corporations, third parties who allegedly relied upon the reports of the accountants in extending credit to the accountants' client. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I
Background

This case involves certain accounting services provided by an accounting firm, Krouse, Kern & Company, Inc. (Krouse) to Summit Power Equipment Distributors, Inc. (Summit) for the fiscal years 1981, 1982 and 1983. In each of those years, Krouse prepared yearly audit reports and monthly financial statements for Summit. During the same period, Toro Company was a major supplier of equipment to Summit, and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Toro Credit Company (Toro), was a major supplier of credit to Summit. Toro required audited reports from Summit in order to evaluate the distributor's financial condition. Summit supplied Toro with the reports prepared by Krouse to fulfill this requirement. The reports allegedly contained mistakes and omissions regarding Summit's actual financial condition.

Toro brought this action in the district court. Jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Toro alleged that, in reliance upon the audit reports, it extended and renewed large amounts of credit to Summit. The reports overstated Summit's assets, the complaint continued, and Toro extended credit that it would not have extended if the reports had been accurate. Summit was unable to repay these amounts. Krouse filed a motion for summary judgment that was granted by the district court. This appeal followed.

II
Holding of the District Court
A. Standard of Care

In an exhaustive and scholarly opinion, the district court analyzed the central issue in this case—the appropriate standard of care required of accountants under Indiana law. Surveying the law of the states of the Union, the court isolated three standards: 1) the Ultramares standard; 2) the Restatement standard; and 3) the “Reasonably Foreseeable” standard.

1. The Ultramares Standard

This standard was first announced by the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y.1931). There, Chief Judge Cardozo disallowed a negligence action against an accounting firm brought by a plaintiff who had neither contractual privity, Id. 174 N.E. at 446, nor a relationship “so close as to approach that of privity.” Id. Recently, in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536, 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its reliance on the Ultramares standard:

    Before accountants may be held liable in negligence to noncontractual parties who rely to their detriment on inaccurate financial reports, certain prerequisites must be satisfied: (1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial reports were to be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or parties, which evinces the accountants' *157 understanding of that party or parties' reliance.

Id. 493 N.Y.S.2d at 443, 483 N.E.2d at 118.

2. The Restatement Standard[37]

This standard permits recovery for those who can be actually foreseen as parties “who will and do rely upon the financial statements.” Toro Co. v. Krouse, Kern & Co., 644 F.Supp. 986, 992 (N.D.Ind.1986) [hereinafter cited as Order]. In pertinent part, section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads as follows:

(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.

3. The “Reasonably Foreseeable” Standard

The district court determined that “[t]wo jurisdictions have proceeded beyond the ‘actually foreseeable’ test of the Restatement and adopted a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ test. Under this standard, accountants owe a duty of care to all parties who are reasonably foreseeable recipients of financial statements for business purposes, provided the recipients rely on the statements pursuant to those business purposes. See Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis.2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).” Order at 992.

The district court then noted that Indiana had not yet had occasion to address directly the question of accountant liability. The district court therefore turned to an analysis of Indiana cases that had addressed the issue of professional liability “to third parties who have had limited or no contact with the provider of services.” Id. at 992. After surveying the early cases, Brown v. Sims, 22 Ind.App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899); Ohmart v. Citizens' Sav. & Trust Co., 82 Ind.App. 219, 145 N.E. 577 (1924); Peyronnin Constr. Co. v. Weiss, 137 Ind.App. 417, 208 N.E.2d 489 (1965), the court focused on the more recent holding in Essex v. Ryan, 446 N.E.2d 368 (Ind.Ct.App.1983). There, subsequent purchasers of property sued a surveyor who allegedly had made an inaccurate survey for the prior owner. After considering the three cases noted above, the Essex court held that the surveyor owed no duty to the successor owners because he had no knowledge that they would rely on his survey. The district court noted that the Indiana court in Essex had explicitly considered the three approaches for professional liability outlined above and had quoted with approval the “privity or near-privity” standard as outlined in Ultramares and had specifically rejected the “actually foreseeable” Restatement position. Id. at 373.

On the basis of this survey of the earlier cases, the district court concluded:

    It is clear that Indiana falls among those jurisdictions which follow the narrow Ultramares standard requiring either a contractual relationship between the parties or at least affirmative evidence of contact between the professional and the third party which indicates the *158 professional's knowledge of the third party's reliance. In Brown, the only case to allow the cause of action to go forward, this contact was extensive and explicit.

Order at 994.

The district court did not believe that the present situation should be distinguished from that presented in Essex. The district judge noted that the Indiana court in Essex had considered similar cases involving many other professions, including accountants. Moreover, noted the district court, the Essex court had squarely considered and rejected the Restatement position while relying on New York's Ultramares decision. Nor did the district court believe that there was any policy reason that might induce the Indiana courts, when confronted with the issue, to adopt a different standard in the case of accountants:

    Certainly an examination of the nature of exposure experienced by surveyors who negligently render their services as compared with accountants does not suggest that accountants should be subject to a more liberal standard. If such a comparison is at all helpful, it counsels the opposite conclusion. Surveyors generally base their opinions on fewer calculations from fewer sources than do accountants. This fact is readily demonstrated by Krouse's answer to Toro's Interrogatory No. 8, which recounts in detail the accounting methods and procedures utilized by Krouse in conducting the Summit audits. Fourteen procedures are outlined, each involving detailed examination and confirmation of various financial records and transactions.

Id. at 994.

B. Application of Standard to Facts of this Case

The district court then turned to an analysis of the facts of the case contained in the material submitted to it in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. It determined that Toro's submissions reasonably could be construed as meeting the first two prongs of the Credit Alliance test. A “reasonable inference can be made that Krouse knew that the reports it furnished to Summit were to be used by Summit to induce Toro's extension of credit and distributing rights based on Toro's reliance on the information contained in the reports.” Id. at 995.

However, the district court determined that, on the third prong, “the complaint and the supporting evidence fail.” Id. Toro's affidavits, concluded the district court, “fail to present evidence which shows the necessary connection between plaintiffs and defendants. They clearly show a relationship among three parties, with Summit forming the joint between Toro and Krouse. The third side of the triangle, however, remains open.” Id. at 995. The court failed to find in the remaining material submitted by either Toro or Krouse any allegation that would close the gap.2 Accordingly, it concluded:

Because Indiana would adopt the most restrictive of the three standards currently used to determine the availability of a cause of action to third parties allegedly injured by negligently performed services by an accountant, Krouse's motion for summary judgment must be granted. None of the evidence presents a genuine issue as to whether Krouse had the necessary contact with Toro which evinces Krouse's understanding of Toro's actual reliance on the reports Krouse furnished to Summit.

Id. at 996.

Finally, the district court turned to the statute of limitations issue. While its disposition of the liability issue made it unnecessary to reach this question, the district court held that

    if a different standard of liability applied in this case that would permit Toro to go forward with its cause of action, the dates that Toro received the reports at issue would control as to the statute of limitations issue. Further evidence would have to be developed on this point, since these dates are not apparent from the record. Presumably, however, Toro would have received the reports from Summit shortly after Summit received them from Krouse. In all likelihood, therefore, this would result in the elimination of the 1981 and 1982 reports as elements of the cause of action.

Id. at 997.

III
Discussion

A.

As the district court correctly noted, this case turns upon a proper identification of the standard of liability imposed upon accountants under the law of Indiana. We therefore address that question first.

1. The Submissions of the Parties

Toro acknowledges that Indiana has not adopted the Restatement standard. However, it argues that just because Indiana has rejected the Restatement position, it cannot be assumed that it has embraced the Ultramares standard. Rather, submits Toro, Indiana would impose liability not only when there is privity between the accountant and the injured party but also when there is actual knowledge on the part of the accountant that the injured party will rely on the work product. Appellants' Br. at 18. This standard is required, it submits, by the holding of the Supreme Court of Indiana in Citizens Gas & Coke Util. v. American Economy Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 998 (Ind.1985) where the court, discussing Essex, wrote, “[t]he surveyor owed no duty to subsequent purchasers of property because he had no knowledge they would rely on his survey and because he was not in privity with them.” 486 N.E.2d at 1001.
Toro continues by urging that sound policy reasons support its view as to the content of Indiana law. The audited financial report, it notes, “has been singled out by both federal and state legislation to be an important vehicle to encourage public confidence in the accuracy of financial information.” Appellants' Br. at 20. Moreover, “the business community has long recognized the responsibility a certified public accountant owes the public when engaged in an audit.” Id. at 21. The appellants note that the Supreme Court of the United States has stated:

   
An independent certified public accountant performs a different role. By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegience to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing public.

United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817–18, 104 S.Ct. 1495, 1502–03, 79 L.Ed.2d 826 (1984). Finally, Toro notes that the Indiana licensing scheme for certified public accountants contemplates a person who “is not only technically competent, but ... [whose] ... financial reports ... are worthy of the public trust and confidence.” Appellants' Br. at 22–23.

Krouse does not disagree with Toro on the identity of the controlling precedent and, like its opponent, grounds its argument on the holdings of the Supreme Court of Indiana in Citizens Gas and of the Indiana Court of Appeals in Essex. Its reading of those cases is, however, substantially different from that offered by its opponent. In Krouse's view, these Indiana cases set forth a test that is the equivalent of the test articulated by the Court of Appeals of New York in Ultramares and recently reaffirmed as the governing law in New York in Credit Alliance. Krouse notes that the Indiana Court of Appeals specifically relied upon the New York court's Ultramares holding in formulating its own holding in Essex. In turn, the Essex case, submits Krouse, “provides an essential cornerstone of the [Indiana] supreme court's Citizen's Gas decision.” Appellees' Br. at 18. There, the Supreme Court of Indiana, submits Krouse, reaffirmed the continued vitality of the privity principle in Indiana. Krouse also notes that the Essex court “specifically declined to adopt § 552, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), that extends liability for supplying false information to any one or more of a group of persons for whose benefit and guidance a professional supplies information, even if the person who becomes the plaintiff is not known to the professional as an individual.” Appellees' Br. at 18.

2. Our Conclusion

We have noted in Lamb v. Briggs Mfg., 700 F.2d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir.1983) that:
[W]here no authoritative resolution of a legal issue had been rendered by the state courts, the district court's construction of state law on that issue is entitled to great weight on appellate review.... In addition, precisely because the district court enforcing a state-created right in a diversity case is in substance “only another court of the state,” the federal court may not “substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the state.”
(citations omitted). In this case, where the district court's decision on the content of state law is the product of a comprehensive, well-reasoned and carefully-crafted opinion, we should be especially mindful of this principle. Nevertheless, we have independently studied the pertinent Indiana case law and, on the basis of that study, believe that the district judge correctly stated the present state of the Indiana law.

We begin our analysis by noting that Indiana has made some firm policy choices in the area under consideration. As the Supreme Court of Indiana noted in Citizens Gas,

    [t]he requirements of privity have been abolished by this Court and the Court of Appeals for products liability and contractor liability involving personal injury caused by a product or work in a condition that was dangerously defective, inherently dangerous or imminently dangerous such that it created a risk of imminent personal injury.

486 N.E.2d at 1000. This limited exception to the privity rule is based on a policy choice that, as a federal court whose jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, we must accept. See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).

The reason for Indiana's policy choice was stated succinctly by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Citizens Gas:

    The reasoning behind all of these cases that has created the exception to the general requirement of privity is apparent and is based on humanitarian principles. One who sells a product or does construction work pursuant to a contract with the owner of a building or premises which presents imminent danger to the health and safety of not only the party he contracts with but to other members of the public can be held liable for resulting injuries even though the third party injured is not privy to the contract. It does not follow that the same exception would be applied where the risk is only that of property damage. In Essex v. Ryan (1983), Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 368, 372, the Essexes sought to recover damages arising from a survey which Ryan had negligently performed for their predecessor in title in 1955. The Essexes claimed damages because of the deceased's professional incompetence and because they were assignees of their predecessors in interest. The Court of Appeals found, however, that the surveyor owed no duty to subsequent purchasers of property because he had no knowledge they would rely on his survey and because he was not in privity with them.

486 N.E.2d at 1000–01.

It is true that, in those areas where privity still applies, there exists an “actual knowledge” exception. See Essex, 446 N.E.2d at 373. However, this “actual knowledge” exception, as articulated by the Indiana courts, is a very narrow and specific one. It requires proof that the defendant had actual knowledge that the particular person or entity bringing the law suit “would rely on the information given.” Essex, 446 N.E.2d at 372. In short, the Indiana courts have made a “distinction between knowledge that a third party will rely on the opinion given and an expectation that unidentified others might rely on it.” Id. (emphasis in original).

We further believe that the district court was correct when it held that this “actual knowledge” exception to the privity rule was the functional equivalent of the Ultramares test's insistence on “near privity.” . . . .

* * * * *

While Indiana has not had occasion to address the matter with quite the specificity found in the New York cases, we believe that a fair reading of the Indiana precedent, in its totality, establishes that the “privity requirement, subject to an actual knowledge exception,” explicitly recognized in Essex, 446 N.E.2d at 373, is designed to preserve the same policy concern as the New York formulation. The Essex court relied explicitly on Ultramares. More importantly, in discussing the earlier Indiana precedent, it pointedly distinguished between *162 those cases where the defendant had affirmatively undertaken to assist the plaintiff with respect to a particular task and those where there had been no such affirmative manifestation. In discussing Brown v. Sims, the Essex court noted that the defendant (a preparer of a title abstract) had personally assured the plaintiff that he could rely on the title's being free from any defect or lien. Essex, 446 N.E.2d at 372. By contrast, noted the Essex court, the savings and loan in Ohmart, (which negligently prepared a title abstract) had no such relationship with the plaintiff. “The distinction ... was that in Brown, the abstractor understood that it was of the essence of his employment that a report be made to, and for the benefit of, a third party, the lender, Brown.” Id. Again, in criticizing the holding in Peyronnin, the Essex court noted that “Weiss had actual knowledge that Peyronnin Construction would rely upon his work, and he was in contact with the company while preparing the estimates.” Id. (emphasis in original).

B.

We must next examine the record to determine whether, in light of the standard we have chosen, Krouse is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.

* * * * *

Our own study of the record leads us to the conclusion that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment. The appellants failed to raise a question of material fact as to an essential element of their claim of accountant liability—whether there was some conduct on the part of Krouse linking them to Toro. There is simply not “sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Accordingly, the district court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.

Like the district court, we need not reach the statute of limitations issue because the affirmance of the summary judgment issue concludes the entire case.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.


_________


            Our second reading, from Melvin Eisenberg, “Corporate Law and Social Norms”, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1252 (1999),[38] exposes students to the governance frameworks that exist in what in the United States has come to be called (misleadingly and dismissively) as social norms. They are social norms and not law precisely because they do not conform to the conventional formof law: arising in common law, or statute or by way of administrative regulation. Yet they may well function like law in the sense of their organization and consent based power to extract or compel obedience. The interplay of form and function―something introduced with the discussion of the Institutes[39]in the first class, appear here again in another guide. Professor Eisenberg considers the way that social norms interact with and serve as a source of governance that supplements corporate law as developed through conventional statutes and judicial construction. Eisenberg starts by describing three kinds of social norms, which he describes as behavioral patterns, practices and obligational norms. He then considers the ways in which these social norms intermesh with core areas of corporate law, focusing on fiduciary duty, corporate governance, the composition of the board of directors, the role of institutional investors and takeovers.

Eisenberg defines social norms quite narrowly “to mean all rules and regulations concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and organizational rules.” (Eisenberg, p. 1255). Peyton Young, among others, have defined the term more or less broadly to suit their purposes and premises.

David Hume ([1739], 1978) was the first to call attention to the central role that norms play in the construction of social order. Norms define property rights, that is, who is entitled to what. They determine what commodities are accepted as money. They shape our sense of obligation to family and community. They determine the meanings we attach to words. Indeed it is hard to think of a form of interaction that is not governed to some degree by social norms.[40]

            Young suggests three general implications of social norms that are worth keeping in mind: The first he calls the “local conformity/global diversity effect,” that different societies often employ different norms for solving the same type of coordination problem. This follows from the fact that norms represent alternative equilibria that can become established through different sequences of chance events. (Young, supra, 12). The second Young identifies as the tipping or punctuated equilibrium effect, that, due to stochastic perturbations, norms occasionally shift, and these shifts tend to be quite rapid compared to the long periods of stasis when a given norm is in place. (ibid.). The third he identifies as stochastically[41] stable norms, “that some norms are inherently more stable or durable than others: once established they tend to remain in place for long periods of time even when buffeted by stochastic shocks.” (Ibid.). This suggests that like customary law, social norms are not inherently deterministic, though they are not random or erratic. They might well form the sort of stable systems of underlying premises of cohesion and expectation that makes law in its more elaborate forms possible, and may also constrain it as well. Taken to an extreme, by contemporary standards, these have been asserted sufficient to support society without a state (Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society [42](Cambridge University Press, 2003).

            In any case, Eisenberg excludes legal rules as the base line system against he seeks to determine the characteristics and operative force of social norms. He excludes organizational rules―which he defines as “formal rules adopted by private organization” (Eisenberg, supra., 1255)―because he understands them as backed by legal sanctions and because “they tend to operate in a much different way than other legal norms.; in fact they tend to operate in many ways like legal rules.” (Ibid., 1256). I disagree with the exclusion of organizational rules from the study of social norms for precisely the reasons Eisenberg would exclude them―organizational rules, especially those of corporations and other non-state governance institutions, function like legal rules and the organizations from which they originate sometimes function like governments. (Backer, Larry Catá, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator.[43]University of Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2007). It is that functional equivalence that makes this form of social norm among the most interesting vehicles for the expansion of law beyond the state that society has experiences in over half a millennium. (e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation.[44]ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008). We will discuss these possibilities, central to globalization, later in the course. Still, using Eisenberg’s definitional constraints is quite useful for distilling the critical insights about social norms that can help students understand the way that functionality, increasingly, has overtaken formal exposition, as a basis for governance, especially for the development of regulatory systems that function like but do not mimic the forms of conventional law and that are developed beyond the state.

            Eisenberg divides social norms into three broad categories, based on the degree of self-consciousness and obligation they involve. (Eisenberg, supra., 1256). The first category include most unconscious patterns of norms grounded for the most part in the natural order and corresponding, as the student will note, to the basest form of natural law identified in the Institutes. These are social norms that do not entail either a sense of obligation or any self-conscious direction. Eisenberg includes things like dressing warmly in cold weather and statistical regularities (he points to auto accidents peaking during holidays) (Ibid). But he also includes simple cultural habits―like drinking coffee with breakfast (ibid). Yet this last is not natural in the sense of the others; rather it refers to cultural norms which involve little or no repercussion if an individual disregards them. These are self-conscious but non-obligatory.

            The second category, which Eisenberg labels “practices” (Ibid, 1257) consists of “rules and regularities. . . self-consciously adhered to or engaged in” but which do not entail obligation (Ibid. 1256). These include determining the time for the start of classes in a law school. These Eisenberg suggests are adhered to consciously but do not entail any sense of obligation, because, as Eisenberg describes it, they can be waived with impunity. (Ibid). I am not sure that is entirely correct―his example, the commencement time for one hour classes that are held for fifty minutes during the course of a school day, I think suggest a much greater set of constraints that produce obligation than indicated in Eisenberg’s text. It is true enough as Eisenberg suggests that there would be no criticism of faculty who changed start and end times and perhaps even the length of the fifty minute hour “as long as she could comfortably fit the schedule of her class into the schedule of other classes” (ibid), but that may no longer be entirely true. The rule may in fact implement constraints that are memorialized in organizational rules (those producing ABA accreditation of the law school for instance) that may changing the fifty minute class rule more difficult and the law school itself may impose an organizational rule making such flexibility impossible. The point is that though Eisenberg is right within the very narrow context of the social norm rule standing alone, it is also likely that these second category social norms are almost always embedded in organizational or legal rules. As such, considered more fully, Eisenberg begins to tease out implicitly, the concept of polycentricity in law-normative systems―that is the idea that laws and rules may exist in a layered form with respect to any activity and that an individual unconsciously and consciously must navigate the relationships among these layered rules, especially where they may conflict. While the example Eisenberg gives is simple―its insight is important in a transnational context where national, international and soft law frameworks may apply simultaneously with respect to a specific activity.

            More importantly, Eisenberg categorizes legal terms of art as falling within this category―his example the industry usage rules of specific contract regimes, or signs for activities like hitchhiking (Eisenberg, supra, 1256-57). Again, these norms are deeply related both to organizational rules and legal rules. They are strengthened principally through their enforcement, for example, in contract, or by their use to signal obligation or meaning in proceedings involving risk allocation or fault. And they tend to operate like legal rules―these come closer to functional regulation though they may not take the form of rules―the common law of equivalent of social norm.

            The third category, obligational rules, “consists of rules or practices that actors not only self-consciously adhere to or engage in, but feel obliged in some sense to adhere or engage in, although (by hypothesis) the rule or practice is neither a legal nor organizational rule.” (Ibid., 1257). The touchstone is whether breach produces self-criticism or criticism by others. Eisenberg includes moral norms. This includes religion and moral-ethical rules. (Ibid., 1262-1263). But some moral rules may also be organizational rules, consider the rules in the Talmud or Canon law. Non moral obligations include the convention that one wears formal attire to opening night of the opera in New York City. (Ibid). Still one wonders whether the criticism for violating practice norms in the context of contract arrangements might produce a tendency toward greater criticism than the failure to wear black tie to the NYC Metropolitan Opera.

            Eisenberg then suggests that the effects of social norms are dependent on two variables, (1) whether the norm is obligation, and (2) if it is obligation, whether it has been internalized by the relevant actor.” (Ibid., 1257). Internalized norms are efficient―these avoid utility analysis or external monitoring; the actor follows the rule she presumes it is the only or right thing to do. (Ibid., 1258-59). Thus the utility of sin in religious systems and guilt in moral-ethical systems. “For regular Metropolitan Opera goers, not dressing formally for opening night may be no more of an option than picking pockets.” (Ibid, 1259). Yet what this may really suggest is that any social norm may be made obligation simply by internalizing its substance. In that sense communal expectations may transform anything into an obligational and internalized norm.

            Eisenberg distinguishes non-internalized norms by reference to the way in which individuals may come to adhere to them. For these, adherence is measured by personal benefit. (Ibid., 1260). Yet these instrumental reasons themselves, it seems, may produce internalization if the norm is to be stabilized―that is if the norm is to have a deep impact on behavior. Absent that, on-internalized obligational norms “will probably collapse.” (Ibid). Eisenberg notes the transitory nature of non-obligational norms, and its tendency to assume the character of obligational norms depending on the context and the perspective of the actors who may be subject to their strictures. All norms, though, will be applied, changed or managed by reference to the consent and application of the community of actors to whom these rules are important. To that extent, and in ways that are similar to the development and strength of customary law, social norms develop with respect to certain determinants of social consent: critical mass, tipping points and other aspects of equilibria (ibid, 1263-64). Critical mass, of course, effectively confirms that norms require a sufficiently large and sustained community of consenting individuals who by their action apply the norm. Tipping points refer to the number of individuals within a community necessary, by their actions, to point to a change in the way the norm is applied, interpreted or followed. Equilibria are those points where no intrinsic or extrinsic forces are sufficiently strong to cause tipping.

            Yet for Eisenberg, social norms appear to become important only when they interact with legal or organizational rules. It is in its subordinate though polycentric aspect that social norms might become interesting to law. Eisenberg considers this interaction of social norms with law in the corporate law. Eisenberg notes but does not focus on social norms explicitly incorporated into legal rules (ibid., 1265) but rather considers how the corporate law of fiduciary duty, corporate governance and takeover bids “is in significant part a result of social norms.” (Ibid). With respect to the first, Eisenberg argues that the fiduciary duty of care and loyalty standards have shifted as a matter of law to reflect substantial changes in the social norms of expectations of director conduct (Ibid., 1268-69; 1274-75); with respect to corporate governance the movement from what Eisenberg describes as a monitoring board to a managerial board, which effectuated substantial changes in expectations of board oversight of the corporation was also to some extent a movement of law to reflect changing social norms, from a passivity to an activity norm (Ibid., 1279-80); with respect to takeovers, the critical change to social norm from hostility to an embrace of hostile takeovers changed occurred when industry leaders chose to disregard the prevailing norm and adopt another (ibid., 1289-1290). Social norms, then, are powerful but dependent. Not law (and to the extent they are they mimic the form of law making), social norms suggest the interpretive underbelly of formal lawmaking. To that extent, certainly, Eisenberg suggests the semiotic element of law, a key area of lawyer training. (e.g., Jan M. Broekman and Larry Catá Backer, Lawyers Making Meaning: The Semiotics of Law in Legal Education II[45](Dordrecht: Springer 2013)). Social norms provide the cultural foundation on which the commands of law are made intelligible and predictable. They are the glue that permits a shared meaning of their terms among the community of those who would be bound by the command of law. But they can be nothing more than interpretive foundation―to be more requires them to change their essential character from meaning or technique, to command, from social norm to law.

            With our next two readings, Michael Reed, “From the ‘Cage’ to the ‘Gaze’? The Dynamics of Organizational Control in Late Modernity,” in Regulation and Organizations: International Perspectives 17 (Glenn Morgan and Lars Engwall eds., 1999), and Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978. (Graham Burchell, trans. New York: Picador Palgrove Macmillan, 2007), we come to a very modern and still quite controversial notion that, indeed, social norms have become the principal basis for governance not merely of non-state organizations, but of the state as well. Here we see what teased out as an encrustation on law in Eisenberg, now freed of its dependence. Foucault provides a foundation for understanding how changes in our collective senses of the meaning and character of our collective institutions, public and private, have produced a movement not just toward the liberation of social norms from law (to assume an autonomous role of governance in their own right), but also how what these institutions are used for (their objectives) have now produced the incentives to move from the more traditionally formal characteristics of law (in judicial decision, statute and regulation) to law expressed in functional terms―as techniques of surveillance, monitoring and assessment. Not that law is dead―by any stretch―but that it no longer has either a monopoly of legitimacy nor does it occupy the field of the governance of human behavior.

            Reed focuses on changing forms of international regulation in contemporary organizations. The focus is on the development of forms of organizational control in which functional techniques substantially replace formal architectures of rulemaking. In particular, Reed picks up the concept raised in the Eisenberg reading―internalization―and now frees it from its dependent association with norms in the way that surveillance is freed from its dependent role as a technique of regulatory enforcement to become regulatory in its own right. Reed argues that “there is a growing perception of an immutable paradigm shift in in control regimes within contemporary work organizations which moves them away from continuing dependence on traditional mechanisms of bureaucratic control [the cage] and towards socially constructed networks of self-regulation and discipline [the gaze].” (Reed, supra, 18).

            Reed points to the tension in modern regulation that highlights the increasing inability of the forms of conventional law forms to meet the policy objectives of regulatory communities.

Bureaucratic control is based on an interconnected set of regulative mechanisms coordinating temporal, spatial and social relations in such a way that they became contained and fixed within a relatively stable and enduring regime of administrative structures. [But these have] become debilitating weaknesses in conditions where ‘smart control’―based on much more highly mobile, miniaturized and dispersed control techniques and practices―emerges as a prerequisite for organizational survival in a globalized economic, political and cultural marketplace. (Reed, supra, 28).

To this end, Reed builds on the foundations of the work of Michel Foucault and his analysis of “panopticon control.” For Reed, panopticon control “refers to the widespread diffusion of specialized techniques of surveillance and control―at every level of the ‘social body’ and utilized by a very diverse set or organizations (the army, police, schools, asylums, hospitals, clinics, prisons, etc.)―geared to the construction and maintenance of a new moral order.” (Reed, supra, 28-29). This new form of regulatory control is contrasted to the traditional forms of control over behavior and status through command. In contrast panopticon governance is centered around a coordinated set of social norms and expectations that produce practices that are “dedicated to the realization of internalized self-surveillance and discipline that largely dispenses with the need for the externally imposed structural controls so strongly emphasized” in traditional conventional models of law and regulation. (Reed, 29). Reed argues that this approach to regulatory control is most advanced in the internal operations of economic enterprises. (Reed, 31-34).

            Foucault’s Lectures at the College de France on Security, Territory and Population brings Reed’s insights back to government. In the assigned reading, Foucault starts by using the mechanisms of security to consider the problem of government and of the management of its population. (Foucault, supra, 88). He notes that traditionally the art of government, and now political science, was directed as advice to the prince (now the state). But government has always been an ambiguous term―government of the self, of the soul, of conduct, of children and of the state, were all common at the eve of the modern period in the West. These intersecting problems of government represented two simultaneous processes. The first was a move from feudal to territorial states, and form territorial to administrative states. The second was a movement of state centralization and religious dispersion so that the locus of government in all its senses could be consolidated within the state with few powerful enough entities to contest this movement of regulatory (governance) power. (Foucault, 89). A noteworthy consequence was a focus on the problem of defining the nature of the government of the state (now engorged with the government of others).

            Machiavelli’s Prince provides a focal point of the analysis; the insight here being that the analysis of the reaction against Machiavelli through the late 18th century provides a window on the way that the understanding of the power and character of government was reconstituted. (Foucault 89-94). For Foucault, that literature marks the movement, socially normative, from law based to managerial states centered on governments through which social norms are managed and applied. Among these changes are the movement from the idea of government as external to the state, one that was always under threat and which had to be protected against internal and external challengers (Foucault (91-92), to the idea of government as internal to the state and its embodiment. That is from the person of the Prince to the collective of the state apparatus (that included the many governments in social and political relations among individuals); “all these governments are internal to society itself, or to the state . . . [t]here is then both a plurality of forms of government and the immanence of practices of government to the state.” (Foucault, 93). But this multiplicity and immanence also produces hierarchy, “there is a specific from that has to be identified, that of the government to be applied to the state as a whole.” (Ibid). That hierarchy and consolidation, in the face of political consolidation and religious dispersion also produces a movement of political management of religion, reflecting the idea of consolidation of the management of morals and eventually as well the management of individuals, goods and wealth. (Foucault, 94). The state, then, comes to represent the aggregation of governance and the superior source for its management from individual to family to the state. Government, by the twentieth century, then, could be understood as the management of the state for the collective good through its “government” of people, things and territory. The ideal of the model state was generalized into the art of government of the state. “To govern a state will thus mean the application of economy, the establishment of an economy, at the level of the state as a whole, that is to say [exercising] supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth and the conduct of all and each, as attentive as that of a father’s over his household and goods.” (Foucault 95).

            But this government is not directionless. The purpose of government is the arrangement of people, things and territory towards an end. (Foucault, 98). These include (1) self-preservation, usually understood as the common good or salvation for all (Foucault 98); (2) specific “finalities” (objectives, final ends) such goals as wealth maximization) (Ibid., 99); (3) the management of people and things to increase the power or wealth of the state (Ibid., 99-100). But Foucault notes the problems of government with each. For the common good, he notes that the public good can be reduced to obedience to the law, that is that the common good exists when all citizens obey the law and conform to the rules through which social harmony is maintained. “That means that the ends of sovereignty is circular” (Ibid., 98). For finalities, Foucault argues that government will be reduced to tactics rather than law; law recedes in the sense that it is no longer perceived as the major instrument in the perspective of what government should be. “For it is in fact the government of the family that best corresponds to the art of government that was sought: a power immanent to society (the father being part of the family), a power over ‘things’ rather than territory, a power with multiple finalities all of which concern the well-being, happiness, and wealth of the family, a peaceful, vigilant power). (Foucault 103, note).

            All of this changes in the 19th century as the idea of government and the state moves from the family to the collective―from organized and hierarchical replicating organisms modeled on the biological family, to mass politics, mass movements and mass government. (Foucault 103-104). This movement, Foucault argues, is made possible by advances in statics and technology. In effect both provide the ability to incarnate what had previously been incorporeal abstractions―the people, the enterprise, the collective, the social organization, etc. Now Foucault suggests, one can see each of these abstractions―and by seeing them (through aggregated statistics for people, through financial reporting conventions for enterprise, by corporate governance norms for collectives and organizations, etc.). (Foucault 104-105). To that end, the techniques of data harvesting, surveillance and social construction become the foundation of the state and its political economy. Surveillance, then, serves not just to change the face of regulation but also to organize the state as well and to incarnate what have now become its greatest stakeholders―the great collectives of individuals organized in a variety of ways and the entirely of the people now incarnated as “the people” with quite specific characteristics that can be unearthed by appropriate data harvesting and analysis. “In fact, statistics, which had heretofore functioned within administrative frameworks, and so in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, now discovers and gradually reveals that the population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of disease, its regularities of accidents.” (Foucault, 104). Surveillance and reporting, then, become central to the organization and functioning of the modern state―and expressed in the form of its rule making, both formal and social―and the state itself becomes an incarnation of the masses (its population) to the management of the welfare of which it now devotes itself.

            We move from government grounded in popular sovereignty to one based on the organization and management of population and economy. In the face of the rise of the masses, what Foucault calls the population, the family recedes as a mere element within the population. The political consequence (and one affecting the breath of the scope of law making) is then that the family moves from the model of government to an instrument of governance; “it will become a privileged instrument for the government of the population rather than a chimera model for good government.” (Foucault 105). The masses (the population or collective) becomes the principle objective of government. And most important, the population is made to serve as the principal instrument of its own management. That last change requires new forms of governing―not just law but the techniques of management. “And the instruments that government will use to obtain these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting directly on the population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, for example, by techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of population to this or that region or activity.” (Foucault 105). Lastly, the population will become the point around which the practice of government is organized. The management of the population becomes itself the object of government “The constitution of a knowledge of government is absolutely inseparable from the constitution of a knowledge of all the processes revolving around population in the wider sense of what we now call ‘the economy’.” (Foucault 106).

            Government and its regulatory structures, then, evolve form regimes of law and sovereignty to one of management and what Foucault calls governmentality. (Foucault 108. Governmentality refers to the way in which modern society is organized through “institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.” (Ibid). Governmentality is centered on government and its control of population through formal and functional approaches to management that is meant to produce self-administration among the subject population in whose name all of this is done. (Foucault 108-109). Governmentality points to the result of a 500 year process that has moved law and the state from one grounded in territory, customary and written law to an administrative state governed through regulation and individual disciplines to the emerging state of affairs: “a state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population.” (Foucault 110). This is not merely governmentality but the world of globalization, of polycentric governance and of law that no longer assumes merely its ancient forms of command and the preservation of structures of hierarchy.

            With our last reading, Larry Catá Backer, “From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations,”Georgetown J. International Law, 39(4):591-653 (2008), students are given a glimpse of the possibilities of approaches to law making in a world of governmentality. Students consider whether Eisenberg’s social norms, including organizational rules, can be liberated from their dependence on law for actualization in governance spheres in a context where, as Foucault suggests.

            Backer argues that international law ought to serve as a vehicle for the enhancement of a market environment in which corporate stakeholders, and principally consumers and investors, might incorporate information about corporate “social” behavior in their consumption and investment decisions. Without incorporating any particular set of “public” values, international law can make it easier for people to manage the “public” or “social” behavior of multinational corporations through a mandatory regime of global reporting. The heart of any such international regulation would be a mandatory system of information gathering, monitoring and disclosure. This then also picks up and seeks to develop a consequence of the move, discussed previously, from formal to functional law in the context of administrative regulations required to provide seamless management of a specific set of human activities.

            Backer posits that law does not appear to compel any sort of responsibility for the working conditions of indirect employees. Law is particularly unhelpful where the indirect employees are employed in a country other than that of the indirect employer. Recent efforts to create mandatory legal obligations touching on corporate social responsibility in the international level have been forcefully rebuffed, principally by representatives of developed states. There has been a strong objection to the use of law, and especially international law, to privilege one set of behavior norms over others in a context in which there is no consensus over appropriate conduct norms for economic entities.

            However, while in the recent past there might not have been even a moral obligation extending to such employees, contemporary standards suggest otherwise—there may now be a moral obligation of some kind to indirect employees. The source of this moral obligation might be derived from a variety of sources, both secular and religious, but it is not grounded in law enforceable by any state. Other sources of moral obligation might include human rights declarations from international organizations and supra-national human rights organizations. Yet even moral obligations can be enforced in the absence of enforceable standards written into hard law. Under the private law of contract, for example, the principal parties can bind themselves voluntarily to behavior standards they might deem proper. The nature and extent of that obligation may be dependent on the values of the stakeholders or the normative system under which all actors operate. Similarly, the parties might agree to certain behaviors in order to receive a certification of compliance with «good» behavior issued by a reputable third party in the business of making such certifications. Those obligations are usually enforced privately as well—through mandatory agreements to disclose information and permit the monitoring of behavior.

            Such moral obligations, and the methodologies of enforcement, are coming to be institutionalized in private regulatory efforts, principally in corporate ethics and behavior codes. Institutionalization of governance, however, is not law. Virtually all of these responses have been in the form of “soft law,” usually voluntary codes that are not enforceable by any political organization. Indeed, the rise of this much-touted corporate social responsibility movement has resulted in the proliferation of a number of responses at every level of governance. The soft law character of these efforts suggests deficiencies. Additionally, there is no institutionalized procedure for enforcement. Moreover, the proliferation of these private forms of regulating moral behavior pose a more fundamental substantive problems. These voluntary codes tend to be written in the most general terms, permitting a tremendous variation of behavior that can be claimed to be consistent with the form or substance of these codes. For those who are looking for both certainty and consistency the private elaboration of substantive behavior exacerbates the problem of uniform standards.

            The problem of indirect employees, then, suggests the overlapping dimensions of the problem posed by any effort to formally regulate the behavior of economic entities across borders through law: the disjunction between moral obligations across borders in the construction of economic relationships across such borders, the multiple sources of values informing regulatory policy even within states, and the difficulties of transposing moral obligation into a substantive law of corporate social responsibility that effectively reaches across borders. Yet, despite these limits it may be possible to construct a plausible system of mandatory regulation at the international level that adds value to economic activity without threatening the contemporary system of market based globalization. The foundation of that regulatory system is tied to monitoring, disclosure and reporting. These are each enforcement mechanics common to the private law of contract. Together they are the essence of modern soft regulation through which the disciplines of informed choice are realized. From out of the means by which moral obligations are enforced among private parties may come a framework for creating a plausible hard law at the international level. This framework would provide incentives (either positive or negative) for international business to consider “public” goals without actually mandating those goals in any specific form—the market would make that determination. These incentives can be provided through law, but in a way that retains a strong sensitivity to the current market bias of globalization—and to the privileging of private arrangements among stakeholders principally involved in economic transactions.

            For that purpose Backer posits a global system of disclosure and transparency, consisting of monitoring and surveillance. The object of these disclosure mandates would not be to establish a definitive set of behaviors, but rather to establish a framework within which corporate stakeholders—consumers, investors, labor, and others—could adjust their relationships on the basis of the behavior disclosed. In a sense, then, monitoring regimes can serve as a framework for incorporating moral obligations within a legal structure of relationships between economic actors, without hardwiring any particular set of ethical standards in law. Backer suggests that this sort of mandatory regulatory regime is plausible as international “hard” law for five reasons. First, it only requires actions on the part of economic enterprises (the gathering and dissemination of information) that have been well internalized by the great majority of these entities. Economic entities harvest, use and report information all the time—for example to government regulators, to investors and to consumers, among others. This is not so much a new task as a modification of a core activity of business. Second, the sort of social disclosure to be targeted under international monitoring regimes are already being provided in large respect through private contract, for example in the context of supplier chain arrangements. Third, information gathering has been a task long assigned to international and transnational public actors. This sort of regulatory activity is something well suited to that sort of organization. Fourth, international instruments already contain monitoring provisions. Thus, the international community already has the skill set necessary to draft this sort of hard law (as do the nation states that must approve such endeavors). Lastly, there already exist a number of frameworks that detail the sort of information that might plausibly be gathered and disclosed that have been developed by global civil society and public actors.

            Backer suggests that such a system will work at the economic level only to the extent that it can be promoted as a mechanics to global market efficiency, avoids making substantive or values driven behavior choices, limits enforcement to the compliance with the information gathering and reporting requirements of the international framework and vests enforcement at the nation-state or private level. The transformations of conventional law and administrative regulation, then, provide the template for the form of regulation, one that converts the techniques of regulation as its substantive form. The substance, like that of customary law, is derived from the social norms of the governance community (in the case of corporate social responsibility, the community of consumers, investors and enterprises). Values-based behavior would be dependent on what the principal participants think is important. The critical element that international law would add is the framework within which information is produced and choices can be made And control of the content of the values that are privileged would depend on the power to convince the critical stakeholders of the correctness of a value system put forward. In this context, values, like law, would be subject to the market, in this case the market for ideas (of values). In this market, private actors—churches, philosophers, social scientists, ethicists, and others—would have a primary role in seeking to offer product (values systems touching on matters of corporate social responsibility) and to market those products to the critical stakeholders.

            Eisenberg was able to draw attention to the relationship between law, organizational rules and social norms. But that analysis remains grounded in the traditional notion of the supremacy of law and the supplemental role of normative systems. Backer suggests the basis for embedding social norms within organizational rule frameworks in governance spaces where traditional law cannot reach, the activities of organizations that cross borders and cannot be contained or regulated by the law of a single state. Yet there are hints in Eisenberg’s analysis that such social norm systems might be both autonomous of law and coherent without reference to an outside and “superior” governance order. And Backer suggests the way in which the techniques of regulation can be used as easily to implement and add context to social norm governance systems as can be used as functional law within administrative regulatory systems. This form of transnational functional law combines the techniques of traditional implementation with the self-regulatory mechanisms of markets based discipline to create self-referencing systems of governance in which substance is contributed by the governance community through standards that are embedded (in Eisenberg’s sense of practice social norms) within flexible system through which to construct a market oriented basis for legal regulation of the behavior of multinational corporations that serves both the desires to ground regulation in public law and the necessity of vesting the power to determine the content of that behavior on the choices of non-governmental actors.

            For the lawyer in contemporary America, the results might eventually be quite profound. It means for her that the regulatory world facing her client is no longer the simple one defined by the structures of the traditional first year law curriculum. Indeed, to some extent, and from a client’s perspective, this curriculum is obsolete in the sense that it no longer reflects the extent of the regulatory universe within which she is now required to operate both within the territory of the state in which she operates but also in those other states, and between them, when her activities reach beyond the borders of the state of residence. A lawyer who knows only law (in the senses we have discussed (common law, statutes, regulation) knows only a portion of the regulatory universe that is now evolving. In the world in which lawyers are expected to operate in this century, a lawyer will have to learn to weave law and social norm as they intersect among public and private governance organizations, and all in the service of the interests of her client.
IV. Problem

            The focus of non-state based governance turns from the state to other actors whose collective association may produce rules that may function like law, in the sense we have come to understand the term as constituent parts of the U.S. legal system. We will consider the possibilities of governance systems beyond formal state based law by considering two problems.  The first centers on the ability of non-state based collectives to impose rules on itself well beyond the requirements of the domestic law of the territory where this group operates.  The second focuses on the ability to use the mechanics of surveillance and monitoring for substantive, behavior altering effects.  

            Problem 1: The Right to Force of Sale of a Sports Team for Violating Social Norms.  You are an associate in the firm of Partner and Partner.  You have been asked by Partner to accompany her to a meeting with a new client, Mr. A. Shilling, a part owner of a basketball team, the San Andreas Eliminators. At the meeting the following facts come to light. 

For many years, Mr. and Mrs. Shilling are equal owners of the San Andreas Eliminators (“SAE”), a basketball franchise which is a member of the National Basketball Association (NBA). The NBA was founded in 1946 and is based in New York, New York. Mrs. Shilling is an active owner and Mr. Shilling a passive one. Over the course of their ownership, Mr. and Mrs. Shilling have executed a number of agreements with the NBA related to profit distribution from television transmission rights, and related matters that included morals clauses—“Any Party may terminate this agreement if the other Parties or any of them shall at any time fail, refuse or neglect to conform his personal conduct to the standards of good citizenship and good sportsmanship or which shall subject any of the Parties to ridicule or contempt.”  In addition, when Mr. and Mrs. Shilling bought the SEA, they signed a contract that included a clause that stated that “an owner will not take any position or action that will materially and adversely affect a team or the league," and that the owner “will be upheld to the highest standard of ethical and moral behavior.".   

Mr. and Mrs. Shilling have been active members of their community and have donated substantial sums to the efforts of the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).[46]SAE team members have included a large number of African American players, coaches and staff, along with members of other racial, ethnic and religious groups. SAE has been very proud of this and included information about its diversity efforts in its advertising.

Suspicious about potential embezzlement of funds by household staff, Mr. Shilling, without his wife’s knowledge, and with the aid of a longtime family friend, Ms. Bea Cee, began recording calls made to and from his wife’s home telephone. The initial suspicion proved to be false; however, the recordings revealed that Mrs. Shilling engaged in long conversations with business associates in which she lamented the number of African Americans on the team and suggested that she harbored a general dislike for African Americans and other ethnic minorities. She thought too many African Americans went to SAE games and lamented that she couldn’t do more to “bring good honest folks” back to the SAE home games. Virtually everyone who heard the tapes agreed that the comments recorded would be very offensive by the standards of the times.

Mr. Shilling was appalled but begged Ms. Cee to remain silent.  Instead, Ms. Cee made the recordings public by selling them to Sports Weekly Magazine, a well respected and large circulation sports magazine. Ms. Cee, in later interviews on national television, indicated that she sold the tapes because she needed the money and she didn’t like Mrs. Shilling. The public response was immediate and quite negative.  A large number of people from celebrities to high ranked government officials condemned the sentiments expressed and urged Mrs. Shilling to apologize and renounce her views.  The NAACP, which had been scheduled to bestow a “Humanitarian of the Year” Award to Mrs. Shilling cancelled the award and the banquet. Sports commentators, and many fans began to urge Mrs. Shilling to sell her interest in the SAE, and SAE team members, coaches and staff expressed their anger and disappointment at the comments and what it suggested about their relationship with Mrs. Shilling.  For her part, Mrs. Shilling, in a series of interviews with national news organizations, defended her comments and suggested that the reactions were “overblown.”  In any case, she said, “This was a free country and people were entitled to their opinion without prejudice.”  Both Mr. and Mrs. Shilling have refused all calls to sell their interest in the SAE.

Within a week of the release of the tapes, the owners and league officials of the NBA met. The NBA owners initially voted to fine Mrs. Shilling heavily, in accordance with the rules of the NBA.  Soon thereafter, they moved to force her to sell the Shilling interest in the team.  The failure to do so would have forfeited the SAE’s membership in the NBA and the right to play league sanctioned games and participate in NBA negotiated contracts. In supporting this effort, the NBA Commissioner argued that the tapes evidenced attitudes substantially detrimental to the NBA’s core commitment to diversity and inclusion, damages relationships with fans, harms NBA owners and players, harms relationships with marketing partners, and harms relationships with government and community leaders. The NBA asserted that such acts violated the NBA Constitution Article 13(d), Article 13(a), Article 13(c). Under the NBA Constitution and related agreements, Mrs. Shilling’s words, actions, and views are attributable to and deemed to be the actions of SAE itself.[47]More specifically, if the Board, by a 3/4 vote, sustains termination charges on the basis of Mrs. Shilling’s words, actions, and views, the Constitution calls for the entirety of SAE’s membership in the NBA to be “automatically” terminated.

Questions:

Would Mrs. and Mr. Shilling’s potential lawsuit against a forcible sale of their interest in the SAE be inconceivable? If so, on what grounds? If not, will the NBA, as the drafter of the NBA’s Constitution, have problems defending their claims if in fact there is no explicit foundation for such a harsh penalty, since ambiguities are typically construed against those who create such legally binding documents? Does the NBA Commissioner’s decision of a forcible sale have the effect of a binding arbitration decision that could be enforceable in court? (Generally, arbitrations are often only reversed when a losing party can point to fraud or a serious conflict of interest on the part of an arbitrator.) Does the lack of a “moral clause” that would condemn an owner whose racism was expressed in private conversations in the NBA Constitution Article 13 that lists a series of enumerated wrongs in contrast to the inclusion of other provisions suggest that such a clause was intentionally omitted?

If Mrs. Shilling were successfully ousted from her ownership interest, would such a precedent be binding for the NBA and other similar associations in the future? If so, what could be the possible consequences of such a precedent?

Even though it is difficult to persuade a court to overturn a decision made by a private association and public policy at times prevails over decisions that would be more technically right, do you think that these arguments would justify the fact that the NBA might not have the strongest justification for the penalty it imposes on the current owners of the SAE?

Since Mr. Shilling has not been accused of any wrongdoing, what if he firmly decides not to relinquish possession of his part of the team without a fight? What rights does he have as a passive owner as opposed to an active owner? Does the answer depend more on the terms of the NBA constitution than on the law of community property? (viz. NBA Constitution Article 14(j): “The decisions of the Association made in accordance with the foregoing procedure shall be final, binding, and conclusive, and each Member and Owner waives any and all recourse to any court of law to review any such decision.” Under New York law and the NBA Constitution, an owner may challenge in court a termination decision not in accordance with the NBA constitution.)

Does it matter whether the remarks were recorded unbeknownst to Mrs. Shilling in her home where there is a heightened expectation of privacy? Did she "willfully" make a detrimental statement or engage in detrimental conduct? (viz. NBA Constitution Article 13(a).) Even though Mrs. Shilling’s views are bigoted, does it matter that there is no indication that the team is in any way managed in a racist manner?

Are normative surroundings and consequences of the potential forcible sale material to the issue? /OR/ If the SAE will not be a viable business as long as Mr. and Mrs. Shilling are the owners, does that provide the grounds, in itself, to force them to sell the team? (viz. harming relationships with marketing partners and fans etc.) Would therefore a public good argument tied to the fact that other teams as well as SAE players might boycott the games and thus impair the viability of the business of the NBA as a whole prevail over the fact that the ownership is Mrs. Shilling’s property (in the form of her ownership interest in a professional franchise) that is being taken from her without her consent?

Could Mrs. Shilling claim that any language in the NBA Constitution that speaks to discipline for owner misconduct was intended to apply only in cases where an owner has demonstrated incompetence in regards to financial matters? If so, could harming relationships with marketing partners and fans etc. be argued as incompetence in financial matters?

Please prepare a short memo explaining your conclusions.
           

In preparation for the writing of that memo and after some research you have gathered the following information:
                                                                                                                                               
NBA Constitution and By-Laws § 2: NBA is an unincorporated, non-profit association with limited membership and a franchise system. The NBA has an elected Commissioner with executive power and the owners are organized in a common council, called the "Board of Governors.” The Board includes one representative from each member club, usually the owner of the club. It has the power given by the Constitution and acts by affirmative vote of no less than three-fourths. The Commissioner is also present at each meeting of the Executive Committee. The Commissioner is elected by the owners and possesses disciplinary power, dispute resolution authority, and decision-making authority including the power to appoint other officers and committees. Basically, the Commissioner has executive power unless the collective bargaining agreement with the Players Association renders specific powers to other authorities. Generally, courts are reluctant to overturn decisions made by private associations as long as such decisions are made within the confines of their by-laws so the question can turn to whether the NBA’s Constitution itself has foundation to oust the Shillings out of their ownership.

NBA Constitution Article 2:
PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION
This Constitution and By-Laws constitutes a contract among the Members of the Association. This Association is organized to operate a league consisting of professional basketball teams, each of which shall be operated by a Member of the Association. The Association and each of its Members shall be subject to the oversight and control of the Board of Governors of the Association as set forth herein and shall be governed by the Constitution and By-Laws, rules, regulations, resolutions, and agreements of the Association, as they may be modified or amended from time to time. The Association shall not be operated for profit.

NBA Constitution Article 13:
TERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP OR MEMBERSHIP
The Membership of a Member or the interest of any Owner may be terminated by a vote of three fourths (3/4) of the Board of Governors if the Member or Owner shall do or suffer any of the following:
(a) Willfully violate any of the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws, resolutions, or agreements of the Association.
* * * * *
(d) Fail or refuse to fulfill its contractual obligations to the Association, its Members, Players, or any other third party in such a way as to affect the Association or its Members adversely.
(a) Willfully violate any of the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws, resolutions, or agreements of the Association.
(c) Fail to pay any dues or other indebtedness owing to the Association within thirty (30) days after Written Notice from the Commissioner of default in such payment.

NBA Constitution Article 14A:
CONSEQUENCES OF TERMINATION
The Membership of a Member or the interest of any Owner shall be terminated on the occurrence of any of the events described in Article 13 by the following procedure:
(a) Any Member of the Association or the Commissioner may charge that a Member or Owner has violated one (1) or more of the provisions of Article 13. Said charge shall be made in Writing and shall be filed with the Commissioner, who shall, no later than three (3) business days after the charges are filed, cause a copy thereof to be served by a Writing upon the Member or Owner against whom such charges have been made.

ARTICLE 15
ALTERNATIVES TO TERMINATION
If a charge that a Member or Owner has committed any of the offenses described in Article 13 is sustained, two-thirds (2/3) of all the Governors may waive the remedy of termination, and instead direct the Member or Owner to pay a stated fine in a stipulated manner and by a stipulated date, which fine may be required to be paid, in whole or in 31
part, to any other Member or Members as compensation to such Member or Members for damages sustained by it or them by reason of such act or acts of omission or commission by such offending Member or Owner. Such fine shall be payable within five (5) days after its imposition. Moreover, the Board of Governors may, in its discretion, either in addition to, or in lieu of, such fine, direct the forfeiture of the offending Member’s Draft rights.

NBA Constitution Article 35A:
MISCONDUCT OF PERSONS OTHER THAN PLAYERS
The provisions of this Article 35A shall apply only to Members and Owners; to Officers, Managers, Coaches, and other employees, agents or representatives of a Member or Owner; and to all Referees and other employees of the Association; except that the term “employees” as used in this Article 35A shall mean employees other than Players. The word “persons” as used herein shall include all such Members, Owners, Officers, Managers, Coaches, Referees, employees, agents or representatives of Members, Owners, or the Association, other than Players.
(c) Any person who gives, makes, issues, authorizes or endorses any statement having, or designed to have, an effect prejudicial or detrimental to the best interests of basketball or of the Association or of a Member or its Team, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding $1,000,000 to be imposed by the Commissioner. The Member whose Owner, Officer, Manager, Coach or other employee has been so fined shall pay the amount of the fine should such person fail to do so within ten (10) days of its imposition.
(Article 35A imposes a fine for each listed violation, but by imputation it could lead to an Article 13 termination.)
(d) The Commissioner shall have the power to suspend for a definite or indefinite period, or to impose a fine not exceeding $1,000,000, or inflict both such suspension and fine upon any person who, in his opinion, shall have been guilty of conduct prejudicial or detrimental to the Association.

Link to NBA Constitution full text:

________

Harold J. SILVER, doing business as Municipal Securities Company, et al., Petitioners,
v.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE.
No. 150
83 S.Ct. 1246
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued Feb. 25 and 26, 1963.Decided May 20, 1963.

* * * * *

The exchanges are by their nature bodies with a limited number of members, each of which plays a certain role in the carrying out of an exchange's activities. The limited-entry feature of exchanges led historically to their being treated by the courts as private clubs, Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 17 N.E. 225 (1888), and to their being given great latitude by the courts in disciplining errant members, see Westwood and Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 Law and Contemp. Prob. 518—525 (1952). As exchanges became a more and more important element in our Nation's economic and financial system, however, the private-club analogy became increasingly inapposite and the ungoverned self-regulation became more and more obviously inadequate, with acceleratingly grave consequences. This impotency ultimately led to the enactment of the 1934 Act. The House Committee Report summed up the long-developing problem in discussing the general purposes of the bill:
‘The fundamental fact behind the necessity for this bill is that the leaders of private business, whether because of inertia, pressure of vested interests, lack of organization, or otherwise, have not since the war been able to act to protect themselves by compelling a continuous and orderly program of change in methods and standards of doing business to match the degree to which the economic system has itself been constantly changing * * *. The repetition in the summer of 1933 of the blindness and abuses of 1929 has convinced a patient public that enlightened self-interest in private leadership is not sufficiently powerful to effect the necessary changes alone—that private leadership seeking to make changes must be given Government help and protection.’ H.R.Rep. No. 1383, supra, at 3.

It was, therefore, the combination of the enormous growth in the power and impact of exchanges in our economy, and their inability and unwillingness to curb abuses which had increasingly grave implications because of this growth, that moved Congress to enact the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2—5 (1934); H.R.Rep. No. 1383, supra, at 2—5.

The pattern of governmental entry, however, was by no means one of total displacement of the exchanges' traditional process of self-regulation. The intention was rather, as Mr. Justice Douglas said, while Chairman of the S.E.C., one of ‘letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used.’ Douglas, Democracy and Finance (Allen ed. 1940), 82. Thus the Senate Committee Report stressed that ‘the initiative and responsibility for promulgating regulations pertaining to the administration of their ordinary affairs remain with the exchanges themselves. It is only where they fail adequately to provide protection to investors that the Commission is authorized to step in and compel them to do so.’ S.Rep. No. 792, supra, at 13. The House Committee Report added the hope that the bill would give the exchanges sufficient power to reform themselves without intervention by the Commission. H.R.Rep. No. 1383, supra, at 15. See also 2 Loss, Securities Regulation (2d ed. 1961), 1175—1178, 1180—1182.

Thus arose the federally mandated duty of self-policing by exchanges. Instead of giving the Commission the power to curb specific instances of abuse, the Act placed in the exchanges a duty to register with the Commission, s 5, 15 U.S.C. s 78e, and decreed that registration could not be granted unless the exchange submitted copies of its rules, s 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. s 78f(a)(3), and unless such rules were ‘just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors,’ s 6(d), 15 U.S.C. s 78f(d). The general dimensions of the duty of self-regulation are suggested by s 19(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. s 78s(b), which gives the Commission power to order changes in exchange rules respecting a number of subjects, which are set forth in the margin.

__________


Louis J. CAPANO, Jr., Plaintiff,
v.
THE WILMINGTON COUNTRY CLUB Defendant.
No. CIV.A. 18037-NC.
2001 WL 1359254
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Court of Chancery of Delaware
Submitted: June 18, 2001.Decided: Oct. 31, 2001.Nov. 1, 2001.
(Some footnotes omitted or renumbered)


MEMORANDUM OPINION
JACOBS, Vice Chancellor.
The Wilmington Country Club, a private country club located in Greenville, Delaware (the “WCC” or the “Club”) has had from its inception a by-law authorizing its board of directors to expel a member for cause (the “expulsion by-law”). The WCC also has a separate by-law that requires a new member, as a condition of membership, to purchase shares of WCC stock that are restricted in terms of their transferability. One such restriction, which is contained in a separate by-law provision, requires that if a member dies or is expelled, his or her shares of stock are forfeited unless the shares are transferred to the member's spouse (the “compulsory stock transfer by-law”).

The plaintiff, Louis J. Capano, Jr. (“Capano”), became a member of the Club in 1981. In so doing, he contracted to be bound by those by-law provisions. In 1999, the WCC's board of directors voted to expel Capano for cause, in that he gave false testimony to a grand jury in a highly publicized criminal proceeding. Capano elected to challenge the expulsion by invoking the arbitration procedure provided for in the expulsion by-law, but he did not prevail in the arbitration.

In this action Capano challenges both the expulsion by-law and the compulsory stock transfer by-law, contending that both are facially invalid under Delaware corporate law principles. In his complaint Capano seeks, among other things, an order directing the WCC: (1) to permit his wife to transfer back to him the shares of WCC stock that he transferred to her after his expulsion, and (2) to reinstate Capano as a Club member.

Pending before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. Those motions present two purely legal issues, namely, whether (1) the Club's expulsion by-law and (2) the compulsory transfer by-law are valid under Delaware corporate statutory and case law. I conclude that both provisions are valid and that consequently, Capano's motion for summary judgment must be denied and the Club's cross motion must be granted.

I. FACTS

The material facts are undisputed. On April 24, 1901, the WCC was formed as a stock corporation under the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) for the “maintenance of an association for social, intellectual, and recreative purposes.”[48]

The Club's certificate of incorporation provides that the Board of Directors will conduct the affairs of the corporation and are authorized “to make by-laws for the government of the corporation, and to alter, change or amend the same at any meeting.”[49]

From its inception, the Club had in effect a by-law (the expulsion by-law) which provided that, “[a]ny member may be suspended or expelled for cause, by the vote of three-fourths of the Directors present at any meeting”.[50]The expulsion by-law initially provided for one week's notice before expulsion, but later was amended to require two weeks' notice.

In 1992, the expulsion by-law was again amended, this time to provide a definition of “cause” for expulsion.[51]The amended by-law further provided that an expelled member could challenge the expulsion for the Club's procedural non-compliance with the by-law by means of an arbitration procedure spelled out in the by-law.

In its current form, the expulsion by-law states that:

    Any member may be suspended or expelled for cause by the vote of three-fourths of the directors present at any meeting.... Challenges to a determination by the Board alleging the Club's procedural noncompliance with this Section ... shall be submitted to private arbitration.”[52]

The Club also had in effect a separate by-law (the compulsory stock transfer by-law) which provided that “[a]ny stockholder ceasing to become a member of the Club by death or otherwise, shall forfeit his or her shares of stock to the Club except as provided in sub-paragraphs (b), (d) or (f) of this section.” Subsection (b), which is one of the exceptions to the forfeiture provision, provides that “[n]o stockholder is permitted to sell or assign any of his or her shares ... except shares may be voluntarily transferred once between spouses to qualify either one for membership.”[53]In obedience to this by-law, this transfer restriction appears as a legend on each of the certificates representing the Club's shares.[54]

Capano became a stockholder member of the WCC in 1981, at which time he purchased one share of WCC stock. He later paid for, and was issued, three additional shares of WCC stock.

On March 27, 1999, the Board of Directors of the WCC notified Capano in writing that it would hold a meeting to consider whether he should be expelled for cause from the Club on the ground that he had made false statements to a grand jury in the case of a highly publicized criminal proceeding. Capano attended that hearing, and was assisted by counsel who advanced the contention that Capano should not be expelled. The directors voted to expel Capano, however, and gave him formal, written notice of the expulsion on April 28, 1999. That notice also stated that, in accordance with the compulsory transfer by-law, Capano could transfer his WCC shares to his wife rather than forfeit them to the Club. Capano accordingly transferred his shares to his wife, thereby enabling her to become a member without purchasing stock.[55]

Shortly thereafter, Capano invoked Article II, Section III(c) of the WCC by-laws, requesting arbitration of the Board's decision to expel him from the Club. After a hearing at which Capano appeared with counsel, the arbitrator upheld the expulsion, having concluded that the Club had complied with its by-laws in all material respects.

II. THE CONTENTIONS AND ISSUES

The pending motions implicate three membership requirements, all contained in the WCC by-laws. The first is that members of the Club must, as a condition of membership, own WCC stock. The second is that the club's directors are authorized to expel a member “for cause.” The third is that if a member dies or is expelled, his or her shares are forfeited, unless they are transferred to the member's spouse.

A careful analysis of Capano's invalidity claim reveals that it challenges only the third of these requirements, namely, the compulsory stock transfer provision. Capano's argument, simply put, is that as a matter of Delaware corporation law that provision must be contained in the Club's certificate of incorporation. The argument is odd, because even if it were found to be valid, the relief that would flow to Capano would be of little utility to him: Capano's status as an expelled member would continue unaffected, and the only consequence of a ruling in his favor would be to allow him to retain his four WCC shares.

That result flows logically from the narrow scope of Capano's claim. Capano does not dispute that as a general matter a private club may enact governance procedures allowing the expulsion of a member for cause. Where the club is organized as a non-stock corporation, the expulsion provision may be contained in the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws. Where the club is a corporation authorized to issue stock, and there is no linkage between expulsion and stock ownership (i.e. there is no compulsory stock transfer provision), the expulsion provision could appear in either the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws. In both circumstances the expulsion provisions would affect the club member only qua member, not qua stockholder. Thus, if the WCC had no compulsory stock transfer requirement, Capano would have no claim, because the board voted to expel him for cause and Capano unsuccessfully challenged that expulsion in an arbitration-all in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Club's by-laws to which Capano voluntarily agreed when he joined the Club.
Capano does, (because he must) attack the expulsion by-law. The basis for his attack is not that the by-laws must appear in the WCC certificate of incorporation, but rather, that Delaware corporate law forbids the directors of a corporation from expelling a stockholder. But that argument, even granting its correctness, is a non-starter, because its factual premise is irrelevant in this case. The WCC's Board expelled Capano only as a member, not as a stockholder, because the expulsion by-law operates only against members in that capacity, not in their capacity as stockholders. The only by-law provision that operates against an (expelled) member in his or her capacity as a stockholder is the compulsory stock transfer by-law. Accordingly, that is the only provision Capano may validly challenge on the basis that it must appear in the corporate charter. Thus, the only genuine corporate law issue presented on these cross motions for summary judgment is whether the compulsory stock transfer by-law provision must, as a matter of Delaware statutory law, be contained in the WCC certificate of incorporation.

Capano's by-law challenge rests upon 8 Del. C. §§ 102(a)(4) and 151, which (to paraphrase) provide that any rights, preferences, restrictions and limitations relating to any class or series of stock must be set forth in the certificate of incorporation. Thus, the implicit premise of Capano's argument is that the compulsory stock transfer by-law constitutes a “limitation” with respect to the WCC stock. That premise, however, is flawed because the compulsory transfer requirement is not a characteristic or attribute-such as a voting right, dividend right, or dividend or liquidation preference-that affects each individual WCC share. Rather, that provision operates only against the holder of the stock (in the event of that member's death or expulsion), not against the stock itself. Put in statutory terms, the compulsory stock transfer provision is not a limitation “with respect to” the WCC shares, and is therefore not statutorily required to be set forth in the Club's charter. The reasons for that conclusion are discussed in the analysis that next follows.

III. ANALYSIS

Two separate by-laws are challenged in this litigation: the expulsion by-law and the compulsory stock transfer by-law. As for the first, no one questions that the WCC has the legal power to expel a member and to adopt a by-law governing that procedure. Courts have given private clubs wide latitude to exclude and/or expel persons as members. Nor does Capano seriously contest that the WCC has that power. What Capano does seriously contest is the compulsory stock transfer by-law that required Capano to transfer his WCC stock to his wife (or suffer forfeiture) after being expelled as a Club member. Ultimately, I conclude that the compulsory stock transfer by-law constitutes a restriction on the transfer of stock that is authorized by, and is evaluated under, 8 Del. C. § 202. The validity of the expulsion by-law is addressed in Part III(A) of this Opinion; the validity of the compulsory stock transfer by-law is analyzed in Part III(B).

A. Validity Of The Expulsion By-Law

The first issue is whether the WCC expulsion by-law, standing alone, is legally valid. More specifically, the issue is whether the WCC may enact a by-law that authorizes the expulsion of a member from the Club for cause, by a vote of the three-fourths of its directors. The answer is clearly yes. As earlier noted, Capano does not dispute that as a general matter, a private club may enact governance procedures that authorize the expulsion of a member for cause.

The WCC is a private club organized as a stock corporation.[56]As a general matter, a private organization is given wide latitude to enact rules to achieve the club's purposes and to discipline its members.14 Membership in voluntary associations is generally viewed as a privilege that may be withheld, not as a right that may be independently enforced.[57]In rare cases where courts have scrutinized a private club's expulsion by-laws, it was only to determine if the club complied with its own by-law procedures, or whether the by-laws violated general public policy, or if bad faith motivated the enforcement of the by-laws against the affected members.[58]In this case, there is no claim that the WCC failed to comply with its own by-laws when it expelled Capano. Nor does Capano contend that his expulsion was motivated by bad faith on the part of the Club's Board of Directors, or that the expulsion by-law violates public policy.

Most important, Capano does not contest that the WCC has the power to exclude him as a member of the WCC at all. What he contends is that he cannot be removed as a stockholder. That argument, however, implicates the compulsory stock transfer by-law, not the expulsion by-law. Upon becoming a Club member, Capano agreed to be bound by the WCC's by-laws-including its expulsion by-law. He cannot now be heard to contest the validity of that by-law merely because its application did not work out in his favor.

Capano argues that his assent to the expulsion by-law does not bar him from attacking it, because the by-law is invalid on its face. Citing Oberly v. Kirby[59]and Frezzo v. Delaware Mushroon Co-op Ass'n,[60]Capano argues that a board of directors of a Delaware corporation can never be empowered to remove any of the corporation's shareholders. But neither that argument nor those authorities need be frontally addressed, because the argument proceeds from a false premise. The expulsion by-law does not result in the “removal” of a Club-member qua shareholder. It operates against a member only in his or her membership capacity.

Only because the WCC is organized as a stock corporation is Capano positioned to advance his “shareholder removal” argument. Even then, in order to make that argument Capano must resort to conflating the expulsion by-law and the compulsory stock transfer by-law provisions. But, as a legal matter those two by-laws are separate, and their requirements and operation are independent of each other. The very nature of Capano's argument (that a corporation's directors cannot legally remove the equity investors) only underscores that Capano's challenge, properly understood, is directed against the compulsory stock transfer-and not the expulsion-by-law. If any demonstration of that were needed, it is that even if Capano's challenge were to prevail, he would not gain reinstatement as a member, but only as a shareholder without membership privileges. The phyrric nature of such a legal victory is apparently what drives Capano's effort to conflate the expulsion and the compulsory transfer by-laws, and to treat them as if they were a single, unified, integrated, and non-severable requirement.

Because Capano has failed to demonstrate that the expulsion by-law is invalid under Delaware law, the sole issue is over the legal validity of the compulsory stock transfer by-law, which requires a member, after being expelled from the Club, to transfer his or her stock to the member's spouse or to forfeit the stock to the WCC. I turn to that issue.

B. The Validity Of The Compulsory Stock Transfer By-law

* * * *

Shareholders are free to contract with each other, and with the corporation, to restrict who may own the corporation's stock.43 Shareholders, particularly in closely-held corporations, customarily enter into contracts amongst themselves. Our Courts have upheld the validity of contracts that restrict the sale of shares to anyone other than a family member; that alter the voting rights of a stockholder based on the size of his or her stock holdings; that require the transfer of shares back to the corporation upon death; and that require the consent of stockholders for certain types of transfers. Section 202 authorizes restrictions of that kind.

As previously noted, the current Section 202(c)(4) expressly permits shareholders to agree to a restriction that requires the transfer of shares to the corporation or to some other person upon the happening of a defined event. Capano's argued-for construction of Sections 141(k) and 102(a)(4)-as depriving shareholders of the power to contract to transfer their securities back to the corporation in those circumstances-would place Section 202(c)(4) into direct conflict with Sections 102(a)(4) and 141(k). A construction of a statutory provision that would place it in conflict with other provisions of the same statute is to be avoided. A cardinal rule of construction requires the Court to adopt an interpretation that harmonizes all of the statutory provisions. On this basis as well, the compulsory stock transfer by-law is valid under Delaware law.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Capano's motion for summary judgment is denied, and the Wilmington Country Club's cross motion for summary judgment is granted. IT IS SO ORDERED.



__________


[1]http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3009&context=facpubs
[2]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1112882
[3] For the regulation of commercial transactions in the early decades of the Conference, see the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896), reprinted in National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, American Uniform Commercial Acts 136 (1910); the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act (1906), reprinted in id. at 185; the Uniform Sales Act (1906), reprinted in id. at 70; the Uniform Bills of Lading Act (1909), reprinted in id. at 213; the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (1909), reprinted in id. at 122; the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (1918), 3B U.L.A. 480 (1992); and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (1933), 3B U.L.A., supra, at 588.
[4]On the history of the American Law Institute and the Restatements, see, for example, James Gordley, European Codes and American Restatements: Some Difficulties, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 140 (1981); N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 L. & Hist. Rev. 55 (1990); and G. Edward White, The American Law Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 L. & Hist. Rev. 1 (1997). For a selective bibliography on the ALI and its activities, see Harry G. Kyriakodis, The Institute in Legal Literature--A Selective Bibliography (visited Feb. 20, 2000) .
[5]or a list of all past and present ALI projects see the ALI’s official website, Past and Present ALI Projects (visited Feb. 20, 2000) < http://www.ali.org/ali/AR99_PastPrj.htm>.
[6]Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute (Feb. 23, 1923), reprinted in The Life of the Law 145, 148-49 (John Honnold ed., 1964). For an analysis of the drafter’s goals, see Hull, supra note 423, at 55-96.
[7] See Charles W. Wolfram, Bismarck’s Sausages and the ALI’s Restatements, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 817, 819-20 (1996) (noting that the Restatements’ impact on courts is unknown and difficult to discern).
[8]On the intent that Restatements function as a substitute for codification, see, for example, Varga, supra note 2, at 161-65; Berger, supra note 14, at 154; and George A. Bermann, La codification aux États-Unis, 82 Revue française d’administration publique 221, 223-25 (1997).
[9] Gordley, supra . . . . , at 140, 156-57.
[10] See Restatement Second of Trusts (1959); Californian Trusts Act, Cal. Prob. Code §§ 15,000-19,403 (West 2000); Uniform Trust Act (Draft, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1999). . . .
[11]Mitchell Franklin, The Historic Function of the American Law Institute: Restatement as Transitional to Codification, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1367, 1367 (1934).
[12]The Life of the Law, supra. . . , at 144 (1964).
[13][Arthur T. Von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and Case Law in the Twenty-First Century, U.C. Davis L. Rev. 659, 669 (1998) ]
[14]See Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory 261, 270 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (referring to a statement by Herman Oliphant).
[15]For example, a broker- dealer who violates the rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers may be expelled from that organization, and under the Securities Act a broker- dealer who is not a member of the NASD cannot effect any transaction in a security other than an exempted security or commercial paper. See Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 629-48 (3d ed. 1995).
[16] Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 222 cmt. b, illus. 2 (1996).
[17] See Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation 40 (1997).
[18]Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, 3 New Palgrave Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 476, 477 (1998). Basu calls the norms he describes in this passage “rationality-limiting norms” on the ground that “a person endowed with [such] norms may forego options which could have enhanced his utility” -- by which Basu seems to mean wealth--” and thus such a person would be considered irrational in terms of mainstream economics.” Id. at 477. In contrast, he says, some norms always enhance an actor's self-interest:
[C]onsider the norm, in many countries, of driving on the right. It is true that this norm is additionally fortified by the law; but it is arguable that even if this were just a norm or a convention and not the law, people would still drive on the right. This explains why the police have to be vigilant in enforcing the stop -sign rule or the speeding rule but not the drive -on-the - right rule. The first two are laws which are not in people's self-interest (they may of course be in their group interest). But the third is a norm which, once it is in place, happens to be entirely compatible with self-interested behaviour. In the absence of such a norm, there are at least two possible equilibria-- everyone drives on the left and everyone drives on the right. The norm is very different from the two discussed above because it simply helps people select an equilibrium.... I call such a norm an ‘equilibrium-selection norm.’ This is the norm the study of which is currently in vogue in economics and has generated a lot of literature, to the extent that economists tend to forget about the other kinds of norms-- conveniently so, since the equilibrium-selection norm is the one which is most compatible with conventional economics.
Id.
[19][Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law For a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996)] at 1662.
[20] Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1197, 1211 (1997).
[21]. . . .  Obligational norms may also be effective because an actor has internalized a metanorm of adherence to the norms of a defined group with which he feels at one. The actor may then adhere to a specific group norm even though he has not internalized that norm and is not motivated by the external benefits or costs that may result from adherence or nonadherence to the norm. This phenomenon is most commonly found where the actor is a member of a special group that is working toward a shared end, or that shares a special ethos, that the actor believes to be important. In certain respects, membership in such groups simply sharpens some of the characteristic incentives to adhere to norms--in this case, the norms of the special group. For example, the sanction of disapproval may be especially salient and effective in such a group. However, there is also a special internal benefit in adhering to the norms of such a group just because they are the norms of the group --the pleasures of belonging, of acting in a special and good endeavor, and of surrendering narrow individuality to a larger cause.
[22] See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 56 (2d ed. 1994). The most significant exception is the kind of norm that Basu calls an equilibrium-selection norm, like keeping to the right. Once such a norm is in place, adhering to the norm is compatible with self-interested behavior even without regard to reputational effects. See Basu, supra. . . .
[23] Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 582 (1933).
[24] See Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1703, 1713, 1726-30 (1989).
[25] See Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1095, 1107 (1986).
[26] [Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law For a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996)], at 1661- 64..
[27]Value -systems can be disaggregated from belief-systems. I treat values and other kinds of views about the world together here because it is often difficult to say whether a change in belief-systems is better characterized as a change in values or as a change in views about the implications or applications of values, and the difference is by and large not significant for purposes of this Article.
[28]See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 119 (1969):
Over a hundred years ago, the German poet Heine warned the French not to underestimate the power of ideas: philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor's study could destroy a civilization. He spoke of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as the sword with which European deism had been decapitated, and described the works of Rousseau as the blood-stained weapon which, in the hands of Robespierre, had destroyed the old regime; and prophesied that the romantic faith of Fichte and Schelling would one day be turned, with terrible effect, by their fanatical German followers, against the liberal culture of the West. The facts have not wholly belied this prediction.
(from the essay, Two Concepts of Liberty); see also A.C. Grayling, Family Feuds, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1998, § 7, at 20 (Book Review) (reviewing Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change (1998)).
[29] Thomas C. Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehavior 91-102 (1978).
[30]Id., at 94.
[31]Id., at 95-
[32]See id., at 101-102.
[33]See Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of Consideration 42 (1997) (“[In tipping processes] individuals are willing to act if enough others act first. Under certain circumstances, a slight change in the willingness of a few people to act first can get the ball rolling.... [C]ollective behavior sometimes... tips suddenly.”).
[34]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568934
[36]ALI, ALI Overview, Creation, available http://ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.creation.
[37] There is one case from a federal district court holding that Indiana would adopt the “actually foreseeable” standard of care for accountants set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. Seedkem, Inc. v. Safranek, 466 F.Supp. 340 (D.Neb.1979). The district court rejected the rationale of the Seedkem opinion and neither party argues that the Restatement standard should be adopted.
[38]http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3009&context=facpubs
[39]http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5983?msg=welcome_stranger
[40]H. Peyton Young, Social Norms, Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series No. 307, Oxford University (ISSN 1471-0498, Jan. 2007, available http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Department-of-Economics-Discussion-Paper-Series/social-norms. He cites the following book length treatments: Lewis, David. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study.[40]Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; Ullman-Margalit, Edna. 1977. The Emergence of Norms.[40]Oxford: Oxford University Press (Book review[40]); Sugden, Robert. 1986. The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare.[40]Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Young, H. Peyton. 1998. Individual Strategy and Social Structure.[40]Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press; Posner, Eric. 2000. Law and Social Norms.[40]Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; Hechter, Michael and Karl-Dieter Opp, eds. 2001. SocialNorms.[40] New York: Russell Sage Foundation; and Bicchieri, Cristina. 2006. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms.[40] New York: Cambridge University Press.)
[41] http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/stochastic
[42]http://www.amazon.com/Anarchy-Legal-Order-Politics-Stateless/dp/1107032288
[43]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953216
[44]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092167
[45]http://books.google.com/books?id=lYse82DRycEC&pg=PA245&lpg=PA245&dq=Jan+Broekman+Larry+Backer+Semiotics&source=bl&ots=MZfiRbWkFQ&sig=QfYbHRJ2rPTFpA_6r4h-TvqM-SE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=k-AsUovAI7S44APi4YE4&ved=0CDQQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=Jan%20Broekman%20Larry%20Backer%20Semiotics&f=false
[46]The NAACP was founded in 1909 and is the oldest and largest civil rights organization in the United States.
[47]NBA Constitution Interpretation (a)(8): ““Member” shall mean a person or Entity that has been granted a  Membership in the Association. For purposes of this Constitution and By-Laws, an action on behalf of a Member by any of its Owners, employees, officers, directors, managers, agents or representatives, or its Governor or Alternate
Governors, shall be the action of a Member.”
[48] Def. Op. Br. at Ex. A, ¶ 3 (certificate of incorporation)
[49]Id. at Ex. A, ¶ 8.

[50] Id. at Ex. B, Art. IV (By-laws, 1902-1903).
[51] The amended provision states that a “[p]roper cause for dismissal will include any conduct which, in the opinion of the Board, is disorderly or injurious to the Club's interests or reputation. The offender's conduct will be judged by the Board in accordance with the Club's purposes: the promotion of fellowship, sportsmanship, and the preservation of the highest standards of personal conduct.” Def. Op. Br. at Ex. C, Art. II, Sec. III(c) (By-laws, 1998).
[52]Id.
[53] Def. Op. Br. at Ex. C, Art. II, Sec. V(d) (By-laws, 1998).
[54] Def. Op. Br. at Ex. F (Stock Certificate).
[55] Def. Op. Br. at Ex. G (letter from Capano to the WCC, dated May 27, 1999, asking that his shares be transferred to his wife)
[56] If the WCC were organized as non-stock corporation, the membership requirements would have to be stated in the certificate of incorporation or (if provided by the certificate of incorporation) in the by-laws. 8 Del. C. § 102(a)(4).
[57] Med. Soc'y of Mobile County v. Walker, Ala.Supr., 16 So.2d 321, 324 (1944); Schroeder v. Meridian Imp. Club, Wash.Supr., 221 P.2d 544, 548 (1950). See generally 6 Am.Jur.2d Associations and Clubs § 18 (1999) (discussing the rights of members in voluntary unincorporated associations).
[58] Haas, mem. op. at 13-21; Calabrese, 384 A.2d at 583; Van Daecle v. Vinci, Ill.Supr., 282 N.E.2d 728, 732 (1972); Otto v. Journeyman Tailors' Protective & Benevolent Union, Cal.Supr., 17 P. 217, 219 (1888).
[59] Del.Supr., 592 A.2d 445 (1991).
[60] Del Ch., 152 A.2d 303 (1959).
 

Three Views of Election Reform in Hong Kong and the One Country-Two Systems Policy

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(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)


The issue of voting reform in Hong Kong has produced a lively debate about the nature of the relations between the governments in Beijing and Hong Kong and the nature of the political system and the possibilities of political reform in Hong Kong.  The South China Morning Post has been running some commentary about the issues, including the somewhat notorious issue of student political action through the Occupy Central movement.  

Thousands of students from two dozen schools in Hong Kong skipped classes Monday to protest "dictatorial" control by the Chinese central government over the territory's election rules.

Students began a weeklong boycott with a rally on the campus of Chinese University of Hong Kong, where they demanded that Beijing withdraw its election reform plan and issue an "apology to the Hong Kong people." (Joanna Chiu, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR reprinted at Philly.co., Sept. 23, 2014)

At the same time, indications from the central government suggest a determination to more closely manage Hong Kong from Beijing (e.g.,Beijing to take a more active role in Hong Kong's affairs, hints Xi Jinping, South China Morning Post, Sept. 23, 2014). And indeed, the "One Country Two Systems" Policy may be undergoing transition in light of the State Council's recent White Paper: "The Practice of the "One Country, Two Systems" Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."

This post includes three quite distinct views of the issue and provide a very useful window on the complexities of the issues and the politics of electoral reform in Hong Kong. In the first, "Lessons in Life,"Surya Deva, an associate professor in the School of Law at City University of Hong Kong, suggests that students boycotting classes in Hing Kong in support of democracy can benefit form the experience as it gives them an important lesson in experiental learning. The second, "Champions of Beijing Camp Losing the Public Opinion War on Political Reform,"by Albert Chen King-hon, a Hong Kong political writer, suggests that out of touch leaders have failed to effectively sell the pending changes and have contributed to popular discontent by badly handling the situation. The last, "No Benefit for Hong Kong if Election System stays the Same," by Bernard Chan, a member fo the Executive Council, argues that so-called pan democrats are acting out of anger and failing to see the value of the proposed changes.


As students from several universities and colleges prepare for a week-long boycott of classes from next Monday, to protest against the National People’s Congress Standing Committee decision on political reform for Hong Kong, the local community is responding in diverse ways.

While some are sympathetic to students’ right to assert their freedom of speech and expression in a peaceful way, the anti-Occupy Central movement has gone to the extent of establishing a hotline for people to report incidents of class boycotts. Others have cautioned students about staying away from classes, saying that doing so might adversely affect their learning.

Are students really going to suffer a lot academically by boycotting classes for a week? Opinions may differ. But I think they would benefit, overall, if they missed classes for a short time for a legitimate cause. In fact, if they were to take the class boycott as a “learning group project”, they could accomplish what is generally not achievable within the four walls of a classroom.

There are several major limitations of the dominant learning model currently practised at universities. The first is that we teach in compartments divided first by disciplines (such as politics, business, law, philosophy, mathematics, and so on) and then by separate courses within each discipline.

However, the challenges that graduates face outside educational institutions do not arise within these artificial boundaries. The universal suffrage saga is a case in point: it is a fascinating cocktail of law, politics, ethics, public policy, colonial history, economics, business, international relations and media advertising.

The project of boycotting classes for one week to push for universal suffrage will offer students an unprecedented opportunity to learn collaboratively in an interdisciplinary setting. Students should gain a lot by working with their peers from across the disciplines at all levels.

Students could, for example, apply a cost-benefit analysis to examine the viability and desirability of a temporary class boycott. Also, why not test the behaviour of the relevant parties to the universal suffrage debate with reference to the prisoner’s dilemma? Similarly, law students could explore with students of politics and philosophy the intersection of law, politics and morality.

While management and business students could harness their leadership and and organisational skills before and during the planned boycott, those studying creative media could join with information technology students to develop means to communicate effectively and in an efficient way with a diverse range of people. The second limitation of classroom learning is the lack of adequate opportunities to apply knowledge to diverse and ever-evolving real-life situations. While teachers employ real or hypothetical case studies, those tools are not always adequate.

What Hong Kong is currently experiencing is unique and constantly evolving. Students would develop a better ability to adapt and react to situations by actually experiencing the political saga rather than sitting on the fence and looking through the lenses of others.

The third limitation of our education system is the excessive focus on grade oriented knowledge accumulation. Grades are important, but equally vital for life is developing a social and ethical consciousness.

By participating in political reform on their own terms, students would realise that, sometimes, grades might have to be sacrificed to some extent to uphold paramount principles. Organising a week-long class boycott would also enable students to harness a range of generic soft skills. To begin with, they would learn to communicate concepts such as universal suffrage, representative democracy and constitutional freedoms to peers from diverse disciplines. Since not all students are likely to support the proposed boycott, students could also learn the art of persuasion by trying to convince each other of the pros and cons of the campaign as a means to achieve certain goals.

Despite sincere attempts to build a consensus, disagreements are bound to surface. This should help students to understand the value of agreeing to disagree and respecting diversity of views. The class boycott project should also result in students picking up other skills, including formulating goals, working in teams, developing reflexive strategies, coordinating tasks and analysing scenarios critically. For example, students would need to analyse critically not only the Standing Committee’s decision but also the political situation in Hong Kong as well as on the mainland. Considering the nature of the subject matter, a discussion on how to strike a balance between sacrosanct principles and pragmatism would be inevitable.

After the strike, students may also learn the limitations of protests and the power of constructive engagement. The aim of this boycott is to fight for democracy and freedoms. In the future, students should consider a class boycott to further many other worthy goals as part of their learning projects – for instance, collecting donations to assist the poor, helping the elderly with their daily chores, promoting sustainable living, and building cultural bridges between people from different ethnic, racial or religious communities. Apart from enhancing the capabilities of students, such projects would benefit the whole of society.

This could, however, only happen if we trust our students – the future of Hong Kong. The current generation should share space with students in shaping the future of Hong Kong and mainland China. The need of the hour is to nurture active, reflective and socially responsible learners who have the capacity to make informed decisions.

Surya Deva is an associate professor in the School of Law at City University of Hong Kong. The views expressed here are the author’s own

_________


"Champions of Beijing Camp Losing the Public Opinion War on Political Reform,"
Albert Chen
King-hon


The authorities are waging a war against the pandemocrats in the court of public opinion in a bid to steamroller Beijing’s highly restrictive nominating method for the next chief executive election in 2017 through the Legislative Council.

It is anybody’s guess how much the Communist Party has spent on its so-called united front efforts in Hong Kong, but it must be a huge amount.

The Hong Kong government is expected to turn the unpopular decision by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress into a proposed amendment to the Chief Executive Election Ordinance early next year. A two-thirds majority in the 70-member legislature is required for the measure to pass.

If it is vetoed, the status quo will be maintained. The bureaucracy’s propaganda machine is now focused on luring the public to take whatever is doled out.

At this critical juncture, both mainland and Hong Kong officials are pulling out all the stops. Yet their line-up of talking heads to argue the case has been, to put it politely, dismal. Their public faces have included the usual ultraconservatives hand-picked as NPC delegates and members of the Executive Council. They include Elsie Leung Oi-sie, Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai, Maria Tam Waichu, Fanny Law Fan Chiu-fun and Arthur Li Kwok-cheung.

They have come across as little more than Beijing mouthpieces. Instead of lowering the political temperature, their sound bites have often ended up inciting more discontent. Leung, a former secretary for justice, said Hong Kong had to become a municipality directly under the central government if residents were to ask for more liberal election rules.

Li ridiculed the planned student boycott of classes by asking three times in the same breath, “Who cares?” He dared the students to give up their university places instead. Students and alumni of Chinese University are ashamed to say that Li was once its vice chancellor.

Tertiary students have been at the forefront of the civil disobedience movement in the wake of the NPC’s decision. Their action is echoed by some progressive students in secondary schools. These young activists, in particular, have become a target of the campaign to stem pro-democracy protest efforts.

The Alliance for Peace and Democracy has gone as far as advertising a hotline to name and shame those secondary schools that allow their students to boycott classes. Its spokesman, Robert Chow Yung, even had the nerve to say the hotline would help our children. The move is a reminder of tactics employed during the Cultural Revolution, when people were urged to betray even those closest to them in the interests of the party.

The alliance’s name-and shame tactics have led to a public outcry, as they are a flagrant breach of the fundamental values in education.

These pro-Beijing figures in Hong Kong are typically aged over 60 and thus witnessed the catastrophe of the Cultural Revolution. They often seek to compare the student activists to Mao Zedong’s red guards.

Yet, as the hotline stunt has shown, it is these people who are resorting to red-guard tactics to resist change.

Another figure who has stepped into the limelight is Wong Kwan-yu, from the Federation of Education Workers. Wong became known two years ago for his role in the government’s aborted attempt to introduce national education as an independent subject into the school curriculum. He was a director of the National Education Services Centre, which had been funded by the Education Bureau to produce material suitable for national education.

Wong told Scholarism convenor Joshua Wong Chi-fung that he and his fellow activists were not much different from triad gangsters. He is oblivious to the fact that the students are just calling for a peaceful demonstration in the form of a class boycott. In contrast, it was the leftist pro-Beijing students in Hong Kong who took an active role in the violent riots of 1967. Chief Executive Leung Chunying and his governance team have consistently performed poorly in popularity surveys. If other public faces of the anti-Occupy Central movement were included in the polls, their popularity scores would probably be even worse.

The fact that opportunists such as Robert Chow and Wong Kwan-yu lead the antidemocratic movement says a lot about the calibre of the rest of their camp.

As the proverb goes, in the country of the blind, the one eyed man is king. The French have a similar saying, which is equally applicable to us: “When a blind man bears the standard, pity those who follow.” We need to keep our eyes wide open to see where these blind standard bearers are heading.
Albert Cheng King-hon is a political commentator. taipan@albertcheng.hk


__________



"No Benefit for Hong Kong if Election System stays the Same,"
Bernard Chan



I have previously argued that legislators and the community in general should accept the National People’s Congress Standing Committee decision on election methods for 2016-17. I said we cannot ignore Beijing’s view of Hong Kong’s constitution in a national context. And I said that rejecting the proposal would do nothing but delay reform.

I also argued that the package, with its element of universal suffrage, really would be an improvement on the current system. Pro-democrats refuse to accept this. They insist that pro-democracy lawmakers should veto this reform, and indeed the next round of consultation.

In effect, they are claiming that we would be better off with the current system. This makes no sense. Yes, the proposed framework is a huge disappointment to many people. But I wonder if some opponents are so bitter and angry about it that they refuse to admit that it is an improvement.

Let me expand on what I wrote about the nomination process for the 2017 chief executive election. I believe that this process, combined with an election by universal suffrage, will produce a far more representative outcome for Hong Kong. That makes it a real improvement.

It comes down to the prenomination stage of the process. This will not be some sort of secret deal fixed behind closed doors. We will not wake up one morning and read that three (or maybe two) individuals have made it onto the ballot for election. We can imagine a number of individuals – maybe eight or nine, or more – competing at this primary stage.

We cannot say specifically how these contestants will be proposed. The forthcoming public consultation will cover that. But I am confident that this will be a competitive process, in full public view. I am also sure that contenders will come from a range of backgrounds; there is no reason a pro-democrat should not take part.

These primary-stage contenders will need to debate in public on big and sensitive issues. They will need to propose their own platforms on education, welfare, housing, tax, economic policy, consumer rights – you name it. If some of them back policies that the public doesn’t like, you can be sure other contenders will criticise them for it. Public opinion polls will identify those with strong public backing. And they will highlight any that the public dislike.

The 1,200 members of the nominating committee will not be able to ignore public opinion in this primary stage. It would be naive to think that someone hostile to Beijing would get onto the ballot. But that still leaves a lot of possibilities.

If I am wrong – if the whole process is rigged and we get just a couple of unpopular “stooges” on the ballot – the whole election loses any credibility. Opposition groups could probably organize a successful boycott of the universal suffrage election. With a low turnout, the “winner” would be visibly rejected by the electorate. Our governance problems would, if anything, be worse than they are now.

I am pretty sure that officials in Beijing and locally have thought this through.

After the primary stage, there will be two or three candidates on the ballot for a universal suffrage election. They will not get that far without being serious about wanting the job. They will compete for your vote. This is going to be very different from the past.

I am not saying this system will be fully democratic. And I am not claiming that, even with an improved mandate, our government will suddenly be perfect. But this really is better than the status quo.
Boycotting the next consultation, or vetoing the final package, might make angry prodemocrats feel good. But please tell me: how exactly do the people of Hong Kong benefit from another five, 10 or even 15 years of the current system?

Bernard Chan is a member of the Executive Council



New Paper Posted: "From Guiding Principles to Interpretive Organizations: Developing a Framework for Applying the UNGPs to Disputes that Institutionalizes the Advocacy Role of Civil Society"

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(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)


I have been  considering the important issues that face international actors--states, civil society and enterprises, as the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (2011) evolves.   See HERE, HERE, and HERE.  I have been particularly concerned with what I have come to consider the part of the Guiding Principles that might benefit from more sustained attention--the so-called 3rd remedial rights pillar of the Guiding Principles.   

I am coming to believe that just as the first pillar focuses on the state and its duty to protect, and the second pillar focuses on enterprises and their responsibility to respect human rights, so the third pillar ought to focus on the individual, and civil society and their  role (in their representative capacity).  That focus ought to recognize individuals  both as object of state duty and enterprise responsibility, but more importantly, as actors in control of their role in the remedial processes, which they ought to have a hand in shaping.  It ought, as well, to recognize civil society actors in their critical institutional roles as advocates and monitors of the system of business and human rights. Civil society is central to actualizing the stakeholder roles of individuals in their participation in the evolution of the Guiding Principles and in their efforts to invoke the systems for the protection of the rights of individuals and to secure compliance by states of their duty to protect, and by enterprises of their responsibility to protect human rights. But this re-focus requires the establishment of more robust mechanics that might be used to develop those webs of interpretive opinion fundamental to the deepening of the Guiding Principles in their application to the contextually driven activities they were meant to help guide.


The abstract follows with links to the essay.



From Guiding Principles to Interpretive Organizations: Developing a Framework for Applying the UNGPs to Disputes that Institutionalizes the Advocacy Role of Civil Society

Larry Catá Backer

Abstract:

Global human rights NGOs evidence the power and temptations of the great normative institutional forces that affect the governance projects of transnational society in the early 21st century. These forces—(1) the drive for order and rationality even within emerging polycentric orders beyond the state, and (2) the transformation of the individual within this polycentric universe from singular being to disembodied abstraction made flesh in the body of civil society—are irresistible. The chapter’s thesis is this: the logic of emerging meta-governance points to the need to establish a central mechanism for the interpretation of transnational normative governance instruments and particularly the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), and the logic of emerging mass governance principles points to the need to vest representative civil society organizations with the authority to bring cases and advocate before such an interpretive body. Movements to develop comprehensive treaty structures pose a threat to the establishment of a workable transnational order compatible with the realities of contemporary governance. This chapter considers both the challenges of the arguments for the institutionalization of NGOs within the normative framework of the UNGPs and the strengths of their critique of the Working Group on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (WG) for missed opportunities. Two of these opportunities, to date ignored, are worthy of serious development. The first is a facility for delivering interpretations of the GPs whether or not deemed binding by state or enterprise instrumentalities at the international level. The second, drawing from the first, would incorporate civil society as a key representative of individuals seeking an interpretation of the INGPs in particular contexts. It follows that the application-interpretation facility requires not just the establishment not just of an institutional framework for providing a means of hearing specific complaints, but in in which individuals could bring these complaints through representative civil society for determination of the application of the GPs in context. The object is to more fully develop the UNGP’s remedial third pillar through the creation of an internationally based autonomous source of process and governance that raises the stakeholder status of individuals, now represented by a civil society sector under the third pillar that states enjoy under the first pillar and enterprises enjoy under the second. The way to that goal requires substantial development, but its value appears clear. A later version to be published in Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning (César Rodríguez-Garavito, ed., forthcoming 2015).



Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: human rights, civil society, multinational corporations, CSR, Guiding Principles, OECD

JEL Classification: K33, M14, O19

The Atlantic Council and Developments in the Movement Toward a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

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I have been writing about the years long efforts by the United States to develop an alternative global trade architecture around its twin efforts, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TTP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). See HERE for a useful perspective. For the TTP see, "The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S. and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order".

(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)

The Atlantic Council provides some useful information on the sometimes slow and convoluted path that is the route toward an alternative to the WTO represented by the TTIP. The Atlantic Council's board is listed here

 This post includes some links and discussion recently provided by the Atlantic Council focused on current developments in trans-Atlantic trade.

 

 

Who's Who & Who's New?

Now that incoming European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has announced his appointees for the next Commission, TTIP Action will introduce several of the new commissioners, their portfolios, and their role in the European Union over the course of the next several weeks. Today's edition introduces Pierre Moscovici, the designated Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs.

“I am an engaged and convinced European. From now on, I will not act as the French Finance Minister anymore but as a European commissioner in the general interest. The most important thing is to contribute to the collective task of restoring growth in Europe,” Moscovici asserted in a recent interview following his nomination. Make sure you follow him on Twitter at @pierremoscovici, and you can find his official website here.

Formerly French Finance Minister, Moscovici will assume the position of Economic Affairs commissioner if confirmed by the European Parliament. Moscovici’s focus will be to create the conditions for sustainable economic growth which creates jobs and spur investment across Europe. His actions will be supervised by Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President for Jobs and Growth, Investment and Competitiveness, and Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue which is likely to create some points of friction as Katainen and Moscovici are both known advocates of budgetary discipline (Euractiv).

His appointment sparked considerable criticism, among those who doubt the credibility and legitimacy of naming a Frenchman to the Economic post because he will be responsible for overseeing national budgets and ensuring they meet the Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit targets (Euractiv). In the event a budget does not, the Financial Times addressed his delicate situation, pointing out that Moscovici will have to approve or reject a French budget that he was in charge of less than six months ago.

Moscovici will be a leading actor in the debate between Europe’s South and North on the loosening of the current fiscal rules. Despite his statement that, “We can have a dose, a certain dose of flexibility. But flexibility is not indulgence, flexibility is not complacency, flexibility is not weakness,” Moscovici made equally clear that Hollande’s plans for the French economic recovery “which lead to cuts in public expenditure and help a pro-business attitude and structural reforms – have to be made.”

Juncker himself deems Moscovici the right person for the job, hoping that he will be a mediator between the EU and the French public with regards to tough upcoming EU budget decisions. Some German MEPs are disappointed by Moscovici’s nomination, calling him 'the Trojan Horse in the Commission', claiming that Juncker has put the fox in charge of the henhouse (Euractiv). In an interview with the German newspaper Spiegel, Moscovici counters this allegation by stating that “processes of reform take time. At the beginning of this millennium, Germany was considered “the sick man of Europe”. Only after years of intensive reform, the economy recovered.”

In line with the views of his party in France, Moscovici is an advocate of free trade and the conclusion of TTIP, which might help him to find future common ground with his German critics.

The official mission letter from President Juncker to Commissioner-designate Moscovici is available here 


 Speeches & Official Announcements

The European Union in the New World Order

In a recent speech at the Yale School of Management, European Commission President Barroso of the European Commission, spoke of the importance of EU partnership with the United States, the international relevance in Europe, and the interconnectedness of economics and geopolitics. Mr. Barroso emphasized the importance of approaching international trade agreements like TTIP and the recent EU agreement with Ukraine in fostering greater international cooperation. (Europa)

Karel De Gucht European Commissioner for Trade Statement on CETA

Karel De Gucht spoke at the European Parliament plenary session last week on the recent agreement of the CETA deal between the EU and Canada, explaining the achievements of the agreement and addressing social, environmental, and labor concerns. De Gucht emphasized that the deal has the highest standards in any trade agreement ever agreed. (Europa)

TTIP- A Joint Paper by the Federal Ministry of Economics and the German Federation of Trade Unions

The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the German Federation of Trade Unions formulated their opinions on the "demands for free trade talks between the EU and the USA under the consideration of sustainability, labor rights and the granting of general interest" in a joint paper. The two parties agreed that an agreement must safeguard labor rights, protect consumers, and maintain high social and environmental standards. Moreover, they also agreed that TTIP offers a great opportunity to strengthen fair and sustainable transatlantic trade relations to boost the economies on both sides. (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology)

Controversy regarding the Free Trade Agreement

Members of the German Federal Parliament met today to debate on TTIP, often adopting opposing views. Federal Minister for Economy and Energy Sigmar Gabriel refuted the Left party’s accusations of a lack of transparency of TTIP negotiations, asking them if they are at all interested in an agreement. Gabriel underlined the opportunities TTIP offers for the German economy and insisted on continuing the negotiations. The Christian Democrats support his view, emphasizing the importance of TTIP for both the creation of jobs and a deepening of transatlantic relations.(German Federal Parliament) – Original article and video in German


Ambassador Gardner's Remarks at the European Young Innovators’ Forum

Ambassador Gardner, the US Ambassador to the EU, gave a speech in Brussels yesterday at Unconvention 2014 regarding the current state of affairs of the tech industry in Europe. Ambassador Gardner cited access to debt financing and low returns for EU venture capital as issues for European small businesses and start-ups. Ambassador Gardner detailed recent positive initiatives and the heightened attention to entrepreneurial matters within the new Commission. He notes that while many legislative opportunities occur at the member-state level, the European Union plays a pivotal role in creating a single digital market.  (United States Mission to the European Union)

For a video of an interview with Ambassador Gardner after his speech, click here

  News

Cameron to Nail 'Myths' About TTIP Leading To NHS Privatisation

UK Prime Minister David Cameron asserts that moving forward on TTIP is essential, stating that “our national security is also really dependent on our economic security,” according to the Huffington Post UK. Cameron emphasizes the economic benefits to the United Kingdom specifically, in addition to the United States and the wider European Union. He also strongly refuted opposition claims that TTIP would have anything to do with privatizing Britain's National Health Services as public services are automatically exempted from all EU trade negotiations. (Huffington Post)

German Industry Calls for 'Investment Offensive' to Boost the Economy

Amid Germany’s current economic downturn, EurActiv Germany reports that German businesses view TTIP as a "historic opportunity" necessary to promote investment, along with other domestic policy measures including stability, tax cuts, and increased R&D spending. (Euractiv)

European Commission Denies Reports that Germany is Derailing CETA

Finbarr Bermingham of the International Business Times UK cites controversial reports stating that Germany attempted to halt the EU-Canadian trade agreement CETA over the inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clause, which is also key German concern in TTIP negotiations. Germany denies the claims, stating that CETA is still on schedule, as Canadian and US officials meet in Canada tomorrow to finalize the text of the agreement. Concerns with the ISDS clause is not expected to derail the ultimate ratification of the final treaty. (International Business Times UK

However, Reuters reports that Germany’s economy minister stated recently that Germany will not ratify CETA if it contains an ISDS clause. Read here for more details. This bears watching as it has direct implications for the investment chapter in TTIP.

Putin Warns Ukraine against Implementing EU Pact

Euractiv recently reported Putin’s recent warnings to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko regarding Russian economic retaliation if Ukraine implements legislation acting on the recent EU-Ukraine trade agreement. The implementation of the agreement is delayed until the end of 2015, providing time for the EU to alleviate Russian concerns and Putin to continue pushing for a cease-fire and closer economic ties between Ukraine and Russia. (Euractiv)

Eurozone Companies Urge Capitals to Reform Economies

Sarah Gordon and Peter Wise of the Financial Times outline the European private sector’s desire for rapid implementation of major structural reforms across the EU, as the actions of the European Central Bank alone are not enough to combat the lack of macroeconomic confidence needed to stimulate demand and spur growth. (Financial Times)

Italian Business Grows restless with Matteo Renzi

Rachel Sanderson of the Financial Times reports on the darkening perception of Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi among business leaders as the country continues to struggle to actually implement its reform agenda, and its recent return to recession. Renzi retains overall support from business leaders; however his lack of momentum is worrying. (Financial Times)

Silva to Seek Trade Deals for Brazil

Joe Leahy of the Financial Times reports on Brazilian presidential candidate Ms. Silva’s plans to prioritize the pursuit of US and EU trade deals and loosen the restrictions of the Mercosur South American trade bloc. Ms. Silva’s other economic plans, including fiscal responsibility and increasing funding for education and the environment, are preferred by investors when compared to those of Ms. Rousseff. (Financial Times)


Cross-Border Swap Dispute Risks Trade War, CFTC’s Giancarlo Says

Silla Brush of Bloomberg describes J. Christopher Giancarlo’s first speech since joining the CFTC, where he advises the United States to increase coordination with Europe on financial regulatory reform and to retract some uncoordinated regulatory reforms that have negatively affected transatlantic cooperation in recent years. (Bloomberg)

  Recent Analysis

In Defense of TTIP: Good for the Economy – and for the Climate

This excellent piece by Carlo Stagnaro, adviser on energy and liberalization to Italy’s minister for economic development, gives a nice overview of how the conclusion of TTIP will not only bring economic benefits to both sides of the Atlantic but will also increase transatlantic energy security, promote environmental sustainability, and could help counter climate change. With his article, Stagnaro counters popular misperceptions of the way that trade in general and TTIP in particular could affect the environment. He also underlines that TTIP should not be viewed as just another trade agreement, concluding that a transatlantic deal has the potential to provide an excellent example for how nations work together on trade and sustainability moving forward. (Energy Post)


A Long Way to Go for TTIP Negotiations 

This article and video by Radio Sweden discusses the geopolitical importance of TTIP for both the United States and the European Union, underlining the need for the two partners to combine their political weight in the international arena to set global standards. The experts believe that negotiations might speed up after November, when the EU Commission has settled in and the upcoming midterm US congressional elections are completed. (Sveriges Radio)


Ten Myths about TTIP 

Denmark's largest business association put together this concise summary of the ten most common misperceptions about TTIP, refuting them all in turn. The criticisms range from a perceived threat to democracy, to an alleged lowering of consumer standards, to an assumed threat to personal privacy. The author counters the points of criticism and concludes that TTIP will achieve common effective and modern standards and high levels of protection for consumers, workers and the environment, with a positive global impact. (Frihandelsbloggen)

Most Difficult Hearings for Commissioners-designate Cañete, Hill & Navracsics, argue the Greens

In this interview, ViEUw’s journalist Jennifer Baker and Helmut Weixler, spokesperson for the Greens Group discuss the current hearings of the Commissioners-designate in front of the European Parliament. According to the Greens, Commissioner designates Miguel Arias Cañete, Jonathan Hill, and Tibor Navracsics, face the most opposition and difficult hearings. The Greens also doubt if the new Commission’s focus on business and economic growth will lead Europe in the right direction. (ViEUws)


Trade Agreements: TTIP and European Partnership Agreements  

In the context of the sixth TTIP negotiation round on September 29, the Dutch newspaper Oneworld will feature debates in the course of next week, addressing the effects, advantages and criticisms of the trade agreements Europe is currently negotiating. Their webpage also features helpful link to additional information and previous discussions on the matter. - Original article in Dutch (Oneworld

Upcoming Events

Seventh Round of TTIP Negotiations – September 29 - October 3 in Washington DC – a political stock-taking between Ambassador Froman and Commissioner De Gucht will follow the talks on October 13. Stakeholder events will take place on Wednesday, October 1 as outlined below.

Shifting Patterns of Trade: TTIP and the South Atlantic -  September 25 in Brussels; hosted by the German Marshall Fund- More Information

Jobs and Economic Growth for Indianapolis: How TTIP Will Help– September 26 in Indianapolis, IN; hosted by the Trans-Atlantic Business Council - More Information

TTIP: Does It Still Have Support in Europe? - September 29 in New York, NY; hosted by the European-American Business Organization and the American Business Forum on Europe  - More Information

CHLI Trade & International Affairs Symposium - September 29 in Washington DC; hosted by the Congressional Hispanic Leadership Institute - More Information

Hearing of the European Commissioner for Trade & Panel Discussion - September 29 in Washington DC; hosted by the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations - More Information

What’s Next? Fostering the Next Generation of Energy Security Conference - September 30 in Washington DC; hosted by the American Security Project - More Information

Global Services Summit- 
September 30 in Washington DC; hosted by the Coalition of Services Industries; featuring remarks by many international Trade ministers - More Information

Stakeholder Policy Presentations
 During the 7th round of TTIP Negotiations
  - October 1 in Chevy Chase, MD; hosted by USTR and the European Commission - More Information


Stakeholder Forum During the 7th Round of TTIP Negotiation
s - Chief Negotiators' Briefing - October 1 in Chevy Chase, MD; hosted by USTR and the European Commission -
More Information

Challenges Facing the World Trade System - October 1 in Washington DC; hosted by Johns Hopkins SAIS - More Information

TTIP Roadshow, Sheffield: The US-EU Trade Negotiations and the Coalition for Transatlantic Business
- October 1 in Sheffield, England; hosted by the British- American Business Association - More Information 

TTIP: A Watershed Agreement with Far-Reaching Implications– October 2 in Philadelphia, PA; hosted by the British American Business Council - More Information


EMI TTIP Summit, Brussels -
October 2 in Brussels; hosted by European Movement International - More Information


District Export Council's Second Annual International Trade Symposium 
- October 3, Washington DC; hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce - More Information

The ECB and the Eurozone: A Conversation with Mario Draghi - 
October 9 in Washington DC; hosted by the Brookings Institute - More Information


The Next Stage of Eurozone Recovery: A Conversation with Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem
- October 10 in Washington DC; hosted by the Atlantic Council - More Information


Chapter 8 (The State and Its Apparatus): From "Elements of Law" to "Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States"--Building an Introductory Course to the Legal Curriculum for the 21st Century

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(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)

Since 2010, I have been posting on the development of a new course I have been developing for our first year law school students, "Elements of Law." The course originally had a quite modest objective--to introduce law students to legal research and reasoning through case law, statutory interpretation, and legal history, processes, and institutions. I chose to broaden its objectives within these specific parameters and development a framing and concepts course that would provide a deep foundation to law students on the legal system they were undertaking to study.
--Elements of Law 3.0: On the Relevance of a First Year Law Course Designed to Frame the Law School Curriculum).
--Developing a New Course--"Elements of Law"
--"Elements of Law" Course 2.0: A Framework Course for the U.S. Law Curriculum,
Grounded in the principles of the sociology of law, the course has morphed into an effort to introduce students to law as a self-referencing system with its own particular structures, premises, constraints and language, with its own logic and taboos and its own means of understanding the world. That systemicity (cf. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Chichester : John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1999) is then a critical element in the way in which the legal system (in this case of the United States) interacts with the world, both as a legal and as a socio-economic-political actor. The course has also expanded from its original narrow and technical focus, to a broader focus on principles and the use of language and logic to build and operate a system of law. That broadening has made it possible to offer the course not just to first year law students, but also to graduate students in the social sciences and in international affairs, as a grounding in the legal systems that are important in their respective fields.

This and the posts that follow produces some of the materials I will be presenting to the class. I offer these materials in hopes that they may prove of use and that you might share comments, perspectives and suggestions as I develop those materials on this site. Thanks.

This post includes a draft of the first Chapter of Part II-- Hierarchies  of Law and Governance; Sources and Uses, Chapter 8 (The State and Its Apparatus).
 
 
 
 
Part II: Hierarchies of Law and Governance; Sources and Uses

Chapter 8

The State and Its Apparatus


I. Introduction.

We have been considering the complex interplay of distinct sub-systems that in the aggregate make up what is understood as “law” in the United States.  You have come to understand that these subsystems include both a methodological and structural element.  Each exhibits distinct cultural behaviors.  Yet each also is intimately connected to the others.  Thus common law describes both the system of substantive law administered through courts, and the methodologies that judges use to develop and apply this law.  Equity describes substantive law that is also judicially administered but beyond the framework of common law.  But it is also a reference to procedural defenses and remedial strategies that can have significant effect on the form and content of judge administered law. Where common law is focused on determining the structures and application of causes of action—referencing rights and obligations defined by conduct parameters—equity tends to consider fairness and prejudice at its core. Like common law and equity, distinct yet related legal sub-systems, statutes and regulations  are related but distinct sub-systems with characteristics somewhat different from those of judicially administered law systems. Both are instrumental expressions of legislative (or administrative will), unlike common law and equity that represents a complex interaction between judicially managed norms and the social norms within which they are embedded. Statutes and regulations are written, and that writing does not change.  Its interpretation and application, however, are either left to or administered by courts.  Courts interpret statute; statutory interpretation is central to the judicial engagement with statutes.  Regulations are established by administrative agencies—courts consider both the jurisdictional power of agencies to regulate, and the authority of other political branches to engage with such agencies.  But courts have imported the methods of common law practice to the exercise of statutory construction.  Statutes and regulations now may be burdened by a complex set of judicial interpretations that may, at times assume importance equal to or greater than the statutory language itself. The ,.

With this introductory chapter we shift our examination from the law to the institutional structures within which they are created, established, elaborated, interpreted and applied. Just as law is organized as a system in which distinct forms of law have superior or inferior power to affect behavior, so too the effectiveness of law, and the extent of its legitimate application is determined to some extent by the nature, character and power of the institution that produced it.

            To that end, this section considers can issue that most lawyers take for granted without stopping long enough to consider—does law (and law making) have a purpose? We will consider two principal schools of thought.  The first assumes that law is an instrument of the state/government with authority to enact it.  At its greatest level of generality, this view posits that law is “positive” and “instrumental.” Under this view, law is the conscious product of the national will directed toward to the attainment of a particular behavior controlling objective.  From that premise, it follows that without government there can be no law. The second assumes that law is autonomous of government.  Law exists whether or not there is a government. In this guise law is understood either as (1) a reflection of the common beliefs and traditions of the people (custom), or (2) the implementation of higher moral norms (natural, religious, rationalist or international customary norms).


II. Chapter Readings

·      John Locke, Second Treatise on Government (Thomas P. Pearson, ed., New York: MacMillan 1952) Chapters X,  XI (Of the Extent of the Legislative Power) Project Gutenberg http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm.
·      Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy 18 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke U. Press 2004) (1932). READ pp. 17-26
·      Larry Catá Backer, Reifying Law: Understanding Law Beyond the State, 26(3) Penn State International Law Review 521 (2008). READ PARTS I & II (pp. 521-46 of the published version); Available http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Reifying-Law.pdf.[1]
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Second Treatise of Government
John Locke
1690
[John Locke's "Second Treatise of Government" was published in 1690. The complete unabridged text has been republished several times in edited commentaries. This text is recovered entire from the paperback book, "John Locke Second Treatise of Government", Edited, with an Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1980. None of the McPherson edition is included in the Etext below; only the original words contained in the 1690 Locke text is included. The 1690 edition text is free of copyright.] Posting Date: July 28, 2010 [EBook #7370] Release Date: January, 2005 [Last updated: January 6, 2014]

* * * * *

CHAPTER. X.
OF THE FORMS OF A COMMON-WEALTH.

Sect. 132. THE majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth.

Sect. 133. By commonwealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the Latines signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language, is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such a society of men, which community or city in English does not; for there may be subordinate communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite different notion from commonwealth: and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that sense, in which I find it used by king James the first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better.

CHAPTER. XI.
OF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

Sect. 134. THE great end of men's entering into society, being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of any body else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law, which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law,* the consent of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make laws, but by their own consent, and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts: nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust; nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted, or farther than they do allow; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society, which is not the supreme.

(*The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belonging so properly unto the same intire societies, that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not therefore which public approbation hath not made so. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.

Of this point therefore we are to note, that such men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Laws therefore human, of what kind so ever, are available by consent. Ibid.)

Sect. 135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being, or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth; yet:

First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power, that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects.* The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's actions, must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good, or valid against it.

(*Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an order, expresly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together: the latter is that which we call the law of a common-weal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regiment amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be, in regard of his depraved mind, little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide, notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted. Unless they do this, they are not perfect. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.)

Sect. 136. Secondly, The legislative, or supreme authority, cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice, and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges:* for the law of nature being unwritten, and so no where to be found but in the minds of men, they who through passion or interest shall miscite, or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge: and so it serves not, as it ought, to determine the rights, and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case: and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniences, which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature, men unite into societies, that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature.

(*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by, which rules are two, the law of God, and the law of nature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature, and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture, otherwise they are ill made. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. iii. sect. 9.

To constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable. Ibid. l. i. sect. 10.)

Sect. 137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man, or many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men; no body being secure, that his will, who has such a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times stronger. And therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions: for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature, if they shall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

Sect. 138. Thirdly, The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that, by entering into society, which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own consent: without this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleases, against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth, can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists, wholly or in part, in assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being, or in one man, as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community; and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is not at all secure, tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

Sect. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before shewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties; the prince, or senate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects property, without their own consent: for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see, that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see, that neither the serjeant, that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his absolute power of life and death, dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it.

Sect. 140. It is true, governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection, should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent, i.e. the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them: for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?

Sect. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.

Sect. 142. These are the bounds which the trust, that is put in them by the society, and the law of God and nature, have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.

First, They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.

Secondly, These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.

Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the consent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.

Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have.

__________


Reifying Law--Government, Law And The Rule Of Law In Governance Systems
Larry Catá Backera1
26 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 521
Winter 2008

I. Introduction

In the West, the relationship of law and human organization, the relationship of law and the individual, and the relationship of the *523 individual to the organizational forms individuals embrace, has been turbulent. At various times since the seventeenth century, law has been understood as an object separate from the state and its apparatus (usually a government).1 In this aspect, law has been constructed as the sum of the common relationships of the people amongst themselves--it is in this sense the manifestation of the people themselves as an aggregate body. Sometimes those relationships also included the political, social and economic relations of the social order. Sometimes it did not. Sometimes, this separate organism called law was considered superior to the state, or at least to the political organs of state power. Sometimes it was viewed as on par with those organs. But law, and especially the basic law customs and laws of the community could be disturbed by the state, through its government, only at great risk to itself.2
At the same time, and increasingly since the seventeenth century, law has been viewed as the expression of state power,3 or at least that of its government.4 In this view, the state, rather than law, is understood as organic. And law is understood as serving as the instrument of the state. In those cases, law was viewed as either process or language.5 As a manifestation of state power, or at least of the power of the apparatus of state, law was considered a means of ordering that manifestation of power, sometimes of cloaking that manifestation in process. Sometimes law was thought to encompass the whole of the rulemaking power of any *524 society. Sometimes law was viewed as substantially less complete--that is, as a partial manifestation of power over behavior. Sometimes law was seen as proceeding from the community, sometimes it was understood to proceed from God. Sometimes law was God. Sometimes law was God's inverse--chaos or worse. And sometimes, in Marxist lands after 1917, law was deemed a manifestation of politics and institutionalized class struggle.6Thereafter in the West, “legal realists” and elements of self-styled legal post modernism echoed this suggestion.7Especially since the 1990s, ironically enough, and in the context of economic globalization, law was deemed to be largely irrelevant, at least in its traditional forms and for its traditional functions.8

This turbulence, once confined to great battles over the nature of governance and power within states, has now become a source of great debate among those interested in the construction of transnational and international legal systems. It underlies the disputes between those advocating an authoritative and binding effect and power of “organic” and customary law in international and transnational systems, and those who view lawmaking as grounded in authentic and legitimate legal instruments produced by positive action of some fraction of the community of nations.

When law is said to “rule” in the West, then, it is meant to cover a large terrain of complex and inconsistent meaning. Thus, law itself serves as a veil over its own nature. However conceived, law remains important to the discourse of power. That people have embraced the idea *525 that law is a thing is beyond dispute. The exact nature of that “thingness” is quite another story. Yet the “thingness” of law is critically important for the ordering of power relationships among people, institutions and communities. I am little interested in the “true” meaning of law as an abstract proposition, or even as a question of fact. I am not sure the question is particularly relevant, except perhaps as a means of gaining advantage in the never ending cultural wars for control of perceptions of meaning. Human behavior is driven by what people believe and the choices they make in adopting certain “privileged” beliefs when constructing their communities, rather than any abstract truth of those beliefs.

For this essay, I explore the way in which law is reified, that is, the way that law is sometimes understood as a thing, process, aspect or character apart from and in addition to its particular content. And I explore the way that this reification has been contested, that is, the development of the notion of law as a mere instrument of power, of law as no more than its content and no less than the power of the institutions whose will it expresses. I suggest some of the important ways in which law-as-a-thing-apart has been recreating itself in the post-Soviet globalized world. I am particularly interested in the ways that law is now said to rule. In ways reminiscent of the dynamics of conversations about law in seventeenth century in England, law has become again amorphous, capable of simultaneous multiple meanings. Law is an important object for capture among those whose systems of institutionalized power relationships require an object around which to legitimate compulsion, behavior and the management of conduct at every level of human organization. I then look forward to the modern expression of these ancient conundrums by exploring the current expression of law as technique.9Specifically, I explore the way in which the contested understanding of law as object or subject becomes a critical element in the management of networks of power at the international global level and in the reconstitution of legal reification in global common law and private transnational legal systems.10 I end by exploring the implications of these theories in the construction of modern transnational constitutionalism, both secular and theocratic.11

*526 II. Gubernaculum and Jurisdictio

In the seventeenth century in England and the American colonies, law was reified as the great bulwark against personal and institutional power. It was a thing that stood outside of the state and its apparatus, but also within it. Law was the reification of the people and their customs, which no single person could undo, but which mediated the relations between the estates of the realm. Law, and especially the common law, as a whole could not be undone by either Crown or Parliament, but reflected them as well. Only the High Court of Parliament could serve as a law making body.12 In this sense, law making could be understood as exceptional, requiring the invocation of an institution representative of all of the constituents of common law. The state and its apparatus and the law were thus two quite different things.13

This understanding had ancient roots. Aristotle clearly distinguished state (the magistrate, or power relationships) from law (the rule, or obligation and duty of individuals and behavior regulation). Though it was clear that there was a relationship between them, that relationship was not vertical. Law was not merely an instrument of state power. At the same time, the state was not merely the expression of law. Aristotle, for example, noted, “all laws are, and ought to be, framed agreeable to the state that is to be governed by them, and not the state to the laws.”14 But at the same time he cautioned that “the laws are different from what regulates and expresses the form of the constitution; it is in their office to direct the magistrate in the execution of his office and the punishment of offenders.”15Aristotle's works had been recovered in Western Europe by the twelfth century.16 The founders of the American republic were well aware of Aristotle's work, including the Politics, which formed the basis of classical education for the American ruling classes at the time of the founding. Echoes can be found in Madison's Federalist No. 10,17 and also in Hamilton's works.18

*527 Its most important roots, however, were a sophisticated medieval jurisprudence.19 For our purposes Bracton provides the most important late medieval foundational source. As Charles McIlwain well put it,20 for English constitutionalists at the end of the medieval period, there was “a separation far sharper than we make in our modern times between government and law, between gubernaculum and jurisdictio.”21Within the sphere of gubernaculum, the power of those who hold authority to act is absolute. That power could be expressed by action--the enforcement action of the state--and also by enactment of law, narrowly conceived. The narrowness of the conception is grounded in the fundamental distinction between enactments of an administrative character, and the power to define a legal right. Thus, to Bracton, “leges (in the narrow sense of the word), constitutions, and assisae are nothing more than administrative orders, and therefore part of ‘government'--something which ‘pertains to the administration of the realm (pertinet ad regni gubernaculum)--and as such are properly within the king's exclusive control.’'22

Within the authority of government, more narrowly defined, law is essentially instrumentalist in character. It serves as an expression of the king's (and thereafter the parliamentary) will. It is fundamentally administrative in character (understood in the modern French or German sense), though it is expressed in the forms of statute. It corresponds roughly to the measures whose transformation into law was so derided by Carl Schmitt23 in his attacks on Weimar constitutionalism.24 There is a residue of this notion still in the differentiation within French constitutional law, between the idea of lois, the province of the nation expressed through its Assembly, and reglement, which under Article 37 of the French Constitution are within the power of the executive authority.25 And this division has been urged as a basis for global governance.26

The space within which gubernaculum operates is broad but not *528 unlimited. The absolute authority of gubernaculum, was limited by jurisdictio, understood as a “higher,” or in modern terms, constitutional law. This higher law described rights, whose breach was beyond the power of government. These rights were not inherently instrumental, that is proceeding from a conscious act of government. They were positive, organic and limiting principles.

Definitions of “right,” . . . share the character of the immemorial custom they define, and these, Bracton says, “since they have been approved by the consent of those using them and confirmed by the oath of kings, can neither be changed nor destroyed without the common consent of all those with whom counsel and consent they have been promulgated.”27Government, within its sphere, had the absolute power to act, through administrative orders (in statutory or other form). But the rights of the political community, expressed in its organic privileges and customs, acquired a life of their own, unmoored from the state or the governance rights of the monarch. In the aggregate, these rights served as a body of law, an expression of an autonomous power of the political community against its governing apparatus (traditionally in the person of the monarch).28“When King John substituted his will for the law, in proceeding against vassals whose wrong had not been judicially proved, civil war and the Great Charter were the result.”29Gubernaculum had no power over jurisdictio, but was required to act within its normative limits. These limits eventually would be expressed through the courts, in its current form as judicial review. Originally it was expressed through assertions of rights by royal vassals, and in the extreme, for example in the 13th, and 17th centuries in England, and in the 18thcentury in the American colonies, as revolution. Law, in this sense, is not instrumental, but is “positive and coercive, and a royal act beyond those bounds is ultra vires.”30

This understanding of the separation of law from government, of the state from the system of rules that bind the apparatus of the state, was popularized within the English elites through Sir John Fortescue's treatise on the Governance of England.31Fortescue carried forward Bracton's notions of a law existing as a limiting power beyond the government's, “formed by the rights of his subjects which the king has sworn to maintain, and which he cannot lawfully change or blemish or *529 arbitrarily transfer from one to another.”32 These traditional notions of law reified as jurisdictio found its most influential modern expression in England during the reigns of the early Stuarts.33 In Sir Edward Coke's writings, it also served as a great basis for American constitutionalism. Coke was widely known in the colonies. His work, especially on property, though expensive, was often a prized part of personal law libraries in the American colonies.34 And the views he expressed were in sympathy with colonizing communities, especially north of the Potomac River.

One of the most influential expressions of the idea of law as an entity separate from government is found in Coke's report of Dr. Bonham's Case (1610).35 The case related to the power of the College of Physicians to regulate the medical trade in London. With respect to the extent of Parliament's power to grant a concession against common law, Coke reported:

And it appeareth in our Books, that in many Cases, the Common law doth controll Acts of Parliament, and sometimes shall adjudge them to be void: for when an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason, or repugnant or impossible to be performed, the Common law will controll it, and adjudge such Act to be void.36 To a great degree, law was meant to protect against the inclusions of power by setting up another power, beyond the reach of an individual, even the holder of governmental authority. It fractured power and set its mechanisms beyond the reach of the sovereign.

Law stood as the thing through which a system of opposing power--entrusted to and managed by a large class of well-socialized acolytes (the bar)--could resist the power of the state to coerce behavior. As Mary Sarah Bilder suggests:

Although during the seventeenth century, Coke and then Hale would develop increasingly elaborate understandings of the common law, the common law remained a system in which pleas to the judiciary required addressing “reason” --” the faculty acquired by training that extracted some workable rules from a formless body of immemorial *530 knowledge”--not appealing for what any ordinary person could claim was justice, equity, or mercy.37 Thus, the law was intolerant of the notion that a monarch had the power to personally decide cases at common law. Corwin well recounts this idea in action in the famous confrontation between Coke and James I at Hampton Court on November 10, 1608, in which the judges of the Realm sought to resist the notion that James, as King, had authority to decide cases at common law in his own person.38

Responding to the idea that reason alone was sufficient to apply the law, Coke responded that:
causes which concern the life, or inheritance or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgment of the law which law is an act which requires long study and experience before a man can attain to the cognizance of it.39 James well understood the implication--the King himself was under law. This, James thought, “should be treason to affirm,”40 to which Coke responded with Bracton's words: “Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege” (“The King ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and to the law”).41 Of course, Coke meant to twist the meaning of Bracton, who wrote at a time in which the law proceeded from God through His Church. For Bracton, all authority may have derived from law, but law derived from God as Logos. With this conflation it was an easy matter (and no treason) to place King under law: that is, under God. A King acting solely on the basis of the authority of his own will acted as a mere man, like any other. Critically for Coke, the Divine connection was not relevant to make the statement true. Now it was common law as jus, not proceeding from the divine that served the purpose of differentiating between lex and homine.

This understanding of law contributed eventually to the production of a doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy under law. Law was understood to exist to some extent beyond the State, though capable of modification (in part) through it.42 Law was both the expression of power (in terms of ordering behavior), and also opposed to power (in terms of resisting assertions by individuals or institutions to order behavior ultra vires). Under this conception of law, government (and the *531 state) is viewed as fiduciary in nature. Its power is derivative and limited. It is thus a partial rather than a total power to order behavior. Government (first King, then King in Parliament, then Parliament alone) might ultimately express law as a conscious and positive act. But Government can never be law, nor reduce law to an instrument of governmental will. In this sense law remains an “other” to government, that is, a thing in a very real sense. It may not be delegated,43 nor may it be reduced to an instrumental character. The “community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of anybody, even their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject.”44 Law, like God, remains outside the reach of individuals, or the people, but moves with them, and serves to protect them from themselves in a complicated conversation.45

But, law also constituted its own point of resistance. “[T]here are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised.”46 Law here retains its composition as thing, but now it is a thing whose purpose is to serve as instrument of the very power it appeared to resist, and managed for this purpose by the same large class of well-socialized acolytes. Thus, Francis Bacon reminds us in oft quoted language that:

Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law; else it would be like the authority claimed by the Church of Rome, which, under pretext of exposition of Scripture, doth not stick to add and alter, and to pronounce that which they do not find, and, by show of antiquity, to introduce novelty.47

Judges, like law, assume an instrumental character. “Let judges also remember that Solomon's throne was supported by lions on both sides; let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne, being circumspect that they do not check or oppose any points of sovereignty.”48

This also found an odd reflection in the American colonies. Mary Sarah Bilder reminds us of the strong colonial embrace of equity, *532 founded in part on an appeal to authority beyond the narrowness of law, bound up in the development of appeal.49

The system that the colonists adopted and adapted contained a substantive theory of justice that differed from the rule of law. Their belief in the importance of equity from an accepted hierarchical political authority led them to create a new culture of appeal. The new culture ironically was based on a procedural device that was linked to institutions they despised (Rome, the Pope, ecclesiastical courts, the king), but with a set of meanings that held forth a promise of justice nonexistent in England.50 Bacon and Coke represented the jurisprudential opposing poles of what would eventually require violent resolution in the English Civil War, which greatly influenced the development of American legal culture. As Kevin Philips explains in a remarkable study of the socio-religious and cultural connections between the English Civil War, the American Revolutionary War and the American Civil War, the “English Civil War is the necessary starting point . . . where the events and alignments leading up to the American Revolution began. The latter was really a second English-speaking civil war, drawing many of its issues, antagonisms, and divisions from the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century British Isles.”51Philips argues that the pattern of rebellion and loyalty in those conflicts “leads to religion.”52 And the road from theology to law and politics is broad and direct, especially before the nineteenth century.53

This idea of theology creating a path to law and politics reconstitutes itself in Hobbes, and the beginning of a “positivist” school of jurisprudence in which government is conceived as the monopoly holder of legitimate power. All other forms of its expression are marginalized and subordinated:
Those that speak of this subject, confound jus and lex, right and law, but they ought to be distinguished. right, consisteth in liberty to do or to forbear; whereas law, determineth, and binds people to do or to forbear. Law and right differ as much as do obligation and liberty, which are inconsistent when applied to the same thing.54 This, of course, is one of the bases not of eighteenth century, but of *533 twentieth century American notions of law and its relationship to the state. In the early nineteenth century, Justice Marshall famously explained American political theory as grounded in a division of governmental authority in which the whole of the legislative power was vested in the Congress.55However, Justice Marshall did not suggest that law was merely the instrument through which this whole of the legislative power was exercised, that is that law was mere servant of legislator who otherwise acted unbounded. By the end of that century though, Americans had come to believe, as Thomas Paine has suggested at the time of the founding of the Republic,56 that the extent of the law was co-extensive with the power to legislate, and that indeed, that law did not exist except as a concession of the legislator, or more generally the people constituted as a legislative body.

Thus, the nineteenth century witnessed a great reconstitution of the relationship between gubernaculum and jurisdictio. By century's end, jurisdictio had become something more like modern constitutionalism, conceptually less organic than medieval notions of constitutional custom (consuetudo) and more directly bound up within sovereign positivism (the right of the people to reconstitute themselves through acts of political will). These are notions indirectly expressed in English constitutionalism57 and more directly expressed in American constitutionalism. In the Weimar Constitution and the French constitutions, of course, the positivist notion completely overcomes consuetude: the people, constituted in a national assembly become the living embodiment of right. And, in modern constitutionalism, gubernaculum becomes the sole space within which jurisdictio can be asserted.58

In common law jurisdictions, the relationship between law and power, or more precisely, between law and the state, become increasingly conflated from the nineteenth century. And in the conflation, the relationship between them becomes multiple and inverted. The absolutism embedded in the administrative gubernaculum is extended to jurisdictio, and jurisdictio becomes an instrument of gubernaculum. The template is set in the seventeenth century in the *534 debate between Coke and Bacon. McIlwain nicely expresses this insight:

In the seventeenth century, the royalists, citing the undoubted precedents for absolutism in government alone, extended those without warrant into the sphere of mere jurisdiction; while the parliamentarians, seeing the limits of the medieval jurisdictio, with equal lack of justification, applied these to acts of government as well as to the definitions of right.59

From the eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth century everywhere, though to the greatest extent in France:
Law was an effective instrument for the constitution of monarchical forms of power in Europe, and political thought was ordered for centuries around the problem of Sovereignty and its rights. Moreover, law . . . was a weapon of the struggle against the same monarchical power which had initially made use of it to impose itself. Finally, law was the principle mode of representation of power.60 The scientism of law, especially as articulated in the nineteenth century by English thinkers uncomfortable with the protean ambiguity of custom, paralleled the rationalization of all human relations that was perhaps the greatest legacy of the Enlightenment. “For Bentham and Austin, the law was, indeed, capable of being a rational science.”61Rationalization of the common law had been in the air among elites since the end of the Napoleonic Wars with Bentham's suggestions to that effect.62 As Alcott nicely summarizes:

What came to be called Austinian legal positivism was thus the means by which the general cultural phenomenon of positivism was allowed vestigially to affect the minds of lawyers. Law could be explained without reference to the extra-legal, the mysterious, the ideal or the moral. The Austinian orthodoxy was also prophetic, as the partly reformed parliament (after 1832) became, or came to seem to be, the engine for revolutionary transformation of British society.63

In the United States, this march toward scientism affected everything in law. For example, legal education was rationalized in the nineteenth century, joining other academic disciplines in the University where its disciples have worked for over a century to make a science of the law.64 *535 This scientism has affected the way in which the law is used to rationalize and model human behavior as well, especially in American criminal law.65Contemporary Americans were no less willing to abandon the unruliness of Coke and custom for Bacon, hierarchy, and rationality. Codification of the common law had been in the air since at least the time of Justice Joseph Story.66 That work continues in the bar, through the century of legal rationalization of the common law.67

Entities like the American Law Institute continue the work of conversion of the common law into something like an Imperial Roman Codex. The American Law Institute (“ALI”), building on the “Bractonian and Blackstonian treatises, declaring the common law on the empirical foundations of judicial decisions,”68fearing the “chaos in a legal world of 48 states”69 but afraid to undertake legislative codification, invented the form of the Restatement. Restatements constituted a synthesis of sorts, “analytical, critical and constructive,”70seeking to reduce to a single systematic form the underlying principles that gave a legal field coherence “and thus restore the coherence of the common law as properly apprehended.”71 They serve once to synthesize and to innovate.72Though not binding, ALI Restatements have proven to be authoritative in many American courts.

French constitutionalism from the time of their eighteenth century revolution expressed well this new relationship of law to state. Law was a function of will expressed through the nation, and it was the nation, rather than law, that was reified, in the French case, in the form of the assembled and legitimate representatives of the nation.73 These *536 assembled representatives together constituted as the nation--another reification. Thus reified, this aggregation served to give concrete form to that abstraction, the state. So manifested, the state could express its will as law, and thus, express the state as a unitary community.74 The Code Napoléon thus proceeded from the nation, as an act of wholly contained sovereign will.75 Yet the Code Napoléon expressed not merely internal, but also external will. “In one aspect of his imperial policy Napoleon was consistent-- the introduction of the Code Napoléon into the annexed territories and vassal states. The Code was the container in which the principles of the French Revolution were carried throughout Western Europe, even as far as Illyria and Poland.”76 Thus, the set of assumptions that shaped the legal culture producing the Code Napoléon also produced the set of assumptions necessary to use that Code (and others like it from other states) as part of the European imperial projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Here one encounters a sort of reification inverted. The objectification is not systemic--there is no intangible but compelling body of law independent of the state apparatus, there are only intangible instruments of the national will whose physical expression is written rule proceeding from the lawgiver. It did not exist outside the state; its objectification was instrumental and dependant on government. This is law as technique, assuming a form generalized as the disciplines by Foucault almost two centuries later.77 And it fit nicely into developing European notions that conflated ethnos, demos, state and government. Thus, for example, Savigny, in a way that was no longer remarkable by the nineteenth century, could articulate a systemic theoretics grounded in the idea that every people constitutes a state. “By transcending the distinction between people and state, Savigny makes it possible to think of private law as the emanation of the people's spirit (Volksgeist), and still conceptualize private international law as a system of conflicts between state laws.”78 For these theorists, of whom Savigny serves as a great early example, it became an object of faith that “just as the people *537 only attain reality through the state, so the people's (private) law becomes law only through the state.”79

The reification of ethnos through law as opposed to the reification of law through demos continues to drive important areas of continental law making. It has proven important in the development of European constitutional theory in the context of the construction of that great supra-national entity, the European Union. This conceptualization of law as an expression of ethno-reification through state formation was nicely expressed, for example, by the German Federal Constitutional Court in considering the character of the European Union within German constitutionalism.80

Democracy, if not to remain a formal principle of accountability, it is dependent upon the existence of specific privileged conditions, such as ongoing free interaction of social forces, interests and ideas, in the course of which political objectives are goals also clarified and modified and as a result of which public opinion moulds political policy. For this to be achieved, it is essential that both the decision-making process amongst those institutions which implement sovereign power and the political objectives in each case should be clear and comprehensible to all, and also that the enfranchised citizen should be able to use its own language in communicating with the sovereign power to which he is subject. . . . [A]ctual conditions of this kind may be developed in the course of time, within the institutional framework of the European Union.81 State and government nicely reify people (as ethnos) through the mechanics of law that serves the ultimate purpose of preserving the autonomy of every ethnos. “Each of the peoples of the individual States is the starting point for a state power relating to that people.”82 The state then serves as source and limit of law. “The States need sufficiently important spheres of activity of their own in which the people of each can develop and articulate itself in a process of political will-formation which it legitimates and controls”83through an instrumentalist law, “in order thus to give legal expression to what binds the people together (to a greater or lesser degree of homogeneity) spiritually, socially and politically.”84

*538 Napoléon, and his successors (especially though by no means limited to the great nineteenth century German theorists) marked the end of a long period of development of customary and positive law not centered on the state.85 Roman law, for example, even as a sort of set of general principles, became formally fractured and incorporated within the ethnic genius of the law codes of European tribes now organized as fully formed Westphalian states. But even on the Continent, the medieval notions of custom and constitutions guaranteed to political subdivisions (the “ancient rights”) survived in some form. They remain a potent force to this day in places like Catalunya, whose twenty-first century struggle for autonomy is based on a political program to vindicate its fourteenth century rights derived from, and confirmed by, the Crown.86
Carl Schmitt captures well the Continental suspicion of approaches to law whose legitimacy and content was to some extent beyond the control of government. Marginalized as mere “custom” “its actual polemical-political significance was determined through the opposition against the legislative right of the absolutist Monarchs. . . . [T]he recognition of customary law always means a limitation on the parliamentary lawmaker to the benefit of other [state] organs, especially, of course, the judiciary.”87 This strongly echoes Coke and places a modern, state centered gloss on law as the reified “other,” separate from the state and its apparatus. Of course, this was the worst of all worlds for theorists like Schmitt, as well as for the great legal system builders of the nineteenth century in Europe, from those who crafted the Code Napoleon, to nineteenth century German law theorists busy creating a normative foundation for the construction of the Reich and the expression of its genius in law, the great Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the *539 German civil code.88 For the great state builders of the nineteenth century, from Hamilton and Thomas Paine in the United States, to the state builders all across Europe, and ultimately the builders of totalitarian state regimes in Europe in the early twentieth century,
[t]he images of legal science and legal practice were (and still certainly are) mastered by a series of simple equivalences. Law = statute; statute = the state regulation that comes about with the participation of the representative assembly. Practically speaking, that is what is meant by law when one demanded the “rule of law” and the “principle of the legality of all state action” as the defining characteristic of the Rechtsstaat.89 The positivist basic norm posits the “congruence of law and statute. The state is law in statutory form; law in statutory form is the state. . . . There is only legality, not authority or commands from above.”90

In the twentieth century, the spirit of Francis Bacon, now rationalized as a “social science,” was strongly felt, but within an altered landscape of law and government. By mid century, among many influential circles of the Western elite, law was displaced by politics; the focus on the formal elements of systems was displaced by the substantive analysis of power. In the United States, the so-called pragmatists and even more ironically misnamed “legal realists” sought to reduce common law notions to a caricature of its system despised by civil lawyers.

Justice Scalia has been among the most astute advocates of positivist instrumentalism of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. For Scalia an autonomous reified law disappeared at the same time that the common law was replaced in the United States by notions of democratic constitutionalism. Scalia's boldest pronouncement in this regard could not be clearer and is worth quoting. Referring to autonomous systems of law based on a common law framework whose autonomy was protected by an independent judiciary, Scalia writes: that such a legal system in the United States “is now barely extant, the system that Holmes wrote about: the common law. That was a system in which there was little legislation, and in which judges created the law of crimes, of torts, of agency, of contracts, of property, of family and inheritance.”91Sounding very much like a legal realist, with strong Nietzschean roots,92 *540 Scalia inverts cause and effect to construct an explanation for this.

And just as theories such as the Divine Right of Kings were necessary to justify the power of monarchs to make law through edicts, some theory was necessary to justify the power of judges (as agents of the King) to make law through common-law adjudication. That theory was the “brooding omnipresence” of an unwritten law that the judges merely “discovered.”93

But, Scalia argues all that has changed now. In place of both the King (undeniably overthrown in the American revolution) and the brooding omnipresence, the Americans have taken on a new golden calf. Presto! Just at the moment that the American colonies organized to form a true common law republic, something magical happened, the substitution of a reified idea, democracy for the old body of the King.

But democracy has overtaken all that. Modern governments, or modern governments in the West at least, are thought to derive their authority from the consent of the governed, and the laws they prescribe are enacted by the people's representatives. Such a system is quite incompatible with the making (or the “finding”) of law by judges--and most especially by unelected judges.94 For Scalia, democratic theory occupies the same place as the theory of the legal effect of the “royal will” occupied for Francis Bacon in Stuart England. In both cases, a view of law as existing outside the power of gubernaculum was inconceivable. In both cases, jurisdictio outside gubernaculum was viewed as subterfuge--the necessary post hoc theorizing of a group seeking to retain power for itself under a system in which such power grabs was inconsistent with the theory of gubernaculum, and therefore inconsistent with its jurisdictio. We are as far away from our founding roots as we can get--and according to Justice Scalia all is necessary in the name of our founding roots. Scalia thus carries forward, in a very illuminating way, the extremist rhetorical style of the eve of the English civil war, and he takes up the cause of the initial loser in that battle.95

In the Soviet Union (and its satellites) and later in the People's Republic of China, realism of a different sort prevailed, that of the Marxist-Leninist insight of the conflation of state-law-power and Party. Theorists in Europe, and then the United States, refined and combined the insights of legal realism and Marxism, in a number of politico- *541 theoretical movements usefully understood as post-modernism. For our purposes, all of these movements had one important characteristic in common--they all sought to embrace, in one form or another the reduction of law to little more than a means by which power is authoritatively communicated. There is only authority and it commands from above. Law is their instrument or the veil through which power is imposed. The only important question for law, then, was its utility in expressing political ideology.96

But the reification of law as instrument, a commonplace by the end of the twentieth century, in turn produced its own sources of resistance.97 One source was reactionary--a return to reification of law through religious normative systems, the same basis of law that Bracton would have understood. In the United States, this reactionary turn has its own instrumentalist turn, much of its progress has been won through a revivified Religion Clause jurisprudence. Another source is post-modern, seeking universal norms within a global human common law edifice created either through emerging international institutions (human rights universalism) or in private law98 or in combinations of both.99 Both are discussed below.

Another inversion of sorts was noticeable by the end of the century. Substituted for a system based on the centrality of “Law-and-Sovereign,”100 was one of force relations through which the mechanism of power can be more usefully examined.101 But this power was essentially instrumental as well--a tool without a master, and without a purpose except as expressed in the aggregate by the consequences of its use. “The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another.”102Power, thus understood, is exercised and not possessed. It is immanent in all relationships, *542 whatever the formal methodologies of expression of those relationships. It comes from below. It is rational and intentional, “the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed.”103 And it engenders its own resistance.104 To use more traditional language, systems of power express the common practices of the people; “[m]ajor dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained by all these confrontations” of force relations.105

Ironically, there is a strong echo of Coke's understanding of common law in Foucault's characterization of power. Just as Coke proposed the common law, a passive bottom up aggregating force, against the conscious law-as-state-instrumentalism of James I, so Foucault posits a similarly constituted concept--“power”--against the positivist instrumentalism of consciously created top down control systems. What can be more Coke-like than an assertion that “[b]y power, I do not mean “Power” as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state”?106Except that for Foucault, power has no master--no systems of acolytes charged with its preservation and interpretation. Foucault offers us power/law in the form of an uncontrollable pantheism as an alternative to Coke's institutionalist model. Yet both models posit the importance of an executive authority in the state; Foucault as an increasing anachronism in the face of the disciplinary power of totalitarian technologically driven governance, and Coke as a monarch whose principal obligation is to keep the peace within the scope of his prerogatives.

The study of law as politics, and politics as power, tends to focus on Marxist-Leninist regimes. And indeed, Marxist-Leninist regimes, through the end of the twentieth century inverted the relationship of law and politics, and centered all power on the state (or more precisely on the Communist Party and the vanguard of the new order).107 But it cannot be forgotten that modern fascism shares a similar view of the relationship of law to power. Mussolini suggested that:

[t]the nation is created by the State, which gives the people, conscious of their own moral unity, the will, and thereby an effective existence. The right of a nation to its independence is derived not from a literary and ideal consciousness of its own existence, much *543 less from a de facto situation more or less inert and unconscious, but from an active consciousness, from an active political will disposed to demonstrate in its right; that is to say, a kind of State already in its pride (in fieri). The State, in fact, as a universal ethical will, is the creator of right.108

One of his theorists, Alfredo Rocco, suggested a concession theory of law and right, reflecting the institutionalist and corporatist mentality of fascism, and its obsession with reification.
Our concept of liberty is that the individual must be allowed to develop his personality on behalf of the state, for these ephemeral and infinitesimal elements of the complex and permanent life of society determined by their normal growth the development of the state. . . . Freedom therefore is due to the citizen and to classes on condition that they exercise it in the interest of society as a whole and within the limits set by social exigencies, liberty being, like any other individual right, a concession of the state. What I say concerning civil liberties applies to economic freedom as well.109

Even current systems of globalization, in their national and trans-border organization, appear to substitute power, and power relations--that is governance and regulation--for law and government. The only difference, perhaps, is the substitution of an institutionalized “system” for state, and “rule” for “law.”110

It has no others. It arouses disparities, it solicits divergences, multiculturalism is agreeable to it but under the condition of an agreement concerning the rules of disagreement. . . . These rules determine the elements that are allowed and the operations permitted for every domain. The object of the game is always to win. Within the framework of these rules, freedom of strategy is left entirely open. It is forbidden to kill one's adversary.111

Yet there are similarities with more traditional approaches. It found expression in the eighteenth century in the work of Jean Jacques *544 Rousseau: “Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men.”112 Law for Rousseau was also essentially instrumental and partial. It serves increasingly as the conceptual framework from which both totalitarian and democratic governance in the West are grounded. Law becomes more and more the codification of power. It need not have a particular character. There are echoes of this in pre-Second World War German notions of Rechtsstaadt,113 and its transmogrification in the theories of Carl Schmitt.114 But it also bears fruit in that most liberal of all twentieth century republics, the United States, especially in the post-Second World War American ideas of process constitutionalism.115 Indeed, the so-called “countermajoritarian difficulty” that has enthralled several generations of American legal and academic elites,116 and that has served as the basis for a campaign to scare the electorate about the power of the judiciary,117reduces itself to a twentieth century version of the perhaps more elegantly proffered argument of Francis Bacon. Bickel and his disciples in their turn, like Francis Bacon before him, argued that lawyers and the courts ought to exercise their authority under the authority of the sovereign.118 For Bacon, that sovereign took the form of the King, for Bickel, that sovereign was the “people” through their elected representatives to which popular authority had been transferred.119 In both cases, they move far from that other great legal tradition, still vibrant at the time of the founding of the American Republic--that understood law as organic and the sovereign power as principally executive in nature.120

Like its eighteenth and nineteenth century counterparts, the newer approaches tend to view law as instrumental, though instrumental in a different sense. That difference, in part, reflects the possibilities for the *545 assertion of newer techniques of power made possible by advances in the technologies of control. The centrality of law--and the state--is substantially weakened once one eliminates the ideas that the state is the supreme repository of power with a monopoly over the institution of power as law, and that law proceeds in specific form solely from the acts of political communities.121Consequently, it has been fashionable to speak of law as an instrument of power, as its mask.122“Law is neither the truth of power nor its alibi. It is an instrument of power which is at once complex and partial.”123 In its twentieth century mode, “power is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.”124 And so it appeared to function effectively in this way in both the democratic West and the totalitarian East. For both societies, law served as the veil behind which the panoptic state could be constructed--providing a regularity and formal legitimacy to many of its techniques, while deflecting the extent of their insinuation in the social order. And Western scholars have devoted substantial energy to unmasking law in the service of this or that system of subordination or more generally of its intensification of force relations of any kind.

Foucault did not live long enough to understand the way in which he both served to describe an epoch about to end and to point the way to that epoch's reconstitution. We have come to live in an age in which the form of “law with its effects of prohibition needs to be resituated among a number of other, non-juridical mechanisms.”125 We are in a position now to better understand Foucault's assertion that:
If it is true that the juridical system was useful for representing, albeit in a nonexhaustive way, a power that was centered primarily around deduction (prélèvement) and death, it is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.126

Today, power applied systems of force relations, have taken up a thread of Foucault's discourse of law/power. I want to explore the great shift from the post-modern--with its obsession with power and its techniques, with subordination and its abolition--to an age in which the techniques *546 of power have been deployed in the service of management. We live in Foucault's asylum: “to effect moral syntheses, assuring an ethical continuity between the world of madness and the world of reason, but by practicing a social segregation that would guarantee bourgeois morality, a universality of fact, and permit it to be imposed as a law upon all forms of insanity.”127 We live in the age of true disciplinary power, power “exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility.”128 The only marker of these disciplines in law, now put to another use--a post-monarchical use, in which we are all subject to the disciplinary machines. Thus, we live in a world, not of a singular hierarchy of disciplinary machines,129 but one in which there are multiple simultaneously functioning and imperfectly horizontally integrated pyramidal organizations producing power and distributing individuals (and other organizations) “in this permanent and continuous field.”130

What are the characteristics of law in this new age of management? What are the techniques of its power/knowledge? To what extent are the techniques of this new age explained through law? I will attempt to extract some answers through an examination of law as technique among transnational actors and God as law within emerging modern traditions of state-based constitutionalism. In this extraction I remain aware that “[i]nstitutional legal history abounds with crooked and confused paths forced unnaturally straight by previous generations of scholars whose vested interest in preserving the rule of law extended to rewriting the past. Accepting an illogicality about institutional development, we might follow a few paths to their cultural complexity.”131

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III. The State and Its Apparatus

We have spent the first part of this course examining the scope and meaning of law for contemporary lawyers. The answer to the question―What is law?―has produced a “lawyer’s answer”: it depends. We have come to understand that variations on the simple answer―law is the manifestation of justice―merely provide a gateway to more profound questions. Among these, the most important for the first year student of law touch on the connection between the form of law, its substance, and the culture of its function (its “Rechtssoziologie”[2] or sociology of law;[3] the way that culture shapes the relationships among courts, government, society and claimants). The student was introduced to the basic forms of U.S. law―common law, equity, statute, and administrative regulation―and the ways in which each is distinguished from the others in terms of their operational premises, development and operationalization through courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies. We ended by considering the most current movements in the development of legal forms (and the form of their underlying substance). If administrative regulations could detach the function of law from its form, might this functional law be detachable from the state? The answer could be found in the progression from the view of social norms as a dependent variable in the operation of law to its transformation as functional law available to state and non-state actors.

With these materials we turn our attention from a consideration of law as a set of autonomous and self-referencing concepts, to law contextualized within the modern state, and particularly within the United States. The central issue students will consider with these readings introduce a core tension in the construction of a government for states. This tension arises from two distinct ways of looking at the relationship between government and law in the West. On the one hand, law has been understood as an instrument of the state and the government established with the delegated authority (from the people) with authority to enact it (in whatever form permitted). Under this view, law is understood as the product of the national will which can only be legitimately expressed as law when law making is asserted directly by the people or (more often) by the people’s representatives constituted as the government of the territory over which the state has the power to impose its rules. On the other hand, law has been understood as related to but autonomous of the state and the government established to administer its territory. It is understood either as a reflection of the common beliefs and traditions of the people who are sovereign within the national territory or otherwise reflect the implementation of higher norms, usually understood as extrinsic to the state and its people (e.g., natural, moral, rationalist or international public) norms.

This is a tension that remains central to the ideology of the state, and as part of that ideology, the foundation of the way in which individuals approach their relationship to the state (and to law). Under the instrumental view, it sometimes follows that the fundamental question of government is the manner in which it may be used to provide for the welfare of the people, and the expectation is that the government will serve as the source and protector of people’s welfare. Law then memorializes the range of protection of individual rights in law through the state. This is a view that finds expression in its modern form first in the works of Jean Jacques Rousseau[4] (especially his Social Contract or Principles of Political Right[5](original Du Contrat Social[6]) (1762)) and then in the work of Carl Schmidtt, which the student has been asked to read.

Laws are, properly speaking, only the conditions of civil association. The people, being subject to the laws, ought to be their author: the conditions of the society ought to be regulated solely by those who come together to form it. . . . Of itself the people wills always the good, but of itself it by no means always sees it. The general will is always in the right, but the judgment which guides it is not always enlightened. It must be got to see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to it; it must be shown the good road it is in search of, secured from the seductive influences of individual wills, taught to see times and spaces as a series, and made to weigh the attractions of present and sensible advantages against the danger of distant and hidden evils. The individuals see the good they reject; the public wills the good it does not see. All stand equally in need of guidance. The former must be compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be taught to know what it wills. If that is done, public enlightenment leads to the union of understanding and will in the social body: the parts are made to work exactly together, and the whole is raised to its highest power. This makes a legislator necessary. (Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk II, § 6 Law[7]).

Many civil law states in Europe, and Marxist Leninist states have embraced a form of this approach (e.g., Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982[8]). But no in the contemporary world it might be hard to provide an example of a state that has embraced a pure form of this approach. Indeed under modern constitutionalist principles even states that are inclined to this approach will also seek to constrain the government in which they have invested much faith and power. We will see an example in the German Basic Law[9] as it sought to create structural constraints to avoid the constitutional excesses of the Nazi period. And the governing ideology of the state may also serve as a constraint, however well applied. (e.g., Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 1982;[10] Backer, Larry Catá, The Rule of Law, the Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the ‘Three Represents’), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism.[11] Journal of Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2006).

The readings from Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy 17-26 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke U. Press 2004) (1932) nicely illustrate this approach. In our readings Schmitt considers the legislative state and the concept of law. He starts by considering the rise of the great legislative states of the 19th century and principally the Deutches Reich.[12] Such legislative states embrace a formalist organizational framework grounded in legislative consent as the basis for the validity of law. These formal concepts, Schmitt argues “are essentially political concepts For this reason, it was the decisive triumph of the legislature that law appeared essentially in the form of statutes and that positive law was in essence statutory law.” (Schmitt, supra17). There was a consequence for the customary law which had been a foundation of medieval conceptions of law: “the acceptability of customary law is denied where one fears it could damage the trust in the legislator so central to the legislative state.” (Ibid). Indeed, and in an insight powerfully relevant to the relationship between statutory and common law in the U.S., Schmitt proposed that “the recognition of customary law always means a limitation on the parliamentary lawmaker to the benefit of other organs, especially, of course, the judiciary.” (Ibid., 17-18).

In the legislative state, legal science is easily reducible to a simple equation―Law EQUALS statute; Statute EQUALS the state regulation that comes about with the participation of the legislative assembly EQUALS law. (Ibid., 18). The “rule of law” and a principle of legality, central to 19th and 20th century legal theory, then, is dependent on the role of the legislature; “law in statutory form is the state” and “the state is law in statutory form.” (Ibid). It follows that the citizen has a duty to obey the law as a self-referencing command―she must effectively obey herself when she (abstracted as part of the body of the state) is the sole source of the law: “only through the law in statutory form is the right to resistance eliminated.” (Ibid). Put a different way, Schmitt suggests rule of law as a set of fundamental equivalences: “The preexisting and presumed congruence and harmony of law and statute, justice and legality, substance and process dominated every detail of the legal thinking of the legislative state.” (Ibid, 19). With echoes of the Institutes Book I (Ibid, 19), Schmitt suggests that the legislative state avoids tyranny only through the development of trust built primarily upon the ability of process to ensure that law remains a manifestation of justice. Consequently, the “law-state” (Rechtssaat)[13]is essentially a process-state. Thus a system that places all trust in its all-powerful legislators can avoid arbitrary governance if it is “dominated entirely by the presumptions of the already noted trust, which first leads to the congruence of justice and formal law.” (Ibid., 20). But such law might also have a substantive element in the form of legal principles as determination of “what should be right for everyone” and as a set of managed interferences with the freedom and property of citizens (Ibid., 21).

Yet Schmitt argues both protect against tyranny only if one adheres to the idea that by definition the legislator cannot legislate anything but right (because the legislator is essentially regulating the abstracted incarnation of the aggregate of the collective self ―the population (Foucault), the people (Rousseau) (Ibid., 23). “In a democracy, law is the momentary will of the people present at the time, that is to say, in practical terms, the will of the transient majority of the voting citizenry; lex est, quod populus jubet[law is what the people order and establish]” (Ibid., 24; quoting Gaius from the Institutes Bk 1. Tit. 2. P.3.). But he notes that this set of presuppositions and potential circularities can work only where the legislative state is supported (with a nod to Rouseau) by a foundational presupposition of a “homogenous people” that are “good” and that thus posits sufficient will to support trust and process exercised through the representative legislature where the “will of the parliament is identified with that of the people” (Ibid, 24). It is only in this state that the formal concept of law can be coherently conceived.

Yet for Schmitt, functional disaster lies in the construction of this set of presumptions that must exist to support the authenticity of the legislative state and the legitimacy of its delegated lawmaking power. “If the assumptions underlying the legislative state of the parliamentary-democratic variety are no longer tenable, then closing one’s eyes to the concrete constitutional situation and clinging to an absolute, ‘value neutral’, functionalist and formal concept of law, in order to save the system of legality, is not far off.” (Ibid., 25). The result is not collapse but instead a greater reliance on process and organizational rules and to the resort to written constitutions as constraints, not on the power of legislatures to but, but on the form through which periodic legislative majorities could impose its will through formal law. The problem of the legislative state, then, is essentially the problem of representation combined with the transfer of a power over law to the re-incarnated “population” of the state in its legislature; law, justice, the state then exist in an imperfect relation.

Under the other, non-instrumental view, it sometimes follows that the fundamental question of government is the manner in its power to affect individual autonomy may be constrained and managed. The object of government may be to serve the people, but the suspicion of the use of government for tyranny and the individual interests of those who occupy positions within the governmental apparatus militates against extending excess authority to that entity. The fundamental idea here is to develop a higher law that protects people from government, and law is understood both to delegate authority to the state but to constrain it as well. This is a view that finds expression in the construction of the federal Republic in the United States and underlies the work of the Federalist Papers[14] and have their partial source in the work of John Locke,[15] which the student has been asked to read. The republic established for the United States tended to embrace a form of this approach. Yet like other republics that tend toward this view in the construction of their government, there is a sometimes strong embrace of the idea of the identity between law and the state, and of the imperative of obedience to law legitimately enacted by the actions of those representatives of the people to which law making authority has been delegated. That, for example, marked the initial reticence to including a Bill of Rights in the American Federal Constitution:

It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes. Such was the petition of right assented to by Charles I., in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of particular reservations. “We, the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordainand establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” Here is a better recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government. (Federalist Papers, No. 84[16] (Hamilton)).

Here one reads both the elaboration of a version of the traditional non-instrumental view, but here merged with a strain of the instrumental view of the state, government and law. That sometimes uneasy jumble has tended to mark the jurisprudential ambiguities of the American Republic, it seems, form its inception.

Like Schmitt, but several centuries earlier, John Locke also considered the problem of the legislative power and its relation to law; John Locke, Second Treatise on Government (Thomas P. Pearson, ed., New York: MacMillan 1952) Chapter XI (Of the Extent of the Legislative Power). Locke starts from the well-known notion of popular consent expressed through power delegation to a representative body. (Locke, supra, 75), but then moves in quite a different direction from Schmitt. Where Schmitt (and Rouuseau) view all power and legitimacy flowing through and to this legislative incarnation of the popular will, Locke viewed the legislature as the nexus of power that itself must be contained by and protected against impositions on the people.

The idea of absolute legislative power is rejected. First, the grant of legislative sovereignty is necessarily limited by the scope of the power actually transferred. But the people may never transfer the whole of its power. That notion is supported by reference to natural law: “nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself or over any other, to destroy his own life or take away the life or property of another.” (Ibid., 76). And embedded within this natural law reference is a principle ultimately fundamental to American political theory, the idea that arbitrary power is inherently illegitimate. Arbitrary power is measured, in turn, by the object of its use―power may be asserted legitimately only if it is “limited to the public good of society. It is a power that has no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave or designedly to impoverish the subjects.” (Ibid).

Second, legislative power must be constrained by what Schmitt would call legality; “the legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary, arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice and to decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, and known authorized judges.” (Ibid, 77). Third, because “the preservation of property being the end of government” (Ibid., 79), the legislative power cannot be used to deprive an individual of her property without her consent. Notice here a fundamental difference with Schmitt; there is a presumption here that customary arrangements both precede and survive the rise of the legislative state and that the object of the legislature is necessarily not instrumental in principal effect but passive an protective―in the way we have come to understand the common law. Indeed, Locke argues, an assurance of this protection lies in “assemblies which are variable, whose members, upon the dissolution of the assembly, are subjects of the common law of their country, equally with the rest.” (Ibid., 79). Fourth, and ironic in the circumstances of 21st century governance, Locke argues that legislatures must be limited in their authority to transfer the lawmaking power to others. (Ibid., 81). Such transfer of power creates the possibility of tyranny as there is a loss of direct connection between the people and those accountable to them. We will see how, over the course of the last century, U.S. jurists have sought to find ways to justify this delegation to the administrative state.

The last reading, Larry Catá Backer, Reifying Law: Understanding Law Beyond the State, 26(3) Penn State International Law Review 521 (2008), attempts to put these strains of theory together for the purpose of understanding the nature of the relationship between law and the state in the United States. That relationship remains ambiguous and in a tension that carries over from unresolved issues of governance that contributed to the English Civil War[17] the effects of which were profound on the intellectual developments in the colonies, especially in the form of the writing of Sir Edward Coke.[18]  On the one hand, law in the United States is understood in some respects to be beyond the reach of the government.  That law—natural law derived from the universal principles of human nature and divine moral and ethical commands related through Scripture and the authoritative writings of established Churches—was also understood as binding on both judges in the application of common law and equity, and binding on government when they sought to use the legislative power. On the other hand, equally prominent in the United States was a strain of thinking that posited that the core premises of the political organization of the federal union contained within it a corollary that the only authoritative source of law was the legislatures of states, and of the general government.  The tension between the two strains of core assumptions about the legitimacy of law and the sources of legitimate expression of law (making) continues to shape the landscape of legislation in the United States.

The reading describes the fundamental contradiction between two approaches to the relationship between law and government that exist in some tension in the United States.  On the one hand, there is the sense that government was instituted to serve law and thus is subordinate to it.  While government has some (sometimes great) authority to make or unmake law, from whatever source derived, that power is constrained by a “higher law” that is expressed in natural law and in the express constraints of the law creating the government (the constitution or basic law). This conception of government supports the idea of the government as one of borrowed powers, with the very specific tasks of preserving individual liberty.  It is a view that is grounded in suspicion of government and which views it as necessary only to the extent it protects individual liberties.  Because liberties are vested in the individual and expressed through communities, the point of organizing the government is to supervise and constrain its power to interfere with those rights. Strong constitutionalism and the judicialization of politics (the tendency to see the great political and social issues of the polity as inherently connected with the constitutional limitations on government to be overseen by an autonomous judiciary) is an important element of the relationship between state, law and the people. The autonomy and legitimacy of the judiciary then becomes a central element of the operation of the state.

On the other hand there is also a sense that popular sovereignty, implemented through representative government, has plenary authority.  That has two consequences woven into the discussion of the Backer test.  The first is that the state, through its representative organs is the only source of authoritative law. Everything else is subordinate and of questionable legitimacy.  Indeed, non-legislative legal systems, like common law, may be implemented only by the sufferance of the legislature evidenced by its creation of a system of courts with the power to entertain causes of action arising from non statutory sources.  The second is that the authority to apply law is not necessarily or exclusively the function of an autonomous judicial ranch with its own customs, traditions and norms. The courts exist only by the sufferance of the legislature and may assert only such power as the legislature grants.  More importantly, the legislature may, in its discretion, empower non-judicial bodies, administrative in character, to undertake quasi-judicial functions.   This conception of government supports the rise of the administrative state and of the power of the state to restrict the scope of judicial authority.  The judiciary is viewed in more limited terms and the idea of constraining the judiciary, rather than the legislature or executive, becomes prominent. Because judges are viewed as autonomous and unelected, there is a sense that, at the limit, they are an anti-democratic element that itself must be constrained.

In his famous essays published as the Spirit of the Common Law,[19] Roscoe Pound explained it this way:

Throughout western Europe the idea of sovereignty as a control from without, of the sovereign as something external to society and set over it, something with which the several individuals who compose society had made a compact binding them to obedience or to which as of divine right passive obedience was due—throughout western Europe this idea superseded the Germanic and feudal conception of a relation of protection and service growing out of tenure of land and involving reciprocal rights and duties. When this idea came to prevail the sovereign was a Byzantine Emperor. What it willed had the force of law.  Law was not something fundamental and eternal, running back of all states, it was the will of this state or that; the  command of this or that sovereign.  Whatever the moral duties of sovereigns, they were incapable of legal limitation.  They might rule under God, but they certainly did not and could not rule under the law, for they made the law.  This conception of law as will has been struggling with the idea of alwe as reason ever since.

. . . . At the Revolution, the people of the several states succeeded to the sovereignty of Parliament.  They thought of this not as feudal but as Byzantine sovereignty.  And yet they were afraid and justly afraid of these emperors they were setting over themselves even as the princeps was a fluctuating body made up of a majority or plurality fo themselves.  Hence by Bills of rights they sought to impose legal limits upon the action of those who wielded the powers of sovereignty, while adhering to the political theory of illimitable power in the sovereign itself. It was inevitable that this compromise between inconsistent theories should sooner or later produce a conflict between courts and people.[20]

Consider the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, a transcript of which follows.  What model of government does it envision, what is the relationship between law, government, and the people, between social norms and the institutions of state?

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The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription

IN CONGRESS, July 4, 1776.

The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America,

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.--Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

    He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.
    He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them.
    He has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only.
    He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.
    He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people.
    He has refused for a long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within.
    He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.
    He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers.
    He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.
    He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our people, and eat out their substance.
    He has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.
    He has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.
    He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation:
    For Quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:
    For protecting them, by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:
    For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:
    For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:
    For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury:
    For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offences
    For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies:
    For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:
    For suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.
    He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us.
    He has plundered our seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.
    He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation.
    He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.
    He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.

In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

Nor have We been wanting in attentions to our Brittish brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.

We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.

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IV. Problem

The issue of nature of the government and its relation to law was of substantial importance from the time of the early Republic.  One of the most interesting early debates about the character of the government and its relation to law centered on the need for and the objections to what became the U.S: Bill of Rights. Some of those arguments are presented below.  Describe the differences in the assumptions about the nature of government and laws in the arguments for the inclusion of a Bill of Rights and against. Are the arguments legal, or political?  Besides the except from Roscoe Pound’s The Spirit of the Common Law, consider the following:


Federalist No. 51

The Structure of Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
Publius (James Madison)
February 6, 1788

* * * * * *

There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view.

First. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority—that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies or States, oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated; the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizen, will be diminished; and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionally increased. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practicable sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent by a judicious modification and mixture of the federal principle.

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Federalist No. 84

Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
July 16, 1788

IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the objections which have appeared against it. There however remain a few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I shall so far consult brevity as to comprise all my observations on these miscellaneous points in a single paper.

The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the plan of the convention contains no bill of rights. . . . .

* * * * *

To the second, that is, to the pretended establishment of the common and statute law by the Constitution, I answer that they are expressly made subject “to such alterations and provisions as the legislature shall from time to time make concerning the same.” They are therefore at any moment liable to repeal by the ordinary legislative power, and of course have no constitutional sanction. The only use of the declaration was to recognize the ancient law and to remove doubts which might have been occasioned by the Revolution. This consequently can be considered as no part of a declaration of rights, which under our constitutions must be intended as limitations of the power of the government itself.

It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA CHARTA, obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were the subsequent confirmations of that charter by subsequent princes. Such was the Petition of the Right assented to by Charles the First in the beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688, and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of Parliament called the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to their primitive signification, they have no application to constitutions, professedly founded upon the power of the people and executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything they have no need of particular reservations. “WE, THE PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.

But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every species of personal and private concerns. If, therefore, the loud clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the constitution of this State. But the truth is that both of them contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be desired.

I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.

On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two: in the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable concerning it in the constitution of this State; in the next, I contend that whatever has been said about it in that of any other State amounts to nothing. What signifies a declaration that “the liberty of the press shall be inviolably preserved”? What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer that its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government. And here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all our rights.

There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the point. The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. The several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution, and conversely the constitution of each State is its bill of rights. And the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights of the Union. Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government? This is done in the most ample and precise manner in the plan of the convention; comprehending various precautions for the public security which are not to be found in any of the State constitutions. Is another object of a bill of rights to define certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are relative to personal and private concerns? This we have seen has also been attended to in a variety of cases in the same plan. Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the convention. It may be said that it does not go far enough though it will not be easy to make this appear; but it can with no propriety be contended that there is no such thing. It certainly must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of declaring the rights of the citizens if they are to be found in any part of the instrument which establishes the government. And hence it must be apparent that much of what has been said on this subject rests merely on verbal and nominal distinctions, entirely foreign from the substance of the thing.

Another objection which has been made, and which, from the frequency of its repetition, it is to be presumed is relied on, is of this nature: “It is improper [say the objectors] to confer such large powers as are proposed upon the national government, because the seat of that government must of necessity be too remote from many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the constituent of the conduct of the representative body.” This argument, if it proves anything, proves that there ought to be no general government whatever. For the powers which, it seems to be agreed on all hands, ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be safely intrusted to a body which is not under every requisite control. But there are satisfactory reasons to show that the objection is in reality not well founded. There is in most of the arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of the imagination. What are the sources of information by which the people in Montgomery County must regulate their judgment of the conduct of their representatives in the State legislature? Of personal observation they can have no benefit. This is confined to the citizens on the spot. They must therefore depend on the information of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how must these men obtain their information? Evidently from the complexion of public measures, from the public prints, from correspondences with their representatives, and with other persons who reside at the place of their deliberations. This does not apply to Montgomery County only, but to all the counties at any considerable distance from the seat of government.

It is equally evident that the same sources of information would be open to the people in relation to the conduct of their representatives in the general government, and the impediments to a prompt communication which distance may be supposed to create will be overbalanced by the effects of the vigilance of the State governments. The executive and legislative bodies of each State will be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the national administration; and as it will be in their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of intelligence, they can never be at a loss to know the behavior of those who represent their constituents in the national councils, and can readily communicate the same knowledge to the people. Their disposition to apprise the community of whatever may prejudice its interests from another quarter may be relied upon, if it were only from the rivalship of power. And we may conclude with the fullest assurance that the people, through that channel, will be better informed of the conduct of their national representatives than they can be by any means they now possess, of that of their State representatives.

It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the country at and near the seat of government will, in all questions that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have the same interest with those who are at a distance, and that they will stand ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union.

* * * * *

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Jefferson to Madison
PARIS, December 20, 1787
* * * * *
I will now add what I do not like.
First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and without the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus law, and trials by jury in all matter of fact triable by the laws of the land and not by the law of Nations. To say, as Mr. Wilson does that a bill of rights was not necessary because all is reserved in the case of the general government which is not given, while in the particular ones all is given which is not reserved might do for the Audience to whom it was addressed, but is surely gratis dictum, opposed by strong inferences from the body of the instrument, as well as from the omission of the clause of our present confederation which had declared that in express terms. It was a hard conclusion to say because there has been no uniformity among the states as to the cases triable by jury, because some have been so incautious as to abandon this mode of trial, therefore the more prudent states shall be reduced to the same level of calamity. It would have been much more just and wise to have concluded the other way that as most of the states had judiciously preserved this palladium, those who had wandered should be brought back to it, and to have established general right instead of general wrong. Let me add that a bull of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.
* * * * *

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Brutus II Essay
Anti Federalist Paper No. 84
On the Lack of a Bill of Rights
New York Journal
November 1, 1787

. . . . When a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should be firmly laid. The constitution proposed to your acceptance, is designed not for yourselves alone, but for generations yet unborn. The principles, therefore, upon which the social compact is founded, ought to have been clearly and precisely stated, and the most express and full declaration of rights to have been made–But on this subject there is almost an entire silence.

If we may collect the sentiments of the people of America, from their own most solemn declarations, they hold this truth as self evident, that all men are by nature free. No one man, therefore, or any class of men, have a right, by the law of nature, or of God, to assume or exercise authority over their fellows. The origin of society then is to be sought, not in any natural right which one man has to exercise authority over another, but in the united consent of those who associate. The mutual wants of men, at first dictated the propriety of forming societies; and when they were established, protection and defense pointed out the necessity of instituting government. In a state of nature every individual pursues his own interest; in this pursuit it frequently happened, that the possessions or enjoyments of one were sacrificed to the views and designs of another; thus the weak were a prey to the strong, the simple and unwary were subject to impositions from those who were more crafty and designing. In this state of things, every individual was insecure; common interest therefore directed, that government should be established, in which the force of the whole community should be collected, and under such directions, as to protect and defend every one who composed it. The common good, therefore, is the end of civil government, and common consent, the foundation on which it is established. To effect this end, it was necessary that a certain portion of natural liberty should be surrendered, in order, that what remained should be preserved: how great a proportion of natural freedom is necessary to be yielded by individuals, when they submit to government, I shall not now enquire.

So much, however, must be given up, as will be sufficient to enable those, to whom the administration of the government is committed, to establish laws for the promoting the happiness of the community, and to carry those laws into effect. But it is not necessary, for this purpose, that individuals should relinquish all their natural rights. Some are of such a nature that they cannot be surrendered. Of this kind are the rights of conscience, the right of enjoying and defending life, etc. Others are not necessary to be resigned, in order to attain the end for which government is instituted, these therefore ought not to be given up. To surrender them, would counteract the very end of government, to wit, the common good.

From these observations it appears, that in forming a government on its true principles, the foundation should be laid in the manner I before stated, by expressly reserving to the people such of their essential natural rights, as are not necessary to be parted with. The same reasons which at first induced mankind to associate and institute government, will operate to influence them to observe this precaution. If they had been disposed to conform themselves to the rule of immutable righteousness, government would not have been requisite. It was because one part exercised fraud, oppression, and violence on the other, that men came together, and agreed that certain rules should be formed, to regulate the conduct of all, and the power of the whole community lodged in the hands of rulers to enforce an obedience to them. But rulers have the same propensities as other men; they are as likely to use the power with which they are vested for private purposes, and to the injury and oppression of those over whom they are placed, as individuals in a state of nature are to injure and oppress one another. It is therefore as proper that bounds should be set to their authority, as that government should have at first been instituted to restrain private injuries.

This principle, which seems so evidently founded in the reason and nature of things, is confirmed by universal experience. Those who have governed, have been found in all ages ever active to enlarge their powers and abridge the public liberty. This has induced the people in all countries, where any sense of freedom remained, to fix barriers against the encroachments of their rulers. The country from which we have derived our origin, is an eminent example of this. Their magna charta and bill of rights have long been the boast, as well as the security, of that nation. I need say no more, I presume, to an American, than, that this principle is a fundamental one, in all the constitutions of our own states; there is not one of them but what is either founded on a declaration or bill of rights, or has certain express reservation of rights interwoven in the body of them. From this it appears, that at a time when the pulse of liberty beat high and when an appeal was made to the people to form constitutions for the government of themselves, it was their universal sense, that such declarations should make a part of their frames of government. It is therefore the more astonishing, that this grand security, to the rights of the people, is not to be found in this constitution.

It has been said, in answer to this objection, that such declaration of rights, however requisite they might be in the constitutions of the states, are not necessary in the general constitution, because, “in the former case, every thing which is not reserved is given, but in the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and every thing which is not given is reserved.” [Editor's Note. Brutus quotes from James Wilson's State House Speech.] It requires but little attention to discover, that this mode of reasoning is rather specious than solid. The powers, rights, and authority, granted to the general government by this constitution, are as complete, with respect to every object to which they extend, as that of any state government—It reaches to every thing which concerns human happiness—Life, liberty, and property, are under its control. There is the same reason, therefore, that the exercise of power, in this case, should be restrained within proper limits, as in that of the state governments. To set this matter in a clear light, permit me to instance some of the articles of the bills of rights of the individuals states, and apply them to the case in question.

For the security of life, in criminal prosecutions, the bills of rights of most of the states have declared, that no man shall be held to answer for a crime until he is made fully acquainted with the charge brought against him; he shall not be compelled to accuse, or furnish evidence against himself–The witnesses against him shall be brought face to face, and he shall be fully heard by himself or counsel. That it is essential to the security of life and liberty, that trial of facts be in the vicinity where they happen. Are not provisions of this kind as necessary in the general government, as in that of a particular state? The powers vested in the new Congress extend in many cases to life; they are authorized to provide for the punishment of a variety of capital crimes, and no restraint is laid upon them in its exercise, save only, that “the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed.” No man is secure of a trial in the county where he is charged to have committed a crime; he may be brought from Niagara to New-York, or carried from Kentucky to Richmond for trial for an offence, supposed to be committed. What security is there, that a man shall be furnished with a full and plain description of the charges against him? That he shall be allowed to produce all proof he can in his favor? That he shall see the witnesses against him face to face, or that he shall be fully heard in his own defense by himself or counsel?

For the security of liberty it has been declared, “that excessive bail should not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted–That all warrants, without oath or affirmation to search suspected places, or seize any person, his papers or property, are grievous and oppressive.”

These provisions are as necessary under the general government as under that of the individual states; for the power of the former is as complete to the purpose of requiring bail, imposing fines, inflicting punishments, granting search warrants, and seizing persons, papers, or property, in certain cases, as the other.

For the purpose of securing the property of the citizens, it is declared by all the states, “that in all controversies at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.”

Does not the same necessity exist of reserving this right, under this national compact, as in that of these states? Yet nothing is said respecting it. In the bills of rights of the states it is declared, that a well regulated militia is the proper and natural defense of a free government—That as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up, and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and controlled by the civil power.

The same security is as necessary in this constitution, and much more so; for the general government will have the sole power to raise and to pay armies, and are under no control in the exercise of it; yet nothing of this is to be found in this new system.

I might proceed to instance a number of other rights, which were as necessary to be reserved, such as, that elections should be free, that the liberty of the press should be held sacred; but the instances adduced, are sufficient to prove, that this argument is without foundation.—Besides, it is evident, that the reason here assigned was not the true one, why the framers of this constitution omitted a bill of rights; if it had been, they would not have made certain reservations, while they totally omitted others of more importance. We find they have, in the 9th section of the 1st article, declared, that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in cases of rebellion—that no bill of attainder, or ex-post facto law, shall be passed—that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, &c. If every thing which is not given is reserved, what propriety is there in these exceptions? Does this constitution any where grant the power of suspending the habeas corpus, to make ex-post facto laws, pass bills of attainder, or grant titles of nobility? It certainly does not in express terms. The only answer that can be given is, that these are implied in the general powers granted. With equal truth it may be said, that all the powers, which the bills of right, guard against the abuse of, are contained or implied in the general ones granted by this constitution.

So far it is from being true, that a bill of rights is less necessary in the general constitution than in those of the states, the contrary is evidently the fact.—This system, if it is possible for the people of America to accede to it, will be an original compact, and being the last, will, in the nature of things vacate every former agreement inconsistent with it. For it being a plan of government received and ratified by the whole people, all other forms, which are in existence at the time of its adoption, must yield to it. This is expressed in positive and unequivocal terms, in the 6th article, “That this constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution, or laws of any state, to the contrary notwithstanding.

“The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers both of the United States, and of the several states shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution.”

It is therefore not only necessarily implied thereby, but positively expressed, that the different state constitutions are repealed and entirely done away, so far as they are inconsistent with this, with the laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, or with treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States; of what avail will the constitutions of the respective states be to preserve the rights of its citizens? should they be plead, the answer would be, the constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, is the supreme law, and all legislatures and judicial officers, whether of the general or state governments are bound by oath to support it. No privilege, reserved by the bills of rights, or secured by the state government, can limit the power granted by this, or restrain any laws made in pursuance of it. It stands therefore on its own bottom, and must receive a construction by itself without any reference to any other—And hence it was of the highest importance, that the most precise and express declarations and reservations of rights should have been made.

This will appear the more necessary, when it is considered, that not only the constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof, but all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, are the supreme law of the land, and supersede the constitutions of all the states. The power to make treaties, is vested in the president, by and with the advice and consent of two thirds of the senate. I do not find any limitation, or restriction, to the exercise of this power. The most important article in any constitution may therefore be repealed, even without a legislative act. Ought not a government, vested with such extensive and indefinite authority, to have been restricted by a declaration of rights? It certainly ought.

So clear a point is this, that I cannot help suspecting, that persons who attempt to persuade people, that such reservations were less necessary under this constitution than under those of the states, are willfully endeavoring to deceive, and to lead you into an absolute state of vassalage.



[1]http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Reifying-Law.pdf
[2]http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rechtssoziologie
[3]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociology_of_law
[4]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Jacques_Rousseau
[5] http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm
[6]http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/r/RousseauJJ_ContratSocial_s.pdf
[7]http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon_02.htm#006
[8]http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
[9]http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/
[10]http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
[11]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=929636
[12]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Reich
[13] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rechtsstaat
[14]http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-federalist-papers/
[15] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Locke
[16]http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-federalist-papers/the-federalist-84.php
[17]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Civil_War
[18] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Coke
[19]Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (Francestwon, NH; Marshall Jones Co., 1921).
[20]Id., at 79.

Keren Wang on "Religion in China: Historical and Legal Context" and Chinese-Vatican Relations

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(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)

The study of the relationship between the state and religion—especially organized and institutional religion originating in the West and Middle East--is grounded in an important and often overlooked premise. That premise is based on a very specific view of religion and a very historically contextualized understanding of the relationship between the state and religious institutions. Both are grounded in the primacy of the model of religious organization and of state-religion relations developed in the Middle East and Europe (and later spread elsewhere in the globe) centering around Judaism, Jewish state organization and its important evolution under Christianity and Islam, the religions that emerged from it. Much of the national and international discussion of the last several centuries has effectively centered on the way in each of these variants of so-called "Abrahamic" religions (and thier contests for domination within social, cultural and economic space) be manifested, and their relations with states legitimated. Other religious traditions are then folded into the master narrative of law-religion discourse, or treated as exceptions or variations within it.

That has been the basis on which the grounding premise fo Abrahamic religions have been universalized and then offered to the international community as the sole basis on which to understand, manage and "protect" the interests of these legal and theological systems, each with substantial designs on the control of the social, political and economic orders of its adherents. It is into that construct that non-Western or Abrahamic traditions--state and religious--are now required to mold themselves. That molding, of course, can sometimes highlight the differences between the founding premises of non-Abrahamic political orders, and the difficulties of transposing the universalizing project of Abrahamic state-religious organization outside of its context.

The essay that follows, Keren Wang, Religion in China: Historical and Legal Context, Coalition for Peace & Ethics Working Paper 9/1 (Sept. 2014), provides an introduction to those issues. The abstract follows. The essay may be access HERE.  On the Coalition for Peace & Ethics, see HERE.
 
 There follows an excerpt from a Vatican sponsored conference on the life of the Catholic Church in China, Holy See, Comunicato: Riunione Plenaria Della Commissione Per La Chiesa Cattolica In Cina (Press Release: Plenary Meeting of the Commission of Catholic Church inChina), Holy See Bulletin April 26, 2012.



Coalition for Peace and Ethics Working Paper No. 9/1
(September 2014)

Religion in China-Historical and Legal Context
Keren Wang


Abstract:

The complex and quite rich discourse centered on the three “Abrahamic” religions does not suggest the only way in which one can approach the issue of religious “liberty” or understand the relation among religion and the state. China offers an important and distinctive path that is in its own way more difficult to square with the Western focused discourse that has now become a global standard. Thus is it necessary, before exploring the technical legal details about the interaction of religion and the state in China. It is perhaps not too much of an exaggeration to say that “religion” signifies the character of the entire Western Civilization-- from the Council of Nicaea to the Crusades, and unto the 17th century Enlightenment and the rise of capitalism, Judeo-Christian religions have always played dominant role in the evolution (and devolution) of what is known as the “West”. China provides a substantially different “story” and that difference is foundational to China’s approach to the legitimacy of the boundaries for religious regulation. This essay offers a brief glimpse at a complex problem, and suggests the basis for the quite substantial difficulties of communicating between systems.
__________ 

The relations between China and the Catholic Church have been strained since the execution and imprisonment of several of its priests in the early 1950s. Current tensions revolve around the power of the Chinese authority to appoint and control the Catholic Church hierarchy in China. Consider in that respect the following News Release issued on the meeting of a Vatican sponsored conference on the life of the Catholic Church in China, Holy See, Comunicato: Riunione Plenaria Della Commissione Per La Chiesa Cattolica In Cina (Press Release: Plenary Meeting of the Commission of Catholic Church inChina), Holy See Bulletin April 26, 2012, an excerpt form which follows:

The Commission which Pope Benedict XVI established in 2007 to study questions of major importance regarding the life of the Catholic Church in China met in the Vatican for the fifth time from 23 to 25 April.

* * * * * *

In the course of the Meeting, attention then focussed on the Pastors, in particular on Bishops and priests who are detained or who are suffering unjust limitations on the performance of their mission. Admiration was expressed for the strength of their faith and for their union with the Holy Father. They need the Church’s prayer in a special way so as to face their difficulties with serenity and in fidelity to Christ.

The Church needs good Bishops. They are a gift of God to his people, for the benefit of whom they exercise the office of teaching, sanctifying and governing. They are also called to provide reasons for life and hope to all whom they meet. They receive from Christ, through the Church, their task and authority, which they exercise in union with the Roman Pontiff and with all the Bishops throughout the world.

Concerning the particular situation of the Church in China, it was noted that the claim of the entities, called "One Association and One Conference", to place themselves above the Bishops and to guide the life of the ecclesial community, persists. In this regard, the instructions given in the Letter of Pope Benedict XVI (cf. Letter to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China, 7), remain current and provide direction. It is important to observe them so that the face of the Church may shine forth with clarity in the midst of the noble Chinese people.

This clarity has been obfuscated by those clerics who have illegitimately received episcopal ordination and by those illegitimate Bishops who have carried out acts of jurisdiction or who have administered the Sacraments. In so doing, they usurp a power which the Church has not conferred upon them. In recent days, some of them have participated in episcopal ordinations which were authorized by the Church. The behaviour of these Bishops, in addition to aggravating their canonical status, has disturbed the faithful and often has violated the consciences of the priests and lay faithful who were involved.

Furthermore, this clarity has been obfuscated by legitimate Bishops who have participated in illegitimate episcopal ordinations. Many of these Bishops have since clarified their position and have requested pardon; the Holy Father has benevolently forgiven them. Others, however, who also took part in these illegitimate ordinations, have not yet made this clarification, and thus are encouraged to do so as soon as possible.

The participants in the Plenary Meeting follow these painful events with attention and in a spirit of charity. Though they are aware of the particular difficulties of the present situation, they recall that evangelization cannot be achieved by sacrificing essential elements of the Catholic faith and discipline. Obedience to Christ and to the Successor of Peter is the presupposition of every true renewal and this applies to every category within the People of God. Lay people themselves are sensitive to the clear ecclesial fidelity of their own Pastors.
Can the premise embraced by China of the separation of religious theology and practice, one the one hand, and religious hierarchy and institutions, on the other, be defended? Are religious institutions inherently political? Those are some of the questions that might be answered in this century.


The Atlantic Council and Developments in the Movement Toward a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

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I have been writing about the years long efforts by the United States to develop an alternative global trade architecture around its twin efforts, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TTP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). See HERE for a useful perspective. For the TTP see, "The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Japan, China, the U.S. and the Emerging Shape of a New World Trade Regulatory Order".

(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)

The Atlantic Council provides some useful information on the sometimes slow and convoluted path that is the route toward an alternative to the WTO represented by the TTIP. The Atlantic Council's board is listed here

 This post includes some links and discussion recently provided by the Atlantic Council focused on current developments in trans-Atlantic trade.

 

 

Who's Who & Who's New?

Now that incoming European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has announced his appointees for the next Commission, TTIP Action will introduce several of the new commissioners, their portfolios, and their role in the European Union over the course of the next several weeks. Today's edition introduces Pierre Moscovici, the designated Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs.

“I am an engaged and convinced European. From now on, I will not act as the French Finance Minister anymore but as a European commissioner in the general interest. The most important thing is to contribute to the collective task of restoring growth in Europe,” Moscovici asserted in a recent interview following his nomination. Make sure you follow him on Twitter at @pierremoscovici, and you can find his official website here.

Formerly French Finance Minister, Moscovici will assume the position of Economic Affairs commissioner if confirmed by the European Parliament. Moscovici’s focus will be to create the conditions for sustainable economic growth which creates jobs and spur investment across Europe. His actions will be supervised by Jyrki Katainen, Vice-President for Jobs and Growth, Investment and Competitiveness, and Valdis Dombrovskis, Vice-President for the Euro and Social Dialogue which is likely to create some points of friction as Katainen and Moscovici are both known advocates of budgetary discipline (Euractiv).

His appointment sparked considerable criticism, among those who doubt the credibility and legitimacy of naming a Frenchman to the Economic post because he will be responsible for overseeing national budgets and ensuring they meet the Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit targets (Euractiv). In the event a budget does not, the Financial Times addressed his delicate situation, pointing out that Moscovici will have to approve or reject a French budget that he was in charge of less than six months ago.

Moscovici will be a leading actor in the debate between Europe’s South and North on the loosening of the current fiscal rules. Despite his statement that, “We can have a dose, a certain dose of flexibility. But flexibility is not indulgence, flexibility is not complacency, flexibility is not weakness,” Moscovici made equally clear that Hollande’s plans for the French economic recovery “which lead to cuts in public expenditure and help a pro-business attitude and structural reforms – have to be made.”

Juncker himself deems Moscovici the right person for the job, hoping that he will be a mediator between the EU and the French public with regards to tough upcoming EU budget decisions. Some German MEPs are disappointed by Moscovici’s nomination, calling him 'the Trojan Horse in the Commission', claiming that Juncker has put the fox in charge of the henhouse (Euractiv). In an interview with the German newspaper Spiegel, Moscovici counters this allegation by stating that “processes of reform take time. At the beginning of this millennium, Germany was considered “the sick man of Europe”. Only after years of intensive reform, the economy recovered.”

In line with the views of his party in France, Moscovici is an advocate of free trade and the conclusion of TTIP, which might help him to find future common ground with his German critics.

The official mission letter from President Juncker to Commissioner-designate Moscovici is available here 


 Speeches & Official Announcements

The European Union in the New World Order

In a recent speech at the Yale School of Management, European Commission President Barroso of the European Commission, spoke of the importance of EU partnership with the United States, the international relevance in Europe, and the interconnectedness of economics and geopolitics. Mr. Barroso emphasized the importance of approaching international trade agreements like TTIP and the recent EU agreement with Ukraine in fostering greater international cooperation. (Europa)

Karel De Gucht European Commissioner for Trade Statement on CETA

Karel De Gucht spoke at the European Parliament plenary session last week on the recent agreement of the CETA deal between the EU and Canada, explaining the achievements of the agreement and addressing social, environmental, and labor concerns. De Gucht emphasized that the deal has the highest standards in any trade agreement ever agreed. (Europa)

TTIP- A Joint Paper by the Federal Ministry of Economics and the German Federation of Trade Unions

The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology and the German Federation of Trade Unions formulated their opinions on the "demands for free trade talks between the EU and the USA under the consideration of sustainability, labor rights and the granting of general interest" in a joint paper. The two parties agreed that an agreement must safeguard labor rights, protect consumers, and maintain high social and environmental standards. Moreover, they also agreed that TTIP offers a great opportunity to strengthen fair and sustainable transatlantic trade relations to boost the economies on both sides. (Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology)

Controversy regarding the Free Trade Agreement

Members of the German Federal Parliament met today to debate on TTIP, often adopting opposing views. Federal Minister for Economy and Energy Sigmar Gabriel refuted the Left party’s accusations of a lack of transparency of TTIP negotiations, asking them if they are at all interested in an agreement. Gabriel underlined the opportunities TTIP offers for the German economy and insisted on continuing the negotiations. The Christian Democrats support his view, emphasizing the importance of TTIP for both the creation of jobs and a deepening of transatlantic relations.(German Federal Parliament) – Original article and video in German


Ambassador Gardner's Remarks at the European Young Innovators’ Forum

Ambassador Gardner, the US Ambassador to the EU, gave a speech in Brussels yesterday at Unconvention 2014 regarding the current state of affairs of the tech industry in Europe. Ambassador Gardner cited access to debt financing and low returns for EU venture capital as issues for European small businesses and start-ups. Ambassador Gardner detailed recent positive initiatives and the heightened attention to entrepreneurial matters within the new Commission. He notes that while many legislative opportunities occur at the member-state level, the European Union plays a pivotal role in creating a single digital market.  (United States Mission to the European Union)

For a video of an interview with Ambassador Gardner after his speech, click here

  News

Cameron to Nail 'Myths' About TTIP Leading To NHS Privatisation

UK Prime Minister David Cameron asserts that moving forward on TTIP is essential, stating that “our national security is also really dependent on our economic security,” according to the Huffington Post UK. Cameron emphasizes the economic benefits to the United Kingdom specifically, in addition to the United States and the wider European Union. He also strongly refuted opposition claims that TTIP would have anything to do with privatizing Britain's National Health Services as public services are automatically exempted from all EU trade negotiations. (Huffington Post)

German Industry Calls for 'Investment Offensive' to Boost the Economy

Amid Germany’s current economic downturn, EurActiv Germany reports that German businesses view TTIP as a "historic opportunity" necessary to promote investment, along with other domestic policy measures including stability, tax cuts, and increased R&D spending. (Euractiv)

European Commission Denies Reports that Germany is Derailing CETA

Finbarr Bermingham of the International Business Times UK cites controversial reports stating that Germany attempted to halt the EU-Canadian trade agreement CETA over the inclusion of an investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clause, which is also key German concern in TTIP negotiations. Germany denies the claims, stating that CETA is still on schedule, as Canadian and US officials meet in Canada tomorrow to finalize the text of the agreement. Concerns with the ISDS clause is not expected to derail the ultimate ratification of the final treaty. (International Business Times UK

However, Reuters reports that Germany’s economy minister stated recently that Germany will not ratify CETA if it contains an ISDS clause. Read here for more details. This bears watching as it has direct implications for the investment chapter in TTIP.

Putin Warns Ukraine against Implementing EU Pact

Euractiv recently reported Putin’s recent warnings to Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko regarding Russian economic retaliation if Ukraine implements legislation acting on the recent EU-Ukraine trade agreement. The implementation of the agreement is delayed until the end of 2015, providing time for the EU to alleviate Russian concerns and Putin to continue pushing for a cease-fire and closer economic ties between Ukraine and Russia. (Euractiv)

Eurozone Companies Urge Capitals to Reform Economies

Sarah Gordon and Peter Wise of the Financial Times outline the European private sector’s desire for rapid implementation of major structural reforms across the EU, as the actions of the European Central Bank alone are not enough to combat the lack of macroeconomic confidence needed to stimulate demand and spur growth. (Financial Times)

Italian Business Grows restless with Matteo Renzi

Rachel Sanderson of the Financial Times reports on the darkening perception of Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi among business leaders as the country continues to struggle to actually implement its reform agenda, and its recent return to recession. Renzi retains overall support from business leaders; however his lack of momentum is worrying. (Financial Times)

Silva to Seek Trade Deals for Brazil

Joe Leahy of the Financial Times reports on Brazilian presidential candidate Ms. Silva’s plans to prioritize the pursuit of US and EU trade deals and loosen the restrictions of the Mercosur South American trade bloc. Ms. Silva’s other economic plans, including fiscal responsibility and increasing funding for education and the environment, are preferred by investors when compared to those of Ms. Rousseff. (Financial Times)


Cross-Border Swap Dispute Risks Trade War, CFTC’s Giancarlo Says

Silla Brush of Bloomberg describes J. Christopher Giancarlo’s first speech since joining the CFTC, where he advises the United States to increase coordination with Europe on financial regulatory reform and to retract some uncoordinated regulatory reforms that have negatively affected transatlantic cooperation in recent years. (Bloomberg)

  Recent Analysis

In Defense of TTIP: Good for the Economy – and for the Climate

This excellent piece by Carlo Stagnaro, adviser on energy and liberalization to Italy’s minister for economic development, gives a nice overview of how the conclusion of TTIP will not only bring economic benefits to both sides of the Atlantic but will also increase transatlantic energy security, promote environmental sustainability, and could help counter climate change. With his article, Stagnaro counters popular misperceptions of the way that trade in general and TTIP in particular could affect the environment. He also underlines that TTIP should not be viewed as just another trade agreement, concluding that a transatlantic deal has the potential to provide an excellent example for how nations work together on trade and sustainability moving forward. (Energy Post)


A Long Way to Go for TTIP Negotiations 

This article and video by Radio Sweden discusses the geopolitical importance of TTIP for both the United States and the European Union, underlining the need for the two partners to combine their political weight in the international arena to set global standards. The experts believe that negotiations might speed up after November, when the EU Commission has settled in and the upcoming midterm US congressional elections are completed. (Sveriges Radio)


Ten Myths about TTIP 

Denmark's largest business association put together this concise summary of the ten most common misperceptions about TTIP, refuting them all in turn. The criticisms range from a perceived threat to democracy, to an alleged lowering of consumer standards, to an assumed threat to personal privacy. The author counters the points of criticism and concludes that TTIP will achieve common effective and modern standards and high levels of protection for consumers, workers and the environment, with a positive global impact. (Frihandelsbloggen)

Most Difficult Hearings for Commissioners-designate Cañete, Hill & Navracsics, argue the Greens

In this interview, ViEUw’s journalist Jennifer Baker and Helmut Weixler, spokesperson for the Greens Group discuss the current hearings of the Commissioners-designate in front of the European Parliament. According to the Greens, Commissioner designates Miguel Arias Cañete, Jonathan Hill, and Tibor Navracsics, face the most opposition and difficult hearings. The Greens also doubt if the new Commission’s focus on business and economic growth will lead Europe in the right direction. (ViEUws)


Trade Agreements: TTIP and European Partnership Agreements  

In the context of the sixth TTIP negotiation round on September 29, the Dutch newspaper Oneworld will feature debates in the course of next week, addressing the effects, advantages and criticisms of the trade agreements Europe is currently negotiating. Their webpage also features helpful link to additional information and previous discussions on the matter. - Original article in Dutch (Oneworld

Upcoming Events

Seventh Round of TTIP Negotiations – September 29 - October 3 in Washington DC – a political stock-taking between Ambassador Froman and Commissioner De Gucht will follow the talks on October 13. Stakeholder events will take place on Wednesday, October 1 as outlined below.

Shifting Patterns of Trade: TTIP and the South Atlantic -  September 25 in Brussels; hosted by the German Marshall Fund- More Information

Jobs and Economic Growth for Indianapolis: How TTIP Will Help– September 26 in Indianapolis, IN; hosted by the Trans-Atlantic Business Council - More Information

TTIP: Does It Still Have Support in Europe? - September 29 in New York, NY; hosted by the European-American Business Organization and the American Business Forum on Europe  - More Information

CHLI Trade & International Affairs Symposium - September 29 in Washington DC; hosted by the Congressional Hispanic Leadership Institute - More Information

Hearing of the European Commissioner for Trade & Panel Discussion - September 29 in Washington DC; hosted by the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations - More Information

What’s Next? Fostering the Next Generation of Energy Security Conference - September 30 in Washington DC; hosted by the American Security Project - More Information

Global Services Summit- 
September 30 in Washington DC; hosted by the Coalition of Services Industries; featuring remarks by many international Trade ministers - More Information

Stakeholder Policy Presentations
 During the 7th round of TTIP Negotiations
  - October 1 in Chevy Chase, MD; hosted by USTR and the European Commission - More Information


Stakeholder Forum During the 7th Round of TTIP Negotiation
s - Chief Negotiators' Briefing - October 1 in Chevy Chase, MD; hosted by USTR and the European Commission -
More Information

Challenges Facing the World Trade System - October 1 in Washington DC; hosted by Johns Hopkins SAIS - More Information

TTIP Roadshow, Sheffield: The US-EU Trade Negotiations and the Coalition for Transatlantic Business
- October 1 in Sheffield, England; hosted by the British- American Business Association - More Information 

TTIP: A Watershed Agreement with Far-Reaching Implications– October 2 in Philadelphia, PA; hosted by the British American Business Council - More Information


EMI TTIP Summit, Brussels -
October 2 in Brussels; hosted by European Movement International - More Information


District Export Council's Second Annual International Trade Symposium 
- October 3, Washington DC; hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce - More Information

The ECB and the Eurozone: A Conversation with Mario Draghi - 
October 9 in Washington DC; hosted by the Brookings Institute - More Information


The Next Stage of Eurozone Recovery: A Conversation with Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem
- October 10 in Washington DC; hosted by the Atlantic Council - More Information


2014 Report of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China Released

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The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by the U.S. Congress in 2000 "with the legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress. The Commission consists of nine Senators, nine Members of the House of Representatives, and five senior Administration officials appointed by the President." (CECC About). It tends to serve as an excellent barometer of the thinking of political and academic elite sin the United States about issues touching on China and the official American line developed in connection with those issues. As such it is an important source of information about the way official and academic sectors think about China. 
 
The CECC FAQs provide useful information about the CECC. See CECC Frequently Asked Questions. They have developed positions on a number of issues: Access to Justice; Civil Society;Commercial Rule of Law; Criminal Justice; Developments in Hong Kong and Macau ; The Environment ; Ethnic Minority Rights;Freedom of Expression; Freedom of Religion ; Freedom of Residence and Movement ; Human Trafficking ; Institutions of Democratic Governance ; North Korean Refugees in China; Population Planning ; Public Health ; Status of Women ; Tibet ; Worker Rights ; and Xinjiang. As one can imagine many of the positions of the CECC are critical of current Chnese policies and institutions. The CECC had most recently focused on Hong Kong (e.g., The Congressional-Executive Commission on China and Press Freedom in Hong Kong April 3, 2014). 


On October 9, 2014, the CECC released its 2014 Report, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2014 Annual Report (113th Congress, 2nd Sess, USGPO).  The Report may be accessed HERE. From the perspective adopted--that China continues to fail to act like an Anglo-European style republic and that it has aggressively sought to advance its own interests and project its power internationally, while controlling discussion that affects its image abroad,  in ways that may be incompatible with U.S. interests, and certainly with the political and economic ideology of the United States--the Report raises all of the important areas of concern.  But that very perspective that gives the Report its power also illustrates its weaknesses and ultimately its irrelevance for one of its key objectives--to pressure China to transform its economic and political systems to mimic that of the United States, and to change its political objectives so that they are compatible with those that benefit the United States.  Indeed to describe the project is to prove the pathos of that approach and the extraordinary misapplication of so much intellectual firepower as represented in that effort.  And that is a shame. Just one example suffices--the criticism of China's failure to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is the subject of substantial criticism by a government that itself has, and laudably in the service of its own interests, refused to em,brace the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  It would serve American interests better to abandon the ideologically rigid perspective that tends to produce flawed analysis and which contributes unnecessarily to antagonism--since at its foundation, the CECC starts from the premise that the Chinese state government is illegitimate and that it is in the interests of the United States to overthrow that regime.  That is hardly a basis for the development of the sort of strong relationships that makes legitimate conversation and criticism possible--even among economic competitors. China ought to be criticized when it fails to live up to its own ideology--just as the United States ought to be open to such criticism for its own failures to live up to its political ideals (as framed in our Constitution and political ideology). Beyond that, these sorts of reports devolve into little more than the usual sort of propaganda and ideological warfare that satisfies few but those engaged in this sort of combat. 

What is needed is rigorous and contextually based analysis that contributes to the application of American policy that advances American interests. That requires a refocus that accepts the organizing principles of the Chinese system and then seeks to hold them to their own ideals and to press them, in the way the United States is pressed, when it fails to fulfill its obligations, especially in ways that affect our own interests. What is not needed is yet another report that highlights the ways in which the Chinese system is not American. Even less necessary is a policy founded on the premise that the CHinese government must be overthrown. To that end, the work of the 4th Plenum, to be held in the coming weeks, on the structure of government and the development of rule of law in China, is probably worth more careful attention.  (e.g., New Essay Posted: "Crafting a Theory of Socialist Democracy For China in the 21st Century: Considering Hu Angang’s (胡鞍钢) Theory of Collective Presidency in the Context of the Emerging Chinese Constitutional State"). But it is likely to be dismissed as propaganda--perhaps because Americans continue to think that the Chinese are just Asian versions of bankrupt European Marxism.  But there is much there that is worth engaging, even with respect to the American ideological mission to advance protection of the dignity of individuals, but undertaken in a Chinese context.

What follows  are the Press Release issued by the CECC Joint Chairs, and their joint transmittal letter to President Obama.




For Immediate Release
Thursday, October 9, 2014
Contact: Scott Flipse

202-226-3777



CECC CHAIRS SENATOR SHERROD BROWN AND REPRESENTATIVE CHRIS SMITH RELEASE 2014 ANNUAL REPORT; CITING LACK OF PROGRESS, THEY URGE A NEW DIPLOMATIC APPROACH THAT INTEGRATES HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW ISSUES THROUGHOUT U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS


Chairs announce bipartisan Hong Kong legislation & in letter to President and
Congressional leaders, identify an action agenda for the next year.

(WASHINGTON, D.C.) Chairman U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Cochair U.S. Representative Chris Smith (R-NJ) issued today the 2014 Annual Report of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). The report provides detailed analysis on 19 human rights and rule of law issue areas and offers specific bipartisan recommendations on ways to address these issues in the U.S.-China relationship. The full report can be accessed on the CECC’s website (www.cecc.gov)

The Chairs also announced bipartisan legislation to update the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, to renew the annual reporting on U.S. interests in Hong Kong as provided for in Section 301 of the Act.

“This year’s report shows that human rights, freedom of speech, and rule of law deteriorated in China, while China’s compliance with international trade rules remained poor. On issue after issue, President Xi Jinping’s government showed more interest in consolidating power, gaming the system, and denying rights than being a responsible global power,” said Senator Sherrod Brown, CECC Chair. “China’s commitment to human rights and rule of law affects the safety of our food, the health of our economy, and stability in the Pacific.”

“It has been another horrific year for human rights in China, no one should still believe that President Xi Jinping will be a new type of Chinese leader, more open to reform and rights protections. This report, like last year’s, details the pervasiveness of China’s brutal population control policies and shows clearly that women continue to face surveillance, shame, and violence, including forced abortions and sterilizations this year,” said Chris Smith , CECC Cochair. “Because of China’s coercive population policies, there are tens of millions of missing daughters in China today, leading to a severe gender imbalance making China ground zero for human trafficking in Asia. Hundreds of courageous rights defenders, such as Gao Zhisheng and Liu Xiaobo, remain detained and there are new and troubling concerns about religious freedom, as dozens of churches were destroyed in the past year and the peaceful religious activities of Christians, Falun Gong, Uyghur Muslims, and Tibetan Buddhists continue to be viewed as potential threats to Communist Party leadership.”

In a letter to President Obama and Congressional leaders, the Chairs cited the unique bipartisan structure of the CECC, with Commissioners from Congress and the Administration, and identified 10 areas for more focused legislative and executive action, including, among other things, worker rights and prison labor, commercial rule of law, food safety, press and Internet freedom, and efforts to reform China’s coercive population planning policies

The letter from Senator Brown and Representative Smith to President Barack Obama, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Speaker John Boehner, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi transmitting the 2014 Annual Report can be found below:

___________

October 9, 2014

The Honorable Barack Obama
The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20050

Dear Mr. President:

The United States’ relationship with the People’s Republic of China is one of the most important of our time. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China was created by Congress in 2000 to monitor and report on two key aspects of this relationship: human rights and the development of the rule of law in China. Concrete progress on these issues will directly benefit both countries. China’s compliance with international human rights standards and international and domestic rules on trade, labor, and the environment will level the playing field, and increase the freedoms, protections, and safety of people on both sides of the Pacific. It will also promote greater trust and cooperation between our two countries. Human rights and rule of law should remain a cornerstone of our policy toward China.

The Commission plays a unique role in formulating U.S. policy toward China. The Commission’s structure, consisting of a bipartisan group of Senators, House Members, and senior-level Administration officials, is intended to foster cooperation between the legislative and executive branches and to promote bipartisan attention to human rights and rule of law with China. By legislative mandate, the Commission produces and publishes a comprehensive annual report on these issues every October that includes recommendations for legislative or executive action.

Overall, the Commission’s 2014 Annual Report found that human rights and rule of law conditions in China did not improve and declined in some areas. Based on developments this past year, the report identifies the following areas that we believe Congress and the Administration should focus on in the coming year:

Rights Advocates. This year’s report highlights the Chinese government’s harsh crackdown on rights advocates, many of whom have called for moderate reforms, in a troubling sign that China’s leaders have become even less tolerant of dissent. The Commission held a hearing on “Understanding China’s Crackdown on Rights Advocates: Personal Accounts and Perspectives” in April 2014 to draw attention to the crackdown. Chinese officials’ treatment of these advocates reflects a broader and systematic lack of respect for the rule of law.

Among the advocates detained or sentenced, many in criminal proceedings that failed to meet the basic requirements of due process, include rights advocate Xu Zhiyong, public interest lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, Uyghur scholar Ilham Tohti, and pastor Zhang Shaojie. On this issue, the report recommends, among other things, greater public recognition for the work of Chinese rights advocates in promoting human rights and rule of law, more frequently raising political prisoner cases with China, ensuring that Chinese rights advocates have freedom of movement and are allowed to participate in international forums and dialogues, and urging China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Worker Rights. This year’s report shows that Chinese workers still lack the basic right to form independent trade unions, that the Chinese government still fails to effectively enforce its own labor laws in many cases, and that child labor and the use of prison labor in the manufacture of products for export remain serious problems. Given the high percentage of goods the United States imports from China, it is likely that products made with child or prison labor or manufactured under poor working conditions continue to enter our country. The report recommends that the United States, as the largest single purchaser of goods and services in the world, ensure effective implementation of Executive Orders 13126 and 13267 which are intended to combat forced or indentured child labor, or trafficked labor in federal procurement and federal contracts. The report also recommends considering closing loopholes such as the consumptive demand exemption in Section 1307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and increasing supply chain transparency so that governments, businesses, and consumers can better trace the origin of products.

Hong Kong. As noted in this year’s report, China took actions that threatened Hong Kong’s democratic development and freedoms in the lead-up to Hong Kong’s first election of its Chief Executive by universal suffrage in 2017. The Commission highlighted these concerns at a roundtable on “Prospects for Democracy and Press Freedom in Hong Kong,” in April 2014. Given the important economic and social interests the U.S. has in Hong Kong, and China’s international commitments on the issue, the Commission’s report recommends that Congress and the Administration renew the reporting requirements of Section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 and express support for Hong Kong democracy by visiting the city and raising the issue in meetings with Chinese central government officials.

Press Freedom. The Commission held a roundtable in December 2013 on “China’s Treatment of Foreign Journalists,” highlighting China’s delays and denials of visas to dozens of foreign journalists and China’s blocking of foreign media Web sites and noted that this is both a freedom of expression and market access issue. Foreign journalists report some of the worst conditions in years, in stark contrast to the situation of Chinese journalists in the United States. The report recommends greater public expression, including at the highest levels of U.S. government, to the issue of press freedom in China and an assessment as to whether China’s treatments of foreign journalists and censorship of foreign Web sites constitutes a violation of China’s World Trade Organization obligations.

Food Safety. The Commission held a hearing in July 2014 on “Pet Treats and Processed Chicken from China: Concerns for American Consumers and Pets” which highlighted ongoing concerns regarding the safety of imported foods from China and the effectiveness of the current country-of-origin labeling system in notifying consumers when a product has been made in China. In response to a question for the record submitted to FDA for the hearing, the Commission learned that China continues to delay the granting of visas for additional FDA inspectors, despite reports that China had earlier agreed to begin granting visas. The Commission recommends greater action to secure these visas and to improve our inspection capabilities in China.

Commercial Rule of Law. The report notes little progress in China’s compliance with international trading obligations. China continues to control its currency, to subsidize and give preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises and domestic companies at the expense of American businesses and workers, to aid or abet intellectual property theft through cyber and other means, and to provide little transparency regarding Chinese companies, state subsidies, and commercial laws and regulations. There were reports of growing concern that foreign companies were being unfairly targeted, especially for antimonopoly investigations. The Commission held a hearing in January 2014 on “China’s Compliance with the World Trade Organization and International Trade Rules.” The report recommends ensuring that China makes concrete improvements in ending currency controls, subsidies for state-owned enterprises, and other policies that violate China’s existing international trading obligations, as a condition for progress in any U.S.-trade related negotiations with China. The report also recommends that the U.S. government more comprehensively track and make publicly accessible China’s trade commitments under the World Trade Organization, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, and U.S. efforts to secure China’s compliance with those commitments.

Population Planning. The report notes that despite a slight modification in the country’s coercive population planning policy to allow a couple to have a second child if one of the parents was a single child, the Chinese government failed to abolish a policy that itself violates international standards and leads to egregious abuses by officials including forced abortions and forced sterilizations. The report recommends abolishing all birth restrictions on Chinese families and urges proactive discussions, within bilateral security dialogues, on the potential for social, humanitarian, and regional trafficking problems if China fails to address imbalanced sex-ratios exacerbated by its coercive population policies.

Religious Freedom. The report notes government campaigns against church buildings and religious symbols apparently prompted by growing concern over the popularity of Christianity in China. The report also notes harassment of Catholic clergy, lawyers attempting to assist unlawfully detained Falun Gong practitioners, and bans on Uyghur Muslims’ observance of Ramadan. The report recommends that the U.S. urge China to implement in good faith the recommendations it accepted from the UN Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review of China held in October 2013, including taking necessary measures to ensure that rights to freedom of religion, as well as religious culture and expression, are fully observed and protected.

Ethnic Minorities. The report notes deteriorating conditions in ethnic minority areas, from increased violence in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region to harsher security measures in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, where some local governments have introduced measures imposing collective punishment intended to deter Tibetans from self-immolating. The report urges the Administration to address issues of human rights, security, and stability at bilateral security dialogues and any exchanges with Chinese military or police officials by sharing best practices on ways to balance civil rights and national security and to differentiate between peaceful dissent and acts of violence. The report recommends that the Chinese government can promote regional stability by respecting ethnic minorities’ right to maintain their language and culture, and to freely practice their religion, as provided for in China’s Constitution and laws. The report also recommends that Congress and the Administration urge China to allow the free flow of information regarding incidents of violence in ethnic minority regions and to allow journalists and international observers access to those areas in line with international standards.

Areas of Potential Progress. The report recommends that Congress and the Administration acknowledge and further inquire with Chinese officials about areas of potential progress noted in the report, including the announced abolition of the reeducation through labor system, potential reforms to the household registration system that could lessen the rural-urban divide, efforts to curb wrongful convictions and increase protections for criminal defendants, amendments to the PRC Trademark Law which increase statutory damages for infringement, revision to the Environmental Protection Law which include provisions that could improve transparency, and efforts to strengthen protections for person with disabilities and victims of domestic violence.

The report contains numerous other recommendations which we also urge you to consider. The Commission and its staff stand ready to assist Congress and the Administration in any way to carry out these recommendations. We look forward to working together on issues of such great importance to our nation.

Sincerely,
Sherrod Brown Christopher H. Smith
Chairman Cochairman

Chapter 9 (Ordering Government Through Law: Constitutions, Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Judicial Decisions, and Other Sources): From "Elements of Law" to "Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States"--Building an Introductory Course to the Legal Curriculum for the 21st Century

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(Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)


Since 2010, I have been posting on the development of a new course I have been developing for our first year law school students, "Elements of Law." The course originally had a quite modest objective--to introduce law students to legal research and reasoning through case law, statutory interpretation, and legal history, processes, and institutions. I chose to broaden its objectives within these specific parameters and development a framing and concepts course that would provide a deep foundation to law students on the legal system they were undertaking to study.
--Elements of Law 3.0: On the Relevance of a First Year Law Course Designed to Frame the Law School Curriculum).
--Developing a New Course--"Elements of Law"
--"Elements of Law" Course 2.0: A Framework Course for the U.S. Law Curriculum,
Grounded in the principles of the sociology of law, the course has morphed into an effort to introduce students to law as a self-referencing system with its own particular structures, premises, constraints and language, with its own logic and taboos and its own means of understanding the world. That systemicity (cf. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Chichester : John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1999) is then a critical element in the way in which the legal system (in this case of the United States) interacts with the world, both as a legal and as a socio-economic-political actor. The course has also expanded from its original narrow and technical focus, to a broader focus on principles and the use of language and logic to build and operate a system of law. That broadening has made it possible to offer the course not just to first year law students, but also to graduate students in the social sciences and in international affairs, as a grounding in the legal systems that are important in their respective fields.

This and the posts that follow produces some of the materials I will be presenting to the class. I offer these materials in hopes that they may prove of use and that you might share comments, perspectives and suggestions as I develop those materials on this site. Thanks.

This post includes a draft of the second Chapter of Part II-- Hierarchies of Law and Governance; Sources and Uses, Chapter 9 (Ordering Government Through Law: Constitutions, Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Judicial Decisions and Other Sources).
 
 
 
Chapter 9


Ordering Government Through Law: Constitutions, Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Judicial Decisions, and Other Sources


I. Introduction.

            In our last chapter we began to consider the relationship between law and the government.  We focused initially on the foundational issue for all legal systems—the relationship between law and government.  We were introduced to two of the more important patterns of such relationships.  The first posits a close relationship and at it limit an identity between law and the government.  The consequence is a tendency to view the legitimacy of law as a function of its production by a legislative or administrative organ of state.  There is another view that understands law as distinct from the government, and that government manages (and sometimes direct) but is not identical to law. We noted that the U.S: legal system seems to borrow a bot from both views, though it has yet to reconcile them in any meaningful way.

            Having considered the distinction between “law” systems and “government” institutions and their quite distinct “systemicity”, this chapter turns to issues of law system coherence. The object is to get the student to begin to think about what goes into the construction of a coherent system of law managed by a government, focusing not on an individual “law” but on law as a system. Issues of legal hierarchy and the systematization of law are the focus of this section of the course. For that purpose the class will consider hierarchies of law—is it possible to rank order these sources of law to determine which one is more authoritative than others; what is the relationship between constitutions, statutes, treaties, regulations, judicial decisions, other sources of law?  The student will consider how political communities rank laws—from constitution to statute, judicial decision and regulation.  She will also consider how government, principally through its courts in the United States, then develops rules for dealing with conflicts of hierarchy among legal systems when more than one appear to apply to the resolution of a dispute. That discussion serves as the basis for considering the underlying normative framework that produces these vertically arranged systems of law.  The student will understand the theories used to justify hierarchy and explain why, for example, constitutional law is superior, or of a different character, from ordinary law.

II. Chapter Readings

·      Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (Cornell U. Press 1955). READ pp. 72-89
·      Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (Cornell U. Press, rev. ed. 1947). READ 1-22
·      U.S. Constitution, Art. I, VI. Cl. 2, Amendments IX, X[1]
·      German Basic Law, arts.20-25; 31[2]
·      Constitution of South Africa, arts. 1, 2, 39, 146-150[3]
·      Indiana Code 1-1-2-1[4]
·      Hierarchy of Law in Georgia[5]

__________

Hierarchy of Law in the United States

Constitution of the United States

Article, § 1
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Article VI, cl. 2
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

Amendments

Article IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Article X.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
__________

German Basic Law

“The Basic Law is the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. It lays down the fundamental structure and essential values of the state. Among other things, the Basic Law defines the principles according to which the elections to the German Bundestag are conducted. It provides the basis for the status and rights of Parliament’s freely elected Members and outlines how the German Parliament should be organised and carry out its business.”[6]

The German Constitution, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, provides for a division of legislative authority in a manner somewhat different from that of the United States.  Its legislative authority is divided between a Bundesrat, which represents the German states (Länder) with relatively constrained authority.  The Bundestag, in contrast,  

is elected by the German people and is the forum where differing opinions about the policies the country should be pursuing are formulated and discussed.

The most important tasks performed by the Bundestag are the legislative process and the parliamentary scrutiny of the government and its work.

The Members of the German Bundestag also decide on the federal budget and deployments of the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces) outside Germany.

Another important function performed by the Bundestag is the election of the German Federal Chancellor.[7]

II. The Federation and the Länder
Article 20 [Constitutional principles – Right of resistance]
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state.
(2) All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies.
(3) The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.
(4) All Germans shall have the right to resist any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available.

Article 20a [Protection of the natural foundations of life and animals]
Mindful also of its responsibility toward future generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial action, all within the framework of the constitutional order.

Article 21 [Political parties]
(1) Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people. They may be freely established. Their internal organisation must conform to democratic principles. They must publicly account for their assets and for the sources and use of their funds.
(2) Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of
unconstitutionality.
(3) Details shall be regulated by federal laws.

* * *

Article 23 [European Union – Protection of basic rights –Principle of subsidiarity]
(1) With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.
(1a) The Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall have the right to bring an action before the Court of Justice of the European Union to challenge a legislative act of the European Union for infringing the principle of subsidiarity. The Bundestag is obliged to initiate such an action at the request of one fourth of its Members. By a statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat, exceptions from the first sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 42, and the first sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 52, may be authorised for the exercise of the rights granted to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat under the contractual foundations of the European Union.
(2) The Bundestag and, through the Bundesrat, the Länder shall participate in matters concerning the European Union. The Federal Government shall keep the Bundestag and the Bundesrat informed, comprehensively and at the earliest possible time.
(3) Before participating in legislative acts of the European Union, the Federal Government shall provide the Bundestag with an opportunity to state its position. The Federal Government shall take the position of the Bundestag into account during the negotiations. Details shall be regulated by a law.
(4) The Bundesrat shall participate in the decision-making process of the Federation insofar as it would have been competent to do so in a comparable domestic matter, or insofar as the subject falls within the domestic competence of the Länder.
(5) Insofar as, in an area within the exclusive competence of the Federation, interests of the Länder are affected, and in other matters, insofar as the Federation has legislative power, the Federal Government shall take the position of the Bundesrat into account. To the extent that the legislative powers of the Länder, the structure of Land authorities, or Land administrative procedures are primarily affected, the  position of the Bundesrat shall be given the greatest possible respect in determining the Federation’s position consistent with the responsibility of the Federation for the nation as a whole. In matters that may result in increased expenditures or reduced revenues for the Federation, the consent of the Federal Government shall be required.
(6) When legislative powers exclusive to the Länder concerning matters of school education, culture or broadcasting are primarily affected, the exercise of the rights belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany as a member state of the European Union shall be delegated by the Federation to a representative of the Länder designated by the Bundesrat. These rights shall be exercised with the participation of, and in coordination with, the Federal Government; their exercise shall be consistent with the responsibility of the Federation for the nation as a whole (7)
Details regarding paragraphs (4) to (6) of this Article shall be regulated by a law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat.

Article 24 [Transfer of sovereign powers – System of collective security]
(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organisations.
(1a) Insofar as the Länder are competent to exercise state powers and to perform state functions, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, transfer sovereign powers to transfrontier institutions in neighbouring regions.
(2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world.
(3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall accede to agreements providing for general, comprehensive and compulsory international arbitration.

Article 25 [Primacy of international law]
The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.

Article 26 [Securing international peace]
(1) Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offence.
(2) Weapons designed for warfare may be manufactured, transported or marketed only with the permission of the Federal Government. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.

* * *

Article 28 [Land constitutions – Autonomy of municipalities]
(1) The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the  principles of a republican, democratic and social state governed by the rule of law, within the meaning of this Basic  Law. In each Land, county and municipality the people shall be represented by a body chosen in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. In county and municipal elections, persons who possess citizenship in any member state of the European Community are also eligible to vote and to be elected in accord with European Community law. In municipalities a local assembly may take the place of an elected body.
(2) Municipalities must be guaranteed the right to regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws. Within the limits of their functions designated by a law, associations of municipalities shall also have the right of self-government according to the laws. The guarantee of self-government shall extend to the bases of financial autonomy; these bases shall include the right of municipalities to a source of tax revenues based upon economic ability and the right to establish the rates at which these sources shall be taxed.
(3) The Federation shall guarantee that the constitutional order of the Länder conforms to the basic rights and to the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article.

* * *

Article 30 [Sovereign powers of the Länder]
Except as otherwise provided or permitted by this Basic Law, the exercise of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for the Länder
.
Article 31[Supremacy of federal law]
Federal law shall take precedence over Land law.

__________

Constitution of South Africa
Arts. 1, 2, 39, 146-150


1. Republic of South Africa
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values:
        Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.
        Non-racialism and non-sexism.
        Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law.
        Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.


2.  Supremacy of Constitution
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.

* * *

39. Interpretation of Bill of Rights
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum-
        a. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom;
        b. must consider international law; and
        c. may consider foreign law.
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.

* * *

Conflicting Laws (§§ 146-150)

146. Conflicts between national and provincial legislation
1. This section applies to a conflict between national legislation and provincial legislation falling within a functional area listed in Schedule 4.
2. National legislation that applies uniformly with regard to the country as a whole prevails over provincial legislation if any of the following conditions is met:
        a. The national legislation deals with a matter that cannot be regulated effectively by legislation enacted by the respective provinces individually.
        b. The national legislation deals with a matter that, to be dealt with effectively, requires uniformity across the nation, and the national legislation provides that uniformity by establishing-
            i. norms and standards;
            ii. frameworks; or
            iii. national policies.
        c. The national legislation is necessary for-
            i. the maintenance of national security;
            ii. the maintenance of economic unity;
            iii. the protection of the common market in respect of the mobility of goods, services, capital and labour;
            iv. the promotion of economic activities across provincial boundaries;
            v. the promotion of equal opportunity or equal access to government services; or
            vi. the protection of the environment.
3. National legislation prevails over provincial legislation if the national legislation is aimed at preventing unreasonable action by a province that-
        a. is prejudicial to the economic, health or security interests of another province or the country as a whole; or
        b. impedes the implementation of national economic policy.
4. When there is a dispute concerning whether national legislation is necessary for a purpose set out in subsection (2) (c) and that dispute comes before a court for resolution, the court must have due regard to the approval or the rejection of the legislation by the National Council of Provinces.
5. Provincial legislation prevails over national legislation if subsection (2) or (3) does not apply.
6. A law made in terms of an Act of Parliament or a provincial Act can prevail only if that law has been approved by the National Council of Provinces.
6. If the National Council of Provinces does not reach a decision within 30 days of its first sitting after a law was referred to it, that law must be considered for all purposes to have been approved by the Council.
7. If the National Council of Provinces does not approve a law referred to in subsection (6), it must, within 30 days of its decision, forward reasons for not approving the law to the authority that referred the law to it.

147. Other conflicts
1. If there is a conflict between national legislation and a provision of a provincial constitution with regard to-
        a. a matter concerning which this Constitution specifically requires or envisages the enactment of national legislation, the national legislation prevails over the affected provision of the provincial constitution;
        b. national legislative intervention in terms of section 44 (2), the national legislation prevails over the provision of the provincial constitution; or
        c. a matter within a functional area listed in Schedule 4, section 146 applies as if the affected provision of the provincial constitution were provincial legislation referred to in that section.
2. National legislation referred to in section 44 (2) prevails over provincial legislation in respect of matters within the functional areas listed in Schedule 5.



148. Conflicts that cannot be resolved
If a dispute concerning a conflict cannot be resolved by a court, the national legislation prevails over the provincial legislation or provincial constitution.

149. Status of legislation that does not prevail
A decision by a court that legislation prevails over other legislation does not invalidate that other legislation, but that other legislation becomes inoperative for as long as the conflict remains.

150. Interpretation of conflicts
When considering an apparent conflict between national and provincial legislation, or between national legislation and a provincial constitution, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation or constitution that avoids a conflict, over any alternative interpretation that results in a conflict.

__________



Indiana Code

IC 1-1-2 Chapter 2. Laws Governing the State

IC 1-1-2-1
Hierarchy of law

Sec. 1. The law governing this state is declared to be:
    First. The Constitution of the United States and of this state.
    Second. All statutes of the general assembly of the state in force, and not inconsistent with such constitutions.
    Third. All statutes of the United States in force, and relating to subjects over which congress has power to legislate for the states, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States.
    Fourth. The common law of England, and statutes of the British Parliament made in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First (except the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry the Eighth,) and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, and not inconsistent with the first, second and third specifications of this section.

__________





III.Ordering Government Through Law: Constitutions, Statutes, Treaties, Regulations, Judicial Decisions, and Other Sources

            We have begun to look at the relationship between law and government.  We have been introduced both to the complexities of the subject and to the ideological foundations of the modern approaches to the issue.   These foundations are, in the West at least, two strains of Enlightenment era ideologies that produced sometimes profoundly distinct notions of the value of government, the necessity of government to law and the relationship of the state to the individual.  Both are grounded in the ancient concept, now understood as infinitely malleable, of popular consent.  This is a notion we encountered first with the Institutes[8](though its origins lie much farther back in Western ideological history and practice).

            On the one hand, consent can be understood as the expression of the popular will, made manifest through government and expressed in law enacted through this apparatus of state. In this construct law is impossible in the absence of government and government provides the incarnation of the popular will which is itself the manifestation of the best interests of the individuals now come together within a political community. Government is a source of protection and obedience to government is a first principle of active engagement with the state.  The protection of that manifestation of the general will is the highest order of systemic protection―process, legality, and a commitment to a basic set of substantive rights form the core of this approach to government and law.  This is an approach that found its most congenial home in continental Europe and Latin America. A variation of this approach underlies Marxist Leninist political theory and state organization.

            On the other hand, consent can be understood as a means of organizing a community of like interests for the protection of property and the operationalization of popular custom and traditions. In this construct, government is a consequential construct, something that is necessary to ensure protection but is not otherwise invested with any inherent power or character.  As a site for the assertion of power against individual interest it is viewed with suspicion and framed in a way that ensures the smallest interference with individual privilege (understood within the structures of custom and tradition to which the community adheres). Consent and adherence to the government is disciplined by ensuring that all are equal before the law (that in many cases remains a work in progress of course) and that the law is firmly anchored in custom as the lived set of consensual practices of the community.   Government is thus both a source of protection and the space within which joint efforts for improvement can be undertaken.  Government is understood as limited in the scope of its power and is itself constrained by law, including the higher law of the state (the subject of this class).  The government may make law but law is not attached to government nor entirely derived from it. This is an approach most notable in pre modern England and its colonies.

            In the United States, no single approach predominates.  The American federal government retains, at least in theory, a foundation in the ideology of constraint limited power―at least as against the states in our federal system.  States retain, at least in theory, an organization in which their power is also derived from and attached to popular willingness to see it exercised.  On the other hand, there is a strong strain in American political theory, one increasingly strong as our political ideology drifts more and more into a governance space primarily occupied by projects of regulatory management of behavior, that favors the idea of the union of government and law, of the idea of delegated power entirely consumed by the apparatus of state (including but not limited to its legislature) and of the primacy of the government as the ultimate reflection of the “popular” (Americans do not use the term “general”) will. Thus, in the United States ideology is ambiguous and ideological goals in tension.  As a result, pragmatism has tended, at least until recently, to prevail in American politics and ideology used only to support what expediency and political calculation required.  That may be changing.

            Today, we take up the related issue.  Whether or not law is an exclusive instrument of government or is otherwise related but not entirely constrained by it, the various forms of law we have encountered, and the needs of government to produce efficient governance structures, have since before the time of the Institutes[9]produced a need to order law in accordance with the needs and premises on which the government of a state is ordered.  While it is certainly possible to conceive of a government system either in which there exists only one type of law, or in which law, by whatever form created share the same authority, such systems are rare and in any case do not reflect current conventional political ideological premises under any governmental system of consequence. Virtually all systems require that law be ordered into a hierarchy, and that the law that touches on the organization and powers of the government assume a dignity greater than that of the law that orders the private relations among individuals. We consider the way that, within the government system of the United States, law is thus ordered, with an eye toward alternatives adopted in other leading or influential states. To that end we focus on the justification and structuring of a “higher law” of government―what most of us now understand generally as the constitutional law of a state―and through that higher law to consider the place of the other forms of law to which we have been introduced in the prior weeks within the domestic legal orders of states.   In our next class we consider the difficult issue of the relationship between the hierarchies of national legal orders and the international order, and specifically is there something to order (e.g., Carlos José Gutierrez, “Conflicts Between Domestic and International Law,”[10]American University Law Review 30:147-154 (1981).

            Our first reading sets the framework of our discussion, Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (Cornell U. Press 1955). It provides the context for consideration of the question of hierarchy in law in the United States, and more specifically, the jurisprudential premises within which the idea of a hierarchy of law could emerge, and more importantly, a hierarchy of law that is related to, constrains but is also embedded in a government. For Corwin, “The Reformation superseded an infallible Pope with an infallible Bible; the American Revolution replaced the sway of a king with that of a document.  That such would be the outcome was not unforeseen from the first” (Corwin, supra, p.1). Corwin’s object is to try to distill the reasons why such a document, the federal constitution, could assume a role as the “higher” law of the United States, one in which the Constitution, much like the Institutes[11](p.3-4) was ordained by the people and thus acquired both legality and supremacy.  “The sole difference between the Constitution of the United States and the imperial legislation justified in this famous text is that the former is assumed to have proceeded immediately from the people, while the later proceeded from a like source only mediately.” (Ibid., 4). But Corwin also suggests that while the Constitution’s supremacy and legality might be ascribed to the legitimacy of the popular approval that ordained it, its legitimacy also was ascribed to the notions of justice contained within it, that is to those natural law principles, “eternal and immutable. . . [not] an act of will but one of discovery and declaration.” (Ibid., p. 5). That is, Corwin argues, that the supremacy of the Constitution followed from the idea that it merely declared “a law superior to the will of human governors.” (ibid). He then seeks to consider these natural law origins of the Constitution and its place within the hierarchy of American law, one grounded in ancient (Roman) concepts of natural law  producing natural rights which could not be taken through the agency of any government except illegitimately.  (Ibid., 15-20; further reading essays in Richard O. Brooks editor, Cicero and Modern Law[12](Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009).

            In the pages before the assigned reading (esp. pp. 57-72)  Corwin considered the development of natural law doctrine and its effects on the way Americans thought about law. He was particularly interested in the contributions of two germinal figures in that development, Grotius and Sir Isaac Newton (pp. 58). Grotius, Corwin tells us, “erected the law of nations upon a natural law basis as a basis against the current international anarchy” (ibid., 57). He also revived, as a subject of legal discourse, Cicero’s ideal of natural law, clearing it of its theological accretions acquired during the medieval period, but not with its associations with notions of the Divine order, and thus making it acceptable to those who had thrown in with the Reformation. (Ibid. 58). “Once natural law is defined as right reason and is described as at once a law of, and a law to, God.” (Ibid) it is free to serve as an autonomous premise for the construction of a law-state.  Newton  provides especially the English speaking world with an ideology of order within the natural world, one that either confirms the orderliness of the divine conception of the world or in the existence of those natural rules which reason, through science, could make manifest (Ibid., 58-50) “[i]nscrutable deity became scrutable nature.” (Ibid., 59).

            These natural law ideas, Corwin tells us, were conveyed into American constitutional theory through the work of John Locke, whose Second Treatise on Civil Government[13]you have encountered in our recent readings.   His transformation of natural rights into rights of the individual, borrowed from the debates between Royalists and Parliamentarians in the English Civil War, rights of “Life, liberty and estate” (“This is because our law is grounded upon the law of nature.  And these three things do flow from the law of nature.” Bacon, Argument in Calvin’s’ Case, Bacon, Works 176.) is made possible through his development of the idea of the “social compact” tied to the law of nature. (Ibid., 61). Locke effectively sought to transform the law of nature from a notion of mass rights to one of individual rights.  In what would become the U.S. these notions were bound up in those social and political compacts, the Mayflower Compact[14]being a principal example, that sought to re-establish a covenantal government among a community of followers that mimicked the covenantal relationships between God and his people in the Bible. “And the procedure which, under the sanction of God, was effective to produce a Church, could also be availed of under the same sanction to produce a commonwealth.” (Ibid., 65). Thus, where Locke looked to natural law as the ultimate basis of authority, American colonists in New England, at least, sought that authority in God and in the patterns of covenant based government established in the Hebrew Bible. For the colonists south of New England, though, the later writings of Locke would prove persuasive. “The two features of the Second Treatise which have impressed themselves most definitely upon American constitutional law are the limitations which it lays down for legislative power and its emphasis on property right.” (Ibid., 67).

            The influence of higher law doctrine associated with the names of Sir Edward Coke[15]and Locke was at its height in England during the period when the American colonies were being most actively settled.” (Ibid., 72).    During the time of settlement and especially before the 18th century, the colonies repeatedly tried “to secure for their constituencies for the benefits of Magna Carta[16]and particularly of the twenty-ninth chapter thereof [due process].” (Ibid., 73).  Indeed, for the colonists, Magna Carta, according to Corwin became a generic term for documents of constitutional significance.

After the Bible, Locke was the principal authority relied on by the preachers to bolster up their political teachings, although Coke, Pufendorf, Sydney, and later on some others were also cited. . . . Natural rights and the social compact, government bounded by law and incapable of imparting legality to measures contrary to law, and the right to resistance to illegal measures all fall into their proper place.” (Ibid., 74-75).

            It was during the 18th century that these ideas began to be applied through a series of judicial cases in which local courts became the sites of development for the political theories that would eventually produce the political theory of the federal constitution. “The suggestion that the local courts might be thus pitted against an usurping Parliament in defense of ‘British rights,’ served to bring the idea of judicial review to the very threshold of the first American constitutions, albeit it was destined to wait there unattended for some years.” (Ibid., 77).  These eventually formed the idea, nicely put forth in the Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768, of the fundamental notion that governmental authority is intrinsically conditioned by a higher and fundamental law intrinsic to the condition of free individuals and subjects.  These ideas also played nicely into the development of the idea, increasingly popular in the colonies, of the fundamental character of the autonomy of each of the units of the Empire, each co-equal and tied together solely through their mutual allegiance to the person of the King. (Ibid., 80-81).  A strain of this eventually appears in the federal organization of the American Union and the perennial power of notions of “states’ rights” in contemporary American discourse. 

            But Corwin also suggests that when aggregated, these strains of political ideas eventually focused the ideological foundations of the American Revolution on the question, earlier at the heart of the English Civil War, of the fundamental character of government and the role of law, especially a “higher” or “natural” law to constrain the apparatus of state (and principally its legislative power.

Lord Acton has described the American Revolution as a contest between two ideas of legislative power.  Even as late as the Declaratory Act of 1766,[17]the American invocation of a constitution setting metes and bounds to Parliament did not fail of a certain response among the English themselves. . . .  The direction which the great weight of professional [English] opinion was now taking was shown when Lord Mansfield . . . ., arose in the House of Lords to support the Declaratory Act.  The passage of that measure by an overwhelming majority committed Parliament substantially to Milton’s conclusion of a century earlier that ‘Parliament was above all positive law, whether civil or common.’” (Ibid., 83-84).

But neither the English nor the American position was extreme.  Both incorporated aspects of the other. The English embraced Parliamentary supremacy but exercised that supremacy within a thousand years of constitutional constraints.  The Americans embraced limited government but also embraced the ideal of legislative sovereignty, which was also “added to the stock of American political ideas”. (Ibid., 87).  But legislative sovereignty of the sort that eventually dominated European systems and one that could trace its origins to the consent and delegation notions of the Institutes, was rejected as the dominant model of the American Republic.  Corwin offers two reasons, based on the emergence of a constitutional system and with it a very specific hierarchy of law that in turn served to constrain the government in the exercise of its now more limited powers.

In the first place, in the American written constitution, higher law at last attained a form which made possible the attribution to it of an entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanating from the sovereign people. . . . . But in the second place, even statutory form could hardly have saved the higher law as a recourse for individuals had it not been backed up by judicial review .” (Ibid., 89).

            With the second reading, Charles McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern (Cornell U. Press, rev. ed. 1947), the student is then introduced to what this political settlement at the start of the American Republic means for the lawyer, and specifically the development of the modern notion of constitutionalism.  McIlwain starts by contrasting the new with the old concept of constitutionalism by contrasting Thomas Paine’s[18]view with that of Henry St. John, Vicount Bolingbroke.[19]For Paine, a constitution is a thing that precedes the government it forms and a government can only exist legitimately as a creature of the constitution that creates it.  (Ibid., 2).  For Bolingbroke, a constitution is the whole of the edifice of state assembled―its laws, institutions, and customs derived from the customs and usages of the people which have agreed to its government.  The government is a descriptor of this assemblage. (Ibid., 3). For Paine a government may not act legitimately contrary to the constitution; for Bolingbroke such an act is evidence of a bad government. (Ibid). In one case arbitrary government is inconceivable in the sense that such an act would destroy the fabric on which the state is built; for the other it merely suggests necessity backed by the authority of the representative of the people. (Ibid., 7).  For Paine the consequence of arbitrary government is either a lawful power of rebellion or the disciplinary power of judicial review (Ibid., 9)

            McIlwain suggests that Paine’s idea “that the only true constitution is one consciously constructed and that a nation’s government is only the creature of this constitution, conforms probably more closely than any other to the actual development in the world since the opening of the nineteenth century.” (Ibid, 14). The sort of written constitution as understood by Paine has become the norm in most parts of the world, though their construction and emphasis has varied over time.   (Ibid).  That becomes clear as we review the constitutions you have been asked to consider for this class: the U.S. Constitution,[20]Art. VI. Cl. 2; the German Basic Law,[21]arts.20-25; 31; and the Constitution of South Africa,[22]arts. 2, 39, 146-150.The U.S. constitution is a so called first generation[23]constitution, the principal focus of which is the establishment of a government (McIlwain, 20) constrained by the provisions of the constitution itself in the exercise of power.  The German Basic Law is a so called second generation constitution, one that, while concerned with the establishment of a constrained government, emphasizes the limitations of the power of the government to interfere in the enjoyment by the people of certain specified rights (articles 1-20 of the GBL).  In addition, the constitution itself limits the power of the people to themselves curtail these basic―natural and superior―rights, rights which no government may abridge, except to the extent permitted by the constitutional language itself, because they stand above and beyond the jurisdiction of state. The South African Constitution is a so called third generation constitution, one in which to the focus of the prior approaches to constitutions are added a more active engagement with and connection to international law and the law development of the constitutional traditions of other states.  

            With the establishment of a law-government order in which the government is understood to be a creature of law―that is of the higher law of the constitution―but which is also vested with the power to legislate and bind both government and individuals, within the constraints, if any, of the constitution under which it was created, the rest of the hierarchy of la, within, a state follows.  That hierarchy identified both the sources of law deemed legitimate and the precedence each is accorded in relation to the others.  Together these form the domestic legal order of a state.   The Background reading (above) and the two excerpts from state law―Indiana Code 1-1-2-1[24]and Hierarchy of Law in Georgia[25]―provide illustrations of the usual hierarchy of law in federal and state systems. The Indiana statute is especially useful for its attempt to codify that amalgam of law types within a multilayer system of governments and for its specification of the receipt of English common law in Indiana:

Sec.1. The law governing this state is declared to be:

            First. The Constitution of the United States and of this state.

            Second. All statutes of the general assembly of the state in force, and not inconsistent with such constitutions.

            Third. All statutes of the United States in force, and relating to subjects over which congress has power to legislate for the states, and not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States.

            Fourth. The common law of England, and statutes of the British Parliament made in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First (except the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry the Eighth,) and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, and not inconsistent with the first, second and third specifications of this section.

Most interesting is the precedence of statute over common law and of state law over federal statute except to the extent of federal power.  That would suggest a broad reading of state power and a narrow reading of the federal power to assert control in matters of concurrent jurisdiction. In reality, as law students learn in the introduction to constitutional law―that determination gas been largely left to the federal courts to decide now. Contrast to Georgia where, according to the chart created, federal statutes, administrative regulations and judicial decisions touching on federal power tale precedence over their state counterparts.

            Legal hierarchy of the sort discussed above makes for great theory but provides little guidance for managing the complex interviewing that is the legal system of the United States within its federal union.  What appears so straightforward in theory can become quite unmanageable in the working lives of lawyers.  This has become especially true over the last century, as the old “law equilibrium”—the cultural consensus about where law ought to originate and the relative roles of the distinct legal sub-systems within it (the object of our study in Chapters 1-7) has given way to two significant changes.  The first is the explosion of statute and administrative regulation that increasingly manage virtually all aspects of life within a state. The second is the move toward nationalization of law production, resulting in a greater willingness to address issues, especially relating to economic activities, at the national level. As a consequence there has been an increased tendency to displace state common law, statutes and administrative regulation by those originating in the national government.   

            That process of the growth of areas subject to legal regulation and the nationalization of law has been managed largely by the federal courts. In the United States, the courts manage legal hierarchy through the application of the doctrine of preemption. Preemption issues tend to focus on the authority of states to legislate in the face of federal power.  The following case provides an example of the approach of the courts both to the expression of the doctrine and to its application against  the law of a state. 

Altria Group v. Good
555 U.S. 70 (2008)

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

   Respondents, who have for over 15 years smoked “light” cigarettes manufactured by petitioners, Philip Morris USA, Inc., and its parent company, Altria Group, Inc., claim that petitioners violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act (MUTPA). Specifically, they allege that petitioners’ advertising fraudulently conveyed the message that their “light” cigarettes deliver less tar and nicotine to consumers than regular brands despite petitioners’ knowledge that the message was untrue. Petitioners deny the charge, asserting that their advertisements were factually accurate. The merits of the dispute are not before us because the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of petitioners on the ground that respondents’ state-law claim is pre-empted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, as amended (Labeling Act). The Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, and we granted certiorari to review its holding that the Labeling Act neither expressly nor impliedly pre-empts respondents’ fraud claim. We affirm.

I

   Respondents are Maine residents and longtime smokers of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes, which are manufactured by petitioners. Invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the Federal District Court, respondents filed a complaint alleging that petitioners deliberately deceived them about the true and harmful nature of “light” cigarettes in violation of the MUTPA, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, §207 (Supp. 2008).[26]Respondents claim that petitioners fraudulently marketed their cigarettes as being “light” and containing “ ‘[l]owered [t]ar and [n]icotine’ ” to convey to consumers that they deliver less tar and nicotine and are therefore less harmful than regular cigarettes. App. 28a–29a.

   Respondents acknowledge that testing pursuant to the Cambridge Filter Method[27]indicates that tar and nicotine yields of Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights are lower than those of regular cigarettes. Id., at 30a. Respondents allege, however, that petitioners have known at all relevant times that human smokers unconsciously engage in compensatory behaviors not registered by Cambridge Filter Method testing that negate the effect of the tar- and nicotine-reducing features of “light” cigarettes. Id., at 30a–31a. By covering filter ventilation holes with their lips or fingers, taking larger or more frequent puffs, and holding the smoke in their lungs for a longer period of time, smokers of “light” cigarettes unknowingly inhale as much tar and nicotine as do smokers of regular cigarettes. Ibid. “Light” cigarettes are in fact more harmful because the increased ventilation that results from their unique design features produces smoke that is more mutagenic per milligram of tar than the smoke of regular cigarettes. Id., at 31a–32a. Respondents claim that petitioners violated the MUTPA by fraudulently concealing that information and by affirmatively representing, through the use of “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” descriptors, that their cigarettes would pose fewer health risks. Id., at 32a, 33a.

   Petitioners moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Labeling Act, 15 U. S. C. §1334(b), expressly pre-empts respondents’ state-law cause of action. Relying on our decisions in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U. S. 504 (1992), and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525 (2001), the District Court concluded that respondents’ MUTPA claim is pre-empted. The court recast respondents’ claim as a failure-to-warn or warning neutralization claim of the kind pre-empted in Cipollone: The claim charges petitioners with “produc[ing] a product it knew contained hidden risks … not apparent or known to the consumer”—a claim that “runs to what [petitioners] actually said about Lights and what [respondents] claim they should have said.” 436 F. Supp. 2d 132, 151 (Me. 2006). And the difference between what petitioners said and what respondents would have them say is “ ‘intertwined with the concern about cigarette smoking and health.’ ” Id., at 153 (quoting Reilly, 533 U. S., at 548). The District Court thus concluded that respondents’ claim rests on a state-law requirement based on smoking and health of precisely the kind that §1334(b) pre-empts, and it granted summary judgment for petitioners.

   Respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals first rejected the District Court’s characterization of respondents’ claim as a warning neutralization claim akin to the pre-empted claim in Cipollone. 501 F. 3d 29, 37, 40 (CA1 2007). Instead, the court concluded that respondents’ claim is in substance a fraud claim that alleges that petitioners falsely represented their cigarettes as “light” or having “lowered tar and nicotine” even though they deliver to smokers the same quantities of those components as do regular cigarettes. Id., at 36. “The fact that these alleged misrepresentations were unaccompanied by additional statements in the nature of a warning does not transform the claimed fraud into failure to warn” or warning neutralization. Id., at 42–43. Finding respondents’ claim indistinguishable from the non-pre-empted fraud claim at issue in Cipollone, the Court of Appeals held that it is not expressly pre-empted. The court also rejected petitioners’ argument that respondents’ claim is impliedly pre-empted because their success on that claim would stand as an obstacle to the purported policy of the FTC allowing the use of descriptive terms that convey Cambridge Filter Method test results. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the District Court.

   In concluding that respondents’ claim is not expressly pre-empted, the Court of Appeals considered and rejected the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in a similar case. 501 F. 3d, at 45. Unlike the court below, the Fifth Circuit likened the plaintiffs’ challenge to the use of “light” descriptors to Cipollone’s warning neutralization claim and thus found it expressly pre-empted. Brown v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 479 F. 3d 383, 392–393 (2007). We granted the petition for certiorari to resolve this apparent conflict. 552 U. S. ___ (2008).

II

   Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Consistent with that command, we have long recognized that state laws that conflict with federal law are “without effect.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U. S. 725, 746 (1981).

   Our inquiry into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that “ ‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U. S. 96, 103 (1963)). Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525 (1977). If a federal law contains an express pre-emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state law still remains. Pre-emptive intent may also be inferred if the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280, 287 (1995).

   When addressing questions of express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis “with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947). That assumption applies with particular force when Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States. Lohr, 518 U. S., at 485; see also Reilly, 533 U. S., at 541–542 (“Because ‘federal law is said to bar state action in [a] fiel[d] of traditional state regulation,’ namely, advertising, we ‘wor[k] on the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’ ” (citation omitted)). Thus, when the text of a pre-emption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading, courts ordinarily “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 449 (2005).

   Congress enacted the Labeling Act in 1965 in response to the Surgeon General’s determination that cigarette smoking is harmful to health. The Act required that every package of cigarettes sold in the United States contain a conspicuous warning, and it pre-empted state-law positive enactments that added to the federally prescribed warning. 79 Stat. 283. Congress amended the Labeling Act a few years later by enacting the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969.[28]The amendments strengthened the language of the prescribed warning, 84 Stat. 88, and prohibited cigarette advertising in “any medium of electronic communication subject to [FCC] jurisdiction,” id., at 89. They also broadened the Labeling Act’s pre-emption provision. See Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 520 (plurality opinion) (discussing the difference in scope of the pre-emption clauses of the 1965 and 1969 Acts). The Labeling Act has since been amended further to require cigarette manufacturers to include four more explicit warnings in their packaging and advertisements on a rotating basis.[29]

   The stated purpose of the Labeling Act is

“to establish a comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby—

   “(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes; and

   “(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.” 79 Stat. 282, 15 U. S. C. §1331.

The requirement that cigarette manufacturers include in their packaging and advertising the precise warnings mandated by Congress furthers the Act’s first purpose. And the Act’s pre-emption provisions promote its second purpose.

   As amended, the Labeling Act contains two express pre-emption provisions. Section 5(a) protects cigarette manufacturers from inconsistent state labeling laws by prohibiting the requirement of additional statements relating to smoking and health on cigarette packages. 15 U. S. C. §1334(a). Section 5(b), which is at issue in this case, provides that “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.” §1334(b).

   Together, the labeling requirement and pre-emption provisions express Congress’ determination that the prescribed federal warnings are both necessary and sufficient to achieve its purpose of informing the public of the health consequences of smoking. Because Congress has decided that no additional warning statement is needed to attain that goal, States may not impede commerce in cigarettes by enforcing rules that are based on an assumption that the federal warnings are inadequate. Although both of the Act’s purposes are furthered by prohibiting States from supplementing the federally prescribed warning, neither would be served by limiting the States’ authority to prohibit deceptive statements in cigarette advertising. Petitioners acknowledge that “Congress had no intention of insulating tobacco companies from liability for inaccurate statements about the relationship between smoking and health.” Brief for Petitioners 28. But they maintain that Congress could not have intended to permit the enforcement of state fraud rules because doing so would defeat the Labeling Act’s purpose of preventing nonuniform state warning requirements. 15 U. S. C. §1331.[30]As we observed in Cipollone, however, fraud claims “rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity.” 505 U. S., at 529 (plurality opinion).

   Although it is clear that fidelity to the Act’s purposes does not demand the pre-emption of state fraud rules, the principal question that we must decide is whether the text of §1334(b) nevertheless requires that result.

III

   We have construed the operative phrases of §1334(b) in two prior cases: Cipollone, 505 U. S. 504, and Reilly, 533 U. S. 525. On both occasions we recognized that the phrase “based on smoking and health” modifies the state-law rule at issue rather than a particular application of that rule.

   In Cipollone, the plurality, which consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O’Connor, and Stevens, read the pre-emption provision in the 1969 amendments to the Labeling Act to pre-empt common-law rules as well as positive enactments. Unlike Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Souter, the plurality concluded that the provision does not preclude all common-law claims that have some relationship to smoking and health. 505 U. S., at 521–523. To determine whether a particular common-law claim is pre-empted, the plurality inquired “whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a ‘requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health … with respect to … advertising or promotion,’ giving that clause a fair but narrow reading.” Id., at 524.

   Applying this standard, the plurality held that the plaintiff’s claim that cigarette manufacturers had fraudulently misrepresented and concealed a material fact was not pre-empted. That claim alleged a violation of the manufacturers’ duty not to deceive—a duty that is not “based on” smoking and health. Id., at 528–529. Respondents in this case also allege a violation of the duty not to deceive as that duty is codified in the MUTPA. The duty codified in that state statute, like the duty imposed by the state common-law rule at issue in Cipollone, has nothing to do with smoking and health.[31]

   Petitioners endeavor to distance themselves from that holding by arguing that respondents’ claim is more analogous to the “warning neutralization” claim found to be pre-empted in Cipollone. Although the plurality understood the plaintiff to have presented that claim as a “theory of fraudulent misrepresentation,” id., at 528, the gravamen of the claim was the defendants’ failure to warn, as it was “predicated on a state-law prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional materials that tend to minimize the health hazards associated with smoking,” id., at 527. Thus understood, the Cipollone plurality’s analysis of the warning neutralization claim has no application in this case.[32]

   Petitioners nonetheless contend that respondents’ claim is like the pre-empted warning neutralization claim because it is based on statements that “might create a false impression” rather than statements that are “inherently false.” Brief for Petitioners 39. But the extent of the falsehood alleged does not alter the nature of the claim. Nothing in the Labeling Act’s text or purpose or in the plurality opinion in Cipollone suggests that whether a claim is pre-empted turns in any way on the distinction between misleading and inherently false statements. Petitioners’ misunderstanding is the same one that led the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, when confronted with a “light” descriptors claim, to reach a result at odds with the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case. See Brown,479 F. 3d, at 391–393. Certainly, the extent of the falsehood alleged may bear on whether a plaintiff can prove her fraud claim, but the merits of respondents’ claim are not before us.

   Once that erroneous distinction is set aside, it is clear that our holding in Cipollone that the common-law fraud claim was not pre-empted is directly applicable to the statutory claim at issue in this case. As was true of the claim in Cipollone, respondents’ claim that the deceptive statements “light” and “lowered tar and nicotine” induced them to purchase petitioners’ product alleges a breach of the duty not to deceive. To be sure, the presence of the federally mandated warnings may bear on the materiality of petitioners’ allegedly fraudulent statements, “but that possibility does not change [respondents’] case from one about the statements into one about the warnings.” 501 F. 3d, at 44.[33]

   Our decision in Reilly is consistent with Cipollone’s analysis. Reilly involved regulations promulgated by the Massachusetts attorney general “ ‘in order to address the incidence of cigarette smoking and smokeless tobacco use by children under legal age … [and] in order to prevent access to such products by underage customers.’ ” 533 U. S., at 533 (quoting 940 Code Mass. Regs. §21.01 (2000)). The regulations did not pertain to the content of any advertising; rather, they placed a variety of restrictions on certain cigarette sales and the location of outdoor and point-of-sale cigarette advertising. The attorney general promulgated those restrictions pursuant to his statutory authority to prevent unfair or deceptive trade practices. Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 93A, §2 (West 1996). But although the attorney general’s authority derived from a general deceptive practices statute like the one at issue in this case, the challenged regulations targeted advertising that tended to promote tobacco use by children instead of prohibiting false or misleading statements. Thus, whereas the “prohibition” in Cipollone was the common-law fraud rule, the “prohibitions” in Reilly were the targeted regulations. Accordingly, our holding in Reilly that the regulations were pre-empted provides no support for an argument that a general prohibition of deceptive practices is “based on” the harm caused by the specific kind of deception to which the prohibition is applied in a given case.

   It is true, as petitioners argue, that the appeal of their advertising is based on the relationship between smoking and health. And although respondents have expressly repudiated any claim for damages for personal injuries, see App. 26a, their actual injuries likely encompass harms to health as well as the monetary injuries they allege. These arguments are unavailing, however, because the text of §1334(b) does not refer to harms related to smoking and health. Rather, it pre-empts only requirements and prohibitions—i.e., rules—that are based on smoking and health. The MUTPA says nothing about either “smoking” or “health.” It is a general rule that creates a duty not to deceive and is therefore unlike the regulations at issue in Reilly.[34]

   Petitioners argue in the alternative that we should reject the express pre-emption framework established by the Cipollone plurality and relied on by the Court in Reilly. In so doing, they invoke the reasons set forth in the separate opinions of Justice Blackmun (who especially criticized the plurality’s holding that the failure-to-warn claim was pre-empted) and Justice Scalia (who argued that the fraud claim also should be pre-empted). While we again acknowledge that our analysis of these claims may lack “theoretical elegance,” we remain persuaded that it represents “a fair understanding of congressional purpose.” Cipollone, 505 U. S., at 529–530, n. 27 (plurality opinion).

   Petitioners also contend that the plurality opinion is inconsistent with our decisions in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U. S. 219 (1995), and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U. S. ___ (2008). Both cases, however, are inapposite—the first because it involved a pre-emption provision much broader than the Labeling Act’s, and the second because it involved precisely the type of state rule that Congress had intended to pre-empt.

   At issue in Wolens was the pre-emptive effect of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA), 49 U. S. C. App. §1305(a)(1) (1988 ed.), which prohibits States from enacting or enforcing any law “relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier.” The plaintiffs in that case sought to bring a claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 815, §505 (West 1992). Our conclusion that the state-law claim was pre-empted turned on the unusual breadth of the ADA’s pre-emption provision. We had previously held that the meaning of the key phrase in the ADA’s pre-emption provision, “ ‘relating to rates, routes, or services,’ ” is a broad one. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 374, 383–384 (1992) (emphasis added). Relying on precedents construing the pre-emptive effect of the same phrase in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U. S. C. §1144(a), we concluded that the phrase “relating to” indicates Congress’ intent to pre-empt a large area of state law to further its purpose of deregulating the airline industry. 504 U. S., at 383–384.[35]Unquestionably, the phrase “relating to” has a broader scope than the Labeling Act’s reference to rules “based on” smoking and health; whereas “relating to” is synonymous with “having a connection with,” id., at 384, “based on” describes a more direct relationship, see Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 13) (“In common talk, the phrase ‘based on’ indicates a but-for causal relationship and thus a necessary logical condition”).

   Petitioners’ reliance on Riegel is similarly misplaced. The plaintiffs in Riegel sought to bring common-law design, manufacturing, and labeling defect claims against the manufacturer of a faulty catheter. The case presented the question whether those claims were expressly pre-empted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U. S. C. §360c et seq. The MDA’s pre-emption clause provides that no State “ ‘may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device … any requirement’ relating to safety or effectiveness that is different from, or in addition to, federal requirements.” Riegel, 552 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (quoting 21 U. S. C. §360k(a); emphasis deleted).

   The catheter at issue in Riegel had received premarket approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). We concluded that premarket approval imposes “requirement[s] relating to safety [and] effectiveness” because the FDA requires a device that has received premarket approval to be made with almost no design, manufacturing, or labeling deviations from the specifications in its approved application. The plaintiffs’ products liability claims fell within the core of the MDA’s pre-emption provision because they sought to impose different requirements on precisely those aspects of the device that the FDA had approved. Unlike the Cipollone plaintiff’s fraud claim, which fell outside of the Labeling Act’s pre-emptive reach because it did not seek to impose a prohibition “based on smoking and health,” the Riegel plaintiffs’ common-law products liability claims unquestionably sought to enforce “requirement[s] relating to safety or effectiveness” under the MDA. That the “relating to” language of the MDA’s pre-emption provision is, like the ADA’s, much broader than the operative language of the Labeling Act provides an additional basis for distinguishing Riegel. Thus, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, Riegel is entirely consistent with our holding in Cipollone.

   In sum, we conclude now, as the plurality did in Cipollone, that “the phrase ‘based on smoking and health’ fairly but narrowly construed does not encompass the more general duty not to make fraudulent statements.” 505 U. S., at 529.

IV

   As an alternative to their express pre-emption argument, petitioners contend that respondents’ claim is impliedly pre-empted because, if allowed to proceed, it would present an obstacle to a longstanding policy of the FTC. According to petitioners, the FTC has for decades promoted the development and consumption of low tar cigarettes and has encouraged consumers to rely on representations of tar and nicotine content based on Cambridge Filter Method testing in choosing among cigarette brands. Even if such a regulatory policy could provide a basis for obstacle pre-emption, petitioners’ description of the FTC’s actions in this regard are inaccurate. The Government itself disavows any policy authorizing the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16–33.

   In 1966, following the publication of the Surgeon General’s report on smoking and health, the FTC issued an industry guidance stating its view that “a factual statement of the tar and nicotine content (expressed in milligrams) of the mainstream smoke from a cigarette,” as measured by Cambridge Filter Method testing, would not violate the FTC Act. App. 478a. The Commission made clear, however, that the guidance applied only to factual assertions of tar and nicotine yields and did not invite “collateral representations … made, expressly or by implication, as to reduction or elimination of health hazards.” Id., at 479a. A year later, the FTC reiterated its position in a letter to the National Association of Broadcasters. The letter explained that, as a “general rule,” the Commission would not challenge statements of tar and nicotine content when “they are shown to be accurate and fully substantiated by tests conducted in accordance with the [Cambridge Filter Method].” Id., at 368a. In 1970, the FTC considered providing further guidance, proposing a rule that would have required manufacturers to disclose tar and nicotine yields as measured by Cambridge Filter Method testing. 35 Fed. Reg. 12671. The leading cigarette manufacturers responded by submitting a voluntary agreement under which they would disclose tar and nicotine content in their advertising, App. 899a–900a, and the FTC suspended its rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 784 (1971).

   Based on these events, petitioners assert that “the FTC has required tobacco companies to disclose tar and nicotine yields in cigarette advertising using a government-mandated testing methodology and has authorized them to use descriptors as shorthand references to those numerical test results.” Brief for Petitioners 2 (emphasis in original). As the foregoing history shows, however, the FTC has in fact never required that cigarette manufacturers disclose tar and nicotine yields, nor has it condoned representations of those yields through the use of “light” or “low tar” descriptors.

   Subsequent Commission actions further undermine petitioners’ claim. After the tobacco companies agreed to report tar and nicotine yields as measured by the Cambridge Filter Method, the FTC continued to police cigarette companies’ misleading use of test results. In 1983, the FTC responded to findings that tar and nicotine yields for Barclay cigarettes obtained through Cambridge Filter Method testing were deceptive because the cigarettes in fact delivered disproportionately more tar to smokers than other cigarettes with similar Cambridge Filter Method ratings. 48 Fed. Reg. 15954. And in 1995, the FTC found that a manufacturer’s representation “that consumers will get less tar by smoking ten packs of Carlton brand cigarettes than by smoking a single pack of the other brands” was deceptive even though it was based on the results of Cambridge Filter Method testing. In re American Tobacco Co., 119 F. T. C. 3, 4. The FTC’s conclusion was based on its recognition that, “[i]n truth and in fact, consumers will not necessarily get less tar” due to “such behavior as compensatory smoking.” Ibid.[36]

   This history shows that, contrary to petitioners’ suggestion, the FTC has no longstanding policy authorizing collateral representations based on Cambridge Filter Method test results. Rather, the FTC has endeavored to inform consumers of the comparative tar and nicotine content of different cigarette brands and has in some instances prevented misleading representations of Cambridge Filter Method test results. The FTC’s failure to require petitioners to correct their allegedly misleading use of “light” descriptors is not evidence to the contrary; agency nonenforcement of a federal statute is not the same as a policy of approval. Cf. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U. S. 51 (2002) (holding that the Coast Guard’s decision not to regulate propeller guards did not impliedly pre-empt petitioner’s tort claims).[37]

   More telling are the FTC’s recent statements regarding the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors. In 1997, the Commission observed that “[t]here are no official definitions for” the terms “light” and “low tar,” and it sought comments on whether “there [is] a need for official guidance with respect to the terms” and whether “the descriptors convey implied health claims.” 62 Fed. Reg. 48163. In November 2008, following public notice and comment, the Commission rescinded its 1966 guidance concerning the Cambridge Filter Method. 73 Fed. Reg. 74500. The rescission is a response to “a consensus among the public health and scientific communities that the Cambridge Filter method is sufficiently flawed that statements of tar and nicotine yields as measured by that method are not likely to help consumers make informed decisions.” Id., at 74503. The Commission’s notice of its proposal to rescind the guidance also reiterated the original limits of that guidance, noting that it “only addresse[d] simple factual statements of tar and nicotine yields. It d[id] not apply to other conduct or express or implied representations, even if they concern[ed] tar and nicotine yields.” Id., at 40351.

   In short, neither the handful of industry guidances and consent orders on which petitioners rely nor the FTC’s inaction with regard to “light” descriptors even arguably justifies the pre-emption of state deceptive practices rules like the MUTPA.

V

   We conclude, as we did in Cipollone, that the Labeling Act does not pre-empt state-law claims like respondents’ that are predicated on the duty not to deceive. We also hold that the FTC’s various decisions with respect to statements of tar and nicotine content do not impliedly pre-empt respondents’ claim. Respondents still must prove that petitioners’ use of “light” and “lowered tar” descriptors in fact violated the state deceptive practices statute, but neither the Labeling Act’s pre-emption provision nor the FTC’s actions in this field prevent a jury from considering that claim. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Notes and Questions.

1.  What role do states play in determining the extent of preemption? Does the federal constitution contemplate any role for states in that context?  See Art. 1, Sec. 1. Might you characterize the role of states as more political than legal—that is, that the constitutional principle of supremacy, which “hard wired” in the Constitution, can be take state interests into account only through the collective consensus of states represented in Congress subject to interpretation by the federal courts?

The issue of regulatory preemption is especially sensitive in the early 21st century with respect to the use of federal regulation as a back door means of voiding state common law tort.  This is especially the case with respect to product liability.  See  The authors note, though,
Preemption is often expressed as an issue of federalism. There may be understandable backlash from state courts who might feel that decisions made by federal agencies should not tie their hands to decide common law claims. What should not be overlooked is that regardless of preemption, state court judges (and legislators) have the ability to consider a manufacturer or other party’s compliance with government regulations as fulfilling the standard of care, or supporting a presumption that a product is not defective.

For instance, a court may find in a specific case that the level of tension between a federal regulation or objective and a state tort claim does not rise to the level that requires preemption. Such a finding, however, is not the end of the inquiry as to whether a manufacturer or other defendant that met federal safety standards, or whose product was specifically approved or certified by a federal agency, should be subject to tort liability. State common law, statutes, and public policy considerations then come into play.

Id., 1226. In this way, one can see how the horizontal dimensions of the interplay between jusge administered law (common law and equity), statute, administrative regulation, and supervisory techniques, studied in Chapters 2-7, now acquire a vertical dimension as well in the United States, where the division of authority between the federal government and states, each empowered to produce law, may produce dissonance as well as coherence in law making.  It is generally left to the U.S. courts to sort these conflicts and develop standards to make the entire system of multiple legal sub-systems coherent.

2. In the case you have just read the Supreme Court applies the standards of preemption to determine the extent of federal displacement of state law.   In Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) the court described the standards of displacement in this way:

It is a familiar and well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause, U.S.Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, invalidates state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to," federal law. Gibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 211 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law may supersede state law in several different ways. First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to preempt state law by so stating in express terms. Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,430 U. S. 519, 430 U. S. 525 (1977). In the absence of express preemptive language, Congress' intent to preempt all state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress "left no room" for supplementary state regulation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,331 U. S. 218, 331 U. S. 230 (1947). Preemption of a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which "the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Ibid.; see Hines v. Davidowitz,312 U. S. 52 (1941).

Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,373 U. S. 132, 373 U. S. 142-143 (1963), or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 312 U. S. 67. See generally Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,467 U. S. 691, 467 U. S. 698-699 (1984).

Id., 712-713.  Which of these standards did the Supreme Court apply in the Altria Group?

3.  To what extent does the principle of supremacy, operationalized through the pre-emption principle, apply to federal regulationas well as federal statute? In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982) the Sup`reme Court noted that:

"Federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes. Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. When the administrator promulgates regulations intended to preempt state law, the court's inquiry is similarly limited:"

"If [h]is choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned."

Id. at 458 U. S. 153-154, quoting United States v. Shimer,367 U. S. 374, 367 U. S. 383 (1961) (and cited with approval in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,467 U. S. 691 (1984)).  Is an administrative agency’s decision about the scope of thr preemptive authority of its regulations subject to Chevron deference?

4. U.S. presidents have sought to manage the way in which federal agencies apply the pre-emption principle to their own quasi-legislative and executive powers by developing parameters and standards within which the use of federal preemption is constrained.  Consider this effort by the administration of President Obama:[38]

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
-----------------------------------------------
For Immediate Release                       May 20, 2009

May 20, 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Preemption

From our Nation's founding, the American constitutional order has been a Federal system, ensuring a strong role for both the national Government and the States. The Federal Government's role in promoting the general welfare and guarding individual liberties is critical, but State law and national law often operate concurrently to provide independent safeguards for the public. Throughout our history, State and local governments have frequently protected health, safety, and the environment more aggressively than has the national Government.

An understanding of the important role of State governments in our Federal system is reflected in longstanding practices by executive departments and agencies, which have shown respect for the traditional prerogatives of the States. In recent years, however, notwithstanding Executive Order 13132 of August 4, 1999 (Federalism), executive departments and agencies have sometimes announced that their regulations preempt State law, including State common law, without explicit preemption by the Congress or an otherwise sufficient basis under applicable legal principles.

The purpose of this memorandum is to state the general policy of my Administration that preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemption. Executive departments and agencies should be mindful that in our Federal system, the citizens of the several States have distinctive circumstances and values, and that in many instances it is appropriate for them to apply to themselves rules and principles that reflect these circumstances and values. As Justice Brandeis explained more than 70 years ago, "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."

To ensure that executive departments and agencies include statements of preemption in regulations only when such statements have a sufficient legal basis:

1. Heads of departments and agencies should not include in regulatory preambles statements that the department or agency intends to preempt State law through the regulation except where preemption provisions are also included in the codified regulation.

2. Heads of departments and agencies should not include preemption provisions in codified regulations except where such provisions would be justified under legal principles governing preemption, including the principles outlined in Executive Order 13132.

3. Heads of departments and agencies should review regulations issued within the past 10 years that contain statements in regulatory preambles or codified provisions intended by the department or agency to preempt State law, in order to decide whether such statements or provisions are justified under applicable legal principles governing preemption. Where the head of a department or agency determines that a regulatory statement of preemption or codified regulatory provision cannot be so justified, the head of that department or agency should initiate appropriate action, which may include amendment of the relevant regulation.

Executive departments and agencies shall carry out the provisions of this memorandum to the extent permitted by law and consistent with their statutory authorities. Heads of departments and agencies should consult as necessary with the Attorney General and the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs to determine how the requirements of this memorandum apply to particular situations.

This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA

Do these instructions represent a political and policy determination that may be modified at will or does it suggest a more permanent, and structurally compelled approach? To what extent must or may the Courts give this memorandum weight in considering issues of pre-emption by administrative agencies? May Congress override these instructions through subsequent legislation?

5.  May Congress limit the authority of regulatory agencies to use their regulatory authority to preempt state law? Can Congress prohibit regulatory agencies from providing the courts with guidance as to the preemptive effects fi regulation? For an attempt, see Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, § 231(a), 122 Stat. 3016, 3070 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2051 note), which prohibited the Consumer Product Safety Commission from asserting preemption or providing an interpretation of the preemptive effect of its rules or regulations, especially as these might be used to determine the preemptive effects of these rules on state common or statutory law permitting damages for conduct that might also violate CPSC regulaitons.

IV. Problem

For many years federal and state courts were hostile to any form of dispute resolution that invoked procedures or institutions other than the courts. But courts can become congested and there had been a movement to permit alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to alleviate these problems, especially in connection with commercial transactions.  To that end, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), “An Act To make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the States or Territories or with foreign nations,” was enacted in 1925.[39]  The FAA mandates judicial facilitation of arbitration when provided by parties through contract.

Relevant portions of the FAA provide:[40]

§ 2. A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.

§ 3 If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.

§ 4 A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days’ notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.

* * *

§ 6  Any application to the court hereunder shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided.

The scope of the preemption of state law under the FAA was considered in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), in which the Supreme Court held that state franchising law that voided arbitration agreement was preempted under the FAA. In American Express Co. Et Al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant et al., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013), a majority of the Supreme Court provided further guidance on the scope of preemption when it applied an “‘overridden by a contrary congressional command,” standard to hold that the FAA does not permit judicial invalidation of a contractual waiver of class arbitration solely because the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.  In the process it narrowed the “effective vindication exception” to FAA preemption. Excerpts of both cases follow. 

Southland Corp. v. Keating
465 U.S. 1 (1984)
(some footnotes omitted and renumbered)

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents the questions (a) whether the California Franchise Investment Law, which invalidates certain arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitration Act, violates the Supremacy Clause and (b) whether arbitration under the federal Act is impaired when a class action structure is imposed on the process by the state courts.
I

Appellant Southland Corp. is the owner and franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores. Southland's standard franchise agreement provides each franchisee with a license to use certain registered trademarks, a lease or sublease of a convenience store owned or leased by Southland, inventory financing, and assistance in advertising and merchandising. The franchisees operate the stores, supply bookkeeping data, and pay Southland a fixed percentage of gross profits. The franchise agreement also contains the following provision requiring arbitration:

"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association . . . and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof."

Appellees are 7-Eleven franchisees. Between September, 1975, and January, 1977, several appellees filed individual actions against Southland in California Superior Court alleging, among other things, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law, Cal.Corp.Code Ann. § 31000 et seq. (West 1977). Southland's answer, in all but one of the individual actions, included the affirmative defense of failure to arbitrate.

In May 1977, appellee Keating filed a class action against Southland on behalf of a class that assertedly includes approximately 800 California franchisees. Keating's principal claims were substantially the same as those asserted by the other franchisees. After the various actions were consolidated, Southland petitioned to compel arbitration of the claims in all cases, and appellees moved for class certification.

The Superior Court granted Southland's motion to compel arbitration of all claims except those claims based on the Franchise Investment Law. The court did not pass on appellees' request for class certification. Southland appealed from the order insofar as it excluded from arbitration the claims based on the California statute. Appellees filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the California Court of Appeal arguing that the arbitration should proceed as a class action.

The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's refusal to compel arbitration of appellees' claims under the Franchise Investment Law. Keating v. Superior Court, Alameda County, 167 Cal.Rptr. 481 (1980). That court interpreted the arbitration clause to require arbitration of all claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law, and construed the Franchise Investment Law not to invalidate such agreements to arbitrate.[41]Alternatively, the court concluded that, if the Franchise Investment Law rendered arbitration agreements involving commerce unenforceable, it would conflict with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, and therefore be invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 167 Cal.Rptr. at 493-494. The Court of Appeal also determined that there was no "insurmountable obstacle" to conducting an arbitration on a classwide basis, and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to conduct class certification proceedings. Id. at 492.

The California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-2, reversed the ruling that claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law are arbitrable. Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192 (1982). The California Supreme Court interpreted the Franchise Investment Law to require judicial consideration of claims brought under that statute, and concluded that the California statute did not contravene the federal Act. Id. at 604, 645 P.2d 1203-1204. The court also remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of appellees' request for classwide arbitration.

We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction pending argument on the merits. 459 U.S. 1101 (1983). We reverse in part and dismiss in part.

II
A

Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), which provides for an appeal from a final judgment of the highest court of a state when the validity of a challenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal law. Here Southland challenged the California Franchise Investment Law as it was applied to invalidate a contract for arbitration made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. Appellees argue that the action of the California Supreme Court with respect to this claim is not a "final judgment or decree" within the meaning of § 1257(2).

Under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,420 U. S. 469, 420 U. S. 482-483 (1975), judgments of state courts that finally decide a federal issue are immediately appealable when

"the party seeking review here might prevail [in the state court] on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant cause of action. . . ."

In these circumstances, we have resolved the federal issue "if a refusal immediately to review the state court decision might seriously erode federal policy." Id. at 420 U. S. 483.

The judgment of the California Supreme Court with respect to this claim is reviewable under Cox Broadcasting, supra. Without immediate review of the California holding by this Court, there may be no opportunity to pass on the federal issue, and as a result "there would remain in effect the unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court" holding that the California statute does not conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 420 U. S. 485. On the other hand, reversal of a state court judgment in this setting will terminate litigation of the merits of this dispute.

Finally, the failure to accord immediate review of the decision of the California Supreme Court might "seriously erode federal policy." Plainly, the effect of the judgment of the California court is to nullify a valid contract made by private parties under which they agreed to submit all contract disputes to final, binding arbitration. The federal Act permits "parties to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,460 U. S. 1, 460 U. S. 22 (1983).

Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought to eliminate. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,407 U. S. 1, 407 U. S. 12 (1972), we noted that the contract fixing a particular forum for resolution of all disputes

"was made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason, it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the courts."

The Zapata Court also noted that

"the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations."

Id. at 407 U. S. 14 (footnote omitted).

For us to delay review of a state judicial decision denying enforcement of the contract to arbitrate until the state court litigation has run its course would defeat the core purpose of a contract to arbitrate. We hold that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts § 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law.

B

That part of the appeal relating to the propriety of superimposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration raises other questions. Southland did not contend in the California courts that, and the state courts did not decide whether, state law imposing class action procedures was preempted by federal law. When the California Court of Appeal directed Southland to address the question whether state or federal law controlled the class action issue, Southland responded that state law did not permit arbitrations to proceed as class actions, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable, and that requiring arbitrations to proceed as class actions "could well violate the [federal] constitutional guaranty of procedural due process."[42]Southland did not claim in the Court of Appeal that, if state law required class action procedures, it would conflict with the federal Act, and thus violate the Supremacy Clause.

In the California Supreme Court, Southland argued that California law applied, but that neither the contract to arbitrate nor state law authorized class action procedures to govern arbitrations. Southland also contended that the Federal Rules were inapplicable in state proceedings. Southland pointed out that, although California law provided a basis for class action procedures, the Judicial Council of California acknowledged "the incompatibility of class actions and arbitration." Petition for Hearing 23. It does not appear that Southland opposed class procedures on federal grounds in the California Supreme Court. Nor does the record show that the California Supreme Court passed upon the question whether superimposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration was contrary to the federal Act.[43]

Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of the state statute was "drawn in question" on federal grounds by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to resolve this question as a matter of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 326 U. S. 207 (1945)

III

As previously noted, the California Franchise Investment Law provides:

"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void."

Cal.Corp.Code Ann. § 31512 (West 1977). The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute to require judicial consideration of claims brought under the state statute, and accordingly refused to enforce the parties' contract to arbitrate such claims. So interpreted, the California Franchise Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, and violates the Supremacy Clause.

In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act provides:

"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."

9 U.S.C. § 2. Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration agreements.

We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce,"[44]and such clauses may be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under state law.

The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,388 U. S. 395 (1967), the Court examined the legislative history of the Act and concluded that the statute "is based upon . . . the incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.'" Id. at 388 U. S. 405 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924)). The contract in Prima Paint, as here, contained an arbitration clause. One party in that case alleged that the other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract, although not of the arbitration clause in particular, and sought to have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal court. The Court held that, notwithstanding a contrary state rule, consideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract "is for the arbitrators, and not for the courts," 388 U.S. at 388 U. S. 400. The Court relied for this holding on Congress' broad power to fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.

At least since 1824, Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause has been held plenary. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U. S. 196 (1824). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, the authority of Congress is "the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." Ibid. The statements of the Court in Prima Paint that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts. As Justice Black observed in his dissent, when Congress exercises its authority to enact substantive federal law under the Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable in state as well as federal courts. Prima Paint, supra, at 388 U. S. 420.

In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 1, 460 U. S. 25, and n. 32, we reaffirmed our view that the Arbitration Act "creates a body of federal substantive law," and expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i.e., the substantive law the Act created was applicable in state and federal courts. Moses H. Cone began with a petition for an order to compel arbitration. The District Court stayed the action pending resolution of a concurrent state court suit. In holding that the District Court had abused its discretion, we found no showing of exceptional circumstances justifying the stay, and recognized "the presence of federal law issues" under the federal Act as "a major consideration weighing against surrender [of federal jurisdiction]." 460 U.S. at 460 U. S. 26. We thus read the underlying issue of arbitrability to be a question of substantive federal law: "Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court." Id. at 460 U. S. 24.

Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts. The House Report plainly suggests the more comprehensive objectives:

"The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts."

H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924) (emphasis added).

This broader purpose can also be inferred from the reality that Congress would be less likely to address a problem whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem of large significance in the field of commerce. The Arbitration Act sought to "overcome the rule of equity that equity will not specifically enforce an[y] arbitration agreement." Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., 6 (1923) (Senate Hearing) (remarks of Sen. Walsh). The House Report accompanying the bill stated:

"The need for the law arises from . . . the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common law, and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment. . . ."

H.R.Rep. No. 96, supra, at 1-2.

Surely this makes clear that the House Report contemplated a broad reach of the Act, unencumbered by state law constraints. As was stated in Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Construction Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (CA2 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring),

"the purpose of the act was to assure those who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal judges, or . . . by state courts or legislatures."

Congress also showed its awareness of the widespread unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements, e.g., Senate Hearing, at 8, and that such courts were bound by state laws inadequately providing for

"technical arbitration by which, if you agree to arbitrate under the method provided by the statute, you have an arbitration by statute[;] but [the statutes] ha[d] nothing to do with validating the contract to arbitrate."

Ibid. The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements. To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to be enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was addressing.

JUSTICE O'CONNOR argues that Congress viewed the Arbitration Act "as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts." Post at 465 U. S. 25. If it is correct that Congress sought only to create a procedural remedy in the federal courts, there can be no explanation for the express limitation in the Arbitration Act to contracts "involving commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 2. For example, when Congress has authorized this Court to prescribe the rules of procedure in the federal courts of appeals, district courts, and bankruptcy courts, it has not limited the power of the Court to prescribe rules applicable only to causes of action involving commerce. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075, 2076 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). We would expect that, if Congress, in enacting the Arbitration Act, was creating what it thought to be a procedural rule applicable only in federal courts, it would not so limit the Act to transactions involving commerce. On the other hand, Congress would need to call on the Commerce Clause if it intended the Act to apply in state courts. Yet at the same time, its reach would be limited to transactions involving interstate commerce. We therefore view the "involving commerce" requirement in § 2, not as an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal courts, but as a necessary qualification on a statute intended to apply in state and federal courts.

Under the interpretation of the Arbitration Act urged by JUSTICE O'CONNOR, claims brought under the California Franchise Investment Law are not arbitrable when they are raised in state court. Yet it is clear beyond question that, if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable. Prima Paint, supra. The interpretation given to the Arbitration Act by the California Supreme Court would therefore encourage and reward forum shopping. We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum in which it is asserted. And since the overwhelming proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts,[45]we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction.[46]Such an interpretation would frustrate congressional intent to place "[a]n arbitration agreement . . . upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924).

In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts,[47]Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.[48] We hold that § 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause.
IV

The judgment of the California Supreme Court denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement is reversed; as to the question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a class action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the California courts, no decision by this Court would be appropriate at this time. As to the latter issues, the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

__________


American Express Co. Et Al. v. Italian Colors Restaurant et al.,
133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013)
(some footnotes omitted or renumbered)

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential recovery.

I

Respondents are merchants who accept American Express cards. Their agreement with petitioners—American Express and a wholly owned subsidiary—contains a clause that requires all disputes between the parties to be resolved by arbitration. The agreement also provides that “[t]here shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis.” In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F. 3d 204, 209 (CA2 2012).

Respondents brought a class action against petitioners for violations of the federal antitrust laws. According to respondents, American Express used its monopoly power in the market for charge cards to force merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 30% higher than the fees for competing credit cards. This tying arrangement, respondents said, violated §1 of the Sherman Act. They sought treble damages for the class under §4 of the Clayton Act.

Petitioners moved to compel individual arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq. In resisting the motion, respondents submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that the cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be “at least several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled. App. 93. The District Court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuits. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It held that because respondents had established that “they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate under the class action waiver,” the waiver was un-enforceable and the arbitration could not proceed. In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F. 3d 300, 315–316 (CA2 2009).

We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662 (2010) , which held that a party may not be compelled to submit to class arbitration absent an agreement to do so. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 559 U. S. 1103 (2010) . The Court of Appeals stood by its reversal, stating that its earlier ruling did not compel class arbitration. In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 634 F. 3d 187, 200 (CA2 2011). It then sua sponte reconsidered its ruling in light of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U. S. ___ (2011), which held that the FAA pre-empted a state law barring enforcement of a class-arbitration waiver. Finding AT&T Mobility inapplicable because it addressed pre-emption, the Court of Appeals reversed for the third time. 667 F. 3d, at 213. It then denied rehearing enbanc with five judges dissenting. In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 681 F. 3d 139 (CA2 2012). We granted certiorari, 568 U. S. ___ (2012), to consider the question “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class arbitration of afederal-law claim,” Pet. for Cert. i.

II

Congress enacted the FAA in response to widespread judicial hostility to arbitration.

* * *

This text reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 3). And consistent with that text, courts must “rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements according to their terms, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 221 (1985) , including terms that “specify with whom [the parties] choose to arbitrate their disputes,” Stolt-Nielsen, supra, at 683, and “the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted,” Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989) . That holds true for claims that allege a violation of a federal statute, unless the FAA’s mandate has been “ ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’ ” CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 2–3) (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 226 (1987) ).

III

No contrary congressional command requires us to reject the waiver of class arbitration here. Respondents argue that requiring them to litigate their claims individually—as they contracted to do—would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws. But the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim. Congress has taken some measures to facilitate the litigation of antitrust claims—for example, it enacted a multiplied-damages remedy. See 15 U. S. C. §15 (treble damages). In enacting such measures, Congress has told us that it is willing to go, in certain respects, beyond the normal limits of law in advancing its goals of deterring and remedying unlawful trade practice. But to say that Congress must have intended whatever departures from those normal limits advance antitrust goals is simply irrational. “[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs.” Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U. S. 522–526 (1987) (per curiam).

The antitrust laws do not “evinc[e] an intention to preclude a waiver” of class-action procedure. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628 (1985) . The Sherman and Clayton Acts make no mention of class actions. In fact, they were enacted decades before the advent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which was “designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U. S. 682–701 (1979). The parties here agreed to arbitrate pursuant to that “usual rule,” and it would be remarkable for a court to erase that expectation.

Nor does congressional approval of Rule 23 establish an entitlement to class proceedings for the vindication of statutory rights. To begin with, it is likely that such an entitlement, invalidating private arbitration agreements denying class adjudication, would be an “abridg[ment]” or modif[ication]” of a “substantive right” forbidden to the Rules, see 28 U. S. C. §2072(b). But there is no evidence of such an entitlement in any event. The Rule imposes stringent requirements for certification that in practice exclude most claims. And we have specifically rejected the assertion that one of those requirements (the class-notice requirement) must be dispensed with because the “prohibitively high cost” of compliance would “frustrate [plain-tiff’s] attempt to vindicate the policies underlying the antitrust” laws. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U. S. 156–168, 175–176 (1974). One might respond, perhaps, that federal law secures a nonwaivable opportunity to vindicate federal policies by satisfying the procedural strictures of Rule 23 or invoking some other informal class mechanism in arbitration. But we have already rejected that proposition in AT&T Mobility, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).

IV

Our finding of no “contrary congressional command” does not end the case. Respondents invoke a judge-made exception to the FAA which, they say, serves to harmonize competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate agreements that prevent the “effective vindication” of a federal statutory right. Enforcing the waiver of class arbitration bars effective vindication, respondents contend, because they have no economic incentive to pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration.

The “effective vindication” exception to which respondents allude originated as dictum in Mitsubishi Motors, where we expressed a willingness to invalidate, on “public policy” grounds, arbitration agreements that “operat[e] . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.” 473 U. S., at 637, n. 19 (emphasis added). Dismissing concerns that the arbitral forum was inadequate, we said that “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” Id., at 637. Subsequent cases have similarly asserted the existence of an “effective vindication” exception, see, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U. S. 247–274 (2009); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 28 (1991) , but have similarly declined to apply it to invalidate the arbitration agreement at issue.[49]

And we do so again here. As we have described, the exception finds its origin in the desire to prevent “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” Mitsubishi Motors, supra, at 637, n. 19 (emphasis added). That would certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of certain statutory rights. And it would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the forum impracticable. See Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U. S. 79, 90 (2000) (“It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights”). But the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy. See 681 F. 3d, at 147 (Jacobs, C. J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).[50]The class-action waiver merely limits arbitration to the two contracting parties. It no more eliminates those parties’ right to pursue their statutory remedy than did federal law before its adoption of the class action for legal relief in 1938, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U. S. C., p. 864 (1938 ed., Supp V); 7A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1752, p. 18 (3d ed. 2005). Or, to put it differently, the individual suit that was considered adequate to assure “effective vindication” of a federal right before adoption of class-action procedures did not suddenly become “ineffective vindication” upon their adoption.[51]

A pair of our cases brings home the point. In Gilmer, supra, we had no qualms in enforcing a class waiver in an arbitration agreement even though the federal statute at issue, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, expressly permitted collective actions. We said that statutory permission did “ ‘not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred.’ ” Id., at 32. And in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S. A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U. S. 528 (1995) , we held that requiring arbitration in a foreign country was compatible with the federal Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. That legislation prohibited any agreement “ ‘relieving’ ” or “ ‘lessening’ ” the liability of a carrier for damaged goods, id., at 530, 534 (quoting 46 U. S. C. App. §1303(8) (1988 ed.))—which is close to codification of an “effective vindication” exception. The Court rejected the argument that the “inconvenience and costs of proceeding” abroad “lessen[ed]” the defendants’ liability, stating that “[i]t would be unwieldy and unsupported by the terms or policy of the statute to require courts to proceed case by case to tally the costs and burdens to particular plaintiffs in light of their means, the size of their claims, and the relative burden on the carrier.” 515 U. S., at 532, 536. Such a “tally[ing] [of] the costs and burdens” is precisely what the dissent would impose upon federal courts here. * * *

*  *  *

The regime established by the Court of Appeals’ decision would require—before a plaintiff can be held to contractually agreed bilateral arbitration—that a federal court determine (and the parties litigate) the legal requirements for success on the merits claim-by-claim and theory-by-theory, the evidence necessary to meet those requirements, the cost of developing that evidence, and the damages that would be recovered in the event of success. Such a preliminary litigating hurdle would undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure. The FAA does not sanction such a judicially created superstructure.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.


Problem.

You represent a local bakery, Dough Corp. (“DC”), a corporation organized under the laws of State Y.  DC delivers pizza dough to local pizzerias.  DC has entered into dough delivery agreements with each of these pizzerias.  The agreements each provides that DC will supply the pizzeria with a set minimum quantity of dough of pizza quality each week for two years. The agreement can be terminated at the end of the term of the agreement.  Each also contain the same arbitration clause.  The arbitration clause includes the following provision, “[t]here shall be no right or authority for any party to assert a defense of laches in any arbitration and neither party shall assert any claim for anticipated future lost profits.”·

Under the laws of State Y, laches may be asserted by any party to a contract dispute. State Y has also enacted a statute that provides that in any action for breach of contract, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to anticipated future lost profits.  Moreover, last year State Y enacted the “Save Our Courts Act,” which, among other things, prohibited the enforcement of arbitration agreements for contracts where any of the parties allege any equitable claims or defenses.  There is no statute of limitations for contract claims in State Y.

DC had been having trouble with one of its customers, Pizzeria. When DC delivered the first order of dough Pizzeria complained that it was of inferior quality and Pizzeria refused to pay.  DC then refused to deliver more dough. Both parties argued that each had breached their agreement. DC waited 2 years before bringing a claim against Pizzeria for breach of contract. Pizzeria has raised the defense of laches and unclean hands in the arbitration. 

Pizzeria has also asserted a claim for future lost profits based on lost sales resulting from what Pizzeria asserts was bad DC dough.  Because DC had cut off dough supplies Pizzeria lost sales until it was able to secure an alternative supplier out of state and at great additional expense. The claim was filed in the state courts of State Y.  DC has moved to dismiss the suit on the basis of the arbitration clause.   

You are the law clerk to the judge who is hearing this case.  She wants to know how she should rule on the motion to dismiss.  Please prepare a one page bench memo outlining whether the dispute between Pizzeria and DC must be arbitrated and the extent to which the FAA preempts conflicting state law. 


[1] http://www.usconstitution.net/const.pdf
[2]http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm
[3] http://www.gov.za/
[4]http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title1/ar1/ch2.html
[5]http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/documents/hierarch.pdf
[6]Deutscher Bundstag, Legal Framework for the German Parliament, The Basic Law, available https://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/documents/legal. .
[7]Deutscher Bundestag, Function and Role, available http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/function/function/197608.
[8]http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5983?msg=welcome_stranger
[9] http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5983/5983-h/5983-h.htm
[10]http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/30/gutierrez.pdf
[11]http://www.gutenberg.org/files/5983/5983-h/5983-h.htm
[12]http://books.google.com/books/about/Cicero_and_modern_law.html?id=x7NDAQAAIAAJ
[13]http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm
[14]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mayflower_Compact
[15] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Coke
[16] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magna_Carta
[17]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaratory_Act
[18] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Paine
[19]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_St_John,_1st_Viscount_Bolingbroke
[20] http://www.usconstitution.net/const.pdf
[21]http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm
[22]http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/index.htm
[23] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_generations_of_human_rights
[24]http://www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title1/ar1/ch2.html
[25]http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/pdf/hierarch.pdf
[26] The MUTPA provides, as relevant, that “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful.” §207. In construing that section, courts are to “be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 United States Code 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.” §207(1).
[27]The Cambridge Filter Method weighs and measures the tar and nicotine collected by a smoking machine that takes 35 milliliter puffs of two seconds’ duration every 60 seconds until the cigarette is smoked to a specified butt length. App. 294a, 668a. As discussed below, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission) signaled in 1966 that the Cambridge Filter Method was an acceptable means of measuring the tar and nicotine content of cigarettes, but it never required manufacturers to publish test results in their advertisements.
[28] Pub. L. 91–222, 84 Stat. 87. Though actually enacted in 1970, Congress directed that it be cited as a “1969 Act.”
[29] Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. 98–474, §4(a), 98 Stat. 2201, 15 U. S. C. §1333(a).
[30]Petitioners also urge us to find support for their claim that Congress gave the FTC exclusive authority to police deceptive health-related claims in cigarette advertising in what they refer to as the Labeling Act’s “saving clause.” The clause provides that, apart from the warning requirement, nothing in the Act “shall be construed to limit, restrict, expand, or otherwise affect the authority of the Federal Trade Commission with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the advertising of cigarettes.” §1336. A plurality of this Court has previously read this clause to “indicat[e] that Congress intended the phrase ‘relating to smoking and health’ … to be construed narrowly, so as not to proscribe the regulation of deceptive advertising.” Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,505 U. S. 504, 528–529 (1992). Nothing in the clause suggests that Congress meant to proscribe the States’ historic regulation of deceptive advertising practices. The FTC has long depended on cooperative state regulation to achieve its mission because, although one of the smallest administrative agencies, it is charged with policing an enormous amount of activity. See 1 S. Kanwit, Federal Trade Commission §§1:1, 1:2 (2004 ed. and Supp. 2008). Moreover, when the Labeling Act was amended in 1969 it was not even clear that the FTC possessed rulemaking authority, see 84 Stat. 89, making it highly unlikely that Congress would have intended to assign exclusively to the FTC the substantial task of overseeing deceptive practices in cigarette advertisements.
[31]In his dissent, Justice Thomas criticizes our reliance on the plurality opinion in Cipollone, post, at 6–8, 14–19, 22, and advocates adopting the analysis set forth by Justice Scalia in his opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part in that case, post, at 3–6, 19–21. But Justice Scalia’s approach was rejected by seven Members of the Court, and in the almost 17 years since Cipollone was decided Congress has done nothing to indicate its approval of that approach. Moreover, Justice Thomas fails to explain why Congress would have intended the result that Justice Scalia’s approach would produce—namely, permitting cigarette manufacturers to engage in fraudulent advertising. As a majority of the Court concluded in Cipollone,nothing in the Labeling Act’s language or purpose supports that result.
[32]The Cipollone plurality further stated that the warning neutralization claim was “merely the converse of a state-law requirement that warnings be included in advertising and promotional materials,” 505 U. S., at 527, evincing the plurality’s recognition that warning neutralization and failure-to-warn claims are two sides of the same coin. Justice Thomas’ criticism of the plurality’s treatment of the failure-to-warn claim, post, at 16, is beside the point, as no such claim is at issue in this litigation.
[33]Justice Thomas contends that respondents’ fraud claim must be pre-empted because “[a] judgment in [their] favor will … result in a ‘requirement’ that petitioners represent the effects of smoking on health in a particular way in their advertising and promotion of light cigarettes.” Post, at 3. He further asserts that “respondents seek to require the cigarette manufacturers to provide additional warnings about compensatory behavior, or to prohibit them from selling these products with the ‘light’ or ‘low-tar’ descriptors.” Post, at 20. But this mischaracterizes the relief respondents seek. If respondents prevail at trial, petitioners will be prohibited from selling as “light” or “low tar” only those cigarettes that are not actually light and do not actually deliver less tar and nicotine. Barring intervening federal regulation, petitioners would remain free to make nonfraudulent use of the “light” and “low-tar” descriptors.
[34]In implementing the MUTPA, neither the state legislature nor the state attorney general has enacted a set of special rules or guidelines targeted at cigarette advertising. As we noted in Cipollone, it was the threatened enactment of new state warning requirements rather than the enforcement of pre-existing general prohibitions against deceptive practices that prompted congressional action in 1969. 505 U. S., at 515, and n. 11.
[35]Petitioners also point to Morales as evidence that our decision in Cipollone was wrong. But Morales predated Cipollone,and it is in any event even more easily distinguishable from this case than American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U. S.219 (1995). At issue in Morales were guidelines regarding the form and substance of airline fare advertising implemented by the National Association of Attorneys General to give content to state deceptive practices rules. 504 U. S., at 379. Like the regulations at issue in Reilly, the guidelines were industry-specific directives that targeted the subject matter made off-limits by the ADA’s express pre-emption provisions. See also Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Assn., 552 U. S. ___ (2008) (holding that targeted ground carrier regulations were pre-empted by a statute modeled on the ADA).
[36]In a different action, the FTC charged a cigarette manufacturer with violating the FTC Act by misleadingly advertising certain brands as “low in tar” even though they had a higher-than-average tar rating. See In re American Brands, Inc., 79 F. T. C. 255 (1971). The Commission and the manufacturer entered a consent order that prevented the manufacturer from making any such representations unless they were accompanied by a clear and conspicuous disclosure of the cigarettes’ tar and nicotine content as measured by the Cambridge Filter Method. Id., at 258. Petitioners offer this consent order as evidence that the FTC authorized the use of “light” and “low tar” descriptors as long as they accurately describe Cambridge Filter Method test results. As the Government observes, however, the decree only enjoined conduct. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26. And a consent order is in any event only binding on the parties to the agreement. For all of these reasons, the consent order does not support the conclusion that respondents’ claim is impliedly pre-empted.
[37]It seems particularly inappropriate to read a policy of authorization into the FTC’s inaction when that inaction is in part the result of petitioners’ failure to disclose study results showing that Cambridge Filter Method test results do not reflect the amount of tar and nicotine that consumers of “light” cigarettes actually inhale. See id., at 8–11.
[39] Pub.L. 68–401, 43 Stat. 883, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. as amended.
[40]9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.  Available
[41]California Corp. Code Ann. § 31512 (West 1977) provides:
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void."

[42]Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Petition for Writs of Mandate or Prohibition in Civ. No. 46162 (Ct.App.Cal., 1st App.Dist.), pp.19-26.
[43]The California Supreme Court cited "[a]nalogous authority" supporting consolidation of arbitration proceedings by federal courts. 31 Cal.3d at 611-612, 645 P.2d at 1208. E.g., Compania Espanola de Petroleo, S. A. v. Nereus Shipping, S. A., 527 F.2d 966, 975 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936 (1976); In re Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 512 F.Supp. 1308, 1309 (SDNY 1981). This, along with support by other state courts and the California Legislature for consolidation of arbitration proceedings, permitted the court to conclude that class action proceedings were authorized:
"It is unlikely that the state Legislature in adopting the amendment to the Arbitration Act authorizing consolidation of arbitration proceedings, intended to preclude a court from ordering classwide arbitration in an appropriate case. We conclude that a court is not without authority to do so."
31 Cal.3d at 613, 645 P.2d at 1209. The California Supreme Court thus ruled that imposing a class action structure on the arbitration process was permissible as a matter of state law.

[44]We note that, in defining "commerce," Congress declared that
"nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."

[45]It is estimated that 2% of all civil litigation in this country is in the federal courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 3 (1982) (206,000 filings in federal district courts in 12 months ending June 30, 1982, excluding bankruptcy filings); Flango & Elsner, Advance Report, The Latest State Court Caseload Data, 7 State Court J. 18 (Winter 1983) (approximately 13,600,000 civil filings during comparable period, excluding traffic filings).
[46]While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any independent federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.
[47]The contention is made that the Court's interpretation of § 2 of the Act renders §§ 3 and 4 "largely superfluous." Post at 465 U. S. 31, n. 20. This misreads our holding and the Act. In holding that the Arbitration Act preempts a state law that withdraws the power to enforce arbitration agreements, we do not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act apply to proceedings in state courts. Section 4, for example, provides that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in proceedings to compel arbitration. The Federal Rules do not apply in such state court proceedings.
[48]The California Supreme Court justified its holding by reference to our conclusion in Wilko v. Swan,346 U. S. 427 (1953), that arbitration agreements are nonbinding as to claims arising under the federal Securities Act of 1933. 31 Cal.3d at 602, 645 P.2d at 1202-1203. The analogy is unpersuasive. The question in Wilko was not whether a state legislature could create an exception to § 2 of the Arbitration Act, but rather whether Congress, in subsequently enacting the Securities Act, had in fact created such an exception.

JUSTICE STEVENS dissents in part on the ground that § 2 of the Arbitration Act permits a party to nullify an agreement to arbitrate on "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Post at 19. We agree, of course, that a party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement. We conclude, however, that the defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law is not a ground that exists at law or in equity "for the revocation of any contract," but merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the California Franchise Investment Law. Moreover, under this dissenting view, a state policy of providing special protection for franchisees . . . can be recognized without impairing the basic purposes of the federal statute.

Post at 465 U. S. 21. If we accepted this analysis, states could wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts," H.R.Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1924), simply by passing statutes such as the Franchise Investment Law. We have rejected this analysis because it is in conflict with the Arbitration Act, and would permit states to override the declared policy requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements.
[49]Contrary to the dissent’s claim, post, at 8–9, and n. 3 (opinion of Kagan, J.), the Court in Mitsubishi Motors did not hold that federal statutory claims are subject to arbitration so long as the claimant may effectively vindicate his rights in the arbitral forum. The Court expressly stated that, “at this stage in the proceedings,” it had “no occasion to speculate” on whether the arbitration agreement’s potential deprivation of a claimant’s right to pursue federal remedies may render that agreement unenforceable. 473 U. S., at 637, n. 19. Even the Court of Appeals in this case recognized the relevant language in Mitsubishi Motors as dicta. In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F. 3d 204, 214 (CA2 2012).
[50]The dissent contends that a class-action waiver may deny a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies in the same way as a clause that bars a party from presenting economic testimony. See post, at 3, 9. That is a false comparison for several reasons: To begin with, it is not a given that such a clause would constitute an impermissible waiver; we have never considered the point. But more importantly, such a clause, assuming it makes vindication of the claim impossible, makes it impossible not just as a class action but even as an individual claim.
[51]Who can disagree with the dissent’s assertion that “the effective-vindication rule asks about the world today, not the world as it might have looked when Congress passed a given statute”? Post, at 12. But time does not change the meaning of effectiveness, making ineffective vindication today what was effective vindication in the past. The dissent also says that the agreement bars other forms of cost sharing—existing before the Sherman Act—that could provide effective vindication. See post, at 11–12, and n. 5. Petitioners denied that, and that is not what the Court of Appeals decision under review here held. It held that, because other forms of cost sharing were not economically feasible (“the only economically feasible means for . . . enforcing [respondents’] statutory rights is via a class action”), the class-action waiver was unenforceable. 667 F. 3d, at 218 (emphasis added). (The dissent’s assertion to the contrary cites not the opinion on appeal here, but an earlier opinion that was vacated. See In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F. 3d 300 (CA2 2009), vacated and remanded, 559 U. S. 1103 (2010) .) That is the conclusion we reject.

New Draft Essay Posted: "Institutionalizing Shangfang within the Chinese Socialist Rule-of-Law Framework"

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My co-author, Keren Wang, and I are preparing for an upcoming conference of the European China Law Studies Association (欧洲中国法研究协会) to take place in late November in Hong Kong.  More on the conference in later postings.

The conference theme this year is “Making, Enforcing and Accessing the Law.” One of the objects of the theme is to explore both the establishment, and implementation of law making within the administrative apparatus of the Chinese state. The question is particularly pressing with respect to systems of remedies for state obligations already well established. Many Westerners focus on the pseudo state building project of judicial empowerment when considering the issue of law making and dispute resolution. Non-judicial mechanisms are viewed with suspicion or dismissed as either transitory of illegitimate as a basis for framing a strong viable system to resolve disputes arising in law.  

We have been considering these issues form a Chinese constitutional perspective.  In earlier work we analyzed the legality and viability of extra judicial detention (Backer, Larry Catá and Wang, Keren, The Emerging Structures of Socialist Constitutionalism with Chinese Characteristics: Extra Judicial Detention (Laojiao and Shuanggui) and the Chinese Constitutional Order, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 23(2): 251 (2014). For this conference we turn our attention to a related institutional structure for the disciplining of state organs and the developing of legal bases for dispute resolution--the system of Shangfang (letters and visits or or petitioning) within the dynamic and evolving construction of a socialist rule of law theory in China.  While many judge the current manifestation of Shangfang to be more or less a failure (e.g., here), we will suggest that reconstituted within the theoretical framework of socialist rule of law, Shangfang may, like shuanggui, serve a useful role in the construction of law and in the disciplining of officials.  This issue becomes more compelling in light of the theme of the 4th Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress to take place in late October 2014 (see here and here).    

To that end we have drafted for presentation a short essay, Institutionalizing Shangfang within the Chinese Socialist Rule-of-Law Framework. The essay is in preliminary draft form, without footnotes, and is structured as a journey of extracting truth from the formal and informal Chinese context. The focus is on theory and formal structure, with an eye toward implementation.  It is not meant to serve another and no doubt equally useful purpose--as  a vessel for the harvesting of prior scholarship and managing that scholarship to a particular objective. The introductory paragraph follows.  We look forward to comments and further engagement.



Larry Catá Backer*[1]
Keren Wang*[2]


The purpose of this essay is to discuss the viability of the shangfang system within the Chinese historical, political and legal context, and to suggest ways in which shuanggui might benefit from further institutionalization under China’s constitutional framework and its emergent socialist rule of law. To do this, we must first think through what socialist rule of law means, then to look at what shangfang was and is becoming, and then to do two things: one is to decide whether there is a place for shangfang within Chinese socialist rule of law, and two, if there is a place, what does it look like?  To look at the shangfang phenomenon in-itself (which is what Western scholars often do, and a lot of Chinese for their own distinct purposes) is to detach it from the most important currents of the evolving political theory. Therefore, it is far more prudent to talk about shangfang going forward within the complex political and historical context of China than just to do yet another formal legal analysis on how shangfang system as it stands right  now fails to adhere the Western notions of the rule of law.
--> Part I contextualizes the issue of shangfang within the larger Chinese project of establishing principles of socialist rule of law. Part II then turns to the re-orientation of the mechanisms of shangfang to serve to further the objectives of socialist rule of law as a more legitimate and viable framework for resolving issues of administrative failures or wrongdoing.


[1]           *          () is the W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University.  The author may be contacted at lcb911@gmail.com. His blog may be accessed in China at http://blog.sina.com.cn/lcbackerblog.
[2]          *          Penn State MIA (2013); Ph.D. candidate in Rhetoric and Social Thought, Penn State School of Communication Arts and Sciences..  The author may be contracted at kerenwcpe@gamil.com.

Chapter 10 (Hierarchies of Law within the Domestic Legal Order and Between National and International Law Reflecting Governmental Order ): From "Elements of Law" to "Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States"--Building an Introductory Course to the Legal Curriculum for the 21st Century

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Since 2010, I have been posting on the development of a new course I have been developing for our first year law school students, "Elements of Law." The course originally had a quite modest objective--to introduce law students to legal research and reasoning through case law, statutory interpretation, and legal history, processes, and institutions. I chose to broaden its objectives within these specific parameters and development a framing and concepts course that would provide a deep foundation to law students on the legal system they were undertaking to study.
--Elements of Law 3.0: On the Relevance of a First Year Law Course Designed to Frame the Law School Curriculum).
--Developing a New Course--"Elements of Law"
--"Elements of Law" Course 2.0: A Framework Course for the U.S. Law Curriculum,
Grounded in the principles of the sociology of law, the course has morphed into an effort to introduce students to law as a self-referencing system with its own particular structures, premises, constraints and language, with its own logic and taboos and its own means of understanding the world. That systemicity (cf. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Chichester : John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1999) is then a critical element in the way in which the legal system (in this case of the United States) interacts with the world, both as a legal and as a socio-economic-political actor. The course has also expanded from its original narrow and technical focus, to a broader focus on principles and the use of language and logic to build and operate a system of law. That broadening has made it possible to offer the course not just to first year law students, but also to graduate students in the social sciences and in international affairs, as a grounding in the legal systems that are important in their respective fields.

This and the posts that follow produces some of the materials I will be presenting to the class. I offer these materials in hopes that they may prove of use and that you might share comments, perspectives and suggestions as I develop those materials on this site. Thanks.

This post includes a draft of the second Chapter of Part II-- Hierarchies of Law and Governance; Sources and Uses, Chapter 10 (Hierarchies of Law within the Domestic Legal Order and Between National and International Law Reflecting Governmental Order).
 
 
Chapter 10


Hierarchies of Law within the Domestic Legal Order and Between National and International Law Reflecting Governmental Order


I. Introduction

            We have been considering the way in which the United States has developed a set of principles to systematically organize the relationship between law and the apparatus of state (its government).  We have seen how that initial decision produced a compromise of sorts between two competing ways of conceptualizing the state-law nexus.  The first understood law as inevitably tied to and produced only by the apparatus of state as a representative avatar for the people as sovereigns.  The second represented an evolution of the old medieval understanding of law as autonomous of the state (and its government). That autonomy, of course, was not absolute—the legislature could project power into law by enacting statutes.  Yet early on, there was also a sense that higher order values might not be interfered with by either the legislature (Parliament) or the executive (the Crown), though together (as Crown in Parliament) they might be vested with the authority to act as or for the sovereign people. We have come to understand how these premises shaped the development of a two tier structure of law with different relationships to the state.  Higher Order or Constitutional law remains somewhat autonomous of the state and can only be amended at great effort.  Other forms of law may be more easily made.  Yet even there the notion of separation remains lurking.   

            We have also begun to understand how this grounding notion of law-state structure produced a need for ordering among law.  If, as we have come to understand it, the law system fo the United States includes several sub-systemic strands that overlap, and if we also have come to understand the governmental system of the United States as layered among local, state and federal authority, then some structural guidance is necessary in order to make the U.S. legal system coherent rather than chaotic.  It is to that point that we considered the way in which hierarchies of law have been established both within states and between states and the general government in Washington D.C.

            With this chapter we broaden our gaze just a little more. This section introduces the student to the issues of legal hierarchy in the context of the state system on which the contemporary global legal and political order is founded. The student will examine the relationship between domestic and international law in relation to the obligation of the state and the obligations of individuals.  That has tended to be a complex business sin the United States, the outer limits of which remain quite lively areas of debate.  The problem at the end of the chapter is meant to help students apply some of the premises underlying U.S. approaches to the incorporation of international law and principles within its domestic jurisprudence and the way in which that international legalization can actually penetrate into the U.S. legal system.



II. Chapter Readings

·      Larry Catá Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonization and Its Challenges for the Legal-State,[1]in FICHL Publication Series No. 11 (2011): The Law of the Future and the Future of the Law 427-437 (Editors: Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis, MorlyFrishman and Laura Kistemaker; TorkelOpsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2011)
·      Medellín v. Texas[2],128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (READ MAJORITY OPINION and skim concurring and dissenting opinions
·      PruneYard Shopping Ctr. V. Robins,[3] 447 U. S. 74 (1980). Read pp 74-81

__________

Inter-Systemic Harmonization And Its Challenges For The Legal-State
Larry Catá Backer
HiiL Law of the Future Series, The Law of the Future and the Future of Law
(Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis, Laura Kistemaker and Morly Frishman, eds., The Hague, Netherlands: Torkel Opsahi Academic Editor, forthcoming 2011).

1. Introduction.

We have been asked to consider, in a summary essay form, three fundamental questions affecting the law-state in this century: 

What do you see as the most significant challenges for the development of the law? What developments are we likely to see in the coming two to three decades? What do those developments mean for national legal systems in the international legal order as a whole?”

The questions put at issue, in a precise way, the fundamental understanding of the basic building blocks of 20th century socio-economic political culture—and particularly the character of law, the state and non-state actors. But these questions also raise issues that are dynamic and that implicate fundamental questions of institutional form, function and legitimacy. Those issues revolve around communication, autonomy and interdependence in the governance activities of state and non-state actors, and the forms in which communication is undertaken, autonomy revealed and interdependence manifested.  There is thus a dynamic element at the core of the questions that requires elaboration and that serves as the urtext for governance actors for this century. The thesis of this essay is this: Whatever the outcome in the decades to come, states and their domestic legal orders will not be able to maintain their isolation from the emerging non-national governance frameworks and retain a substantial relevance; to avoid irrelevance, states and their law systems must recognize governance polycentricism and more effectively communicate with the emerging extra-legal governance frameworks of public and private governance systems and by public and private actors. It is that dynamic element of inter-systemic harmonization and its challenges for that law-state that this essay considers, weaving this theme within the three questions initially posed.  

2. The Future: Divergence, Coordination, and Contradiction in Ideologies of Convergence.

            At the start of the 21st century, governance harmonization has become a more complicated, more desired, and yet more elusive enterprise. Even as the enterprise of harmonization has grown, states have begun to more aggressively resist harmonization as its ability to serve as a framework for the transfer of governance power from states to new centres has been more widely felt. However, that element of resistance has been complicated by the entry of new actors within governance circles. Harmonization is currently proceeding simultaneously along a number of different lines—horizontal, vertical and inter-systemic—that reflects these ambiguous and multi-vector interactions and that also suggests the context in which the future of legal systems, however understood, will be determined.

            Horizontal harmonization occurs between entities (traditionally state entities) roughly similarly situated within hierarchies of authorities—for example between the states of the United States, between the Member States of the European Union, or between two less formally connected states, for example between India and Chile or between other states in the global community. It can be as simple a project as finding a common language for communication and as complicated a project as integrating legal systems. This push toward horizontal harmonization of laws among sovereigns describes the great project of comparative law with its origins in European 19th century notions of the state. Much that passes for lawmaking remains at this level of 19th century conceptions, even as the foundations for those conceptions—the superiority of the state and of the positive law produced by a sovereign demos—has been severely challenged.  The challenges are both horizontal and vertical.  Harmonization among states unequal in power or development is sometimes understood either as a form of colonialism (a political undertaking through law) or more insidiously, as a means of imposing the ideologies and political choices of powerful states on less developed ones under the guise of simplicity, communication and other virtues of legal harmonization. Even something as basic as the linguistics of a language, can have ideological effects when transposed, especially when words migrate from the legal cultures of developed states into those of developing states.  For example, the migration of developed state notions of property imported into Brazil or Panama to protect the rights of squatters on public lands has been used as a vehicle for developers to deprive these dwellers of their properties through sale or mortgage foreclosures. 

            The monopoly of horizontal harmonization was broken in the aftermath of the World Wars of the 20th century. After 1945 the focus increasingly shifted from the state to a community of states, and from horizontal to vertical harmonization. Vertical harmonization, that is the harmonization between superior and inferior political entities, is less well developed and there is no real consensus about its utility or legitimacy. Yet it is the central element of the great 20th century project of legal internationalization—and of the fundamental change in the understanding of the state—now deeply embedded within an increasingly managed community of states. The move towards internationalisation of standards and the communal management of certain behaviours (by individuals, enterprises or states) through positive law—corruption, human rights, and war—has become an important element of global and transnational governance. The financial crisis of 2007-08 brought this project into the foreground as the power of states, funnelled through the G-20 framework, sought to coordinate and channel state power through a supra-national entity whose consensus views would then be adopted by all states.  Transnational constitutionalism represents an important form of efforts to undertake development of a customary practice of vertical harmonization. The recent constitutional crisis in Honduras, and the critical role played by international norms in resolving that domestic constitutional crisis, provides a recent example of the development and growth of this form of harmonization. Yet, the project of vertical harmonization remains incomplete, and its fundamental premises continue to be challenged, even as the great edifices of supra-national institutions are created and public transnational law evolves. 

            However, vertical harmonization continues to be grounded at its core in the state.  Ironically, the great project of vertical harmonization—economic globalisation—has also served to illuminate the limitations of a state centred approach to law and harmonization. The 21stcentury has witnessed the emergence of governance polycentricism, of the potential broadening of the mechanics of law beyond the memorialisation of the commands of territorially bounded states, of the rise of private law with public functions and of public entities as private actors.  This has substantially changed the landscape of law. These changes have given rise to the most controversial form of harmonization, at once the most interesting and potentially most far reaching variant—inter-systemic harmonization, or harmonization of public and private governance systems and by public and private actors.  States operating as private enterprises in economic markets and economic entities serving as substitutes for the state in weak governance zones suggests the context in which public and private governance systems remain autonomous but communicate and converge. The movement from customary and positive law to contract and the governance mechanisms of surveillance expand and change the nature and character of governance.  The great projects of sovereign investing by Norway and the People’s Republic of China through their sovereign wealth funds provide examples of one of the forms that inter-systemic harmonization is already taking. Sovereign investing integrates systems of traditional state law making, public policy, administrative mechanisms and participation in private markets to produce a comprehensive and transnational approach to governance objectives.

            These changes both augment the power of states (with respect to the expansion of the palette of legitimate governance tools) and shrink the scope of its control (as other governance communities emerge with authority over actors operating within the territory of states). The management of that convergence, communication and interaction has been a great challenge for current efforts to harmonize polycentric public-private systems, existing within states and outside of the domestic legal order of any state.  Projects like that of John Ruggie’s business and human rights governance framework—the Three Pillar Protect-Respect-Remedy Framework—provides a contemporary application of these issues and serves as a harbinger of things to come.  Indeed, within the cluster of governance issues understood as business and human rights, for example, the intersection among domestic and international public legal orders, private governance orders, the public role of private entities and the private role of public entities become acute.

            Consequently, in place of the traditional focus on the law-state and its obsession with the division between public and private, another focus is emerging, one in which the comparative law project will need to bridge gaps between public law based state systems and private social norm based systems. Just as lawmaking might have become unmoored from the state, the state has itself become unmoored. And so the issue of corporate citizenship serves as a proxy for the equally important converse issues—that of the private rights of states as participants in global markets. At the international level, states and other collectives might well have to meet more as equals, even as they interact within vertical hierarchies in particular contexts. But even those localized hierarchies are now unstable. Corporations negotiate “agreements” with small states; nations negotiate treaties. Large corporations can coerce small states in ways that mimic the ways in which larger states can do the same to smaller and more vulnerable ones. States and corporations are now capable of deploying forces in the field—sometimes states hire corporations that serve as mercenary armies for hire. The clear lines of public and private authority, and even the once clear lines of its Marxist-Leninist opposite, have become blurred.

3. The Challenge for the Development of Law: Avoiding Containment and  Irrelevance.

            The construction and management of inter-relations between public and private governance communities and the move from law to extra-legal systems of behaviour control will serve as the great project of the 21stcentury. As a consequence, the greatest challenge for law in the 21stcentury is to avoid becoming irrelevant in an emerging global governance order in which corporations use contracts to regulate their supply chains, states reconstitute themselves as private market actors and private enterprises assert regulatory control of markets through authoritative systems of assessment and rating.

            Consider for example, the conventionally understood relationship between public and private law. Private law has traditionally been understood to derive its power and legitimacy from the state. It is attached to the state.  The attachment of private law to the state provides a strong ideological basis for the management of private relationships by the state apparatus and the political community it represents.  That attachment also suggested a place outside of which law did not reach—but which was not considered legitimate or legal, whatever its binding effect. And that was the end of it—as far as the jurisdictional boundaries and legitimacy-dignity of law was understood to extend.  Thus, for example, with respect to limits on the use of real property, the focus is on the individual common law states, whose rights and obligations are mediated by the state through an application of the law of nuisance.  In China, the same limits start from the obligations of individuals to the community, memorialized in the great principles of Harmonious Society mediated through the state apparatus under the leadership of the Communist Party.  In theocratic systems, the focus is on the community of the faithful whose collective obligations are mediated by a priestly institution through religious law.

            Beyond the law of any of these variants lies a universe of morals, psychology, markets and religion to which law was opaque (though was not above deploying discretely from time to time through the device of “policy” focus, for example), and which existed subject to the pre-emptive power of law.  The ideology of law produced an incentive towards autarchy totalitarianism in which the highest authority is characterized as political and vested in territorially bounded states whose legitimating organs (today democracy, yesterday anything from the Kaiser to the priest) were solely vested with authority to bind all juridically recognized persons within the state.  The ideology of law permitted a certain variation—sustaining the political framework of the United States, the Soviet Union, Imperial Japan, and Nationalist Socialist Germany simultaneously.    

            But the 21st century has witnessed the rise of a new institutional phenomenon—the functional detachment of private law from the state. This suggests a fundamental reorientation of governance, a movement away from the law-state binary to one grounded in the law-norm binary (within which the state is not necessarily present). That reorientation, in turn, suggests polycentricism, breaking the monopoly of power exercised by the state producing positive law through democratically elected institutions and reviving the autonomous force of custom.  Yet this is custom of a non-traditional sort; custom is now understood as producing rules that are given force through the state apparatus (the traditional understanding of customary domestic law) but it is also now understood as producing rules that memorialize the customs of other governance communities, from multi-national corporations, to supra-national actors. Law systems, in all their traditional variation, now co-exist with the regulatory contract systems of multi-national corporations, with the governance norms of transnational law-religion systems and with supra-national organizations that produce and seek to enforce their own sets of governance norms among their consenting members.

            But detachment also produces different forms of governance. Law tends to assume a simple and single dimension form—a command to be obeyed, usually in the form of an injunction to act or avoid acting in particular ways. However, the forms of governance have expanded well beyond this simple and ancient technique. The movement away from law to governance techniques has also made it easier for non-state communities to develop an institutional framework and mechanics of effective governance. Monitoring, surveillance, disclosure, standard setting, binding principles, and objective evaluation techniques are among the methods of governance that have acquired an increasing regulatory aspect.  One can govern as effectively by fine-tuning the classes of information required of an individual and providing consequences for the results of the evaluation thereof, as by the command of a statute.

            This challenge to law suggests another—an institutional convergence in governance capacity.  Developed states and the largest multinational corporations are closer in form and operation than either is to less developed states and smaller corporations. Larger corporations and developed states are then more likely to look to each other for governance harmonization than either would look to developing states or smaller corporations. That, in turn, suggests a fundamental reorientation of governance chains grounded in a functional abandonment of the public-private distinction. The resulting polycentricism becomes a powerful governance force as the historical movement toward the assertion of near monopoly power by states within their territories is reversed under the operative framework of economic globalisation.

            Opening borders to commerce and investment has a strong collateral effect on the extent of the empire of law as the operative instrument of the law-state.  Open borders permit a disaggregation of citizenship from residence, especially among investors and their investments. It also produces a power in individuals to consent to membership in communities with its own rules and institutional structures, whose objectives and functions straddle multiple territorial borders.  Law now finds itself in a competitive environment of a force unseen since the Enlightenment in Europe.  On the one hand, the character of law within states in changing.  On the other, new techniques of law making and porous borders have increased the sources of governance. Law, like the state, has not so much been reduced in scope and power, as it has now come to share governance space with a host of different institutions producing distinct forms of command that may have some of the effects of traditional law but are not law (classically understood as a legitimate command sourced in the apparatus of a political state).

4. Toward a Mechanics of Relevance for National Legal Systems in the International Legal Order as a Whole.

            States need not embrace the passive virtues of the philosophy of quietism. Indeed, it is essential for each state to not merely rethink the basis of its legitimacy, form and function within its territory, but also to stake out a space for its positive contribution within emerging jurisdictional challenges posed by new governance frameworks, especially with respect to its areas of control. The great challenge for states is to find a way in which they might more actively engage in the processes of inter-systemic and vertical harmonization without losing their fundamental character and democratic connection with their citizens. That requires a willingness to develop a domestic legal order that incorporates evolving international standards that are themselves a product of the active participation of states and other relevant stakeholders. This can work, for example, in the area of corporate governance, in standards for bribery, and in the regulation of conflict.  

            That task requires a number of actions. First, states must not pout. States that embrace insularity in the face of the emerging global polycentric governance orders, states that raise walls of domestic legal systems around the borders of their national territories (with the occasional extraterritorial foray) will, quite perversely, increase the ability and ease with which other regulatory actors might penetrate those barriers. The penetration would take advantage of the blindness of law-states to governance frameworks beyond the state, that is, they would take advantage of the limits inherent in the territorial borders that once served more positively as a means for asserting a monopoly of state power within them. Foreign multinational corporation regulation of host state suppliers through contract provisions with little connection to the domestic legal order of the host state, or the fidelity of host state actors to the requirements of foreign supra-national evaluation and standard setting bodies are examples of penetration that states would find difficult to prevent without foregoing those connections that are almost invariably essential to the well-being of its people.

            Second, states and their domestic legal orders will have to engage polycentricism within their territories. That might require some flexibility in communicating with autonomous systems and a willingness to harmonize their domestic legal order with those of important parallel systems. This future is likely to be represented by the governance communication and harmonization challenges faced recently by a multinational corporation in the mining business, which found itself in violation of the requirements of an autonomous international system of norms for the conduct of its subsidiary, operating a mine through a subsidiary jointly owned by it and a provincial government in the place where the mine was located, despite the fact that the highest national court had determined that the conduct at issue met all of the legal requirements imposed by the state in which that mine was located.  States without sufficient points of contact with non-state governance systems will find themselves isolated and less in control of the activities that occur within their national territory.

            Third, the complexities of governance, and the dispersion of governance authority pose institutional management problems for states.  One of the greatest is what John Ruggie has called problems of incoherence.  At the state level, incoherence denotes the failure of communication and coordination of policy and law making among the various ministries and regulatory agencies of a state apparatus. The classic example is that of the South African Republic, whose negotiation of bi-lateral investment treaty provisions by one ministry did not take into account the requisites of human rights based policy being implemented by another ministry.  The resulting conflicting obligations produced litigation to the detriment of state policy.  At the international level, incoherence is more common and illustrated by the disjunction between the rules applicable within a state through domestic law and the international obligations of the state without direct domestic effect.

            Fourth, states must avoid legal segmentation. In the context of 19th century global horizontal harmonization legal segmentation produces a harmonized law for elites driven by the state and a local traditionalist law/custom for everyone else.  In places like Japan before 1945 this produced a tendency towards multiple domestic legal orders within a single territory.  The same effects are sometimes exhibited in developing states subject to significant harmonization pressure through their entanglements with the global financial community regulators—the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  In the context of inter-systemic harmonization, similar patterns produce a challenge of multiple domestic legal orders that harmonize rules applicable, at least functionally, to distinct segments of the national population. There is already evidence of this; China exhibits a tendency toward bifurcated labour markets depending on whether labour is hired for production within foreign dominated supply chains or domestic ones.  Bi-lateral investment treaties create pockets of private law and rule making with respect to which the domestic legal order may not play a decisive role. 

            Taken together, these strategies suggest in the briefest form, the contours of the challenges posed by inter-systemic harmonization, and the dangers of resisting harmonization among these governance frameworks of “unequal” and distinctive governance organs—states, intergovernmental organizations, transnational private actors and multinational corporations and religions, to name only a few. States seek to remain effective and powerful autonomous actors. The expression of state power through law must remain vital.  Yet these two objectives have become complicated in a world in which states—and law—no longer occupy the governance stage without competitors. States that can accommodate the new realities of power diffusion and governance variety—of corporations that regulate, of states that seek to project their power through traditionally private juridical persons (corporations, transnational public and private organizations, and sovereign investment funds), of functional law effectuated through survey, surveillance, disclosure, standards, conditional income support programs, supply chain relations, religious command and the like, are likely to be more effective actors within and without their territories than those who hide from these changes or resist them. 

            But the processes of inter-systemic harmonization, like those of horizontal and vertical harmonization, will neither be harmonious nor a rationally unfolding well-managed process compelled by the power of its internal coherence and its external incentives.  The process will be messy—and the results uneven. Vanguard states will become both more powerful internally and more influential within global governance communities; rejectionist states will seek to preserve traditional approaches in solidarity with like minded states but become, in the process, less relevant globally.  An important factor determining the extent of conflict in moving to a world organized on principles of inter-systemic harmonization, of course, and the effects of these transformations, are also largely dependent on variations in state power. The least developed and least powerful states (politically, culturally or economically) are likely to face these challenges in a more direct and consequential form than the largest or most powerful states. China and the United States can resist emerging trends longer, and reach accommodations with the products of such trends in ways which are impossible for the least developed African states. And indeed, in some ways, and though it seeks to turn the process to advance its own interests, China has already begun to move toward an inter-systemic harmonization model more successfully than the United States. A most interesting set of challenges face states that are already deeply enmeshed in supra-national governance organizations.  The Member States of the European Union have greater experience in the dynamics of cooperation within loosely bound normative structures. They also have experience in governance within diffuse governance frameworks in which power is shared among a number of stakeholders.  Yet all of this diffusion remains confined to the state and its supra-national creatures. Much can be learned from the experience of Europe, though European states will have much to learn, as well, from the experiences of developing states that confront the power of transnational non-state governance.  Inter-systemic harmonization suggests the possibility that law might preserve its relevance and autonomy. But it can achieve this objective only by conceding its monopoly on governance.


__________


JOSE ERNESTO MEDELLIN, Petitioner v. TEXAS
No. 06-984
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
552 U.S. 491; 128 S. Ct. 1346; 170 L. Ed. 2d 190
October 10, 2007, Argued
March 25, 2008, Decided
[Available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZS.html]
Chief Justice Robertsdelivered the opinion of the Court.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), located in the Hague, is a tribunal established pursuant to the United Nations Charter to adjudicate disputes between member states.  In the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I. C. J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31) (Avena), that tribunal considered a claim brought by Mexico against the United States.  The ICJ held that, based on violations of the Vienna Convention, 51 named Mexican nationals were entitled to review and reconsideration of their state-court convictions and sentences in the United States.  This was so regardless of any forfeiture of the right to raise Vienna Convention claims because of a failure to comply with generally applicable state rules governing challenges to criminal convictions.
. . . .
Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin, who had been convicted and sentenced in Texas state court for murder, is one of the 51 Mexican nationals named in the Avenadecision.  Relying on the ICJ’s decision and the President’s Memorandum, Medellin filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin’s application as an abuse of the writ under state law, given Medellin’s failure to raise his Vienna Convention claim in a timely manner under state law.  We granted certiorari to decide two questions.  First, is the ICJ’s judgment in Avenadirectly enforceable as domestic law in a state court in the United States?  Second, does the President’s Memorandum independently require the States to provide review and reconsideration of the claims of the 51 Mexican nationals named in Avenawithout regard to state procedural default rules?  We conclude that neither Avena nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions.  We therefore affirm the decision below.
I
A
In 1969, the United States, upon the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention or Convention), Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T. I. A. S. No. 6820, and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention (Optional Protocol or Protocol), Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 325, T. I. A. S. No. 6820.  The preamble to the Convention provides that its purpose is to “contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations.”21 U.S.T., at 79; Sanchez-Llamas, supra, at 337, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557.  Toward that end, Article 36 of the Convention was drafted to “facilitat[e] the exercise of consular functions.”  Art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T., at 100.  It provides that if a person detained by a foreign country “so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State” of such detention, and “inform the [detainee] of his righ[t]” to request assistance from the consul of his own state.  Art. 36(1)(b), id., at 101.
The Optional Protocol provides a venue for the resolution of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Vienna Convention.  Art. I, 21 U.S.T., at 326.  Under the Protocol, such disputes “shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” and “may accordingly be brought before the [ICJ] . . . by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.”Ibid.
The ICJ is “the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”United Nations Charter, Art. 92, 59 Stat. 1051, T. S. No. 993 (1945).  It was established in 1945 pursuant to the United Nations Charter.  The ICJ Statute―annexed to the U. N. Charter―provides the organizational framework and governing procedures for cases brought before the ICJ.  Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), 59 Stat. 1055,, T. S. No. 993 (1945).
Under Article 94(1) of the U. N. Charter, “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.”59 Stat. 1051.  The ICJ’s jurisdiction in any particular case, however, is dependent upon the consent of the parties.  See Art. 36, id., at 1060.  The ICJ Statute delineates two ways in which a nation may consent to ICJ jurisdiction:  It may consent generally to jurisdiction on any question arising under a treaty or general international law, Art. 36(2), ibid., or it may consent specifically to jurisdiction over a particular category of cases or disputes pursuant to a separate treaty, Art. 36(1), ibid.  The United States originally consented to the general jurisdiction of the ICJ when it filed a declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction under Art. 36(2) in 1946.  The United States withdrew from general ICJ jurisdiction in 1985.  See U. S. Dept. of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I. L. M. 1742 (1985). By ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, the United States consented to the specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to claims arising out of the Vienna Convention.  On March 7, 2005, subsequent to the ICJ’s judgment in Avena, the United States gave notice of withdrawal from the  Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention.  Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
B
Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national, has lived in the United States since preschool.  A member of the  “Black and Whites” gang, Medellin was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal murders of two Houston teenagers.
* * *
Medellin was arrested at approximately 4 a.m. on June 29, 1993.  A few hours later, between 5:54 and 7:23 a.m., Medellin was given Miranda warnings; he then signed a written waiver and gave a detailed written confession.  App. to Brief for Respondent 32-36.  Local law enforcement officers did not, however, inform Medellin of his Vienna Convention right to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention.  Brief for Petitioner 6-7.  Medellin was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death; his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal.  Medellin v. State, No. 71,997 (Tex. Crim. App., May 16, 1997), App. to Brief for Respondent 2-31.
Medellin first raised his Vienna Convention claim in his first application for state post conviction relief.  The state trial court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted because Medellin had failed to raise it at trial or on direct review.  The trial court also rejected the Vienna Convention claim on the merits, finding that Medellin had “fail[ed] to show that any non-notification of the Mexican authorities impacted on the validity of his conviction or punishment.”Id.,at 62.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.  Id., at 64-65.
. . . .
Medellin then filed a habeas petition in Federal District Court.  The District Court denied relief, holding   that Medellin’s Vienna Convention claim was procedurally defaulted and that Medellin had failed to show prejudice arising from the Vienna Convention violation.  See Medellin v. Cockrell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27339, Civ. Action No. H-01-4078 (SD Tex., June 26, 2003), App. to Brief for Respondent 66, 86-92.
While Medellin’s application for a certificate of appealability was pending in the Fifth Circuit, the ICJ issued its decision in Avena.  The ICJ held that the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention by failing to inform the 51 named Mexican nationals, including Medellin, of their Vienna Convention rights.  2004 I. C. J., at 53-55.  In the ICJ’s determination, the United States was obligated “to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals.”Id., at 72, P 153(9)..  The ICJ indicated that such review was required without regard to state procedural default rules.  Id., at 56-57.
The Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. . .
This Court granted certiorari.  Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 161 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2005) (per curiam) (Medellin I).  Before we heard oral argument, however, President George W. Bush issued his Memorandum for the United States Attorney General, providing:
“I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.”App. to Pet. for Cert. 187a.
Medellin, relying on the President’s Memorandum and the ICJ’s decision in Avena, filed a second application for habeas relief in state court.  Ex parte Medellin, 223 S. W. 3d 315, 322-323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  . . .
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently dismissed Medellin’s second state habeas application as an abuse of the writ.  223 S. W. 3d, at 352.  In the court’s view, neither the Avena decision nor the President’s Memorandum was “binding federal law” that could displace the State’s limitations on the filing of successive habeas applications.  Ibid.  We again granted certiorari.  550 U.S. 917, 127 S. Ct. 2129, 167 L. Ed. 2d 862 (2007).
II
Medellin first contends that the ICJ’s judgment in Avena constitutes a “binding” obligation on the state and federal courts of the United States.  He argues that “by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the treaties requiring compliance with the Avena judgment are already the ‘Law of the Land’ by which all state and federal courts in this country are ‘bound.’”  Reply Brief for Petitioner 1.  Accordingly, Medellin argues, Avena is a binding federal rule of decision that pre-empts contrary state limitations on successive habeas petitions.
No one disputes that the Avena decision―a decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes―constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States.  But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts.  The question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domesticlegal effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.
This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that―while they constitute international law commitments―do not by themselves function as binding federal law.  The distinction was well explained by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 2 Pet. 253, 315, 7 L. Ed. 415 (1829),  overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 7 Pet. 51, 8 L. Ed. 604 (1833), which held that a treaty is “equivalent to an act of the legislature,” and hence self-executing, when it “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.”Foster, supra, at 314, 2 Pet. 253, 315, 7 L. Ed. 415.  When, in contrast, “[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.”Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386 (1888).  In sum, while treaties “may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.”Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (CA1 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.).
A treaty is, of course, “primarily a compact between independent nations.”Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598, 5 S. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798 (1884).  It ordinarily “depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.”Ibid.. . . .  Only “[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, [will] they have the force  and effect of a legislative enactment.”Whitney, supra, at 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386.
. . . .
Medellin and his amici nonetheless contend that the Optional Protocol, United Nations Charter, and ICJ Statute supply the “relevant obligation” to give the Avenajudgment binding effect in the domestic courts of the United States.  Reply Brief for Petitioner 5-6.. . . .Because none of these treaty sources creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic law.
A
The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.  Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-397,  105 S. Ct. 1338, 84 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1985).  Because a treaty ratified by the United States is “an agreement among sovereign powers,” we have also considered as “aids to its interpretation” the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as “the post ratification understanding” of signatory nations.  Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226, 116 S. Ct. 629, 133 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1996). . . .
As a signatory to the Optional Protocol, the United States agreed to submit disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention to the ICJ.  The Protocol provides:  “Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.”  Art. I, 21 U.S.T., at 326.  Of course, submitting to jurisdiction and agreeing to be bound are two different things.  A party could, for example, agree to compulsory nonbinding arbitration.  Such an agreement would require  the party to appear before the arbitral tribunal without obligating the party to treat the tribunal’s decision as binding.  See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U. S.-Can.-Mex., Art. 2018(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I. L. M. 605, 697 (1993) (“On receipt of the final report of [the arbitral panel requested by a Party to the agreement], the disputing Parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations and recommendations of the panel”).
The most natural reading of the Optional Protocol is as a bare grant of jurisdiction.  It provides only that “[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice” and “may accordingly be brought before the [ICJ] . . . by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.”  Art. I, 21 U.S.T., at 326.  The Protocol says nothing about the effect of an ICJ decision and does not itself commit signatories to  comply with an ICJ judgment.  The Protocol is similarly silent as to any enforcement mechanism.
The obligation on the part of signatory nations to comply with ICJ judgments derives not from the Optional Protocol, but rather from Article 94 of the United Nations Charter―the provision that specifically addresses the effect of ICJ decisions.  [13] Article 94(1) provides that “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.”  59 Stat. 1051 (emphasis added).  The Executive Branch contends that the phrase “undertakes to comply” is not “an acknowledgement that an ICJ decision will have immediate legal effect in the courts of U. N. members,” but rather “a commitment on the part of U. N. members to take future action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ decision.”  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin I, O. T. 2004, No. 04-5928, p 34.
We agree with this construction of Article 94.  The Article is not a directive to domestic courts.  It does not provide that the United States “shall” or “must” comply with an ICJ decision, nor indicate that the Senate that ratified the U. N. Charter intended to vest ICJ decisions with immediate legal effect in domestic courts.  Instead, “[t]he words of Article 94 . . . call upon governments to take certain action.”Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 273 U.S. App. D.C. 266, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (CADC 1988) (quoting Diggs v. Richardson, 180 U.S. App. D.C. 376, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (CADC 1976); internal quotation marks omitted).  . . . .  In other words, the U. N. Charter reads like “a compact between independent nations” that “depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the  honor of the governments which are parties to it.”Head Money Cases, 112 U.S., at 598, 5 S. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798.
The remainder of Article 94 confirms  that the U. N. Charter does not contemplate the automatic enforceability of ICJ decisions in domestic courts.. . .   Article 94(2)―the enforcement provision―provides the sole remedy for noncompliance:  referral to the United Nations Security Council by an aggrieved state.  59 Stat. 1051.
The U. N. Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic―that is, nonjudicial―remedy is itself evidence that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts.  See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S., at 347, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557.  And even this “quintessentially internationalremed[y],”id., at 355, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557, is not absolute.  First, the Security Council must “dee[m] necessary” the issuance of a recommendation or measure to effectuate the judgment.  Art. 94(2), 59 Stat. 1051.  Second, as the President and Senate were undoubtedly aware in subscribing to the U. N. Charter and Optional Protocol, the  United States retained the unqualified right to exercise its veto of any Security Council resolution.
This was the understanding of the Executive Branch when the President agreed to the U. N. Charter and the declaration accepting general compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.  . . . .
If ICJ judgments were instead regarded as automatically enforceable domestic law, they would be immediately and directly binding on state and federal courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.  Mexico or the ICJ  would have no need to proceed to the Security Council to enforce the judgment in this case.  Noncompliance with an ICJ judgment through exercise of the Security Council veto―always regarded as an option by the Executive and ratifying Senate during and after consideration of the U. N. Charter, Optional Protocol, and ICJ Statute―would no longer be a viable alternative.  There would be nothing to veto.  In light of the U. N. Charter’s remedial scheme, there is no reason to believe that the President and Senate signed up for such a result.
In sum, Medellin’s view that ICJ decisions are automatically enforceable as domestic law is fatally undermined by the enforcement structure established by Article 94.  His construction would eliminate the option of noncompliance contemplated by Article 94(2), undermining the ability of the political branches to determine whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment.  Those sensitive foreign policy decisions would instead be transferred to state and federal courts charged with applying an ICJ judgment directly as domestic law.  And those courts would not be empowered to decide whether to comply with the judgment―again, always regarded as an option by the political branches―any more than courts may consider whether to comply with any other species of domestic law.  This result would be particularly anomalous in light of the principle that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative―’the political’―Departments.”Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726 (1918).
. . . .
Medellin argues that because the Avena case involves him, it is clear that he―and the 50 other Mexican nationals named in the Avena decision―should be regarded as parties to the Avena judgment.  Brief for Petitioner 21-22.  But cases before the ICJ are often precipitated by disputes involving particular persons or entities, disputes that a nation elects to take up as its own. . . . .   That has never been understood to alter the express and established rules that only nation-states may be parties before the ICJ, Art. 34, 59 Stat. 1059, and―contrary to the position of the dissent, post, at ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 244―that ICJ judgments are binding only between those parties, Art. 59, Stat. 1062.
. . . .
It is, moreover, well settled that the United States’ interpretation of a treaty “is entitled to great weight.”Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-185, 102 S. Ct. 2374, 72 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1982). . .  .   The Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law.  See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 27-29.
. . . .
The pertinent international agreements, therefore, do not provide for implementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic courts, and “where a treaty does not provide a particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it  is not for the federal courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own.”Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S., at 347, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557.
B
The dissent faults our analysis because it “looks for the wrong thing (explicit textual expression about self-execution) using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the treaty language).”Post, at ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 246.  Given our obligation to interpret treaty provisions to determine whether they are self-executing, we have to confess that we do think it rather important to look to the treaty language to see what it has to say about the issue.  That is after all what the Senate looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty.
The interpretive approach employed by the Court today―resorting to the text―is hardly novel.  In two early cases involving an 1819 land-grant treaty between Spain and the United States, Chief Justice Marshall found the language of the treaty dispositive.  In Foster, after distinguishing between self-executing treaties (those “equivalent to an act of the legislature”) and non-self-executing treaties (those “the legislature must execute”), Chief Justice Marshall held that the 1819 treaty was non-self-executing. 27 U.S. 253, 2 Pet., at 314, 7 L. Ed. 415.  Four years later, the Supreme Court considered another claim under the same treaty, but concluded that the treaty was self-executing.  See Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 7 Pet., at 87, 8 L. Ed. 604.  The reason was not because the treaty was sometimes self-executing and sometimes not, but because “the language of” the Spanish translation (brought to the Court’s attention for the first time) indicated the parties’ intent to ratify and confirm the land-grant “by force of the instrument itself.”Id., 32 U.S. 51, 7 Pet., at 89, 8 L. Ed. 604.
As against this time-honored textual approach, the dissent proposes a multifactor, judgment-by-judgment analysis that would “jettiso[n] relative predictability for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors.”Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (1995).  The dissent’s novel approach to deciding which (or, more accurately, when) treaties give rise to directly enforceable federal law is arrestingly indeterminate.  Treaty language is barely probative. Post, at ____ - ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 237-238 (“[T]he absence or presence of language in a treaty about a provision’s self-execution proves nothing at all”).  Determining whether treaties themselves create federal law is sometimes committed to the political branches and sometimes to the judiciary. Post, at ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 238-246.  Of those committed to the judiciary, the courts pick and choose which shall be binding United States law―trumping not only state but other federal law as well―and which shall not. Post, at ____ - ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 238.  They do this on the basis of a multifactor, “context-specific” inquiry. Post, at ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 238.  Even then, the same treaty sometimes gives rise to United States law and sometimes does not, again depending on an ad hoc judicial assessment. Post, at ____ - ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 238-246.
Our Framers established a careful set of procedures that must be followed before federal law can be created under the Constitution―vesting that decision in the political branches, subject to checks and balances.  U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7.  They also recognized that treaties could create federal law, but again through the political branches, with the President making the treaty  and the Senate approving it.  Art. II, § 2.  The dissent’s understanding of the treaty route, depending on an ad hoc judgment of the judiciary without looking to the treaty language―the very language negotiated by the President and approved by the Senate―cannot readily be ascribed to those same Framers.
The dissent’s approach risks the United States’ involvement in international agreements.  It is hard to believe that the United States would enter into treaties that are sometimes enforceable and sometimes not.  Such a treaty would be the equivalent of writing a blank check to the judiciary.  Senators could never be quite sure what the treaties on which they were voting meant.  Only a judge could say for sure and only at some future date.  This uncertainty could  hobble the United States’ efforts to negotiate and sign international agreements.
In this case, the dissent―for a grab bag of no less than seven reasons―would tell us that this particular ICJ judgment is federal law. Post, at ____ - ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 238-246.  That is no sort of guidance.
Nor is it any answer to say that the federal courts will diligently police international agreements and enforce the decisions of international tribunals only when they should be enforced.  Ibid. The point of a non-self-executing treaty is that it “addresses itself to the political, notthe judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”Foster, 27 U.S. 253, 2 Pet., at 314, 7 L. Ed. 415 (emphasis added); Whitney, 124 U.S., at 195,8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386.  See also Foster, 27 U.S. 253, 2 Pet. , at 307, 7 L. Ed. 415 (“The judiciary is not that department of the government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided”).  The dissent’s contrary approach would assign to the courts―not the political branches―the primary role in deciding when and how international agreements will be enforced.  To read a treaty so that it sometimes has the effect of domestic law and sometimes does not is tantamount to vesting with the judiciary the power not only to interpret but also to create the law.
C
Our conclusion that Avena does not by itself constitute binding federal law is confirmed by the “post ratification understanding” of signatory nations.  See Zicherman, 516 U.S., at 226, 116 S. Ct. 629, 133 L. Ed. 2d 596.  There are currently 47 nations that are parties to the Optional Protocol and 171 nations that are parties to the Vienna Convention.  Yet neither Medellin nor his amicihave identified a single nation that treats ICJ judgments as binding in domestic courts. . . . . 
Our conclusion is further supported by general principles of interpretation.  To begin with, we reiterated in Sanchez-Llamaswhat we held in Breard, that “‘absent a clear and express statement to the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the treaty in that State.’”548 U.S., at 351, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557 (quoting Breard, 523 U.S., at 375, 118 S. Ct. 1352, 140 L. Ed. 2d 529).  Given that ICJ judgments may interfere with state procedural rules, one would expect the ratifying parties to the relevant treaties to have clearly stated their intent to give those judgments domestic effect, if they had so intended.  Here there is no statement in the Optional Protocol, the U. N. Charter, or the ICJ Statute that supports the notion that ICJ judgments displace state procedural rules.
Moreover, the consequences of Medellin’s argument give pause.  An ICJ judgment, the argument goes, is not only binding domestic law but is also unassailable.  As a result, neither Texas nor this Court may look behind a judgment and quarrel with its reasoning or result.  (We already know, from Sanchez-Llamas, that this Court disagrees with both  the reasoning and result in Avena.) Medellin’s interpretation would allow ICJ judgments to override otherwise binding state law; there is nothing in his logic that would exempt contrary federal law from the same fate.  See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119, 53 S. Ct. 305, 77 L. Ed. 641 (1933)(later-in-time self-executing treaty supersedes a federal statue if there is a conflict).  And there is nothing to prevent the ICJ from ordering state courts to annul criminal convictions and sentences, for any reason deemed sufficient by the ICJ.  Indeed, that is precisely the relief Mexico requested. Avena, 2004 I. C. J., at 58-59.
Even the dissent flinches at reading the relevant treaties to give rise to self-executing ICJ judgments in all cases. . . .
In short, and as we observed in Sanchez-Llamas, “[n]othing in the structure or purpose of the ICJ suggests that its interpretations were intended to be conclusive on our courts.”548 U.S., at 354, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557.  Given that holding, it is difficult to see how that same structure and purpose can establish, as Medellin argues, that judgmentsof the ICJ nonetheless were intended to be conclusive on our courts.  A judgment is binding only if there is a rule of law that makes it so.  And the question whether ICJ judgments can bind domestic courts depends upon the same analysis undertaken in Sanchez-Llamas and set forth above.
Our prior decisions identified by the dissent as holding a number of treaties to be self-executing, see post, at ____ - ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 235, and Appendix A, stand only for the unremarkable proposition that some international agreements are self-executing and others are not.  . . .
We do not suggest that treaties can never afford binding domestic effect to international tribunal judgments―only that the U. N. Charter, the Optional Protocol, and the ICJ Statute do not do so.  And whether the treaties underlying a judgment are self-executing so that the judgment is directly enforceable as domestic law in our courts is, of course, a matter for this Court to decide.  See Sanchez-Llamas, supra, at 353-354, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557.
D
Our holding does not call into question the ordinary enforcement of foreign judgments or international arbitral agreements.  Indeed, we agree with Medellin that, as a general matter, “an agreement to abide by the result” of an international adjudication―or what he really means, an agreement to give the result of such adjudication domestic legal effect ―can be a treaty obligation like any other, so long as the agreement is consistent with the Constitution.  See Brief for Petitioner 20.  The point is that the particular treaty obligations on which Medellin relies do not of their own force create domestic law.
. . . .
Further, that an ICJ judgment may not be automatically enforceable in domestic courts does not mean the particular underlying treaty is not.  Indeed, we have held that a number of the “Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation” Treaties cited by the dissent, see post,Appendix B, are self-executing―based on “the language of the[se] Treat[ies].”  See Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., supra, at 180, 189-190, 102 S. Ct. 2374, 72 L. Ed. 2d 765.  In Kolovrat v.  Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 191, 196, 81 S. Ct. 922, 6 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1961), for example, the Court found that Yugoslavian claimants denied inheritance under Oregon law were entitled to inherit personal property pursuant to an 1881 Treaty of Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce between the United States and Serbia.  See also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 507-511, 517-518, 67 S. Ct. 1431, 91 L. Ed. 1633 (1947) (finding that the right to inherit real property granted German aliens under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany prevailed over California law).  Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, see post, at ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 236-237, neither our approach nor our cases require that a treaty provide for self-execution in so many talismanic words; that is a caricature of the Court’s opinion.  Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.
In addition, Congress is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those involving complex commercial disputes.  Cf. post, at ____, 170 L. Ed. 2d, at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The judgments of a number of international tribunals enjoy a different status because of implementing legislation enacted by Congress. . . .    Such language demonstrates that Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international obligations when it desires such a result.
Further, Medellin frames his argument as though giving the Avena judgment binding effect in domestic courts simply conforms to the proposition that domestic courts generally give effect to foreign judgments.  But Medellin does not ask us to enforce a foreign-court judgment settling a typical commercial or property dispute. . . .   What is more, on Medellin’s view, the judgment would force the State to take action to “review and reconside[r]” his case.  The general rule, however, is that judgments of foreign courts awarding injunctive relief, even as to private parties, let alone sovereign States, “are not generally entitled to enforcement.”  See 1 Restatement § 481, Comment b, at 595.
In sum, while the ICJ’s judgment in Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal law  that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions.  As we noted in Sanchez-Llamas, a contrary conclusion would be extraordinary, given that basic rights guaranteed by our own Constitution do not have the effect of displacing state procedural rules.  See 548 U.S., at 360, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557. Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by “many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.”Ibid.
III
Medellin next argues that the ICJ’s judgment in Avena is binding on state courts by virtue of the President’s February 28, 2005 Memorandum.  The United States contends that while the Avenajudgment does not of its own force require domestic courts to set aside ordinary rules of procedural default, that judgment became the law of the land with precisely that effect pursuant to the President’s Memorandum and his power “to establish  binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state law.”Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae5.  Accordingly, we must decide whether the President’s declaration alters our conclusion that the Avenajudgment is not a rule of domestic law binding in state and federal courts. . . .
A
The United States maintains that the President’s constitutional role “uniquely qualifies” him to resolve the sensitive  foreign policy decisions that bear on compliance with an ICJ decision and “to do so expeditiously.”Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11, 12.  We do not question these propositions.  . . . .  In this case, the President seeks to vindicate United States interests in ensuring the reciprocal observance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of international law.  These interests are plainly compelling.
 Such considerations, however, do not allow us to set aside first principles.  The President’s authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, “must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”Youngstown, supra, at 585, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417; Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918 (1981).
Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.  First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”Youngstown, 343 U.S., at 635, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417(opinion concurring).  Second, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”Id., at 637, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 In this circumstance, Presidential authority can derive support from “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence.”Ibid.   Finally, “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,” and the  Court can sustain his actions “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.”Id., at 637-638, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417
B
The United States marshals two principal arguments in favor of the President’s authority “to establish binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state law.”Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5.  The Solicitor General first argues that the relevant treaties give the President the authority to implement the Avena judgment and that Congress has acquiesced in the exercise of such authority.  The United States also relies upon an “independent” international dispute-resolution power wholly apart from the asserted authority based on the pertinent treaties.  Medellin adds the additional argument that the President’s Memorandum is a valid exercise of his power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
1
The United States maintains that the President’s Memorandum is authorized by the Optional Protocol and the U. N. Charter.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 9.  That is, because the relevant treaties “create an obligation to comply with Avena,” they “implicitly give the President authority to implement that treaty-based obligation.”Id., at 11 (emphasis added).  As a result, the President’s Memorandum is well grounded in the first category of the Youngstownframework.
We disagree.  The President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them.  The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to  Congress. Foster, 27 U.S. 253, 2 Pet., at 315, 7 L. Ed. 415; Whitney, 124 U.S., at 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386; Igartua-De La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 150.
. . . . .
A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to have domestic effect of its own force.  That understanding precludes the assertion that Congress has implicitly authorized the President ―acting on his own―to achieve precisely the same result.  We therefore conclude, given the absence of congressional legislation, that the non-self-executing treaties at issue here did not “express[ly] or implied[ly]” vest the President with the unilateral authority to make them self-executing.  See id., at 635, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Accordingly, the President’s Memorandum does not fall within the first category of the Youngstownframework.
Indeed, the preceding discussion should make clear that the non-self-executing character of the relevant treaties not only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vested the President with the authority to unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly prohibits him from doing so.  When the President asserts the power to “enforce” a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate.  His assertion of authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-executing treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson’s third category, not the first or even the second.  See id., at 637-638, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417.
. . . .
The United States nonetheless maintains that the President’s Memorandum should be given effect as domestic law because “this case involves a valid Presidential action in the context of Congressional ‘acquiescence.’”   Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae11, n 2.  Under the Youngstowntripartite framework, congressional acquiescence is pertinent when the President’s action falls within the second category―that is, when he “acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority.”343 U.S., at 637, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Here, however, as we have explained, the President’s effort to accord domestic effect to the Avenajudgment does not meet that prerequisite.
In any event, even if we were persuaded that congressional acquiescence could support the President’s asserted authority to create domestic law pursuant to a non-self-executing treaty, such acquiescence does not exist here.  The United States first locates congressional acquiescence in Congress’s failure to act following the President’s resolution of prior ICJ controversies.  A review of the Executive’s actions in those prior cases, however, cannot support the claim that Congress acquiesced in this particular exercise of Presidential authority, for none of them remotely involved transforming an international obligation into domestic law and thereby displacing state law. . . . . ..
The United States also directs us to the President’s “related” statutory responsibilities and to his “established role” in litigating foreign policy concerns as support for the President’s asserted authority to give the ICJ’s decision in Avenathe force of domestic law.  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16-19.  Congress has indeed authorized the President to represent the United States before the United Nations, the ICJ, and the Security Council, 22 U.S.C. § 287, but the authority of the President to represent the United  States before such  bodies speaks to the President’s internationalresponsibilities, not any unilateral authority to create domestic law.  The authority expressly conferred by Congress in the international realm cannot be said to “invite” the Presidential action at issue here.  See Youngstown, supra, at 637, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 (Jackson, J., concurring).  At bottom, none of the sources of authority identified by the United States supports the President’s claim that Congress has acquiesced in his asserted power to establish on his own federal law or to override state law.
None of this is to say, however, that the combination of a non-self-executing treaty and the lack of implementing legislation preclude the President from acting to comply with an international treaty obligation.  It is only to say that the Executive cannot unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty by giving it domestic effect.  That is, the non-self-executing character of a treaty constrains the President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.  The President may comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means, so long as they are consistent with the Constitution.  But he may not rely upon a non-self-executing treaty to “establish binding rules of decision that preempt contrary state law.”Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5.
2
We thus turn to the United States’ claim that―independent of the United States’ treaty obligations―the Memorandum is a valid exercise of the President’s foreign affairs authority to resolve claims disputes with foreign nations.  Id., at 12-16.  The United States relies on a series of cases in which this Court has upheld the authority of the President to settle foreign claims pursuant to an executive agreement.  See Garamendi, 539 U.S., at 415, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 156 L. Ed. 2d 376; Dames & Moore, 453 U.S., at 679-680, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942);  United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330, 57 S. Ct. 758, 81 L. Ed. 1134 (1937).  In these cases this Court has explained that, if pervasive enough, a history of congressional acquiescence can be treated as a “gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”Dames & Moore, supra, at 686, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
This argument is of a different nature than the one rejected above.  Rather than relying on the United States’ treaty obligations, the President relies on an independent source of authority in ordering Texas to put aside its procedural bar to successive habeas petitions. Nevertheless, we find that our claims-settlement cases do not support the authority that the President asserts in this case.
. . . .
Even still, the limitations on this source of executive power are clearly set forth and the Court has been careful to note that “[p]ast practice does not, by itself, create power.”Dames & Moore, supra, at 686, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 69 L. Ed. 2d 918.
The President’s Memorandum is not supported by a “particularly longstanding practice” of congressional acquiescence, see Garamendi, supra, at 415,123 S. Ct. 2374, 156 L. Ed. 2d 376, but rather is what the United States itself has described as “unprecedented action,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Sanchez-Llamas, O. T. 2005, Nos. 05-51 and 04-10566, pp 29-30.  Indeed, the Government has not identified a single instance in which the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State’s police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws.  Cf. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993)“States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law” (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982); internal quotation marks omitted).  The Executive’s narrow and strictly limited authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum.
3
Medellin argues that the President’s Memorandum is a valid exercise of his “[T]ake Care” power.  Brief for Petitioner 28.  The United States, however, does not rely upon the President’s responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3.  We think this a wise concession.  This authority allows the President to execute the laws, not make them.  For the reasons we have stated, the Avena judgment is not domestic law; accordingly, the President cannot rely on his Take Care powers here.
The judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.


447 U.S. 74
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
No. 79-289 Argued: March 18, 1980 ―- Decided: June 9, 1980
[Available at: http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/74/case.html]
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
We postponed jurisdiction of this appeal from the Supreme Court of California to decide the important federal constitutional questions it presented. Those are whether state constitutional provisions, which permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to which the public is invited, violate the shopping center owner’s property rights under the Fifth [p77] and Fourteenth Amendments or his free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
I
Appellant PruneYard is a privately owned shopping center in the City of Campbell, Cal. It covers approximately 21 acres ― 5 devoted to parking and 16 occupied by walkways, plazas, sidewalks, and buildings that contain more than 65 specialty shops, 10 restaurants, and a movie theater. The PruneYard is open to the public for the purpose of encouraging the patronizing of its commercial establishments. It has a policy not to permit any visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity, including the circulation of petitions, that is not directly related to its commercial purposes. This policy has been strictly enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion. The PruneYard is owned by appellant Fred Sahadi.
Appellees are high school students who sought to solicit support for their opposition to a United Nations resolution against “Zionism.” On a Saturday afternoon they set up a card table in a corner of PruneYard’s central courtyard. They distributed pamphlets and asked passersby to sign petitions, which were to be sent to the President and Members of Congress. Their activity was peaceful and orderly, and, so far as the record indicates, was not objected to by PruneYard’s patrons.
Soon after appellees had begun soliciting signatures, a security guard informed them that they would have to leave because their activity violated PruneYard regulations. The guard suggested that they move to the public sidewalk at the PruneYard’s perimeter. Appellees immediately left the premises and later filed this lawsuit in the California Superior Court of Santa Clara County. They sought to enjoin appellants from denying them access to the PruneYard for the purpose of circulating their petitions.
The Superior Court held that appellees were not entitled under either the Federal or California Constitution to exercise [p78] their asserted rights on the shopping center property. App. to Juris.Statement A-2. It concluded that there were “adequate, effective channels of communication for [appellees] other than soliciting on the private property of the [PruneYard].”Id. at A-3. The California Court of Appeal affirmed.

The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitution protects “speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned.”23 Cal.3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979).. . .
Before this Court, appellants contend that their constitutionally established rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude appellees from adverse use of appellants’ private property cannot be denied by invocation of a state constitutional provision or by judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private property. We postponed consideration of the question of jurisdiction until the hearing of the case on the merits. 444 U.S. 949. We now affirm.
II
We initially conclude that this case is properly before us as an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2). . . .
III
Appellants first contend that Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,407 U.S. 551 (1972), prevents the State from requiring a private shopping center owner to provide access to persons exercising their state constitutional rights of free speech and petition when adequate alternative avenues of communication are available. Lloyddealt with the question whether, under the Federal Constitution, a privately owned shopping center may prohibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling is unrelated to the shopping center’s operations. Id. at 552. The shopping center had adopted a strict policy against the distribution of handbills within the building complex and its malls, and it made no exceptions to this rule. Id. at 555. . .  Respondents in Lloyd argued that, because the shopping center was open to the public, the First Amendment prevents the private owner from enforcing the handbilling restriction on shopping center premises. Id. at 564.. . . [p81]In rejecting this claim, we substantially repudiated the rationale of 407 U.S. 551(1972), prevents the State from requiring a private shopping center owner to provide access to persons exercising their state constitutional rights of free speech and petition when adequate alternative avenues of communication are available. Lloyd dealt with the question whether, under the Federal Constitution, a privately owned shopping center may prohibit the distribution of handbills on its property when the handbilling is unrelated to the shopping center’s operations. Id. at 552. The shopping center had adopted a strict policy against the distribution of handbills within the building complex and its malls, and it made no exceptions to this rule. Id. at 555.. . . Respondents in Lloyd argued that, because the shopping center was open to the public, the First Amendment prevents the private owner from enforcing the handbilling restriction on shopping center premises. Id.at 564.. . .  [p81] In rejecting this claim, we substantially repudiated the rationale of Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,391 U.S. 308]391 U.S. 308(198), which was later overruled in 391 U.S. 308 (198), which was later overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB,424 U.S. 507(1976). We stated that property does not lose its private character merely because the public is generally invite to use it for designated purposes,” and that “ [t]he essentially private character of a store and its privately owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or clustered with other stores in a modern shopping center.”407 U.S. at 569.
Our reasoning in Lloyd, however, does not, ex propriovigore, limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution. Cooper v. California,386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). See also 407 U.S. at 569-570. In Lloyd, supra, there was no state constitutional or statutory provision that had been construed to create rights to the use of private property by strangers, comparable to those found to exist by the California Supreme Court here. It is, of course, well established that a State, in the exercise of its police power, may adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provision. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,272 U.S. 365 (1926); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,427 U.S. 50 (1976).Lloyd held that, when a shopping center owner opens his private property to the public for the purpose of shopping, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not thereby create individual rights in expression beyond those already existing under applicable law. See also Hudgens v. NLRB, supra at 517-521. [p82]
IV
Appellants next contend that a right to exclude others underlies the Fifth Amendmentguarantee against the taking of property without just compensation and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee against the deprivation of property without due process of law. .  . .
Here the requirement that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants’ property right under the Taking Clause. There is nothing to suggest that preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center. . .  .
There is also little merit to appellants’ argument that they have been denied their property without due process of law. . .  .
V
Appellants finally contend that a private property owner has a First Amendmentright not to be forced by the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others.. . . They [p86] state that, in Wooley v. Maynard,430 U.S. 705(1977), this Court concluded that a State may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological [p87]message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. This rationale applies here, they argue, because the message of Wooley is that the State may not force an individual to display any message at all.
Wooley, however, was a case in which the government itself prescribed the message, required it to be displayed openly on appellee’s personal property that was used “as part of his daily life,” and refused to permit him to take any measures to cover up the motto even though the Court found that the display of the motto served no important state interest. Here, by contrast, there are a number of distinguishing factors. Most important, the shopping center, by choice of its owner, is not limited to the personal use of appellants. It is instead a business establishment that is open to the public to come and go as they please. The views expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition thus will not likely be identified with those of the owner. Second, no specific message is dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants’ property. There consequently is no danger of governmental discrimination for or against a particular message. Finally, as far as appears here, appellants can expressly disavow any connection with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand. Such signs, for example, could disclaim any sponsorship of the message and could explain that the persons are communicating their own messages by virtue of state law.
. . .
We conclude that neither appellants’ federally recognized property rights nor their First Amendment right have been infringed by the California Supreme Court’s decision recognizing a right of appellees to exercise state-protected rights of expression and petition on appellants’ property. The judgment of the Supreme Court of California is therefore
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins the opinion of the Court except that sentence thereof, anteat 84, which reads:
Nor [p89]as a general proposition is the United States, as opposed to the several States, possessed of residual authority that enables it to define “property” in the first instance.
__________


III. Hierarchies of Law within the Domestic Legal Order and Between National and International Law Reflecting Governmental Order

            Over the course of the last several classes the student has been introduced to the relationship between the state, its government and systems of law as it has developed in the West. We started with an exploration of the premises of most important approaches to the construction of relationships between law, the state and a government. Beyond the substantive characteristics of each, and their similarities and differences, the student was also introduced to the effects of each set of ordering premises on the fundamental relationship between the individual, the political community and their government. On an as applied basis, it provides the student with the tools that make an understanding of different political systems, and their relationship to law, more understandable. In addition, the student was also exposed to the way in which each of these approaches communicate. Ultimately the object was to provide students with the outlines of the framework within which the modern law-state has been created and deployed in domestic and global governance.

            The class then turned to the issue of ordering law within each of these framing structures. In the face of the structuring characteristics of the modern law-state, how do states order law, and by ordering law, implement theoretical premises about the relationship of the individual to government and government to law. The focus of the class was on two principal objectives. The first was to explore the creation and the legitimacy of “higher law” that both constrains the state and its government, which has become the basis of modern constitutional law. The second was to explore a consequence of this establishment of a “higher law” system for ordering government, and its effects for ordering “inferior” law that may otherwise be declared or enacted by courts, legislatures or administrative bodies. Together these two facets of law-ordering creates what is commonly understood as the domestic legal order of a state. That is, the domestic legal order of a state refers both to the ordering of law within a state and also to the mechanics by which government is constituted, constrained, and legitimated by a states “higher law” and by which a government contributes to the enactment, implementation and enforcement of law.

            The management of legal hierarchies in the United States was then introduced.  The doctrine of preemption serves as the tool through which multi-jurisdictional states—federal states like the United States, and federative unions of states, like the European Union—manage the multi-system legal orders.  The object is coherence within a governance space in which law operates through multiple autonomous but related sub systems (common law, statutes, etc.) organized in simple hierarchies (recall the Indiana statute on legal hierarchy) within states, and in more complex relationships between state hierarchically ordered law systems and those of a superior governmental system (the United States general government), which share authority over the subject of legal regulation.  The system of preemption is made complicated precisely because multi-level federations now legislate in areas traditionally left to non-state social norm systems, and because of a shift on political consensus that once favored local law making and now favors law making at the national level. 

            In a world in which the state represented the repository of the highest law of the territory within which its authority could be enforced, the domestic legal order of states expressed both a description of a system of law-states, and also gave expression to the premise that the law-state was the highest form of legitimate law making. Beyond that was the world of the “law of nations” in a modern version not far different from its conception at the time of the Institutes (e.g., Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens[4](James Brown Scott ed., translation of the 1758 edition by Charles G. Fenwick (another English language version[5])), and from the 19th century a more formalized structure of contract relations between states, managed under a system of treaties and custom understood as international law.[6]These applied as contracts among equals among the family of civilized nations but could be used to support colonization or the making of unequal treaties when superior nations engaged in state to state relations with an inferior state. Before 1945, this system, of international law produced a bifurcated approach to law systems. On the one hand the system of law produced withina state, the sum of which constituted its domestic legal order, was understood to apply directly to individuals and understood as the legitimate expression of popular sovereignty because it proceeded from the people or their representatives in ways sanctioned by the “higher (constitutional) law” of the state. On the other hand, the obligations incurred by states among each other were said to bind states, as juridical entities, but had no effect within the territory of a state unless, under the rules provided for this purpose within a state, these treaty or customary obligations, were incorporated into the domestic legal order of a state. In the absence of that incorporation there was no automatic transposition of international into domestic law and individuals within a state had neither rights nor obligations under these provisions, however much they might want either.

            But especially since the middle of the 20th century, law and law systems have once again become more detached from the state, and assumed an autonomy that might produce a direct connection between international law and individuals wherever situated irrespective of the action or inaction of an intermediary state. This change is described in your reading, Larry Catá Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonization and Its Challenges for the Legal-State,[7] in FICHL Publication Series No. 11 (2011): The Law of the Future and the Future of the Law 427-437 (Editors: Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis, Morly Frishman and Laura Kistemaker; Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, Oslo, 2011). Again, the object is coherence, but the vantage point has changed.  Were the state once stood at the apex of legal regulation, now it is increasingly subsumed within higher order systems, both public (international state based institutions) and private. Harmonization is currently proceeding along different lines that reflect ambiguous and multi-vector interactions between traditional and emerging governance actors and that suggest the context in which the future of legal systems, however understood, will be determined. This think piece first considers the foundations. The great 19th century project of horizontal harmonization, centered on states and their domestic law systems. The 20th century project of vertical harmonization focused on legal internationalization, from which the edifices of supra-national institutions and public transnational law evolve. It then turns to the current challenge of inter-systemic harmonization. Founded on governance polycentricity, of the mechanics of law beyond the domestic legal orders of states, of the rise of private law with public functions, and of public entities as private actors, it is changing the landscape of law. The greatest challenge for law is to avoid becoming irrelevant where corporations use contracts to govern their supply chains, states become private market actors, and private enterprises regulate markets by assessment and rating.

            The development of supra-national norm making, at first centered on the United Nations and its related organizations, and then spreading to a number of the multilateral public organizations, have created a system of norm and law making that seeks to regulate areas of conduct once reserved to states. More importantly, these international organizations not only began producing regulation and law but also began to understand their governance role as inter connected with the law of the domestic legal orders of the member states of these organizations. (e.g., José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers, Oxford University Press, 2006). Globalization also tended to shift regulatory emphasis from states to a “transnational” space beyond, though not clearly vertically arranged against the domestic legal orders of states with which they came in contact. (e.g., Gunther Teubner,‘Global Bukowina’[8]: Legal Pluralism in the World Society,[9]in Global Law Without a State 3-28 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997)). Some states created mechanisms for the automatic incorporation of their international law obligations within their domestic legal orders. Others placed international law obligations within the hierarchy of their laws, sometimes placing international law above and sometimes on the same level as domestic statutes. Still others retained a high wall between the international obligations of the state and its domestic legal order, requiring a positive transposition of international law by legislative action or by the inclusion in the treaty itself of an explicit provision for automatic incorporation upon approval of the treaty by the legislature. In any case, the relation of the international obligations of states to other aspects of law has always been treated, and especially so in the United States, as something apart from domestic legislation. Complicating the situation was the rise of international organizations with authority to create international rules or set standards with sometimes binding effects. Lastly, some aspects of both international treaty law and custom have come to be accepted by many, if not most states as binding whether or not a state consents to their application. These peremptory norms, jus cogens,[10] remain quite controversial (e.g., Inter-American Court, The Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Mexico,[11] Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 (Decision No) Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 18 (Official Case No)IHRL 3237 (IACHR 2003), issued September 17, 2003).

For today’s class students will consider these issues as applied in the United States. We will use as the basis of our examination the discussion in Medellín v. Texas,[12]128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008). The case presents a useful example of the way in which state, federal and national governments, and their legal orders, now intersect within the law-state system of the United States. Its complexity provides a window on the realities of the application of law where multiple jurisdictions and systems of law may apply simultaneously to a single event or series of events.

The facts of the case are fairly straightforward:

Petitioner Jose Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national, has lived in the United States since preschool. A member of the “Black and Whites” gang, Medellin was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal murders of two Houston teenagers.

. . . .

Medellin was arrested at approximately 4 a.m. on June 29, 1993. A few hours later, between 5:54 and 7:23 a.m., Medellin was given Miranda warnings; he then signed a written waiver and gave a detailed written confession. App. to Brief for Respondent 32-36. Local law enforcement officers did not, however, inform Medellin of his Vienna Convention right to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention. Brief for Petitioner 6-7. Medellin was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death; his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Medellin v. State, No. 71,997 (Tex. Crim. App., May 16, 1997), App. to Brief for Respondent 2-31.

But because Medellin was a Mexican national, the interests of Mexico in the welfare of its citizens and as memorialized in agreements between the United States and Mexico might also play a part. In 1969, the United States ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations[13] and the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention[14] (Optional Protocol or Protocol) on Apr. 24, 1963. The preamble to the Convention sets out as one of its purposes to “contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations.” 21 U.S.T., at 79. Consequently, Convention Article 36, to “facilitat[e] the exercise of consular functions” (Art. 36(1), 21 U.S.T., at 100), provides that if a person detained by a foreign country “so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State” of such detention, and “inform the [detainee] of his righ[t]” to request assistance from the consul of his own state. Art. 36(1)(b), id., at 101. Disputes arising out of an interpretation of the Convention are to be resolved in the International Court of Justice[15] under its compulsory jurisdiction. U.N. member states undertake to comply with ICJ decisions.

The United States originally consented to the general jurisdiction of the ICJ when it filed a declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction under Art. 36(2) in 1946. The United States withdrew from general ICJ jurisdiction in 1985. See U. S. Dept. of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I. L. M. 1742 (1985). By ratifying the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, the United States consented to the specific jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to claims arising out of the Vienna Convention. On March 7, 2005, subsequent to the ICJ’s judgment in Avena, the United States gave notice of withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations. (Medellin, supra ).

No issue of international law was raised during the course of the arrest, or trial court proceedings. “Medellin first raised his Vienna Convention claim in his first application for state post-conviction relief. The state trial court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted because Medellin had failed to raise it at trial or on direct review. The trial court also rejected the Vienna Convention claim on the merits, finding that Medellin had “fail[ed] to show that any non-notification of the Mexican authorities impacted on the validity of his conviction or punishment.” Id., at 62. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.” (Ibid). At this point, Medellin filed a federal habeas corpus[16]petition in the federal district court. It was denied. While this denial was on appeal to the Fifth Circuit,

“the ICJ issued its decision in Avena [and Other Mexican Nationals; Mexico v. United States of America, 2004 I. C. J. 12[17] (Judgment of Mar. 31). The ICJ held that the United States had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention by failing to inform the 51 named Mexican nationals, including Medellin, of their Vienna Convention rights. 2004 I. C. J., at 53-55. In the ICJ’s determination, the United States was obligated “to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the [affected] Mexican nationals.” Id., at 72, P 153(9).. The ICJ indicated that such review was required without regard to state procedural default rules. Id., at 56-57.” (Ibid).

The Fifth Circuit then ruled against Medellin. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari,[18]Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 661, 125 S. Ct. 2088, 161 L. Ed. 2d 982 (2005) (per curiam) (Medellin I). Before the Supreme Court heard oral argument, however, then President George W. Bush issued a Memorandum for the United States Attorney General, which provided:

“I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena], by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 187a. (Medellin, supra).

Relying on both the Presidential Memorandum and the ICJ Avena decision, Medellin filed a second application for habeas relief in state court. Ex parte Medellin, 223 S. W. 3d 315, 322-323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). That appeal was then dismissed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as an abuse of the writ. Ex Parte Medellín,
223 S. W. 3d, 315, at 352 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2006). In that court’s view, neither the Avena decision nor the President’s Memorandum was “binding federal law” that could displace the State’s limitations on the filing of successive habeas applications. Ibid. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 550 U.S. 917, 127 S. Ct. 2129, 167 L. Ed. 2d 862 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court then had two significant issues to deal with―the first was the effect of international law on American jurisprudence and its incorporation into the decisions of American courts. The second was an issue of federalism, touching on the effect of a Presidential Memorandum purportedly issued under the President’s foreign affairs powers on the application and interpretation of the criminal law of a state.


With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court first summarized its view of the relationship of international law to the domestic law of the United States.

No one disputes that the Avena decision―a decision that flows from the treaties through which the United States submitted to ICJ jurisdiction with respect to Vienna Convention disputes―constitutes an international law obligation on the part of the United States. But not all international law obligations automatically constitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts. The question we confront here is whether the Avena judgment has automatic domestic legal effect such that the judgment of its own force applies in state and federal courts.
This Court has long recognized the distinction between treaties that automatically have effect as domestic law, and those that―while they constitute international law commitments―do not by themselves function as binding federal law. The distinction was well explained by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 2 Pet. 253, 315, 7 L. Ed. 415 (1829), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 7 Pet. 51, 8 L. Ed. 604 (1833), which held that a treaty is “equivalent to an act of the legislature,” and hence self-executing, when it “operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.” Foster, supra, at 314, 2 Pet. 253, 315, 7 L. Ed. 415. When, in contrast, “[treaty] stipulations are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect.” Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386 (1888). In sum, while treaties “may comprise international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on these terms.” Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (CA1 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C. J.).

A treaty is, of course, “primarily a compact between independent nations.” Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598, 5 S. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798 (1884). It ordinarily “depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.” Ibid..... Only “[i]f the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative, [will] they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment.” Whitney, supra, at 194, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386.

So far so good, but Medellin then suggested that the Avena decision was binding as law within the United States because the relevant U.N. Charter provisions, the Optional Protocol and the ICJ Statute were effectively self-executing. A majority of the justices disagreed.

To arrive at this determination, the Supreme Court described what it considered the appropriate interpretive analysis for cases of this kind. Because statutes are at issue, it interpretation starts with the relevant text (Ibid; Part II.A). But, “‘Because a treaty ratified by the United States is “an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as “aids to its interpretation” the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as “the post ratification understanding” of signatory nations. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226, 116 S. Ct. 629, 133 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1996).” (Ibid). The majority suggested that the “most natural reading of the Optional Protocol is as a bare grant of jurisdiction.” (Ibid). In any case, they reasoned, the obligation to comply with ICJ judgments arises from the U.N. Charter and not the Optional Protocol. But if that is the case, the Court determined, then the operative language, that each member state undertakes to comply with ICJ decisions means only that the member state commits “to take future action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ decision.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Medellin I, O. T. 2004, No. 04-5928, p 34.” (Ibid). Thus, the undertaking is a political undertaking not a legalone. In effect, the U.N. Charter, the majority suggests, commits the United States only to endeavor to transpose ICJ judgments into domestic law. For this purpose, the Supreme Court relied on both the position of the U.S. government and its application of prior cases, and its inference from the framework for the enforcement of ICJ decisions. “It is, moreover, well settled that the United States’ interpretation of a treaty “is entitled to great weight.” Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-185, 102 S. Ct. 2374, 72 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1982). . . . The Executive Branch has unfailingly adhered to its view that the relevant treaties do not create domestically enforceable federal law. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 4, 27-29.” (Ibid).

In sum, Medellin’s view that ICJ decisions are automatically enforceable as domestic law is fatally undermined by the enforcement structure established by Article 94. His construction would eliminate the option of noncompliance contemplated by Article 94(2), undermining the ability of the political branches to determine whether and how to comply with an ICJ judgment. Those sensitive foreign policy decisions would instead be transferred to state and federal courts charged with applying an ICJ judgment directly as domestic law. And those courts would not be empowered to decide whether to comply with the judgment―again, always regarded as an option by the political branches―any more than courts may consider whether to comply with any other species of domestic law. This result would be particularly anomalous in light of the principle that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative―’the political’―Departments.” Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726 (1918).

The majority then faults the dissenting opinion for misreading the texts and misinterpreting the other sources relied on. The dissent, the majority tells the reader, failed to appropriately consider the text. “As against this time-honored textual approach, the dissent proposes a multifactor, judgment-by-judgment analysis that would “jettiso[n] relative predictability for the open-ended rough-and-tumble of factors.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 547, 115 S. Ct. 1043, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1024 (1995).” (Ibid., Part II.B). Lastly, in Part II.C., the majority supported its reading by considering the understanding of other signatory states after ratification. (Part II.C.). There is a suggestion of the anti-democratic character of holding that the ICJ decision is self-executing as well as the suggestion that this result might interfere with the constitutional prerogatives of the federal courts. (Ibid).

In sum, while the ICJ’s judgment in Avena creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, it does not of its own force constitute binding federal law that pre-empts state restrictions on the filing of successive habeas petitions. As we noted in Sanchez-Llamas, a contrary conclusion would be extraordinary, given that basic rights guaranteed by our own Constitution do not have the effect of displacing state procedural rules. See 548 U.S., at 360, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 165 L. Ed. 2d 557. Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by “many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.” (Ibid. Part II.D.)

But what about the power of the President to compel the Texas courts to apply the treaty? The Supreme Court agrees that the interests of the United States that the president was seeking to advance were compelling. But however compelling, the court argued, in the absence of a constitutionally sufficient power, the President could not assert authority (or better put, the State of Texas could refuse to comply with any purported assertion).

Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area. First, “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Youngstown, 343 U.S., at 635, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 (opinion concurring). Second, “[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” Id., at 637, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 In this circumstance, Presidential authority can derive support from “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence.” Ibid. Finally, “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,” and the Court can sustain his actions “only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Id., at 637-638, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 (Ibid., Part III.A).

The United States and Medellin advanced three arguments in support of the President’s authority: (1) that the relevant treaties give the President the authority to implement the Avena judgment and that Congress has acquiesced in the exercise of such authority; (2) that the President exercised an “independent” international dispute-resolution power wholly apart from the asserted authority based on the pertinent treaties, and (3) that the President’s Memorandum is a valid exercise of his power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The majority rejected the first argument on the ground that “the President has an array of political and diplomatic means available to enforce international obligations, but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one is not among them. The responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.” (Ibid., III.B.1). In any event, the Court concluded, Congress never acquiesced to this sort of assertion of Presidential power. The Court emphasized that no President has the authority to unilaterally execute a non-self-executing treaty. (Ibid). The Court also rejected the claim that the president had sufficient authority under his foreign affairs powers. (Ibid., III.B.2). This claim depended on Congressional acquiescence, of which the Court found none. The court rejected the third argument on the grounds that the power to execute the laws did not include within it the power to enact them. (Ibid., III.B.3). For those reasons, the State of Texas was free to ignore the Presidential memorandum as of no legal effect.

Whatever one thinks of the merits of the majority’s reasoning, the Medellin case thus provides a very clear picture of the construction of the hierarchy of law in the United States, and especially the application of international law within the American domestic legal order. International law that is self-executing when made has the same effect as statutes passed by Congress. They need not be enacted anew. On the other hand, they can be repealed, modified or ignored by subsequent enactments of Congress, even if the language of the treaty itself committed the United States to refrain from doing any of those things. Unlike other states, self-executed international law has no special or superior place within the American hierarchy of law. The same is true of law enacted by Congress to transpose international obligations into national law. The techniques of statutorily interpretation will be applied to determine whether a treaty is self-executed and the focus, in these cases will be on the text of the treaty and the intent of the executive in negotiating the treaty. The post ratification behavior of the state parties may also serve as evidence of the intent of the parties relating to the meaning of the treaty. The President may not compel states to comply with the treaty obligations that the United States has ratified, absent legitimately enacted statutes that transpose these state to state obligations into domestic law. Neither may the President appear to effectively legislate such compliance in the absence of Congressional acquiesce or action. Where the Federal Constitution fails to give the President power, states are free to ignore his command, and state law and practice may prevail over Presidential desires, even those backed by international commitments to which the United States (through its federal government) is bound. Thus the internal and external dimensions of the authority of international law in the United States and its role in the hierarchy of U.S. law.

It must be remembered, however, that the premises out of which the majority Justices reached their conclusion remain highly contested. That contestation exists on two levels. One level is focused on the peculiarities of U.S. constitutional law. Within the parameters of American constitutional law, the narrow textualism[19]that produced the majority opinion is countered by a functional[20] approach well illustrated by the dissenting Justices. Rather than focusing on the logic of the text at issue and the intent of the drafters in the interpretive construction of the text, the functionalist justice will look to achieving the intent objective of the drafters rather than privileging the textual and formal logic of the text. As the majority in the Medellin case suggested, formalists tend to view the functional approach as veering too close to and sometimes embracing a legislative power that is not for courts to wield. Thus the issue of interpretation, the issue of legal hierarchies and the role of international law in the United States becomes one not merely of the application of law and constitutional principles, but also of the theory of separation of powers (which organ of government has the authority to make these determinations) and of the character of interpretation itself (e.g., when does interpretation become legislation). (Medellin, Part II.B).

The other level of contestation focuses on the emerging structural framework of international law and organizations. Internationalists tend to reject the foundational premises on which the Medellin justices relied. Here the readings may be useful (Larry Catá Backer, Inter-Systemic Harmonization and Its Challenges for the Legal-State,[21]supra). Traditional hierarchies of law, grounded in the ultimate supremacy of the law-state is sometimes rejected in favor of a legal hierarchy on which at least conventional international law[22] and jus cogens is treated as equal or superior to the statutory law of states. This is a set of presumptions that may be implicitly built into international governance instruments sometimes (U.N. Guiding Principles of Business and Human Rights).[23] Many states continue to reject this notion, but internationalists and international public and private organizations increasingly take the view that international law is both superior and binding not just on states but also directly on the residents and juridical persons residing in any state that may be part of the community of states that have produced this law. One approach is based on the premise that the community of nations, especially where each is legitimately established under democratic principles, has the authority to constrict common laws of nations that ought to be directly applied to all members of that governance community. But this is countered by those who view this as illegitimate because of the democratic deficit[24] in its development―that is that international law is developed and agreed by institutions with no direct connection with the people in whom sovereignty is vested. In either case, what is becoming clear is that, while the Medellin opinion represents a very nice application of the classical theory of legal hierarchy between domestic and international law, one that still has strong adherents, that classical theory is in fact under sustained challenge. But that challenge is coming not form the law-state but form the emerging international community and with respect to the law/governance structures they are producing.

The final reading for this class session, PruneYard Shopping Ctr. V. Robins,[25] 447 U. S. 74 (1980), suggests the limits of federal authority to shape or constrain state law. In this case the Supreme Court held that a state could interpret its constitution to prohibit the private owner of a shopping center from using state trespass law to exclude peaceful expressive activity in the open areas of the shopping center. The issue turned on the ability of the State of California to impose constitutional requirements under its own state constitution different form that sufficient under the Federal Constitution. Thus two principles emerge. First, under the U.S. Constitution,[26] states[27] can provide their citizens with broader rights in their constitutions than under the federal Constitution, so long as those rights do not infringe on any federal constitutional rights. Second under the constitution of the State of California, that power extends to the protection of the right to free speech. For the student concerned with issues of hierarchy another insight emerges―legal hierarchies in the United States may not be entirely rigid, and indeed may be porous in certain respects. Thus while in this case federal constitutional law could constrain the scope of California’s constitution, where the state sought to act in a way that was different from but not in opposition to the federal constitutional principle, that action might not be deemed impermissible. But the arbiter of this porosity is the court.

PruneYard reminds us again, of course, of the importance of hierarchy in law. In that case, state constitutional law, which is supreme within the domestic legal order of a state, must itself conform to the superior effects of the constitution of the community of states to which California is a member. It is thus against the overriding constraints of federal constitutional (and to some extent statutory) law, that the California constitution must be read. PruneYardalso provides an insight into the arguments rejected in Medellin. There the plurality rejected the application of a similar relationship between international law and the constitutional law of the United States. They rejected the idea of a hierarchy in which international law sat atop the constitutional and domestic legal order of states in favor of a view that treated the two systems as distinct through connected through the intermediation of consent in which legislatures evidenced acquiescence through legal transposition (the enactment of international obligation into domestic law through statutes and the like).

Yet it is also important to remember that there is a hierarchy of international law, one that in some ways is as contested that that within domestic legal orders (Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transnational Legislative Power: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets,[28] 29 American University International Law Review– (forthcoming 2013)). Sometimes the hierarchy is explicitly bound up with the issues of the appropriate sources of law to be applied by international bodies. The Statute of the International Court of Justice,[29]which played a prominent role in Medellin, for example, provides:

1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations , as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono,[30] if the parties agree thereto. (Statute ¶ 38).

This suggests both the scope of international law that is generally and conventionally recognized by public international law and also the hierarchy within which they are woven together for purposes of application and interpretation. It also suggests that, like the law of the United States, international law recognizes both a customary element as well as a private element, the latter of which might invoke equity. More interesting still, and reflecting practices in civil law countries, international law sometimes permits the persuasive use of academic writing as well as the reasoned opinions of other courts, that is of courts whose decisions do not otherwise bind.

A harder question for international law is the extent to which “soft law” fits into the hierarchy of international law. Soft laware instruments that may be produced by international public organizations but that do not have the binding effect of either domestic or international law. Traditionally these were viewed as aspirational with no binding effect. But sometimes their provisions become so well accepted that they become part of customary law and to some extent binding, or are otherwise taken up and incorporated into traditional international law instruments. They are thus seen as valuable as transitional instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights[31] is a good example. (e.g., Roberto Andorno, “The Invaluable Role of Soft Law in the Development of Universal Norms in Bioethics”,[32] paper at a Workshop jointly organized by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German UNESCO Commission, Berlin, 15 February 2007). Some soft law instruments, such as the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises[33] of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development[34] provide more complex examples of soft law. Here soft law contains not just a set of substantive standards that, though not binding, are require OECD Member States to provide mechanisms through which parties may seek to complain of violations of the Guidelines. (Backer, Larry Catá, Rights and Accountability in Development (Raid) V Das Air and Global Witness V Afrimex: Small Steps Toward an Autonomous Transnational Legal System for the Regulation of Multinational Corporations,[35] Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 2010). Lastly private codes of conduct are the most problematic governance instrument within conventional international law. Many traditionalists don’t consider them either soft or law―at most private contract or quasi contract among its parties. (considered in Jan Klabbers, Reflections on Soft International Law in a Privatized World[36]) Others view these as the elements of emerging systems of transnational governance. (Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society,[37] Gunther Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot 1997, 3-28 Backer, Larry Catá, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation.[38] ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2008).


IV. Problem.

            The object of the problem that follows is to provide the student with an opportunity to synthesize the materials presented and to apply it in a slightly different context.  The object for the student is to think through the ramifications both of the way in which legal hierarchies are ordered and the constraining principles that serve to mediate their application.

Problem:

            Assume the following facts: You are a member of the Attorney General’s office of the State of New Mexico. New Mexico has extensively regulated the sale of liquor within its borders.  Among other statutes, New Mexico law provides that beer and wine may not be sold in the same store.   In addition, New Mexico limits sale of liquor other than beer and wine to persons who can demonstrate that they are older than 26 years of age.  However, liquor may be sold bi licensed establishments any day of the week between the hours of 9 AM and 7 PM.  

            The United States and Mexico have been concerned about liquor fueled crime in the border area.  They are particularly concerned in places around El Paso Texas and Juarez Mexico.  The governments of both nations determine that a comprehensive approach is in order and enter into the U.S. Mexico Liquor Control Treaty.  Among its provisions are the following: (1) no establishment may sell liquor from Friday evening at 8 PM through Sunday noon if located on an interstate highway (U.S.) or national road (Mexico) within 100 miles of the border, or in any case within thirty (30) miles of the border; and (2) any person with a valid proof of age may purchase beer wine and other liquor in either country upon proof of age of 21 or older. The Treaty  entered into force in January and in the same month Congress enacted and the President signed a bill that enacted all of the Treaty’s provisions into law. 

            The new Mexico Governor is furious and she directs the Attorney General to determine whether the President and Congress have the authority to effectively void New Mexico liquor law.  Write a short memo analyzing the issue and stating your conclusion. The following materials may provide you with some guidance in addition to the materials read earlier in the chapter.



State of Missouri v. Holland
252 U.S. 416 (1920)

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a bill in equity brought by the State of Missouri to prevent a game warden of the United States from attempting to enforce the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of [p431] July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, and the regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture in pursuance of the same. The ground of the bill is that the statute is an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, and that the acts of the defendant done and threatened under that authority invade the sovereign right of the State and contravene its will manifested in statutes. The State also alleges a pecuniary interest, as owner of the wild birds within its borders and otherwise, admitted by the Government to be sufficient, but it is enough that the bill is a reasonable and proper means to assert the alleged quasi sovereign rights of a State. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237. Marshall Dental Manufacturing Co. v. Iowa, 226 U.S. 460, 462. A motion to dismiss was sustained by the District Court on the ground that the act of Congress is constitutional. 258 Fed. Rep. 479. Acc., United States v. Thompson, 258 Fed. Rep. 257; United States v. Rockefeller, 260 Fed.Rep. 346. The State appeals.

On December 8, 1916, a treaty between the United States and Great Britain was proclaimed by the President. It recited that many species of birds in their annual migrations traversed certain parts of the United States and of Canada, that they were of great value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection. It therefore provided for specified close seasons and protection in other forms, and agreed that the two powers would take or propose to their lawmaking bodies the necessary measures for carrying the treaty out. 39 Stat. 1702. The above mentioned Act of July 3, 1918, entitled an act to give effect to the convention, prohibited the killing, capturing or selling any of the migratory birds included in the terms of the treaty except as permitted by regulations compatible with those terms, to be made by [p432] the Secretary of Agriculture. Regulations were proclaimed on July 31, and October 25, 1918. 40 Stat. 1812; 1863. It is unnecessary to go into any details because, as we have said, the question raised is the general one whether the treaty and statute are void as an interference with the rights reserved to the States.

To answer this question, it is not enough to refer to the Tenth Amendment, reserving the powers not delegated to the United States, because, by Article II, § 2, the power to make treaties is delegated expressly, and by Article VI treaties made under the authority of the United States, along with the Constitution and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are declared the supreme law of the land. If the treaty is valid, there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government. The language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being general, the question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon which the present supposed exception is placed.

It is said that a treaty cannot be valid if it infringes the Constitution, that there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-making power, and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the States, a treaty cannot do. An earlier act of Congress that attempted by itself and not in pursuance of a treaty to regulate the killing of migratory birds within the States had been held bad in the District Court. United States v. Shauver, 214 Fed.Rep. 154. United States v. McCullagh, 221 Fed.Rep. 288. Those decisions were supported by arguments that migratory birds were owned by the States in their sovereign capacity for the benefit of their people, and that, under cases like Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, this control was one that Congress had no power to displace. The same argument is supposed to apply now with equal force. [p433]

Whether the two cases cited were decided rightly or not, they cannot be accepted as a test of the treaty power. Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power, but they must be ascertained in a different way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national wellbeing that an act of Congress could not deal with, but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, "a power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government" is not to be found. Andrews v Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33. What was said in that case with regard to the powers of the States applies with equal force to the powers of the nation in cases where the States individually are incompetent to act. We are not yet discussing the particular case before us, but only are considering the validity of the test proposed. With regard to that we may add that, when we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience, and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether [p434] it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must consider what this country has become in deciding what that Amendment has reserved.

The State, as we have intimated, founds its claim of exclusive authority upon an assertion of title to migratory birds, an assertion that is embodied in statute. No doubt it is true that, as between a State and its inhabitants, the State may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone, and possession is the beginning of ownership. The whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State, and, in a week, a thousand miles away. If we are to be accurate, we cannot put the case of the State upon higher ground than that the treaty deals with creatures that, for the moment are within the state borders, that it must be carried out by officers of the United States within the same territory, and that, but for the treaty, the State would be free to regulate this subject itself.

As most of the laws of the United States are carried out within the States and as many of them deal with matters which, in the silence of such laws, the State might regulate, such general grounds are not enough to support Missouri's claim. Valid treaties, of course, "are as binding within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United States." Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683. No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power. We do not have to invoke the later developments of constitutional law for this proposition; it was recognized as early as Hopkirk v. Bell, 3 Cranch 454, with regard to statutes [p435] of limitation, and even earlier, as to confiscation, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall.199. It was assumed by Chief Justice Marshall with regard to the escheat of land to the State in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 275. Haguenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258. Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340. So as to a limited jurisdiction of foreign consuls within a State. Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1. See Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453. Further illustration seems unnecessary, and it only remains to consider the application of established rules to the present case.

Here, a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another power. The subject matter is only transitorily within the State, and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute, there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States. The reliance is vain, and were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden to act. We are of opinion that the treaty and statute must be upheld. Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 118.

Decree affirmed.

Notes and Questions.

1.  What result if the President entered into a Treaty ratified by the Senate in which the United States agreed to purchase property from another state; would the ratification of the Treaty serve also to compel Congress to appropriate the funds necessary to meet this Treaty obligation?  Consider that the federal Constitution specifically vests the legislative power in Congress and that appropriation measures must commence in the House of Representatives.

2.  The regulation of liquor has a long and contentious history in the United States.  After a long campaign, the federal Constitution had been amended to prohibit sales and consumption of most liquor in the early part of the 20thcentury.  The 18th Amendment (1919) provided in relevant part that “After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.” After a tumultuous decade or so that constitutional amendment was repealed.  Section 2 of the 21st Amendment (1933) provided that “The transportation or importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”

3.  The effect of the 21st Amendment was to confer regulatory authority on states with respect to liquor.  In a series of decisions the Supreme Court held that power to be quite broad, even when it resulted in the erection of barriers to trade that would otherwise be prohibited.  See, e.g., tate Board of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936) (California licensing fee for importation); Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35 (upholding state law regulating liquor pricing). However, the Supreme Court has refused to validate state laws that appear to interfere with commerce.  In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986), the Supreme Court invalidated a state law prohibiting wholesalers form charging lower prices for out of state sales than those permitted for in state sales under state law.

4.  In Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005), the Supreme Court appeared to narrow the scope of state freedom to regulate liquor sales that have a discriminatory effect on commerce, appearing to substantially narrow the rule of Young’s Market. The Court held that the 21st Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution, especially those that prohibit state regulation that inhibits interstate commerce.  It concluded that state liquor laws are valid even when they have a discriminatory effect State's regime "advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives," (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 278 (1988)).

__________




[1]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1789190
[2]http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZS.html
[3]http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/74/case.html
[4]http://books.google.com/books?id=DeyiAAAAMAAJ&pg=PR30&dq=Le+droit+des+gens++Library+Company+of+Philadelphia&hl=en&ei=SHK4TanFFoXEgAfemuBm&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
[5]http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_01.htm
[6]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_law
[7]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1789190
[8]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896478
[9]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=896478
[10]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peremptory_norm
[11]http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/series_A_OC-18.html
[12]http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-984.ZS.html
[13]http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf
[14]http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963_disputes.pdf
[15] http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/
[16]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habeas_corpus
[17]http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/2004.03.31_avena.htm
[18] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certiorari
[19] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Textualism
[20] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Textualism
[21]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1789190
[22]http://www.brooklynpeace.org/brooklynforpeace/committees/international-law/fact-sheet-downloads/conventional-and-customary-international-law.pdf
[23]http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf
[24]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_deficit_in_the_European_Union
[25] http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/74/case.html
[26]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Constitution
[27] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._state
[28]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2177778
[29]http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0
[30]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ex_aequo_et_bono
[31]http://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/introduction.aspx
[32] http://www.unesco.de/1507.html
[33]http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/1922428.pdf
[34] http://www.oecd.org/
[35] http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427883
[36]http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Klabbers/JKSoft_law_and_public.pdf
[37]http://www.jura.uni-frankfurt.de/42852872/Bukowina_english.pdf
[38]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092167

My Remarks: "A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility Codes without the State?: On the Regulatory Character of Private Corporate Codes"

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(Pix from HERE)

I was fortunate enough to participate On October 17 in a "Workshop on research by the UM-HiiL-Chair on the Internationalisation of Law, the theme of which was “Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility: Transforming voluntary corporate codes into private law obligations?”, held at the Theater aan het Vrijthof, Vrijthof 47, Maastricht, Netherlands under the sponsorship of the University of Maastricht, the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, and their UM-HiiL Chair.  The workshop description and program follow below.

I spoke to the "Implications for the effective regulation of companies."  My remarks, "A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility Codes without the State?: On the Regulatory Character of Private Corporate Codes" also follows.




Workshop on research by the UM-HiiL-Chair on the Internationalisation of Law – Friday 17 October (Theater aan het Vrijthof, Vrijthof 47, Maastricht)

Corporate codes are voluntary policies that companies frequently develop in order to show the public their commitment to respect human rights, to improve workplace standards, and to protect the environment in their global operations. The research conducted by the UM- HiiL-Visiting Chair on the Internationalisation of Law has focussed in one of its research projects on these codes. As one of the core outcomes, the argument has been developed that such voluntary corporate codes, in order to be successful in the long run, would need to be transformed into private law obligations. This result has been reached by engaging in an interdisciplinary socio-legal analysis, which suggests treating the codes as unilateral declarations that reveal a serious effort of companies to regulate public interest matters in the absence of global government. It is this specific character that private law is accordingly called upon to support by enforcing these codes.

This workshop aims to discuss and critically evaluate the outcome of this research in general and this core suggestion in particular. The first part of the conference seeks to analyse the implications that a suggested enforcement of initially voluntary corporate commitments on CSR will have on specific areas of law.

What implications do (enforced) corporate commitments have for European law and the European discussion on legal frameworks on CSR? What does it mean for the area of private law if unilateral public commitments of companies become enforceable? What consequences does it have for corporate governance rules if companies and individual managers begin to have binding obligations towards society? In the second part, the focus is shifted from the legal to the broader societal consequences that such a proposed enforcement of voluntary corporate codes could have. What consequences will the suggestion have for different forms of capitalist organisation? Will, due to national specifics, enforcement occur only in some countries or is it more likely that fundamentally different forms of enforcement will occur, which are shaped by the specific national variant of capitalism? What are the societal consequences if the task of regulating public interest matters is taken over by private actors and this role is legally enforced? And what are the consequences of enforcing corporate codes for effectively regulating the behaviour of companies? Will the enforcement of voluntary commitments steer companies into socially responsible behaviour or will it rather have detrimental effects as overregulating social norms?

The workshop will consist of presentations by amongst others the UM-HiiL-Chairholders. Sufficient room for discussion is given after each presentation and all participants of the conference are highly encouraged to actively contribute to the discussion.


Preliminary Programme


10:00-10:20 Welcome and Introduction: Nicole Kornet, Associate Professor of Commercial Law

Panel I: Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility – Legal Implications
Chair: Mieke Olaerts, Assistant Professor of Company Law

10:20-11:00 Implications for European law-making

EU Law-Making on CSR?
Bruno de Witte, Professor of European Union Law, Current UM-HiiL-Chair

11:00-11:40 Implications for corporate law and governance

Corporate Governance and Responsibility: Paradigms Lost
Jan Eijsbouts, Professor of Corporate Social Responsibility

11:40-12:20 Implications for private law

Corporate Codes and promissory language
Jan Smits, Professor of European Private Law, UM-HiiL-Chair 2010-2012

12:20-13:30 Lunch break

Panel II: Enforcing corporate social responsibility – Societal Implications
Chair: Catalina Goanta, PhD Researcher affiliated with the UM-HiiL-Chair

13:30-14:10 Implications for the organisation of capitalism

Corporate Codes and Varieties of Capitalism
Gunther Teubner, Professor of Private Law and Legal Sociology, University of Frankfurt am Main, UM-HiiL-Chair 2009-2010

14:10-14:50 Implications for the relation between public and private regulationç
A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility Codes without the State?: On the Regulatory Character of Private Corporate Codes
Larry Catá Backer, Professor of Law and International Affairs, Pennsylvania State University
14:50-15:20 Coffee Break

15:20-16:00 Implications for the effective regulation of companies

Not Taking Corporate Codes Too Seriously: Pitfalls of Over-Legalization and the Crowding Out Effect
Mark Kawakami, PhD Researcher affiliated with the UM-HiiL Chair

16:00-16:30 Concluding Remarks

Problems of and Prospects for enforced Corporate Social Responsibility
Anna Beckers, PhD Researcher affiliated with the UM-HiiL-Chair

16:30 Drinks and informal get-together
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A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility Codes without the State?: On the Regulatory Character of Private Corporate Codes

Larry Catá Backer

We have gathered here to celebrate, and consider, what I think we will be able to look back on as a great example of the robust development of the project of legalization within the logic of globalization. In her thesis, “Taking Corporate Codes Seriously: Towards Private Law Enforcement of Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility Codes,” Anna Beckers looks out across more than a century and across two germinal events—one a fire in a sweat shop in New York and the other a fire in a sweat shop in Bangladesh—to theorize, and quite persuasively, the continuity of a project of the legalization of the social and economic sphere that is undiminished by time.

Though the context is quite different, the project remains the same—to embed behavior control within a network of mandatory proscriptions attached in some authoritative way to the state. It is the difference in context that poses the challenge—not the ultimate object.

The political context is globalization and its re-situating of the state (or perhaps at this moment in time all but the most powerful of them) as perhaps not the sole occupant of the apex of political and social power in the world.

The social context is rule systems being developed by private actors, primarily corporations and NGOs, and public actors, most recently the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the apparatus of the UN Human Rights Council.

The economic context is the business enterprise unconstrained by borders, political or otherwise. Corporate social responsibility bound up in corporate codes of behavior and related private governance standards systems thus serve as a key site for the evolution of legalization and legitimacy in governance, from its 20th century formalist rigidity into something of a bridge between the political and social sphere. And for this purpose, the state, like the corporation before it, is reduced to a nexus of connections within the structures of governance.

But even as the project of code legalization develops what may well become a most sound theory of legalization of societal norms within the state, and even as this project produces the best case for the reform of law within the state both plausible and necessary to achieve the aims of legitimacy, enforcement, and authority in governance, I look on this quite worthy and necessary project with dread. It is a dread informed, in part, by a contemporary application of Aristotle’s insights about a more ancient relation between law and the state:
For a law derives all its strength from custom, and this requires long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy matter to pass from established laws to other new ones, is to weaken the power of laws. [Bk II ch VIII; 1269a]

For the people do not easily change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees only that one thing takes the place of another; so that the ancient laws will remain, while the power will remain in the hands of those who have brought about a revolution in the state. [Bk. IV, ch. V, 1292b]
These insights apply, I believe, with equal force to the constitution of a law for corporate codes. The move to reconstitute law within a legalization project threatens the underlying foundations of the current law-state and this can threaten the authority of law and of the state. Paradoxically, perhaps, the project of legalization evidences how a love of ancient custom, in this case the customs and patterns of the post-Westphalian law-state, remains, while power shifts to those, enterprises included, that have brought about a revolution in the state, and in the meaning of legalization in a new world order that has yet to be revealed.

The remainder of these remarks are meant to briefly sketch out what I see as the danger—for state and business enterprise—that flows out of the fundamental ideological premises that appear to make legalization within the state necessary and inevitable, when it may be neither but for the blinders of the ideology that appears to make them so.

I offer this as an exercise in mining under the fairly thick walls of the ideology of law and state, not to undermine this ideology but to offer a view of the world from beyond its walls. And so, when I look across the century from the Triangle Shirtwaist fire to the Rana Plaza fire of 2013, I might see legalization in a substantially different light, one in which the state may play a substantially reduced role and from which it might profit by its absence, one in which a legalization of the social and economic sphere may be indeed proceeding, but not in an unbroken line nor in the shadow of the state.

I start by positing two quite distinct views of the relationship of the state and law, both of which were formed in the fires of the Anglo-European revolutionary period from 1640 through 1917. The embrace of any one of these views tends to fundamentally shape the context in which theorizing codes can take place. I then consider how shifting from the dominant view of state-law fusion to those that posit the autonomy of law might allow for the possibility of alternative approaches. To that end I consider several of the key premises underlying the code legalization project.


1. Ideologies of the law-state.

The struggles of the post Westphalian period to theorize and implement a new model of state organization profoundly affected the framework within which analysis of governance became possible. Though a large variety of state theory has emerged since 1640, virtually all of them share the same foundational characteristics. These foundations are, in the West at least, two strains of Enlightenment era ideologies that produced sometimes profoundly distinct notions of the value of government, the necessity of government to law and the relationship of the state to the individual. Both are grounded in the ancient concept, now understood as infinitely malleable, of popular consent.

On the one hand, consent can be understood as the expression of the popular will, made manifest through government and expressed in law enacted through this apparatus of state. In this construct law is impossible in the absence of government and government provides the incarnation of the popular will which is itself the manifestation of the best interests of the individuals now come together within a political community. Government is a source of protection, and obedience to government is a first principle of active engagement with the state. The protection of that manifestation of the general will is the highest order of systemic protection―process, legality, and a commitment to a basic set of substantive rights form the core of this approach to government and law. This is an approach that found its most congenial home in continental Europe and Latin America. A variation of this approach underlies Marxist Leninist political theory and state organization.

On the other hand, consent can be understood as a means of organizing a community of like interests for the protection of specific values (in the Anglo-American world, of property) and the operationalization of popular custom and traditions. In this construct, government is consequential, something that is necessary to ensure protection but is not otherwise invested with any inherent power or character. As a site for the assertion of power against individual interest it is viewed with suspicion and framed in a way that ensures the smallest interference with individual privilege (understood within the structures of custom and tradition to which the community adheres). Consent and adherence to the government is disciplined by ensuring that all are equal before the law (that in many cases remains a work in progress of course) and that the law is firmly anchored in custom as the lived set of consensual practices of the community. Government is thus both a source of protection and the space within which joint efforts for improvement can be undertaken. Government is understood as limited in the scope of its power and is itself constrained by law, including the higher law of the state (the subject of so-called natural, religious or constitutional law). The organs of government specified therefor may make law but law is not attached to government nor entirely derived from it. This is an approach most notable in pre modern England and its colonies, and a variation of this form prevails in the United States, though for how much longer is hard to say.

There is a third way of theorizing consent and the construction of the political order. That path suggests not merely the separation of law from the apparatus of state, but also the passive role of the state in the construction of law, that is left to a democratic process beyond the state organs itself. It is founded on the notion that legal instrumentalism is itself anti democratic and that it is the functional aggregation of the facts of life that provide the basis for law—the ancient customs and liberties of a people now transposed to a post modern age. There are at least two well-known variations, of course. The older one, which provided much grist for Carl Schmitt and his kind, posits custom and social norms without limit, but as a corollary suggests that communal borders may be drawn in any way and to keep anyone out. The other, also in some sense ancient, posits a set of law above laws, either as natural or theological law, which serve as meta-taboos. In these frameworks the legislature acquires a vestigial role and the force of the state is centered on administration.

The project of legalization, then, acquires substantially different meaning, depending on which of these fundamental premises of the law-state is invoked. The 20th century was the great period of the instrumental law-state as the center of primal authority over a political sphere that was deemed dominant over the social and economic (and to some extent the religious) spheres. The 21st century may see exposed a revolution in ideology, now masked by the power of old patterns, that makes a legal imprimatur less relevant for stability or authenticity of governance. The unmasking of the new may well come when the project of expanding the meaning, content and sources of law (the project of legalization) becomes so broad that it itself becomes meaningless and the new categories that lie beneath it become better exposed. What those are we have only a clue at the moment. But it is clear that the new world order involves the re-fracture of power and a more polymorphous and heterodox system of hopefully coherent systems of rules that bind, sometimes like law and sometimes not.


2. Consequences for theorizing corporate code legalization.

The legalization of corporate codes project provides some useful clues. Let me highlight just a few.

1. The first, of course involves the labeling project of legalization. Legalization, and its promise of stability and legitimacy follow from the judgment inherent in the descriptor—voluntary—usually attached to corporate codes. This applies whether the codes are 3rd party public or private efforts from the OECD, U.N. or Amnesty International, or whether they are the idiosyncratic product of an enterprise respecting its supply chain. To label such codes as voluntary is possible only within a regime that posits the model of law within the state as the highest ideal of governance and the truest form of legitimate expression of power—public, democratic and bound by a domestic legal order that is a world onto itself (though in communion with others of its kind). It suggests codes as subordinate, contingent and transitory and thus deploys the premises of the underlying ideology to avoid contention. Codes have the character they do precisely because that is the place they are assigned by the natural logic of the ideological system of the law state which itself remains unquestioned. Thus “genuine legal obligations” may arise only within the tight space of domestic legal orders, and governance that falls “beyond the law” do not because they are sourced beyond the state. But this can be true only under conditions of the classical law-state where the identity of law and the state is assumed without question. But where law may exist autonomously of the state might codes not also be conceived as genuine legal obligations, though not that of the state, and not perhaps of a sort for which remedies might be sought through the state?

2. The second arises from the character of corporations and their relation to the apparatus of government and its legal structures. Under the premises of the classical law-state, and especially in continental Europe, it is natural to speak of the corporation as a creature of law, certainly as to its personality and its relation to the apparatus of state. But that notion rests on the more profound idea that the sole authentic and primal incarnation of communal will must be the state, and that all other aggregations of communal will—from corporations to social organizations—necessarily derive their license to operate from the state. In its extreme form, in European Marxist Leninist states, the very idea of the corporate form apart from the state is itself inconceivable—as is the case in contemporary Cuba. This construction includes a critical wrinkle—the emphasis of the fundamental aggregation of corporations as one focused on capital, rather than on the aggregation of social forces. This is the classic formulation that brings together the fundamental tenets of both classical capitalist and Marxist obsessions with capital and the consequential idea that corporations are at heart “merely an accumulation of capital.” While these ideas serve the premises of the classical law state, they might become less compelling when the premises of the law-state are removed. The reason, of course, is that the classical theory of corporations assume the subordination of the social sphere to a political sphere occupied in its entirety by the apparatus of government. Once one presumes an organization based on capital and dependent for legitimacy on a derogation of state power, everything else follows. But that focus on political subordination and the primacy of capital can both distort and constrain analysis. It fails to consider both the autonomy of the social role of enterprises free of the ideology of capital (in both its capitalist and Marxist senses) and fails to understand the social costs of the subsidization of this construct, including the construction and maintenance of corporate codes. Perhaps Catholic social thought has hinted at a distinct approach, but that too is only in its nascent stages of development.

3. The third arises from the consequences, thought to be natural and inevitable, that because corporate codes are regulatory—because they ape law—they assume an incursion into the political sphere and thus necessarily must be absorbed in some way by the state to ensure that these regulatory forays become law. Yet here, shifting fundamental premises of law-state relations, suggests that the problem may well lie in trying to transform the societal dimension of governance into a legal dimension (that is into a state of transition to law) by using the notion of regulatory intent or function as a bridge. One moves from interlinking to intermeshing to amalgamation and transformation as an inevitable process that is triggered by the determination of regulatory intent. Outside of the classical parameters of the orthodox law-state, the underlying premises of this approach are dangerous and erroneous. It suggests that regulation is necessarily legal and thus within the domain of the state. As a consequence, where such regulation remains “private”, that is in the social or economic spheres, it is necessarily incomplete and transitory. But that can be true only under orthodox law-state theory. It does not follow from other conceptions of the relationship of law to the state. It is dangerous because the premise is itself grounded on the notion of the right of the state to impose itself without limit in the social sphere. Yet this power is itself belied by core notions of western constitutional ideology that are grounded in fundamental constraints on state power. And it is also contrary to notions of respect for belief communities and their rights of self-governance, ideals not limited to religious communities alone. Thus governance contracts of the sort that include many corporate codes may point to new forms of rights and duties but perhaps ones falling outside the state apparatus as readily as they might be conceived as inevitably tending toward “the legal.” The premise is not inevitable that societal governance = regulatory legality for which the intervention of the state is required or preferred. Carl Schmitt’s articulation of the claustrophobic world of parliamentary democracy must give way to the realities of power shifting around the informal legislatures of the enterprise organismus and its opponents, the individual disembodied, aggregated and reconstituted as NGOs in social space, but also interlinked with the political spaces where their effects can be felt.

4. The fourth follows from the implications of social sphere legislation but in two respects. Within the orthodox premises undergirding the law-state, especially within Europe, it is necessary and important to reject the notion of any equivalence between societal and legal-political constitution. To do otherwise would subvert the hierarchy of legitimacy at the core of the law-state system. The boundaries between societal and political constitutionalism remain important for the integrity of either. Yet the project of legalization might well subvert this fundamental distinction even as it seeks to preserve it. Where corporate codes are understood as species of legislative privatization if focused on generalized societal interests, then they are recharacterized as moving into the public sphere with the consequence that they can only have authoritative effect if reconstituted as legal and legislative. Might this be an inversion of the old Marxist dictum that law is politics is economics to something like economics is politics is law? Yet to bring corporate codes “back home” into the state through the mediating techniques of legalization might undo the very foundation of the law state system in two ways. First, it stretches the meaning of law beyond the parameters within which it remains a coherent subject of politics in the law-state system. What corporations produce is not law, can never be law, and may well offend classically understood notions of law. What corporations produce may be legalized, but to call it law is to suggest that any act of power can, through the expedient of legalization, affect the appearance and usurp the authenticity of law—which within orthodox theory must be a product of the state apparatus and sourced within its normative framework. Second, it might make it possible to destabilize the core foundation of the system by substituting powerful functionally differentiated actors for the popular sovereign as the source of law. Worse, it would undertake this subversion through the techniques of judicialization of the legalization process—by stretching and contorting the interpretive processes of courts to embed corporate codes without legislative action. And where legislative action may be needed to operationalize, it might be reduced merely to the expedient of permitting the courts to engage in this activity. These are problems not merely of definition but of normative effect. It presents the law-state with a conundrum—it must legalize to preserve its coherence as a regulatory system, but it may lose its coherence and legitimacy as a regulatory system if it engages in this sort of legalization. The answer may require the abandonment if the orthodox law state in the face of globalization—it is the state that will change in order to authoritatively embed the corporation within the political sphere other than through its administrative regulatory apparatus (the regulatory agencies through which such interactions have been traditionally mediated in the modern administrative state).

5. Last, just as law can be understood as political governance with social and economic objectives (even if the latter is merely to structure markets), so corporate codes might be understood as economic governance with social and political objectives structured in legal form. The power of both is enhanced through formal and informal interlinkages that create webs of polycentric and partial governance that might be felt distinctly across the supply chain and beyond the territory of any particular place. That may well be the single most important consequence of globalization—not chaos, but anarchy, order without a center, and an ordering of rules in three-dimensional space. The project of embedding through legalization presents substantial and perhaps necessary opportunities which, if done well, might extend the reach of the law-state while preserving its normative forms and legitimacy. But doing it well might require a bit of self control under conditions of social differentiation where embedding can only be as incomplete as the regulatory reach of the corporate code enacting enterprise or the reach of the international “soft law” norms they might be made to embrace, first as norm, and then in a mandatory fashion through legalization. Indeed, neither the power to regulate nor the acts producing legalization can be understood, standing alone, as sufficient to support systemicity among polycentric social and political subsystems that themselves are fractured and interlinked in dynamic and partial ways. Legalization does not speak to the coherence of the corporate codes of Walmart, Nike, Zara and Philips creating a connection with the legalization in the European Union, the United States, China and the like, unless differentiation is understood solely as functional and not normative. Legalization thus carries with it a harmonizing element that may be as mandatory as the resulting legal liability of enterprises within states. But that leaves the larger issue of differentiation. Legalization, under conditions of the logic of the law-state, can reach equilibrium only when all of these subsystems are knit together—one way or another. But that process also threatens the law-state by suggesting that it no longer sits at the apex of power and that democratic theory ends at national borders, which remain quite open to projections of legalized power from abroad.

I have said enough, I think, for one sitting. If corporate codes are regulatory and socially embedded, then they function politically, and to that extent, to the extent of the political function of societal embedding, then legalization is necessary to embed codes into the state, and so embedded, to stabilize and authenticate them—as law, as bridges between societal and economic spheres, as structural coupling, as a means of imposing coherence on multi-governance systems, etc. If corporate codes are understood as political in this fashion they must be expressed in the only way open for such expression, by a legality that itself is an expression of and permission from state power. This is the necessary logic one can extract from the normative grundnorms of the law-state system that posits the state at the center of law. But that also requires a modification of state legality that is itself problematic because it recognizes a source of law generating power beyond its own apparatus (the government) and without popular constraint, and only partially within its control. The necessity of legalization presents its own dangers. And it might well be that in the process Aristotle’s suggestion that the forms of legalization will long outlive the revolution that such actions usher in may be a consequence that only our children will live long enough to appreciate.

Thank you.

Chinese Communist Party Plenum on Socialist Rule of Law: Xi Jinping on Five Key Points of Chinese Rule of Law

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My co-author Keren Wang and I have been following the very interesting and important discussion of Socialist Rule of Law and its evolution in China.  This week is especially important for that enterprise as the Chinese Communist Party Plenum on the rule of law and its Socialist character.

This post includes both Keren Wang's English language summary translation of Xi Jinping's Five Key Points on Chinese Rule of Law, which include the following.
1.  If the corruption problem persists, it will inevitably lead to the overthrow of the Party and the State;

2. The Party must confine its own actions within the bounds of the Constitution and law;

3. We must enclose power within the cage of institutions;

4.  When civilians have no place to go to seek redress for the wrongs they suffered,civil unrest will be inevitable;

5.  We must perform our legal obligations, and refrain from exercising powers that are not provided by law.  

The post also includes the  original Chinese reporting of the presentation at which these Five Key Points were announced (Link).




Summary of Xi Jinping's Five Key Points on Chinese Rule of Law:

  1. If the corruption problem persists, it will inevitably lead to the overthrow of the Party and the State (腐败问题越演越烈,最终必然会亡党亡国)
  • "'Maggots will only feed on what's already rotten (物必先腐,而后虫生)'. Lessons from other countries teach us that persistent corruption is a major force driving the long-term accumulation of social antagonisms... If corruption is not swiftly and forcefully dealt with, social unrest and the topping of regime would be inevitable."
  • The Party must confine its own actions within the bounds of the Constitution and law.    (党自身必须在宪法和法律范围内活动)
    • "Ensure the implementation of the constitution, is to ensure the realization of the fundamental interests of the people."
    • "Never allow unfair trials hurt the trust of the people, and harm their interests"
    • "The rule-of-law is to rule according to the Constitution; governing by law is to govern by the Constitution... The Party must discipline itself according to the Party Constitution, and governing the country according to the Constitution"
  • We must enclose power within the cage of institution (把权力关进制度的笼子里)
    • "Enforcing Party discipline involves the forceful punishment of cadres violating the Party rule"
    • "We must strengthen the restriction and supervision of the exercise of power, to shut power within the cage of institution, and to form effective mechanisms deterring corrupt behavior."
  • When civilians have no place to go to seek redress for the wrongs they suffered, civil unrest would be inevitable. (老百姓无处伸冤,民间就会骚乱)
    • "The difficulty we're facing right now is not legislating the right law, but implementing these law into practice"
    • "Transparency is an excellent anti-corrosive agent. The legitimacy cannot be established if power is exercised where the light doesn't shine." 
    • On this point, Xi Jinping borrowed Rousseau's famous quote that "the most important law of all is not engraved on marble or brass, but in the hearts of the citizens"
  • We must perform our legal obligations, and refrain from exercising powers that are not provided by law (法定职责必须为、法无授权不可为)
    • "The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, adhere to the rule of law must first adhere to the principle of governing according to the Constitution"
    • "administrative organs at all levels must perform their duties strictly in accordance with law"
     _ _ _ _ _ _ _

    习近平眼中的“法治中国”

    2014年10月22日 18:42:06 来源: 新华网 

    新华网北京10月22日电 据新华社“新华视点”微信报道,正在召开的十八届四中全会,是我们党首次以依法治国为主题的中央全会。

      事实上,十八大以来,习近平总书记多次在讲话中强调依法治国的重要性。下面是我们从总书记几次讲话中摘录的一些片段,从中可以窥见总书记对法治建设的深入思考。

      一、腐败问题越演越烈,最终必然会亡党亡国

      2012年11月17日,十八届中央政治局第一次集体学习时的讲话:

      “物必先腐,而后虫生。”近年来,一些国家因长期积累的矛盾导致民怨载道、社会动荡、政权垮台,其中贪污腐败就是一个很重要的原因。大量事实告诉我们,腐败问题越演越烈,最终必然会亡党亡国!我们要警醒啊!

      二、党自身必须在宪法和法律范围内活动

      2012年12月4日,在首都各界纪念现行宪法公布施行三十周年大会上的讲话:

      1、保证宪法实施,就是保证人民根本利益的实现。只要我们切实尊重和有效实施宪法,人民当家作主就有保证,党和国家事业就能顺利发展。反之,如果宪法受到漠视、削弱甚至破坏,人民权利和自由就无法保证,党和国家事业就会遭受挫折。

      2、我们要依法公正对待人民群众的诉求,努力让人民群众在每一个司法案件中都能感受到公平正义,决不能让不公正的审判伤害人民群众感情、损害人民群众权益。

      3、依法治国,首先是依宪治国;依法执政,关键是依宪执政。新形势下,我们党要履行好执政兴国的重大职责, 必须依据党章从严治党、依据宪法治国理政。党领导人民制定宪法和法律,党领导人民执行宪法和法律,党自身必须在宪法和法律范围内活动,真正做到党领导立 法、保证执法、带头守法。

      三、把权力关进制度的笼子里

      2013年1月22日,在十八届中央纪委二次全会上的讲话:

      1、从严治党,惩治这一手决不能放松。要坚持“老虎”“苍蝇”一起打,既坚决查处领导干部违纪违法案件,又切实解决发生在群众身边的不正之风和腐败问题。要坚持党纪国法面前没有例外,不管涉及到谁,都要一查到底,决不姑息。

      2、扬汤止沸,不如釜底抽薪。要从源头上有效防治腐败,加强对典型案例的剖析,从中找出规律性的东西,深化 腐败问题多发领域和环节的改革,最大限度减少体制障碍和制度漏洞。要加强对权力运行的制约和监督,把权力关进制度的笼子里,形成不敢腐的惩戒机制、不能腐 的防范机制、不易腐的保障机制。

      3、我们查处的腐败分子中,方方面面的一把手比例不低。这说明,对一把手的监督仍然是一个薄弱环节。由于监督缺位、监督乏力,少数一把手习惯了凌驾于组织之上、凌驾于班子集体之上。“权力导致腐败,绝对权力导致绝对腐败。”如果权力没有约束,结果必然是这样。

      4、在我们的一些干部中,特权思想、特权现象还是比较严重的。从上到下,违规占有多套住房的,违规占用公家 车辆的,以各种形式侵占公共利益的,违规侵害群众利益的,明里暗里为亲属升官发财奔走的,以权枉法的,这样的干部不乏其人啊!这些特权现象严重损害了社会 公平正义,引起了群众极大不满。我们决不能见怪不怪啊! 

      5、如果升学、考公务员、办企业、上项目、晋级、买房子、找工作、演出、出国等各种机会都要靠关系、搞门 道,有背景的就能得到更多照顾,没有背景的再有本事也没有机会,就会严重影响社会公平正义。这种情况如不纠正,能形成人才辈出、人尽其才的生动局面吗?这 个社会还能有发展活力吗?我们党和国家还能生机勃勃向前发展吗?

      四、老百姓无处伸冤,民间就会骚乱

      2014年1月7日,在中央政法工作会议上的讲话:

      1、有了法律不能有效实施,那再多法律也是一纸空文,依法治国就会成为一句空话。

      2、天下之事,不难于立法,而难于法之必行。对执法司法状况,人民群众意见还比较多,社会各界反映还比较大,主要是不作为 、乱作为特别是执法不严、司法不公、司法腐败问题比较突出。

      3、老百姓无处伸冤,民间就会骚乱。英国哲学家培根说:“一次不公正的裁判,其恶果甚至超过十次犯罪。因为犯罪虽是无视法律——好比污染了水流,而不公正的审判则毁坏法律——好比污染了水源。”这其中的道理是深刻的。

      4、执法不严、司法不公,一个重要原因是少数干警缺乏应有的职业良知。许多案件,不需要多少法律专业知识, 凭良知就能明断是非,但一些案件的处理就偏偏弄得是非界限很不清楚。各行各业都要有自己的职业良知,心中一点职业良知都没有,甚至连做人的良知都没有,那 怎么可能做好工作呢?

      5、做到严格执法、公正司法,就要信仰法治、坚守法治。“法不阿贵,绳不挠曲。”这就是法治精神的真谛。如果不信仰法治,没有坚守法治的定力,面对权势、金钱、人情、关系,是抵不住诱惑、抗不住干扰的。

      6、制度的生命力在执行,有了制度没有严格执行就会形成“破窗效应”。比如,世界上许多国家都对律师同法 官、检察官接触交往作出严格规定,严禁律师和法官私下会见,不能共同出入酒店、娱乐场所甚至同乘一部电梯。但是,我们的一些律师和法官、检察官相互勾结, 充当“司法掮客”,老百姓说是“大盖帽,两头翘,吃了被告吃原告”,造成了十分恶劣的影响。

      7、阳光是最好的防腐剂。权力运行不见阳光,或有选择地见阳光,公信力就无法树立。执法司法越公开,就越有权威和公信力。涉及老百姓利益的案件,有多少需要保密的?除法律规定的情形外,一般都要公开。

      8、如果领导干部不遵守法律,怎么让群众遵守法律?对来自群众反映政法机关执法办案中存在问题的举告,党政领导干部可以依法按程序批转,但不得提出倾向性意见,更不能替政法机关拍板定案。要把能不能依法办事、遵守法律作为考察识别干部的重要标准。

      9、法律要发挥作用,需要全社会信仰法律。卢梭说,一切法律中最重要的法律,既不是刻在大理石上,也不是刻 在铜表上,而是铭刻在公民的内心里。我国是个人情社会,人们的社会联系广泛,上下级、亲戚朋友、老战友、老同事、老同学关系比较融洽,逢事喜欢讲个熟门熟 道,但如果人情介入了法律和权力领域,就会带来问题,甚至带来严重问题。现在,一个案件在审理过程中,当事人到处找门路、托关系、请客送礼,不托人情、不 找关系的是少数。过去讲“有理走遍天下”,现在有理的也到处找人。这从另一角度说明,老百姓要办点事多么不易,不打点打点,不融通融通,不意思意思,就办 不成事!这种现象一定要扭转过来!

      10、对司法机关尚未或正在办理的案件,媒体可以报道,但不要连篇累牍发表应该怎么判、判多少年等评论,防止形成“舆论审判”,以便为执法司法机关行使职权营造良好舆论环境。

      五、法定职责必须为、法无授权不可为

      2014年9月5日,在庆祝全国人民代表大会成立60周年大会上的讲话:

      1、宪法是国家的根本法,坚持依法治国首先要坚持依宪治国,坚持依法执政首先要坚持依宪执政。我们必须坚持把依法治国作为党领导人民治理国家的基本方略、把法治作为治国理政的基本方式,不断把法治中国建设推向前进。

      2、各级行政机关必须依法履行职责,坚持法定职责必须为、法无授权不可为,决不允许任何组织或者个人有超越 法律的特权。要深入推进公正司法,深化司法体制改革,加快建设公正高效权威的司法制度,完善人权司法保障制度,严肃惩治司法腐败,让人民群众在每一个司法 案件中都感受到公平正义。 

    Chapter 11 (Rule of Law/Role of Law): From "Elements of Law" to "Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States"--Building an Introductory Course to the Legal Curriculum for the 21st Century

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    (Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)


    Since 2010, I have been posting on the development of a new course I have been developing for our first year law school students, "Elements of Law." The course originally had a quite modest objective--to introduce law students to legal research and reasoning through case law, statutory interpretation, and legal history, processes, and institutions. I chose to broaden its objectives within these specific parameters and development a framing and concepts course that would provide a deep foundation to law students on the legal system they were undertaking to study.
    --Elements of Law 3.0: On the Relevance of a First Year Law Course Designed to Frame the Law School Curriculum).
    --Developing a New Course--"Elements of Law"
    --"Elements of Law" Course 2.0: A Framework Course for the U.S. Law Curriculum,  
    Grounded in the principles of the sociology of law, the course has morphed into an effort to introduce students to law as a self-referencing system with its own particular structures, premises, constraints and language, with its own logic and taboos and its own means of understanding the world. That systemicity (cf. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Chichester : John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1999) is then a critical element in the way in which the legal system (in this case of the United States) interacts with the world, both as a legal and as a socio-economic-political actor. The course has also expanded from its original narrow and technical focus, to a broader focus on principles and the use of language and logic to build and operate a system of law. That broadening has made it possible to offer the course not just to first year law students, but also to graduate students in the social sciences and in international affairs, as a grounding in the legal systems that are important in their respective fields.

    This and the posts that follow produces some of the materials I will be presenting to the class. I offer these materials in hopes that they may prove of use and that you might share comments, perspectives and suggestions as I develop those materials on this site. Thanks.

    This post includes a draft of the fourth Chapter of Part II (Hierarchies of Law and Governance; Sources and Uses) --Chapter 11 (Role of Law/Rule of Law).
     
     
     
    Chapter 11

    The Relationship of Law and the Government of the State―
    Role of Law/Rule of Law

    I. Introduction

                The last chapter of Section II seeks to put all the materials we have considered  before around the notions, now increasingly important in framing discussion about the legitimacy of law and law systems, which are understood as rule of law. The notions of rule of law as a set of process values (thin rule of law) and normative values (thick rule of law) are explored.  A comparative approach suggests the malleability of the concept of rule of law but also its importance as a sign of law system legitimacy. The idea of due process and rule of law as a human right is also explored.  More importantly, the student will be introduced to the fundamental difference between rule of law as a political concept—one that embraces a particular ideology of political organization and social structuring—and rule of law as a legal concept within the United States legal system.  In its later aspect, rule of law as been subsumed within the core constitutional principles of due process and equal protection understood as tools to avoid governmental tyranny or the assertion of arbitrary power.  Those principles, and the rule of law construct it embodies, find expression in the United States in the jurisprudence of fundamental rights. The focus on rule of law in the United States will introduce students to due process as a constitutional and rule of law concept. Consideration of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,  124 S Ct 2633 (2004) will serve to provide context to these notions.  The problem will focus on the methodologies for determining and protecting fundamental rights within a rule of law legal context.


    II. Chapter Readings

    ·      United Nations Rule of Law, “What is the Rule of Law”[1]
    ·      Norhiro Urabe, “Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View of the United States and Japan,”[2]Law and Contemporary Problems 53(1):61-72 (1990)
    ·      David Clark, “The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law”
    ·      Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,[3]124 S Ct 2633 (2004) READ PARTS I, III

    Optional
    ·      Mary Crock and Daniel Ghezlbash, “Due Process and Rule of Law as Human Rights: The High Court and the ‘Offshore’ Processing of Asylum Seekers,”[4]READ 1-9

    __________

    United Nations Rule of Law
    About
    What is the Rule of Law[5]


    Aristotle said more than two thousand years ago, "The rule of law is better than that of any individual."


    The notion of the “rule of law” stems from many traditions and continents and is intertwined with the evolution of the history of law itself. The Code of Hammourabi, promulgated by the King of Babylon around 1760 BC, is one of the first examples of the codification of law, presented to the public and applying to the acts of the ruler. In the Arab world, a rich tradition of Islamic law embraced the notion of the supremacy of law. Core principles of holding government authority to account and placing the wishes of the populace before the rulers, can be found amid the main moral and philosophical traditions across the Asian continent, including in Confucianism. In the Anglo-American context, the Magna Carta of 1215 was a seminal document, emphasizing the importance of the independence of the judiciary and the role of judicial process as fundamental characteristics of the rule of law. In continental Europe notions of rule of law focused on the nature of the State, particularly on the role of constitutionalism.

    Recent attempts to formalize its meaning have drawn on this rich history of diverse understandings. The modern conception of the rule of law has developed as a concept distinct from the “rule of man”, involving a system of governance based on non-arbitrary rules as opposed to one based on the power and whim of an absolute ruler. The concept of rule of law is deeply linked to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs. Long before the United Nations, States were working towards a rule of justice in international life with a view to establishing an international community based on law.

    Today, the concept of the rule of law is embedded in the Charter of the United Nations.[[6]] In its Preamble, one of the aims of the UN is “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained”. A primary purpose of the Organization is “to maintain international peace and security… and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,[[7]] the historic international recognition that all human beings have fundamental rights and freedoms, recognizes that “… it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law…”

    For the UN, the Secretary-General defines the rule of law as “a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency." (Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” (2004))[[8]]

    The principle of the rule of law applies at the national and international levels. At the national level, the UN supports a rule of law framework that includes a Constitution or its equivalent, as the highest law of the land; a clear and consistent legal framework, and implementation thereof; strong institutions of justice, governance, security and human rights that are well structured, financed, trained and equipped; transitional justice processes and mechanisms; and a public and civil society that contributes to strengthening the rule of law and holding public officials and institutions accountable. These are the norms, policies, institutions and processes that form the core of a society in which individuals feel safe and secure, where legal protection is provided for rights and entitlements, and disputes are settled peacefully and effective redress is available for harm suffered, and where all who violate the law, including the State itself, are held to account.

    At the international level, the principle of the rule of law embedded in the Charter of the United Nations encompasses elements relevant to the conduct of State to State relations. The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations[[9]] recognizes the inherent link between the UN and the international rule of law. Its preamble emphasizes “the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among nations.” Drawn from existing commitments in international law, the core values and principles of the UN include respect for the Charter and international law; respect for the sovereign equality of States and the principle of non-use or threat of use of force; the fulfillment in good faith of international obligations; the need to resolve disputes by peaceful means; respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; recognition that protection from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes is not only a responsibility owed by a State to its population, but a responsibility of the international community, the equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and the recognition that peace and security, development, human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. Appropriate rules of international law apply to the Organization as they do to States.


    Notes and Questions.

    1. Since 2006, the United Nations system has sought to take a more pro.-active role in rule of law issues.  To that end, a Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group was created in 2006.[10] The Secretary General’s Report provided:

    I have decided to establish a Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group within the Secretariat. This Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General, will be the focal point for coordinating system-wide rule of law activities so as to ensure quality control and greater policy coherence and coordination. The Group, which will be supported by a small secretariat unit, will act as a repository of rule of law materials, expert rosters, web resources and best practices, in close cooperation with the relevant lead entities. The Group will also give consideration to recommending the establishment of a rule of law trust fund.

    The Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group will also lead a consultative process with relevant partners , first and foremost Member States. This will identify priority gaps in capacity of the United Nations that need to be filled in the rule of law area and recommend where, and by when, these capacities should be established.

    Id., 2.

    2. While the initial focus of the United Nations was on transitional justice in states emerging from periods of lawlessness and misrule, the focus on rule of law clearly has wider application.  To some extent, the work of conceiving the meaning and implementation of rule of law concepts at the international level is likely to be influential not just in the way that international law and norms is shaped and understood, but may also trickle down and have some influence in the way in which courts might be persuaded to understand the concept and apply it to their own constitutional systems.  Is that the case in the United States?

    3.  In its 2008 Guidance Note of the Secretary General: UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance,[11]the United Nations also suggested the constituent parts of a rule of law state in the following terms:

    B. FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING THE RULE OF LAW
    1.A Constitution or equivalent , which, as the highest law of the land, inter alia:
    • Incorporates internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in international treaties, provides for their applicability in domestic law, and establishes effective and justiciable remedies at law for violations;
    • Provides for non-discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which protects national minorities;
    • Provides for the equality of men and women;
    • Defines and limits the powers of government and its various branches, vis-à-vis each other, and the people;
    • Limits emergency powers and derogations of human rights and freedoms under states of emergency to those permissible under international standards;
    • Empowers an independent and impartial judiciary.

    2. A legal framework, and the implementation thereof, consistent with international norms and standards, which protects human rights and provides for effective redress, including:
    • Fair immigration, nationality and asylum laws;
    • Penal laws, including for transnational crimes, and criminal procedure laws that ensure the effective and fair administration of justice for perpetrators, including juveniles in conflict with the law as well as victims and witnesses, consistent with, among others, the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power;
    • Prison laws and regulations that are consistent with, among others, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners;
    • Laws for the protection of minorities, children, displaced and returning populations, and other marginalized or vulnerable groups that take into account their special status and international standards for their protection, and that outlaw and address the effects of discrimination;
    • Laws that establish legal protection for the rights of women on an equal basis with men, and that ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the ffective protection of women against any act of discrimination;
    • Laws protecting free association and assembly, and guarantees that press, libel, broadcasting and other laws respect free expression, opinion and information;
    • Security legislation that protects non-derogable human rights, and ensures civilian control and oversight;
    • Laws on the judiciary, legal practice and prosecution that reflect, among others, the standards embodied in the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors;
    • Laws, guidelines and directives that govern the conduct of police and other security forces consistent with, among others, the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials;
    • Fair procedures for the settlement of civil entitlements and disputes under the law and fair administration of laws, regulations, procedures and institutions.

    3. An electoral system, which, inter alia:
    • Assures, through periodic and genuine elections, that the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government;
    • Assures the right of everyone to take part in the government of his or her country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives, including through the application of temporary special measures;
    • Assures equal access to public service, including elective public service;
    • Guarantees universal and equal suffrage, and secrecy of the ballot;
    • Provides for non-discrimination in the area of political rights, and secures an electoral atmosphere that is free of intimidation and respectful of certain prerequisite rights, such as freedom of opinion, expression, information, assembly and association;
    • Provides for objective, unbiased and independent electoral administration, and independent review of alleged irregularities;
    • Provides for the transfer of power to victorious parties and candidates under the law.

    4. Institutions of justice, governance, security and human rights that are well-structured and financed, trained and equipped to make, promulgate, enforce and adjudicate the law in a manner that ensures the equal enjoyment of all human rights for all, including:
    • A legislative institution or mechanism for the formulation and public promulgation of
    laws in a procedurally transparent manner;
    • Effective oversight institutions or mechanisms (e.g., anti-corruption bodies, parliamentary committees, national human right s institutions, independent commissions on human rights and ombudsman offices consistent with the Paris Principles);
    • A judiciary, which is independent, impartial and adequately empowered to adjudicate the law with integrity and ensure its equal application to all within its jurisdiction;
    • State institutional capacities to make policy for and manage the effective administration of justice, the provision of security, crime prevention, and to investigate and prosecute violations of the law;
    • Police and other law enforcement agencies that protect individuals and communities, enforce the law without discrimination and take appropriate action against alleged violations of the law, including appropriate oversight mechanisms;
    • Corrections services that provide for a safe, secure and humane prison and rehabilitation
    system, including alternatives to deprivation of liberty and diversion measures;
    • An accessible capacity to provide legal and paralegal assistance to those unable to afford it, and adequate and effective defense for those alleged to have violated the law;
    • A social service capacity to assist victims and witnesses of crime and abuse of power, including children, to participate effectively in the administration of justice in a manner
    that ensures redress for harm suffered;
    • A system to effectively adjudicate rights and responsibilities within the family, on the basis of gender equality and in the best interest of the child, which ensures that the protection of children from abuse, exploitation, harm and neglect;
    • A professional training regime for lawyers, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement and prison officials that promotes a culture of service, discipline and ethics;
    • Military and civil defense forces that has allegiance to the Constitution, or equivalent, and other laws of the land, and to the democratic government, and follows international humanitarian law;
    • Effective and accessible mechanisms for resolution of entitlements and disputes between and among individuals, State organs, and groups in society, including courts, administrative tribunals, alternative or traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, and commissions or mechanisms for, among others, the fair settlement of property and housing disputes.

    5. Transitional justice processes and mechanisms that respond to country contexts while anchored in international norms and standards to address the legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation, which may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms such as ad hoc criminal tribunals, truth commissions, vetting processes and reparations programmes.

    6. A public and civil society that contributes to strengthening the rule of law and holds public officials and institutions accountable , including:
    • A system of governance that promotes a culture of legality, legal empowerment and ensures the public is aware of and educated in the full-range of its rights and responsibilities;
    • Communities that have equal access to justice and are empowered to participate in resolving disputes peacefully and responding to community safety needs and concerns;
    • Full access to judicial and other mechanisms for independent oversight of the exercise of executive authority and abuse of power;
    • A strong civil society, including, inter alia, adequately trained, equipped, financed and organized non-governmental organizations and professional associations, women’s groups, labor unions and community organizations;
    • A free, responsible and flourishing mass media.

    To what extent are these political rather than legal notions?  Is it possible to entirely separate political form legal issues?  Is law understood only as an instrument of political policy or does it exist within its own  self referencing structures? Is the United Nations approach compatible with that of the United States in the way in which it has structured its own legal system?  What are the differences?

    4.  The American Bar Association also has a “Rule of Law Initiative.”[12]It is described as an international development program promoting the rule of law through in country partnerships. Its core principles are described this way:
    The core principles that guide ABA ROLI’s work are:

        Employing a highly consultative approach to the delivery of technical assistance that is responsive to the requests and priorities of the Initiative’s local partners.
        Employing a comparative approach in the provision of technical legal assistance, with the U.S. legal system providing just one of several models that host country reformers can draw upon.
        Providing technical assistance and advice that is neutral and apolitical.
        Building local capacity by strengthening institutions in both the governmental and non-governmental sectors and by furthering the professional development of ABA ROLI’s host country staff, many of whom become the next generation of leaders in their countries.
        Providing thought leadership in the field of rule of law promotion that draws on both ABA ROLI’s extensive overseas field experience and on the resources and convening power of the ABA and its more than 400,000 members in the United States and abroad.[13]

    The ABA’s ROLI has focused on access to justice and human rights, women’s rights, anti-corruption, criminal law reform, judicial reform and legal education.  To what extent do these initiatives speak to issues of law or issues of politics policy and culture? 

    5.  Within the United States, the notion of rule of law tends to be understood within a cluster of other terms. More than half a century ago Paul Kauper noted;[14] “Here in the United States we have not, on the whole, given a lot of thinking to the Rule of Law idea which Dicey developed at such length on the basis of his observation of the English system. We speak of “government under law”, of a “government of laws and not of men,” or some may even use the term “due process of law” to refer in a broad way to ideas that may otherwise find expression in the rule of law terminology.” This has not changed much in the intervening years.  What appears to be clear is that in the United States, the meaning of rule of law takes on a distinctive cast depending on whether one is speaking of the internal system of the United States or of systems beyond the U.S.  Internally, the idea of rule of law clusters around notions of fairness and of structural protections against arbitrary governance and tyranny.  Externally it references a host of political and ideological objectives for which law and law systems may be used as an instrument for their achievement.

    _________


    Hamdi V. Rumsfeld, et al.
    542 U.S. 507 (2004)
    [Available at:
    http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-6696.ZO.html]
    (footnotes renumbered)

    Justice O’Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer join.

    At this difficult time in our Nation’s history, we are called upon to consider the legality of the Government’s detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as an “enemy combatant” and to address the process that is constitutionally owed to one who seeks to challenge his classification as such. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that petitioner’s detention was legally authorized and that he was entitled to no further opportunity to challenge his enemy-combatant label. We now vacate and remand. We hold that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.

    I

        On September 11, 2001, the al Qaeda terrorist network used hijacked commercial airliners to attack prominent targets in the United States. Approximately 3,000 people were killed in those attacks. One week later, in response to these “acts of treacherous violence,” Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Authorization for Use of Military Force (“the AUMF”), 115 Stat. 224. Soon thereafter, the President ordered United States Armed Forces to Afghanistan, with a mission to subdue al Qaeda and quell the Taliban regime that was known to support it.

        This case arises out of the detention of a man whom the Government alleges took up arms with the Taliban during this conflict. His name is Yaser Esam Hamdi. Born an American citizen in Louisiana in 1980, Hamdi moved with his family to Saudi Arabia as a child. By 2001, the parties agree, he resided in Afghanistan. At some point that year, he was seized by members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban government, and eventually was turned over to the United States military. The Government asserts that it initially detained and interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan before transferring him to the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. In April 2002, upon learning that Hamdi is an American citizen, authorities transferred him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where he remained until a recent transfer to a brig in Charleston, South Carolina. The Government contends that Hamdi is an “enemy combatant,” and that this status justifies holding him in the United States indefinitely–without formal charges or proceedings–unless and until it makes the determination that access to counsel or further process is warranted.

        * * *

        The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, 337 F.3d 335 (2003), and we granted certiorari. 540 U.S. __ (2004). We now vacate the judgment below and remand.

    II

        The threshold question before us is whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as “enemy combatants.” There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such. It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this case, the “enemy combatant” that it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was “ ‘part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ ” in Afghanistan and who “ ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ ” there. Brief for Respondents 3. We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is authorized.

        The Government maintains that no explicit congressional authorization is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the Constitution. We do not reach the question whether Article II provides such authority, however, because we agree with the Government’s alternative position, that Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.

        Our analysis on that point, set forth below, substantially overlaps with our analysis of Hamdi’s principal argument for the illegality of his detention. He posits that his detention is forbidden by 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). Section 4001(a) states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” Congress passed §4001(a) in 1971 as part of a bill to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 811 et seq., which provided procedures for executive detention, during times of emergency, of individuals deemed likely to engage in espionage or sabotage. Congress was particularly concerned about the possibility that the Act could be used to reprise the Japanese internment camps of World War II. H. R. Rep. No. 92—116 (1971); id., at 4 (“The concentration camp implications of the legislation render it abhorrent”).    The Government again presses two alternative positions. First, it argues that §4001(a), in light of its legislative history and its location in Title 18, applies only to “the control of civilian prisons and related detentions,” not to military detentions. Brief for Respondents 21. Second, it maintains that §4001(a) is satisfied, because Hamdi is being detained “pursuant to an Act of Congress”–the AUMF. Id., at 21—22. Again, because we conclude that the Government’s second assertion is correct, we do not address the first. In other words, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow category we describe (assuming, without deciding, that such authorization is required), and that the AUMF satisfied §4001(a)’s requirement that a detention be “pursuant to an Act of Congress” (assuming, without deciding, that §4001(a) applies to military detentions).

        The AUMF authorizes the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 115 Stat. 224. There can be no doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the “necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorized the President to use.

        The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by “universal agreement and practice,” are “important incident[s] of war.” Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S., at 28. The purpose of detention is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle and taking up arms once again. Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 571, 572 (2002) (“[C]aptivity in war is ‘neither revenge, nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the war’ ” (quoting decision of Nuremberg Military Tribunal, reprinted in 41 Am. J. Int’l L. 172, 229 (1947)); W. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920) (“The time has long passed when ‘no quarter’ was the rule on the battlefield … . It is now recognized that ‘Captivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,’ but ‘merely a temporary detention which is devoid of all penal character.’ … ‘A prisoner of war is no convict; his imprisonment is a simple war measure.’ ” (citations omitted); cf. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (CA9 1946) (“The object of capture is to prevent the captured individual from serving the enemy. He is disarmed and from then on must be removed as completely as practicable from the front, treated humanely, and in time exchanged, repatriated, or otherwise released” (footnotes omitted)).

        There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant. In Quirin, one of the detainees, Haupt, alleged that he was a naturalized United States citizen. 317 U.S., at 20. We held that “[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of … the law of war.” Id., at 37—38. While Haupt was tried for violations of the law of war, nothing in Quirin suggests that his citizenship would have precluded his mere detention for the duration of the relevant hostilities. See id., at 30—31. See also Lieber Code, ¶153, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Gen. Order No. 100 (1863), reprinted in 2 Lieber, Miscellaneous Writings, p. 273 (contemplating, in code binding the Union Army during the Civil War, that “captured rebels” would be treated “as prisoners of war”). Nor can we see any reason for drawing such a line here. A citizen, no less than an alien, can be “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners” and “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States,” Brief for Respondents 3; such a citizen, if released, would pose the same threat of returning to the front during the ongoing conflict.

        In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of “necessary and appropriate force,” Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.

        Hamdi objects, nevertheless, that Congress has not authorized the indefinite detention to which he is now subject. The Government responds that “the detention of enemy combatants during World War II was just as ‘indefinite’ while that war was being fought.” Id., at 16. We take Hamdi’s objection to be not to the lack of certainty regarding the date on which the conflict will end, but to the substantial prospect of perpetual detention. We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the “war on terror,” although crucially important, are broad and malleable. As the Government concedes, “given its unconventional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire agreement.” Ibid. The prospect Hamdi raises is therefore not far-fetched. If the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life.

        It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities. See Article 118 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S. T. 3316, 3406, T. I. A. S. No. 3364 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities”). See also Article 20 of the Hague Convention (II) on Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1817 (as soon as possible after “conclusion of peace”); Hague Convention (IV), supra, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2301(“conclusion of peace” (Art. 20)); Geneva Convention, supra, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2055 (repatriation should be accomplished with the least possible delay after conclusion of peace (Art. 75)); Praust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained without Trial, 44 Harv. Int’l L. J. 503, 510—511 (2003) (prisoners of war “can be detained during an armed conflict, but the detaining country must release and repatriate them ‘without delay after the cessation of active hostilities,’ unless they are being lawfully prosecuted or have been lawfully convicted of crimes and are serving sentences” (citing Arts. 118, 85, 99, 119, 129, Geneva Convention (III), 6 T. I .A. S., at 3384, 3392, 3406, 3418)).

        Hamdi contends that the AUMF does not authorize indefinite or perpetual detention. Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress’ grant of authority for the use of “necessary and appropriate force” to include the authority to detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not the situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan. See, e.g., Constable, U.S. Launches New Operation in Afghanistan, Washington Post, Mar. 14, 2004, p. A22 (reporting that 13,500 United States troops remain in Afghanistan, including several thousand new arrivals); J. Abizaid, Dept. of Defense, Gen. Abizaid Central Command Operations Update Briefing, Apr. 30, 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040430-1402.htm l (as visited June 8, 2004, and available in the Clerk of Court’s case file) (media briefing describing ongoing operations in Afghanistan involving 20,000 United States troops). The United States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.” If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of “necessary and appropriate force,” and therefore are authorized by the AUMF.

        Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 125 (1866), does not undermine our holding about the Government’s authority to seize enemy combatants, as we define that term today. In that case, the Court made repeated reference to the fact that its inquiry into whether the military tribunal had jurisdiction to try and punish Milligan turned in large part on the fact that Milligan was not a prisoner of war, but a resident of Indiana arrested while at home there. Id., at 118, 131. That fact was central to its conclusion. Had Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate soldiers by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the holding of the Court might well have been different. The Court’s repeated explanations that Milligan was not a prisoner of war suggest that had these different circumstances been present he could have been detained under military authority for the duration of the conflict, whether or not he was a citizen.[15]

        Moreover, as Justice Scalia acknowledges, the Court in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), dismissed the language of Milligan that the petitioners had suggested prevented them from being subject to military process. Post, at 17—18 (dissenting opinion). Clear in this rejection was a disavowal of the New York State cases cited in Milligan, 4 Wall., at 128—129, on which Justice Scalia relies. See id., at 128—129. Both Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. *257 (N. Y. 1815), and M’Connell v. Hampton, 12 Johns. *234 (N. Y. 1815), were civil suits for false imprisonment. Even accepting that these cases once could have been viewed as standing for the sweeping proposition for which Justice Scalia cites them–that the military does not have authority to try an American citizen accused of spying against his country during wartime–Quirin makes undeniably clear that this is not the law today. Haupt, like the citizens in Smith and M’Connell, was accused of being a spy. The Court in Quirin found him “subject to trial and punishment by [a] military tribunal[ ]” for those acts, and held that his citizenship did not change this result. 317 U.S., at 31, 37—38.

        Quirin was a unanimous opinion. It both postdates and clarifies Milligan, providing us with the most apposite precedent that we have on the question of whether citizens may be detained in such circumstances. Brushing aside such precedent–particularly when doing so gives rise to a host of new questions never dealt with by this Court–is unjustified and unwise.

        To the extent that Justice Scalia accepts the precedential value of Quirin, he argues that it cannot guide our inquiry here because “[i]n Quirin it was uncontested that the petitioners were members of enemy forces,” while Hamdi challenges his classification as an enemy combatant. Post, at 19. But it is unclear why, in the paradigm outlined by Justice Scalia, such a concession should have any relevance. Justice Scalia envisions a system in which the only options are congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or prosecution for treason or some other crime. Post, at 1. He does not explain how his historical analysis supports the addition of a third option–detention under some other process after concession of enemy-combatant status–or why a concession should carry any different effect than proof of enemy-combatant status in a proceeding that comports with due process. To be clear, our opinion only finds legislative authority to detain under the AUMF once it is sufficiently clear that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant; whether that is established by concession or by some other process that verifies this fact with sufficient certainty seems beside the point.

        Further, Justice Scalia largely ignores the context of this case: a United States citizen captured in a foreign combat zone. Justice Scalia refers to only one case involving this factual scenario–a case in which a United States citizen-POW (a member of the Italian army) from World War II was seized on the battlefield in Sicily and then held in the United States. The court in that case held that the military detention of that United States citizen was lawful. See In re Territo, 156 F.2d, at 148.

        Justice Scalia’s treatment of that case–in a footnote–suffers from the same defect as does his treatment of Quirin: Because Justice Scalia finds the fact of battlefield capture irrelevant, his distinction based on the fact that the petitioner “conceded” enemy combatant status is beside the point. See supra, at 15—16. Justice Scalia can point to no case or other authority for the proposition that those captured on a foreign battlefield (whether detained there or in U.S. territory) cannot be detained outside the criminal process.

        Moreover, Justice Scalia presumably would come to a different result if Hamdi had been kept in Afghanistan or even Guantanamo Bay. See post, at 25 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This creates a perverse incentive. Military authorities faced with the stark choice of submitting to the full-blown criminal process or releasing a suspected enemy combatant captured on the battlefield will simply keep citizen-detainees abroad. Indeed, the Government transferred Hamdi from Guantanamo Bay to the United States naval brig only after it learned that he might be an American citizen. It is not at all clear why that should make a determinative constitutional difference.

    III

        Even in cases in which the detention of enemy combatants is legally authorized, there remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status. Hamdi argues that he is owed a meaningful and timely hearing and that “extra-judicial detention [that] begins and ends with the submission of an affidavit based on third-hand hearsay” does not comport with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Brief for Petitioners 16. The Government counters that any more process than was provided below would be both unworkable and “constitutionally intolerable.” Brief for Respondents 46. Our resolution of this dispute requires a careful examination both of the writ of habeas corpus, which Hamdi now seeks to employ as a mechanism of judicial review, and of the Due Process Clause, which informs the procedural contours of that mechanism in this instance.

    A

        Though they reach radically different conclusions on the process that ought to attend the present proceeding, the parties begin on common ground. All agree that, absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States. U.S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”). Only in the rarest of circumstances has Congress seen fit to suspend the writ. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, §1, 12 Stat. 755; Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, §4, 17 Stat. 14. At all other times, it has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with law. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). All agree suspension of the writ has not occurred here. Thus, it is undisputed that Hamdi was properly before an Article III court to challenge his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Brief for Respondents 12. Further, all agree that §2241 and its companion provisions provide at least a skeletal outline of the procedures to be afforded a petitioner in federal habeas review. Most notably, §2243 provides that “the person detained may, under oath, deny any of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material facts,” and §2246 allows the taking of evidence in habeas proceedings by deposition, affidavit, or interrogatories.

        The simple outline of §2241 makes clear both that Congress envisioned that habeas petitioners would have some opportunity to present and rebut facts and that courts in cases like this retain some ability to vary the ways in which they do so as mandated by due process. The Government recognizes the basic procedural protections required by the habeas statute, Id., at 37—38, but asks us to hold that, given both the flexibility of the habeas mechanism and the circumstances presented in this case, the presentation of the Mobbs Declaration to the habeas court completed the required factual development. It suggests two separate reasons for its position that no further process is due.

    B

        First, the Government urges the adoption of the Fourth Circuit’s holding below–that because it is “undisputed” that Hamdi’s seizure took place in a combat zone, the habeas determination can be made purely as a matter of law, with no further hearing or factfinding necessary. This argument is easily rejected. As the dissenters from the denial of rehearing en banc noted, the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s seizure cannot in any way be characterized as “undisputed,” as “those circumstances are neither conceded in fact, nor susceptible to concession in law, because Hamdi has not been permitted to speak for himself or even through counsel as to those circumstances.” 337 F.3d 335, 357 (CA4 2003) (Luttig, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also id., at 371—372 (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Further, the “facts” that constitute the alleged concession are insufficient to support Hamdi’s detention. Under the definition of enemy combatant that we accept today as falling within the scope of Congress’ authorization, Hamdi would need to be “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners” and “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States” to justify his detention in the United States for the duration of the relevant conflict. Brief for Respondents 3. The habeas petition states only that “[w]hen seized by the United States Government, Mr. Hamdi resided in Afghanistan.” App. 104. An assertion that one resided in a country in which combat operations are taking place is not a concession that one was “captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign theater of war,” 316 F.3d, at 459 (emphasis added), and certainly is not a concession that one was “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners” and “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.” Accordingly, we reject any argument that Hamdi has made concessions that eliminate any right to further process.

    C

        The Government’s second argument requires closer consideration. This is the argument that further factual exploration is unwarranted and inappropriate in light of the extraordinary constitutional interests at stake. Under the Government’s most extreme rendition of this argument, “[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict” ought to eliminate entirely any individual process, restricting the courts to investigating only whether legal authorization exists for the broader detention scheme. Brief for Respondents 26. At most, the Government argues, courts should review its determination that a citizen is an enemy combatant under a very deferential “some evidence” standard. Id., at 34 (“Under the some evidence standard, the focus is exclusively on the factual basis supplied by the Executive to support its own determination” (citing Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455—457 (1985) (explaining that the some evidence standard “does not require” a “weighing of the evidence,” but rather calls for assessing “whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion”)). Under this review, a court would assume the accuracy of the Government’s articulated basis for Hamdi’s detention, as set forth in the Mobbs Declaration, and assess only whether that articulated basis was a legitimate one. Brief for Respondents 36; see also 316 F.3d, at 473—474 (declining to address whether the “some evidence” standard should govern the adjudication of such claims, but noting that “[t]he factual averments in the [Mobbs] affidavit, if accurate, are sufficient to confirm” the legality of Hamdi’s detention).

        In response, Hamdi emphasizes that this Court consistently has recognized that an individual challenging his detention may not be held at the will of the Executive without recourse to some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to determine whether the Executive’s asserted justifications for that detention have basis in fact and warrant in law. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425—427 (1979). He argues that the Fourth Circuit inappropriately “ceded power to the Executive during wartime to define the conduct for which a citizen may be detained, judge whether that citizen has engaged in the proscribed conduct, and imprison that citizen indefinitely,” Brief for Petitioners 21, and that due process demands that he receive a hearing in which he may challenge the Mobbs Declaration and adduce his own counter evidence. The District Court, agreeing with Hamdi, apparently believed that the appropriate process would approach the process that accompanies a criminal trial. It therefore disapproved of the hearsay nature of the Mobbs Declaration and anticipated quite extensive discovery of various military affairs. Anything less, it concluded, would not be “meaningful judicial review.” App. 291.

        Both of these positions highlight legitimate concerns. And both emphasize the tension that often exists between the autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a particular goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived of a constitutional right. The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const., Amdt. 5, is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330—331 (1993); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127—128 (1990); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 274—275 (1984); Addington v. Texas, supra, at 425. Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing “the private interest that will be affected by the official action” against the Government’s asserted interest, “including the function involved” and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process. 424 U.S., at 335. The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest if the process were reduced and the “probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards.” Ibid. We take each of these steps in turn.

    1

        It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both sides of the scale in this case. Hamdi’s “private interest … affected by the official action,” ibid., is the most elemental of liberty interests–the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action”); see also Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (noting the “substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily”). “In our society liberty is the norm,” and detention without trial “is the carefully limited exception.” Salerno, supra, at 755. “We have always been careful not to ‘minimize the importance and fundamental nature’ of the individual’s right to liberty,” Foucha, supra, at 80 (quoting Salerno, supra, at 750), and we will not do so today.

        Nor is the weight on this side of the Mathews scale offset by the circumstances of war or the accusation of treasonous behavior, for “[i]t is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,” Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted), and at this stage in the Mathews calculus, we consider the interest of the erroneously detained individual. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property”); see also id., at 266 (noting “the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed,” and emphasizing that “the right to procedural due process is ‘absolute’ in the sense that it does not depend upon the merits of a claimant’s substantive assertions”). Indeed, as amicus briefs from media and relief organizations emphasize, the risk of erroneous deprivation of a citizen’s liberty in the absence of sufficient process here is very real. See Brief for AmeriCares et al. as Amici Curiae 13—22 (noting ways in which “[t]he nature of humanitarian relief work and journalism present a significant risk of mistaken military detentions”). Moreover, as critical as the Government’s interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat. See Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., at 125 (“[The Founders] knew–the history of the world told them–the nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen”). Because we live in a society in which “[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty,” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975), our starting point for the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis is unaltered by the allegations surrounding the particular detainee or the organizations with which he is alleged to have associated. We reaffirm today the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law, and we weigh the opposing governmental interests against the curtailment of liberty that such confinement entails.

    2

        On the other side of the scale are the weighty and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States. As discussed above, supra, at 10, the law of war and the realities of combat may render such detentions both necessary and appropriate, and our due process analysis need not blink at those realities. Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (noting the reluctance of the courts “to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (acknowledging “broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war”).

        The Government also argues at some length that its interests in reducing the process available to alleged enemy combatants are heightened by the practical difficulties that would accompany a system of trial-like process. In its view, military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world away, and discovery into military operations would both intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense and result in a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble of war. Brief for Respondents 46—49. To the extent that these burdens are triggered by heightened procedures, they are properly taken into account in our due process analysis.

    3

        Striking the proper constitutional balance here is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat. But it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad. See Kennedy v. Mendoza&nbhyph;Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164—165 (1963) (“The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with guarantees which, it is feared, will inhibit government action”); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties … which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile”).

        With due recognition of these competing concerns, we believe that neither the process proposed by the Government nor the process apparently envisioned by the District Court below strikes the proper constitutional balance when a United States citizen is detained in the United States as an enemy combatant. That is, “the risk of erroneous deprivation” of a detainee’s liberty interest is unacceptably high under the Government’s proposed rule, while some of the “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” suggested by the District Court are unwarranted in light of their limited “probable value” and the burdens they may impose on the military in such cases. Mathews, 424 U.S., at 335.

        We therefore hold that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. See Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’ ” (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)); Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (“due process requires a ‘neutral and detached judge in the first instance’ ” (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61—62 (1972)). “For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’ It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 233 (1864); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (other citations omitted)). These essential constitutional promises may not be eroded.

        At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus, once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria. A burden-shifting scheme of this sort would meet the goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while giving due regard to the Executive once it has put forth meaningful support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy combatant. In the words of Mathews, process of this sort would sufficiently address the “risk of erroneous deprivation” of a detainee’s liberty interest while eliminating certain procedures that have questionable additional value in light of the burden on the Government. 424 U.S., at 335.[16]

        We think it unlikely that this basic process will have the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the Government forecasts. The parties agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized. The Government has made clear in its briefing that documentation regarding battlefield detainees already is kept in the ordinary course of military affairs. Brief for Respondents 3—4. Any factfinding imposition created by requiring a knowledgeable affiant to summarize these records to an independent tribunal is a minimal one. Likewise, arguments that military officers ought not have to wage war under the threat of litigation lose much of their steam when factual disputes at enemy-combatant hearings are limited to the alleged combatant’s acts. This focus meddles little, if at all, in the strategy or conduct of war, inquiring only into the appropriateness of continuing to detain an individual claimed to have taken up arms against the United States. While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233—234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[L]ike other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the individual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests reconciled”); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (“What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial
    questions”).

        In sum, while the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the
    Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial
    adjudicator.

    D

        In so holding, we necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S., at 587. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (it was “the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty”); Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (The war power “is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties”). Likewise, we have made clear that, unless Congress acts to suspend it, the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of detentions. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S., at 301 (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest”). Thus, while we do not question that our due process assessment must pay keen attention to the particular burdens faced by the Executive in the context of military action, it would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge. Absent suspension of the writ by Congress, a citizen detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to this process.

        Because we conclude that due process demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute his classification, the proposed “some evidence” standard is inadequate. Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short. As the Government itself has recognized, we have utilized the “some evidence” standard in the past as a standard of review, not as a standard of proof. Brief for Respondents 35. That is, it primarily has been employed by courts in examining an administrative record developed after an adversarial proceeding–one with process at least of the sort that we today hold is constitutionally mandated in the citizen enemy-combatant setting. See, e.g., St. Cyr, supra; Hill, 472 U.S., at 455—457. This standard therefore is ill suited to the situation in which a habeas petitioner has received no prior proceedings before any tribunal and had no prior opportunity to rebut the Executive’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.

        Today we are faced only with such a case. Aside from unspecified “screening” processes, Brief for Respondents 3—4, and military interrogations in which the Government suggests Hamdi could have contested his classification, Tr. of Oral Arg. 40, 42, Hamdi has received no process. An interrogation by one’s captor, however effective an intelligence-gathering tool, hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate factfinding before a neutral decisionmaker. Compare Brief for Respondents 42—43 (discussing the “secure interrogation environment,” and noting that military interrogations require a controlled “interrogation dynamic” and “a relationship of trust and dependency” and are “a critical source” of “timely and effective intelligence”) with Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S., at 617—618 (“one is entitled as a matter of due process of law to an adjudicator who is not in a situation which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . . which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true” (internal quotation marks omitted). That even purportedly fair adjudicators “are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927). Plainly, the “process” Hamdi has received is not that to which he is entitled under the Due Process Clause.

        There remains the possibility that the standards we have articulated could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted military tribunal. Indeed, it is notable that military regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status under the Geneva Convention. See Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, Army Regulation 190—8, §1—6 (1997). In the absence of such process, however, a court that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved. Both courts below recognized as much, focusing their energies on the question of whether Hamdi was due an opportunity to rebut the Government’s case against him. The Government, too, proceeded on this assumption, presenting its affidavit and then seeking that it be evaluated under a deferential standard of review based on burdens that it alleged would accompany any greater process. As we have discussed, a habeas court in a case such as this may accept affidavit evidence like that contained in the Mobbs Declaration, so long as it also permits the alleged combatant to present his own factual case to rebut the Government’s return. We anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution that we have indicated is necessary in this setting, engaging in a factfinding process that is both prudent and incremental. We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.

    IV

        Hamdi asks us to hold that the Fourth Circuit also erred by denying him immediate access to counsel upon his detention and by disposing of the case without permitting him to meet with an attorney. Brief for Petitioners 19. Since our grant of certiorari in this case, Hamdi has been appointed counsel, with whom he has met for consultation purposes on several occasions, and with whom he is now being granted unmonitored meetings. He unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on remand. No further consideration of this issue is necessary at this stage of the case.

    * * *

        The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

    It is so ordered.


    III. The Relationship of Law and the Government of the State―Role of Law/Rule of Law

    For the second part of this course, we have been considering the relationship between law and the organs of state government.  We have explored the two principal models that are the foundation of the organization of virtually every state in the West and many in most other parts of the world to some extent.  We then examined the way in which law and any manifestation of the organs of government are ordered.  We have come to understand the foundational importance of hierarchy in the structuring of law systems and of their relationship to government.  We have examined in that connection the relationship between government and the “higher law” of the constitution in the West. We then examined the consequences of a systems structured with a higher law at its top and government and subordinate law forms extending beneath it. Lastly we considered the traditional relationship between the law inside a state―its domestic legal order―and the law outside of the state.  The latter, now understood as international law, has undergone substantial changes since 1945 and the creation of a governance architecture built around international organizations, the United Nations, World Trade Organization, regional human rights courts and the like.  Simultaneously, the ability of states to protect their domestic legal orders has been challenged as borders have become more porous to transactions in goods, capital, services and to a lesser extent, people, in a process usually understood as economic globalization.  Together, these trends have made it harder for states to shut international out of their domestic legal orders; but not entirely.  We ended our last chapter with a consideration of Medillin, the Supreme Court’s embrace of a very traditional and historically conventional approach to protecting the borders between domestic and international lawmaking within the United States. Medellin is not a unique expression of American values.  It is reflected in the ideologies of important sectors of the American political class as well (e.g., President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address: A Revolutionary Manifesto For International Law in Chaotic Times,[17]Law at the End of the Day, April 1, 2006).

                With this chapter we finish our consideration of the issues that frame Western, and particularly American, understandings of the relationship between law and government and that also structure the hierarchical relationships between law and government and among distinct classes of law. Our object today is to organize the preceding materials around its ideological core―an ideological core that probably best states the core premises of American legal theory.  That core ideology is commonly referenced by lawyers―and increasingly by our political officials―as “rule of law.”  I have elsewhere suggested a standard model for rule of law in the early 21st century:[18]

    The normative basis for evaluating the proper conduct of a state, as the locus of political power within a defined territory, is to some large extent bundled up in the complex of concepts understood as the “rule of law:”

    What we in the West have come to call the “rule of law” has always been a multi-edged sword. It is most commonly deployed to guard against arbitrary use of state power by people with access to that power. It is in this sense that the rule of law is perhaps best understood. In its basic political sense it encompasses ideals such as free and fair elections, protected through the instrumentalities of the state, principally the independent judiciary, against abuse by individuals. The rule of law can also be used to protect a polity against its own excesses. [Larry Catá Backer, Using Law Against Itself: Bush v. Gore Applied in the Courts,[19]55 Rutgers L. Rev. 1109, 1110-11 (2003). I noted there the growing influence of these notions outside the West, citing to the work of Anwar Ibrahim, an influential Malay politician: “For Ibrahim, the rule of law encapsulates three principles. . .The first is the predominance of regular law so that the government has no arbitrary authority over the citizen. . .Secondly, all citizens are equally subject to the ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts. . And thirdly, perhaps the most significant, the citizen’s personal freedoms are formulated and protected by the ordinary law, rather than by abstract constitutional declarations.” Id. at 1109 n.1 (quoting Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance[20]63 (1996)).

    As a consequence, conformity of the state to accepted standards of rule-of-law notions tends to be measured only against the performance of the state—principally through its government. The core of this measure is focused on the regularization of rulemaking. Power must be exercised only through regular processes of rulemaking. [On process and rule of law, see Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law 257-301 (1998)]. Rules must apply fairly to all, and the mechanisms for their enactment and enforcement must also be applied fairly and equally to all. [“The idea of the rule of law is also inextricably linked with certain basic institutional arrangements. The fundamental notion of equality, which lies close to the heart of our convictions about justice and fairness, demands an equal voice for all adult citizens in the legislative process.” T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism 22 (1993). See also Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1997)]. No individual is above fairly enacted rules, nor is any individual delegated the power to make rules other than as part of systems for rulemaking that are representative and not inherently arbitrary. Additionally, all laws must respect certain boundaries of state power. Law must not be used for bad ends. While this moral or ethical component can take many forms, it generally encompasses behavioral norms now commonly understood to comprise an international system of human rights.

    There is thus something of a consensus in the West with respect to the necessary connection between the form in which rulemaking power is manifested and political legitimacy. (See, e.g., Spencer Zifac, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Rethinking Values and Reforming Institutions, in Globalisation and the Rule of Law 32-65 (Spencer Zifcak ed., 2005)). For the earlier English version of the concept, see, e.g., A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution[21]107-23 (Liberty Classics 1982) (1885). Rawls nicely summarized the consensus:

    Political power is legitimate only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution (written or unwritten) the essentials of which all citizens, as reasonable and rational, can endorse in the light of their common human reason. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy. It is a further desideratum that all legislative questions that concern or border on those essentials, or are highly divisive, should also be settled, so far as possible, by guidelines and values that can be similarly endorsed. (John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: a Restatement[22]41 (2001)).

    That law may not be used for bad ends, a premise we have first encountered in the Institutes, is here refashioned by some as the idea of “thick” rule of law. (See Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion, in Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the U.S. 1, 4 (Randall Peerenboom, ed., 2004). In German theory it encompasses the idea of the sozialstaat. “The Sozialstaat stands for social justice and obligates the government to provide for the basic needs of all Germans.” (Donald Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 35 (1997)). Its international dimensions is grounded in ideas, current after 1945, that there were a group of basic substantive norms that must be held commonly by the community of states. This idea derived great impetus from the insight that a state could conform to a process-centered rule of law to commit bad deeds against the powerless. As a consequence, process alone would be insufficient to produce a thick rule of law ideology that produced appropriate conformity to actions and values. In the Twentieth Century, the great models of rule of law states gone awry were Germany between 1943 and 1945 and Japan prior to 1945. (e.g., See Meryll Dean, Japanese Legal System: Text and Materials 76-79 (1997); Donald P. Kommers, supra 30-41 (1997)). We have seen in our last class how some constitutions recognize this component explicitly. See, e.g., S. Afr. Const. 1996,[23]art. 39(1)  (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum—(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.”).

    Our first reading, United Nations Rule of Law, “What is the Rule of Law,”[24]adds context to the notion of Rule of Law.  It seeks to draw on traditions across the world in ancient cultures for the idea that at some level the idea of Rule of Law is universal.

    The notion of the “rule of law” stems from many traditions and continents and is intertwined with the evolution of the history of law itself. The Code of Hammourabi, promulgated by the King of Babylon around 1760 BC, is one of the first examples of the codification of law, presented to the public and applying to the acts of the ruler. In the Arab world, a rich tradition of Islamic law embraced the notion of the supremacy of law. Core principles of holding government authority to account and placing the wishes of the populace before the rulers, can be found amid the main moral and philosophical traditions across the Asian continent, including in Confucianism. In the Anglo-American context, the Magna Carta of 1215 was a seminal document, emphasizing the importance of the independence of the judiciary and the role of judicial process as fundamental characteristics of the rule of law. In continental Europe notions of rule of law focused on the nature of the State, particularly on the role of constitutionalism. (Ibid).

    It then looks to recent efforts to formalize and combine these related global traditions into a working concept with legal and political implications. “The modern conception of the rule of law has developed as a concept distinct from the “rule of man”, involving a system of governance based on non-arbitrary rules as opposed to one based on the power and whim of an absolute ruler. The concept of rule of law is deeply linked to the principle of justice, involving an ideal of accountability and fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs.” (Ibid).


    It notes that a version of the concept of Rule of Law has been universalized and embedded in the Charter of the United Nations.[25]

    In its Preamble, one of the aims of the UN is “to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained”. A primary purpose of the Organization is “to maintain international peace and security… and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” The Universal Declaration of Human Rights[26]of 1948, the historic international recognition that all human beings have fundamental rights and freedoms, recognizes that “… it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law…”

    And it refers to a proffered definition put forward by the U.N. Secretary General:

    a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.” (Report of the Secretary-General: The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (2004)[27]) (Ibid., emphasis omitted).

    For the United Nations, Rule of Law is a concept that applies both to states and international organizations.  It applies within domestic legal orders and to constrain the relationships among states. 

    At the national level, the UN supports a rule of law framework that includes a Constitution or its equivalent, as the highest law of the land; a clear and consistent legal framework, and implementation thereof; strong institutions of justice, governance, security and human rights that are well structured, financed, trained and equipped; transitional justice processes and mechanisms; and a public and civil society that contributes to strengthening the rule of law and holding public officials and institutions accountable. (Ibid).

     At the international level, the core notion of Rule of Law has been elaborated to some extent in the The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations[28]and applies to state to state relations drawn from existing commitments in international law, the core values and principles of the UN include respect for the Charter and international law; respect for the sovereign equality of States and the principle of non-use or threat of use of force; the fulfillment in good faith of international obligations; the need to resolve disputes by peaceful means; respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; recognition that protection from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes is not only a responsibility owed by a State to its population, but a responsibility of the international community, the equal rights and self-determination of peoples; and the recognition that peace and security, development, human rights, the rule of law and democracy are interlinked and mutually reinforcing.(Ibid).

    Taken together, the United Nations proffers a dual track but parallel system of Rule of Law ideology that is both drawn from the cultural and legal traditions of the major centers of world civilization, but that is then articulated by the community of nations in congress at the United Nations, with application both to the organization of domestic legal orders (and the elaborations of constraints thereto) and to the organizational and operation of a parallel but equally binding system of international law.  Rule of Law, then, comes up from the bottom but is formalized and protected from the top.

    In our second reading, Norhiro Urabe, “Rule of Law and Due Process: A Comparative View of the United States and Japan,”[29]Law and Contemporary Problems53(1):61-72 (1990), suggests the optimism of the United Nations version of Rule of Law.  Urabe considers the American embrace of rule of law by considering it from a perspective outside the United States. Urabe contrasts the thick rule of law that has become important in the ideology of American rule of law with the more process driven “thin” rule of law represented by modern conceptions of Rechtsstaat which he understands as “administration by law.” (Ibid., 62). 

    In summary, the major distinction between the Rule of Law underlying Western constitutionalism and Rechtstaat or Rule of Law of German and Japanese origin is where power and rights are vested. The Western Rule of Law holds that `powers and rights vest naturally in individuals and that government is limited in its power to infringe upon these rights.  On the contrary, the Rechtsstaat, a more hierarchical tradition, holds that all powers and rights naturally vest in government, which then allocates rights and powers to its citizens.   Rechtsstaat does not recognize any individual rights as fundamental; government and not nature is the source of individual rights.  (Ibid., pp. 62-63).    

    Urabe characterizes the sources and expression of rule of law in the United States this way: “[O]ne can find a consensus in England and the United States that the central meaning of the Rule of Law is that governmental power should be bound by law.  In Japan things are quite different.” (Ibid., 67). Urabe finds rule of law incorporated in Japanese law in a number of ways. First in the concept that the “supreme law in the constitution is deemed to be an expression of the Rule of Law.” (Ibid., 64). Second, the Constitution is understood as the source of the protection of human rights in Japan.  (Ibid., 65).  Third, the Constitution incorporates as a fundamental precept the concept of due process. (Ibid.). Fourth, the entire judicial power is vested in the Japanese Supreme Court.  (Ibid). Lastly, this judicial power includes judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation. (Ibid).

    Urabe notes that in contrast to the United States, Japanese Rule of Law advocates embraced the idea that the central meaning of the Rule of law was that “people should obey the law.” (Ibid., 68) This was proffered as the antithesis of the “Rule of Force.” (Ibid), but not the use of force by the state―rather Urabe refers to what we now understand as the power of mass movement. This, Urabe notes, was the position taken by two influential advocates of the Rule of Law in Japan, Chief Justices Kotaro Tanaka and Kisaburo Yokota. (Ibid.).  For them, the expression of direct popular power, whether through labor strikes or mass movements that affect the functioning of the Japanese legislature represented a breakdown of the rule of law in favor of what Westerners might call “mob rule” or the “Rule of Force.”  Rule of law, then, “meant the exclusion of unlawful force of any kind.” (Ibid).  And of course, the only lawful force was that provided in law by the legitimate state organs to government. While in England, these advocates noted, rule of law was used against government, which was unnecessary in Post War Japan.  The difference was attributable to the state of government in England and Japan.  In England the Rule of law was needed to constrain what had then been viewed as its exercise of autocratic and unlimited power. In post war Japan, there is no autocratic government and thus rule of law had to be deployed to constrain mass democratic movements as the real source of unlimited and potentially autocratic power. “Therefore the most important purpose of the Rule of Law was not to bind governmental power but to exclude the use of force by the people and to require people to obey the law.” (Ibid).

    If Rule of Law is directed against expression of popular power in Japan, in contrast to England the United States where it is directed against governmental power, then the role of the constitution in each state assumes a different character. Urabe suggests that a natural consequence in Japan is that “the Constitution is given much importance in Japan as a matter of form or theory. . . . In Japan, the Constitution is in most cases treated as important in principle, but of little importance in practice.” (Ibid, 69).   And Japanese courts rarely tend to apply Rule of Law against assertions of governmental power. (Ibid., 69-70).  He notes the few cases of judicial determinations that legislation exceeded the powers of government and suggested that even where the Supreme Court had declared a law unconstitutional, the effect was little felt on Japanese political or social life. (Ibid., 70). 

    He concludes that the Rule of Law is, indeed, a universal principle, but only “so long as the phrase refers to the protection of the rights and liberties of the people.” (Ibid., 71).  These protections have not been fully realized when measured against the American yardstick.  But then, the current constitutional system was itself given to the people by a Higher Authority―the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers―in a way reminiscent of the process of Imperial constitutionalism in the late 19th century.  This tends to reinforce the idea of the rule of law as proceeding from a higher state power and directed toward the management of the population and to maintain proper democratic order.  Still, the movement towards American style rule of law, Urabe suggests, continues to advance in Japan (Ibid., 72). Yet Urabe also illustrates the power of the distinct foundational schools of governance organization we began to study with the materials of Section II-A.  For societies grounded on notions of communal power and on the identity of communal authority and the apparatus of state, the idea of obedience is strong, the protections of process and legality are powerful and the focus of Rule of Law must necessarily be on the management of individualistic and anti-social elements.  The opposite is true for societies that embrace the premise of property and individual right, the idea of constraining the state is strong and the focus of rule of law is on process and substance, each crafted to provide rules limiting state power to affect individual autonomy while preserving enough power in the state to protect individual interests in life, liberty and property.   

    If Urabe seeks to contextualize and challenge the move toward a unitary and well-disciplined ideology of “Rule of Law”, the third reading, David Clark, “The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law” seeks to develop taxonomy of the concept. “The expression refers to a doctrine―some would say, an ideology―about how the governments should act, and has been used as a synonym for constitutional government and sometimes, though as we shall see these terms are not coeval, to mean democratic government. In intellectual discussions there are various versions of the term and this short essay will assay some of these meanings and then deal with the relationship between the doctrine and legal institutions and also the relationship between the doctrine and the idea of rule by law.” (Ibid). After a brief historical introduction focused on the development of what becomes the rule of law  notion in the West, and its eventual expression as constitutional practice in the United States and England, Clark considers the evolution of modern “Rule of Law” theories starting with the germinal work of Albert Venn Dicey on the rule of law in England.  He summarized Dicey’s views this way:

    -that no person is punishable except for a breach of law established in the ordinary manner before the ordinary courts of the land; this is in contrast to arbitrary power and excludes wide discretionary authority;

    -that no man is above the law; that every person, whatever be his rank and condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals, or equality before the law and this excludes exemptions of officials or others from a duty to obey the law which governs citizens;

    -that general principles of the constitution are the result of judicial decisions determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought before the courts. (Ibid)

    Later versions, Clark notes, “stressed the formal rather than the substantive aspects of the law, and eschewed all connections with human rights or a Bill of Rights, or in fact,with a democratic political order of the western type.”  These purely procedural models  might be reduced to notions that the term “in some states merely means that parties before a court are entitled to be treated in accordance with the rules in existence at the time the case is heard.” (Ibid).

    The problem with this view is that while it proved a way of distinguishing between arbitrary government, i.e., government where there are either no rules, or rules of a certain type, and the rule of law in the formal sense, this model was compatible with a range of political regimes including apartheid South Africa and even Nazi Germany, both of which had rules and laws. . . . Thus these conditions are a new substantive twist to the rule of law by saying something about the content of the rules themselves . . . . One argument for this approach is that unless there are such standards, governments will continue to treat their citizens, or some of their citizens, according to whim or even deliberate policies that entail abuses of human rights. This argument necessarily implies that national borders were permeable, and that governments did not have absolute sovereignty to do whatever they liked. (Ibid).

    As a consequence, especially inthe West, there has been a movement from rule of law from  a process and institutional legitimation function to one more deeply concerned with substantive political ideals, especially that of the democratic organization of the state.  These ideals, of course, Clark stresses, may be hard to implement consistently, even in democratic Western states. Thus, Clark notes, it is sometimes argued that rule of law serves as an ideological mask behind which social and economic hierarchies can continue to operate relatively unimpeded.

    Clark makes three points that reflect a general consensus in the West about at least the broadest outlines of rule of law:

    In practice, most rule of law systems recognise that large congeries of power are potentially dangerous and have sought to either divide power or at least balance off the various branches of government, and have also recognised that the executive in particular, ought to be accountable for what it does. . . . 

    In practice, the operation of a rule of law state assumes that public officials are aware of the legal limits on their power, and will for the most part accept these limits. The evidence shows that this is not always so . . . , though this is normally not so widespread or blatant as to undermine the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, but its corrosive effects on public sentiment towards the legal system ought not to be underestimated. . . .

    Another assumption is that legitimacy comes from obeying the law, and in democratic systems by having attained power by free and fair elections; and also that the state recognises a relatively autonomous civil society consisting of voluntary organisations, . . .  which the state does not directly control and in operations of which it does not interfere. (Ibid).

    These do not all always cut in the same direction; nor may be internally consistent. He ends with a consideration of a distinct approach to rule of law in East Asia. Taken together, though, one again, senses the importance of Rule of law as an organizing principle that is sometimes used as shorthand for the core premises on which institutional legitimacy is founded and a reaffirmation of the special role the core structural relationships among law, government, people and officials through which the political organs of state power are organized. In effect, then perhaps, Rule of Law is shorthand for the core principles of the organization of the law-state in its modern form. To the extent that this shorthand then serves to draw distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate forms of organizing and implementing state power through government and law systems, Rule of Law itself becomes an important ideological battleground. (e.g., Backer, Larry Catá, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Framework for Legitimate Public Power Systems.[30]Penn State Law Review, Vol. 113, No. 3, 2009).

    We end with a consideration of the application of Rule of Law principles in contemporary American constitutional law, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,[31]124 S Ct 2633 (2004), paying special attention to Parts I and III of the plurality opinion.  In Hamdi a divided Supreme Court held that “although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here. Due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision maker.” Most interesting here is the way in which the process aspects of rule of law are embedded and shaped by the context in which they arise and that notions of absolutes in rule of law remain absent from the legal discourse in the United States within its judicial architecture.  (Hamdi, slip op. 1). 

    The facts of the case are straightforward:

    This case arises out of the detention of a man whom the Government alleges took up arms with the Taliban during this conflict. His name is Yaser Esam Hamdi. Born an American citizen in Louisiana in 1980, Hamdi moved with his family to Saudi Arabia as a child. By 2001, the parties agree, he resided in Afghanistan. At some point that year, he was seized by members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed to the Taliban government, and eventually was turned over to the United States military. The Government asserts that it initially detained and interrogated Hamdi in Afghanistan before transferring him to the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay in January 2002. In April 2002, upon learning that Hamdi is an American citizen, authorities transferred him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where he remained until a recent transfer to a brig in Charleston, South Carolina. The Government contends that Hamdi is an enemy combatant, and that this status justifies holding him in the United States indefinitely without formal charges or proceedings unless and until it makes the determination that access to counsel or further process is warranted. (Ibid., slip op. 2-3).

    Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus[32]under 28 U.S.C. § 2241[33]  in the Eastern District of Virginia. He argued that the detention of his son violated the 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S.Constitution because he was being held indefinitely without charges or access to counsel. The government argued that indefinite detention was procedurally legitimate against enemy combatants during wartime. The district court ordered that counsel be given access to Hamdi.  On appeal, a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals panel reversed, finding that the district court had failed to extend appropriate deference to the security and intelligence interests of the Government in wartime. It remanded to the district court to conduct a “deferential inquiry into Hamdi’s status.” (Slip op. at 4).  If it determined that Mandi was an enemy combatant, the 4th Circuit opined, then the government’s detention would be deemed lawful.On remand and after consideration of the so-called Mobbs Declaration (a statement from a Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the 4th Circuit eventually affirmed a dismissal of the habeas corpus petition (Slip op. at 8).

    We will not spend time on the first issue considered by the Supreme Court.  That issue, whether the President has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as enemy combatants. (slip op. 8-17).  A majority of the Court determined that the Executive had such authority, though the reasons supporting that authority remain contested. Much of it relies on interpretation of prior case law and the principles that can be extracted (and applied) therefrom. For our purposes, it suffices to know that citizens maybe held as enemy combatants.  Justice Scalia’s vigorous dissent is worth reading as an insight to the ambiguities in judicial interpretation of prior cases, the process of extraction of principles therefrom and the application of those highly contextualized principles to the dispute before the court.

    For purposes of considering the application of process based Rule of Law principles within the American constitutional law framework, the discussion that follows is more relevant (slip op. Part III).

    Hamdi argues that he is owed a meaningful and timely hearing and that extra-judicial detention [that] begins and ends with the submission of an affidavit based on third-hand hearsay does not comport with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Brief for Petitioners 16. The Government counters that any more process than was provided below would be both unworkable and constitutionally intolerable. Brief for Respondents 46. (slip op. 17).

    The opinion starts from a set of general principles of process rights in the United States respecting writs of habeas corpus.  First, the writ remains available to every individual within the United States.  Its suspension requires Congressional action, which has only rarely been used.  And its core objective is to serve as a “critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” (slip op.18). Because the writ has not been suspended, Hamdi could property petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  (Ibid).


    The writ of habeas corpus embodies not merely the right to seek to challenge deprivations of individual liberty before a court but also “provide a skeletal outline of the procedures to be afforded a petitioner in federal habeas corpus review.” (Ibid).  This includes the right to deny the facts on which a deprivation was based and to take evidence by deposition, affidavit or interrogatories. (Ibid). Hamdi, then, would appear to have the right to present and rebut facts and courts retain a power to vary the ways in which this is accomplished.  The Government, however, argued that even if this is the case, that the presentation of the Mobbs Declaration completed the requirement of factual development.  In effect, the government affidavit, the government asserted, was all the process that Hamdi was due under both the habeas corpus statute and the due process provisions of the federal constitution.   The government advanced two reasons to support this position, the first easily rejected by the Supreme Court, the second requiring more complex analysis.


    The government first asserted that there was no factual issue subject to review.  The Court rejected this assertion for a number of reasons.  First, they were unconvinced that the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s seizure were undisputed, especially since Hamdi had not been permitted to dispute them.  Second, under the definition of enemy combatant adopted by the plurality, it is not clear that sufficient facts had been alleged to support the detention. “An assertion  that one resided in a country in which combat operations are taking place is not a concession that one was ‘captured in a zone of active combat operations in a foreign theater of war.’” (Ibid slip op, 19).

    The Government’s second argument merited more careful analysis.  The Government asserted the factual exploration was unwarranted because its interests in preserving the security of the United States in a  theater of war could not be overcome an individual’s habeas corpus rights. (Ibid., 20).

    At most, the Government argues, courts should review its determination that a citizen is an enemy combatant under a very deferential ‘some evidence’ standard. . . . Under this review, a court would assume the accuracy of the Government’s articulated basis for Hamdi’s detention, as set forth in the Mobbs Declaration, and assess only whether that articulated basis was a legitimate one. (Ibid., 20).

    Hamdi, on the other hand, argued that his liberty interest, that is his interest in avoiding arbitrary detention by the Executive, is sufficiently strong enough to justify recourse to “some proceeding before a neutral tribunal to determine whether the Executive’s asserted justifications for that detention have basis in fact and warrant in law.” (Ibid., 21). The Court agreed that both positions had merit. “And both emphasize the tension that often exists between the autonomy that the Government asserts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a particular goal and the process that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived of a constitutional right.” (Ibid).

    The Court, then, suggested that where strong interests conflicted , basic procedural rights could be protected and the conflict resolved only by balancing the interests of each and fashioning the structure of process that ensure the harmonization of those interests to the extent possible. The balancing standard is articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976). 

    Mathews dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest, ‘including the function involved’ and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process. 424 U. S., at 335. The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation’ of the private interest if the process were reduced and the ‘probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards.’

    The Court first weighed Hamdi’s liberty interest. (Ibid., slip op. 22-24).  This liberty interest is described as the elemental of liberty interests, that of being free from physical detention from one’s own government. If liberty is the norm in American society, detention without trial must be understood as a carefully limited exception.  (Ibid., 22). This liberty interest is not offset, according to the Court, by the “circumstances of war or the accusation of treasonous behavior” (Ibid., 23) especially where the Court must weigh the risk of erroneous deprivation. This risk of erroneous deprivation is heightened under a circumstance where there is no opportunity to rebut the government’s assertions.

    Moreover, as critical as the Government’s interest may be in detaining those who actually pose an immediate threat to the national security of the United States during ongoing international conflict, history and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat.(Ibid., 23).

    The nature of the accusation cannot affect the balancing.  And the Court reaffirmed “the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law, and we weigh the opposing governmental interests against the curtailment of liberty that such confinement entails.” (Ibid., 24).

    The Court then weighed the government’s interest. (Ibid., 24-25). The Court reaffirmed as well the weight of the government’s interest in protecting the security of the United States and its citizens in time of war. “Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of war making belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable for making them.” (Ibid., 24).

    But what balance?  The Court essentially sought to protect both Hamdi’s interest in liberty and the government’s interest in security.  First, the plurality held that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision maker.” (Ibid., 26). But the Plurality also was sensitive to the government’s interests.  Thus the “exigencies of the circumstances may demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.” (Ibid., 27). First, hearsay[34]could be accepted as the most reliable evidence.  Moreover, the tribunal may permit a presumption in favor of the government’s evidence as long as Hamdi is provided with a fair opportunity for rebuttal.  (Ibid).

    A burden-shifting scheme of this sort would meet the goal of ensuring that the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to prove military error while giving due regard to the Executive once it has put forth meaningful support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy combatant. (Ibid).

    Those deviations from the usual structure of judicial practice may thus preserve the government’s interests while ensuring, to the satisfaction of the plurality, that the core protections of due process for Hamdi―notice and an opportunity to be heard before neutral and detached judge at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.

    In sum, while the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator. (Ibid., 28-29).

    Though the details of the decision remain contested―note that the opinion was able to garner the support of less than a majority of the members of the Supreme Court―it remains a useful exposition of the basic ideas and arguments that frame the process elements of rule of law in the United States. At the apex of procedural rule of law in the United is the premise that no deprivation of life, liberty or property by the State or its agents can be undertaken without the protection of a minimal set of process protections.  That is, the interests of the state can never be sufficiently strong to obliterate completely the right of an individual to process protections before she is deprived of any interest in her liberty, life or property.  On the other hand, the individual is not entitled to the full range of process protections that could be made available by the state―a trial on the merits in a federal or state court subject to the rules of evidence and procedure developed therefor. That is the essence of Matthewsas applied in Hamdi; the state cannot deprive an individual of the opportunity for meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before it deprives the individual of interest in life, liberty or property.  However, the form and quality of the meaning opportunity for notice and hearing will depend on the circumstances, and the circumstances will be highly dependent on a judicial weighing of the relative interests of the state (public policy and objectives) and the individual (erroneous deprivations).

    Critical to that analysis are the premises that procedural rights, even constitutionally grounded procedural rights are not absolute.  The rights must be understood in context and may be applied differently depending on the weight of alternative rights against which it is deployed. Though Hamdi raises the question in the context of war, the same analysis applies in any number of other context―e.g., procedures required for student suspensions from public schools. The role of courts are central―they play a mediating role between the rights of the state and those of individuals.  That mediating role permits the development of contextual applications of procedural rights in ways that preserve the basic principles of process rule of law in a flexible way that tends to satisfy the parties sufficiently that systemic integrity is preserved. The government may be bound by its own law and must conform to legality, but that legality is constrained by principles of higher law that may be applied against the state.


    IV. Problem

                An introduction to Fundamental Rights as Constraints on State Power in the United States.  In Chapter 8 students were introduced to the problem of fundamental rights as an ordering principle of the U.S. legal system.  The debate around the necessity for a “Bill of Rights”—a specification of those areas  where state action was prohibited or constrained, was explored form the perspective f what it suggested about the relationship between law and the state.  It was meant to suggest the ways in which law is treated both as autonomous of the state—and in some respects beyond the power of the state to interfere with such law—and as linked to the government of the state as the representative of the people as sovereign with ultimate authority  to establish the rules by which society is governed. In this chapter 9 and 10, we considered the substantive effect of the premises that followed from the determination that law in the United States was in part a reflection of values that could not be interfered with by the state and in part a reflection of the popular will manifested through government legislation.   Those consequences produced both a systemic approach to legal coherence grounded in hierarchy and established the importance of popular sovereignty at the nation’s frontiers.   

                In this chapter we considered the underlying principle that holds all of these premises together—the concept of the rule of law.  We noted that rule of law can embrace a significant political and ideological agenda.  But in the United States, and for its effect on the legal system, rule of law tends to focus on a more precisely defined area—the protection of individuals in their rights against arbitrary discrimination against individuals or arbitrary interference with an individual without legally sufficient purpose.   Both of those sets of rights against state interference with individual actions, activities, relationships, etc., arise through(not necessarily from) two provisions of the U.S. Constitution. 

    Amendment V
    No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

    Amendment XIV
    Section 1.
    All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

    Generally the protection against state interference with rights is grounded in principles of equal protection when the purported interference denies a right to some but not others on the basis on some set of categorical distinctions.  Where the state interference affects everyone, then the courts tend to apply an analysis grounded in due process.

                Let’s consider the use of due process as a constraint on state power.   First, “[i] n their procedural aspect, the Due Process Clauses are understood first of all to require that when the courts or the executive act to deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property, they do so in accordance with established law. Judges and executive officers may not simply make up some method of proceeding and sentence someone to prison on that basis. This requirement that deprivation follow the rule of law is so fundamental that it is often forgotten, but there is good reason to believe that some version of it is the historical root meaning of due process.[35] The Fifth and
    Fourteenth Amendment provision speaks positively about the power of the state to deprive any person of life, liberty or property, once the requisite minimum formalities have been observed. It might be possible to argue that the provision permits variance in the minimum process necessary, depending on the importance of the deprivation; and we have built a huge jurisprudence on this notion. It requires resort to extra-constitutional principles of limitations of state power to derive from the Due Process Clause a notion that certain classes of deprivation may never (or hardly ever) be effected by the state irrespective of the amount of procedural due process provided.[36]

    Generally, the doctrines that constitute substantive due process is grounded in a four part standard.  First, a fundamental right must be identified (either within the Constitution, or form natural law or the traditions and customs of the people).  Second there must be a determination of infringement and that the infringement is more than immaterial.  Third, there is an assessment of the state’s justification for the infringement or interference with the fundamental right, and lastly there is balancing of the state’s interests in interference with the individual’s interest in here rights that included an assessment of proportionality—the relationship of the means used to the objectives of the interference.

                For interference with fundamental rights, the courts have adopted a strict scrutiny test, one that is generally quite difficult for a state to overcome. Under this standard the interference will be permitted if the court determines that it is justified by a compelling interest narrowly tailored to meet the objective giving rise to that interest. For all other interference with rights, the courts apply less stringent standards of review—either rational basis, or a heightened form of rational basis standard.  Under this standard the court will permit the interference if it can discern a rational basis for the interference (whether to not that basis was the basis for the interference).

                This framework reflects the embrace of dual conceptions of the relationship between law and government that is the basis of the U.S. legal system. Fundamental rights exist autonomously of the state, indeed they are understood as existing prior in time and beyond the organizing rationale of the state.  At the same time those fundamental rights may be given effect as a matter of lawonly if they can be understood as inherent in the constitutional framework itself—its text and structural objectives.  The tension illustrated here is evidenced by the political split among the U.S. population. On one side are those who, favoring an state based approach, support the position that only rights identified in the constitution can be understood as fundamental.  On the other side are those who, favoring an autonomy of law approach, support the position that such fundamental rights might be discerned in the customs and traditions of the people, the intent of the constitution’s framers, or natural law. In either case, both positions rest fundamentally on the principle that the state is organized to protect against the arbitrary use of power or the use of law and the state to impose tyranny on society or any of its parts.

    Problem: For the case that follows, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), describe the ways in which the majority opinion and concurrence differ with respect to the determination of  (1) the sources and existence of a fundamental right, (2) the interference with that right, (3) the state’s justification for interference, and (4) the extent that the interference was proportionate to the objective.  Consider as well how this exercise is related to the “thick” or “thin” notions of rule of law discussed earlier in the chapter. Note as well Justice Souter’s reference to the importance of common law methodology as an important element of the construction of fundamental rights.  Does the majority agree?

    Washington v. Glucksberg
    521 U.S. 702 (1997)
    (footnotes omitted or renumbered)

    CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.

    The question presented in this case is whether Washington's prohibition against "caus[ing]" or "aid[ing]" a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that it does not.

    * * *

    I

    We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. See, e. g., Casey, supra, at 849-850; Cruzan, supra, at 269-279; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting importance of "careful 'respect for the teachings of history'"). In almost every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide.8 The States' assisted-suicide bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life. Cruzan, supra, at 280 ("[T]he States-indeed, all civilized nations-demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide"); see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U. S. 361, 373 (1989) ("[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is ... the pattern of enacted laws"). Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide-and, therefore, of assisting suicide-are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages. See generally Marzen 17-56; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context 77-82 (May 1994) (hereinafter New York Task Force).

    More specifically, for over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 294-295 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In the 13th century, Henry de Bracton, one of the first legal-treatise writers, observed that "[j]ust as a man may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by slaying himself." 2 Bracton on Laws and Customs of England 423 (f. 150) (G. Woodbine ed., S. Thorne transl., 1968). * * *  Thus, "[t]he principle that suicide of a sane person, for whatever reason, was a punishable felony was ... introduced into English common law."[37]Centuries later, Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England not only provided a definitive summary of the common law but was also a primary legal authority for 18th- and 19th-century American lawyers, referred to suicide as "self-murder" and "the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure .... " 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 189. Blackstone emphasized that "the law has ... ranked [suicide] among the highest crimes," ibid., although, anticipating later developments, he conceded that the harsh and shameful punishments imposed for suicide "borde[r] a little upon severity." Id., at 190.

    For the most part, the early American Colonies adopted the common-law approach. For example, the legislators of the Providence Plantations, which would later become Rhode Island, declared, in 1647, that "[s]elf-murder is by all agreed to be the most unnatural, and it is by this present Assembly declared, to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself out of a premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor: ... his goods and chattels are the king's custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be an infant, a lunatic, mad or distracted man, he forfeits nothing." The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1647-1719, p. 19 (J. Cushing ed. 1977). Virginia also required ignominious burial for suicides, and their estates were forfeit to the Crown. A. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 108, and n. 93, 198, and n. 15 (1930).

    Over time, however, the American Colonies abolished these harsh common-law penalties. William Penn abandoned the criminal-forfeiture sanction in Pennsylvania in 1701, and the other Colonies (and later, the other States) eventually followed this example. Cruzan, supra, at 294 (SCALIA, J., concurring). Zephaniah Swift, who would later become Chief Justice of Connecticut, wrote in 1796:

        "There can be no act more contemptible, than to attempt to punish an offender for a crime, by exercising a mean act of revenge upon lifeless clay, that is insensible of the punishment. There can be no greater cruelty, than the inflicting [of] a punishment, as the forfeiture of goods, which must fall solely on the innocent offspring of the offender .... [Suicide] is so abhorrent to the feelings of mankind, and that strong love of life which is implanted in the human heart, that it cannot be so frequently committed, as to become dangerous to society. There can of course be no necessity of any punishment." 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 304 (1796).

    This statement makes it clear, however, that the movement away from the common law's harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance of suicide; rather, as Chief Justice Swift observed, this change reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish the suicide's family for his wrongdoing. Cruzan, supra, at 294 (SCALIA, J., concurring). Nonetheless, although States moved away from Blackstone's treatment of suicide, courts continued to condemn it as a grave public wrong. * * *

    That suicide remained a grievous, though nonfelonious, wrong is confirmed by the fact that colonial and early state legislatures and courts did not retreat from prohibiting assisting suicide. Swift, in his early 19th-century treatise on the laws of Connecticut, stated that "[i]f one counsels another to commit suicide, and the other by reason of the advice kills himself, the advisor is guilty of murder as principal." 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 270 (1823). * * *

    The earliest American statute explicitly to outlaw assisting suicide was enacted in New York in 1828, Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 20, § 4, 1828 N. Y. Laws 19 (codified at 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, Tit. 2, Art. 1, § 7, p. 661 (1829)), and many of the new States and Territories followed New York's example. * * *

    Though deeply rooted, the States' assisted-suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed. Because of advances in medicine and technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to die in institutions, from chronic illnesses. President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment 16-18 (1983). * * * At the same time, however, voters and legislators continue for the most part to reaffirm their States' prohibitions on assisting suicide.

    * * *

    California voters rejected an assisted-suicide initiative similar to Washington's in 1993. On the other hand, in 1994, voters in Oregon enacted, also through ballot initiative, that State's "Death With Dignity Act," which legalized physician-assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill adults.14 Since the Oregon vote, many proposals to legalize assisted-suicide have been and continue to be introduced in the States' legislatures, but none has been enacted. And just last year, Iowa and Rhode Island joined the overwhelming majority of States explicitly prohibiting assisted suicide. * * * Also, on April 30, 1997, President Clinton signed the Federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction Act of 1997, which prohibits the use of federal funds in support of physician-assisted suicide. Pub. L. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U. S. C. § 14401 et seq.).[38] * * *


    Thus, the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful examinations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues. For example, New York State's Task Force on Life and the Law-an ongoing, blue-ribbon commission composed of doctors, ethicists, lawyers, religious leaders, and interested laymen-was convened in 1984 and commissioned with "a broad mandate to recommend public policy on issues raised by medical advances." New York Task Force vii. Over the past decade, the Task Force has recommended laws relating to end-of-life decisions, surrogate pregnancy, and organ donation. Id., at 118-119. After studying physician-assisted suicide, however, the Task Force unanimously concluded that "[l]egalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia would pose profound risks to many individuals who are ill and vulnerable .... [T]he potential dangers of this dramatic change in public policy would outweigh any benefit that might be achieved." Id., at 120.

    Attitudes toward suicide itself have changed since Bracton, but our laws have consistently condemned, and continue to prohibit, assisting suicide. Despite changes in medical technology and notwithstanding an increased emphasis on the importance of end-of-life decisionmaking, we have not retreated from this prohibition. Against this backdrop of history, tradition, and practice, we now turn to respondents' constitutional claim.

    II

    The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the "liberty" it protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992) (Due Process Clause "protects individual liberty against 'certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them''') (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986)). The Clause also provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 301-302 (1993); Casey, 505 U. S., at 851. In a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the "liberty" specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925); to marital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965); to use contraception, ibid.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438 (1972); to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952), and to abortion, Casey, supra. We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 278-279.

    But we "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." Collins, 503 U. S., at 125. By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field," ibid., lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court, Moore, 431 U. S., at 502 (plurality opinion).

    Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," id., at 503 (plurality opinion); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934) ("so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"), and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 326 (1937). Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Flores, supra, at 302; Collins, supra, at 125; Cruzan, supra, at 277-278. Our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible decisionmaking," Collins, supra, at 125, that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe ... 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." 507 U. S., at 302.

    JUSTICE SOUTER, relying on Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961), would largely abandon this restrained methodology, and instead ask "whether [Washington's] statute sets up one of those 'arbitrary impositions' or 'purposeless restraints' at odds with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," post, at 752 (quoting Poe, supra, at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).

    In our view, however, the development of this Court's substantive-due-process jurisprudence, described briefly supra, at 719-720, has been a process whereby the outlines of the "liberty" specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment-never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully clarified-have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition. This approach tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial review. In addition, by establishing a threshold requirement-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need for complex balancing of competing interests in every case.

    * * *

    We now inquire whether this asserted right has any place in our Nation's traditions. Here, as discussed supra, at 710-719, we are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today, even for terminally ill, mentally competent adults. To hold for respondents, we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every State. See Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U. S. 22, 31 (1922) ("If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it"); Flores, 507 U. S., at 303 ("The mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that 'substantive due process' sustains it").

    Respondents contend, however, that the liberty interest they assert is consistent with this Court's substantive-due-process line of cases, if not with this Nation's history and practice. Pointing to Casey and Cruzan, respondents read our jurisprudence in this area as reflecting a general tradition of "self-sovereignty," Brief for Respondents 12, and as teaching that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes "basic and intimate exercises of personal autonomy," id., at 10; see Casey, 505 U. S., at 847 * * *

    In Cruzan, we considered whether Nancy Beth Cruzan, who had been severely injured in an automobile accident and was in a persistive vegetative state, "ha[d] a right under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment" at her parents' request. 497 U. S., at 269. We began with the observation that "[a]t common law, even the touching of one person by another without consent and without legal justification was a battery." Ibid. We then discussed the related rule that "informed consent is generally required for medical treatment." Ibid. After reviewing a long line of relevant state cases, we concluded that "the common-law doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment." Id., at 277. Next, we reviewed our own cases on the subject, and stated that "[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." Id., at 278. Therefore, "for purposes of [that] case, we assume[d] that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id., at 279; see id., at 287 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). We concluded that, notwithstanding this right, the Constitution permitted Missouri to require clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Id., at 280-281.

    Respondents contend that in Cruzan we "acknowledged that competent, dying persons have the right to direct the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment and thus hasten death," Brief for Respondents 23, and that "the constitutional principle behind recognizing the patient's liberty to direct the withdrawal of artificial life support applies at least as strongly to the choice to hasten impending death by consuming lethal medication," id., at 26. Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that "Cruzan, by recognizing a liberty interest that includes the refusal of artificial provision of life-sustaining food and water, necessarily recognize[d] a liberty interest in hastening one's own death." 79 F. 3d, at 816.

    The right assumed in Cruzan, however, was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy. Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation's history and constitutional traditions. The decision to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection. Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct. See Quill v. Vacco, post, at 800-808. In Cruzan itself, we recognized that most States outlawed assisted suicide-and even more do today-and we certainly gave no intimation that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be some-how transmuted into a right to assistance in committing suicide. 497 U. S., at 280.

    Respondents also rely on Casey. There, the Court's opinion concluded that "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade[, 410 U. S. 113 (1973),] should be retained and once again reaffirmed." 505 U. S., at 846. We held, first, that a woman has a right, before her fetus is viable, to an abortion "without undue interference from the State"; second, that States may restrict post-viability abortions, so long as exceptions are made to protect a woman's life and health; and third, that the State has legitimate interests throughout a pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the unborn child. Ibid. In reaching this conclusion, the opinion discussed in some detail this Court's substantive-due-process tradition of interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect certain fundamental rights and "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," and noted that many of those rights and liberties "involv[e] the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime." Id., at 851.

    * * *

    The history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted "right" to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The Constitution also requires, however, that Washington's assistedsuicide ban be rationally related to legitimate government interests. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319-320 (1993); Flores, 507 U. S., at 305. This requirement is unquestionably met here. As the court below recognized, 79 F. 3d, at 816-817,[39]Washington's assisted-suicide ban implicates a number of state interests * * *.

    First, Washington has an "unqualified interest in the preservation of human life." Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 282. The State's prohibition on assisted suicide, like all homicide laws, both reflects and advances its commitment to this interest. See id., at 280; Model Penal Code § 210.5, Comment 5, at 100 ("[T]he interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another"). This interest is symbolic and aspirational as well as practical:

        "While suicide is no longer prohibited or penalized, the ban against assisted suicide and euthanasia shores up the notion of limits in human relationships. It reflects the gravity with which we view the decision to take one's own life or the life of another, and our reluctance to encourage or promote these decisions." New York Task Force 131-132.

    * * *

    The State also has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession. In contrast to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that "the integrity of the medical profession would [not] be threatened in any way by [physician-assisted suicide]," 79 F. 3d, at 827, the American Medical Association, like many other medical and physicians' groups, has concluded that "[p]hysician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer." American Medical Association, Code of Ethics § 2.211 (1994); see Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA 2229,2233 (1992) * * *

    Next, the State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and mistakes. The Court of Appeals dismissed the State's concern that disadvantaged persons might be pressured into physician-assisted suicide as "ludicrous on its face." 79 F. 3d, at 825. We have recognized, however, the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 281. * * *

    The State's interest here goes beyond protecting the vulnerable from coercion; it extends to protecting disabled and terminally ill people from prejudice, negative and inaccurate stereotypes, and "societal indifference." 49 F. 3d, at 592. The State's assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the lives of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued than the lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously disabled person's suicidal impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as anyone else's. See New York Task Force 101-102; Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, supra, at 9, 20 (discussing prejudice toward the disabled and the negative messages euthanasia and assisted suicide send to handicapped patients).

    Finally, the State may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia. * * *  If suicide is protected as a matter of constitutional right, it is argued, "every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it." Compassion in Dying, 49 F. 3d, at 591; see Kevorkian, 447 Mich., at 470, n. 41, 527 N. W. 2d, at 727-728, n. 41. The Court of Appeals' decision, and its expansive reasoning, provide ample support for the State's concerns. The court noted, for example, that the "decision of a duly appointed surrogate decision maker is for all legal purposes the decision of the patient himself," 79 F. 3d, at 832, n. 120; that "in some instances, the patient may be unable to self-administer the drugs and ... administration by the physician ... may be the only way the patient may be able to receive them," id., at 831; and that not only physicians, but also family members and loved ones, will inevitably participate in assisting suicide, id., at 838, n. 140. Thus, it turns out that what is couched as a limited right to "physician-assisted suicide" is likely, in effect, a much broader license, which could prove extremely difficult to police and contain. Washington's ban on assisting suicide prevents such erosion.

    This concern is further supported by evidence about the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The Dutch government's own study revealed that in 1990, there were 2,300 cases of voluntary euthanasia (defined as "the deliberate termination of another's life at his request"), 400 cases of assisted suicide, and more than 1,000 cases of euthanasia without an explicit request. In addition to these latter 1,000 cases, the study found an additional 4,941 cases where physicians administered lethal morphine overdoses without the patients' explicit consent. Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, supra, 12-13 (citing Dutch study). * * *

    We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various interests. They are unquestionably important and legitimate, and Washington's ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion and protection. We therefore hold that Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.060(1) (1994) does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or "as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors." 79 F. 3d, at 838.

    ***

    Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society. The decision of the en banc Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

    It is so ordered.

    SOUTER, J., concurring in the Judgment:

    * * *
    My understanding of unenumerated rights in the wake of the Poe dissent and subsequent cases avoids the absolutist failing of many older cases without embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with past practice described at a very specific level. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S., at 847-849, 112 S.Ct., at 2804-2806. That understanding begins with a concept of “ordered liberty,” Poe, 367 U.S., at 549, 81 S.Ct., at 1780 (Harlan, J.); see also Griswold, 381 U.S., at 500, 85 S.Ct., at 1690, comprising a continuum of rights to be free from “arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,” Poe, 367 U.S., at 543, 81 S.Ct., at 1777 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

    “Due Process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could *766 serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.” Id., at 542, 81 S.Ct., at 1776.

    * * *

    After the Poe dissent, as before it, this enforceable concept of liberty would bar statutory impositions even at relatively trivial levels when governmental restraints are undeniably irrational as unsupported by any imaginable rationale. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938) (economic legislation “not ... unconstitutional unless ... facts ... preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis”); see also Poe, supra, at 545, 548, 81 S.Ct., at 1778, 1779-1780 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (referring to usual “presumption of constitutionality” and ordinary test “going merely to the plausibility of [a statute's] underlying rationale”). Such instances are suitably rare. The claims of arbitrariness that mark almost all instances of unenumerated substantive rights are those resting on “certain interests requir [ing] particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment[,] [c]f. Skinner v. Oklahoma [ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942) ]; * * *. In the face of an interest this powerful a State may not rest on threshold rationality or a presumption of constitutionality, but may prevail only on the ground of an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the realm of the reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right asserted. Poe, supra, at 548, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780 (Harlan, J., dissenting) * * *

    This approach calls for a court to assess the relative “weights” or dignities of the contending interests, and to this extent the judicial method is familiar to the common law. Common-law method is subject, however, to two important constraints in the hands of a court engaged in substantive due process review. First, such a court is bound to confine the values that it recognizes to those truly deserving constitutional stature, either to those expressed in constitutional text, or those exemplified by “the traditions from which [the Nation] developed,” or revealed by contrast with “the traditions from which it broke.” Poe, 367 U.S., at 542, 81 S.Ct., at 1776 (Harlan, J., dissenting). “ ‘We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and disregard the limits ... derived from considerations that are fused in the whole nature of our judicial process ... [,] considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession.’ ” Id., at 544-545, 81 S.Ct., at 1778 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-171, 72 S.Ct. 205, 208-209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)); * * *

    The second constraint, again, simply reflects the fact that constitutional review, not judicial lawmaking, is a court's business here. The weighing or valuing of contending interests in this sphere is only the first step, forming the basis for determining whether the statute in question falls inside or outside the zone of what is reasonable in the way it resolves the conflict between the interests of state and individual. See, e.g., Poe, supra, at 553, 81 S.Ct., at 1782 (Harlan, J., dissenting); * * * It is no justification for judicial intervention merely to identify a reasonable resolution of contending values that differs from the terms of the legislation under review. It is only when the legislation's justifying principle, critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must give way. Only if this standard points against the statute can the individual claimant be said to have a constitutional right. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S., at 279, 110 S.Ct., at 2851-2852 * * *

    The Poe dissent thus reminds us of the nature of review for reasonableness or arbitrariness and the limitations entailed by it. But the opinion cautions against the repetition of past error in another way as well, more by its example than by any particular statement of constitutional method: it reminds us that the process of substantive review by reasoned judgment, Poe, 367 U.S., at 542-544, 81 S.Ct., at 1776-1778, is one of close criticism going to the details of the opposing interests and to their relationships with the historically recognized principles that lend them weight or value.

    Although the Poe dissent disclaims the possibility of any general formula for due process analysis (beyond the basic analytic structure just described), see id., at 542, 544, 81 S.Ct., at 1776, 1777-1778, Justice Harlan of course assumed that adjudication under the Due Process Clauses is like any other instance of judgment dependent on common-law method, being more or less persuasive according to the usual canons of critical discourse. See also Casey, 505 U.S., at 849, 112 S.Ct., at 2805-2806 (“The inescapable fact is that adjudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts always have exercised: reasoned judgment”). When identifying and assessing the competing interests of liberty and authority, for example, the breadth of expression that a litigant or a judge selects in stating the competing principles will have much to do with the outcome and may be dispositive. As in any process of rational argumentation, we recognize that when a generally accepted principle is challenged, the broader the attack the less likely it is to succeed. The principle's defenders will, indeed, often try to characterize any challenge as just such a broadside, perhaps by couching the defense as if a broadside attack had occurred. So the Court in Dred Scott treated prohibition of slavery in the Territories as nothing less than a general assault on the concept of property. See 19 How., at 449-452.

    Just as results in substantive due process cases are tied to the selections of statements of the competing interests, the acceptability of the results is a function of the good reasons for the selections made. It is here that the value of common-law method becomes apparent, for the usual thinking of the common law is suspicious of the all-or-nothing analysis that tends to produce legal petrification instead of an evolving boundary between the domains of old principles. Common-law method tends to pay respect instead to detail, seeking to understand old principles afresh by new examples and new counterexamples. The “tradition is a living thing,” Poe, 367 U.S., at 542, 81 S.Ct., at 1776 (Harlan, J., dissenting), albeit one that moves by moderate steps carefully taken. “The decision of an apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take its place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to come.” Id., at 544, 81 S.Ct., at 1777 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). Exact analysis and characterization of any due process claim are critical to the method and to the result.

    So, in Poe, Justice Harlan viewed it as essential to the plaintiffs' claimed right to use contraceptives that they sought to do so within the privacy of the marital bedroom. This detail in fact served two crucial and complementary functions, and provides a lesson for today. It rescued the individuals' claim from a breadth that would have threatened all state regulation of contraception or intimate relations; extramarital intimacy, no matter how privately practiced, was outside the scope of the right Justice Harlan would have recognized in that case. See id., at 552-553, 81 S.Ct., at 1781-1782. It was, moreover, this same restriction that allowed the interest to be valued as an aspect of a broader liberty to be free from all unreasonable intrusions into the privacy of the home and the family life within it, a liberty exemplified in constitutional provisions such as the Third and Fourth Amendments, in prior decisions of the Court involving unreasonable **2285 intrusions into the home and family life, and in the then-prevailing status of marriage as the sole lawful locus of intimate relations. Id., at 548, 551, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780, 1781.11 The individuals' interest was therefore at its peak in Poe, because it was supported by a principle that distinguished of its own force between areas in which government traditionally had regulated (sexual relations outside of marriage) and those in which it had not (private marital intimacies), and thus was broad enough to cover the claim at hand without being so broad as to be shot-through by exceptions.

    On the other side of the balance, the State's interest in Poe was not fairly characterized simply as preserving sexual morality, or doing so by regulating contraceptive devices. Just as some of the earlier cases went astray by speaking without nuance of individual interests in property or autonomy to contract for labor, so the State's asserted interest in Poe was not immune to distinctions turning (at least potentially) on the precise purpose being pursued and the collateral consequences of the means chosen, see id., at 547-548, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780. It was assumed that the State might legitimately enforce limits on the use of contraceptives through laws regulating divorce and annulment, or even through its tax policy, ibid., but not necessarily be justified in criminalizing the same practice in the marital bedroom, which would entail the consequence of authorizing state enquiry into the intimate relations of a married couple who chose to close their door, id., at 548-549, 81 S.Ct., at 1779-1780. See also Casey, 505 U.S., at 869, 112 S.Ct., at 2816 (strength of State's interest in potential life varies depending on precise context and character of regulation pursuing that interest).

    The same insistence on exactitude lies behind questions, in current terminology, about the proper level of generality at which to analyze claims and counterclaims, and the demand for fitness and proper tailoring of a restrictive statute is just another way of testing the legitimacy of the generality at which the government sets up its justification.12 We may therefore classify Justice Harlan's example of proper analysis in any of these ways: as applying concepts of normal critical reasoning, as pointing to the need to attend to the levels of generality at which countervailing interests are stated, or as examining the concrete application of principles for fitness with their own ostensible justifications. But whatever the categories in which we place the dissent's example, it stands in marked contrast to earlier cases whose reasoning was marked by comparatively less discrimination, and it points to the importance of evaluating the claims of the parties now before us with comparable detail. For here we are faced with an individual claim not to a right on the part of just anyone to help anyone else commit suicide under any circumstances, but to the right of a narrow class to help others also in a narrow class under a set of limited circumstances. And the claimants are met with the State's assertion, among others, that rights of such narrow scope cannot be recognized without jeopardy to individuals whom the State may concededly protect through its regulations.

    * * *

    In my judgment, the importance of the individual interest here, as within that class of “certain interests” demanding careful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim, see Poe, supra, at 543, 81 S.Ct., at 1776-1777, cannot be gainsaid. Whether that interest might in some circumstances, or at some time, be seen as “fundamental” to the degree entitled to prevail is not, however, a conclusion that I need draw here, for I am satisfied that the State's interests described in the following section are sufficiently serious to defeat the present claim that its law is arbitrary or purposeless.

    * * *




    [1]http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3
    [2]http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4023&context=lcp
    [3]http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/03-6696P.ZO
    [4] http://theredtelephone.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/due-process-and-rule-of-law-as-a-human-right.pdf
    [10]See United Nations Secretary General, Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law: Report of the Secretary-General A/61/636-S/2006/980 (14 Dec. 2006).  Available http://unrol.org/files/2006%20Report.pdf.
    [12]See American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiatrive, Our Origins and Principles.  Available http://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/rule_of_law/about/origin_principles.html.
    [13]Ibid.
    [14]Paul Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Rule fo Law, 59(4) Michigan Law Review  531 (1961).
    [15][15]Here the basis asserted for detention by the military is that Hamdi was carrying a weapon against American troops on a foreign battlefield; that is, that he was an enemy combatant. The legal category of enemy combatant has not been elaborated upon in great detail. The permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are presented to them.
    [16]Because we hold that Hamdi is constitutionally entitled to the process described above, we need not address at this time whether any treaty guarantees him similar access to a tribunal for a determination of his status.
    [17]http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/04/president-bushs-second-inaugural.html
    [18](“The Rule of Law, The Chinese Communist Party, and Ideological Campaigns: Sange Daibiao (the “Three Represents”), Socialist Rule of Law, and Modern Chinese Constitutionalism,”  16(1) Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 29-102 (2006), pp. 34-36)
    [19]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=410242
    [20]http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Asian_Renaissance.html?id=-p9lPwAACAAJ
    [21]http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Law_of_the_Constitution.html?id=_20NOnZgpNMC
    [22]http://books.google.com/books/about/Justice_as_Fairness.html?id=AjrXZIlbK1cC
    [23]http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf
    [24]http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3
    [25]http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=UNcharter.pdf
    [26]http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=Universal%20Declaration%20of%20Human%20Rights.pdf
    [27]http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=2004%20report.pdf
    [28]http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=3dda1f104.pdf
    [29]http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4023&context=lcp
    [30]http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1272264
    [31]http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/03-6696P.ZO
    [32]http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/habeas_corpus
    [33]http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2241
    [34] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hearsay
    [35]John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 Virginia. Law Review 493, 496 (1997).
    [36]Larry Catá Backer, Fairness as a General Principle of American Constitutional Law: Applying Extra-Constitutional Principles to Constitutional Cases in Hendricks and M.L.B., 33 Tulsa Law Journal 135, 149-150 (1997). 
    [37] [Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone, & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. 1, 148-242 (1985) (App.)] at 59.
    [38]Other countries are embroiled in similar debates: The Supreme Court of Canada recently rejected a claim that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms establishes a fundamental right to assisted suicide, Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 107 D. L. R. (4th) 342 (1993); the British House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics refused to recommend any change in Great Britain's assisted-suicide prohibition, House of Lords, Session 1993-94 Report of the Select Committee on Medical Ethics, 12 Issues in Law & Med. 193, 202 (1996) ("We identify no circumstances in which assisted suicide should be permitted") * * *.
    [39]The court identified and discussed six state interests: (1) preserving life; (2) preventing suicide; (3) avoiding the involvement of third parties and use of arbitrary, unfair, or undue influence; (4) protecting family members and loved ones; (5) protecting the integrity of the medical profession; and (6) avoiding future movement toward euthanasia and other abuses. 79 F. 3d, at 816-832.
     

    Chapter 12 ( The General Government; Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances): From "Elements of Law" to "Introduction to the Law and Legal System of the United States"--Building an Introductory Course to the Legal Curriculum for the 21st Century

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    (Pix (c) Larry Catá Backer 2014)


    Since 2010, I have been posting on the development of a new course I have been developing for our first year law school students, "Elements of Law." The course originally had a quite modest objective--to introduce law students to legal research and reasoning through case law, statutory interpretation, and legal history, processes, and institutions. I chose to broaden its objectives within these specific parameters and development a framing and concepts course that would provide a deep foundation to law students on the legal system they were undertaking to study.
    --Elements of Law 3.0: On the Relevance of a First Year Law Course Designed to Frame the Law School Curriculum).
    --Developing a New Course--"Elements of Law"
    --"Elements of Law" Course 2.0: A Framework Course for the U.S. Law Curriculum,  
    Grounded in the principles of the sociology of law, the course has morphed into an effort to introduce students to law as a self-referencing system with its own particular structures, premises, constraints and language, with its own logic and taboos and its own means of understanding the world. That systemicity (cf. Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Chichester : John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 1999) is then a critical element in the way in which the legal system (in this case of the United States) interacts with the world, both as a legal and as a socio-economic-political actor. The course has also expanded from its original narrow and technical focus, to a broader focus on principles and the use of language and logic to build and operate a system of law. That broadening has made it possible to offer the course not just to first year law students, but also to graduate students in the social sciences and in international affairs, as a grounding in the legal systems that are important in their respective fields.

    This and the posts that follow produces some of the materials I will be presenting to the class. I offer these materials in hopes that they may prove of use and that you might share comments, perspectives and suggestions as I develop those materials on this site. Thanks.

    This post includes a draft of the first chapter of Part III (Institutional Architecture of Law and Governance: The United States and Law Making) -- Chapter 12 (The General Government; Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances). 

    Chapter 12
     The General Government; Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances


    I. Introduction.

                We have examined the nature of the principal object of the study of the legal system of the United States, its forms of law and their systematization. Part I of the materials focused on the identification and characteristics of the principles forms that law takes in the United States—common law, equity, statutes and administrative regulations, along with the legal effects of private governance and administrative reporting techniques. Part II considered the forms in which these legal sub-systems are systemized. We considered the theories under which government is organized and their application to the United States, the development of a hierarchy of law, its relation to the law developed in international for a, and then considered the issue of legal integrity through the notion of “rule of law” as a political and juridical concept.

                In this Part III, we turn to a consideration of those institutions the United States has created to wield law.  We will briefly review the basics of the organization of the American state.  We engage in this review not for purposes of a civics lesson but to acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the places where law originates and the ways in which societies can divide the power to make, apply and enforce law. We start with the General Government, considering the division of its power into three “bundles”—(a) Executive; (b) Legislative; (c) Judicial.  We then consider the way in which these power divisions are policed by introducing the concepts of separation of powers and checks and balances.  We start in this chapter with an introduction ot the extent and limits of executive power, and the way in which law is used to constrain its exercise.

    II. Chapter Readings
                                                                                                   
    ·      Division of Power: (a) Executive; (b) Legislative; (c) Judicial --U.S. Constitution,[1]Arts. I-III
    ·      Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
    ·      Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer[2](The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
    ·      United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937)

    __________

    U.S. Constitution, Arts. I, II, III

    Notes and Questions.

    1.  Compare the provisions of Articles I-III with the list of grievances interposed in the Declaration of Independence considered in Part II of these materials.  To what extent is there overlap between the limitations on the federal government and the provisions of the constitution?

    2.   Might one consider some of these provisions to suggests that the constitution might embrace an anti-tyranny principle, that is a principle that power ought not to be wielded either without a source in law or without a check? These provisions together might be grouped as the “checks and balances” approach to power division in the Constitution. To what extent do the provisions suggest a principle of efficient government, that is that government ought to be able to function to achieve its objectives? These provisions together might be grouped together as the separation of powers approach to power division. Which is the stronger principle?



    __________

    YOUNGSTOWN SHEET & TUBE CO. ET AL. v. SAWYER
    No. 744
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    343 U.S. 579; 72 S. Ct. 863; 96 L. Ed. 1153
    May 12-13, 1952, Argued 
    June 2, 1952, Decided
    [Available at: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/343/579]
    MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
    We are asked to decide whether the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills. The mill owners argue that the President’s order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President.  The Government’s position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.  The issue emerges here from the following series of events:
    In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between the steel companies and their employees over terms and conditions that should be included in new collective bargaining agreements.  Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute.  On December 18, 1951, the employees’ representative, United Steelworkers of America, C. I. O., gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing bargaining agreements expired on December 31.  The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service then intervened in an effort to get labor and management to agree.  This failing, the President on December 22, 1951, referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization  Board[3] to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. This Board’s report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the Union gave notice of a nation-wide strike called to begin at 12:01 a. m. April 9.  The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense and that governmental seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the continued availability of steel. Reciting these considerations for his action, the President, a few hours before the strike was to begin, issued Executive Order 10340, a copy of which is attached as an appendix, post, p. 589.  The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running.  The Secretary immediately issued his own possessory orders, calling upon the presidents of the various seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States.  They were directed to carry on their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the Secretary.  The next morning the President sent a message to Congress reporting his action.  Cong. Rec., April 9, 1952, p. 3962.  Twelve days later he sent a second message.  Cong. Rec., April 21, 1952, p. 4192.  Congress has taken no action.
    Obeying the Secretary’s orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the District Court.  Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provisions.  The District Court was asked to declare the orders of the President and the Secretary invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining their enforcement.  Opposing the motion for preliminary  injunction, the United States asserted that a strike disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger the well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had “inherent power” to do what he had done―power “supported by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by court decisions.” The Government also contended that in any event no preliminary injunction should be issued because the companies had made no showing that their available legal remedies were inadequate or that their injuries from seizure would be irreparable.  Holding against the Government on all points, the District Court on April 30 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from “continuing the seizure and possession of the plants . . . and from acting under the purported authority of Executive Order No. 10340.”103 F.Supp. 569. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s injunction. 90 U. S. App. D. C., 197 F.2d 582. Deeming it best that the issues raised be promptly decided by this Court, we granted certiorari on May 3 and set the cause for argument on May 12.  343 U.S. 937.
    Two crucial issues have developed: First. Should final determination of the constitutional validity of the President’s order be made in this case which has proceeded no further than the preliminary injunction stage?  Second. If so, is the seizure order within the constitutional power of the President?
    I.
    * * * * *
    II.
    The President’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.  There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to take possession of property as he did here.  Nor is there any act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from which such a power can fairly be implied.  Indeed, we do not understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization for this seizure. There are two statutes which do authorize the President to take both personal and real property under certain conditions.[4] However, the Government admits that these conditions were not met and that the President’s order was not rooted in either of the statutes.   The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes (§ 201 (b) of the Defense Production Act) as “much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.”
    Moreover, the use of the seizure technique to solve labor disputes in order to prevent work stoppages was not only unauthorized by any congressional enactment; prior to this controversy, Congress had refused to adopt that method of settling labor disputes.  When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency.[5] Apparently it was thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the process of collective bargaining.[6] Consequently,  the plan Congress adopted in that Act did not provide for seizure under any circumstances.  Instead, the plan sought to bring about settlements by use of the customary devices of mediation, conciliation, investigation by boards of inquiry, and public reports.  In some instances temporary injunctions were authorized to provide cooling-off periods.  All this failing, unions were left free to strike after a secret vote by employees as to whether they wished to accept their employers’ final settlement offer.[7]
    It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision of the Constitution.  And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President.  The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution.  Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that “The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . .”; that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully  executed”; and that he “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.”
    The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President’s military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war.  Such cases need not concern us here.  Even though “theater of war”be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.  This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
     Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant executive power to the President.  In the framework of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.  The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.  And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute. The  first section of the first article says that “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”
    * * * *
    The President’s order does not direct that a congressional policy be executed in a manner prescribed by Congress―it directs that a presidential policy be executed in a manner prescribed by the President.  The preamble of the order itself, like that of many statutes, sets out reasons why the President believes certain policies should be adopted, proclaims these policies as rules of conduct to be followed, and again, like a statute, authorizes a government official to promulgate additional rules and regulations consistent with the policy proclaimed and needed to carry that policy into execution.  The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by the order is beyond question.  It can authorize the taking of private property for public use.  It can make laws regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain fields of our economy.  The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control.
    It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes.  But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution.
    * * * * *
    The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times.  It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice.  Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand.
    The judgment of the District Court is
    Affirmed.

    MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER.
    Although the considerations relevant to the legal enforcement of the principle of separation of powers seem to me more complicated and flexible than may appear from what MR. JUSTICE BLACK has written, I join his opinion because I thoroughly agree with the application of the principle to the circumstances of this case. 
    * * * * *
    To that end they rested the structure of our central government on the system of checks and balances.  For them the doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt necessity.  Not so long ago it was fashionable to find our system of checks and balances obstructive to effective government.  It was easy to ridicule that system as outmoded―too easy.  The experience through which the world has passed in our own day has made vivid the realization that the Framers of our Constitution were not inexperienced doctrinaires.  These long-headed statesmen had no illusion that our people enjoyed biological or psychological or sociological immunities from the hazards of concentrated power.  It is absurd to see a dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of the Mississippi Valley.  The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day.  It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard  of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.
    The Framers, however, did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government.  They were familiar with the revisory functions entrusted to judges in a few of the States and refused to lodge such powers in this Court.  Judicial power can be exercised only as to matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster, and only if they arise in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constitute “Cases” or “Controversies.”
    * * * * *
    The issue before us can be met, and therefore should be, without attempting to define the President’s powers comprehensively. 
    * * * * *
    The question before the Court comes in this setting.  Congress has frequently―at least 16 times since 1916―specifically provided for executive seizure of production, transportation, communications, or storage facilities.  In every case it has qualified this grant of power with limitations and safeguards.  This body of enactments―summarized in tabular form in Appendix I, post, p. 615―demonstrates that Congress deemed seizure so drastic a power as to require that it be carefully circumscribed whenever the President was vested with this extraordinary authority.  The power to seize has uniformly been given only for a limited period or for a defined emergency, or has been repealed after a short period.  Its exercise has been restricted to particular circumstances such as “time of war or when war is imminent,” the needs of “public safety” or of “national security or defense,” or “urgent and impending need.” The period of governmental operation has been limited, as, for instance, to “sixty days after the restoration of productive efficiency.” Seizure statutes usually make executive action dependent on detailed conditions: for example, (a) failure or refusal of the owner of a plant to meet governmental supply needs or (b) failure of voluntary negotiations with the owner for the use of a plant necessary for great public ends.  Congress often has specified the particular executive agency which should seize or operate the plants or whose judgment would appropriately test the need for seizure. Congress also has not left to implication that just compensation be paid; it has usually legislated in detail regarding enforcement of this litigation-breeding general requirement.  (See Appendix I, post, p. 615.)
    Congress in 1947 was again called upon to consider whether governmental seizure should be used to avoid serious industrial shutdowns.  Congress decided against conferring such power generally and in advance, without special Congressional enactment to meet each particular need. 
    * * * * *
    In adopting the provisions which it did, by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, for dealing with a “national emergency” arising out of a breakdown in peaceful industrial relations, Congress was very familiar with Governmental seizure as a protective measure.  On a balance of considerations, Congress chose not to lodge this power in the President.  It chose not to make available in advance a remedy to which both industry and labor were fiercely hostile.
    * * * * *
    It cannot be contended that the President would have had power to issue this order had Congress explicitly negated such authority in formal legislation.  Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power from the President as though it had said so in so many words.  The authoritatively expressed purpose of Congress to disallow such power to the President and to require him, when in his mind the occasion arose for such a seizure, to put the matter to Congress and ask for specific authority from it, could not be more decisive if it had been written into §§ 206-210 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. 
    * * * * *
    A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times feels the lack of power to act with complete, all-embracing, swiftly moving authority.  No doubt a government with distributed authority, subject to be challenged in the courts of law, at least long enough to consider and adjudicate the challenge, labors under restrictions from which other governments are free.  It has not been our tradition to envy such governments.  In any event our government was designed to have such restrictions.  The price was deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these restrictions afford.  * * * *

    MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
    * * *
    MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment and opinion of the Court.
    * * *
    The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.  While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.  It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.  Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.  We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, . . . .
    1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.  In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. 
    * * * * *
    2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.  In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
    * * * * *
    3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling  the Congress from acting upon the subject.
    4. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
    Into which of these classifications does this executive seizure of the steel industry fit? It is eliminated from the first by admission, for it is conceded that no congressional authorization exists for this seizure. That takes away also the support of the many precedents and declarations which were made in relation, and must be confined, to this category. 
    * * * * *
    Can it then be defended under flexible tests available to the second category?  It seems clearly eliminated from that class because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure. In cases where the purpose is to supply needs of the Government itself, two courses are provided: one, seizure of a plant which fails to comply with obligatory orders placed by the Government; another, condemnation of facilities, including temporary use under the power of eminent domain. The third is applicable where it is the general economy of the country that is to be protected rather than exclusive governmental interests. None of these were invoked.  In choosing a different and inconsistent way of his own, the President cannot claim that it is necessitated or invited by failure of Congress to legislate upon the occasions, grounds and methods for seizure of industrial properties.
    This leaves the current seizure to be justified only by the severe tests under the third grouping, where it can be supported only by any remainder of executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject. 
    * * * * *
    The Solicitor General seeks the power of seizure in three clauses of the Executive Article, the first reading, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” * * * *  I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated.
    The clause on which the Government next relies is that “The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States . . . .” . . . .  It undoubtedly puts the Nation’s armed forces under presidential command.  . . . .
    That seems to be the logic of an argument tendered at our bar―that the President having, on his own responsibility, sent American troops abroad derives from that act “affirmative power” to seize the means of producing a supply of steel for them.  To quote, “Perhaps the most forceful illustration of the scope of Presidential power in this connection is the fact that American troops in Korea, whose safety and effectiveness are so directly involved here, were sent to the field by an exercise of the President’s constitutional powers.” Thus, it is said, he has invested himself with “war powers.”
    * * * * *
    Assuming that we are in a war de facto, whether it is or is not a war de jure, does that empower the Commander in Chief to seize industries he thinks necessary to supply our army? The Constitution expressly places in Congress power “to raise and support Armies” and “to provide and maintaina Navy.” (Emphasis supplied.) This certainly lays upon Congress primary responsibility for supplying the armed forces. Congress alone controls the raising of revenues and their appropriation and may determine in what manner and by what means they shall be spent for military and naval procurement.  I suppose no one would doubt that Congress can take over war supply as a Government enterprise.  On the other hand, if Congress sees fit to rely on free private enterprise collectively bargaining with free labor for support and maintenance of our armed forces, can the Executive, because of lawful disagreements incidental to that process, seize the facility for operation upon Government-imposed terms?
    There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the  Army and Navywill constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants. 
    * * * * *
    The third clause in which the Solicitor General finds seizure powers is that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .” That authority must be matched against words of the Fifth Amendment that “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law . . . .” One gives a governmental authority that reaches so far as there is law, the other gives a private right that authority shall go no farther.  These signify about all there is of the principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.
    The Solicitor General lastly grounds support of the seizure upon nebulous, inherent powers never expressly granted but said to have accrued to the office from the customs and claims of preceding administrations.  The plea is for a resulting power to deal with a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case, the unarticulated assumption being that necessity knows no law.
    Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all nonlegal and much legal discussion of presidential powers.  “Inherent” powers, “implied” powers, “incidental” powers, “plenary” powers, “war” powers and “emergency” powers are used, often interchangeably and without fixed or as
    * * * * *
    The claim of inherent and unrestricted presidential powers has long been a persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy.  While it is not surprising that counsel should grasp support from such unadjudicated claims of power, a judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attorney for one of the interested parties as authority in answering a constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself.  But prudence has counseled that actual reliance on such nebulous claims stop short of provoking a judicial test.
    * * * * *
    This brings us to a further crucial question.  Does the President, in such a situation, have inherent constitutional power to seize private property which makes congressional action in relation thereto unnecessary? We find no such power available to him under the present circumstances.  The present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threatened attack.  We do not face the issue of what might be the President’s constitutional power to meet such catastrophic situations.  Nor is it claimed that the current seizure is in the nature of a military command addressed by the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently threatened with, total war.
    The controlling fact here is that Congress, within its constitutionally delegated power, has prescribed for the President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for his use in meeting the present type of emergency. Congress has reserved to itself the right to determine where and when to authorize the seizure of property in meeting such an emergency. Under these circumstances,  the President’s order of April 8 invaded the jurisdiction of Congress.  It violated the essence of the principle of the separation of governmental powers.  Accordingly, the injunction against its effectiveness should be sustained.
    MR. JUSTICE CLARK, concurring in the judgment of the Court.
    * * * * *
    DISSENT
    MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON, with whom MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE MINTON join, dissenting.
    The President of the United States directed the Secretary of Commerce to take temporary possession of the Nation’s steel mills during the existing emergency because “a work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen engaged in combat in the field.” The District Court ordered the mills returned to their private owners on the ground that the President’s action was beyond his powers under the Constitution.
    This Court affirms.  Some members of the Court are of the view that the President is without power to act in time of crisis in the absence of express statutory authorization.  Other members of the Court affirm on the basis of their reading of certain statutes.  Because we cannot agree that affirmance is proper on any ground, and because of the transcending importance of the questions presented not only in this critical litigation but also to the powers of the President and of future Presidents to act in time of crisis, we are compelled to register this dissent.
    I.
    * * * *
    II.
    The steel mills were seized for a public use.  The power of eminent domain, invoked in this case, is an essential attribute of sovereignty and has long been recognized as a power of the Federal Government.  Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367  (1876). Plaintiffs cannot complain that any provision in the Constitution prohibits the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case.  The Fifth Amendment provides: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” It is no bar to this seizure for, if the taking is not otherwise unlawful, plaintiffs are assured of receiving the required just compensation.  United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
    Admitting that the Government could seize the mills, plaintiffs claim that the implied power of eminent domain can be exercised only under an Act of Congress; under no circumstances, they say, can that power be exercised by the President unless he can point to an express provision in enabling legislation.  This was the view adopted by the District Judge when he granted the preliminary injunction. Without an answer, without hearing evidence, he determined the issue on the basis of his “fixed conclusion . . . that defendant’s acts are illegal” because the President’s only course in the face of an emergency is to present the matter to Congress and await the final passage of legislation which will enable the Government to cope with threatened disaster.
    Under this view, the President is left powerless at the very moment when the need for action may be most pressing and when no one, other than he, is immediately  capable of action.  Under this view, he is left powerless because a power not expressly given to Congress is nevertheless found to rest exclusively with Congress.
    * * * *
    III.
    A review of executive action demonstrates that our Presidents have on many occasions exhibited the leadership contemplated by the Framers when they made the President Commander in Chief, and imposed upon him the trust to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” With or without explicit statutory authorization, Presidents have at such times dealt with national emergencies by acting promptly and resolutely to enforce legislative programs, at least to save those programs until Congress could act.  Congress and the courts have responded to such executive initiative with consistent approval.  * * * *
    V.
    * * * *
    VI.
    The diversity of views expressed in the six opinions of the majority, the lack of reference to authoritative precedent, the repeated reliance upon prior dissenting opinions, the complete disregard of the uncontroverted facts showing the gravity of the emergency and the temporary nature of the taking all serve to demonstrate how far afield one must go to affirm the order of the District Court.
    The broad executive power granted by Article II to an officer on duty 365 days a year cannot, it is said, be invoked to avert disaster.  Instead, the President must confine himself to sending a message to Congress recommending action.  Under this messenger-boy concept of the Office, the President cannot even act to preserve legislative programs from destruction so that Congress will have something left to act upon.  There is no judicial finding that the executive action was unwarranted because there was in fact no basis for the President’s finding of the existence of an emergency for, under this view, the gravity of the emergency and the immediacy of the threatened disaster are considered irrelevant as a matter of law.
    * * * *
    As the District Judge stated, this is no time for “timorous” judicial action.  But neither is this a time for timorous executive action.  Faced with the duty of executing the defense programs which Congress had enacted and the disastrous effects that any stoppage in steel production would have on those programs, the President acted to preserve those programs by seizing the steel mills.  There is no question that the possession was other than temporary in character and subject to congressional direction―either approving, disapproving or regulating the manner in which the mills were to be administered and returned to the owners.  The President immediately informed Congress of his action and clearly stated his intention to abide by the legislative will.  No basis for claims of arbitrary action, unlimited powers or dictatorial usurpation of congressional power appears from the facts of this case.  On the contrary, judicial, legislative and executive precedents throughout our history demonstrate that in this case the President acted in full conformity with his duties under the Constitution.  Accordingly, we would reverse the order of the District Court. 

    __________
    United States v. Belmont
    301 U.S. 324 (1937)

    MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

    This is an action at law brought by petitioner against respondents in a federal district court to recover a sum of money deposited by a Russian corporation (Petrograd [p326] Metal Works) with August Belmont, a private banker doing business in New York City under the name of August Belmont & Co. August Belmont died in 1924, and respondents are the duly appointed executors of his will. A motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action was sustained by the district court, and its judgment was affirmed by the court below. 85 F.2d 542. The facts alleged, so far as necessary to be stated, follow.

    The corporation had deposited with Belmont, prior to 1918, the sum of money which petitioner seeks to recover. In 1918, the Soviet Government duly enacted a decree by which it dissolved, terminated and liquidated the corporation (together with others), and nationalized and appropriated all of its property and assets of every kind and wherever situated, including the deposit account with Belmont. As a result, the deposit became the property of the Soviet Government, and so remained until November 16, 1933, at which time the Soviet Government released and assigned to petitioner all amounts due to that government from American nationals, including the deposit account of the corporation with Belmont. Respondents failed and refused to pay the amount upon demand duly made by petitioner.

    The assignment was effected by an exchange of diplomatic correspondence between the Soviet Government and the United States. The purpose was to bring about a final settlement of the claims and counterclaims between the Soviet Government and the United States, and it was agreed that the Soviet Government would take no steps to enforce claims against American nationals, but all such claims were released and assigned to the United States, with the understanding that the Soviet Government was to be duly notified of all amounts realized by the United States from such release and assignment. The assignment and requirement for notice [p327] are parts of the larger plan to bring about a settlement of the rival claims of the high contracting parties. The continuing and definite interest of the Soviet Government in the collection of assigned claims is evident, and the case, therefore, presents a question of public concern, the determination of which well might involve the good faith of the United States in the eyes of a foreign government. The court below held that the assignment thus effected embraced the claim here in question, and with that we agree.

    That court, however, took the view that the situs of the bank deposit was within the State of New York; that in no sense could it be regarded as an intangible property right within Soviet territory, and that the nationalization decree, if enforced, would put into effect an act of confiscation. And it held that a judgment for the United States could not be had, because, in view of that result, it would be contrary to the controlling public policy of the State of New York. The further contention is made by respondents that the public policy of the United States would likewise be infringed by such a judgment. The two questions thus presented are the only ones necessary to be considered.

    First. We do not pause to inquire whether, in fact, there was any policy of the State of New York to be infringed, since we are of opinion that no state policy can prevail against the international compact here involved.

    This court has held, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, that every sovereign state must recognize the independence of every other sovereign state, and that the courts of one will not sit in judgment upon the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.

    That general principle was applied in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, to a case where an action in replevin had been brought in a New Jersey state court to recover a consignment of hides purchased in Mexico from [p328] General Villa. The title of the purchaser was assailed on the ground that Villa had confiscated the hides. Villa, it appeared, had seized the hides while conducting independent operations under the Carranza government, which, at the time of the seizure, had made much progress in its revolution in Mexico. The government of the United States, after the trial of the case in the state court, had recognized the government of Carranza, first as the de facto government of the Republic of Mexico and later as the government de jure. This court held that the conduct of foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power was not subject to judicial inquiry or decision; that who is the sovereign of a territory is not a judicial question, but one the determination of which by the political departments conclusively binds the courts, and that recognition by these departments is retroactive, and validates all actions and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of its existence. "The principle," we said, p. 303,

    that the conduct of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as we have here, as it was held to be to the cases cited, in which claims for damages were based upon acts done in a foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations between governments, and vex the peace of nations."

    Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 308-309, 310, is to the same effect.

    In A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co., L.R. [1921] 3 K.B. 532, the English Court of Appeal expressly approved [p329] and followed our decision in the Oetjen case. The English case involved that part of the same decree of the Soviet Government here under consideration which declared certain private woodworking establishments to be the property of the Republic. Under that decree, the Government seized plaintiff's factory in Russia, together with a stock of wood therein. Agents of the Republic sold a quantity of the stock so seized to the defendants, who imported it into England. Thereafter, the British Government recognized the Soviet Government as the de facto government of Russia. Upon these facts, the court held that, the British Government having thus recognized the Soviet Government, existing at a date before the decree in question, the validity of that decree and the sale of the wood to the defendants could not be impugned, and gave judgment for defendants accordingly. The court regarded the decree as one of confiscation, but was unable to see (Bankes, L.J. p. 546) how the courts could treat the decree

    otherwise than as the expression by the de facto government of a civilized country of a policy which it considered to be in the best interest of that country. It must be quite immaterial for present purposes that the same views are not entertained by the Government of this country, are repudiated by the vast majority of its citizens, and are not recognized by our laws.

    Lord Justice Scrutton, in his opinion, discusses (pp. 557-559) the contention that the courts should refuse to recognize the decree and the titles derived under it as confiscatory and unjust, and concludes that the question is one not for the judges, but for the action of the sovereign through his ministers. "I do not feel able," he said,
    to come to the conclusion that the legislation of a state recognized by my Sovereign as an independent sovereign state is so contrary to moral principle that the judges ought not to recognize it. The responsibility for recognition or nonrecognition, with the consequences of each, rests on the [p330] political advisers of the Sovereign, and not on the judges.
    Further citation of authority seems unnecessary.

    We take judicial notice of the fact that, coincident with the assignment set forth in the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet Government, and normal diplomatic relations were established between that government and the Government of the United States, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. The effect of this was to validate, so far as this country is concerned, all acts of the Soviet Government here involved from the commencement of its existence. The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment, and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an international compact between the two governments. That the negotiations, acceptance of the assignment, and agreements and understandings in respect thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted. Governmental power over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government. And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole organ of that government. The assignment and the agreements in connection therewith did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty-making clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the Senate.

    A treaty signifies "a compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare." Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600. But an international compact, as this was, is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate. There are many such compacts, of which a protocol, a modus vivendi, a postal convention, and agreements [p331] like that now under consideration are illustrations. See 5 Moore, Int.Law Digest, 210-221. The distinction was pointed out by this court in the Altman case, supra, which arose under § 3 of the Tariff Act of 1897, authorizing the President to conclude commercial agreements with foreign countries in certain specified matters. We held that, although this might not be a treaty requiring ratification by the Senate, it was a compact negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of the President, and as such was a "treaty" within the meaning of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, the construction of which might be reviewed upon direct appeal to this court.

    Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies. The supremacy of a treaty in this respect has been recognized from the beginning. Mr. Madison, in the Virginia Convention, said that, if a treaty does not supersede existing state laws as far as they contravene its operation, the treaty would be ineffective. "To counteract it by the supremacy of the state laws, would bring on the Union the just charge of national perfidy, and involve us in war." 3 Elliot's Debates 515. And see Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall.199, 236-237. And while this rule in respect of treaties is established by the express language of cl. 2, Art. VI, of the Constitution, the same rule would result in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national government, and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states. Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316, et seq. In respect of all international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes, the State of New York does not exist. Within the field of its powers, whatever [p332] the United States rightfully undertakes it necessarily has warrant to consummate. And when judicial authority is invoked in aid of such consummation, state constitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry and decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional power. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416; Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341.

    Second. The public policy of the United States relied upon as a bar to the action is that declared by the Constitution, namely, that private property shall not be taken without just compensation. But the answer is that our Constitution, laws and policies have no extraterritorial operation unless in respect of our own citizens. Compare United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra, at p. 318. What another country has done in the way of taking over property of its nationals, and especially of its corporations, is not a matter for judicial consideration here. Such nationals must look to their own government for any redress to which they may be entitled. So far as the record shows, only the rights of the Russian corporation have been affected by what has been done, and it will be time enough to consider the rights of our nationals when, if ever, by proper judicial proceeding, it shall be made to appear that they are so affected as to entitle them to judicial relief. The substantive right to the moneys, as now disclosed, became vested in the Soviet Government as the successor to the corporation, and this right that government has passed to the United States. It does not appear that respondents have any interest in the matter beyond that of a custodian. Thus far, no question under the Fifth Amendment is involved.

    It results that the complaint states a cause of action, and that the judgment of the court below to the contrary is erroneous. In so holding, we deal only with the case [p333] as now presented, and with the parties now before us. We do not consider the status of adverse claims, if there be any, of others not parties to this action. And nothing we have said is to be construed as foreclosing the assertion of any such claim to the fund involved, by intervention or other appropriate proceeding. We decide only that the complaint alleges facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the respondents.

    Judgment reversed.

    Notes and Questions.

    1.  What is judicial notice and why did the opinion engage in the practice?

    2.  Would you have decided the case in the same way had you applied the tests set out in the Youngstown Steel case?
    __________

    III. The General Government; Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

    The first two sections of this course provided a general introduction to the core issues of a legal education.  The first section considered the nature of law.  It introduced students to the basic definitions of and then introduced students to the distinct forms of law that have risen in the West: customary law (common law), statutes, administrative regulations, and non-law law.  The second section introduced government to the mix.  It considered hierarchies of law and government. It considered the ways in which government is ordered through law and the hierarchies of law― from constitution to administrative regulation and court decisions. We were then introduced to the division between the system of laws that comprise a domestic legal order and those that make up the international legal order.   We ended with a discussion of the ideologies of rule of law within this construction of the law-state, with a focus on the procedural rights developed under the U.S. constitution. 

    We have now set the stage for a more targeted discussion of the specifics of the organization of the American law-state.  For this class we review the organization of the general government of the United States―what is commonly now called its “federal” government.  Then we consider the three animating principles that support its design―separation of powers, checks and balances and division of power between general and state government (federalism).

    Central to the establishment of the organization of the general government were three key postulates of organizing government.  The first was that government’s organization must be so structured that it would impede tyranny by the whole of government, by any part of it or by factions of individuals within it. The British imperial government was a model against which to structure such a government.  To that end, the power of government must not be concentrated and ought to be diffused among as many parts and actors as necessary and prudent. The second was that government must be efficient. The confederation of the newly independent colonies after 1783, organized through its Articles of Confederation,[8]  was a model against which to structure a more efficient state apparatus.  The third was that the general government was meant to provide the benefits of aggregation with as little loss of local sovereignty as possible.  To that end the construction of a unitary nation-state[9]was to be avoided and the powers of the general government, as against the residuary powers of the states were to be carefully circumscribed.  The three premises were not entirely complementary.  At its limit, institutional power fracture reduces the possibilities of tyranny but requires that a substantial amount of inefficiency be built into government.  Efficient government tends to foster majoritarian tyranny and the challenge to the residuary powers of states.  And the constraints on federal power tends to weaken both federal efficiency and avoid tyranny, it merely shifts those issues down to the state level.   

    But the founders provided a minimal framework for reconciling these premises, left their resolution to politics and appeared to assume that the give and take of politics would shift the consensus around, within limits, during the course of the Republic’s existence. And, indeed, to some large extent, that has been the case.  The one spectacular failure, marked by the American Civil War[10](1861-65), produced a somewhat radical restructuring of the state apparatus, the full measure of the potential of which was not realized until the economic[11]and racial[12]crises of the United States (1929-1969).   Much of the Federal Constitution is devoted to the organization of a government in which these three premises could be harmonized to the greatest extent possible.  The structural reconciliation is subsumed under the notion at the center of our study for today―separation of powers and checks and balances.  At its core both are framed around the division of the entire authority of the federal government into three distinct branches: executive, legislative and judicial (separation of powers).  Further, the extent of the powers of each was thought to be distinctly circumscribed in the text of the constitution itself, with the remainder of the extent of assertion of governmental power left to the states (federalism).  Lastly, the assertion of even the core of executive, legislative and judicial power could not be successfully or fully undertaken without the cooperation of at least one of the other branches of government (checks and balances).

    Those protections of checks and balances and federalism are only partially dependent on the application of the “rules” built into the constitution for the structure of state governmental organs.  As important is the political sphere is determining the specific scope of relations among the branches.  Thus, for example, before the beginning of the 20th century and the reform of the federal constitution, the interests of states in the operation of the general government were protected because all members of the U.S. Senate[13]were chosen by the organs of state government and owed their loyalty to the states they represented (Art. I §3).  Legislation in Congress, then, could not be enacted, unless the interests of a majority of states acceded to it. On the other hand, members of the House of Representatives[14]answer to the people of their district, and do so often, standing for re-election on short cycles (Art. I §2).  The President, on the other hand, answered to a national constituency, but one selected through an electoral college that represented the will (until the later 19th century) of the electors chosen by local people to represent them in the selection of the leader of the general government (Art. II § 1).  Because they each answered to different constituencies, they might represent distinct interests that could guide their invocation of both their inherent power and set the tone of their willingness to cooperate with the other branches. Federal judges are appointed for life and do not directly answer to the people.  But they are selected by the president and confirmed by Congress, that may, to some extent undo any of the interpretive work of the federal courts (except where legislation is declared unconstitutional―but even then, the Congress and President can sometimes work around the specific point of constitutional contention).  And in any case, the Congress can, if sufficiently goaded, affect the judiciary through its control of the organization of the courts and its budget. Likewise, though Congress determines the federal budget (Art. I § 7), the President decides when and how it is spent, and recently, whether it will be spent at all. All three branches are also limited in their jurisdictional reach.  The powers of Congress are specified (Art. I. §§ 8,9), as are those of the President (Art. II §2).  The judicial branch is specifically limited in its authority to hear cases (Art. III, §2).  Moreover, the general government is constituted as a referee of sorts among states (Art. IV).  The residuary power of states is also limited (Art.I §10).   And, as we noted earlier, the Constitution establishes a hierarchy of authority with the legislative and judicial authority of the general government at the top (Art. VI).

    The divisions were originally defended in the Federal Papers.[15] 

    || Federalist No. 47[16]||The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts; From the New York Packet. Friday, February 1, 1788.

    Author: James Madison

    To the People of the State of New York:

    HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power among its constituent parts. One of the principal objections inculcated by the more respectable adversaries to the Constitution is,its supposed violation of the political maxim,that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The several departments of power are distributed and blended in such a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form, and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other parts. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded.

    The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal re-probation of the system. I persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to everyone, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct. The oracle who is always consulted and cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point. The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which the maxim was drawn. On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which, when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are appointed by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them, one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative department forms also a great constitutional council to the executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative department as often to attend and participate in its deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote. From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying “There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates,” or, “if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers,” he did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in, or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This would have been the case in the constitution examined by him, if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed also the complete legislative power, or the supreme administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again, can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate officers in the executive department. The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body,” says he, “there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical manner.” Again: “Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR.

    Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR.” Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they arehere, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.

    If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. . . .

    In citing these cases, in which the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments have not been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under which they were framed. It is but too obvious that in some instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of violating the sacred maxim of free government, is warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author, nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing paper. Moreover, Congress may impeach and remove either the President or judges for misconduct.

    Though the foundation of the organization of the general government of the United States is based on this separation of the powers of government among a legislative, executive and judicial branch, the exercise by each branch of the powers assigned to it could not be accomplished without the cooperation of one or both of the other branches.  This system of checks and balancesdisciplines the potential excesses of the exercise of power by each branch of government under a system of separation of powers.   Thus, for example, the President negotiates treaties but these must be ratified by the Senate.  The Congress adopts statutes, but they must be approved by the President; yet even when the President vetoes legislation, Congress may override the veto by a 2/3 vote of both houses of Congress.  The judicial branch interprets the laws and may invalidate legislation or presidential action beyond their constitutionally specified powers.  But judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  And Congress may modify the extent of the federal judiciary, limit judicial review under certain circumstances, and must pass a budget to support judicial activities. Taken together, separation of powers and checks and balances ensures that the unitary power of power of government is divided  along functional lines, and that even the exercise of functionally divided power must be undertaken with a least a minimum of cooperation by the other branches. Where the branches of government collide, a constitutional crisis is likely to occur and the ultimate power of voters to hold executive and legislators accountable is supposed to serve as the political check on excess or bad behavior, at least as the voters may see it.  (See, e.g., Abner Greene, “Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking,” The University of Chicago Law Review 61(1) 123-196 (Winter, 1994)).  Despite the structural constraints built into checks and balances  mechanics in the Constitution, people worry that the exigencies of particular eras may create a situation in which one branch of government might become much more powerful than others.  People sometimes then seek to consider whether the structural constraints of the constitution may be applied or interpreted in a way that readjusts the balances of power among the branches. (See, e.g., Eric Posner, “Balance of Powers Arguments and the Structural Constitution,”[17]Chicago Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 622 (2d Series) (Nov. 2012) (arguing that balance of power theories are unworkable and normatively questionable, and that judges and scholars should abandon the balance them in favor of consider whether bureaucratic innovation is likely to improve policy outcomes.)). Alternatively, it is possible to understand that beyond the minimal structural framework of separation of powers and checks and balances, the actual inter relationship of the branches of government is left to politics and the ultimate preferences of voters, eventually and episodically expressed.

    The complex interplay between the structural framework of separation of powers, checks and balances and the political realities of government have a strong political dimension.  That is, the provisions are supposed to work through the political choices of the members of each branch whose actions are then ultimately accountable to the people—usually through elections.  Thus, each branch may secure temporary and marginal advantage in the extent of their power vis a vis the others but only to the extent that ambiguities may be decided and within the scope of allowable acquiescence in the actions of the other branches.  But as in other areas of U.S. law, the political interplay of the branches of government have been constrained through a long process of legalization.  In effect, the law of the Constitution has been interpreted by the federal courts to impose certain structural constraints on political choices made by government officials. The outer boundaries of politics, then, is mediated by law—as interpreted by the courts. We consider these issues through the classic Steel Seizure Case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,[18]343 U.S. 579 (1952). The facts of the case remind the student that sometimes constitutional cases involving issues of separation of powers may touch on some of the most important, and divisive, political confrontations of American society.  In this case, the facts emerge out of a long term clash between labor and capital in the remaking of post WWII American society fought at the height of one of the first and most intensive military engagements with  their  Cold War Marxist-Leninist counterparts (the Korean War[19]) and centered in political strategic gamesmanship between President and Congress for control of the national political agenda.   (See Harry S Truman, Years of Trail and Hope[20](Doubleday, 1956)).

    The majority opinion, written by Justice Black provided:

    In the latter part of 1951, a dispute arose between the steel companies and their employees over terms and conditions that should be included in new collective bargaining agreements. Long-continued conferences failed to resolve the dispute. On December 18, 1951, the employees’ representative, United Steelworkers of America, C. I. O., gave notice of an intention to strike when the existing bargaining agreements expired on December 31. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service then intervened in an effort to get labor and management to agree. This failing, the President on December 22, 1951, referred the dispute to the Federal Wage Stabilization Board to investigate and make recommendations for fair and equitable terms of settlement. This Board’s report resulted in no settlement. On April 4, 1952, the Union gave notice of a nation-wide strike called to begin at 12:01 a. m. April 9. The indispensability of steel as a component of substantially all weapons and other war materials led the President to believe that the proposed work stoppage would immediately jeopardize our national defense and that governmental seizure of the steel mills was necessary in order to assure the continued availability of steel. Reciting these considerations for his action, the President, a few hours before the strike was to begin, issued Executive Order 10340, a copy of which is attached as an appendix, post, p. 589. The order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of most of the steel mills and keep them running. The Secretary immediately issued his own possessory orders, calling upon the presidents of the various seized companies to serve as operating managers for the United States. They were directed to carry on their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the Secretary. The next morning the President sent a message to Congress reporting his action. Cong. Rec., April 9, 1952, p. 3962. Twelve days later he sent a second message. Cong. Rec., April 21, 1952, p. 4192. Congress has taken no action.

    Obeying the Secretary’s orders under protest, the companies brought proceedings against him in the District Court. Their complaints charged that the seizure was not authorized by an act of Congress or by any constitutional provisions. The District Court was asked to declare the orders of the President and the Secretary invalid and to issue preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining their enforcement. Opposing the motion for preliminary injunction, the United States asserted that a strike disrupting steel production for even a brief period would so endanger the well-being and safety of the Nation that the President had “inherent power” to do what he had done ― power “supported by the Constitution, by historical precedent, and by court decisions.” The Government also contended that in any event no preliminary injunction should be issued because the companies had made no showing that their available legal remedies were inadequate or that their injuries from seizure would be irreparable. Holding against the Government on all points, the District Court on April 30 issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary from “continuing the seizure and possession of the plants . . . and from acting under the purported authority of Executive Order No. 10340.” 103 F.Supp. 569. On the same day the Court of Appeals stayed the District Court’s injunction. . . . Deeming it best that the issues raised be promptly decided by this Court, we granted certiorari on May 3 and set the cause for argument on May 12. (Steel Seizure Case.)

    The issue was quite straightforward:

    We are asked to decide whether the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel mills. The mill owners argue that the President’s order amounts to lawmaking, a legislative function which the Constitution has expressly confided to the Congress and not to the President.  The Government’s position is that the order was made on findings of the President that his action was necessary to avert a national catastrophe which would inevitably result from a stoppage of steel production, and that in meeting this grave emergency the President was acting within the aggregate of his constitutional powers as the Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States.  (Steel Seizure Case.)

    The analysis was also straightforward (we do not discuss the initial issue here―whether the case was ripe for decision by the Supreme Court at the preliminary injunction stage of litigation).  It is an excellent example of formalist[21]reasoning in U.S. judicial interpretation of statutes and constitutions.  The formalist analysis undertaken by Justice Black is both short and elegant.

    He starts with the general rule―the extent of the President’s power derives either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution. (Steel Seizure Case §II). There is no statute that expressly authorities the President to issue a valid Executive Order of the sort at issue here. Moreover the parties to the litigation did not suggest that there was any Congressional statute appears from which such power could be implied. However, there are two statutes that permit the President to do what he intends―seize the mills and ensure continuous production of war material. But the President chose not to invoke them.  The reasons were obvious then―they took too long and cost too much money (“The Government refers to the seizure provisions of one of these statutes (§ 201 (b) of the Defense Production Act) as “much too cumbersome, involved, and time-consuming for the crisis which was at hand.”“ Ibid).  But they were also less obvious―in the early 1950s, as the Cold War began, efforts to distinguish the democratic and capitalist West from the Marxist Leninist Totalitarian Soviet bloc included references to the way in which the West protected private property while the Soviets seized the hard earned factories and other productive forces of individuals.  It would appear odd for the American President to do something quite similar to what the Soviets had been doing in Eastern Europe in aid of the American war effort against a Soviet satrap[22]in North Korea.
     
    Justice Black alsonotes that Congress specifically rejected the sort of action the President attempted through the Executive Order device.  “When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency. Apparently it was thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the process of collective bargaining.” (Ibid).  Under Taft-Hartley, Congress chose mediation, conciliation and boards of inquiry.  “In some instances temporary injunctions were authorized to provide cooling-off periods.  All this failing, unions were left free to strike after a secret vote by employees as to whether they wished to accept their employers’ final settlement offer.” (Ibid). But Taft Hartley Act action was politically dangerous for a President from a Democratic Party who would likely lose labor union support if he relied on Taft Hartley.  That Act had been the culmination of Republican Party efforts to hobble the more aggressive and labor friendly provisions of the pre-WWII National Labor Relations Act.  That effort was made possible by a media campaign heavy on the emphasis of the infiltration of labor union organizations by organized crime (and less on the collusion of businesses with the enemy powers during WWII, but that is another story, and one many of whose protagonists remained bitter about to their dying days).

    For the formalist, all of these political calculations summed to zero.  The President failed to invoke the only statutory avenues available to him.  Therefore the only other basis to support the Executive Order had to be found in the Constitution and to the powers conferred on the President.  Justice Black notes that no one claimed that the Constitution expresslypermitted the President to issue the Executive Order.

    The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that “The executive Power shall be vested in a President . . .”; that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”; and that he “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” (Steel Seizure Case Part II.)

    Justice Black rejects the contention that the President’s military powers extends to the issuance of the Executive Order with effect outside the zone of combat.  In words that would echo in perhaps perverse ways in Hamdi,[23]discussed in our last class, Justice Black noted:

    Even though “theater of war”is an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military authorities.  (Ibid).

    Justice Black rejected the argument that the power to issue the Executive order was inherent in the general executive power of the President.  For Justice Black, the Executive Order functioned like a statute and not like the execution of one.  The Congress, not the president, retained the power to make law.  The President’s efforts to take that power onto himself in this context exceeded his authority.

    The power of Congress to adopt such public policies as those proclaimed by the order is beyond question. It can authorize the taking of private property for public use. It can make laws regulating the relationships between employers and employees, prescribing rules designed to settle labor disputes, and fixing wages and working conditions in certain fields of our economy. The Constitution does not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control. (Ibid).

    He also rejected what in other circumstances other majorities of Supreme Court justices had found constitutionally compelling―congressional acquiescence.   But that is the essence of formalism; such acquiescence is messy and functional in the sense that it represents an unwholesome deviation from the letter of the structure of the law. “It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority have taken possession of private business enterprises in order to settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution * * * * * “ (Ibid.).

    And thus, for Justice Black, the resolution of the case naturally followed: “The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand.” (Ibid).

    Interestingly, though Justice Black’s opinion settled the matter, it has been the concurring and dissenting opinions that have been much more influential on the conceptualization of separation of powers in the aftermath of the decision.

    Justice Frankfurter was sensitive both to the issues of separation of powers and checks and balances, which he believed this decision furthered to avoid concentrations of power.  For him, there is a sense that the decision had political implications―the defense of separation of powers preserved the democratic character of the state as envisioned by the Founders. This was particularity important in the early 1950s, when the mortal political enemy of the United States was characterized as foundationally anti-democratic. “It is absurd to see a dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of the Mississippi Valley. The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority.” (Ibid).

    But as important, Justice Frankfurter also used the opinion to restate a vision of judicial engagement that left the court out of the political battles between President and Congress. “The Framers, however, did not make the judiciary the overseer of our government. They were familiar with the revisory functions entrusted to judges in a few of the States and refused to lodge such powers in this Court. Judicial power can be exercised only as to matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster, and only if they arise in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constitute “Cases” or “Controversies.”“ (Ibid).  To that end, Justice Frankfurter considered the history of legislation to the point at which the Executive Order was issued. “Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power from the President as though it had said so in so many words. The authoritatively expressed purpose of Congress to disallow such power to the President and to require him, when in his mind the occasion arose for such a seizure, to put the matter to Congress and ask for specific authority from it, could not be more decisive if it had been written into §§ 206-210 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.” (Ibid).

    But there is a bit of remorse.  There is a price to be paid when efficiency is sacrificed to avoid tyranny.

    A scheme of government like ours no doubt at times feels the lack of power to act with complete, all-embracing, swiftly moving authority. No doubt a government with distributed authority, subject to be challenged in the courts of law, at least long enough to consider and adjudicate the challenge, labors under restrictions from which other governments are free. It has not been our tradition to envy such governments. In any event our government was designed to have such restrictions. The price was deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these restrictions afford. (Ibid).

    In contrast to the opinions of Justices Black and Frankfurter, the dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice’s Reed and Mointon provide an excellent example of a functionalist approach[24]to interpretative of statutory and constitutional provisions.  For them, the overriding issue was to preserve the union.  To this end every structure of the Constitutional arrangement must be bent.  The failure to do so would preserve a perfectly and elegantly structured by eventually defunct Republic to the benefit of none of its citizens.  Here they draw a line beyond which efficiency concerns must trump the fear of tyranny―with echoes to the rationale of the ancient roman senatus consulta (a form of which we discussed when we reviewed the Institutes[25]).Foer them the power of eminent domain and that of the President’s military powers were sufficient to justify this action in aid of the war effort. (Ibid., dissent §§II, III).

    The broad executive power granted by Article II to an officer on duty 365 days a year cannot, it is said, be invoked to avert disaster. Instead, the President must confine himself to sending a message to Congress recommending action. Under this messenger-boy concept of the Office, the President cannot even act to preserve legislative programs from destruction so that Congress will have something left to act upon. There is no judicial finding that the executive action was unwarranted because there was in fact no basis for the President’s finding of the existence of an emergency for, under this view, the gravity of the emergency and the immediacy of the threatened disaster are considered irrelevant as a matter of law. (Ibid., dissent, § VI).

    But the opinion that has proven the most influential, and the one that the Supreme Court has relied on since for its analytical framework when considering interpretive issues relating to the structural elements of separation of powers in the constitution, is that created in the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson.  His three part balancing test merges elements of formalist and functionalist components that permit some judicial interpretive flexibility within a fairly well defined forma framework provided by the formal structures of the Constitution itself. 

    First the functionalist chapeau[26]to the three part analytical framework:

    The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.  While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.  It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.  Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.  We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers.

    Then the three part functional-formal standard:

    1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. * * * *

    2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. * * * *

    3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. 4 Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. (Ibid. Jackson, J., concurring).

    Justice Jackson then applies this analytical framework tothe case.  He eliminates the first category by admission of the parties.   In what might for some be a more questionable analysis, Justice Jackson eliminates applicability of the second category on grounds similar to those used by Justice Frankfurter―a determination that Congress has not merely failed to acquiesce, it has made its opposition to the action represented by the Executive Order clear.

    It seems clearly eliminated from that class because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure. In cases where the purpose is to supply needs of the Government itself, two courses are provided: one, seizure of a plant which fails to comply with obligatory orders placed by the Government; another, condemnation of facilities, including temporary use under the power of eminent domain. The third is applicable where it is the general economy of the country that is to be protected rather than exclusive governmental interests. None of these were invoked. In choosing a different and inconsistent way of his own, the President cannot claim that it is necessitated or invited by failure of Congress to legislate upon the occasions, grounds and methods for seizure of industrial properties. (Ibid).

    The questionable part, of course, is provided by the analysis of the dissenting justices.  It may not be as clear cut that Congress refused to acquiesce here. The difficulty here, of course, is to attempt to draw a judgment from a number of actions that may or may not be related to produce something like a plausible set of intentions by a Congress that in make-up was not anywhere the same of those whose actions contributed to the interpretation of intent. It might as easily have been possible, as the dissenting justices suggested, that having noticed Congress of the seizure by Executive Order, the Congress could have acted to either affirm or reject the action through legislation or other assertion of power. The issue of interpreting intention from prior actions remains one of the more contentious actions of the Court, and sometimes contributes to its least convincing actions.

    Having eliminated the first two the only justification available is in the third category.  But this is one where Presidential power is at its weakest and the test is at its most severe, “where it can be supported only by any remainder of executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject. * * * * “ (Ibid). Justice Jackson is not impressed with the government’s argument which he characterizes thus:

    That seems to be the logic of an argument tendered at our bar ― that the President having, on his own responsibility, sent American troops abroad derives from that act “affirmative power” to seize the means of producing a supply of steel for them. To quote, “Perhaps the most forceful illustration of the scope of Presidential power in this connection is the fact that American troops in Korea, whose safety and effectiveness are so directly involved here, were sent to the field by an exercise of the President’s constitutional powers.” Thus, it is said, he has invested himself with “war powers.” * * * * (Ibid).

     Justice Jackson then notes that if, indeed, the United States is at war, then it is the responsibility of Congress, and not the president, to support the military effort.

    I suppose no one would doubt that Congress can take over war supply as a Government enterprise. On the other hand, if Congress sees fit to rely on free private enterprise collectively bargaining with free labor for support and maintenance of our armed forces, can the Executive, because of lawful disagreements incidental to that process, seize the facility for operation upon Government-imposed terms? (Ibid).

    Where the President sought to take these powers to himself, then the tyranny dangers against which the Constitution provides protection ought to guide the result.  Here there is an echo of Justice Frankfurter’s concerns, but in a more analytical framework. Thus Justice Jackson’s dismissive: “There are indications that the Constitution did not contemplate that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants.” (Ibid).  From the perspective of the early 21st century, it is possible to suggest that the line has been moved a bit closer to Presidential discretion in matters of this kind, but with Congressional acquiescence (e.g., U.S.A. Patriot Act[27]). Likewise, Justice Jackson rejects resort to what he describes as resort to use of “nebulous, inherent powers never expressly granted but said to have accrued to the office from the customs and claims of preceding administrations. The plea is for a resulting power to deal with a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case, the unarticulated assumption being that necessity knows no law.”(Ibid).  These, Justice Jackson argues, are political arguments, not legal arguments, and better deployed elsewhere.

    With a nod to functional issues of efficiency in times of crisis, Justice Jackson notes that perhaps a different result might have been appropriate in the event of an imminent invasion or preparation for total war―the situation marked by the period leading to the entry of the United States into the global military conflict upon the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor in 1941. “The present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or threatened attack. We do not face the issue of what might be the President’s constitutional power to meet such catastrophic situations. Nor is it claimed that the current seizure is in the nature of a military command addressed by the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently threatened with, total war.” (Ibid).  But the Korean War was not the Second World War, and the seizure of steel mills was not the same as the coordinated use of industry to aid a total war effort. In these circumstances separation of powers principles and the premise of protecting against tyranny  trumps efficiency concerns in the conduct of a foreign military intervention―even at the cost of American lives and the possible protraction of hostilities.

    On the afternoon of the announcement of the Supreme Court decision, the steel mills were returned to their owners and almost immediately thereafter the unions struck (1952 Steel Strike[28]).  Truman, in his memoirs, continued to argue that the case was wrongly decided and cost service personnel their lives as the war effort was seriously affected.  For an interesting discussion on the way in which the Supreme Court may have retreated from its interventionist role in the Steel Seizure case, see, Neal Devins and  Louis Fisher, “The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?,”[29]Constitutional Commentary 19:63-86 (2002).


    IV. Problem

                You have considered the development of a judicial structure for the legalization of the political division of authority between the branches of the federal government. You have, in the process, begun to consider the tools judges use to aid in analysis of constitutional provisions.  These include normative principles derived from the constitution itself (these include anti-tyranny and efficiency principles), and interpretive principles grounded either in formalism or functionalism. Formalist principles are guided by the text of the instrument subject to interpretation and tend to focus on methodologies of infusing words with meanings (plain meaning, coherence in reading, ordinary meaning, meaning of words derived from their use in the statute, etc.). Functionalist principles are guided by the objectives of the provision being interpreted (intent of the drafters, effect of interpretive application balancing interests, etc.).  This problem examines the legalization of the division of power between general and state government (federalism).  Consider the following case:

    Bond v. U.S.
    No. 12–158. Argued November 5, 2013—Decided June 2, 2014


    Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court.

    The horrors of chemical warfare were vividly captured by John Singer Sargent in his 1919 painting Gassed. The nearly life-sized work depicts two lines of soldiers, blinded by mustard gas, clinging single file to orderlies guiding them to an improvised aid station. There they would receive little treatment and no relief; many suffered for weeks only to have the gas claim their lives. The soldiers were shown staggering through piles of comrades too seriously burned to even join the procession.

    The painting reflects the devastation that Sargent witnessed in the aftermath of the Second Battle of Arras during World War I. That battle and others like it led to an overwhelming consensus in the international commu-nity that toxic chemicals should never again be used as weapons against human beings. Today that objective is reflected in the international Convention on Chemical Weapons, which has been ratified or acceded to by 190 countries. The United States, pursuant to the Federal Government’s constitutionally enumerated power to make treaties, ratified the treaty in 1997. To fulfill the United States’ obligations under the Convention, Congress en-acted the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998. The Act makes it a federal crime for a person to use or possess any chemical weapon, and it punishes violators with severe penalties. It is a statute that, like the Convention it implements, deals with crimes of deadly seriousness.

    The question presented by this case is whether the Implementation Act also reaches a purely local crime: an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure her husband’s lover, which ended up causing only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with water. Because our constitutional structure leaves local criminal activity primarily to the States, we have generally declined to read federal law as intruding on that responsibility, unless Congress has clearly indicated that the law should have such reach. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act contains no such clear indication, and we accordingly conclude that it does not cover the unremarkable local offense at issue here.

    I

    A

    In 1997, the President of the United States, upon the advice and consent of the Senate, ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–21, 1974 U. N. T. S. 317. The nations that ratified the Convention (State Parties) had bold aspirations for it: “general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction.” Convention Preamble, ibid. This purpose traces its origin to World War I, when “[o]ver a million casualties, up to 100,000 of them fatal, are estimated to have been caused by chemicals . . . , a large part following the introduction of mustard gas in 1917.” Kenyon, Why We Need a Chemical Weapons Convention and an OPCW, in The Creation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 1, 4 (I. Kenyon & D. Feakes eds. 2007) (Kenyon & Feakes). The atrocities of that war led the community of nations to adopt the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemicals as a method of warfare. Id., at 5.

    Up to the 1990s, however, chemical weapons remained in use both in and out of wartime, with devastating consequences. Iraq’s use of nerve agents and mustard gas during its war with Iran in the 1980s contributed to international support for a renewed, more effective chemical weapons ban. Id., at 6, 10–11. In 1994 and 1995, long-held fears of the use of chemical weapons by terrorists were realized when Japanese extremists carried out two attacks using sarin gas. Id., at 6. The Convention was conceived as an effort to update the Geneva Protocol’s protections and to expand the prohibition on chemical weapons beyond state actors in wartime. Convention Preamble, 1974 U. N. T. S. 318 (the State Parties are “[d]etermined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, . . . thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 1925”). The Convention aimed to achieve that objective by prohibiting the development, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons by any State Party or person within a State Party’s jurisdiction. Arts. I, II, VII. It also established an elaborate reporting process requiring State Parties to destroy chemical weapons under their control and submit to inspection and monitoring by an international organization based in The Hague, Netherlands. Arts. VIII, IX.

    The Convention provides:

    “(1) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

    “(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

    “(b) To use chemical weapons;

    “(c) To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons;

    “(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, any-one to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” Art. I, id., at 319.

    “Chemical Weapons” are defined in relevant part as “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.” Art. II(1)(a), ibid. “Toxic Chemical,” in turn, is defined as “Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” Art. II(2), id., at 320. “Purposes Not Prohibited Under this Convention” means “[i]ndustrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes,” Art. II(9)(a), id., at 322, and other specific purposes not at issue here, Arts. II(9)(b)–(d).

    Although the Convention is a binding international agreement, it is “not self-executing.” W. Krutzsch & R. Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention 109 (1994). That is, the Convention creates obligations only for State Parties and “does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law” absent “implementing legislation passed by Congress.” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, n. 2 (2008). It instead provides that “[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.” Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. S. 331. “In particular,” each State Party shall “[p]rohibit natural and legal persons anywhere . . . under its jurisdiction . . . from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity.” Art. VII (1)(a), id., at 331–332.

    Congress gave the Convention domestic effect in 1998 when it passed the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act. See 112Stat. 2681–856. The Act closely tracks the text of the treaty: It forbids any person knowingly “to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive, stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical weapon.” 18 U. S. C. §229(a)(1). It defines “chemical weapon” in relevant part as “[a] toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose.” §229F(1)(A). “Toxic chemical,” in turn, is defined in general as “any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.” §229F(8)(A). Finally, “purposes not prohibited by this chapter” is defined as “[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,” and other specific purposes. §229F(7). A person who violates section 229 may be subject to severe punishment: imprisonment “for any term of years,” or if a victim’s death results, the death penalty or imprisonment “for life.” §229A(a).

    B

    Petitioner Carol Anne Bond is a microbiologist from Lansdale, Pennsylvania. In 2006, Bond’s closest friend, Myrlinda Haynes, announced that she was pregnant. When Bond discovered that her husband was the child’s father, she sought revenge against Haynes. Bond stole a quantity of 10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine (an arsenic-based compound) from her employer, a chemical manufacturer. She also ordered a vial of potassium dichromate (a chemical commonly used in printing photographs or cleaning laboratory equipment) on Amazon.com. Both chemicals are toxic to humans and, in high enough doses, potentially lethal. It is undisputed, however, that Bond did not intend to kill Haynes. She instead hoped that Haynes would touch the chemicals and develop an uncomfortable rash.

    Between November 2006 and June 2007, Bond went to Haynes’s home on at least 24 occasions and spread the chemicals on her car door, mailbox, and door knob. These attempted assaults were almost entirely unsuccessful. The chemicals that Bond used are easy to see, and Haynes was able to avoid them all but once. On that occasion, Haynes suffered a minor chemical burn on her thumb, which she treated by rinsing with water. Haynes repeatedly called the local police to report the suspicious substances, but they took no action. When Haynes found powder on her mailbox, she called the police again, who told her to call the post office. Haynes did so, and postal inspectors placed surveillance cameras around her home. The cameras caught Bond opening Haynes’s mailbox, stealing an envelope, and stuffing potassium dichromate inside the muffler of Haynes’s car.

    Federal prosecutors naturally charged Bond with two counts of mail theft, in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1708. More surprising, they also charged her with two countsof possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violationof section 229(a). Bond moved to dismiss the chemical weapon counts on the ground that section 229 exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. The District Court denied Bond’s motion. She then entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved her right to appeal. The District Court sentenced Bond to six years in federal prison plus five years of supervised release, and ordered her to pay a $2,000 fine and $9,902.79 in restitution.

    Bond appealed, raising a Tenth Amendment challenge to her conviction. The Government contended that Bond lacked standing to bring such a challenge. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed. We granted certiorari, the Government confessed error, and we reversed. We held that, in a proper case, an individual may “assert injury from governmental action taken in excess of the authority that federalism defines.” Bond v. United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (Bond I) (slip op., at 8). We “expresse[d] no view on the merits” of Bond’s constitutional challenge. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14).

    On remand, Bond renewed her constitutional argument. She also argued that section 229 does not reach her conduct because the statute’s exception for the use of chemicals for “peaceful purposes” should be understood in contradistinction to the “warlike” activities that the Convention was primarily designed to prohibit. Bond argued that her conduct, though reprehensible, was not at all “warlike.” The Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 681 F. 3d 149 (CA3 2012). The court acknowledged that the Government’s reading of section 229 would render the statute “striking” in its “breadth” and turn every “kitchen cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a potential chemical weapons cache.” Id., at 154, n. 7. But the court nevertheless held that Bond’s use of “ ‘highly toxic chemicals with the intent of harming Haynes’ can hardly be characterized as ‘peaceful’ under that word’s commonly understood meaning.” Id., at 154 (citation omitted).

    The Third Circuit also rejected Bond’s constitutional challenge to her conviction, holding that section 229 was “necessary and proper to carry the Convention into effect.” Id., at 162. The Court of Appeals relied on this Court’s opinion in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920) , which stated that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” that implements it “as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government,” id., at 432.

    We again granted certiorari, 568 U. S. ___ (2013).

    II

    In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the remainder. The States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we have often called a “police power.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 567 (1995) . The Federal Government, by contrast, has no such authority and “can exercise only the powers granted to it,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819), including the power to make “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 18. For nearly two centuries it has been “clear” that, lacking a police power, “Congress cannot punish felonies generally.” Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 428 (1821). A criminal act committed wholly within a State “cannot be made an offence against the United States, unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States.” United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670, 672 (1878) .

    The Government frequently defends federal criminal legislation on the ground that the legislation is authorized pursuant to Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. In this case, however, the Court of Appeals held that the Government had explicitly disavowed that argument before the District Court. 681 F. 3d, at 151, n. 1. As a result, in this Court the parties have devoted significant effort to arguing whether section 229, as applied to Bond’s offense, is a necessary and proper means of executing the National Government’s power to make treaties. U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 2. Bond argues that the lower court’s reading of Missouri v. Holland would remove all limits on federal authority, so long as the Federal Government ratifies a treaty first. She insists that to effectively afford the Government a police power whenever it implements a treaty would be contrary to the Framers’ careful decision to divide power between the States and the National Government as a means of preserving liberty. To the extent that Holland authorizes such usurpation of traditional state authority, Bond says, it must be either limited or overruled.

    The Government replies that this Court has never held that a statute implementing a valid treaty exceeds Congress’s enumerated powers. To do so here, the Government says, would contravene another deliberate choice of the Framers: to avoid placing subject matter limitations on the National Government’s power to make treaties. And it might also undermine confidence in the United States as an international treaty partner.

    Notwithstanding this debate, it is “a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.” Escambia County v. Mc-Millan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam); see also Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Bond argues that section 229 does not cover her conduct. So we consider that argument first.

    III

    Section 229 exists to implement the Convention, so we begin with that international agreement. As explained, the Convention’s drafters intended for it to be a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. But even with its broadly worded definitions, we have doubts that a treaty about chemical weapons has anything to do with Bond’s conduct. The Convention, a product of years of worldwide study, analysis, and multinational negotiation, arose in response to war crimes and acts of terrorism. See Kenyon & Feakes 6. There is no reason to think the sovereign nations that ratified the Convention were interested in anything like Bond’s common law assault.

    Even if the treaty does reach that far, nothing prevents Congress from implementing the Convention in the same manner it legislates with respect to innumerable other matters—observing the Constitution’s division of responsibility between sovereigns and leaving the prosecution of purely local crimes to the States. The Convention, after all, is agnostic between enforcement at the state versus federal level: It provides that “[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Convention.” Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. S. 331 (emphasis added); see also Tabassi, National Implementation: Article VII, in Kenyon & Feakes 205, 207 (“Since the creation of national law, the enforcement of it and the structure and administration of government are all sovereign acts reserved exclusively for [State Parties], it is not surprising that the Convention is so vague on the critical matter of national implementation.”).

    Fortunately, we have no need to interpret the scope of the Convention in this case. Bond was prosecuted under section 229, and the statute—unlike the Convention—must be read consistent with principles of federalism inherent in our constitutional structure.

    A

    In the Government’s view, the conclusion that Bond “knowingly” “use[d]” a “chemical weapon” in violation of section 229(a) is simple: The chemicals that Bond placed on Haynes’s home and car are “toxic chemical[s]” as defined by the statute, and Bond’s attempt to assault Haynes was not a “peaceful purpose.” §§229F(1), (8), (7). The problem with this interpretation is that it would “dramatically intrude[ ] upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction,” and we avoid reading statutes to have such reach in the absence of a clear indication that they do. United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 350 (1971) .

    Part of a fair reading of statutory text is recognizing that “Congress legislates against the backdrop” of certain unexpressed presumptions. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244, 248 (1991) . As Justice Frankfurter put it in his famous essay on statutory interpretation, correctly reading a statute “demands awareness of certain presuppositions.” Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947). For example, we presume that a criminal statute derived from the common law carries with it the requirement of a culpable mental state—even if no such limitation appears in the text—unless it is clear that the Legislature intended to impose strict liability. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 422, 437 (1978) . To take another example, we presume, absent a clear statement from Congress, that federal statutes do not apply outside the United States. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255 (2010) . So even though section 229, read on its face, would cover a chemical weapons crime if committed by a U. S. citizen in Australia, we would not apply the statute to such conduct absent a plain statement from Congress.[30]The notion that some things “go without saying” applies to legislation just as it does to everyday life.

    Among the background principles of construction that our cases have recognized are those grounded in the relationship between the Federal Government and the States under our Constitution. It has long been settled, for example, that we presume federal statutes do not abrogate state sovereign immunity, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 243 (1985) , impose obligations on the States pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1–17 (1981), or preempt state law, Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947) .

    Closely related to these is the well-established principle that “ ‘it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides’ ” the “usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460 (1991) (quoting Atascadero, supra, at 243). To quote Frankfurter again, if the Federal Government would “ ‘radically readjust[ ] the balance of state and national authority, those charged with the duty of legislating [must be] reasonably explicit’ ” about it. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 544 (1994) (quoting Some Reflections, supra, at 539–540; second alteration in original). Or as explained by Justice Marshall, when legislation “affect[s] the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” Bass, supra, at 349.

    We have applied this background principle when construing federal statutes that touched on several areas of traditional state responsibility. See Gregory, supra, at 460 (qualifications for state officers); BFP, supra, at 544 (titles to real estate); Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 174 (2001) (land and water use). Perhaps the clearest example of traditional state authority is the punishment of local criminal activity. United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 618 (2000) . Thus, “we will not be quick to assume that Congress has meant to effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.” Bass, 404 U. S., at 349.

    In Bass, we interpreted a statute that prohibited any convicted felon from “ ‘receiv[ing], possess[ing], or transport[ing] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm.’ ” Id., at 337. The Government argued that the statute barred felons from possessing all firearms and that it was not necessary to demonstrate a connection to interstate commerce. We rejected that reading, which would “render[ ] traditionally local criminal conduct a matter for federal enforcement and would also involve a substantial extension of federal police resources.” Id., at 350. We instead read the statute more narrowly to require proof of a connection to interstate commerce in every case, thereby “preserv[ing] as an element of all the of-fenses a requirement suited to federal criminal jurisdiction alone.” Id., at 351.

    Similarly, in Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 850 (2000) , we confronted the question whether the federal arson statute, which prohibited burning “ ‘any . . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce,’ ” reached an owner-occupied private residence. Once again we rejected the Government’s “expansive interpretation,” under which “hardly a building in the land would fall outside the fed-eral statute’s domain.” Id., at 857. We instead held that the statute was “most sensibly read” more narrowly to reach only buildings used in “active employment for commercial purposes.” Id., at 855. We noted that “arson is a paradigmatic common-law state crime,” id., at 858, and that the Government’s proposed broad reading would “ ‘significantly change[ ] the federal-state balance,’ ” ibid. (quoting Bass, 404 U. S., at 349), “mak[ing] virtually every arson in the country a federal offense,” 529 U. S., at 859.

    These precedents make clear that it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve ambiguity in a federal statute. In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition given the term—“chemical weapon”—being defined; the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading; and the lack of any apparent need to do so in light of the context from which the statute arose—a treaty about chemical warfare and terrorism. We conclude that, in this curious case, we can insist on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States. See Bass, supra, at 349.[31]

    B

    We do not find any such clear indication in section 229. “Chemical weapon” is the key term that defines the statute’s reach, and it is defined extremely broadly. But that general definition does not constitute a clear statement that Congress meant the statute to reach local criminal conduct.

    In fact, a fair reading of section 229 suggests that it does not have as expansive a scope as might at first appear. To begin, as a matter of natural meaning, an educated user of English would not describe Bond’s crime as involving a “chemical weapon.” Saying that a person “used a chemical weapon” conveys a very different idea than saying the person “used a chemical in a way that caused some harm.” The natural meaning of “chemical weapon” takes account of both the particular chemicals that the defendant used and the circumstances in which she used them.

    When used in the manner here, the chemicals in this case are not of the sort that an ordinary person would associate with instruments of chemical warfare. The substances that Bond used bear little resemblance to the deadly toxins that are “of particular danger to the objectives of the Convention.” Why We Need a Chemical Weapons Convention and an OPCW, in Kenyon & Feakes 17 (describing the Convention’s Annex on Chemicals, a nonexhaustive list of covered substances that are subject to special regulation). More to the point, the use of something as a “weapon” typically connotes “[a]n instrument of offensive or defensive combat,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2589 (2002), or “[a]n instrument of attack or defense in combat, as a gun, missile, or sword,” American Heritage Dictionary 2022 (3d ed. 1992). But no speaker in natural parlance would describe Bond’s feud-driven act of spreading irritating chemicals on Haynes’s door knob and mailbox as “combat.” Nor do the other circumstances of Bond’s offense—an act of revenge born of romantic jealousy, meant to cause discomfort, that produced nothing more than a minor thumb burn—suggest that a chemical weapon was deployed in Norristown, Pennsylvania. Potassium dichromate and 10-chloro-10H-phenoxarsine might be chemical weapons if used, say, to poison a city’s water supply. But Bond’s crime is worlds apart from such hypotheticals, and covering it would give the statute a reach exceeding the ordinary meaning of the words Congress wrote.

    In settling on a fair reading of a statute, it is not un-usual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term, particularly when there is dissonance between that ordinary meaning and the reach of the definition. In Johnson v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 136 (2010) , for example, we considered the statutory term “ ‘violent felony,’ ” which the Armed Career Criminal Act defined in relevant part as an offense that “ ‘has as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another.’ ” Although “physical force against . . . another” might have meant any force, however slight, we thought it “clear that in the context of a statutory definition of ‘violent felony,’ the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Id., at 140. The ordinary meaning of “chemical weapon” plays a similar limiting role here.

    The Government would have us brush aside the ordinary meaning and adopt a reading of section 229 that would sweep in everything from the detergent under the kitchen sink to the stain remover in the laundry room. Yet no one would ordinarily describe those substances as “chemical weapons.” The Government responds that because Bond used “specialized, highly toxic” (though legal) chemicals, “this case presents no occasion to address whether Congress intended [section 229] to apply to common household substances.” Brief for United States 13, n. 3. That the statute would apply so broadly, however, is the inescapable conclusion of the Government’s position: Any parent would be guilty of a serious federal offense—possession of a chemical weapon—when, exasperated by the children’s repeated failure to clean the goldfish tank, he considers poisoning the fish with a few drops of vinegar. We are reluctant to ignore the ordinary meaning of “chemical weapon” when doing so would transform a statute passed to implement the international Convention on Chemical Weapons into one that also makes it a federal offense to poison goldfish. That would not be a “realistic assessment[ ] of congressional intent.” Post, at 6 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

    In light of all of this, it is fully appropriate to apply the background assumption that Congress normally preserves “the constitutional balance between the National Government and the States.” Bond I, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). That assumption is grounded in the very structure of the Constitution. And as we explained when this case was first before us, maintaining that constitutional balance is not merely an end unto itself. Rather, “[b]y denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.” Ibid.

    The Government’s reading of section 229 would “ ‘alter sensitive federal-state relationships,’ ” convert an astonishing amount of “traditionally local criminal conduct” into “a matter for federal enforcement,” and “involve a substantial extension of federal police resources.” Bass, 404 U. S., at 349–350. It would transform the statute from one whose core concerns are acts of war, assassination, and terrorism into a massive federal anti-poisoning regime that reaches the simplest of assaults. As the Government reads section 229, “hardly” a poisoning “in the land would fall outside the federal statute’s domain.” Jones, 529 U. S., at 857. Of course Bond’s conduct is serious and unacceptable—and against the laws of Pennsylvania. But the background principle that Congress does not normally intrude upon the police power of the States is critically important. In light of that principle, we are reluctant to conclude that Congress meant to punish Bond’s crime with a federal prosecution for a chemical weapons attack.

    In fact, with the exception of this unusual case, the Federal Government itself has not looked to section 229 to reach purely local crimes. The Government has identified only a handful of prosecutions that have been brought under this section. Brief in Opposition 27, n. 5. Most of those involved either terrorist plots or the possession of extremely dangerous substances with the potential to cause severe harm to many people. See United States v. Ghane, 673 F. 3d 771 (CA8 2012) (defendant possessed enough potassium cyanide to kill 450 people); United States v. Crocker, 260 Fed. Appx. 794 (CA6 2008) (defendant attempted to acquire VX nerve gas and chlorine gas as part of a plot to attack a federal courthouse); United States v. Krar, 134 Fed. Appx. 662 (CA5 2005) (per curiam) (defendant possessed sodium cyanide); United States v. Fries, 2012 WL 689157 (D Ariz., Feb. 28, 2012) (defendant set off a homemade chlorine bomb in the victim’s driveway, requiring evacuation of a residential neighborhood). The Federal Government undoubtedly has a substantial interest in enforcing criminal laws against assassination, terrorism, and acts with the potential to cause mass suffering. Those crimes have not traditionally been left predominantly to the States, and nothing we have said here will disrupt the Government’s authority to prosecute such offenses.

    It is also clear that the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (and every other State) are sufficient to prosecute Bond. Pennsylvania has several statutes that would likely cover her assault. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§2701 (2012) (simple assault), 2705 (reckless endangerment), 2709 (harassment). 3 And state authorities regularly enforce these laws in poisoning cases. See, e.g., Gamiz, Family Survives Poisoned Burritos, Allentown, Pa., Morning Call, May 18, 2013 (defendant charged with assault, reckless endangerment, and harassment for feeding burritos poisoned with prescription medication to her husband and daughter); Cops: Man Was Poisoned Over 3 Years, Harrisburg, Pa., Patriot News, Aug. 12, 2012, p. A11 (defendant charged with assault and reckless endangerment for poisoning a man with eye drops over three years so that “he would pay more attention to her”).

    The Government objects that Pennsylvania authorities charged Bond with only a minor offense based on her “harassing telephone calls and letters,” Bond I, 564 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2), and declined to prosecute her for assault. But we have traditionally viewed the exercise of state officials’ prosecutorial discretion as a valuable feature of our constitutional system. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U. S. 357, 364 (1978) . And nothing in the Convention shows a clear intent to abrogate that feature. Prosecutorial discretion involves carefully weighing the benefits of a prosecution against the evidence needed to convict, the resources of the public fisc, and the public policy of the State. Here, in its zeal to prosecute Bond, the Federal Government has “displaced” the “public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, enacted in its capacity as sovereign,” that Bond does not belong in prison for a chemical weapons offense. Bond I, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 12); see also Jones, supra, at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring) (federal prosecution of a traditionally local crime “illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively displace a policy choice made by the State”).

    As we have explained, “Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal crime conduct readily denounced as criminal by the States.” Bass, 404 U. S., at 349. There is no clear indication of a contrary approach here. Section 229 implements the Convention, but Bond’s crime could hardly be more unlike the uses of mustard gas on the Western Front or nerve agents in the Iran-Iraq war that form the core concerns of that treaty. See Kenyon & Feakes 6. There are no life-sized paintings of Bond’s rival washing her thumb. And there are no apparent interests of the United States Congress or the community of nations in seeing Bond end up in federal prison, rather than dealt with (like virtually all other criminals in Pennsylvania) by the State. The Solicitor General acknowledged as much at oral argument. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 47 (“I don’t think anybody would say [that] whether or not Ms. Bond is prosecuted would give rise to an international incident”).

    This case is unusual, and our analysis is appropriately limited. Our disagreement with our colleagues reduces to whether section 229 is “utterly clear.” Post, at 5 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). We think it is not, given that the definition of “chemical weapon” in a particular case can reach beyond any normal notion of such a weapon, that the context from which the statute arose demonstrates a much more limited prohibition was intended, and that the most sweeping reading of the statute would fundamentally upset the Constitution’s balance between national and local power. This exceptional convergence of factors gives us serious reason to doubt the Government’s expansive reading of section 229, and calls for us to interpret the statute more narrowly.

    In sum, the global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon. There is no reason to suppose that Congress—in implementing the Convention on Chemical Weapons—thought otherwise.

    *  *  *

    The Convention provides for implementation by each ratifying nation “in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. S. 331. As James Madison explained, the constitutional process in our “compound republic” keeps power “divided between two distinct governments.” The Federalist No. 51, p. 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). If section 229 reached Bond’s conduct, it would mark a dramatic departure from that constitutional structure and a serious reallocation of criminal law enforcement authority between the Federal Government and the States. Absent a clear statement of that purpose, we will not presume Congress to have authorized such a stark intrusion into traditional state authority.

    The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

    It is so ordered.

    __________
               
     
    Problem: Be prepared to answer the following questions about the case:

    1. Where does the federal Constitution provide a definition of federalism?  Where does the Court derive principle for reading federalism limits onto Congressional Power to legislate and the executive power to enter into international obligations.

    2. Do you think a decision that Bond was found guilty under section 229 of the Act would be plausible? How would you make that argument? Would it be plausible under a plain text analysis/interpretation? Did the Supreme Court primarily utilize plain text analysis/interpretation techniques? If so, how? Does plain text analysis/interpretation serve the desired outcome of the Supreme Court? If not, why? Are other forms of construction and interpretation used? If so, why?

    3. If the court did not use a textual analysis, what interpretive principles did it use?  How do you compare what way the Court used statutory analysis in Holy Trinity with the analysis of the majority in this case?

    4.  Why is a broad application and interpretation of Section 229 of the Act inconceivable for the Court even if every chemical, such as vinegar, could be interpreted, according to the Act, as a chemical weapon? – again is there something different about chemicals? When INTENTIONALLY using vinegar to harm/destroy/kill another living thing, even a goldfish as the example the Court used, do you agree that to classify this as a use of a chemical weapon is inconceivable?

    5.  Consider Belmont, studied above. Would the court have reached the same result if Section 229 had been part of a self executing executive agreement in which the parties specifically indicated that chemical weapons was to be broadly interpreted?




    [1]http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html
    [2]http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/343/579
    [3]This Board was established under Executive Order 10233, 16 Fed. Reg. 3503.
    [4]The Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 625-627, 50 U. S. C. App. (Supp. IV) § 468; the Defense Production Act of 1950, Tit. II, 64 Stat. 798, as amended, 65 Stat. 132.
    [5]93 Cong. Rec. 3637-3645.
    [6]93 Cong. Rec. 3835-3836.
    [7]Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 152-156, 29 U. S. C. (Supp. IV) §§ 141, 171-180.
    [8]http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/articles.html
    [9]http://www.bundesrat.de/nn_11004/EN/funktionen-en/inhalte/2-Vorteile-Nachteile-en.html
    [10]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Civil_War
    [11]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Depression
    [12]http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Civil-Rights-Movement.aspx
    [13]http://www.senate.gov/
    [14] http://www.house.gov/
    [15]http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_01.html
    [16]http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_47.html
    [17]http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/622-eap-balance.pdf
    [18]http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/343/579
    [19] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War
    [20]http://archive.org/stream/yearsoftrialandh000234mbp#page/n5/mode/2up
    [21]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_formalism
    [22] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Satrap
    [23]http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-6696.ZS.html
    [24]http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2007/06/legal_theory_le_1.html
    [25]http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5983?msg=welcome_stranger
    [26]http://unterm.un.org/dgaacs/unterm.nsf/8fa942046ff7601c85256983007ca4d8/99954c21bccf56e185257156006f0e6b?OpenDocument
    [27] http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/PLAW-107publ56.pdf
    [28]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1952_steel_strike
    [29]http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1379&context=facpubs
    [30]Congress has in fact included just such a plain statement in section 229(c)(2): “Conduct prohibited by [section 229(a)] is within the jurisdiction of the United States if the prohibited conduct . . . takes place outside of the United States and is committed by a national of the United States.”
    [31]Justice Scaliacontends that the relevance of Bassand Jones to this case is “entirely made up,” post, at 3 (opinion concurring in judgment), but not because he disagrees with interpreting statutes in light of principles of federalism. Rather, he says that Bass was a case where the statute was unclear. We agree; we simply think the statute in this case is also subject to construction, for the reasons given. As for Jones, Justice Scalia argues that the discussion of federalism in that case was beside the point. Post, at 4. We do not read Jones that way; the Court adopted the “most sensibl[e] read[ing]” of the statute, 529 U. S., at 855, which suggests that other sensible readings were possible. In arriving at its fair reading of the statute, the Court considered the dramatic extent to which the Government’s broader interpretation would have expanded “the federal statute’s domain.” Id., at 857. We do the same here.
     

    A More Muscular Mass Line: Shan Gao on " Reshaping the leadership of People’s Democratic Dictatorship: Mass Line Education in a nutshell"

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    The mass line has been a central element of the Chinese Communist line for a long time.  But it has undergone significant development, especially in the first decades of the 21st century. 

     

    But the mass line itself can be understood as containing two distinct dimensions.  One dimension is normative.  The mass line references the democratic obligation of the vanguard party to be responsive to the people as it moves society toward the achievement of a communist state.  That is inherent in the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party Constitution ("The Party follows the mass line in its work, doing everything for the masses, relying on them in every task, carrying out the principle of "from the masses, to the masses," and translating its correct views into action by the masses of their own accord. The biggest political advantage of the Party lies in its close ties with the masses while the biggest potential danger for it as a governing party comes from its divorce from them.").

    But equally important, and perhaps more so since the 18th Communist Party Congress, has been its intra-Party and disciplinary dimensions. That is also inherent in the General Program of the Chinese Communist Party Constitution ("The Party's style of work and its maintenance of ties with the masses of the people are a matter of vital importance to the Party. The Party will establish a sound system for punishing and preventing corruption by fighting it in a comprehensive way, addressing both its symptoms and root cause and combining punishment with prevention, with the emphasis on prevention. The Party will persistently oppose corruption and step up efforts to improve its style of work and uphold integrity." ). In this aspect, the mass line serves as a disciplinary technique, a measure of the responsiveness of party cadres to the people and a standard against which to measure corruption, an important element of f Xi Jinping's Five Key Points on Chinese Rule of Law (see HERE). 
    The upcoming education campaign, including cracking down on undesirable work styles, will bring a closer tie between the Party and the people, the editorial says.

    Undesirable work styles, such as formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and extravagance, are like an invisible wall that cuts off the Party from the people, depriving the CPC of people foundation, it says.

    Faced with the challenges in the new era, all CPC members should carry forward the glorious tradition of arduously struggle and make exemplary conducts, it adds. (People's Daily editorial stresses stronger ties with masses, Xinhua, July 1, 2013)

    This post highlights a short essay produced by Shan Gao, a member of the research team at the Coalition for Peace and Ethics, that considers the current form of mass line education among party cadres.  The essay,  
    -->Reshaping the leadership of People’s Democratic Dictatorship: Mass Line Education in a nutshell, looks in more detail at the shape and content of the current mass line education campaign.  While the effects appears solely aimed at Party discipline, its effects will likley be widely felt throughout Chinese society and business. 


    Reshaping the leadership of People’s Democratic Dictatorship: Mass Line Education in a nutshell
    Shan Gao


    Introduction

    Since the new administration of 18th Central Committee of CPC, there is a visible shift of Party work from emphasizing the governing power of the democratic dictatorship into emphasizing what qualify as proper execution of democratic dictatorship. The party leader understand that undesired working style and illegal or malpractice during the execution are the real elephant in room that deteriorate people-party ties and destabilized governing power , thus reshaping the leadership became an imminent theme for this administration. The lunch of Anti-Corruption campaign and the current Mass Line Education campaign focused on improving public perception of party leadership through two aspects: prosecute illegal and malpractice conducts by party members; exposed and intervene problems of working and life style. Both of the campaigns revealed party intent to reshape the leadership in the short term and reinstall law and orders in the long term.


    The background of the Mass Line Education

    For the past few years, China’s glamourous urban transformation and Chinese corporations’ high profile global presentations have been shadowed by the rising social issues of rich-poor gap, bureaucracy, pollution, justice and corruption. The growing public outcry and great expectations for deep reform put China’s social transition and achievements under global spotlights and then casted severe criticisms and doubts on Chinese government as well as its social-political system. These attention and criticisms are like gloomy clouds, which concerned party’s new administration, as party leader Xi put this way “winning or losing public support is an issue that concerns the CPC’s survival or extinction… the CPC can only be stable when it maintains a single mind and shares weal and woe with the people, as well as relies on the people to push forward historical advancement.[1]

    Since the 18th central committee of CPC, the imminent focus of the new administration is to transform Public’s perception of the Party, and more importantly, Party member’s perception on Party’ leadership. This is an enchanted topic that both western and china unresolved: how to carry out vanguard party’s leadership to governing a socialist state. The new administration intent to fix some problems within its system and ideology work, which is an uneasy project requires necessary institutional reforms as well as some ideology production that premised on the level of state, society and individual person.

    The lunch of ideology campaign “Chinese Dream[2]” and “Socialist Core Value[3]” are the perfect examples showed new administration’s intention of rising social awareness on the modernized vision of socialist state. The new vision involved elements such as economy prosperity, social justice and personal virtue. Every Chinese are expected to learn these new elements of socialist state from every possible way: large banner of “Chinese Dream” and “Socialist Core Value” has been displayed in every outdoor billboards nationwide, even shared space with regular commercial post.


    (From Left, “Chinese Dream, after all, is the dream of the people. We must realize it by closely depending on the people. We must incessantly bring benefits to the people. Realizing the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modren history.” Quote Xi jinping)

    (Right, “Socialist Core Vallue: (State) prosperity, democracy, civility, harmony, (Society) freedom, equality, justice, the rule of law, (Person) patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendship”)


    Besides large scale propaganda works try to reshape public’s perception on modernized notion of socialist state, other campaigns were set up to re-educate Party cadres and members with correct understanding on Party’s leadership. The lunch of the anti-corruption campaign[4] with the restructure of Central Discipline and Inspection agency and the lunch of nationwide Mass Line Education campaign both led to party’s effort on reshaping the party’s leadership and working style. If the anti-corruption campaign concerns the legitimacy of party members’ execution of power, then the nation-wide Mass Line Education campaign put great weight on reeducate party members for the quality and efficiency of such execution.

    On June 18, Xi JInping proclaimed the year-long Mass Line Education Campaign in Beijing, which designed to “thoroughly reshape Party members’ working style” with the focus of rekindling a strong ties with people. As the CCTV webpage provided that:

    “’Mass line’ refers to a guideline under which CPC officials and members are required to prioritize the interests of the people and persist in representing them and working on their behalf. The one-year educational campaign was launched in June by China´s leaders to boost ties between CPC officials, members and the people, while cleaning up undesirable work styles such as formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance.[5]

    The Education campaign is also a reinforcement on the tightening party discipline and regulation in order to reshape party officials’ revolutionary image, Xinhua news cited Xi’s words: “Party should take the campaign as a chance to introduce new rules, improve existing ones, and nullify outdated regulations.” Thus, the operation of Anti-Corruption campaign and Mass Line Education campaign could be considered together as a “house cleaning” that try to sweep away undesired party member and their working style in order to reshape their leadership.

    What is Mass Line Education?

    On May 9th, Central Committee of CPC issue Opinions on Strictly Implement the Mass Line Education, which detailed the significances of having mass line education, the main tasks and objectives. According to the Opinion, Party cadres and members above county levels[6]” (a group of party members who normally holding higher ranking posts in government, SOEs and other social organizations) shall participant the one year education program.

    Unlike anti-corruption campaign targets the illegal and malpractice of party cadres and members, mass line education campaign has very specific goal that targeted the working and life style of party members: against undesired working style in order to improve people’s satisfaction on the work of party cadres and members, against extravagant spending in order to improve the public image of the party. Xi’s keynote on May 9th summarized this object as “fight against formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism and extravagance; fulfilling the requirements of serving the people, being down-to earth, upright and corruption-free; making efforts to solve outstanding problems and firmly grasping the basic principles.[7]

    The education campaign advice party members “watching from the mirror, grooming oneself, taking a bath and seeking remedies.” A metaphor of “self-purification, self-perfection, self-renewal and self-progression,” which requiring three stages of a one year education program. These stages designed to identify, confess and intervene some of the most undesired working and life style problems of the party members. The stages are: “study and communication, applying education material and Identify problems in the work, and Correct problems and introduce norms.” As the below diagram shows:


    This three stage process designed to reeducate party cadres and members with correct understanding of their duties and responsibilities as a member of vanguard party and how to properly carry out these duties in order to satisfy the needs of the people.

    How does Mass Line Education Campaign organized?

    According to the data from people.com, the first round education campaign focus on the more than 17 million Party cadres and members from the central committee of CPC level and provincial level. The second round focuses on more than 69 million party cadres and members above the county level[8]. In order to efficiently carry out a nation-wide education program on this scale, the campaign has been organized in hierarchy manner with a temporary working system that affiliate with the party organization.



    As the above diagram showed, the headquarters of the education campaign is a temporary organ, “Mass Line Education Campaign Leading Work Group Office (hereafter the Office),” which carries out the day to day operation of the education work under its jurisdiction. The Office is led by Party secretary from higher ranking Party Committee, thus when higher ranking Party secretary finished their education through the first round of the program, they are eligible to charge the Office and direct the education program for his or her lower level Party colleagues. Other members of the Office is selected from the Party organization within the entity by local or central Party Committee. For example, in order to lunch an education program for all the government agencies and departments at city district level, a Leading Work Group Office is needed to be installed with the aid of district party committee. The party secretary of the district government would be the director of the Office, while senior officers and junior government employees would be selected to fulfill other duties to run the Office.

    Three major sectors and other sectors had been set up to run specific area of education campaign. The General sector designs study activities and responses for the coordination and communication between different study groups that participated the education program. General sector reports to Office director and take out instructions or decisions made by the director. The propaganda sector promotes and publishes the study program or activity during the education campaign. The Inspection group is the most important one, which monitors the study quality of the participators under its assigned jurisdictions. They would closely oversee the operation of education program by sending their liaison officer to inspect study activity during the three stages. In practice, each inspector sector from the Office would oversee about 7-8 study groups.

    Read, Confess and Intervene: Three Stage of Education Campaign

    As previously suggested, the one year education program has three stages with different objectives. The first one is a study and opinion session that educate party members with party values, principles and socialism theory. The second stage is an admission and confession session: based on what you learnt from the previous stage, admit your weakness and wrongdoings in work and personal life. The third stage is a correction session that party members provide solutions to those identified issues. The entire three stages is a huge project that directed by the Office and overseen by the Organization Department of CPC.

    Study reading materials is the core of the first stage. There are six books that been universally used during the education campaign, which are three white books, one blue book, one red book and one book on socialist evolution theory. The three white books are:

    1. Strict Implementation of frugal and thrifty style, and Anti Waste: Anthology of Important Words from Leaders by Party Literature Research Office;

    2. Selected Works On Mass Line, by Party Literature Research Office;

    3. Selected Studying Materials for CPC Mass Line Education Program by Mass Line Education Campaign Central Leading Work Group Office;

    The first two books are the anthology from previous and current party leaders’ instructions, orders and speeches on topics of Mass Line and anti-extravagancy, both of which had been structured in a chronologic order[9]. The third white book wholly devoted to selected speeches of Xi Jinping since the 18th congress of CPC with great focus on promoting the party working ethic and party members’ responsibilities to the party, people, and nation. Unlike previously published anthology by central propaganda department that omit the Xi’s speech on commemorate 30 anniversary of 1982 Constitution, this publication titled with “selected studying materials” not only included “Xi Jinping commemorated the 30th anniversary of China’s 1982 Constitution” but also “carefully study the Party Constitution and strictly follow it.”



    (Three White Books: Selected speeches and instructions from previous and current party leaders on the Mass Line, anti-extravagancy and selected speeches by Xi Jinping on certain important issues)

    The red book and blue book are two case studies that focus on good example and bad examples of party cadres’ behavior in their work. The Blue Book, or Case Study on Endangerment of Mass Interest, it listed some of the most high profile cases involved with mass petition and mass protest as examples to show how official’s wrongful conducts and misperception of the power would cause massive social grievance. For example, some citation of the book from the public provides that:

    “The first and foremost question of the mass line education is about value, which Party cadres have to reconsidering who they are working for… some party cadres has misconception on their ruling power. Party cadres cannot always consider their power is come from party or his superior. In fact, our power come from the people. [10]

    The Redbook, on the other hand listed all good example of party cadre behavior and working style that defend and promote people’s interest[11].

    (Blue Book and Red Book, showing good example and bad example of party cadre’s working style)

    The last book is Global Socialism in Five Hundred Years (Party Cadres Edition) by Central Propaganda Department Theory Bureau[12]. Unlike other books focus on the mass line and party cadres’ work and life style, this book concentrate on one topic: the evolution of socialism under the time frame of five centuries. It has six chapters, one epilogue and one postscript. The first four chapters devoted to the evolution of socialism in foreign land. Follow a chronological order, the writer introduced the origination of utopian socialism ideal in 16th century, the creation of Marxist-Engle’s Socialist Theory, and the establishment of Lenin State, the rise and fall of soviet state and other Eastern Europe socialist state. Chapter five and six focuses on the development of socialism in China with conclusion that socialism with Chinese characteristics would bring great prosperity for future china. The epilogue further concludes the historical trend of replacing capitalism with socialism and firm opinion on China’s unique socialism. In summary, this is a book about socialism and socialist faith, designed to reeducate party member for their socialist belief.


    (Global Socialism in Five Hundred Years (Party Cadres Edition) by Central Propaganda Department Theory Bureau, Xuexi Publishing House, Dangjian Duwu Publishing House. A book about socialism and socialist faith, designed to reeducate party member for their socialist belief.)

    The reading materials are the only one part of learning process, the education program also provided documentaries, study conference, and group discussions. The inspection sector of the Office would go examine the quality of the study activity by showing up without any advance notice.

    After fair amount of time of the learning stage, participants of Mass Line Education are required to participate confession and self-reflection sessions. At this stage, the party cadres and members are expected to admit their personal wrongdoings and weakness for extravagancy life style. Just as the previous stage, the inspect sector of the Office would show up at the session without advance notice. Participants are required to admit these problems through the form of oral debates with other party members and written statements that handle to the Office for review. The subsectors of the Office would carefully review these written statements in accordance with specific sets of principles and requirements. When party cadres’ statement not satisfy certain evaluating criteria, even formatting issue, he or she need to revise and resubmit the statement. Frequent revise for “6 or 9 times” is quite normal as one junior employee of the Party Organization said. Although insubordinate and uncooperative behavior is highly unlikely, the subsector in fact lacks technics to verify the facts of submitted statements.

    The criticism part of this session could be carried out in various forms. For some study group, this is like sending out customer review questionnaires, except the “customer” here are the people that they serve. Sometimes, the criticism could be organized in the form of Democratic Life Meeting, as some foreign experts noticed[13]. More importantly, the criticism session is not an exclusive close door or internal session. The education campaign provides open door sessions, designed to improve the transparency of party work by inviting people to participate the process and submit their complaints to the party cadres. During the first round of mass line education in last September, Hebei Provincial Party Committee Democratic Meeting had been aired on national TV[14] at prime time. Thus, inviting people to join the meeting and submit complaints became a standard process within the education program.


    (Left: On September 25, state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) aired a 24-minute segment about a recent self-criticism session by party officials in Hebei Province at prime time of evening news. This unusual move of high officials’ public confession had raise speculations on the exercise of left Maoism[15].)

    (Right: Local Municipal Government Democratic Meeting invited representatives from people, party members and other cadres[16].)


    The last stage of the education program is the session of assessing and correcting issues, and establishing prevention mechanism. At this stage, party cadres and members are required to submit reports to Inspector group showing they correct their problems. The subsectors from the Office would assess these reports, file the dock and provide comments to the study groups. All those files will be collected and reevaluated by special committee for the purpose of final report. The end of education program at each level is marked by the publication of such report at a specific conference.


    Summary

    Unlike Anti-Corruption Campaign that investigated and prosecuted illegal or malpractice conducts by party cadres and members, the Mass Line Education Campaign mainly reeducate party members for undesired working or life style. Substantial punishments are not the purpose of the campaign. Although insubordinate or uncooperative behavior is highly unlikely during the program, workers from Organizational Department admitted they lacks man power and technic to verify whether problems had been truly exposed and whether exposed problems would be properly fixed. Despite this flaw within the education program, the leader did emphasize after the year-long program, regulations and rules shall be installed in order to maintain long term order and quality of party working style.

    By inviting the commons, and reintroducing party values and principles, the Party wish to expose and intervene problems, so its members and cadres could reshape their working style and revolutionary images to improve the connections with the people. At the end of the day, the lunch of Anti-Corruption Campaign and the Mass Line Education Campaign both suggested new Party Committee intent to reshape vanguard party’s leadership by reinforce revolutionary values, principles and modernized ideology works on socialism. Both campaigns are perfect example showing the new party committee wish to start reform from the party and party discipline first. Precisely those old thinking and old habits that halt a substantial reform.



    NOTES:

    [1] Xinhua News, Xi: Upcoming CPC campaign a "thorough cleanup" of undesirable practices, June 18, 2013, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/18/c_132465115.htm


    [2] Xinhua News, Profile: Xi Jinping: Pursuing dream for 1.3 billion Chinese, March 16, 2013, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/17/c_124467411.htm


    [3] Xinhua News, Xi stresses core socialist values, Feb 2, 2014,see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-02/25/c_126190257.htm


    [4] Xinhua News, No ending for CPC anti-corruption war, April 25, 2014, see http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206974/8609981.html


    [5] About Mass Line Campaign, http://english.cntv.cn/special/cpcmassline/homepage/index.shtml


    [6] CCTV News, Xi orders spicing-up of China's anti-graft campaign, March 19, 2014, see http://english.cntv.cn/special/cpcmassline/homepage/index.shtml


    [7] CCTV News, Xi: Upcoming CPC campaign a "thorough cleanup" of undesirable practices, June 18, 2013, see http://english.cntv.cn/20130618/105384.shtml


    [8] CPC News, Diagram Explaining the Mass Line Education, Oct 8. 2014, see http://qzlx.people.com.cn/n/2014/1008/c364565-25789042.html


    [9] Party Literature Research Office, Strict Implementation of frugal and thrifty style, and Anti Waste: Anthology of Important Words from Leaders, Central CPC Literature Publishing House. The preface provided that:

    “[I]n response to Xi’s criticism on the ‘extravagant spending and waste on Dinners and Banquets’…we selected some Party cadres’ important instructions on anti-extravagant spending: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zeming, Hu Jingtao, Xi Jinping, Zhen Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Chen Yun for your Mass Line Education study.”

    Selected Works On Mass Line, by Party Literature Research Office, Central CPC Literature Publishing House and Party Building Books Publishing House. The preface provided that:

    2013 June: This book is specifically designed for Mass Line Education Campaign, which selected Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zeming, Hu Jingtao and Xi Jinping’s discussion on the mass line and historical materialism with great focus on “serve the people” and “being competent and incorruptible”




    [10]损害群众利益典型案例剖析摘编http://www.guchengnews.com/2014/0306/250587.shtml


    [11]各地联系服务群众经验做法选编, 中央党的群众路线教育实践活动领导小组办公室http://www.wfhlxy.com/qunzhong/E_ReadNews.asp?NewsID=668


    [12] Webpage introducing Global Socialism in Five Hundred Years, see CPC News, http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/68294/375830/


    [13] Jerome Doyon, The End of the Road for Xi’s Mass Line Campaign: An Assessment, Oct 28, 2014, see http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=42991&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=8b3cd141a264ddaa1b47d899074719f6#.VE0M9PnF-So


    [14] Hebei Party Secretary criticized by its peers on national TV, September 27, http://news.sohu.com/20130927/n387340361.shtml


    [15] Party’s TV ‘self-criticism’ and militant rhetoric raise specter of Maoism, Oct 9, 2013, see http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/china-media-bulletin-issue-no-94#.VE0M2fnF-So


    [16]市委组织部召开党的群众路线教育实践活动征求意见座谈会, April 1, http://www.gzdw.gov.cn/n289/n421/n578/c10448210/content.html

    Announcing "Business and Human Rights Jounal" a New Cambridge Journal and Call for Papers

    $
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    It is my great pleasure to pass along an announcement of the start of what will be an excellent and much needed journal established under the aegis of Cambridge University Press--the Business and Human Rights Journal.

    A description of the new Journal, on whose editorial board I serve, and the initial call for papers follows, along with a list of the editors in chief and the editorial board of the Journal. Please consider submitting your manuscripts to the BHRJ.




    The Business and Human Rights Journal (BHRJ) is a new peer-reviewed academic journal published by Cambridge University Press. The journal will be launched at the 4th UN Business and Human Rights Forum in December 2015.

    BHRJ will provide an authoritative platform for scholarly debate on all issues concerning the interface of business and human rights in an open, critical and interdisciplinary manner. It aims to publish original and diverse works of the highest scholarly quality examining any relevant issue from theoretical, empirical and policy/reform-oriented perspective.

    In addition to publishing scholarly articles and book reviews, BHRJ will feature a ‘Developments in the Field’ (DiF) section, which will include short pieces highlighting key policy, legal and regulatory developments, as well as case studies and insight pieces by academics, practitioners, human rights advocates, and policy-makers.

    The Editors welcome submissions on all business and human rights-related topics from scholars and practitioners working in diverse fields such as business and human rights, corporate social responsibility, business ethics, business management, economics, political science, sociology, international law, international relations, public policy, constitutional law, human rights, labour law, environmental law, trade and investment law, consumer protection law, corporate/business law, corporate governance, sustainability, and globalisation. We encourage submissions from scholars representing all parts of the world and particularly from scholars in the Global South.

    BHRJ will consider submissions on a rolling basis. However, in order to be considered for the inaugural issue, the submission deadline is 31 March 2015.

    The recommended length (including footnotes) is 9,000-12,000 words for articles, 1,500-2,500 words for DiF pieces, and 1,000-1,500 words for book reviews. The Editors may, however, consider longer or shorter papers. Please consult the BHRJ style sheet for further instructions for contributors.

    Manuscripts should be sent as a Word attachment to BHRJ@cambridge.org. If you have any queries, please contact any of the Editors-in-Chief:

    Surya Deva (suryad@cityu.edu.hk),
    Anita Ramasastry (arama@uw.edu),
    Michael Santoro (msantoro@business.rutgers.edu), and
    Florian Wettstein (florian.wettstein@unisg.ch).

    _________

    Editors
    Professor Anita Ramasastry
    Professor Michael Santoro
    Professor Florian Wettstein
    Associate Professor Surya Deva

    Book Review Editor
    Associate Professor Karin Buhmann
    Copenhagen Business School (CBS)
    Porcelaenshaven 18 B
    DK- 2000 Frederiksberg
    Denmark

    Editorial Board
    Dr Michael K Addo
    University of Exeter; Member, UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, UK
    Professor Denis G Arnold
    University of North Carolina at Charlotte, USA
    Professor Dorothee Baumann-Pauly
    NYU’s Stern School of Business, USA
    Professor David Bilchitz
    Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
    Professor George G Brenkert
    McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, USA
    Professor Tom Campbell
    Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Sturt University, Australia
    Professor Wang Canfa
    China University of Political Science and Law; Director, Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victim, China
    Professor Larry Catá Backer
    Dickinson Law School, Penn State University, USA
    Professor Andrew Clapham
    Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
    Dr Shane Darcy
    Irish Centre for Human Rights Galway, Ireland
    Professor Thomas Donaldson
    Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, USA
    Associate Professor Mary Gallagher
    Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, USA
    Professor Erika George
    College of Law, University of Utah, USA
    Associate Professor Nien-hê Hsieh
    Harvard Business School, USA
    Professor Sarah Joseph
    Faculty of Law and Director, Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Monash University, Australia
    Professor David Kinley
    Chair in Human Rights Law, Sydney Law School, Australia
    Professor Ching Kwan Lee
    University of California at Los Angeles, USA
    Professor Sheldon Leader
    School of Law, University of Essex; Director, Essex Business and Human Rights Project, UK
    Professor Robert McCorquodale
    British Institute of International & Comparative Law, UK
    Professor Ken McPhail
    University of Manchester, UK
    Assistant Professor Mahdev Mohan
    Singapore Management University, Singapore
    Dr Justine Nolan
    Faculty of Law and Deputy Director, Australian Human Rights Centre, University of New South Wales, Australia
    Professor Guido Palazzo
    University of Lausanne, Switzerland
    Professor Thomas Pogge
    Yale University, USA
    Professor César Rodríguez Garavito
    Program on Global Justice, University of Los Andes, Colombia
    Associate Professor Sara Seck
    Faculty of Law, Western University, Canada
    Associate Professor Penelope Simons
    Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, Canada
    Professor Patricia H Werhane
    Darden School of Business, University of Virginia, USA
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