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Thinking About Sustainability Reporting: The Conference Board Issues its "Sustainability Practices: Trends in Corporate Sustainability Reporting in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific (2018)"

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Sustainability reporting is one of the new frontiers of corporate social responsibility within an accountability based culture structured around sub-cultures of risk management and compliance (social and legal).  Its character as a frontier challenge for business responding to changing structures of legal and social risk is a function of a number of factors, many of which are both well known and under-explored. All are politically and ideologically contentious.     

In recent years, our friends at the Conference Board been been examining sustainability issues (e.g., From the Conference Board: Embedding Sustainability Issues in Corporate Boards).   They have just announced distribution of a new data driven report: Thomas Singer, Anuj Saush, and Anke Schrader, Sustainability Practices: Trends in Corporate Sustainability Reporting in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific(Conference Board 2018 ISBN: 978-0-8237-1370-7).

The Report is worth reading and considering carefully for what it tells us about sustainability "from the bottom up." The executive Summary and my brief comments follows below.




First, sustainability is itself a term in search of a consensus definition.  Sustainability, for the moment appears to be whatever it is the reporting enterprise (or the opposing non governmental organization, or for that matter the state) it is.  Second, there is a lively "marketplace" for approaches to defining sustainability.  The one with the most likely potential for dominance (eventually) may be the UN Sustainable Development Goals project.  But that is not a sure thing. Third, because sustainability reporting tends to embrace quite a number of distinct goals, its power is weakened as companies develop methodologies for picking and choosing from among the many sustainability goals those that it will emphasize for its reporting (and those that it might emphasize less for its operations).



 (Sustainability Practices: Trends in Corporate Sustainability Reporting in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific (2018), p. 11) 
 

Fourth, sustainability principles are unconnected to any sort of accountability or compliance measures. Indeed, one of the great tasks that remains unfulfilled either in the context of sustainability or human rights reporting is the inability to develop accountability measures that are little more than ever more elaborate exercises in story-tellingFifth, efforts to develop sustainability accountability measures also are heavily embedded in a competitive market environment in which public and private bodies are racing to get "product" out into the market and to acquire a dominant position.  Sixth,  incoherence in this context is not necessarily a bad thing given the early stage of development of this area.  However This is not a bad thing in the short term but it has a profound effect on transparency, reducing its value as companies retreat to narrative reporting.  Seventh, the resulting incoherence in both principles and accountability measures, even among reporting companies, makes comparison within an enterprise and between enterprises virtually impossible except at a very broad level of generality.  


 (Sustainability Practices: Trends in Corporate Sustainability Reporting in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific (2018), p.6) 



Eighth, sustainability reporting has yet to substantially integrate it methodologies and effects to reporting about a company's financial reporting. To the extent that sustainability and financial reporting remain distinct and separate operations it will be difficult to deeply integrate sustainability practices into production decision making. 

___________


Thomas Singer, Anuj Saush, and Anke Schrader, Sustainability Practices: Trends in Corporate Sustainability Reporting in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific(Conference Board 2018 ISBN: 978-0-8237-1370-7).

Executive Summary

Corporate sustainability reporting—the disclosure of the economic, environmental, and social impacts of a company—has evolved tremendously over the last two decades, growing from a niche practice to one increasingly expected of companies. The main- streaming of sustainability reporting has been driven, in part, by increased pressure from shareholders and other stakeholders who see value in understanding how a company manages its nonfinancial impacts. This message was made clear by BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink in his 2018 letter to company CEOs. Reporting is also being helped along

by pointed regulations in various regions. Whether the combination of regulatory requirements and shareholder pressure will improve actual sustainability performance, not just compliance, remains to be seen.

Sustainability reporting is still not a uniform practice across the globe and remains sporadic in countries where nonfinancial reporting regulation and stakeholder pressures are absent Even in Europe, where nonfinancial reporting has had a longer history compared to other regions, there are significant differences in levels of transparency across countries. For example, there is as wide a gap in the levels of disclosure between companies in the United Kingdom and Poland, as there is between companies in

Japan and Pakistan. The lack of comparable nonfinancial reporting regulations across jurisdictions has in part made sustainability reporting a globally uneven practice. In a few countries, mandatory nonfinancial reporting requirements have led to significant increases in disclosure rates. In the absence of mandated disclosure, in some countries industry-led initiatives and stakeholder pressure have also been major drivers of disclosure. But sustainability reporting rates are conspicuously low in countries where stakeholder pressures and regulation are both largely absent.

Mandatory and voluntary sustainability reporting instruments will continue to shape reporting practices, with an increased focus on materiality Some mandatory reporting instruments are being introduced at a regional level (e.g., the EU Directive on nonfinancial reporting), others at the national level (e.g., gender pay gap reporting in the UK), and some are market driven (e.g., Singapore Exchange Sustainability Reporting Guide, California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) petition to require public companies to disclose environmental, social, and governance (ESG) aspects). Some companies disclose more than they are required to, spurred in large part by pressure from investors and a recognition that transparency can help strengthen relationships with stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and suppliers. Voluntary reporting frameworks, such as the GRI Standards, play an important role in helping companies navigate nonfinancial disclosure.

These voluntary reporting instruments are also evolving to encourage companies to focus their reporting on material issues—those that companies and their stakeholders deem most important or relevant to their business. Materiality is a key focus, for example, of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which encourages firms to align climate-related risk disclosures with investors’ needs. While a minority of companies currently disclose the material risks that climate change poses to their business, for example, increased pressure from investors and regulators is likely to change that.

Nonfinancial disclosure alone does not necessarily translate into better sustainability performance as companies tick the boxes without tipping the scales This finding raises the fundamental question of why companies report and whether regulations are translating into improvements in sustainability performance. For example, 99 percent of sample companies in Japan report the percentage of women on the board, yet women account for only 3 percent of directors among Japanese companies. Similarly, 70 percent of companies in Taiwan report board diversity figures, yet women account for a meager 7 percent of directors. By contrast, just under half of companies in France report the share of women on their boards, and women hold a median of 40 percent of board seats among these companies. Not all sustainability reporting requirements are effective at driving performance improvements. Existing reporting requirements are more effective when they include due diligence mechanisms to achieve not only greater disclosure but also performance improvements. Lastly, companies can benefit much more by embracing not only the letter but the spirit of the reporting instruments, mandatory or voluntary, which ultimately are intended to drive improvements in sustainability performance.

New Draft Posted: "From the Social to the Human Rights of Labor: Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 23, the ILO, and Working Rights Principles"

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer; detail of Pieter Brueghel, Le Combat de Carnavale et Carême; Royal Museum of Fine Arts Brussels)

I take this opportunity to announce the posting of a new draft, "From the Social to the Human Rights of Labor: Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 23, the ILO, and Working Rights Principles" (CPE Working Paper No. 2/1 (Jan. 2019)).

The essay reflects a little about the well known great transformation of conceptions from which society could think about and respond to the "problem" of labor to the contemporary conceptual baselines that shifted the normative gaze from the "problem" of labor to that of laborers  within a conceptual framework now focused on the "problem" of the rights of individuals and the obligations of states, enterprises (and eventually) other actors). The expectation is that a final version of this essay may appear in(Humberto Cantú Rivera (ed.) ) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (Brill/Nijhoff, 2019).

The abstract and introduction follow below.  The essay may be accessed here


Working Papers
Coalition for Peace & Ethics




Abstract: Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights represents the culmination of a substantial transformation in the conceptual baselines for developing legal and normative frameworks respecting work and workers. This chapter considers this movement from a focus on conditions of labor to the modern principles that frame the human rights of labor. Section 1 of the chapter provides the context, situating labor rights from conceptions of social rights to rights embedded within the broad spectrum of human rights. Section 2 examines the movement of labor rights principles from its initial international conceptualization in the newly formed International Labor Organization in 1919 to its eventual expression as the principles of article 23. Section 3 then considers the impact of article 23’s right to work principles. The section first considers the development of labor rights principles through different international instruments. It then considers UDHR labor rights principles as specifically addressed in regional or domestic contexts. It ends with reflections on challenges and obstacles now and going forward. A later version may appear in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (Humberto Cantú Rivera (ed.), Brill/Nijhoff, 2019 (forthcoming))
Key words: labor rights, human rights, ILO, trafficking child labor, slavery, forced labor, Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, right to work.

1. Introduction

In retrospect, now 70 years after its declaration by the General Assembly as the first part of what would emerge as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[1] the international community quite clearly sees in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the great foundational document of the contemporary world,[2] one confirmed in the 1993 UN Vienna Declaration on human rights.[3] The UDHR has been the impetus for the numerous international instruments, and the underlying normative basis of the work of regional human rights organizations, as well as those embedded within the domestic legal orders of many states. That impetus might well have been made possible, ironically enough, because initial resistance required abandonment of any idea of producing a legally binding document rather than a set of principles.[4] Yet any concerted approach to the legalization of human rights at the international level remained both contentious and latent until after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of globalization as the operative mode of internationalization.[5] In the contemporary world, the UDHR has found its way into the discourse of social norms overseen by international public organization, and most importantly perhaps into the language, discourse and emerging structures of business and human rights.[6] The UDHR serves as the baseline for policy, legal or judicial consideration of human rights ‘elements’ in economic, political, and social institutional action.[7]

The unity of that foundational role, however, also tends to veil the substantial divisions that have mired efforts to transpose the principles of the UDHR into international law, and the further difficulty of transposing the international legal obligations of states into their respective domestic legal orders. The core differences among states with respect to the value and precedence of the principles of the UDHR has fractured the project of legalization into multiple components. These pit those states and their intellectual allies who saw in the UDHR principles of social, economic and cultural rights the necessary basis for the development (later) of civil and political rights, against those who saw the development of robust regimes of civil and political rights as the necessary predicate for the legitimate development of economic, social and cultural rights.[8] That fracture intensifies in application within international and domestic orders in the face of the influence of those who have seen in the UDHR a troubling architecture for the normalization of Western liberal values and approaches at the expense of those who were on the wrong end of European colonization and imperial projects.[9] Civil society participation reflected this division.[10]

The fractures that emerged even as the UDHR was being drafted might well have been understood as latent within the UDHR themselves, embedded, for example, within the discursive dissonance between two principle UDHR narratives.[11] Hoover describes an oscillation “between two poles: on one side it can be seen as a moment of founding for the human rights regime, based on the documents’ unique status as a symbol of moral consensus . . . while on the other hand it can be seen as a political imposition by the post-war liberal powers intent upon remaking the international order in their image.”[12] But even that binary fracture ignores colonized people not at the table, along with key global actors representing non liberal Western perspectives—the Communist bloc, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Of these, the Communist bloc, though absent at the start of the construction of global human rights regimes would assert an ever stronger influence thereafter in efforts to legalize the UDHR within the UN system and in regional and domestic efforts. Hoover seeks to avoid the “narrative trap” by extracting from it the principle that the UDHR was itself the embodiment of politics and the start of a conversation which is ongoing, but as agonistic politics in which stability was characterized by a constant state of disagreement that produced both forward movement and constraints[13] At the same time, there was another tension evident from the beginning, one that saw Latin American states seeking to strengthen the charter and to make some or all of its provisions binding, against those who viewed such an effort as counterproductive.[14] This division continues to bedevil international discourse, for example around the issue of the development of a comprehensive treaty for business and human rights, a project led by Ecuador and South Africa, but opposed by the United States and the European Union.[15]

This context and those insights provide a useful framework for the task of this Chapter, to consider the UDHR’s 23rd Article on the right to work. The provision is fairly straightforward:
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.[16]
The UDHR cemented an understanding, long in the making, that labor rights were central to the scope and understanding of human rights emerging after 1945.[17] That centering involved the convergence of two otherwise distinct frameworks—the first touched on conditions of work, and the second on the rights embedded in individuals; that is one framed the issues external to actors and the other internalized those issues within individuals now reconstituted as rights bearers rather than as objects of obligation. A key element of that centering was the movement in consensus about labor from a project of constraining those who hire labor into a project embedding rights to labor in individuals. And yet, the characterization of labor rights as human rights had the potential to transform the conceptualization of labor from an issue of conditions of servitude to one centered on the dignity of laborers; and the issue of labor rights as human rights remains a subject of discussion.[18]

The simplicity of Article 23 elaborates four of the most central elements of what in the contemporary world is understood as the core of the human rights of labor. The first is a noncoercion principle. Rights to labor is embedded in those who proffer work rather than in those who would employ them—or the state. Though the state may not constrain the personal right of individuals to work, it must assume a positive obligation to protect the rights bearing individual where the individual is not working. Central to the right are free choice in employment (the worker and not those who control work have the right to determine choice of employment), and work conditions that are favorable. These are the great principles of protection against slavery: those who control work cannot control labor; those who can offer employment cannot compel work, for there is no right in capital to demand labor; and like capital, labor must be fairly treated, working conditions (other than remuneration) must be judged against principles of dignity and fairness as markets or the state might determine.[19] (Rosado Marzán 2017; Yamada 2009).

The second is a limited non-discrimination principle. Once employed, all individuals ought to be paid without regard to extraneous condition or circumstances. These can include whatever circumstances in ordinary course give rise to discrimination—ethnicity, race, religion, gender, political beliefs, and the like. Yet curiously, the anti-discrimination principle did not reach to the initial decision to hire or to shunt individuals into particular forms of labor based on those characteristics with respect to which discrimination in pay was condemned. The third is a principle of a living wage. Fairness is understood with reference to the condition of the rights holder rather than of the employer. It creates a double burden, the first on employers to pay fair wages, the second on the state to make up any difference between fair wages (determined by markets or otherwise) and living wages determined by reference to the condition of rights holders and their dependents (determined by reference to family, however that may be defined). The last is the principle of collective action. Individuals have parallel rights to aggregate their capital and to aggregate their labor. States ought not privilege the rights to collective action by capital over the right of labor to do the same.

These principles—of noncoercion, of nondiscrimination, of living wages, and of collective action—now constitute the bench mark against which both the legal systems of states and the governance systems of institutions operating in the societal sphere are measured. This chapter briefly considers the provisions of UNHR Article 23’s right to work provisions. The next section considers the origins of the right to work within the UDHR. It is followed by section 3 which examines the effect of the right to work principle. The work concludes by suggesting the growing authority of the right to work principles in the modern context of managing the behaviors of economic actors in production chains—from the construction of normative views of trafficking and modern slavery, to the debates about living wages, to the aggregation of political and labor power in labor aggregation principles.


NOTES

[1] Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR)

[2] Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press 2010) 81-83; Mary Ann, Glendon ‘Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (1997) 73 Notre Dame LR1153–1190.

[3] UNGA World Conference on Human Rights ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23

[4] Glendon (n 2).

[5] Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2003) 233-270 (Cold War rivalry marginalized human rights within the UN).

[6] UNHRC, The Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UN, New York and Geneva, 2011) (UNGP).

[7] Amnesty International ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Amnesty International-What We Do <https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/> accessed 26 January 2019 (“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a document that acts like a global road map for freedom and equality – protecting the rights of every individual, everywhere. It was the first time countries agreed on the freedoms and rights that deserve universal protection in order for every individual to live their lives freely, equ­­ally and in dignity.”).

[8] Larry Catá Backer, ‘The Role of Companies in Privatizing Socio-Economic Rights in India and China Under Emerging Global Regulatory Frameworks’ in (Surya Deva, (ed) Socio-Economic Rights In Emerging Free Markets: Comparative Insights From India And China (Routledge, London, 2015) 44-70

[9] Makau Mutua, Human Rights: a Political and Cultural Critique (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2002); Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (OUP, Oxford, 2007).

[10] M. Glen Johnson, ‘A Magna Carta for Mankind: Writing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ in (M. Glen Johnson and Janusz Symonides (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A History of Its Creation and Implementation 1948-1998 (UNESCO Publishing, Paris, 1998) 19, 25-26

[11] Joe Hoover, ‘Rereading the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: plurality and contestation, not consensus. (2013) 12 JHuman Rights 217-241.

[12] Ibid., citing Mutua (n 2, 552-555); and Christina M. Cerna, ‘Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human Rights in Different Socio-cultural Contexts’ (1994) 16 HRQ 740–752. 2

[13] Hoover (n 11) citing Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Verso, 2001); Chantal Mouffe, ‘Democracy in a Multipolar World.” In (Joe Hoover, Meera Sabaratnam, and Laust Schouenborg, eds.) Interrogating Democracy in World Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) 118–129..

[14] Johnson (n10), 29-30, 34-38.

[15] John G. Ruggie, ‘Business and Human Rights: The Evolving International Agenda’ (2017) 101 AJIL 819-840; Larry Catá Backer, ‘Moving Forward the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights: Between Enterprise Social Norm, State Domestic Legal Orders, and the Treaty Law that Might Bind Them All’ (2015) 38 Fordham Int'l L.J. 457.

[16] UDHR (n 1).

[17] Lee Swepston, The Development in International Law of Articles 23 and 24 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Labor Rights Articles (Lam Edition, Dordrecht, Neth: Brill – Nijhoff, 2014).

[18] Cf., Kevin Kolben, ‘Labor Rights as Human Rights?’ (2009) Va. J. Int’l L 50:449-484 (arguing that there are significant differences between labor and human rights).

[19] David C. Yamada, ‘Human Dignity and American Employment Law’ (2009) 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 52; César F. Rosado Marzán, ‘Dignity Takings and Wage Theft’ (2017) 92 Chicago Kent Law Review 1203.

Corporate Practice Commentator: Selecting the Ten Best Articles in the Corporate and Securities Field for 2018

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer; Tauluseinä Tavelväggen, Wall of Printings (1977); Nörrköping Art Museum Turku Findland))

Every year for almost 25 years, the Corporate Practice Commentator (with great thanks to Robert Thompson (Georgetown)) announces the results of its annual poll to select the ten best corporate and securities articles.  Faculty in corporate and securities law are usually asked to select about six choices for best corporate and securities articles from a list of articles published and indexed in legal journals during 2018.  This year about 395 articles were listed.  

There is  justifiably much attention paid to those ten or so articles that garnered the most notice from this academic community each year especially in social media outlets of importance to the academy (e.g., here). 

At the same time, it seems to me that the greatest service of these sorts of exercises is the gathering together of the group of writings that even merit consideration for "best" among their peers. The field of corporate and securities law has grown with the expansion of economic activity beyond the state, as well as with the explosion of self regulatory mechanisms at the local and international level, all of which have transformed notions of legal risk (which consequentially becomes more interesting for the legal academic). 

It is with that in mind and in hopes of sparking greater readership among the many excellent but perhaps overlooked contributions to knowledge in this again dynamic field, I include below the list of the 2018 choices from among whcih the "best" will be drawn (word searchable).  The list may also be accessed HERE (pdf and also word searchable). My hope is that interested readers will find it easier to explore these contributions that might over wise have missed within the increasingly broad field. The pool of candidates for prior years may also be accessed on line HERE




Business Associations and Securities Articles Indexed during 2018
January 19, 2018
1.          Elaine Waterhouse Wilson.  Cooperatives: the first social enterprise.  66 DePaul L. Rev. 1013-1079 (2017).
2.          Alicia E. Plerhoples.  Nonprofit displacement and the pursuit of charity through public benefit corporations.  21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 525-571 (2017).
3.          John C. Coffee Jr.  The globalization of entrepreneurial litigation: law, culture, and incentives.  165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1895-1925 (2017).
4.          Emiliano Giudici & Justin Blount.  Evaluating market reactions to non-practicing entity litigation.  20 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 51-86 (2017).
5.          Brian Knight. Federalism and federalization on the fintech frontier.  20 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 129-206 (2017).
January 26, 2018
6.          Murillo Campello, Daniel Ferrés & Gaizka Ormazabal.  Whistle-blowers on the board? The role of independent directors in cartel prosecutions.  60 J.L. & Econ. 241-268 (2017).
7.          Diane Del Guercio, Elizabeth R. Odders-White & Mark J. Ready.  The deterrent effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement intensity on illegal insider trading: evidence from run-up before news events.  60 J.L. & Econ. 269-307 (2017).
February 2, 2018
8.          Charles Yablon.  Byte marks: making sense of new F.R.C.P. 37(e).  69 Fla. L. Rev. 571-597 (2017).
9.          Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson & A.C. Pritchard.  Piling on? An empirical study of parallel derivative suits.  14 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 652-682 (2017).
10.       Samuel F. Ernst.  Pluralism applied: a concordant approach to selecting contract rules.  101 Marq. L. Rev. 87-129 (2017).
11.       Julie E. Cohen.  Law for the platform economy.  51 UC Davis L. Rev. 133-204 (2017).
12.       Kenneth R. Davis.  The equality principle: how Title VII can save insider trading law.  39 Cardozo L. Rev. 199-243 (2017).
13.       Michael D. Guttentag.  Selective disclosure and insider trading.  69 Fla. L. Rev. 519-569 (2017).
February 9, 2018
14.       Jonathan Macey & David Swensen.  Recovering the promise of the orderly and fair stock exchange.  42 J. Corp. L. 777-791 (2017).
15.       Juana Paola Bustamante I., Kevin J. Fandl.  Incentivizing gray market entrepreneurs in emerging markets.  37 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 415-456 (2017).
16.       Zehra G. Kavame Eroglu.  The political economy of international standard setting in financial reporting: how the United States led the adoption of IFRS across the world.  37 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 457-512 (2017).
17.       Brandon L. Garrett.  Book reviews. The boom and bust of American imprisonment. Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal by Eugene Soltes; Capital Offenses: Business Crime and Punishment in America’s Corporate Age by Samuel W. Buell; Free Market Criminal Justice: How Democracy and Laissez Faire Undermine the Rule of Law by Darryl K. Brown.  96 Tex. L. Rev. 163-179 (2017).
18.       David Hess.  Business, corruption, and human rights: towards a new responsibility for corporations to combat corruption.  2017 Wis. L. Rev. 641-693.
19.       Eric C. Chaffee.  Securities regulation in virtual space.  74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1387-1456 (2017).
20.       Merritt B. Fox & Gabriel Rauterberg.  Stock market futurism.  42 J. Corp. L. 793-808 (2017).
21.       Kevin S. Haeberle.  Discrimination platforms.  42 J. Corp. L. 809-832 (2017).
22.       Kristin N. Johnson.  Regulating innovation: high frequency trading in dark pools.  42 J. Corp. L. 833-886 (2017).
23.       Merritt B. Fox & Kevin S. Haeberle.  Evaluating stock-trading practices and their regulation.  42 J. Corp. L. 887-915 (2017).
February 16, 2018
24.       Larry Catá Backer.  The human rights obligations of state-owned enterprises: emerging conceptual structures and principles in national and international law and policy.  50 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 827-888 (2017).
25.       Nicholas Calcina Howson.  China’s “corporatization without privatization” and the late nineteenth century roots of a stubborn path dependency.  50 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 961-1006 (2017).
26.       Pammela S. Quinn.  “Head-of-state-owned enterprise” immunity.  50 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1065-1090 (2017).
27.       David Rosenfeld.  Admissions in SEC enforcement cases: the revolution that wasn’t.  103 Iowa L. Rev. 113-184 (2017).
28.       Anita K. Krug.  The other securities regulator: a case study in regulatory damage.  92 Tul. L. Rev. 339-391 (2017).
February 23, 2018
29.       Eric C. Chaffee & Karie Davis-Nozemack.  Corporate tax avoidance and honoring the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and its stockholders.  58 B.C. L. Rev. 1425-1481 (2017).
30.       Brandon L. Garrett.  The public interest in corporate settlements.  58 B.C. L. Rev. 1483-1543 (2017).
31.       Peter Reilly.  Corporate deferred prosecution as discretionary injustice.  2017 Utah L. Rev. 839-883.
32.       Miriam F. Weismann.  The missing metrics of sustainability: just how beneficial are benefit corporations?  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 1-50 (2017).
33.       Israel Klein.  A change in accounting, a change in law.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 51-76 (2017).
34.       Michael B. Dorff.  Why public benefit corporations?  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 77-113 (2017).
35.       Ronnie Cohen, Gabriele Lingenfelter.  Money isn’t everything: why public benefit corporations should be required to disclose non-financial information.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 115-147 (2017).
36.       Ben W. Heineman Jr.  Resolving the partner-guardian tension: the key to general counsel independence.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 149-186 (2017).
March 2, 2018
37.       Shannon Kathleen O’Byrne, Cindy A. Schipani.  Feminism(s), progressive corporate law, and the corporate oppression remedy: seeking fairness and justice.  19 Geo. J. Gender & L. 61-111 (2017).
38.       Peter N. Levenberg. Directors' liability and shareholder remedies in South African companies--evaluating foreign investor risk. 26 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1-60 (2017).
39.       Thomas E. Rutledge. The 2017 amendments to Kentucky's business entity statutes. 56 U. Louisville L. Rev. 55-81 (2017).
40.       Benedict Sheehy.  Conceptual and institutional interfaces between CSR, corporate law and the problem of social costs.  12 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 93-147 (2017).
41.       Larry Catá Backer.  Sovereign wealth funds, capacity building, development, and governance.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 735-780 (2017).
42.       David F. Freeman Jr.  U.S. financial regulation of sovereign wealth funds.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 781-814 (2017).
43.       Enrico Ginevra & Chiara Presciani.  Sovereign wealth fund transparency and the European rules on institutional investor disclosure.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 815-835 (2017).
44.       Locknie Hsu.  The role and future of sovereign wealth funds: a trade and investment perspective.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 837-856 (2017).
45.       Gabriele Lattanzio & William L. Megginson.  International relations and sovereign wealth funds’ political value: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 857-888 (2017).
46.       Paul Rose.  What responsibilities do sovereign funds have to other investors?  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 889-916 (2017).
47.       Patrick J. Schena.  When states invest at home: the development role of sovereign wealth funds in public finance.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 917-947 (2017).
48.       Beate Sjåfjell, Heidi Rapp Nilsen & Benjamin J. Richardson.  Investing in sustainability or feeding on stranded assets? The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 949-979 (2017).
49.       Chris Thomale.  Sovereign wealth and social responsibility.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 981-995 (2017).
50.       Edwin M. Truman.  Sovereign wealth fund transparency and accountability explored.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 997-1026 (2017).
51.       Marc-Philippe Weller, Luca Kaller.  Sovereign wealth funds investing in Germany.  52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1027-1055 (2017).
52.       Jill E. Fisch.  Standing voting instructions: empowering the excluded retail investor.  102 Minn. L. Rev. 11-60 (2017).
March 9, 2018
53.       Gwendolyn J. Gordon.  Environmental personhood.  43 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 49-91 (2018).
54.       Heather Hughes.  Property and the true-sale doctrine.  19 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 870-926 (2017).
March 16, 2018
55.       Kevin Crow, Lina Lorenzoni Escobar.  International corporate obligations, human rights, and the Urbaser standard: breaking new ground?  36 B.U. Int’l L.J. 87-118 (2018).
56.       Kurt S. Schulzke, Gerlinde Berger-Walliser.  Toward a unified theory of materiality in securities law.  56 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 6-70 (2017).
March 23, 2018
57.       Brian Kingsley Krumm.  Fostering innovation and entrepreneurship: Shark Tankshouldn’t be the model.  70 Ark. L. Rev. 553-608 (2017).
58.       Mihailis E. Diamantis.  Clockwork corporations: a character theory of corporate punishment.  103 Iowa L. Rev. 507-569 (2018).
59.       Ryan M. Walters.  When can you shoot the messenger? Understanding the legal protections for entities providing information on business products and services in the digital age.  96 Or. L. Rev. 185-248 (2017).
60.       Joseph Pileri.  Uncharted waters? Legal ethics and the benefit corporation.  8 St. Mary’s J. Legal Mal. & Ethics 180-190 (2017).
61.       Jay T. Jorgensen.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act turns 40 — “reflections on Walmart’s enhanced ethics & compliance program.”  5 Tex. A&M L. Rev 237-252 (2017)
62.       Anthony J. Casey, Anthony Niblett.  Self-driving contracts.  43 J. Corp. L. 1-33 (2017).
63.       Yaron Nili.  Out of sight, out of mind: the case for improving director independence disclosure.  43 J. Corp. L. 35-76 (2017).
64.       Amanda M. Rose.  The “reasonable investor” of federal securities law: insights from tort law’s “reasonable person” & suggested reforms.  43 J. Corp. L. 77-118 (2017).
March 30, 2018
65.       Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park.  Organic corporate governance.  59 B.C. L. Rev. 21-69 (2018).
66.       Matthew Jennejohn.  The architecture of contract innovation.  59 B.C. L. Rev. 71-143 (2018).
67.       Abbey Stemler.  The myth of the sharing economy and its implications for regulating innovation.  67 Emory L.J. 197-241 (2017).
68.       Matthew C. Turk.  Regulation by settlement.  66 U. Kan. L. Rev. 259-324 (2017).
69.       Court E. Golumbic.  “The big chill”: personal liability and the targeting of financial sector compliance officers.  69 Hastings L.J. 45-93 (2017).
April 6, 2018
70.       Bret Wells.  Reform of corporate distributions in subchapter C.  37 Va. Tax Rev. 365-419 (2018).
71.       Douglas M. Spencer.  Corporations as conduits: a cautionary note about regulating hypotheticals.  47 Stetson L. Rev. 225-258 (2018).
72.       Lisa Gilbert.  After the “change election,” the money in the political landscape.  47 Stetson L. Rev. 259-265 (2018).
73.       Gretchen Goldman, Genna Reed, Jacob Carter.  Risks to science-based policy under the Trump administration.  47 Stetson L. Rev. 267-293 (2018).
74.       Kathy Kiely.  Digital disclosure cheats: an anthology of cautionary tales and pro tips for the public interest advocate.  47 Stetson L. Rev. 295-310 (2018).
75.       Frederick H. Alexander.  Whose portfolio is it, anyway?  47 Stetson L. Rev. 311-332 (2018).
76.       Andrew Verstein.  Insider tainting: strategic tipping of material nonpublic information.  112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 725-787 (2018).
77.       Jill E. Fisch, Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick.  The logic and limits of event studies in securities fraud litigation.  96 Tex. L. Rev. 553-618 (2018).
April 13, 2018
78.       Jayme Herschkopf.  Morality and securities fraud.  101 Marq. L. Rev. 453-504 (2017).
April 20, 2018
79.       Christopher W. Peterson.  Piercing the corporate veil by tort creditors.  13 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 63-95 (2017).
80.       Jacob S. Sherkow.  Cancer’s IP.  96 N.C. L. Rev. 297-380 (2018).
81.       Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey & David A. Skeel Jr.  Bankruptcy on the side.  112 Nw. U. L. Rev. 255-311 (2017).
82.       K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe.  CEO pay redux.  96 Tex. L. Rev. 205-278 (2017).
83.       Shawn Grant. Caution, curves ahead: does the future signal changes for whistleblowers? 42 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1-28 (2017).  
April 27, 2018
84.       Tracy H. Porter, Susan S. Case & Matthew C. Mitchell.  Is it freedom of or freedom from religion in organizations?  17 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 1-24 (2017).
85.       Ronald J. Colombo.  Religious liberty and the business corporation.  17 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 25-43 (2017).
86.       Robert H. Nelson.  The financial crisis as a religious crisis.  17 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 45-86 (2017).
87.       Sarah Helene Duggin.  God’s grace and the marketplace: Mainline Protestant church, faith and business.  17 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 87-125 (2017).
88.       Nikaela Jacko Redd & Lutisha S. Vickerie.  The rise and fall of brick and mortar retail: the impact of emerging technologies and executive choices on business failure.  17 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 127-171 (2017).
May 4, 2018
89.       Max Schanzenbach, Nadav Shoked.  Reclaiming fiduciary law for the city.  70 Stan. L. Rev. 565-642 (2018).
90.       Karen Woody.  “Declinations with disgorgement” in FCPA enforcement.  51 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 269-311 (2018).
91.       Albert H. Choi.  Fee-shifting and shareholder litigation.  104 Va. L. Rev. 59-111 (2018).
92.       Eleanor Lumsden.  The future is mobile: financial inclusion and technological innovation in the emerging world.  23 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1-44 (2018).
93.       Schan Duff.  The new financial stability regulation.  23 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 46-111 (2018).
94.       Edmund Mokhtarian, Alexander Lindgren.  Rise of the crypto hedge fund: operational issues and best practices for an emergent investment industry.  23 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 112-158 (2018).
95.       Shivaram Rajgopal, Roger M. White.  Stock trades of Securities and Exchange Commission employees.  60 J.L. & Econ. 441-477 (2017).
May 11, 2018
96.       Charles Penrod.  The party’s over: it is time to end unpaid internships at for-profit organizations.  19 W. Mich. U. Cooley J. Prac. & Clin. L. 1-29 (2017).
97.       Donald Clarke, Fang Lu.  The law of China’s local government debt: local government financing vehicles and their bonds.  65 Am. J. Comp. L. 751-798 (2017).
May 18, 2018
98.       John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, David L. Schwartz.  How often do non-practicing entities win patent suits?  32 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 237-310 (2017).
99.       Shannon M. Roesler.  Evaluating corporate speech about science.  106 Geo. L.J. 447-514 (2018).
100.    Jason Malone & Tim Winslow.  Financial assurance: environmental protection as a cost of doing business.  93 N.D. L. Rev. 1-56 (2018).
101.    Lynne L. Dallas.  Is there hope for change? The evolution of conceptions of “good” corporate governance.  54 San Diego L. Rev. 491-564 (2017).
102.    Matthew D. Cain, Jill Fisch, Steven Davidoff Soloman & Randall S. Thomas. The shifting tides of merger litigation.  71 Vand. L. Rev. 603-640 (2018).
103.    Andrew Verstein.  The corporate governance of national security.  95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 775-834 (2018).
104.    Lynn M. Lopucki.  Algorithmic entities.  95 Wash. U. L. Rev. 887-953 (2018).
May 25, 2018
105.    Maren B. Worley.  Holding investment bankers liable for aiding and abetting corporate directors: the under-deterrent.  32 BYU J. Pub. L. 151-189 (2017).
106.    Jena Martin.  Hiding in the light: the misuse of disclosure to advance the business and human rights agenda.  56 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 530-592 (2018).
107.    Ruth Jebe.  Corporate sustainability reporting and “material information”: an empirical study of materiality under the GRI and frameworks.  33 Conn. J. Int’l L. 95-135 (2017).
108.    Timothy W. Guinnane, Susana Martínez-Rodríguez.  Choice of enterprise form: Spain, 1886-1936.  34 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1-26 (2018).
109.    Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Sandrine Spaeter.  Incentive contracts and downside risk sharing.  34 J.L. Econ. & Org. 79-107 (2018).
110.    Anthony Moffa.  Environmens rea.  122 Penn St. L. Rev. 299-346 (2018).
111.    Martin Edwards.  The big crowd and the small enterprise: intracorporate disputes in the close-but-crowdfunded firm.  122 Penn St. L. Rev. 411-462 (2018).
112.    Peggy Kirk Hall & Rusty Rumley.  Legal challenges facing unmanned aerial systems and commercial agriculture.  39 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 389-424 (2017).
113.    Yehonatan Givati.  Of snitches and riches: optimal IRS and SEC whistleblower rewards.  55 Harv. J. on Legis. 105-142 (2018).
114.    Verity Winship, Jennifer K. Robbennolt.  Admissions of guilt in civil enforcement.  102 Minn. L. Rev. 1077-1146 (2018).
June 1, 2018
115.    Amy Deen Westbrook, David A. Westbrook.  Unicorns, guardians, and the concentration of the U.S. equity markets.  96 Neb. L. Rev. 688-741 (2018).
116.    Tamara Belinfanti, Lynn Stout.  Contested visions: the value of systems theory for corporate law.  166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 578-631 (2018).
117.    Caleb N. Griffin.  The hidden cost of M&A.  2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 70-129.
118.    Anne M. Tucker & student Holly van den Toorn.  Will swing pricing save sedentary shareholders?  2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 130-208.
119.    Bernard S. Sharfman.  The importance of the business judgment rule.  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 27-69 (2017).
120.    William S. Laufer.  The missing account of progressive corporate criminal law.  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 71-142 (2017).
121.    Daniel J. Morrissey.  Are mutual funds robbing retirement savings?  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 143-185 (2017).
122.    Mira Ganor.  Toehold collaborations beyond insider trading.  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 187-246 (2017).
123.    Jonathan G. Rohr.  Freedom of contract and the publicly traded uncorporation.  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 247-309 (2017).
124.    Jon Endean.  A payoff to second best pragmatism: rethinking entity classification for foreign companies.  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 311-349 (2017).
125.    Anne Tucker.  20/20 vision in the long & short-termism debate.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 337-347 (2018).
126.    Owen D. Jones.  Brain perspectives on investor behavior and decision-making errors.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 349-366 (2018).
127.    William A. Birdthistle.  Federalism of personal finance: state & federal retirement plans.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 367-385 (2018).
128.    K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe.  Institutional investors, corporate governance, and firm value.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 387-418 (2018).
129.    Caroline Flammer.  Long-term executive compensation as a remedy for corporate short-termism.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 419-424 (2018).
130.    Elisabeth de Fontenay.  The myth of the ideal investor.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 425-447 (2018).
131.    Jim Hawley, Jon Lukomnik.  The long and short of it: are we asking the right questions? Modern portfolio theory and time horizons.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 449-474 (2018).
132.    Claire A. Hill.  An identity theory of the short- and long-term investor debate.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 475-495 (2018).
133.    Jennifer G. Hill.  Good activist/bad activist: the rise of international stewardship codes.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 497-524 (2018).
134.    Frank Partnoy.  Specificity and time horizons.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 525-541 (2018).
135.    Rachelle Sampson & Yuan Shi.  Are investor time horizons shortening?  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 543-550 (2018).
136.    Lynn Stout & Sergio Gramitto.  Corporate governance as privately-ordered public policy: a proposal.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 551-576 (2018).
137.    Andrew Verstein.  Wrong-termism, right-termism, and the liability structure of investor time horizons.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 577-611 (2018).
138.    Harold Weston, Conrad Ciccotello.  Flash traders (milliseconds) to indexed institutions (centuries): the challenges of an agency theory approach to governance in the era of diverse investor time horizons.  41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 613-653 (2018).
139.    Verity Winship, Jennifer K. Robbennolt.  An empirical study of admissions in SEC settlements.  60 Ariz. L. Rev. 1-66 (2018).
June 8, 2018
140.    S.I. Strong.  Congress and commercial trusts: dealing with diversity jurisdiction post-Americold.  69 Fla. L. Rev. 1021-1091 (2017).
141.    Xuan-Thao Nguyen.  Zombie patents and zombie companies with patents.  69 Fla. L. Rev. 1147-1156 (2017).
142.    Samuel W. Buell.  Why do prosecutors say anything? The case of corporate crime.  96 N.C. L. Rev. 823-858 (2018).
143.    Cindy R. Alexander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee.  Non-prosecution of corporations: toward a model of cooperation and leniency.  96 N.C. L. Rev. 859-901 (2018).
144.    J.S. Park.  Blasius, bylaw amendment powers & supermajority amendment bylaws.  18 UC Davis Bus. L.J. 129-159 (2017).
145.    Gideon Mark.  Confidential witness interviews in securities litigation.  96 N.C. L. Rev. 789-822 (2018).
146.    Paul G. Mahoney.  Deregulation and the subprime crisis.  104 Va. L. Rev. 235-300 (2018).
147.    Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg.  Stock market manipulation and its regulation.  35 Yale J. on Reg. 67-126 (2018).
June 15, 208
148.    Jeremy C. Kress.  Board to death: how busy directors could cause the next financial crisis.  59 B.C. L. Rev. 877-929 (2018).
149.    Jongho Kim.  To be creditor or to be shareholder, that is the question: is the debt-for-equity swap creditors’ financial suicide?  10 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 359-460 (2017).
150.    Grace M. Giesel.  Control of the attorney-client privilege after mergers and other transformational transactions: should control of the privilege be alienable by contract?  48 Seton Hall L. Rev. 309-352 (2018).
151.    J. William Callison.  Dangling threads: Hobby Lobby and corporate law issues.  48 U. Mem. L. Rev. 447-461 (2017).
152.    Daniel Isaacson.  The perfect storm is brewing once again: what scaling back Dodd-Frank will mean for the credit default swap.  10 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 249-272 (2017).
July 6, 2018
153.    J. Maria Glover.  “Encroachments and oppressions”: the corporatization of procedure and the decline of rule of law.  86 Fordham L. Rev. 2113-2130 (2018).
154.    Uri Benoliel, Jenny Buchan, Tony Gutentag.  Revisiting the rationality assumption of disclosure laws: an empirical analysis.  46 Hofstra L. Rev. 469-488 (2017).
155.    Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, Hon. Richard A. Posner.  When it comes to business the right and left sides of the Court agree.  54 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 33-55 (2017).
156.    Anthony Michael Sabino.  Reflections upon the jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia: selections from securities law, arbitration, and administrative law.  46 Hofstra L. Rev. 445-467 (2017).
157.    Ryan Bubb, Marcel Kahan.  Regulating motivation: a new perspective on the Volcker Rule.  96 Tex. L. Rev. 1019-1051 (2018).
July 13, 2018
158.    Curtis J. Milhaupt, Mariana Pargendler.  Governance challenges of listed state-owned enterprises around the world: national experiences and a framework for reform.  50 Cornell Int’l L.J. 473-542 (2017).
159.    Christopher W. Peterson.  Piercing the corporate veil in Nebraska.  51 Creighton L. Rev. 247-279 (2018).
160.    Gregory M. Gilchrist.  Individual accountability for corporate crime.  34 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 335-388 (2018).
161.    Matteo Gatti.  Reconsidering the merger process: approval patterns, timeline, and shareholders’ role.  69 Hastings L.J. 835-924 (2018).
162.    William J. Moon.  Book review. Tax havens as producers of corporate law. Re-Imagining Offshore Finance: Market-Dominant Small Jurisdictions in a Globalizing Financial World by Christopher M. Bruner.  116 Mich. L. Rev. 1081-1100 (2018).
163.    Jeffrey A. Maine.  Multinational efforts to limit intellectual property income shifting: the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project.  20 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 259-273 (2017).
164.    Diane M. Ring.  Corporate migrations and tax transparency and disclosure.  62 St. Louis U. L.J. 175-192 (2017).
165.    David Elkins.  The elusive definition of corporate tax residence.  62 St. Louis U. L.J. 219-236 (2017).
166.    A.C. Pritchard.  Book review. Insider trading law and the ambiguous quest for edge. Black Edge by Sheelah Kolhatkar.  116 Mich. L. Rev. 945-957 (2018).
July 20, 2018
167.    Gladriel Shobe.  Private benefits in public offerings: tax receivable agreements in IPOs.  71 Vand. L. Rev. 889-935 (2018).
168.    Jeremy Kidd.  Quacks or bootleggers: who’s really regulating hedge funds?  75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 367-447 (2018).
169.    Caren Morrison.  Private actors, corporate data and national security: what assistance do tech companies owe law enforcement?  26 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 407-436 (2017).
170.    Scott D. Hughes.  Cryptocurrency regulations and enforcement in the U.S.  45 W. St. L. Rev. 1-28 (2017).
July 27, 2018
171.    Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova.  Private wealth and public goods: a case for a National Investment Authority.  43 J. Corp. L. 437-491 (2018).
172.    Dorothy S. Lund.  The case against passive shareholding voting.  43 J. Corp. L. 493-536 (2018).
173.    Usha R. Rodrigues.  Tournament of managers: lessons from the academic leadership market.  43 J. Corp. L. 537-579 (2018).
174.    Anne M. Tucker.  The long and the short: portfolio ratios & mutual fund investment time horizons.  43 J. Corp. L. 581-648 (2018).
175.    Hester Peirce.  Rethinking the national market system.  43 J. Corp. L. 649-662 (2018).
August 3, 2018
176.    Alexander M. Nourafshan.  From the closet to the boardroom: regulating LGBT diversity on corporate boards.  81 Alb. L. Rev. 439-487 (2017-2018).
177.    Tesch Leigh West.  When corporations go to church: free exercise under Hobby Lobby.  27 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 37-71 (2018)
178.    Seth Green.  Going beyond ethics and compliance: the growing corporate movement to embrace social value creation.  49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 573-580 (2018).
179.    Steven A. Ramirez.  Diversity and ethics: toward an objective business compliance function.  49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 581-609 (2018).
180.    Cheryl L. Wade.  Corporate compliance that advances racial diversity and justice and why business deregulation does not matter.  49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 611-636 (2018).
181.    Arthur Acevedo.  Corporate ethics: approaches and implications to expanding the corporate mindset of profitability.  49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 637-654 (2018).
182.    Celia R. Taylor.  The Dodd-Frank death knell.  49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 655-668 (2018).
183.    Melinda S. Molina.  Addressing the lack of diversity on corporate boards: building responsive law school pedagogy and curriculum.  49 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 669-676 (2018).
August 10, 2018
184.    Jill E. Fisch.  Governance by contract: the implications for corporate bylaws.  106 Cal. L. Rev. 373-409 (2018).
185.    Larry Catá Backer.  The corporate social responsibilities of financial institutions for the conduct of their borrowers: the view from international law and standards.  21 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 881-920 (2017).
186.    Lucas Bradley.  Georgia’s unconstitutional business venue provision: a Kingdom with impermissible borders.  69 Mercer L. Rev. 433-452 (2018).
187.    M Catherine Norman.  Small-business health insurance: a symptom of the diseased American health care system...what is the cure?  69 Mercer L. Rev. 533-573 (2018).
188.    Aaron M. Page.  Just compensation? Whether “business & human rights” compensation awards should embrace deterrence considerations.  50 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 353-446 (2018).
189.    Daniel C.K. Chow.  China’s anti-corruption crackdown and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  5 Tex. A&M L. Rev 323-341 (2018).
190.    Gideon Mark.  The Yates Memorandum.  51 UC Davis L. Rev. 1589-1671 (2018).
191.    Cathy Hwang.  Deal momentum.  65 UCLA L. Rev. 376-425 (2018).
192.    Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller & Steven Utke .  Does shareholder voting matter? Evidence from the takeover market.  53 Wake Forest L. Rev. 157-209 (2018).
193.    Julian Velasco.  The diminishing duty of loyalty.  75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1035-1095 (2018).
194.    Amy Deen Westbrook.  Cash for your conscience: do whistleblower incentives improve enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?  75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1097-1167 (2018).
195.    Karl T. Muth, Andrew Leventhal.  Mutuals: an area of legal climate change.  9 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 597-618 (2018).
196.    Andrew A. Schwartz.  The gatekeepers of crowdfunding.  75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 885-955 (2018).
197.    Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody.  The Leidos mix-up and the misunderstood duty to disclose in securities law.  75 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 957-1034 (2018).
198.    Stanislav Dolgopolov.  Securities fraud embedded in the market structure crisis: high-frequency traders as primary violators.  9 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 551-596 (2018).
199.    John P. Anderson.  Insider trading and the myth of market confidence.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 1-16 (2018)
200.    Stephen M. Bainbridge.  Kokesh footnote three notwithstanding: the future of the disgorgement penalty in SEC cases.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 17-30 (2018).
201.    Franklin A. Gevurtz.  The road not taken: a comparison of the E.U and U.S. insider trading prohibitions.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 31-47 (2018).
202.    Zachary J. Gubler.  “Maximalism with an experimental twist”: insider trading law at the Supreme Court.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 49-64 (2018).
203.    Joan MacLeod Heminway.  Tipper/tippee insider trading as unlawful deceptive conduct: insider gifts of material nonpublic information to strangers.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 65-99 (2018).
204.    Peter J. Henning.  Making up insider trading law as you go.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 101-120 (2018).
205.    Roberta S. Karmel.  The fiduciary principle of insider trading needs revision.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 121-134 (2018).
206.    Yesha Yadav.  Insider information and the limits of insider trading.  56 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 135-152 (2018).
August 17, 2018
207.    Charlene D. Luke.  Captivating deductions.  46 Hofstra L. Rev. 855-912 (2018).
208.    Hans Krause Hansen.  Policing corruption post- and pre-crime: collective action and private authority in the maritime industry.  25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 131-156 (2018).
209.    Fenner L. Stewart.  Behind the cloak of corporate social responsibility: safeguards for private participation within institutional design.  25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 233-264 (2018).
210.    Paddy Ireland.  Efficiency or power? The rise of the shareholder-oriented joint stock corporation.  25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 291-330 (2018).
211.    Vanetia K. Wetherspoon.  Stark violations discovered during due diligence: to disclose of not?  20 Quinnipiac Health L.J. 105-154 (2017).
212.    David A. Weisbach.  New equity integration.  71 Tax L. Rev. 1-52 (2017).
213.    Young Ran (Christine) Kim.  Carried interest and beyond: the nature of private equity investment and its
214.    Vincenzo Bavoso. The corporate law dilemma and the enlightened sovereign control paradigm: in search of a new legal framework.  12 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 241-278 (2018).
215.    Ronald H. Filler, Jerry W. Markham.  Whistleblowers—a case study in the regulatory cycle for financial services.  12 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 311-340 (2018).
216.    Harvey Gelb.  The Husky case: fraud, bankruptcy, and veil piercing.  12 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 341-362 (2018).
August 24, 2018
217.    Joan MacLeod Heminway.  Let’s not give up on traditional for-profit corporations for sustainable social enterprise.  86 UMKC L. Rev. 779-803 (2018).
218.    John E. Tyler III.  Structuring for action and longevity in the green economy: being intentional about committing to social/green purposes, connecting effort and impact, and addressing harm and accountability. 86 UMKC L Rev 937-961 (2018).
219.    Andrew Keay, Jingchen Zhao.  Transforming corporate governance in Chinese corporations: a journey, not a destination.  38 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 187-232 (2018).
220.    Chang-hsien Tsai, Yen-nung Wu.  What conflict minerals rules tell us about the legal transplantation of corporate social responsibility standards without the state: from the United Nations to the United States to Taiwan.  38 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 233-284 (2018).
August 31, 2018
221.    Deborah Masucci, Shravanthi Suresh.  Transforming business through proactive dispute management.  18 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 659-676 (2017).
222.    Jeff Thomas.  Equity crowdfunding portals should join and enhance the crowd by providing venture formation resources.  42 Nova L. Rev. 375-415 (2018).
223.    Joseph A. Schremmer, Charles C. Steincamp.  Imputing regulatory failures in oil and gas licensing: a discussion and proposal.  57 Washburn L.J. 265-314 (2018).
224.    Jeff Todd, R. Todd Jewell.  Dubious assumptions, economic models, and expert testimony.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 279-321 (2018).
225.    James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas.  Delaware’s retreat: exploring developing fissures and tectonic shifts in Delaware corporate law.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 323-389 (2018).
226.    Mohsen Manesh.  Creatures of contract: a half-truth about LLCs.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 391-465 (2018).
227.    Jonathan S. Masur, Eric A. Posner.  Cost-benefit analysis and the judicial role.  85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935-986 (2018).
September 7, 2018
228.    Jennifer S. Fan.  Catching disruption: regulating corporate venture capital.  2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 341-425. 
229.    Kathleen McGarvey Hidy.  Business disputes over social media accounts: legal rights, judicial rationales, and the resultant business risks.  2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 426-494.
230.    Mark K. Brewer.  Corporate social responsibility in the age of hydraulic fracturing in the United States and the United Kingdom.  51 Creighton L. Rev. 577-602 (2018).
231.    Dan DePasquale, Surbhi Sarang & Natalie Bump Vena.  Forging food justice through cooperatives in New York City.  45 Fordham Urb. L.J. 909-950 (2018).
232.    Jonathan Brown.  Beyond corporate form: a response to Dan DePasquale, Surbhi Sarang, and Natalie Bump Vena’s Forging Food Justice through Cooperatives in New York City.  45 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1121-1139 (2018).
233.    Beth Van Schaack.  The inconsequential choice-of-law question posed by Jesner v. Arab Bank.  24 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 359-368 (2018).
234.    Bernard S. Sharfman.  A private ordering defense of a company’s right to use dual class share structures in IPOs.  63 Vill. L. Rev. 1-34 (2018).
235.    J. Robert Brown Jr.  Shareholder proposals and the limits of encrypted interpretations.  63 Vill. L. Rev. 35-77 (2018).
236.    Nicholas Walter.  The utility of rational basis review.  63 Vill. L. Rev. 79-123 (2018).
237.    Marek Dubovec, Adalberto Elias.  The challenges of the Mexican intermediated securities holding system and opportunities for modernization.  19 Or. Rev. Int’l L. 93-130 (2018)
September 14, 2018
238.    Daniel Greene, Omesh Kini, Jaideep Shenoy.  An investigation of pooled purchasing as a source of value creation in diversifying acquisitions.  60 J.L. & Econ. 597-636 (2017).
239.    Yuqi Gu, Connie X. Mao, Xuan Tian.  Banks’ interventions and firms’ innovation: evidence from debt covenant violations.  60 J.L. & Econ. 637-671 (2017).
240.    Juliet P. Kostritsky.  One size does not fit all: a contextual approach to fiduciary duties owed to preferred stockholders from venture capital to public preferred to family business.  70 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 43-114 (2017).
241.    Ross Levine, Chen Lin, Lai Wei.  Insider trading and innovation.  60 J.L. & Econ. 749-800 (2017).
242.    Matthew L. Mustokoff, Margaret E. Mazzeo.  Loss causation on trial in Rule 10b-5 litigation a decade after Dura.  70 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 175-219 (2017).
September 21, 2018
243.    William Magnuson. The public cost of private equity. 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1847-1910 (2018).
244.    Robert J. Rhee. A legal theory of shareholder primacy. 102 Minn. L. Rev. 1951-2017 (2018
245.    Lynn M. LoPucki. Corporate charter competition. 102 Minn. L. Rev. 2101-2168 (2018).
246.    Oscar G. Chase. Consent to judicial jurisdiction: the foundation of "registration" statutes. 73 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 159-200 (2018).
247.    Hilary J. Allen.  The SEC as financial stability regulator.  43 J. Corp. L. 715-774 (2018).
248.    Dan Awrey, Kristin van Zwieten.  The shadow payment system.  43 J. Corp. L. 775-816 (2018).
249.    Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten, Gabriel V. Rauterberg.  Informed trading and its regulation.  43 J. Corp. L. 817-898 (2018).
250.    David Min.  Housing finance reform and the shadow money supply.  43 J. Corp. L. 899-937 (2018).
September 28, 2018
251.    Alan R. Palmiter.  Corporate triplespeak: responses by investor-owned utilities to the EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan.  83 Brook. L. Rev. 983-1027 (2018).
252.    Shu-Yi Oei.  The trouble with gig talk: choice of narrative and the worker classification fights.  81 Law & Contemp. Probs. 107-136 (2018).
253.    Ellen S. Podgor.  Disruptive innovation in criminal defense: demanding corporate criminal trials.  69 Mercer L. Rev. 825-838 (2018).
254.    Susan S. Kuo, Benjamin Means.  The political economy of corporate exit.  71 Vand. L. Rev. 1293-1332 (2018).
255.    Joshua Ulan Galperin.  Private, environmental, governance.  9 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 1-4 (2018).
256.    Lisa Benjamin.  Institutional investors in the UK and “carbon-major” companies: private environmental governance post-Paris.  9 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 5-20 (2018).
257.    Sarah J. Morath.  Private governance and animal welfare.  9 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 21-32 (2018).
258.    Albert C. Lin.  Pope Francis’ encyclical on the environment as private environmental governance.  9 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 33-44 (2018).
259.    Kristen van de Biezenbos.  Enforcing private environmental governance standards through community contracts.  9 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 45-49 (2018).
260.    Joshua Ulan Galperin.  Pragmatism, pragtivism, and private environmental governance.  9 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 50-55 (2018).
261.    Anthony O’Rourke.  Parallel enforcement and agency interdependence.  77 Md. L. Rev. 985-1061 (2018).
262.    Gregory Scopino.  Preventing spoofing: from criminal prosecution to social norms.  84 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1069-1143 (2016).
263.    Arthur McMahon III.  It takes a village to fund a start-up: how an electronic community for early-stage investments can bring democracy back to equity crowdfunding.  84 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1269-1334 (2016).
October 5, 2018
264.    Carliss N. Chatman.  The corporate personhood two-step.  18 Nev. L.J. 811-861 (2018).
265.    Hao Jiang.  Enforcing the bargain v. materiality requirement: the future of disclosure-only settlements post-Trulia.  38 Pace L. Rev. 569-607 (2018).
266.    Peter Lee.  Innovation and the firm: a new synthesis.  70 Stan. L. Rev. 1431-1501 (2018).
267.    Giovanni Strampelli.  Knocking at the boardroom door: a transatlantic overview of director-institutional investor engagement in law and practice.  12 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 187-241 (2018).
268.    Neal Newman.  Regulation A+: new and improved after the JOBS Act or a failed revival?  12 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 243-285 (2018).
269.    Susan Lorde Martin.  The Appointments Clause and the SEC’s administrative law judges: protecting the separation of powers, political accountability, and investors.  12 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 287-319 (2018).
270.    Linda Allen.  Accounting for contingent litigation liabilities: what you disclose can be used against you.  12 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 321-347 (2018).
October 12, 2018
271.    Edwin Bustinza Lozada. The corporate social responsibility in the Peruvian mining industry: future challenges. 46 Denv. J. Intl'l L. & Pol'y 207-222 (2018).
272.    Richard P. Wolfe. Minority shares under the Louisiana Business Corporation Act: expulsion, oppression, and fiduciary duty. 64 Loy. L. Rev. 25-121 (2018).
273.    Dmitry A. Pentsov. Contractual joint ventures in international investment arbitration. 38 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 391-448 (2018).
274.    Lori D. Johnson. Redefining roles and duties of the transactional lawyer: a narrative approach. 91 St. John's L. Rev. 845-881 (2017).
275.    Peter Molk. Protecting LLC owners while preserving LLC flexibility. 51 UC Davis L. Rev. 2129-2190 (2018).
276.    Kevin S. Haeberle, M. Todd Henderson. Making a market for corporate disclosure. 35 Yale J. on Reg. 383-436 (2018).
277.    Scott Hirst. Universal proxies. 35 Yale J. on Reg. 437-511 (2018).
October 19, 2018
278.    Kenneth J. Vanko.  Dissolution and rational choice: the unique remedial framework for director deadlock under the Illinois Business Corporation Act.  38 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 348-395 (2018).
279.    Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon.  Settling the staggered board debate.  166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1475-1510 (2018)
280.    Jeffrey C. O’Brien.  The craft brewing boom and Minnesota’s three-tier system: the case for change.  43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 971-1002 (2017).
281.    Zachary Atherton-Ely.  Demonstrating value to a corporation as in-house counsel.  43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1003-1013 (2017).
282.    Kathleen Harrell-Latham & student Daniel Spicer.  Think like a lawyer, act like a mogul: tackling practical business problems in a changing legal landscape.  43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1014-1058 (2017).
283.    Zachary J. Robins, student Timothy M. Joyce.  How to crowdfund and not fall flat on your face: best practices for investment crowdfunding offerings and the data to prove it.  43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1059-1094 (2017).
284.    Leanne Fuith.  Creating the lawyer as business leader.  43 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1095-1112 (2017).
285.    Seth C. Oranburg.  Hyperfunding: regulating financial innovations.  89 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1033-1099 (2018).
October 26, 2018
286.    Lécia Vicente.  The Hohfeldian concept of share in limited liability companies: a view from the common and civil law traditions.  33 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 41-74 (2018).
287.    Anat Alon-Beck.  The coalition model, a private-public strategic innovation policy model for encouraging entrepreneurship and economic growth in the era of new economic challenges.  17 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 267-326 (2018).
288.    Beverley Earle, Anita Cava.  Examining the JPMorgan “Princeling” settlement: insight into current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) interpretation and enforcement.  17 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 365-410 (2018).
289.    Thomas Buergenthal.  International human rights: need for further institutional development.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 9-16 (2018).
290.    Sara Sun Beale.  The Trafficking Victim Protection Act: the best hope for international human rights litigation in the U.S. courts?  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 17-47 (2018).
291.    Michael J. Kelly.  Atrocities by corporate actors: a historical perspective.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 49-89 (2018).
292.    Carsten Stahn.  Liberals vs romantics: challenges of an emerging corporate international criminal law.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 91-125 (2018).
293.    Milena Sterio.  Corporate liability for human rights violations: the future of the Alien Tort Claims Act.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 127-150 (2018).
294.    Kishanthi Parella.  Brand as information intermediary.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 151-164 (2018).
295.    Caroline Kaeb.  Corporate engagement with public policy: the new frontier of ethical business.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 165-186 (2018).
296.    David Nersessian.  A human rights perspective on professional responsibility in global corporate practice.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 187-212 (2018).
297.    David Scheffer.  Is the presumption of corporate impunity dead?  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 213-223 (2018).
298.    Ursula Tracy Doyle.  The cost of territoriality: jus cogens claims against corporations.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 225-233 (2018).
299.    Jonas Grimheden.  Civil litigation in response to corporate human rights abuse: the European Union and its member states.  50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 235-248 (2018).
300.    Yuliya Guseva.  The SEC and foreign private issuers: a path to optimal public enforcement.  59 B.C. L. Rev. 2055-2133 (2018).
301.    Hugo S.W. Farmer.  How do you qualify as a whistleblower under the Dodd-Frank Act? Blowing the whistle on a circuit split.  36 J.L. & Com. 101-130 (2018).
302.    Stuart R. Cohn & Miao Yinzhi.  The dragon and the eagle: reforming China’s securities IPO laws in the U.S. model, pros and cons.  17 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 327-363 (2018).
November 2, 2018
303.    Mohsen Manesh.  Equity in LLC law?  44 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 93-141 (2016).
304.    Ann Juergens & student Diane Galatowitsch.  Fostering client altruism and the common good in the practice of law: learning from emerging movements in business and economics.  44 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1-40 (2018).
305.    James Keuning & Ann Rainhart.  The law firm operations team: collaborative agent of change in a changing profession.  44 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 41-104 (2018).
306.    Lilian V. Faulhaber.  The trouble with tax competition: from practice to theory.  71 Tax L. Rev. 311-365 (2018).
307.    Gregg D. Polsky, Adam H. Rosenzweig.  The Up-C revolution.  71 Tax L. Rev. 415-470 (2018).
308.    Elizabeth Brown, Inara Scott.  Sanctuary corporations: should liberal corporations get religion?  20 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1101-1144 (2018).
November 9, 2018
309.    Maria Lucia Passador, Federico Riganti.  Shareholders’ rights in agency conflicts: selected issues in the transatlantic debate.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 569-618 (2018).
310.    Matthew T. Bodie.  Holacracy and the law.  42 Del. J. Corp. L. 619-686 (2018).
311.    Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Janos N. Barberis  From FinTech to TechFin: the regulatory challenges of data-driven finance.  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 393-446 (2018).
312.    Adriana Z. Robertson.  Blowing hot air: regulatory credibility and the living will requirement.  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 447-505 (2018).
313.    Sean Delany, Jeremy Steckel.  Balancing public and private interests in pay for success programs: should we care about the private benefit doctrine?  14 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 507-594 (2018).
November 16, 2018
314.    Michael R. Siebecker & student Andrew M. Brandes.  Corporate compliance and criminality: Does the common law promote culpable blindness?  50 Conn. L. Rev. 387-441 (2018).
315.    Franklin A. Gevurtz.  Saying yes: Reviewing board decisions to sell or merge the corporation.  44 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 437-513 (2017).
316.    Martin H. Malin.  Protecting platform workers in the gig economy: Look to the FTC.  51 Ind. L. Rev. 377-411 (2018).
317.    Jacqueline Laínez Flanagan.  Holding U.S. corporations accountable: toward a convergence of U.S. international tax policy and international human rights.  45 Pepp. L. Rev. 685-746 (2018).
318.    Robert Anderson IV.  The Delaware trap: an empirical analysis of incorporation decisions.  91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 657-710 (2018).
319.    Lenore Palladino.  Shareholder primacy and worker prosperity: a broken link.  66 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1011-1032 (2018).
November 30, 2018
320.    Eli Bukspan, Eylon Yadin.  Marrying corporate law and family businesses.  66 Drake L. Rev. 549-584 (2018)
December 7, 2018
321.    Andrew Elmore.  Franchise regulation for the fissured economy.  86 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 907-965 (2018).
322.    Paula Dalley.  Vicarious charity: social responsibility and Catholic social teaching.  56 J. Cath. Legal Stud. 85-130 (2017).
323.    Joanna Shepherd.  Consolidation and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: the role of mergers and acquisitions in the current innovation ecosystem.  21 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 1-28 (2018).
324.    David B. Wilkins, Maria J. Esteban Ferrer.  The integration of law into global business solutions: the rise, transformation, and potential future of the Big Four accountancy networks in the global legal services market.  43 Law & Soc. Inquiry 981-1026 (2018).
325.    Leonard McCarthy.  Coming of age: the new face of integrity compliance.  90 Temp. L. Rev. 603-609 (2018).
326.    Todd Haugh.  Caremark’s behavioral legacy.  90 Temp. L. Rev. 611-646 (2018).
327.    Paul E. McGreal.  Caremark in the arc of compliance history.  90 Temp. L. Rev. 647-680 (2018).
328.    Claire A. Hill.  Caremark as soft law.  90 Temp. L. Rev. 681-697 (2018).
329.    James A. Fanto.  The governing authority’s responsibilities in compliance and risk management, as seen in the American Law Institute’s Draft Principles of compliance, risk management, and enforcement.  90 Temp. L. Rev. 699-726 (2018).
330.    Donald C. Langevoort.  Caremark and compliance: a twenty-year lookback.  90 Temp. L. Rev. 727-742 (2018).
December 21, 2018
331.    Christopher M. Brumer.  Center-left politics and corporate governance: what is the "progressive" agenda?  2018 BYU L. Rev. 267-333.
332.    Joseph K. Leahy.  Intermediate scrutiny for corporate political contributions.  44 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1119-1224 (2017).
333.    Carol Goforth.  Making the case for the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2013) in Arkansas.  40 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 187-230 (2017).
334.    Matthew J. Wilkins.  You don't need love...but it helps: insider trading law after Salman.  106 Ky. L.J. 433-461 (2017-2018).
335.    Kevin S. Haeberle, M. Todd Henderson.  A new market-based approach to securities law.  85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1313-1393 (2018).
December 28, 2018
336.    Victoria Barnes. Judicial intervention in early corporate governance disputes: Vice-Chancellor Shadwell's lost judgment in Mozley v. Alston (1847).  58 Am. J. Legal Hist. 394-413 (2018).
337.    Sarath Sanga. A  theory of corporate joint ventures.  106 Cal. L. Rev. 1437-1475 (2018).
338.    Karen C. Burke. Exploiting the Medicare tax loophole.  21 Fla. Tax Rev. 570-621 (2018).
339.    James R. Repetti.  The impact of the 2017 Act's tax rate changes on choice of entity.  21 Fla. Tax Rev. 686-714 (2018).
340.    Erik Roder. Combining limited liability and transparent taxation: lessons from the convergent evolution of GmbH & Co. KGs, S Corporations, LLCs, and other functionally equivalent entities. 21 Fla. Tax Rev. 762-843 (2018).
341.    Sara Dezalay. Lawyers in Africa: brokers of the state, intermediaries of globalization. 25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 639-669 (2018).
342.    Cheryl Scarboro, Diana Wielocha. Role of employee discipline in FCPA settlements: balancing competing considerations. 50 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1207-1235 (2018). [
343.    Russell Korobkin, Michael Dorff. Bargaining with the CEO: the case for "negotiate first, choose second." 34 Negotiation J. 347-377 (2018).
344.    Samuel Dinnar, Lawrence Susskind. The eight big negotiation mistakes that entrepreneurs make. 34 Negotiation J. 401-413 (2018).
345.    Ronald J. Colombo. An antitrust approach to corporate free exercise claims.  92 St. John's L. Rev. 29-90 (2018).
346.    Valerie J. Pelton. Jebel Ali: open for business.  27 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 375-401 (2018).
347.    William S. Laufer. A very special regulatory milestone.  20 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 392-428 (2017).
348.    Darren Rosenblum. When does sex diversity on boards benefit firms?  20 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 429-484 (2017).
Additional Articles Published During 2018
349.    Mark L Steinberg.  Texas Gulf Sulphur at Fifty-A Contemporary and Historical Perspective.  71 SMU L. Rev. 625-641 (2018).
350.    Steven M. Bainbridge.  Equal Access to Information: The Fraud at the Heart of Texas Gulf Sulphur.  71 SMU L. Rev. 643-652 (2018).
351.     Richard M. Buxbaum.  From TGS Conservatorships to Sarbanes-Oxley Fair Funds.  71 SMU L. Rev. 653-674. (2018).
352.     Wendy G. Couture.  Texas Gulf Sulphur: A Case Study on Responding to Market Rumors. 71 SMU L. Rev. 675-695 (2018).
353.    James D. Cox.  Seeking an Objective for Regulating Insider Trading Through Texas Gulf Sulphur. 71 L. Rev. 697-711 (2018).
354.    Onnig H. Dombalagian.  Texas Gulf Sulphur and Information Disclosure Policy.  71 SMU L. Rev.713-727 (2018).
355.    Lisa M. Fairfax.  From Equality to Duty: On Altering the Reach, Impact, and Meaning of the Texas Gulf Legacy. 71 SMU L. Rev. 729-748 (2018).
356.    Jill E. Fisch.   Constructive Ambiguity and Judicial Development of Insider Trading.  71 SMU L. Rev. 749-766 (2018).
357.    Merritt B. Fox & George N. Tepe.  Personal Benefit Has No Place in Misappropriation Tipping Cases. 71 SMU L. Rev. 767-782 (2018).
358.    Tamar Frankel.  Insider Trading.  71 SMU L. Rev. 783-797 (2018).
359.    Roberta. S. Karmel.  Will Fifty Years of the SEC’s Disgorgement Remedy Be Abolished?  71 SMU L. Rev. 799 810 (2018).
360.    Michael J. Kaufan.  From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Laudato Si': Mining Equitable Principles from Insider Trading Law. 71 SMU L. Rev.811-833 (2018).
361.    Donald C. Langevoort.  From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of Two Duties.  71 SMU L.Rev.835-851 (2018).
362.    Mark J. Loewenstein.  Thinking Fast and Slow About the Concept of Materiality.  71 SMU L. Rev.853-868 (2018).
363.    Jonathan Macey.  Martoma and Newman: Valid Corporate Purpose and the Personal Benefit Test. 71 SMU L. Rev. 869-882 (2018).
364.    Daniel J. Morrissey.  Taming Rule 10b-5-1: The Unfinished Business of Texas Gulf Sulphur.  71 SMU L. Rev.883-894 (2018).
365.    Donna M. Nagy.  The Statutory Authority for Court-Ordered Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions. 71 SMU L. Rev. 895-926 (2018).
366.    Adam C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson.  Texas Gulf Sulphur and the Genesis of Corporate Liability Under Rule l0b-5.  71 SMU L. Rev. 927-946 (2018).
367.    Margaret Sachs.  Unintended Consequences: The Link Between Judge Friendly's Texas Gulf Sulphur Concurrence and Recent Supreme Court Decisions Misconstruing Rule 10b-5.  71 SMU L. Rev. 947-965 (2018).
368.    James C. Spindler. The Coasian Firm and Insider Trading, Revisited.  71 SMU L. Rev. 967-985 (2018).
369.    Manning G. Warren III. A Birthday Toast to Texas Gulf Sulphur.  71 SMU L. Rev. 987-998 (2018).
370.    Verity Winship. Disgorgement in Insider Trading Cases: FY2005-FY2015.  71 SMU L. Rev. 999-1013 (2018).
371.    Henry T. C. Hu & John D. Morley.  A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-Traded Funds.  91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 839-941 (2018)
372.    Alan M. Weinberger.  Henry Ford’s Wingman: A Perspective on the Centennial of Dodge v. Ford. 14 NYU J. L.& Bus. 1013 (2018).
373.    Sean Griffin, Dan Awrey & Blanaid Clake.  Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 Yale J. Reg. 1 (2018).
374.    Jill E. Fisch, Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon.  Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance.  8 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 101 (2018).
375.    Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer. Opportunity Makes a Thief: Corporate Opportunities as Legal Transplant and Convergence in Corporate Law.  15 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 92-183 (2018).
376.    Gina-Gail Fletcher.  Legitimate Yet Manipulative: The Conundrum of Open-Market Manipulation.  68 Duke. L.J. 479 (2018).
377.    Debra C. Jeter, Randall S. Thomas, Harwell Wells.  Democracy and Dysfunction: Rural Electric Cooperatives and the Surprising Persistence of the Separation of Ownership and Control.  70 Ala. L. Rev. 361 (2018).
378.    Stephen F. Diamond and Jennifer W. Kuan.  Are the stock markets "rigged"? An empirical analysis of regulatory change.  55 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 33-40 (2018). 
379.    Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter.  Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies.  73 Bus. Law. 961-1009 (2018).
380.    Tom C.W. Lin.  Incorporating Social Activism.  98 B.U. L. Rev. 1535-1605 (2018).
381.    Joshua Fershee.  The End of Responsible Growth and Governance? The Risks Posed by Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy.  19 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 361 (2018)
382.    George S. Geis.  Traceable Shares and Corporate Law.  113 Nw. U. L.Rev. 227 (2018)
383.    Virginia Harper Ho.  Nonfinancial Disclosure & The Costs of Private Ordering.  55 Am. Bus. L. J. 407-474 (2018)
384.    Kathryn Judge.  Investor-Driven Financial Innovation.  8 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 291 (2018). 
385.    William W Bratton & Adam J. Levitin.  The New Bond Workouts.  166 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597-1674 (2018).
386.    Helen Hershkoff and Marcel Kahan. Forum-Selection Provisions in Corporate 'Contracts’.  93 Wash. L. Rev. 265 (2018). 
387.    Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie.  Shareholder Voting and the Symbolic Politics of Corporation as Contract.  53 Wake Forest L. Rev. 511-557 (2018).
388.    Michal Barzuza.  Inefficient Tailoring: The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law.  Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 131 (2018). 
389.    Edward B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld.  Antitrust for Institutional Investors.  82 Antitrust L. J. 221-78 (2018).
390.    James J. Park.  Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory Disclosure.  2018 Wis. L. Rev. 1133-1191 (2018)
391.    Constance Z. Wagner.  Evolving Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons Learned from the European Union Directive on Non-Financial Reporting.  19 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 619 (2018).
392.    Yesha Yadav. Too-Big-to-Fail Shareholders.  103 Minn. L. Rev. 101 (2018).
393.    Chris Brummer and Yesha Yadav.  Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma.  107 Geo. L. J. 235 (2018)
394.    Mark J. Roe.  Stock-Market Short-Termism’s Impact.  167 U. Pa. L. Rev. 71-121 (2018).
395.    Stephen J. Lubben & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.  "Too Big and Unable to Fail." 69 Fla. L. Rev.  1205-1247 (2017)


Introduction to Series: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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This Blog Essay site tries to devote every February to a series of integrated but short essays on a single theme. For 2014 this site introduces a new theme: Reimaging the State in the Global Sphere: An Inventory of Sovereign Wealth Fund as Regulator and Participant in Global Markets. In 2013, the site considered The U.S. National Contact Point--Corporate Social Responsibility Between Nationalism, Internationalism and Private Markets Based Globalization. For 2010, this site introduced a new series--Business and Human Rights. And in 2009, the Ruminations Series  sought to develop a set of aphoristic (ἀφορισμός) essays, meant to provoke thought rather than explain it.

The year 2019 intensified global concern over the shape and direction of democratic theory and its expression in states. Liberal democratic states, once comfortably secure in the expression of an orthodox view of what democracy meant and how it was expressed, have had those beliefs challenged by internal actions that appear to challenge the core premises of democratic states--populism (left and right), foreign interventions, and the increasing willingness of political actors to test the frontiers of structures and institutions of government have all appeared to pose significant threats to the integrity of democratic theory and practice. This has caused anxiety throughout the democratic world--and certainly among the intelligentsia in their self assumed role as guardians of theory and monitors of the legitimacy of practice.

In its most spectacular forms, this has produced great contests over the legitimacy of democratic practice--mostly in smaller and more fragile states. While Venezuela ended 2018 and started 2019 as the most extreme expression of that anxiety in action, many in virtually every other state has become concerned about the state of democratic theory and practice. In these cases, foreign interventions and internal instability appear to remind us all of the dangers of failing to meet the challenges to the stabilizing and legitimating core of theory and practice.

Despite the sometimes expressed conceit of contemporary liberal democratic states that they represent the vanguard and defenders of orthodox (and therefore legitimate) democratic theory and its expression, the last several years has seen a more vigorous and self conscious development of democratic theory and its expression in so-called illiberal states, and primarily among certain states organized around principles of Marxism and Leninism. Yet, like their liberal democratic counterparts, Marxist Leninist states have also been confronted with the challenges of democratic expression (within the logic of their own ideological foundations).

Both the challenges of developing a sound democratic theory compatible with the core ordering premises of a Marxist Leninist state, and the willingness of the vanguard party to transpose these premises into viable practices are nicely illustrated in the multi-year efforts of the Cuban state to both retain its Leninist fundamental organization while developing that Leninism to provide a more open space for direct intervention of the collective in the management of the state by its Communist Party core.  To that end, Cuba had embarked on a multi year project that started with the reform at the Party level of the political and economic model of state organization, the redrawing of the economic plan for the nation, and in the embedding of these core principles into the operative documents of the administrative organization of the state--culminating in the drafting of a new state constitution. In that context the Party has also sought to develop mechanisms for popular participation in both the Communist Party's political work, and in development of mechanisms of popular approval.  These combine engagement in formulation as well as in Western style plebiscites. We have written about these in a number of earlier posts (e.g., links at  CubaConstitution).

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite.

In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh ut what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem.  We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach.  This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking  on the Cuban process of constitutional reform

This introduction includes a short summary of that work: The Democratic Constitution of Illiberal States—An Empirical Approach to Theorizing Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba. This will frame the posts that follow.

 



The Democratic Constitution of Illiberal States—An Empirical Approach to Theorizing Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba
Larry Catá Backer, Flora Sapio, James Korman

Popular participation and representation are the great antipodes of contemporary democratic theory. The former embodies the principle that political power resides in the individual; the latter that in the exercise of political authority such power must be delegated and exercised in a fiduciary capacity for the community of individuals. Yet representative delegation dilutes popular authority and requires regimes of accountability beyond elections; but popular control produces majoritarian tyranny if unconstrained.

In the construction of mediating institutions—governments and vanguard institutions mostly— political communities have drawn on a variety of theories that have sought to reconcile these core principles in the construction of government that is accepted as legitimate and thus whose authority over the polity may be asserted even without individual consent. Liberal democracies have moved from the concept of the embodiment of political self-constitution as incarnated in the body of a person (the Greek monos arkhein) to its incarnation within the body (res) of the people (publicus). But that incarnation, as well, has been situated within vanguard organizations—aristos kratia—the characteristics of which have undergone tremendous ideological transformation since the time of the Roman Republic—with its most powerful current expressions as liberal republican, Marxist Leninist vanguardist, transnational multilateralist organization.

This paper seeks to consider the issues of democratic self-constitution in illiberal states. To that end it focuses on the current process of constitutional revision in Cuba, a traditional Marxist Leninist State in the process of self-transformation. For the last several years Cuba has been in the midst of a quite public national effort at reform. To that end it has revised its core political and economic principles through a complex process under the leadership of its Communist Party (PCC). Those reforms to the organizing political and economic theory of the state then produced a move to reform the national constitution to reflect these reforms. In both cases, the PCC and the state apparatus attempted to invoke the core mechanics of popular participation even as it sought to manage that participation under the leadership of the PCC and popular representatives in national institutions.

What makes this process particularly interesting, with ramifications both for liberal democratic systems, and multilateralist supra national organizations with deep commitment to democratic principles, is the way in which the process of popular participation used multiple spaces. In particular, the emergence of social media platforms as novel ‘constitutive spaces’ pose a conundrum for constitutional theory. Through the use of qualitative and quantitative measures this paper seeks to better understand both the changing character of popular participation in representative institutions, and its consequences for democratic theory. Part I provides the background to the study. Part II then introduces the study and its methodology. We use data from government web sites, the official reports, and social media sites to examine the contours of participation, its constitution, and its limitations. We intend to develop from the analysis of four distinct data sets a clearer understanding of the nature of popular participation. Part II then considers consequences and applications both within Cuba and beyond.










Content Links: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2019)


In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite.

This Post includes the links to the contents of this series.





Introduction (The Democratic Constitution of Illiberal States—An Empirical Approach to Theorizing Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba

Part 1: Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0; the 1976 Constitution.

Part I (Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0; the 1976 Constitution) Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2019)



In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem.  We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach.  This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking  on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.
For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite.
This Post includes Part I: Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0; the 1976 Constitution.





 By 1975, a time when country was undergoing profound transformations, the constitution of 1940 was no longer applicable to that moment in history. A new Law of Laws was needed for this new stage of the revolution. A group of jurists, appointed by the political and mass movement organizations, produced a draft constitution. In every school, workplace, military unit, city block, farm and rural village people discussed the document and made corrections and additions. (Cuba’s Constitution of 1976: An Historic Setback / Dimas Castellano (Translating Cuba 11 April 2016)).
 
As we will develop over the course of the posting in this series, the Cuban experiment in constitutional reformation  presents some unique elements.  It may also point to the development of the collectivist premises on which the Cuban political order is might be used to structure democratic mechanisms that might have application in other in Party-State systems.  The well orchestrated and multi-year process that led from the reform of the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party in 2011 (Lineamientos), to the development of the reconstituted PCC political and economic model in 2016, and finally to the reform of the state constitution to reflect this new model and the emerging historical stage of Cuban development in 2018-2019, represents an important sequencing of political development.  It also represents an equally important development of mechanisms for popular consultation both in the context of the PCC's work, and in the work of developing and approving the state constitution. 
 
But as Dimas Castellano points out in the text quoted above, this is not the first time that the Cuban Party-State has sought to invoke mechanisms of popular engagement  in major formal and structural reform efforts.  And, indeed, what may emerge  with respect to the study of the 2011-2019 process that eventually produced the reform of the Cuban constitution,  is that what appears most interesting about the current process of reform may represent more an evolutionary process from a socialist democracy 1.0 to its 2.0 version. 

To that end it might be useful to revisit the documents produced during the course of the first post revolutionary constitutional reform period that ended with the adoption of the 1976 constitution.Cuba was essentially without a formal constitution (though not without a form of basic law) from just after the establishment of the post-Batista government in 1959, its transformation into a Marxist Leninist  form of government in the early 1960s, and its development during the first 15 years of its existence.  The adoption of the first post revolutionary constitution marked the formal establishment of an autonomous (of sorts) PCC under the strong direction of its core--the PCC's First Secretary (Fidel Castro) and the PCC Central Committee--and the celebration of its first Congress .  

That first PCC Congress adopted what in retrospect have remained the core organizing documents of the political and economic systems that remains the operational base of its society. These resolutions framing the core premises of the political and economic order were then to be transposed into a state constitution.  That state constitution was then itself to be the object through which the masses would be informed of the political principles around which the state was organized, and also to provide the masses with an opportunity to engage with those principles.

El Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba considera que el texto perfeccionado por la Comisión Preparatoria Central con los aportes de la discusión pública y popular del Anteproyecto de Constitución, fundamentado éste en los principios del marxismo-leninismo, sirve a la firme decisión de nuestro Partido y nuestro pueblo trabajador de dotar a nuestro país de una Constitución Socialista que, por corresponder a las realidades y necesidades de la construcción del socialismo, sea norma inviolable para la actuación de todos, tanto de los órganos del Estado, sus dirigentes, funcionarios y empleados, como de cada ciudadano en particular; sea fundamento seguro del ascenso y consolidación de la legalidad socialista. Considera, asimismo, que el Proyecto de Ley de Tránsito Constitucional contiene las disposiciones transitorias indispensables para regular la oportunidad y el orden en que deben entrar en vigor los diversos artículos de la Constitución y señalar las normas anteriores a su aprobación que conservan vigencia temporal. El Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista de Cuba, en consecuencia, da su aprobación al texto perfeccionado del Anteproyecto de Constitución y recomienda que sea publicado oficialmente como Proyecto de Constitución de la República y sometido mediante referendo al voto universal, libre y secreto de los ciudadanos, junto con el Proyecto de Ley de Tránsito Constitucional; que el referendo se organice de modo que todos los ciudadanos con derecho al sufragio tengan la oportunidad de votar en él, para lo cual deben establecerse colegios electorales no solo en razón del domicilio, sino también del lugar donde se encuentren los electores: albargues de las brigadas, unidades militares y del Ejército Juvenil, centros docentes de internados, barcos de pesca y mercantes, misiones en el extranjero, etc; que el referendo se celebre el domingo 15 de febrero, de modo que la Constitución pueda proclamarse solemnemente el 24 de febrero, ochenta y un aniversario del inicio de la guerra revolucionaria por la independencia nacional organizada por José Martí, cuyo anhelo de que la Ley Primera de la República sea el culto de los cubanos a la dignidad plena del hombre, preside nuestra Constitución, como norma de nuestra sociedad socialista y principio siempre presente en todo el desarrollo de nuestra Revolución. Fuente: Granma, 26 de diciembre de 1975, p. 3
 
But this engagement was not to be undertaken without boundaries on discourse. Rather popular participation was meant to serve as a further means through which the vanguard revolutionary party could continue its project of socializing the masses to the revolutionary order.  Fidel Castro made that quite clear in his address to the Congress:
Estamos seguros de que lo que falta para que el Congreso tenga la mayorcalidad, que el evento tenga la mayor significación, será cumplido.

Por ser este precisamente el Primer Congreso, comprende un sinnúmero deasuntos del mayor interés. Y, en realidad, grandes e importantes decisiones,que influirán enormemente en la vida futura del país, se han de tomar en ese Congreso.

Por lo pronto, ya estamos discutiendo con todo el pueblo la Constitución de laRepública. La Constitución de la República nos llevó casi 40 horas de análisis yde discusión en la Comisión Preparatoria. Ahora la está discutiendo todo elpueblo. Después tendremos de nuevo que analizarla, tomando en cuenta lasopiniones y los criterios que se han vertido. Y vemos con qué interés el puebloha tomado la discusión de la Constitución.

* * *
Cuando los procesos revolucionarios se institucionalizan y se consolidan através de instituciones realmente adecuadas —como ocurrió con la Revolución Bolchevique, que tiene ya más de 50 años, que avanza ininterrumpidamente, y sabemos que seguirá avanzando—, vemos qué gran estabilidad le da a esospueblos, qué gran estabilidad tienen esas naciones y esas colectividadeshumanas cuando se organizan bien, cuando se institucionalizan bien, cuandotienen los organismos adecuados para marchar adelante. (Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz,primer secretario del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba yprimer ministro del gobierno revolucionario, en el acto en que lefueran entregados los compromisos del pueblo en saludo al PrimerCongreso del Partido por parte de los dirigentes de las organizacionesde masas, en el Palacio de la Revolucion, el 29 de mayo de 1975, "AÑODEL PRIMER CONGRESO").
And that that popular engagement was to be undertaken and narrowed through the lens of revolutionary representation.  It was clear that the idea ideologically was that the masses would be represented best by those among them with the greatest credentials as PCC adherents and most attached to the PCC's line developed especially for the purpose of conceiving and articulating a constitution. 
Nuestro pueblo sabe quiénes integran el Partido, sabe que esos militantesfueron seleccionados en los centros de trabajo con la activa participación de lasmasas; sabe que en el Partido militan los mejores obreros, sabe que en elPartido militan los mejores ciudadanos, y sabe que para el Congreso loscomunistas eligieron entre los mejores comunistas para trazar la línea delPartido (APLAUSOS). Y por eso, nuestro pueblo se siente representado en el Partido.

Pero además, las tesis más importantes fueron discutidas con todo el pueblo.El pueblo participó en la elaboración de esas tesis y en la elaboración de lapolítica de los años futuros. ¡Y por eso sabe que las tesis y los acuerdos del Congreso son sus tesis y son sus acuerdos! (APLAUSOS)

Si allí en el "Carlos Marx" se reunió el Congreso del Partido, aquí en la Plaza dela Revolución se reúne el Congreso del pueblo para expresar su apoyo a losacuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS). Pero si allí votamos, aquí debemos votartambién (APLAUSOS). Si allí discutimos y aprobamos todas las tesis, aquí, enrepresentación de todo el pueblo, debemos también votar, y preguntarle anuestro pueblo si apoya o no apoya los acuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS YEXCLAMACIONES DE: "¡Sí!")(Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel CastroRuz,primer secretario del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba yprimer ministro del gobierno revolucionario, en el Acto de masas conmotivo de la clausura del Primer Congreso del Partido Comunista deCuba. Plaza de la Revolucion, 22 de diciembre de 1975, "AÑO DELPRIMER CONGRESO".).



 

Part 2: Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0--A pure Theory of Elections Within A Caribbean Leninist State: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years series theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite. 

This Post includes Part 2: Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0--A pure Theory of Elections Within A Caribbean Leninist State.








(Data on the voting for the 1976 Cuba Constitution referendum; Direct Democracy Website).

Cuba's first post 1959 revolution constitutional plebiscite was held as part of the organization of the Cuban Communist Party and the institutionalization of its structures. It marked one of the significant products of the PCC's 1st Congress (official history of 1st Congress here).  It was embedded within a broader project of elaborating the core principles of what would become Cuba's Caribbean Marxism, with respect to what would emerge as the first conceptualization of Cuba's economic and political model. This formalization of the PCC's "Basic Line" and the conceptual expression of the principles of political and economic organization were expressed in the many documents and resolution produced under the guidance of the Central Committee of the PCC and its First Secretary, and approved at the 1st PCC Congress.
-Sobre la Plataforma Programática.
-Sobre los Estatutos del Partido.
-Sobre la Vida Interna del Partido.
-Sobre la política de formación, selección, ubicación, promoción y superación de los cuadros.
-Sobre las directivas para el desarrollo económico y social en el quinquenio 1976-1980.
-Sobre la Constitución y Ley de tránsito constitucional.
-Sobre los Organos del Poder Popular.
-Sobre la División Político-administrativa.
-Sobre el Sistema de dirección y planificación de la economía.
-Sobre el Cronograma de aplicación de la división político-administrativa, los órganos del Poder Popular y el Sistema de Dirección de la economía.
-Sobre Política Internacional.
-Sobre los Estudios del marxismo-leninismo en nuestro país
-Sobre los Medios de difusión masiva
-Sobre Política educacional
-Sobre Política Científica Nacional
-Sobre la Cultura artística y literaria
-Sobre la Cuestión agraria y las relaciones con el campesinado.
-Sobre la Política en relación con la religión, la iglesia y los creyentes.
-Sobre el pleno ejercicio de la igualdad de la mujer.
-Sobre la formación de la niñez y la juventud.
-Sobre las apelaciones.
-Sobre el XI Festival Mundial de la Juventud y los EstudiantesResolución Especial


To those ends, of course, the 1st PCC Congress and its work product constituted the first major coordinated effort to solidify the ideological foundations of the Cuban and state on that foundation ot build the institutional structures necessary for its application to the nation.  That foundation looked to institutionalize the role of the Communist Party in its overarching role as a vanguard with the primary objective of ensuring stability and conformity with its ideological line in the operation of the state.
Cuando los procesos revolucionarios se institucionalizan y se consolidan através de instituciones realmente adecuadas —como ocurrió con la RevoluciónBolchevique, que tiene ya más de 50 años, que avanza ininterrumpidamente, ysabemos que seguirá avanzando—, vemos qué gran estabilidad le da a esospueblos, qué gran estabilidad tienen esas naciones y esas colectividadeshumanas cuando se organizan bien, cuando se institucionalizan bien, cuandotienen los organismos adecuados para marchar adelante. (Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz,primer secretario del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba yprimer ministro del gobierno revolucionario, en el acto en que lefueran entregados los compromisos del pueblo en saludo al PrimerCongreso del Partido por parte de los dirigentes de las organizacionesde masas, en el Palacio de la Revolucion, el 29 de mayo de 1975, "AÑODEL PRIMER CONGRESO").

Thus, that solidification has had staying power; despite many challenges and crisis, the vanguard party has remained loyal to the  core premises of what in retrospect were the foundations of Cuba's Caribbean Marxism.  These continue to inform the operation and conceptual universe of its leaders to this day (Backer, Cuba's Caribbean Marxism, 2018)). That institutionalization included among its core elements a state constitution, the reproganization of territorial divisions, the establishment of a national assembly, and the reorganization of the administrative organs of the state.
La Revolución viene realizando en estos últimos meses un considerable esfuerzo en la aplicación de los acuerdos del Congreso: la Constitución, el establecimiento de los Poderes Populares, la nueva División Político-Administrativa, la reestructuración de los organismos centrales del Estado, la implantación progresiva de un sistema de dirección de la economía, e incontables tareas más de orden partidario y estatal. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, EN EL ACTO CONMEMORATIVO DEL XVI ANIVERSARIO DE LOS COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION, CELEBRADO EN LA PLAZA DE LA REVOLUCION "JOSE MARTI", CIUDAD DE LA HABANA, EL 28 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1976, "AÑO DEL XX ANIVERSARIO DEL GRANMA").

Caribbean Marxism, however, was never intended as mere theory.  Rather, its object was to inform the political and economic project of the PCC to be implemented through administrate institutions designed and operated to that end. This, as a first task, those structuring and conceptual premises, and particularly the economic and political model embraced in the 1st PCC Congress required translation into an institutionalized political apparatus. That, in turn, required an the institutionalization of a mass organization for the expression of popular power. That produced the organization of the National Assembly of Popular Power, whose work began on 2 December 1976 (official description here).
En este acto trascendental e histórico, del cual todos somos testigos vivientes, cesa el período de provisionalidad del Gobierno Revolucionario y adopta nuestro Estado socialista formas institucionales definitivas. La Asamblea Nacional se constituye en órgano supremo del Estado y asume las funciones que le asigna la Constitución. Era un deber y es a la vez un gran triunfo de nuestra generación arribar a esta meta.
* * *
Estos representantes del pueblo no reciben remuneración alguna por su condición de diputados. Tampoco ejercen el cargo sin el control de sus conciudadanos. Su representación es revocable en cualquier instante por los mismos que los eligieron. Ninguno estará por encima de la ley, ni del resto de sus compatriotas. Sus cargos no entrañan privilegios sino deberes y responsabilidades. También en nuestro sistema el gobierno y la administración de justicia dependen directamente de la Asamblea Nacional. Hay división de funciones, pero no hay división de poderes. El poder es uno, el del pueblo trabajador, que se ejerce a través de la Asamblea Nacional y de los organismos del Estado que de ella dependen. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, EN LA SESION SOLEMNE DE CONSTITUCION DE LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DEL PODER POPULAR, CELEBRADA EN EL TEATRO "CARLOS MARX", EL 2 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1976, "AÑO DEL XX ANIVERSARIO DEL GRANMA"

It also required a blueprint for the administrative structure through which the economic and political model could be implemented through state organs. These administrative organs would institutionalize administrative authority through which the PCC would operate--not as a vanguard, but as a state organ asserting the administrative power of government both internally and externally. These were to be confirmed by the new new revolutionary constitution.

These organs were not meant merely to implement Marxist Leninist ideology, but to preserve it as well. Fidel Castro in 1976 was at some pains to point out the importance of the relation between ideology, the state organs, and the integrity of the vanguard Communist Party by contrasting Cuba and the Soviet Union to China. China ceased to be a Leninist and Marxist state when it chose to abandon its core ideology, when it started to abandon class struggle and the privileging of wokers, peasants and their allies.
De que las cosas más absurdas pueden ocurrir aún en el seno de la familia socialista y en países que iniciaron ese glorioso y revolucionario camino, si los principios se descuidan, si los conceptos se pierden, si los hombres se hacen dioses, si el internacionalismo se abandona, es la historia reciente de China. Ese país, cuya heroica y abnegada victoria revolucionaria constituyó, después de la gloriosa Revolución de Octubre, una de las más grandes y alentadoras esperanzas para todos los pueblos de la Tierra, ha sido escenario de la más brutal traición al movimiento revolucionario mundial. No es justo culpar de ello a ese noble y abnegado pueblo, ni a los comunistas chinos que tantas pruebas han dado de sus virtudes heroicas y su espíritu revolucionario.

¿Cómo explicar entonces los hechos que allí sucedieron? ¿Cómo explicar que la política internacional china terminara asociada a las fuerzas más retrógradas del imperialismo en todas partes del mundo, su defensa de la OTAN, su amistad con Pinochet, su criminal complicidad con Africa del Sur contra el MPLA, su odio y su campaña repugnante contra la Unión Soviética, sus cobardes ataques a Cuba, al extremo de asociarse a los peores voceros del imperialismo yanki para presentarla como una amenaza para los pueblos de América Latina, que es tanto como hacerse cómplice del bloqueo y de la infame política de agresión imperialista contra nuestra patria?

Todo eso puede ocurrir cuando una camarilla corrompida y endiosada puede hacerse dueña del Partido, destruir, humillar y aplastar a los mejores militantes e imponer su voluntad a toda la nación, apoyada en la fuerza y el prestigio que emana de una profunda revolución social. Siempre he creído que los fundadores de un proceso revolucionario socialista adquieren ante sus conciudadanos tal autoridad y ascendencia, tales y tan poderosos medios de poder, que el uso irrestricto de esa autoridad, ese prestigio y esos medios puede llevar a graves errores e increíbles abusos de poder. Pienso por ello y he pensado siempre, que cualesquiera que sean los méritos individuales de cualquier hombre, toda manifestación de culto a la personalidad debe ser radicalmente evitada; que cualquier hombre, no importa qué aptitudes se le puedan atribuir, nunca será superior a la capacidad colectiva, que la dirección colegiada, el respeto irrestricto a la práctica de la crítica y la autocrítica, la legalidad socialista, la democracia y disciplina partidista y estatal y la inviolabilidad de las normas y las ideas básicas del marxismo-leninismo y el socialismo son los únicos valores sobre los cuales puede sostenerse una verdadera dirección revolucionaria. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, EN LA SESION SOLEMNE DE CONSTITUCION DE LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DEL PODER POPULAR, CELEBRADA EN EL TEATRO "CARLOS MARX", EL 2 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1976, "AÑO DEL XX ANIVERSARIO DEL GRANMA")
Thus ideology provides the boundary between a revolutionary democratic state under the direction of a vanguard party, and a vanguard party that itself has become a reactionary force.  But that ideology can only be protected by the masses themselves--that is the revolutionary masses to which popular authority could eb vested--in a state of class struggle that would include only workers, students, peasnats and their allies.  They serve as the critical authenticating and protective force that preserves the Leninist and Mraxist principles of the state even against its own organs.

As a consequence, ideology, and the institutionalization of state and Party organs was not enough to conform to the core ideological requisite of mass solidaity. Though these organs of popular power that implemented the conceptualization of the Cuban economic and political model were developed under the leadership of and with the guidance of the PCC, it was also thought necessary to invoke a  mechanism for the concrete expression of popular participation and approval.

That institutionalized expression of mass solidarity was to be undertaken in two ways. The first was through an exercise of popular consultation. That in turn served the purposes of obtaining feedback, but also as a mechanism for identifying popular sentiment and to socialize the masses as to the appropriate way to approach the political project undertaken through the leadership of the PCC. "Por lo pronto, ya estamos discutiendo con todo el pueblo la Constitución de laRepública. La Constitución de la República nos llevó casi 40 horas de análisis yde discusión en la Comisión Preparatoria. Ahora la está discutiendo todo elpueblo. Después tendremos de nuevo que analizarla, tomando en cuenta lasopiniones y los criterios que se han vertido. Y vemos con qué interés el puebloha tomado la discusión de la Constitución" (Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz,primer secretario del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba yprimer ministro del gobierno revolucionario, en el acto en que lefueran entregados los compromisos del pueblo en saludo al PrimerCongreso del Partido por parte de los dirigentes de las organizacionesde masas, en el Palacio de la Revolucion, el 29 de mayo de 1975, "AÑODEL PRIMER CONGRESO"). To that end, the state organized a comprehensive series of formalized discussion session where popular opinion was identified, gathered, and passed on in summary form (Dieter Nohlen, Elections in the Americas: A data handbook, Vol. 1:197). And, in that respect the local mass organizations served a useful purpose to both organize mass engagement, and to discipline it. 
Y, efectivamente, además de las tareas habituales, los Comités de Defensa han desarrollado un gran esfuerzo en apoyo de todas las actividades que se llevan a cabo en cumplimiento de los acuerdos del Primer Congreso. Fue necesario un arduo trabajo para organizar el referéndum en que se proclamó la Constitución Socialista de nuestro país; ha sido necesario también un ingente esfuerzo en todas las tareas relacionadas con la nueva División Político-Administrativa y la constitución de los Poderes Populares; todo el trabajo relacionado con los carnés de identidad, los registros de electores y la organización del proceso; el trabajo relacionado con la movilización de masas, las asambleas diferentes que hay que llevar a cabo. ¡Ahí han estado presentes los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución! (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, EN EL ACTO CONMEMORATIVO DEL XVI ANIVERSARIO DE LOS COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION, CELEBRADO EN LA PLAZA DE LA REVOLUCION "JOSE MARTI", CIUDAD DE LA HABANA, EL 28 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1976, "AÑO DEL XX ANIVERSARIO DEL GRANMA").

The second form of institutionalized expression of mass solidarity was to be undertaken by signs of mass approval of the final product developed from consultation and the work undertaken under the leadership of the PCC. This was to take two distinct but related forms, each evidencing the unique re-characterization of the devices  in socialist terms. Indeed, at this initial phase of socialist mass participation (still too early to call it theorized socialist democracy), it was necessary to develop the character and nature of popular (mass) participation. The first modality for the expression of mass solidarity was through acclamation, and the expression of the unity of the people with the Party at mass events guided by PCC leadership. "Pero, además, este Congreso ha reflejado la extraordinaria unidad de nuestropueblo y de nuestro Partido. Y ha sido un Congreso profundamente justo yprofundamente humano."(DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE EN JEFE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, . . .EN EL ACTO DE MASAS CON MOTIVO DE LA CLAUSURA DEL PRIMER CONGRESO DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA. PLAZA DE LA REVOLUCION, 22 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1975, "AÑO DEL PRIMER CONGRESO" This acclamation device was to be manifested at mass events.  The Cuban state apparatus was careful to record this manifestation. 
Pero además, las tesis más importantes fueron discutidas con todo el pueblo. El pueblo participó en la elaboración de esas tesis y en la elaboración de la política de los años futuros. ¡Y por eso sabe que las tesis y los acuerdos del Congreso son sus tesis y son sus acuerdos! (APLAUSOS)

Si allí en el "Carlos Marx" se reunió el Congreso del Partido, aquí en la Plaza de la Revolución se reúne el Congreso del pueblo para expresar su apoyo a los acuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS). Pero si allí votamos, aquí debemos votar también (APLAUSOS). Si allí discutimos y aprobamos todas las tesis, aquí, en representación de todo el pueblo, debemos también votar, y preguntarle a nuestro pueblo si apoya o no apoya los acuerdos del Congreso (APLAUSOS Y EXCLAMACIONES DE: "¡Sí!")

Es decir, ¿estamos conformes con los acuerdos del Congreso? (APLAUSOS Y EXCLAMACIONES DE: "¡Sí!")

Aquí podríamos preguntar también si alguien está en contra. (EXCLAMACIONES DE: "¡No!")

Si alguien se abstiene (EXCLAMACIONES DE: "¡No!") Entonces, aprobados por unanimidad los acuerdos del Congreso. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE EN JEFE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER SECRETARIO DEL COMITE CENTRAL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA Y PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN EL ACTO DE MASAS CON MOTIVO DE LA CLAUSURA DEL PRIMER CONGRESO DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA. PLAZA DE LA REVOLUCION, 22 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1975, "AÑO DEL PRIMER CONGRESO").

This form acquires legitimacy from the process of democratic and mass engagement in the process of drafting and criticizing the initial documents. Mass democracy, then, can be spontaneous--at least under the guidance and leadership of senior Party officials.

The second modality of the expression of mass solidarity was through the mechanism of voting.  That required resort to the traditional device of elections, in the case of constitutional refor through the organization of a plebiscite in which the masses, under the leadership of the PCC, would express their approval of the work of the PCC and its organs evidenced in the Constitutional draft (ostensibly amended in light of popular commentary). The referendum was held on 15 February 1976 and served as the first time since before 1959 that the Cuban people were permitted to participate in a nationwide vote.It was overwhelmingly approved as noted above in the Data on the voting for the 1976 Cuba Constitution referendum; Direct Democracy Website). This is not meant to be the same as elections in liberal democratic states, but to reflect the assent of the people to the product of the process in which they had a direct  involvement.   

El tránsito de la LF1959 a la Constitución de 1976 trajo consigo la única consulta popular en las urnas de la historia constitucional de Cuba; la decisión fue adoptada por el Consejo de Ministros y el Buró Político del Partido Comunista. Esa consulta fue calificada como referendo (Vega, 1988: p. 119; Azcuy, 2004: p. 83, Guanche, 2011: p. 42), y además de que se oficializó con esa denominación (Ley No 1229/1975), justo recayó sobre la Constitución vigente para su aprobación. Previamente se había sometido a debate popular el anteproyecto, por lo que el pueblo podía modificar su contenido; pero la mayoría de esos cambios fueron poco sustanciales, basta comparar el anteproyecto con la Constitución aprobada.

* * *

Algunos consideran a esta consulta popular de aprobación de la Constitución cubana en 1975 como un plebiscito vinculante (Altman, 2005: p. 218; Hevia, 2010: p. 177), otros han minimizado la trascendencia del proceso de elaboración de la Constitución de 1976, que involucró una participación directa sui generis (el debate popular) con un MDD, arguyendo que este (el proceso en su totalidad) ocurrió en un ambiente autoritario (Vergottini, 2009: p. 146), o con falta de libertades públicas (Asensi, 1996: p. 63). Así dicho se obvia que la Constitución de 1976 significó el cierre del Período de Provisionalidad, interregno útil a la progresiva institucionalización del naciente Estado revolucionario, y que por lo tanto, algunas de las prescripciones constitucionales ya tenían precedente en leyes y prácticas políticas anteriores. ((Teodoro) Yan Guzman Hernández, Los mecanismos de democracia directa en Cuba: diseño normativo y práctica; 2016).









Part 3: Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0--The Template for Socialist Democracy: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years series theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite. 

This Post includes Part 3: Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0--The Template for Socialist Democracy.






In Parts 1 and 2 of this Series I briefly sketched out the approach of the current Cuban political establishment when it was initially faced with the issue of constituting its political and administrative institutions.  That task did not arise at the time of the establishment of the current system in 1959 upon the establishment of the current version of the Cuban Republic.  Rather, the revolutionary government functioned on the basis of ad hoc and interim measures for the first fifteen or so years of its existence.  It was the need to institutionalize its government, and to memorialize its conceptualization of the political and economic model it had embraced, that drove the political and military leadership toward the project of constitutionalization in the wake of the establishment of a solidified Communist Party establishment, and the adoption by that establishment of key documents through which to assert leadership over the state apparatus and the masses. 

At the same time, those political and economic modeling, in the Cuban context was faced with a conundrum for the establishment of its legitimacy. On the one hand, the revolutionary government was by 1975 firmly Marxist Leninist in a classically European sense. And it had already made clear its rejection of the Chinese path toward Leninist state organization and Marxist economics grounded in state directed markets theory. On the other hand, its form embrace of the original contradiction of Marxist Leninist states--the centrality of class struggle and the primacy of worker-peasant solidarity given voice through the vanguard--required a more direct incorporation of popular participation directly in the constitution of the state and administrative apparatus, as well as in the formulation of the basic conceptualization of the economic and political model. Yet this engagement with the masses were to be undertaken even as a primary responsibility of the Leninist vanguard was to guide the masses toward a better understanding of its role within a Marxist state. 

For the Cuban state leaders the solution appeared in two tracks.  On the one hand, the masses were to be engaged in the process of formulating theory and institutional charters.  On the other they were to affirm or assent to the adoption of those documents--at the instance of the vanguard--through the traditional mechanics of voting.  At the same time, engagement was understood to serve as a means of socializing the masses and leading them to a proper understanding of the tasks and of the necessary content of theory and the necessary character of the institutions of state and Party. Likewise, affirmation acts were not to be understood as liberal democratic elections or voting.  Acclamation could be manifested in mass assemblies; and it could also be managed through referendum. 

The process of constitutionalizing the state around the paramount political leadership of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) undertaken during the course of the 1ts POC Congress, the process of managing popular engagement, of responding to that engagement with changes to draft documents, and thereafter of securing mass approval, set the template for each of these action in the future.  For us--as we undertake the close study of the process of securing constitutional revision--first through the leading elements of the PCC, then through drafting committee and POC Congress, and then through the organization of mass power, to popular consultation and thereafter to be affirmed through a national plebiscite, the actions of state and party in 1975 provide both a baseline and the conceptual starting point for the eventual development of Cuban theories of Socialist Democracy. 
At the same time, it is important to distinguish constitutionalizing action separated by almost a generation, and made more remote by the profound changed in the world as well as in Cuba since the adoption of the 1976 Constitution and the organization of the institutional structures of the PCC. For one thing, that branch of Soviet Marxist Leninism has withered on the vine.  Its last real theorist, however, was Fidel Castro himself.  Yet Cuba's own engagement with Leninism as the remnant of Soviet ideology has been profoundly challenged both by regional changes and by the vigorous development of 21st century Chinese Marxist Leninism. China provides both support and inspiration, but at the same time a challenge to Cuban ideology.  That challenge intensifies to the extent to which Cuba remains committed to classic class struggle, continues to reject the market as inherently a device of capitalist imperialism, and continues to define itself against the United States (as the ultimate 'other'). At the same time, China's influence has grown as its interest in Cuba has deepened and as its international importance has expanded. Moreover, by 2018, the PCC itself had already developed quite distinct markers of participation that went well beyond the highly controlled engagement that was at the center of mass participation in 1975. 
Thus, it is important to start with 1975 as the baseline for methodologies, and perhaps theories of mass participation.  At the same time, those baseline templates were themselves transformed starting with the movement, after Raúl Castro's assumption of apex authority within the FAR and the PCC, and the development of more open textured (by Cuban standards) methods for popular engagement in what became the PCC's Lineamientos, and thereafter its reconceptualization of the political and economic model, and now the 2019 Constitution.  What are the central elements of that template?
First the Cuban PCC adopted something that to American eyes appears to look suspiciously like a corporate governance model.  That translates in Leninist terms to the following--all political change must originate in the PCC.  AT the same time the PCC is constrained by its own line to the sorts of political projects it might initiate, as well as with respect to its contents. But legitimacy requires affirmation by the masses, the way the key board proposals require shareholder approval. 
Second, the object of this approval under the guidance of the PCC, is in part to legitimate the PCC's work, but also to educate the masses and move the PCC's project forward of socializing the masses into appropriate class consciousness and thus of advancing their loyalty to the revolution and its principles. To that extent, and again borrowing an analogy from American corporate practice--engagement was to be structured and managed in ways that contemporary Americans would recognize as corporate or small town "town hall meetings" (e.g., here).  I have referred to this as   Populist Technocracy and Engagement.
Third, Constitution follows the development of political principle, and remains subordinate to those principles.  In this sense, the constitution memorializes the normative structures the control of which is delegated to the PCC and the content of which is subject to its own development of Marxism and Leninism in context.  As such, constitutional reform is both a consequential event (and in this sense a technical rather than a normative project) and constrained by core premises and principles which may not be challenged through the process of constitutional reform. 
Fourth, that basic relationship between constitutional reform and the PCC political line, then constrains and shapes the nature of popular engagement (by defining what may or may not be suggested) and by then providing the mechanisms for weighing the value of such contributions,.  It is in that sense that any engagement in which suggestions for the abandonment of central planning (for example) would just not register on those charged with receiving popular suggestions. 
Fifth, there is nothing sacred about the forms of popular affirmation.  Mass events are as legitimate as traditional voting.  Moreover, mass engagement must be organized through the institutions of mass revolutionary discipline--for example the committees for the Defense of the Revolution, who themselves are committed to moving forward the PCC line against "reactionary" and dissident elements. It is in that sense that one could conceive of the process as entirely democratic, even as it severely constrained by the form and content of debate. 

Sixth, the notion of affirmation itself is understood as ministerial in the sense that it follows from and ought to reflect the popular 'buy in' resulting from the process of mass engagement in the development of the final draft. It is in that sense unnecessary and the understanding is that only those things (and candidates) that must be approved or affirmed would be brought to a vote int he first place-  Socialist consultation produces the consensus and agreement which is a predicate for a vote that merely serves as a mechanism for memorializing that consensus through a discrete mass act (of voting). 










The State of the Union 2019--Thoughts on the Rituals of Stalemate and the Theater of Discourse in the State of the Union Speech and the Democratic Party Response

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Long before the elections of 2016, the American Republic had been moving toward more formal and open hostilities in the cultural civil war, one with social, economic, cultural and political consequences, that was one of the great consequences of the immediate post 1945 period. That war only intensified after Mr. Trump assumed the U.S. Presidency. From 2016, the tensions between the principal players in the great war for the control of the basic narratives of the American Republic and the orthodox principles that constrain its "official" society came out of the shadows and assumed a central role in the politics that has followed.  

To an extent, this now quite public and formal eruption might in the long term be useful for the Republic.  Issues long buried as unsuitable for "polite political society" have now become the central elements of political, cultural and social battles among those with the money, power and clout to "make a difference"--and all, of course on the behalf of the rest of the nation, whose cadres are meant to listen reverentially, pick sides, and follow directions for the glorious victory of any of those parties.  Quite sensible--all sides have been working hard to reduce the autonomy of the individual even as it sharpens the  delineations of the aggregations that now serve as the incarnations of meta-persons, social persons constructs, built from the amalgamations of traits with some political value. 

Like many others, I watch the slow, excruciating, and largely humorless lurch toward some sort of apotheosis with a combination of impatience and dread. But a-lurching we must go.

It is with that in mind that I read through President trump's State of the Union Address, and the response by Georgia Democrat Stacey Abrams. The State of the Union Address in Congress had itself for a time become an issue of high politics as both parties played hardball for a variety of objectives dear to them and their constituents and maneuvered for advantage around the disaster that has been the closure of the government. 

Mr. Trump's speech along Ms. Abrams' response follow, along with very brief comments. For those who desire an annotated journey through the President's speech, you may find the following of some value: here (New York Times), here (The Washington Post), and here (NPR). For an thought leader takaways here, and here.




1. It has been the curse of this generation of the political class and those that manage them that they resort all too easily to data driven pandering.  It was hard not to start thinking about the conflation of the focus group (and sometimes pithy and well targeted) rhetorical bites in television infomercials with the narrative offered up to the gods of social media assessment so evident in both speech and response.  That is not to blame the speakers.  Goodness knows, speech is now so tightly constrained by data driven expectations satisfaction that is is hard to imagine why they would even try to write something original for consumption.  One can envision that day (perhaps already here) where such speeches are completely detached from the human element--a product of the logical cobbling together of key words and phrases amassed for that purpose through well designed algorithms. 



2. And, indeed, there is evidence that the intelligentsia is already well disposed toward the embrace of algorithmically authored verbiage--as long as it meets the ideologically pre-programmed checklists that now pass for analysis. This tells us more, of course, about the state of our orthodoxy--and the modalities of ethics and other devices used to protect those orthodoxies--that it may say about whatever content those remarks purport to deliver.

3. As a consequence, there should be no surprise that the speeches contain nothing "new" in the sense of rhetorical impulses toward movement forward from the current positions of the ideological trenches built at great costs by our political "Great Powers" in the landscape of our "Flanders Fields" (if I may shamelessly invoke the imagery of WWI). What one sees yet again, as one has seen with increasing clarity since the start of President Obama’s second term, is the commitment of both of the Great Power Parties to quite strategically driven trench warfare. And the thinking of these political organizations is roughly similar to that of the general staffs of the European Great Powers in 1914—the idea that each can out last, out spend and out talk the other for the control of the political narrative (and the legitimating votes as a gateway to the unfettered exercise of delegated power). But one need go no further than the speeches themselves. Mr. Trump invoked the analogy quite directly but with reference to President Reagan and directed outward toward military competition for dominance with Russia. Ms. Abrams was perhaps more subtle—by invoking the imagery of historical determinism toward goals that (ought to be ) shared.



(Pix credit here))


4. In the absence of substance, the State of the Union and the response by the opposition party necessarily descends to theatre. But that is not a criticism. Americans have long ago ceased to speak for the purpose of communicating but instead deploy words and phrases for the purpose of inciting mass response (or the approving clucking of those who amplify and direct mass reactions). One is reminded of the person in early live broadcast television and on game shows, whose role was to hold up words (signs) the purpose of which was to induce reaction (theater) as signaled by the text (applaud, laugh, stamp feet, etc.). That is not new, American political discourse has been slithering toward those forms for almost a generation. What may be new after 2016 is the conscious and open embrace of the form by both the speaker and his audience.


5. But through the magic of technology the “whole world is a stage” and actors turned politicians, and politicians turned actors are acutely aware that there is more power in the scene itself than in the triggering effect of signaling words and phrases (with apologies for the descent into the land of cliché). In this context, Speaker Pelosi’s clapping acquired greater power (and more notice) than the rhetorical flourishes of either speech or response. ""She invented this weird walrus clap that was mocking, aggressive, and delightfully surreal all at the same time," one Twitter user wrote" (here) The pictures used to enrich social media and press accounts become the incarnation of the aggregation of the words that effectively substitute for the words themselves. The power of rhetoric is now in memes and "Photoshop Battles" (here) rather within which words and their ideas shrivel.  "Throughout the speech the House speaker managed to undermine Trump without speaking a word, employing subtle eye rolls or apparently ignoring him by reading papers to show her disapproval" ( Pelosi turns clapping into a viral art form as she trolls Trump). 

6.  It follows that it is the pictures used to depict the event, rather than the event itself that has now--after a very long gestation as the practices of traditional press outlets changed to suit the times and their taste for direct political engagement--become not just its representation but also its  management.  The object remains the same, inflaming passions, or in the drier language of the administrator of the engagement of the (voting or focus group relevant) masses might say, to lead people to an appropriate understanding of events and their implications. Not that this is necessarily to be deplored; it is an ancient habit of polities in any case.  Rather its transformation through shifting importance of images and theatre over words, that represents a curious turn in the performance of politics--even among the highfaluting elite elements of the Republic.   But one remember that what appears perfectly positive in one era might in another be viewed as implicating future political, social and cultural taboos (for example in the racial undertones of American WWI propaganda; images like words can come back to bite one):


 (Pix credit HERE)

7. If uninspired by the reactionary historical social justice determinism of the Democratic Party, or the passive aggressive street brawler merchant hustling of the Republican Party, then what might be usefully retrieved from the words communicated at this (necessarily important—because the nation has now constructed it so) event?

A. Calls for unity have been reduced to fetish invocations. They are a necessary incantation, an opening spell, that makes it possible to then enter into the discourse of trench warfare.

B. Unity calls, however, serve an important function—for they do not mean in the speechifying of either Party that the warring political organs ought to come together—but rather than there is a clearly identifiable orthodoxy to which all political actors must conform. This the call to unity actually is (1) an affirmation of an overarching and binding orthodoxy, (2) an acknowledgement of heresy on the part of political opponents, and (3) a declaration that disciplinary mechanisms are necessary to bring opponents back to conformity.

C. Those orthodoxies of course point in very different directions. Both place their faith in the state, and in the community, to be sure. But each emphasizes states and community is dramatically different ways. And at the heart of this, for both parties, is the definition and control of the masses whose management and control of their most important powers (and of these especially to vote) is at the heart of the pragmatic objectives of each of the parties. Ms. Abrams, of course, was most explicit, but she and her supporters believe that she was the victim of abuse in that respect. At the same time, migration issues and census counts also play into the larger calculus—each in part connected to the way in which “the people” are constituted recognized, and afforded roles in the space reserved for mass participation.  The arguments remain quintessentially and passionately American, rooted in a history of a slow progress toward universal suffrage.  And yet it is also tempting to understand the overtones of Leninism that such rhetorical stances evoke, and quite strongly. Its Leninist essence might be understood in what appears to be a universal political set of "first principles" around the issue of who constitutes "the people." And "people" have always (even in the United States) been understood  to constitute only that portion of the mass of the inhabitants who are vested with participatory political. In the U.S. that is currently understood in terms of identity (race, gender, religion and the like). In China, it was understood in the economic terms of class struggle ("Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. . . they enforce their dictatorship over the running dogs of imperialism . . . suppress them, allow them only to behave themselves and not to be unruly in word or deed." Mao Zedong, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship).)

D. Individuals have merged with their political significance. One no longer understands people as individuals—but rather they are manifestation (the living incarnation) of a politics, experience, status or condition that points to the orthodoxy to which all political will must bend. It is not for nothing that pundits sometimes spend as much time of an analysis of the legions of “strategic invitees” of both parties than they do on the speeches. And yet those invitees serve as the dioramas of large portions of the speech and response which use them to incarnate abstract points (the orthodoxy). In a sense, this reminds us of the power of the ancient practice of venerating saints and martyrs both for their incarnation of “truth” and as living examples of the practice of truth in our times. The veneration of Logos, then, is one of the great markers of this age—and one is likely to see this practice intensified (and augmented by books on saints and martyrs and—in this age—of visual depictions through documentaries and other theatrical renditions).





(Pix Credit: Here's Why Congresswomen Will Wear All White to the State of the Union)


E. Color matters in a world in which it is impossible to escape the public eye. A generation ago the West became enamored of “color” revolutions. That made for good copy and served as a useful way of flattening events to make them easier to digest and to manage (at least with respect to the domestic response sought). There was a bit of color revolution in the air as part of the theatrical elements of the speeches. Democrats rallied around white; Mrs. Trump around a more military style; and Tiffany Trump causes a stir precisely because she wore white rather than some other color. The speech, and its response, then, were worn, in this instance, on the bodies of women. 

(Pix Credit: Tiffany Trump arrives dressed in white to hear President Donald Trump deliver his State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on Capitol Hill in Washington on Tuesday, Feb. 5, 2019. (Photo: Andrew Harnik, AP))


F. Class warfare still sells; it is something special to watch the translation of the old European (and Cuban) ideological obsession with class warfare into the rhetoric of the American political organ generally understood to be its most right wing (using that term with caution here because the underlying meaning of relational terms like left and right, and conservative and liberal, have lost all of the contextual bearings in this century in this Republic). As rhetoric it was thus marvelous to hear that invocation from Mr. Trump who himself occupies an interesting space within its divisions: “No issue better illustrates the divide between America’s working class and America’s political class than illegal immigration. Wealthy politicians and donors push for open borders while living their lives behind walls, and gates, and guards.” Ms. Abrams countered Mr. Trump’s class, with class stories of her own, but added the intersectionality of race and gender. These also sell well—at least as disciplinary tropes within public discursive space (and increasingly private economic space as well).

___________
Remarks by President Trump in State of the Union Address


Issued on: February 6, 2019


February 5, 2019
9:07 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Madam Speaker, Mr. Vice President, Members of Congress, the First Lady of the United States — (applause) — and my fellow Americans:

We meet tonight at a moment of unlimited potential. As we begin a new Congress, I stand here ready to work with you to achieve historic breakthroughs for all Americans.

Millions of our fellow citizens are watching us now, gathered in this great chamber, hoping that we will govern not as two parties but as one nation. (Applause.)

The agenda I will lay out this evening is not a Republican agenda or a Democrat agenda. It’s the agenda of the American people.

Many of us have campaigned on the same core promises: to defend American jobs and demand fair trade for American workers; to rebuild and revitalize our nation’s infrastructure; to reduce the price of healthcare and prescription drugs; to create an immigration system that is safe, lawful, modern, and secure; and to pursue a foreign policy that puts America’s interests first.

There is a new opportunity in American politics, if only we have the courage, together, to seize it. (Applause.) Victory is not winning for our party. Victory is winning for our country. (Applause.)

This year, America will recognize two important anniversaries that show us the majesty of America’s mission and the power of American pride.

In June, we mark 75 years since the start of what General Dwight D. Eisenhower called the “Great Crusade” — the Allied liberation of Europe in World War II. (Applause.) On D-Day, June 6th, 1944, 15,000 young American men jumped from the sky, and 60,000 more stormed in from the sea, to save our civilization from tyranny. Here with us tonight are three of those incredible heroes: Private First Class Joseph Reilly, Staff Sergeant Irving Locker, and Sergeant Herman Zeitchik. (Applause.) Please. Gentlemen, we salute you.

In 2019, we also celebrate 50 years since brave young pilots flew a quarter of a million miles through space to plant the American flag on the face of the moon. Half a century later, we are joined by one of the Apollo 11 astronauts who planted that flag: Buzz Aldrin. (Applause.) Thank you, Buzz. This year, American astronauts will go back to space on American rockets. (Applause.)

In the 20th century, America saved freedom, transformed science, redefined the middle class, and, when you get down to it, there’s nothing anywhere in the world that can compete with America. (Applause.) Now we must step boldly and bravely into the next chapter of this great American adventure, and we must create a new standard of living for the 21st century. An amazing quality of life for all of our citizens is within reach.

We can make our communities safer, our families stronger, our culture richer, our faith deeper, and our middle class bigger and more prosperous than ever before. (Applause.)

But we must reject the politics of revenge, resistance, and retribution, and embrace the boundless potential of cooperation, compromise, and the common good. (Applause.)

Together, we can break decades of political stalemate. We can bridge old divisions, heal old wounds, build new coalitions, forge new solutions, and unlock the extraordinary promise of America’s future. The decision is ours to make.

We must choose between greatness or gridlock, results or resistance, vision or vengeance, incredible progress or pointless destruction.

Tonight, I ask you to choose greatness. (Applause.)

Over the last two years, my administration has moved with urgency and historic speed to confront problems neglected by leaders of both parties over many decades.

In just over two years since the election, we have launched an unprecedented economic boom — a boom that has rarely been seen before. There’s been nothing like it. We have created 5.3 million new jobs and, importantly, added 600,000 new manufacturing jobs — something which almost everyone said was impossible to do. But the fact is, we are just getting started. (Applause.)

Wages are rising at the fastest pace in decades and growing for blue-collar workers, who I promised to fight for. They’re growing faster than anyone else thought possible. Nearly 5 million Americans have been lifted off food stamps. (Applause.) The U.S. economy is growing almost twice as fast today as when I took office. And we are considered, far and away, the hottest economy anywhere in the world. Not even close. (Applause.)

Unemployment has reached the lowest rate in over half a century. (Applause.) African American, Hispanic American, and Asian American unemployment have all reached their lowest levels ever recorded. (Applause.) Unemployment for Americans with disabilities has also reached an all-time low. (Applause.) More people are working now than at any time in the history of our country — 157 million people at work. (Applause.)

We passed a massive tax cut for working families and doubled the child tax credit. (Applause.)

We virtually ended the estate tax — or death tax, as it is often called — on small businesses for ranchers and also for family farms. (Applause.)

We eliminated the very unpopular Obamacare individual mandate penalty. (Applause.) And to give critically ill patients access to lifesaving cures, we passed, very importantly, Right to Try. (Applause.)

My administration has cut more regulations in a short period of time than any other administration during its entire tenure. (Applause.) Companies are coming back to our country in large numbers thanks to our historic reductions in taxes and regulations. (Applause.)

And we have unleashed a revolution in American energy. The United States is now the number-one producer of oil and natural gas anywhere in the world. (Applause.) And now, for the first time in 65 years, we are a net exporter of energy. (Applause.)

After 24 months of rapid progress, our economy is the envy of the world, our military is the most powerful on Earth, by far, and America — (applause) — America is again winning each and every day. (Applause.)

Members of Congress: The state of our union is strong. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE: USA! USA! USA!

THE PRESIDENT: That sounds so good. (Laughter.)

Our country is vibrant and our economy is thriving like never before.

On Friday, it was announced that we added another 304,000 jobs last month alone — almost double the number expected. (Applause.) An economic miracle is taking place in the United States, and the only thing that can stop it are foolish wars, politics, or ridiculous partisan investigations. (Applause.)

If there is going to be peace and legislation, there cannot be war and investigation. It just doesn’t work that way.

We must be united at home to defeat our adversaries abroad. This new era of cooperation can start with finally confirming the more than 300 highly qualified nominees who are still stuck in the Senate. In some cases, years and years waiting. Not right. (Applause.) The Senate has failed to act on these nominations, which is unfair to the nominees and very unfair to our country.

Now is the time for bipartisan action. Believe it or not, we have already proven that that’s possible.

In the last Congress, both parties came together to pass unprecedented legislation to confront the opioid crisis, a sweeping new farm bill, historic VA reforms. And after four decades of rejection, we passed VA Accountability so that we can finally terminate those who mistreat our wonderful veterans. (Applause.)

And just weeks ago, both parties united for groundbreaking criminal justice reform. They said it couldn’t be done. (Applause.)

Last year, I heard, through friends, the story of Alice Johnson. I was deeply moved. In 1997, Alice was sentenced to life in prison as a first-time non-violent drug offender. Over the next 22 years, she became a prison minister, inspiring others to choose a better path. She had a big impact on that prison population, and far beyond.

Alice’s story underscores the disparities and unfairness that can exist in criminal sentencing, and the need to remedy this total injustice. She served almost that 22 years and had expected to be in prison for the remainder of her life.

In June, I commuted Alice’s sentence. When I saw Alice’s beautiful family greet her at the prison gates, hugging and kissing and crying and laughing, I knew I did something right. Alice is with us tonight, and she is a terrific woman. Terrific. Alice, please. (Applause.)

Alice, thank you for reminding us that we always have the power to shape our own destiny. Thank you very much, Alice. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

Inspired by stories like Alice’s, my administration worked closely with members of both parties to sign the FIRST STEP Act into law. Big deal. (Applause.) It’s a big deal.

This legislation reformed sentencing laws that have wrongly and disproportionately harmed the African American community. The FIRST STEP Act gives non-violent offenders the chance to reenter society as productive, law-abiding citizens. Now states across the country are following our lead. America is a nation that believes in redemption.

We are also joined tonight by Matthew Charles from Tennessee. In 1996, at the age of 30, Matthew was sentenced to 35 years for selling drugs and related offenses. Over the next two decades, he completed more than 30 Bible studies, became a law clerk, and mentored many of his fellow inmates.

Now, Matthew is the very first person to be released from prison under the FIRST STEP Act. (Applause.) Matthew, please. Thank you, Matthew. Welcome home. (Applause.)

Now, Republicans and Democrats must join forces again to confront an urgent national crisis. Congress has 10 days left to pass a bill that will fund our government, protect our homeland, and secure our very dangerous southern border.

Now is the time for Congress to show the world that America is committed to ending illegal immigration and putting the ruthless coyotes, cartels, drug dealers, and human traffickers out of business. (Applause.)

As we speak, large, organized caravans are on the march to the United States. We have just heard that Mexican cities, in order to remove the illegal immigrants from their communities, are getting trucks and buses to bring them up to our country in areas where there is little border protection. I have ordered another 3,750 troops to our southern border to prepare for this tremendous onslaught.

This is a moral issue. The lawless state of our southern border is a threat to the safety, security, and financial wellbeing of all America. We have a moral duty to create an immigration system that protects the lives and jobs of our citizens. This includes our obligation to the millions of immigrants living here today who followed the rules and respected our laws. Legal immigrants enrich our nation and strengthen our society in countless ways. (Applause.)

I want people to come into our country in the largest numbers ever, but they have to come in legally. (Applause.)

Tonight, I am asking you to defend our very dangerous southern border out of love and devotion to our fellow citizens and to our country.

No issue better illustrates the divide between America’s working class and America’s political class than illegal immigration. Wealthy politicians and donors push for open borders while living their lives behind walls, and gates, and guards. (Applause.)

Meanwhile, working-class Americans are left to pay the price for mass illegal migration: reduced jobs, lower wages, overburdened schools, hospitals that are so crowded you can’t get in, increased crime, and a depleted social safety net. Tolerance for illegal immigration is not compassionate; it is actually very cruel. (Applause.)

One in three women is sexually assaulted on the long journey north. Smugglers use migrant children as human pawns to exploit our laws and gain access to our country. Human traffickers and sex traffickers take advantage of the wide-open areas between our ports of entry to smuggle thousands of young girls and women into the United States and to sell them into prostitution and modern-day slavery.

Tens of thousands of innocent Americans are killed by lethal drugs that cross our border and flood into our cities, including meth, heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl.

The savage gang, MS-13, now operates in at least 20 different American states, and they almost all come through our southern border. Just yesterday, an MS-13 gang member was taken into custody for a fatal shooting on a subway platform in New York City. We are removing these gang members by the thousands. But until we secure our border, they’re going to keep streaming right back in.

Year after year, countless Americans are murdered by criminal illegal aliens. I’ve gotten to know many wonderful Angel moms and dads, and families. No one should ever have to suffer the horrible heartache that they have had to endure.

Here tonight is Debra Bissell. Just three weeks ago, Debra’s parents, Gerald and Sharon, were burglarized and shot to death in their Reno, Nevada home by an illegal alien. They were in their eighties, and are survived by 4 children, 11 grandchildren, and 20 great-grandchildren. Also here tonight are Gerald and Sharon’s granddaughter Heather, and great-granddaughter Madison.

To Debra, Heather, Madison, please stand. Few can understand your pain. Thank you. And thank you for being here. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

I will never forget, and I will fight for the memory of Gerald and Sharon that it should never happen again. Not one more American life should be lost because our nation failed to control its very dangerous border.

In the last two years, our brave ICE officers made 266,000 arrests of criminal aliens, including those charged or convicted of nearly 100,000 assaults, 30,000 sex crimes, and 4,000 killings or murders.

We are joined tonight by one of those law enforcement heroes: ICE Special Agent Elvin Hernandez. When Elvin — (applause) — thank you.

When Elvin was a boy, he and his family legally immigrated to the United States from the Dominican Republic. At the age of eight, Elvin told his dad he wanted to become a Special Agent. Today, he leads investigations into the scourge of international sex trafficking.

Elvin says that, “If I can make sure these young girls get their justice, I’ve [really] done my job.” Thanks to his work, and that of his incredible colleagues, more than 300 women and girls have been rescued from the horror of this terrible situation, and more than 1,500 sadistic traffickers have been put behind bars. (Applause.) Thank you, Elvin.

We will always support the brave men and women of law enforcement, and I pledge to you tonight that I will never abolish our heroes from ICE. Thank you. (Applause.)

My administration has sent to Congress a commonsense proposal to end the crisis on the southern border. It includes humanitarian assistance, more law enforcement, drug detection at our ports, closing loopholes that enable child smuggling, and plans for a new physical barrier, or wall, to secure the vast areas between our ports of entry.

In the past, most of the people in this room voted for a wall, but the proper wall never got built. I will get it built. (Applause.)

This is a smart, strategic, see-through steel barrier — not just a simple concrete wall. It will be deployed in the areas identified by the border agents as having the greatest need. And these agents will tell you: Where walls go up, illegal crossings go way, way down. (Applause.)

San Diego used to have the most illegal border crossings in our country. In response, a strong security wall was put in place. This powerful barrier almost completely ended illegal crossings.

The border city of El Paso, Texas used to have extremely high rates of violent crime — one of the highest in the entire country, and considered one of our nation’s most dangerous cities. Now, immediately upon its building, with a powerful barrier in place, El Paso is one of the safest cities in our country. Simply put: Walls work, and walls save lives. (Applause.)

So let’s work together, compromise, and reach a deal that will truly make America safe.

As we work to defend our people’s safety, we must also ensure our economic resurgence continues at a rapid pace. No one has benefitted more from our thriving economy than women, who have filled 58 percent of the newly created jobs last year. (Applause.)

You weren’t supposed to do that. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.

All Americans can be proud that we have more women in the workforce than ever before. (Applause.)

Don’t sit yet. You’re going to like this. (Laughter.)

And exactly one century after Congress passed the constitutional amendment giving women the right to vote, we also have more women serving in Congress than at any time before. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE: USA! USA! USA!

THE PRESIDENT: That’s great. Really great. And congratulations. That’s great.

As part of our commitment to improving opportunity for women everywhere, this Thursday we are launching the first-ever government-wide initiative focused on economic empowerment for women in developing countries.

To build on — (applause) — thank you. To build on our incredible economic success, one priority is paramount: reversing decades of calamitous trade policies. So bad.

We are now making it clear to China that, after years of targeting our industries and stealing our intellectual property, the theft of American jobs and wealth has come to an end. (Applause.) Therefore, we recently imposed tariffs on $250 billion of Chinese goods, and now our Treasury is receiving billions and billions of dollars.

But I don’t blame China for taking advantage of us; I blame our leaders and representatives for allowing this travesty to happen. I have great respect for President Xi, and we are now working on a new trade deal with China. But it must include real, structural change to end unfair trade practices, reduce our chronic trade deficit, and protect American jobs. (Applause.) Thank you.

Another historic trade blunder was the catastrophe known as NAFTA. I have met the men and women of Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Hampshire, and many other states whose dreams were shattered by the signing of NAFTA. For years, politicians promised them they would renegotiate for a better deal, but no one ever tried, until now.

Our new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the USMCA, will replace NAFTA and deliver for American workers like they haven’t had delivered to for a long time. I hope you can pass the USMCA into law so that we can bring back our manufacturing jobs in even greater numbers, expand American agriculture, protect intellectual property, and ensure that more cars are proudly stamped with our four beautiful words: “Made in the USA.” (Applause.)

Tonight, I am also asking you to pass the United States Reciprocal Trade Act, so that if another country places an unfair tariff on an American product, we can charge them the exact same tariff on the exact same product that they sell to us. (Applause.)

Both parties should be able to unite for a great rebuilding of America’s crumbling infrastructure. (Applause.)

I know that Congress is eager to pass an infrastructure bill, and I am eager to work with you on legislation to deliver new and important infrastructure investment, including investments in the cutting-edge industries of the future. This is not an option. This is a necessity.

The next major priority for me, and for all of us, should be to lower the cost of healthcare and prescription drugs, and to protect patients with preexisting conditions. (Applause.)

Already, as a result of my administration’s efforts, in 2018, drug prices experienced their single largest decline in 46 years. (Applause.)

But we must do more. It’s unacceptable that Americans pay vastly more than people in other countries for the exact same drugs, often made in the exact same place. This is wrong, this is unfair, and together we will stop it — and we’ll stop it fast. (Applause.)

I am asking Congress to pass legislation that finally takes on the problem of global freeloading and delivers fairness and price transparency for American patients, finally. (Applause.)

We should also require drug companies, insurance companies, and hospitals to disclose real prices to foster competition and bring costs way down. (Applause.)

No force in history has done more to advance the human condition than American freedom. In recent years — (applause) — in recent years, we have made remarkable progress in the fight against HIV and AIDS. Scientific breakthroughs have brought a once-distant dream within reach. My budget will ask Democrats and Republicans to make the needed commitment to eliminate the HIV epidemic in the United States within 10 years. We have made incredible strides. Incredible. (Applause.) Together, we will defeat AIDS in America and beyond. (Applause.)

Tonight, I am also asking you to join me in another fight that all Americans can get behind: the fight against childhood cancer. (Applause.)

Joining Melania in the gallery this evening is a very brave 10-year-old girl, Grace Eline. Every birthday — (applause) — hi, Grace. (Laughter.) Every birthday since she was four, Grace asked her friends to donate to St. Jude’s Children’s Hospital. She did not know that one day she might be a patient herself. That’s what happened.

Last year, Grace was diagnosed with brain cancer. Immediately, she began radiation treatment. At the same time, she rallied her community and raised more than $40,000 for the fight against cancer. (Applause.) When Grace completed treatment last fall, her doctors and nurses cheered — they loved her; they still love her — with tears in their eyes as she hung up a poster that read: “Last day of chemo.” (Applause.) Thank you very much, Grace. You are a great inspiration to everyone in this room. Thank you very much.

Many childhood cancers have not seen new therapies in decades. My budget will ask Congress for $500 million over the next 10 years to fund this critical lifesaving research.

To help support working parents, the time has come to pass School Choice for Americans’ children. (Applause.) I am also proud to be the first President to include in my budget a plan for nationwide paid family leave, so that every new parent has the chance to bond with their newborn child. (Applause.)

There could be no greater contrast to the beautiful image of a mother holding her infant child than the chilling displays our nation saw in recent days. Lawmakers in New York cheered with delight upon the passage of legislation that would allow a baby to be ripped from the mother’s womb moments from birth. These are living, feeling, beautiful babies who will never get the chance to share their love and their dreams with the world. And then, we had the case of the Governor of Virginia where he stated he would execute a baby after birth.

To defend the dignity of every person, I am asking Congress to pass legislation to prohibit the late-term abortion of children who can feel pain in the mother’s womb. (Applause.)

Let us work together to build a culture that cherishes innocent life. (Applause.) And let us reaffirm a fundamental truth: All children — born and unborn — are made in the holy image of God.

The final part of my agenda is to protect American security. Over the last two years, we have begun to fully rebuild the United States military, with $700 billion last year and $716 billion this year.

We are also getting other nations to pay their fair share. (Applause.) Finally. Finally. For years, the United States was being treated very unfairly by friends of ours, members of NATO. But now we have secured, over the last couple of years, more than $100 billion of increase in defense spending from our NATO Allies. (Applause.) They said it couldn’t be done.

As part of our military build-up, the United States is developing a state-of-the-art missile defense system.

Under my administration, we will never apologize for advancing America’s interests.

For example, decades ago, the United States entered into a treaty with Russia in which we agreed to limit and reduce our missile capability. While we followed the agreement and the rules to the letter, Russia repeatedly violated its terms. It’s been going on for many years. That is why I announced that the United States is officially withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty.

Perhaps — (applause) — we really have no choice. Perhaps we can negotiate a different agreement, adding China and others, or perhaps we can’t — in which case, we will outspend and out-innovate all others by far. (Applause.)

As part of a bold new diplomacy, we continue our historic push for peace on the Korean Peninsula. Our hostages have come home, nuclear testing has stopped, and there has not been a missile launch in more than 15 months. If I had not been elected President of the United States, we would right now, in my opinion, be in a major war with North Korea. (Applause.)

Much work remains to be done, but my relationship with Kim Jong Un is a good one. Chairman Kim and I will meet again on February 27th and 28th in Vietnam. (Applause.)

Two weeks ago, the United States officially recognized the legitimate government of Venezuela — (applause) — and its new President, Juan Guaidó. (Applause.)

We stand with the Venezuelan people in their noble quest for freedom, and we condemn the brutality of the Maduro regime, whose socialist policies have turned that nation from being the wealthiest in South America into a state of abject poverty and despair. (Applause.)

Here in the United States, we are alarmed by the new calls to adopt socialism in our country.

AUDIENCE: Booo —

THE PRESIDENT: America was founded on liberty and independence, and not government coercion, domination, and control. (Applause.) We are born free and we will stay free. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE: USA! USA! USA!

THE PRESIDENT: Tonight, we renew our resolve that America will never be a socialist country. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE: USA! USA! USA!

THE PRESIDENT: One of the most complex set of challenges we face, and have for many years, is in the Middle East. Our approach is based on principled realism, not discredited theories that have failed for decades to yield progress. For this reason, my administration recognized the true capital of Israel, and proudly opened the American Embassy in Jerusalem. (Applause.)

Our brave troops have now been fighting in the Middle East for almost 19 years. In Afghanistan and Iraq, nearly 7,000 American heroes have given their lives. More than 52,000 Americans have been badly wounded. We have spent more than $7 trillion in fighting wars in the Middle East.

As a candidate for President, I loudly pledged a new approach. Great nations do not fight endless wars. (Applause.)

When I took office, ISIS controlled more than 20,000 square miles in Iraq and Syria — just two years ago. Today, we have liberated virtually all of the territory from the grip of these bloodthirsty monsters.

Now, as we work with our allies to destroy the remnants of ISIS, it is time to give our brave warriors in Syria a warm welcome home.

I have also accelerated our negotiations to reach — if possible — a political settlement in Afghanistan. The opposing side is also very happy to be negotiating. Our troops have fought with unmatched valor. And thanks to their bravery, we are now able to pursue a possible political solution to this long and bloody conflict. (Applause.)

In Afghanistan, my administration is holding constructive talks with a number of Afghan groups, including the Taliban. As we make progress in these negotiations, we will be able to reduce our troop’s presence and focus on counterterrorism. And we will indeed focus on counterterrorism.

We do not know whether we will achieve an agreement, but we do know that, after two decades of war, the hour has come to at least try for peace. And the other side would like to do the same thing. It’s time. (Applause.)

Above all, friend and foe alike must never doubt this nation’s power and will to defend our people. Eighteen years ago, violent terrorists attacked the USS Cole. And last month, American forces killed one of the leaders of that attack. (Applause.)

We are honored to be joined tonight by Tom Wibberley, whose son, Navy Seaman Craig Wibberley, was one of the 17 sailors we tragically lost. Tom, we vow to always remember the heroes of the USS Cole. (Applause.) Thank you, Tom.

My administration has acted decisively to confront the world’s leading state sponsor of terror: the radical regime in Iran. It is a radical regime. They do bad, bad things.

To ensure this corrupt dictatorship never acquires nuclear weapons, I withdrew the United States from the disastrous Iran nuclear deal. (Applause.)

And last fall, we put in place the toughest sanctions ever imposed by us on a country.

We will not avert our eyes from a regime that chants “Death to America” and threatens genocide against the Jewish people. (Applause.) We must never ignore the vile poison of anti-Semitism, or those who spread its venomous creed. With one voice, we must confront this hatred anywhere and everywhere it occurs.

Just months ago, 11 Jewish-Americans were viciously murdered in an anti-Semitic attack on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh. SWAT Officer Timothy Matson raced into the gunfire and was shot seven times chasing down the killer. And he was very successful. Timothy has just had his 12th surgery, and he is going in for many more. But he made the trip to be here with us tonight. Officer Matson, please. (Applause.) Thank you. We are forever grateful. Thank you very much.

Tonight, we are also joined by Pittsburgh survivor, Judah Samet. He arrived at the synagogue as the massacre began. But not only did Judah narrowly escape death last fall, more than seven decades ago, he narrowly survived the Nazi concentration camps. Today is Judah’s 81st birthday. (Applause.)

AUDIENCE: (Sings “Happy Birthday.”) (Applause.)

MR. SAMET: Thank you!

THE PRESIDENT: They wouldn’t do that for me, Judah. (Laughter.)

Judah says he can still remember the exact moment, nearly 75 years ago, after 10 months in a concentration camp, when he and his family were put on a train and told they were going to another camp. Suddenly, the train screeched to a very strong halt. A soldier appeared. Judah’s family braced for the absolute worst. Then, his father cried out with joy, “It’s the Americans! It’s the Americans!” (Applause.) Thank you.

A second Holocaust survivor who is here tonight, Joshua Kaufman, was a prisoner at Dachau. He remembers watching through a hole in the wall of a cattle car as American soldiers rolled in with tanks. “To me,” Joshua recalls, “the American soldiers were proof that God exists, and they came down from the sky.” They came down from Heaven.

I began this evening by honoring three soldiers who fought on D-Day in the Second World War. One of them was Herman Zeitchik. But there is more to Herman’s story. A year after he stormed the beaches of Normandy, Herman was one of the American soldiers who helped liberate Dachau. (Applause.) He was one of the Americans who helped rescue Joshua from that hell on Earth.

Almost 75 years later, Herman and Joshua are both together in the gallery tonight, seated side-by-side, here in the home of American freedom. Herman and Joshua, your presence this evening is very much appreciated. Thank you very much. (Applause.) Thank you.

When American soldiers set out beneath the dark skies over the English Channel in the early hours of D-Day, 1944, they were just young men of 18 and 19, hurtling on fragile landing craft toward the most momentous battle in the history of war.

They did not know if they would survive the hour. They did not know if they would grow old. But they knew that America had to prevail. Their cause was this nation and generations yet unborn.

Why did they do it? They did it for America. They did it for us.

Everything that has come since — our triumph over communism, our giant leaps of science and discovery, our unrivaled progress towards equality and justice — all of it is possible thanks to the blood and tears and courage and vision of the Americans who came before.

Think of this Capitol. Think of this very Chamber, where lawmakers before you voted to end slavery, to build the railroads and the highways, and defeat fascism, to secure civil rights, and to face down evil empires.

Here tonight, we have legislators from across this magnificent republic. You have come from the rocky shores of Maine and the volcanic peaks of Hawaii; from the snowy woods of Wisconsin and the red deserts of Arizona; from the green farms of Kentucky and the golden beaches of California. Together, we represent the most extraordinary nation in all of history.

What will we do with this moment? How will we be remembered?

I ask the men and women of this Congress: Look at the opportunities before us. Our most thrilling achievements are still ahead. Our most exciting journeys still await. Our biggest victories are still to come. We have not yet begun to dream.

We must choose whether we are defined by our differences or whether we dare to transcend them.

We must choose whether we squander our great inheritance or whether we proudly declare that we are Americans.

We do the incredible. We defy the impossible. We conquer the unknown.

This is the time to reignite the American imagination. This is the time to search for the tallest summit and set our sights on the brightest star. This is the time to rekindle the bonds of love and loyalty and memory that link us together as citizens, as neighbors, as patriots.

This is our future, our fate, and our choice to make. I am asking you to choose greatness.

No matter the trials we face, no matter the challenges to come, we must go forward together.

We must keep America first in our hearts. We must keep freedom alive in our souls. And we must always keep faith in America’s destiny that one nation, under God, must be the hope and the promise, and the light and the glory, among all the nations of the world.

Thank you. God bless you. And God bless America. Thank you very much. Thank you. (Applause.)

END 10:29 P.M. EST

_________


Good evening, my fellow Americans. I’m Stacey Abrams, and I am honored to join the conversation about the state of our union. Growing up, my family went back and forth between lower middle class and working poor.

Yet, even when they came home weary and bone-tired, my parents found a way to show us all who we could be. My librarian mother taught us to love learning. My father, a shipyard worker, put in overtime and extra shifts; and they made sure we volunteered to help others. Later, they both became United Methodist ministers, an expression of the faith that guides us.

These were our family values - faith, service, education and responsibility.

Now, we only had one car, so sometimes my dad had to hitchhike and walk long stretches during the 30-mile trip home from the shipyards. One rainy night, Mom got worried. We piled in the car and went out looking for him — and eventually found Dad making his way along the road, soaked and shivering in his shirtsleeves. When he got in the car, Mom asked if he’d left his coat at work. He explained he’d given it to a homeless man he’d met on the highway. When we asked why he’d given away his only jacket, Dad turned to us and said, “I knew when I left that man, he’d still be alone. But I could give him my coat, because I knew you were coming for me.”


Our power and strength as Americans lives in our hard work and our belief in more. My family understood firsthand that while success is not guaranteed, we live in a nation where opportunity is possible. But we do not succeed alone - in these United States, when times are tough, we can persevere because our friends and neighbors will come for us. Our first responders will come for us.

It is this mantra - this uncommon grace of community - that has driven me to become an attorney, a small business owner, a writer, and most recently, the Democratic nominee for Governor of Georgia. My reason for running for governor was simple: I love our country and its promise of opportunity for all, and I stand here tonight because I hold fast to my father’s credo - together, we are coming for America, for a better America.

Just a few weeks ago, I joined volunteers to distribute meals to furloughed federal workers. They waited in line for a box of food and a sliver of hope since they hadn’t received a paycheck in weeks. Making their livelihoods a pawn for political games is a disgrace. The shutdown was a stunt engineered by the President of the United States, one that defied every tenet of fairness and abandoned not just our people — but our values.

For seven years, I led the Democratic Party in the Georgia House of Representatives. I didn’t always agree with the Republican Speaker or Governor, but I understood that our constituents didn’t care about our political parties - they cared about their lives. So, when we had to negotiate criminal justice reform or transportation or foster care improvements, the leaders of our state didn’t shut down - we came together. And we kept our word.

It should be no different in our nation’s capital. We may come from different sides of the political aisle; but, our joint commitment to the ideals of this nation cannot be negotiable.

Our most urgent work is to realize Americans’ dreams of today and tomorrow. To carve a path to independence and prosperity that can last a lifetime. Children deserve an excellent education from cradle to career. We owe them safe schools and the highest standards, regardless of ZIP code.

Yet this White House responds timidly while first graders practice active shooter drills and the price of higher education grows ever steeper. From now on, our leaders must be willing to tackle gun safety measures and the crippling effect of educational loans; to support educators and invest what is necessary to unleash the power of America’s greatest minds.

In Georgia and around the country, people are striving for a middle class where a salary truly equals economic security. But instead, families’ hopes are being crushed by Republican leadership that ignores real life or just doesn’t understand it. Under the current administration, far too many hard-working Americans are falling behind, living paycheck to paycheck, most without labor unions to protect them from even worse harm.

The Republican tax bill rigged the system against working people. Rather than bringing back jobs, plants are closing, layoffs are looming and wages struggle to keep pace with the actual cost of living.

We owe more to the millions of everyday folks who keep our economy running: like truck drivers forced to buy their own rigs, farmers caught in a trade war, small business owners in search of capital, and domestic workers serving without labor protections. Women and men who could thrive if only they had the support and freedom to do so.

We know bipartisanship could craft a 21st century immigration plan, but this administration chooses to cage children and tear families apart. Compassionate treatment at the border is not the same as open borders. President Reagan understood this. President Obama understood this. Americans understand this. And Democrats stand ready to effectively secure our ports and borders. But we must all embrace that from agriculture to health care to entrepreneurship, America is made stronger by the presence of immigrants - not walls.

Rather than suing to dismantle the Affordable Care Act, as Republican Attorneys General have, our leaders must protect the progress we’ve made and commit to expanding health care and lowering costs for everyone.

My father has battled prostate cancer for years. To help cover the costs, I found myself sinking deeper into debt - because while you can defer some payments, you can’t defer cancer treatment. In this great nation, Americans are skipping blood pressure pills, forced to choose between buying medicine or paying rent. Maternal mortality rates show that mothers, especially black mothers, risk death to give birth. And in 14 states, including my home state where a majority want it, our leaders refuse to expand Medicaid, which could save rural hospitals, economies, and lives.

We can do so much more: take action on climate change. Defend individual liberties with fair-minded judges. But none of these ambitions are possible without the bedrock guarantee of our right to vote. Let’s be clear: voter suppression is real. From making it harder to register and stay on the rolls to moving and closing polling places to rejecting lawful ballots, we can no longer ignore these threats to democracy.

While I acknowledged the results of the 2018 election here in Georgia - I did not and we cannot accept efforts to undermine our right to vote. That’s why I started a nonpartisan organization called Fair Fight to advocate for voting rights.

This is the next battle for our democracy, one where all eligible citizens can have their say about the vision we want for our country. We must reject the cynicism that says allowing every eligible vote to be cast and counted is a “power grab.” Americans understand that these are the values our brave men and women in uniform and our veterans risk their lives to defend. The foundation of our moral leadership around the globe is free and fair elections, where voters pick their leaders - not where politicians pick their voters.

In this time of division and crisis, we must come together and stand for, and with, one another. America has stumbled time and again on its quest towards justice and equality; but with each generation, we have revisited our fundamental truths, and where we falter, we make amends.

We fought Jim Crow with the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, yet we continue to confront racism from our past and in our present - which is why we must hold everyone from the very highest offices to our own families accountable for racist words and deeds - and call racism what it is. Wrong.

America achieved a measure of reproductive justice in Roe v. Wade, but we must never forget it is immoral to allow politicians to harm women and families to advance a political agenda. We affirmed marriage equality, and yet, the LGBTQ community remains under attack.

So even as I am very disappointed by the president’s approach to our problems - I still don’t want him to fail. But we need him to tell the truth, and to respect his duties and the extraordinary diversity that defines America.

Our progress has always found refuge in the basic instinct of the American experiment - to do right by our people. And with a renewed commitment to social and economic justice, we will create a stronger America, together. Because America wins by fighting for our shared values against all enemies: foreign and domestic. That is who we are - and when we do so, never wavering —- the state of our union will always be strong.

Thank you, and may God bless the United States of America.

Part 4: The Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba and the Origins of the Socialist Plebiscite 1960-1962--Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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(Pix Credit HERE)

In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years series theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite. 

This Post includes Part 4: The Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba and the Origins of the Socialist Plebiscite 1960-1962.





I have been considering the 1st  Cuban Communist Party (PCC) Congress of 1975 as the template for the ideological and constitutional changes that followed from the 7th PCC Congress in 2016. As we will see in more detail in future posts, most of the structural elements of the 7th PCC Congress and the forms of constitutional reform that followed were first attempted in the context of the development of the PCC's first comprehensive ideological line, and the transposition of that line into the 1976 Cuban constitution.  In both cases, significant ideological work of the PCC was immediately followed by its articulation in the state constitution.  More importantly, in both cases, the process included a well managed intervention of popular engagement and validation. This included the solicitation of mass reaction to the circulating drafts of key documents and a popular plebiscite.

What was missing from the 2016-2019 reform effort, including its constitutional dimension was what had been a key element of popular participation--the organization of mass acclamation at a rally called for that purpose. The 1st PCC Congress and the resulting modalities of popular affirmation appeared to mark a turning point in the practice of early Caribbean Marxist socialist democracy. That was the last time that the mechanics of popular affirmation were used, and then only as a supplement to a more conventional use of voting.

Yet mass acclamation played a decisive role in the early stages of post revolutionary Cuba, And it has never been rejected as inimical to the core ideology of the Cuban Leninism. Popular acclamation at large gatherings of the people was a first effort to find a way to produce democratic practice that avoided what was increasingly seen as the ideologically corrupt system of popular voting. It served as the first iteration of a process that sought to do two things. The first was to distinguish ¡the forms of democratic engagement in Leninist states from that of Western liberal democracies. The idea was that conventional voting was itself ideologically contaminated with bourgeois principles of class exploitation and that an alternative mode of democratic expression was needed. The second was to embed principles of class struggle--and of the primacy of the worker-revolutionary axis--into the expression of democratic engagement.

 En la Plaza Cívica (actual Plaza de la Revolución) pronuncia vibrante discurso donde da a conocer la “Primera Declaración de La Habana” donde la Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba, suceso inédito en los anales de Latinoamérica, fue legítimamente constituida como fuente de derecho democrático, 2 de septiembre de 1960. Foto: Fidel Soldado de las Ideas.
The solution of the revolutionary government was to attempt an exercise in direct sovereign democracy by constituting a General National Assembly of the Cuban People (Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo Cubano). It was used in two instances between 1960 and 1962, and produced two key ideological instruments that defined Cuba's external relations and the internal structures for the expression of sovereign authority. It appeared in vestigial form at the end of the 1st PCC Congress and then only as part of a arger effort to create the Party-State governance architecture (as the sovereign act of delegating authority to both Party and to its popular expression no longer in general mass assemblies but in the institutionalization of the mass will in the National Assembly of Popular Power. Yet that trasition--which will be discussed briefly in a future post--ought not t take away from the importance of the development of core political principles around the idea of mass assemblies, of the suscision of popular voting, and of the conception of the membership of the politiy that, under the direction of the vanguard, was fit to exercise mass political power.

First Asamblea Gemeral Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba--2 September 1960. 

The first  was produced at the end of a mass assembly on 2 September 1960 in Havana. It marked the rupture of relations with the United States.The event is inscribed in the political consciousness of the post revolutionary government in a quite specific way:
En una plaza repleta de pueblo que demostraba su apoyo incondicional a la Revolución triunfante del 1ero de enero de 1959, se levantaba una voz potente, el entonces primer ministro Fidel Castro Ruz da a conocer la Primera Declaración de La Habana. Una respuesta convincente de la Revolución Cubana a la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA) es aprobada por unanimidad. El pueblo cubano decide enfrentarse a las declaraciones de esta organización que hasta su actualidad responde a los intereses de los Estados Unidos. (Fidel Castro: “¡Cuba es el territorio libre de América!”).
[TRANS: In a plaza filled with the populace all demonstrating their unconditional support for the triumphant Revolution of January 1, 1959, there raised a unified powerful voice, then Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz made known the First Declaration of Havana. That convincing response from the Cuban Revolution to the Organization of American States (OAS) was then approved unanimously.The Cuban people decide to confront the declarations of that organization that up to then responds to the interests of the United States.]
But this was no ordinary gathering of supporters.  The mass event was quite deliberately framed as a constitutive gathering with sovereign effect as a General National Assembly of the Cuban People "an unprecedented event in the annals of Latin America, [which] was legitimately constituted as a source of democratic power, September 2, 1960" (Original: "Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba, suceso inédito en los anales de Latinoamérica, fue legítimamente constituida como fuente de derecho democrático, 2 de septiembre de 1960") (CubaDebate, Fidel Castro: “¡Cuba es el territorio libre de América!”).

Two fundamentally important premises were articulated around the Havana Declaration of relevance to the issue of democratic accountability in (in this case) an emerging Leninist system.  The first touched on the mechanisms of direct democracy in a large modern state.  It centered both on the theory of democratic action at a mass event, as well as the mechanics for determining under what conditions such sovereignty exercising events might be understood to exist.   This was the immediate problem facing the revolutionary government as it sought to confront the need to act. The second was a longer term concern.  This centered on the role and mechanics of voting, of elections, within a revolutionary state suspicious of voting as a technique for class based domination.

The mechanics of direct democracy:

With respect to the first, the premise of a popular assembly was meant to look both backwards to overcome Cuba's past and outward to provide a model for other Latin American (and eventually all developing) states.  It was in its own way self consciously universal in its pretensions--at least with respect to the condtions and realities of Latin America.
Nuestra patria pequeña representa hoy intereses que se salen de nuestras fronteras. ¡A nuestra patria pequeña le ha tocado el destino de ser el faro que ilumine a los millones y millones de hombres y mujeres igual que nosotros, que en la América sufren hoy lo mismo que nosotros sufríamos ayer! ¡Nos ha tocado ese destino glorioso y nosotros seremos una luz que no se apagará nunca, una luz que será cada día más brillante y cuyos reflejos llegarán cada día más lejos sobre las tierras de la América hermana! ((DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN LA MAGNA ASAMBLEA POPULAR CELEBRADA POR EL PUEBLO DE CUBA EN LA PLAZA DE LA REPUBLICA, EL 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1960)).
[TRANS: Our small homeland today represents interests that go beyond our borders. The destiny of our little homeland isto be the beacon that enlightens the millions and millions of men and women just like us, who in America today suffer the same as we suffered yesterday!This glorious destiny has touched us and we will be a light that will never be extinguished, a light that will become brighter each day and whose reflections will reach farther and farther on the lands of sister America!]

It looked backwards by interposing a popular assembly against the tradition of what Fidel Castro called the assembly of sergeants (with reference to the recently overthrown Batista dictatorship). It was meant to interpose the performance of democratic and sovereign prerogatives through a public assembly of people acting on instinct--and also guided with respect to the details of its action by and through the leadership of the revolutionary (not yet Marxist Leninist) government.  That government, of course, acquired legitimacy through force of arms.  And it was important to cement that initial armed legitimacy by an expression of assent by a reunion of a group of people large and potent enough to have rejected and undone that government (at great cost but possible as later experiences in Egypt and Ukraine would make clearer).
Era lógico que en cualquier reunión de cancilleres no se fuese a condenar a Cuba; era lógico que en cualquier reunión de cancilleres se condenase a Estados Unidos por sus agresiones a un país pequeño. Lo absurdo era que el país pequeño fuese a ser condenado por los cancilleres, precisamente para servir los designios del poderoso país agresor. Y eso es lo que vamos a discutir hoy en esta asamblea general nacional del pueblo de Cuba.

En primer lugar, ¿por qué es esta una asamblea general del pueblo? ¿Qué quiere decir esto de una asamblea general del pueblo? Quiere decir, en primer lugar, que el pueblo es soberano, es decir que la soberanía radica en el pueblo y que de él dimanan todos los poderes (APLAUSOS). El pueblo de Cuba es soberano. Nadie podría discutir que aquí está representada la mayoría del pueblo; nadie podría discutir que aquí está representado el pueblo. En los anales de la historia de nuestra patria jamás se reunió semejante multitud; en los anales de la historia de nuestra patria jamás se vio un acto semejante; en los anales de la historia de América jamás se reunió semejante multitud; en los anales de la historia de América jamás se vio un acto semejante (APLAUSOS).

Los cubanos podemos hoy hablarle a América; los cubanos podemos hoy hablarle al mundo. Aquí no se ha reunido un grupito de “sargentos” políticos; aquí no se ha reunido un puñadito de mercenarios; ¡aquí se ha reunido hoy el pueblo! (APLAUSOS.) Los que quieran saber lo que es un pueblo reunido, ¡que vengan y vean esto!; los que quieran saber qué es un pueblo democrático, ¡que vengan y vean esto!; los que quieran ver lo que es un pueblo rigiendo sus propios destinos, ¡que vengan y vean esto!; los que quieran saber qué es una democracia, ¡que vengan y vean esto! (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN LA MAGNA ASAMBLEA POPULAR CELEBRADA POR EL PUEBLO DE CUBA EN LA PLAZA DE LA REPUBLICA, EL 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1960).
[TRANS: It would have been logical that in any meeting of foreign ministers Cuba would not be condemned; It would have been logical that in any meeting of foreign ministers the United States ought to have been condemned for its aggressions against a small country. The absurdity was that the small country would be condemned by the foreign ministers, precisely to serve the designs of the powerful aggressor country. And that is what we are going to discuss today in this national general assembly of the people of Cuba.
First, why is this a general assembly of the people? What does this mean about a general assembly of the people? It means, in the first place, that the people are sovereign, that is to say that sovereignty is rooted in the people and that all powers emerge from it (applause). The people of Cuba are sovereign. No one could argue that the majority of the people are represented here; No one could argue that the people are represented here. In the annals of the history of our country such a crowd never met; In the annals of the history of our country, such an act was never seen; in the annals of the history of America such a multitude never met; In the annals of the history of America a similar act was never seen (applause).
We Cubans can speak to America today; We Cubans can speak to the world today. A small group of political "sergeants" has not gathered here; here a handful of mercenaries have not gathered; Here the populace has gathered today! (Applause.) Those who want to know what a united populace, come and see this! Those who want to understand a democratic people, come and see this! those who want to see what a people ruling their own destinies, come and see this !; those who want to know what a democracy is, come and see this!
And thus the general national assembly of the people was juxtaposed against the assemblies of contemporary democracy and dictatorship--the assemblies of states beholden to a great power, and the assemblies of national actors beholden to a "primus." Against these that mimicked the forms of democracy, Fidel Castro offered the performance of the masses themselves, gathered together in the largest open space in Havana--as the incarnation of the genius of the people and vested by that reason with the full sovereign authority of the political community self constituted as the Cuban Republic.

To be clear, the object of that characterization was neither to defend or to reject it, but rather to hold it up as an important moment in the development of Caribbean Marxist notions of what in China might eventually be come to be understood as the mass line. But the mass line in Cuba was from the first practiced in an entirely different way. Given the nature of the revolutionary government--revolution first and political self-conception after--it makes sense to understand that the revolutionary government would first draw on Western principles of pure democracy (likely sieved through glimmerings of Rousseau (they they might have understood them).

The notion of popular assembly was then generalized as a basic theory of democratic governance of states in their external relations. To that extent, the ideology began to conflate the notions of popular assent with that of the nature of representation in states. The result was curious in the sense that it suggested that representation on the model of liberal democratic states was no representation at all; and that the revolutionary leadership (e.g., vanguard leadership( model emerging in the post 1959 governance apparatus of Cuba provided a more authentic model of representative and democratic action.
Es un principio, es un principio elemental de derecho público, que ningún puede comprometer a su país en actos de derecho internacional, si ese acto no cuenta con la aprobación del pueblo. Un representante de cualquier país no va a una reunión internacional por su propio derecho. Nadie tiene derecho por su propia cuenta a comprometer la conducta internacional de un país, y los que van sin representar a los países, a comprometer la conducta de los países, no comprometen tal conducta. Todo acto que se haga por encima de la voluntad soberana de los pueblos, es un acto nulo, carece de validez. Por tanto, la validez de la declaración de Costa Rica depende no de los cancilleres, depende de los pueblos, y al pueblo de Cuba no le pueden venir con el cuento de que esa declaración tenga validez, porque ellos dicen representar a los pueblos, ¡no!, a nosotros hay que probarnos que ese es el sentimiento de los pueblos (APLAUSOS). Y nosotros le pedimos al gobierno de Venezuela, al gobierno de Perú, al gobierno de Chile, al gobierno de Argentina, al gobierno de Brasil, al gobierno de Ecuador, al gobierno de Costa Rica; es decir, les pedimos, respetuosamente, a los gobiernos de América que convoquen a sus pueblos en asamblea general y les sometan la Declaración de Costa Rica (APLAUSOS). (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN LA MAGNA ASAMBLEA POPULAR CELEBRADA POR EL PUEBLO DE CUBA EN LA PLAZA DE LA REPUBLICA, EL 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 1960).
[TRANS: It is a principle, it is an elementary principle of public law, that no state official can commit his country in acts of international law, if that act does not have the approval of the people. A representative of any country does not go to an international meeting in its own right. Nobody has the right on their own to compromise the international conduct of a country, and those who go without representing the countries, to compromise the behavior of the countries, do not commit such behavior. Any act that is done over the sovereign will of the people, is a null act, it lacks validity. Therefore, the validity of the declaration of Costa Rica does not depend on the will of the foreign ministers, it depends on the will of the people, and one cannot come to the Cuban people with the story that this declaration has any validity merely because they claim to represent the peoples, No! We have to prove to ourselves that this is the feeling of the people. (Applause) And we ask the government of Venezuela, the government of Peru, the government of Chile, the government of Argentina, the government of Brazil, the government of Ecuador, the government of Costa Rica; that is, we ask, respectfully, the governments of America to summon their peoples in a general assembly and submit to them the Declaration of Costa Rica. (Applause)].
That theory was then meant to serve not just the Cuban context, but rather, the model for all (small) republic), or at least those who were seeking liberation from the constraints of an international system that from the perspective of the Cuban revolutionary government, were bound in dependency to a master state. "Y el que no reúna al pueblo, el que no reúna al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata!; el que no consulte al pueblo, ¡ese no es demócrata! ¡Para ser demócrata hay que consultar al pueblo! (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡Eso solo se da en Cuba!”)"(Ibid.) [An he who fails to gather together the people, he is not a democrat; he who does not consult the people, he is not a democrat; to be a democrat one has to consult the people. That only happens in Cuba!]. Notice here the intimate connection between mass assemblies and the guidance of the vanguard, already well developed, though not using the traditional discursive tropes of Soviet Leninism. . . yet.


The theory of voting in revolutionary governments.

But inherent as well in the notion of popular expression in mass assemblies, were the notions of authentic democracy and of the role of voting and thus of authentic representation). Fidel Castro was at pains to describe this to the Assembly itself in September 1960:
y esta sí que es una representación, porque aquí no hay “pucherazo”, ni hay fraude, ni hay voto comprado, ni hay sargento político, ni hay maquinaria, ni hay botella, ni hay nada; ¡esto sí es puro! (APLAUSOS.) Esta sí que es una democracia limpia de impurezas, limpia de impurezas, es una democracia verdaderamente “pasteurizada” (RISAS Y APLAUSOS). Y que no nos digan que la otra es más democracia que esta; que la democracia del sargento político, del “pucherazo”, de la botella, de la politiquería, del soborno, de la compra de conciencias, de la coacción, de la maquinaria política, es más pura que esta.  ¿Puede haber algo más puro que una reunión de todo el pueblo? (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡No!”) ¿Alguien trajo al pueblo a la fuerza? (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡No!”) ¿Alguien le pagó al pueblo para que viniera? (EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡No!”) El que vino aquí y está pasando el trabajo que están pasando ustedes, porque nosotros sabemos que en una multitud apretada son muchas las personas que se desmayan, y son muchas las personas... (IBID).
[And this [assembly ]is a representation, because here there is no "pucherazo" [vote management by the principal parties and connected withcaciquismo], no fraud, no vote buying, no political sergeant, no machinery, no bottle, and there is nothing; This is pure! (Applause.) This is a democracy free of impurities, free of impurities, it is a truly "pasteurized" democracy (LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE). And do not tell us that the other is more democracy than this; that the democracy of the political sergeant, of the "pucherazo", of the bottle, of politicking, of bribery, of the purchase of consciences, of coercion, of the political machinery, is purer than this. Can there be anything more pure than a meeting of the whole people? (EXCLAMATIONS OF: "No!") Did someone bring the town by force? (EXCLAMATIONS FROM: "No!") Did someone pay the town to come? (SHOUTING: "No!") The one who came here and is passing the work that you are going through, because we know that in a crowded crowd there are many people who faint, and there are many people ...]
Again the juxtaposition between what the Cuban government painted as a liberal democracy with elaborate forms but no real substance, against the purity of a direct expression of democratic action through assemblies of the masses at which all of the perceived deficiencies of the liberal order were absent. But of course, this would be possible only because the element of spontaneous assembly (something truly revolutionary in the sense of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine or the Arab Spring in Egypt) was avoided. Spontaneous assemblies were revolutionary int he sense that their project was to replace the ruling order. Castro's nothing of popular assembly could be democratic within a governance order only to the extent it was managed by and functioned under the guidance of the vanguard. In the case of Cuba that vanguard acquired the legitimate mantle of leadership and the authority to guide by virtue of a military triumph.

The text of the Havana Declaration itself elaborated what was to be the initial conceptual position of what would emerge as Caribbean Marxism. It's Sixth paragragh declared:
“La Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba, expresa la convicción cubana de que la democracia no puede consistir sólo en el ejercicio de un voto electoral, que casi siempre es ficticio y está manejado por latifundistas y políticos profesionales, sino en el derecho de los ciudadanos a decidir, como ahora lo hace esta Asamblea General del Pueblo de Cuba, sus propios destinos. La democracia, además, sólo existirá en América cuando los pueblos sean realmente libres para escoger, cuando los humildes no estén reducidos —por el hambre, la desigualdad social, el analfabetismo y los sistemas jurídicos—, a la más ominosa impotencia. (Ibid).
[TRANS: "The National General Assembly of the People of Cuba, expresses the Cuban conviction that democracy can not consist only in the exercise of an electoral vote, which is almost always fictitious and is managed by large landowners and professional politicians, but in the right of citizens to decide, as now does this General Assembly of the People of Cuba, their own destinies. Democracy, moreover, will only exist in America when the people are really free to choose, when the humble are not reduced-by hunger, social inequality, illiteracy and legal systems-to the most ominous impotence].
The position reflects what has crystallized into the well known position, first of the Soviet bloc and then of developing states with respect to the realization of human dignity (expressed in the language of rights) and its relationship to the fundamental notion of democratic expression through voting and similar mechanisms developed at the core of theories of Western liberal democracies. That approach is premised on the notion that liberal democracies are inherently corrupt because of the effects of economic subordination on the free will of voters. As a consequence, economic rights are central and paramount to the attainment of political rights. Political rights cannot be bootstrapped into existence through its mechanics, especially the mechanics of elections. As a consequence, centering principles of democracy around voting in the absence of economic rights which liberates individuals form the effective (direct or indirect) control of hierarchs (defined in any number of ways) amounts to a subterfuge and the substitution of political theater for democratic politics.

And, of course, what follows is the need for a focus on economic rights, the centrality of a leading force installed for that purpose, the central objective of government to guide its people toward liberation. Most importantly, it then reconstitutes the people (worthy of exercising sovereignty) to those already committed to the project of economic liberation (understood in the Marxist sense for th emost part); and excluding all other individuals as unsuitable for the exercise of popular sovereignty under the leadership of a "right acting" vanguard.


Second Asamblea Gemeral Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba--4 February 1962.  

The Second National General Assembly was organized on 4 February 1962 in response to yet another international rebuff of the Cuban revolutionary government by other Latin American states. Specifically, the trigger was the action taken by the OAS at its January 1962 meeting at which the organization voted additional sanctions against Cuba and the day after U.S. President Kennedy Kennedy signed Executive Order No. 3447, more firmly establishing what then became known as the Cuban Embargo. " Se reúne por segunda vez, con carácter de órgano soberano de la voluntad del pueblo cubano, esta Asamblea General en el día de hoy; y se reúne para dar cabal respuesta a la maniobra, a la conjura, al complot de nuestros enemigos en Punta del Este." (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER SECRETARIO DE LA DIRECCIONA NACIONAL DE LAS ORI Y PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN LA SEGUNDA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DEL PUEBLO DE CUBA, CELEBRADA EN LA PLAZA DE LA REVOLUCION, EL 4 DE FEBRERO DE 1962; and generally, Segunda Declaración de La Habana: Por su única, verdadera e irrenunciable independencia; Cubadebate 4 Feb. 2017).

The event and its context, then, assumes a fundamental place within the development of the principles and orientations of the Cuban state both internally and in its relationship with its neighbors. Those principles, and the context in which they arose, also resonated with the Cuban leadership and their allies in the Caribbean in the midst of the 7th PCC Congress and the development of the reconcpetualization of the political and economic model along with the constitutional reform that necessarily followed. In 2017, an official Cuban organ noted
más de un millón de cubanos colmaron la Plaza de la Revolución al llamado que hiciera el Gobierno Revolucionario para constituir la Segunda Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo, la cual aprobó la Segunda Declaración de La Habana, que reafirmó nuestra dignidad como nación libre, independiente y soberana, al tiempo que proclamaba la proyección y vocación latinoamericanista de la Revolución Cubana. ((Segunda Declaración de La Habana: Por su única, verdadera e irrenunciable independencia; Cubadebate 4 Feb. 2017).)
[TRANS: More than a million Cubans filled the Plaza de la Revolución [formerly the Plaza de la República]] answering the call for assembly made by the Revolutionary Government for the purpose of constituting the Second National General Assembly of the People, which approved the Second Declaration of Havana, which reaffirmed our dignity as a free, independent and sovereign nation , while proclaiming the projection and Latin Americanist vocation of the Cuban Revolution.]
That was certainly echoed by the friendly elements of the then government of Venezuela through its press organs:
Con el pasar de los años la Declaración se convirtió en una verdadera afirmación de principios, a favor de la proyección y vocación latinoamericana de la Revolución Cubana con un profundo respeto al carácter socialista e internacionalista del proceso político cubano. [TRANS: With the pasaage fo time the [2nd Declaraiton of Havana] has become a true affirmation of principles advancing Over the years, the Declaration became a true affirmation of principles, in favor of the projection and Latin American character of the Cuban Revolution with a deep respect for the socialist and internationalist character of the Cuban political process.] (La II Declaración de La Habana expone los principios para la proyección hacia los pueblos de Latinoamérica de la Revolución Cubana).

One of the most interesting elements of the Second General National Assembly was the way in which it affirmed the notion of people grounded in class and political solidarity in a way that effectively permitted the reconstitution of "the people" without respect to nationality.
Con nosotros se encuentran numerosos latinoamericanos que visitan a nuestro país o participaron de la Conferencia de los Pueblos en La Habana (APLAUSOS), pero ellos no deben ser solo espectadores. Proponemos a la Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo que los latinoamericanos no sean espectadores, sino que tengan derecho también a votar junto con el pueblo de Cuba la Declaración de La Habana (APLAUSOS PROLONGADOS Y EXCLAMACIONES DE: “¡Fidel, Fidel!”) ((DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER SECRETARIO DE LA DIRECCIONA NACIONAL DE LAS ORI Y PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN LA SEGUNDA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DEL PUEBLO DE CUBA, CELEBRADA EN LA PLAZA DE LA REVOLUCION, EL 4 DE FEBRERO DE 1962)
[TRANS: With us there are many Latin Americans who visit our country or participated in the Peoples Conference in Havana (applause), but they should not be just spectators. We propose to the National General Assembly of the People that Latin Americans not be spectators, but also have the right to vote along with the people of Cuba, the Declaration of Havana (PROLONGED APPLAUSE AND EXCLAMATIONS OF: "Fidel, Fidel!")] 
The focus was not anarchic. Rather it furthered the emerging principles of Latin American solidarity at the heart of Caribbean Marxism.  That solidarity posited a common supra-sovereign alignment of Latin American states in opposition to the United States and its purported domination of the hemisphere: 
Ningún pueblo de América Latina es débil, porque forma parte de una familia de 200 millones de hermanos que padecen las mismas miserias, albergan los mismos sentimientos, tienen el mismo enemigo, sueñan todos un mismo mejor destino, y cuentan con la solidaridad de todos los hombres y mujeres honrados del mundo entero (APLAUSOS)."  (Ibid.)
[TRANS: No Latin American people are weak, because they form part of a family of 200 million brothers who share the same mideries, harbor the same sentiments, and have the same enemy, who all dream of a better destiny, and whi count on the solodarity of all honest men and women worldwide"].

Taken together, the two General National Assemblies produced an ideological urtext from which the PCC would find it difficult to reject. That urtext was grounded in the essential role of popular affirmation as the fundamental device for legitimating the authority of the vanguard. It opened the possibility that this mass popular assembly might one day not approve. But at the same time it pressed the principle of vanguard guidance to constrain the discretion of mass assemblies. And it substantially boxed in the breadth of popular action by limiting its exercise to those who were already committed to the revolutionary enterprise, starting with the objects of class struggle: workers,m peasants, and aligned intellectuals.

But connecting the device of General National Assemblies to the popular constitutive actions around the 1st PCC Congress in 1975 and the approval of the 1976 constitution requires the development of devices that were meant to solve the ultimate problem that this mechanism ultimately presented a maturing revolutionary government--a problem that has confronted all government based on popular sovereignty--that of efficiency. Like other similarly constituted states, the Cuban revolutionary government would eventually choose the path of representative mass democracy. But it would be one that required two distinct levels to reconcile its operations to the core postulates of Leninist government. The fist layer would have to consist of the classical Leninist theory of vanguard party power; with the vanguard party understood to incarnate and represent the political will of the nation. At the same time, the masses would have to be reconstituted in representative form so that they might be assembled efficiently and managed effectively. To that end one moves from the assembly of the masses in 1962 to the construction of the national assembly of popular power, a subject which we take up next.
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Part 5: From the Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba to the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular; Situating Popular Assent Within an Institutional Cage -- Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years series theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite. 

This Post includes Part 5: From the Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba to the Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular; Situating Popular Assent Within an Institutional Cage.

Series Content Links.





For the Cuban state, the second Havana Declaration (discussed here) marked the last time the revolutionary government used the mechanism of assembly this way.  Between the beginning of 1962 and the mass activities around the development of the ideological documents approved in the 1st PCC Congress in 1975 there were many assemblies of the masses in the Plaza de la Revolución. But those assemblies were rallies and constitutive in nay sense.  But of course, it was for the vanguard to determine the character of the assembly--to an outsider it would have been hard to distinguish a large mass rally from the constitutive assemblies held in 1960 and 1962.  The key to both was not the assembly itself but the invocation of its sovereign character, not by the masses themselves, but by its vanguard, those with the authority to assemble the people in this way.

Viewed in this way, even at this stage, as the Cuban revolutionary government was feeling its way toward Leninist governance principles and Marxist political principles grounded in class struggle in which the only people who mattered were the proletarian and the revolutionary worker cadres (the Cuban "militantes" nodding toward the military focus of the initial success), it was clear that a sort of corporatist "active-passive" principle had been embraced.  That is, the principle of popular mass action could not be self invoked, it acquired its constitutive character only as a result of the call to assembly by the vanguard. And that call could only be understood as effective when exercised only by the people, which were understood, in turn to include only those leading forces of society in solidarity with the principles of the revolution and the leadership of the revolutionary government.  The circle is complete.


But more than that, the early invocation of the mass assembly was the foil against which the PCC could begin to develop its theory of democratic action. That theory started from the core proposition that the modalities of elections that formed the core element of the principle expression of liberal democracy were illegitimate. Rejecting the value of elections produced two immediate results. The first was that the ideal of representation produced by elections were as suspect as the modalities of elections themselves. The second was that popular engagement had to be undertaken in some other way. That last point was important in one key respect--it served as an acknowledgement, even early in the revolutionary development process, that the vanguard's legitimacy was tied to some sort of express of popular consent.




But the model of mass assemblies, especially on an Island the configuration of Cuba posed problems of representation as well. It was subtly acquired by Fidel Castro during the First Assembly in his praise of the event in which he identified people who had managed to attend from the Western and Central provinces. But it would have been impossible for those of the Eastern provinces to attend--and that problem, already of historic significance (marginalization of the Eastern provinces by the Havana metropolis and ironically the tradition of starting successful revolution against Havana in the Eastern provinces)--eventually might cause a problem of imbalance. That imbalance, in turn, would bring back the core problem of representation itself--the problem the assembly was meant to overcome. Or, in the hands of the ideological enemies of the revolutionary government, a deliciously ironic argument that such assemblies were as empty of substance as were the elections that Castro criticized in the liberal democracies.

(Pix Credit HERE)


It is against this ideological backdrop that the revolutionary government slowly confronted the issue of its institutionalization.Like all revolutionary governments was brought face to face with the contradictions of its principles as a revolutionary party against the realities of running a state. And like the Soviet Union, the Cuban revolutionary government made a number of choices that brought into tension its earlier core ideologies and the allurements of an ideology, not of nomenklatura (for that had already progressed prodigiously between 1962 and 1976) but of the vessel for popular affirmation of vanguard policy to then be sent back to the vanguards cadres placed startegically within the administrative apparatus of the state.

For the revolutionary government that required a progression from revolutionary government to socialist state, with respect to which Fidel Castro sought to cast in as good a light as possible.
"En este acto trascendental e histórico, del cual todos somos testigos vivientes, cesa el período de provisionalidad del Gobierno Revolucionario y adopta nuestro Estado socialista formas institucionales definitivas. La Asamblea Nacional se constituye en órgano supremo del Estado y asume las funciones que le asigna la Constitución. Era un deber y es a la vez un gran triunfo de nuestra generación arribar a esta meta." (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENTE DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, EN LA SESION SOLEMNE DE CONSTITUCION DE LA ASAMBLEA NACIONAL DEL PODER POPULAR, CELEBRADA EN EL TEATRO "CARLOS MARX", EL 2 DE DICIEMBRE DE 1976, "AÑO DEL XX ANIVERSARIO DEL GRANMA") [TRANS: "In this transcendental and historical act, of which we are all living witnesses, the provisional period of the Revolutionary Government ceases and our definitive institutional forms are adopted by our socialist State. The National Assembly is constituted as the supreme organ of the State and assumes the functions assigned to it by the Constitution. It was a duty and it is at the same time a great triumph of our generation to reach this goal"].
 The official history suggests an organic progress from a revolutionary state in which all authority had to be concentrated in the hands of a single vanguard to a position of stability that at last permitted the revolutionary vanguard to seek to institutionalize its governance through representative organs under its leadership.  The necessities of dismantling the structures and operations of U.S. (primarily) colonialism (as they characterized the relationship) and the need to develop new structures created a context in which the revolutionary gobvernment took for itself all of the powers of state
"dictó las leyes revolucionarias, expropió a los explotadores, desarrolló básicas mutaciones sociales, llevó a cabo con éxito la lucha política frente a las agresiones externas e internas. Apoyado masivamente por el pueblo, el gobierno revolucionario impulsó en este período vastas y hondas transformaciones políticas, económicas, sociales y culturales en la vida cubana." (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular)) [TRANS: "decreed revolutionary laws, expropriated the exploiters property, developed basic social mutations, successfully carried out the political struggle against external and internal aggression. Supported overwhelmingly by the people, the revolutionary government promoted in this period vast and deep political, economic, social and cultural transformations in Cuban life."].
But, of course, it was not clear that it was either a duty or a triumph; or if it was, whether it was to a large extent a fulfilled of the ideological promises of the earliest period of revolutionary governance. More importantly, it was not entirely true--as the revolutionary government used that period to develop and apply principles of mass popular approval as the fundamental modality for ratification of their actions.

Yet that process of democratic ratification was actually undertaken only twice; the rhetoric of ratification remained far more potent than its application.  And that augured another conundrum for the government:  it could not abandon its core ideological notion of popular ratification at mass events; such undertakings, however, had been reserved for extraordinarily events; that left unanswered questions about the scope of any obligation to seek popular (mass) acclamation. If the scope of mandatory popular affirmation was broad, then a mechanism would have to be developed for the institutionalized invocation of the popular will (its affirmation power); however to the extent that this would require devolving that popular power to an institution, it would raise the issue of popular representation in such a body.  But to approach that question was also to confront the companion ideological constraint made explicit in the two Havana Declarations--specifically the ideological line that traditional voting mechanisms were corrupted by the ideology of liberal democracies and would tend to lead to systemic corruption in the sense that it would create incentives towards class based dominance.

Moreover, even if one could solve that problem, the fundamental problem of the relationship of this mechanism for popular assent to the leadership responsibilities of the PCC would have to be theorized and also operationalized within the institutions structures created.  That relationship, in turn, might be based on principles of active versus passive power already inherent in the relationship between the revolutionary government and the Asambleas General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba.  And yet, it might also require something more than a simple affirmation of work done elsewhere.  It was necessary, then, also to consider the extent to which such an institutionalized voice of popular affirmation might also be avenue for review and interaction (here with an institutionalized voice of the people) of the legislative and policy guidance received from the PCC.  

By the early 1970s, a determination was made that there was a need to streamline the process of popular approval of fundamental acts not otherwise reserved to the administrative machinery. The constitution of mass assemblies like the Asambleas General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba of the early 1960s was ideologically ideal but practically impossible for the business of acquiring a constant and uniform and predictable approval of leadership guidance by the PCC. At the same time, the idea of engagement was thought useful--the idea that popular deep engagement in the formulation of the actions to be affirmed doubled the instance of popular investment in the work of the state and cemented the theoretical requirement of popular involvement in the operation of the state. To that end, the PCC developed a new model for reform that was to have a substantial impact on the way in which it understood and practiced what was to become Caribbean Marxist Socialist democracy.

There were models and templates available to the revolutionary government.  The Chinese Communist Party's revolutionary government established its large National People's Congress system at the national, provincial and local levels in 1954 at the time it first sought to institutionalize its revolutionary organs and give structure to an expression of its mass line ("from the people to the people) and it served as the conduit for the consideration and approval of the Chinese 18954 Constitution. But as important, perhaps, was that even as the Cuban revolutionary government was working through issue of institutionalization, the Chinese were  experiencing the full force of their Cultural Revolution, an important point of which was the passage of a transformed Chinese Constitution adopted January 17, 1975  by the 4th National People's Congress. Both the 1954 and the 1975 Chinese constitutions constituted the people--and popular participation in the administrative functions of the state, through their system of National People's Congresses.
All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The Organs through which the people exercise power are the National People's Congress and the local people's congresses.
The National People's Congress, the local people's congresses and other organs of state practice democratic centralism. (1954 Chinese Constitution Art. 2).
All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the People. The organs through which  the people exercise power are the people's congresses at all levels, with deputies of workers, peasants and soldiers as their main body.The people's congresses at all levels and all other organs of state practice democratic centralism (1975 Constitution, art. 3).
These might resonate more with the early Cuban model (at least in broadest theory), but would represent something of a break from past practice. But by the mid 1970s the rupture between Fidel Castro and the Chinese was very much in evidence, one that survived almost to the day that Mr. Castro died (here), which remained unchanged from the time of the Cultural Revolution and through the period of Reform and Opening up, and which complicated Cuban-Chinese relations for a generation. The source, ironically enough, was characterized by the Cuban leader as one of the deleterious effects of cults of personality and personal dictatorship.
De que las cosas más absurdas pueden ocurrir aún en el seno de la familia socialista y en países que iniciaron ese glorioso y revolucionario camino, si los principios se descuidan, si los conceptos se pierden, si los hombres se hacen dioses, si el internacionalismo se abandona, es la historia reciente de China. Ese país, cuya heroica y abnegada victoria revolucionaria constituyó, después de la gloriosa Revolución de Octubre, una de las más grandes y alentadoras esperanzas para todos los pueblos de la Tierra, ha sido escenario de la más brutal traición al movimiento revolucionario mundial.. . .Todo eso puede ocurrir cuando una camarilla corrompida y endiosada puede hacerse dueña del Partido, destruir, humillar y aplastar a los mejores militantes e imponer su voluntad a toda la nación, apoyada en la fuerza y el prestigio que emana de una profunda revolución social. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, supra, 2 Dec. 1976) (TRANS:  "That the most absurd things can happen even in the bosom of the socialist family and in countries that started that glorious and revolutionary path, if the principles are neglected, if the concepts are lost, if men become gods, if internationalism is abandons, that is the recent history of China. That country, whose heroic and self-sacrificing revolutionary victory constituted, after the glorious October Revolution, one of the greatest and most encouraging hopes for all the peoples of the Earth, has been the scene of the most brutal betrayal of the world revolutionary movement. . . . All this can happen when a corrupted and deified clique can take over the Party, destroy, humiliate and crush the best militants and impose its will on the entire nation, supported by the strength and prestige that emanates from a profound social revolution.")

A more likely model was supplied by the rich cornucopia of ideas and practice generated by Soviet intellectual hegemons in the period from 1917, and whose forms as they emerged through the 1970s proved appealing. "Cuando los procesos revolucionarios se institucionalizan y se consolidan através de instituciones realmente adecuadas —como ocurrió con la Revolución Bolchevique, que tiene ya más de 50 años, que avanza ininterrumpidamente, y sabemos que seguirá avanzando—, vemos qué gran estabilidad le da a esos pueblos. (Discurso pronunciado por el Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz,primer secretario del Comite Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba yprimer ministro del gobierno revolucionario, en el acto en que lefueran entregados los compromisos del pueblo en saludo al PrimerCongreso del Partido por parte de los dirigentes de las organizacionesde masas, en el Palacio de la Revolucion, el 29 de mayo de 1975, "AÑODEL PRIMER CONGRESO")[TRANS: "When the revolutionary processes are institutionalized and consolidated through truly adequate institutions - as was the case with the Bolshevik Revolution, which is now more than 50 years old, which is progressing uninterruptedly, and we know that it will continue to advance - we see what great stability it gives these people"].

The ideological forms of the Soviets were likely much more compatible with what was coming to be embraced as ideology. The old Soviets were embedded in the early efforts to develop structures of democratic dictatorship which limited the "franchise" along class struggle principles (excluding "reactionaries and capitalist elements however these might be defined).  It was democratic in the sense that at least in theory these were meant to incarnate working class participation in government.  It was a dictatorship in the sense that it excluded reactionary elements and sought the guidance of the political vanguard.  It's nostalgia for and efforts to connect with at least the theories of the Paris Commune was also appealing from a theoretical perspective. But even here, the shadow of Stalinism hung heavy (on Stalinism, Leszek Kolalowski, Main Currents of Marxism (OUP 1978), p. 789-92 ("the personification of a system which irresistibly sought to be personalized" 792)

More importantly, in the construction of institutionalized Soviets was an ideological position that legitimated practical politics as an important instrument in the sort of class struggle at the heart of the Soviet and Cuban political experiment.
From the point of view of practical politics the idea that the Soviets are necessary as combat organisations but must not be transformed into state organisations is infinitely more absurd than from the point of view of theory. Even in peacetime, when there is no revolutionary situation, the mass struggle of the workers against the capitalists—for instance, the mass strike—gives rise to great bitterness on both sides, to fierce passions in the struggle, the bourgeoisie constantly insisting that they remain and mean to remain “masters in their own house”, etc. And in time of revolution, when political life reaches boiling point, an organisation like the Soviets, which embraces all the workers in all branches of industry, all the soldiers, and all the working and poorest sections of the rural population—such an organisation, of its own accord, with the development of the struggle, by the simple “logic” of attack and defence, comes inevitably to pose the question point-blank. The attempt to take up a middle position and to “reconcile” the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is sheer stupidity and doomed to miserable failure. That is what happened in Russia to the preachings of Martov and other Mensheviks, and that will inevitably happen in Germany and other countries if the Soviets succeed in developing on any wide scale, manage to unite and strengthen. To say to the Soviets: fight, but don’t take all state power into your hands, don’t become state organisations—is tantamount to preaching class collaboration and “social peace” between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. It is ridiculous even to think that such a position in the midst of fierce struggle could lead to anything but ignominious failure. But it is Kautsky’s everlasting fate to sit between two stools. He pretends to disagree with the opportunists on everything in theory, but in practice he agrees with them on everything essential (i.e., on everything pertaining to revolution). (Vladimir Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (The Soviets Dare Not Become State Organisations)(Lenin’s Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Volume 28, 1974, pages 227-325 (Nov. 1918))
And here is the crux of the problem for which the Cuban Revolutionary government sought a solution through the theater and structural changes memorialized in and around the 1ts PCC Congress. The problem was easy enough to state: irrespective of the model chosen, none would fit comfortably within the practices of Cuban politics, even that of the then current revolutionary government.  How might such a transposition of model be justified? Justification could not come easily from a Chinese model which at the time seemed too remote and too culturally specific to be of use.  Rather, the more culturally appealing Soviet model was much more compatible with Cuban intellectual sensibilities (so deeply embedded in European intellectual and political movements) to which the leaders of the revolutionary government presumed to be heirs. Soviet theory provided too objectives that the revolutionary government sought--a theoretical discourse on worker democracy, and a means of tying worker democracy to the discipline of vanguard leadership. An example:
 The Soviets are the direct organisation of the working and exploited people themselves, which helps them to organise and administer their own state in every possible way. And in this it is the vanguard of the working and exploited people, the urban proletariat, that enjoys the advantage of being best united by the large enterprises; it is easier for it than for all others to elect and exercise control over those elected. The Soviet form of organisation automatically helps to unite all the working and exploited people around their vanguard, the proletariat. (Vladimir Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky, supra (Bourgeois And Proletarian Democracy)).
But there is a large chasm between the revolutionary Russia of 19818 and that of Cuba after 1959. How might the revolutionary government draw on these strains of thinking, and these toolkits of structuring the enterprise of state that could still retain some connection with the revolutionary ideology they had been practicing through the device of mass affirmation under the guidance of the revolutionary leadership? To see that evolution is to understand the way the Cuban leadership constructed the conceptual and institutional structures of the 1st PCC Congress and its 1976 Constitution, and as well, the structural basis from which Socialist Democratic practice might emerge a generation later.

One starts with the unity of power (a rejection of liberal democratic notions of separation of powers within state organs) in favor of the unity of power from the sovereign element of the national population (its workers, peasants, etc.) exercised under the guidance of the revolutionary vanguard toward a specific end (the triumph of the proletariat (eventually) and the protection of the worker state.
Hay división de funciones, pero no hay división de poderes. El poder es uno, el del pueblo trabajador, que se ejerce a través de la Asamblea Nacional y de los organismos del Estado que de ella dependen. Nuestra forma de Estado toma en cuenta la experiencia acumulada por otros pueblos que han transitado el camino del socialismo y nuestra propia práctica. Como corresponde a una verdadera concepción revolucionaria aplicamos a nuestras condiciones concretas los principios esenciales del marxismo-leninismo.  (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, supra, 2 Dec. 1976) (TRANS: There is division of functions, but there is no division of powers. Power is undivided, that of the working people, exercised through the National Assembly and the State agencies that depend on it. Our form of State takes into account the experience accumulated by other peoples who have traveled the path of socialism and our own practice. As befits a true revolutionary conception, we apply the essential principles of Marxism-Leninism to our concrete conditions. ).
One draws on the theories and practices  within the Communist International (by then of course defunct institutionally though Communist internationalism was embraced strongly by the Cuban revolutionary government).  "Nuestra forma de Estado toma en cuenta la experiencia acumulada por otros pueblos que han transitado el camino del socialismo y nuestra propia práctica. Como corresponde a una verdadera concepción revolucionaria aplicamos a nuestras condiciones concretas los principios esenciales del marxismo-leninismo."

And one bends these organs to the institutionalization of revolutionary objectives.  That requires the creation of a political institution (the PCC) and a means of incarnating popular power (the Asamblea nacional). And one places these changes within a structure of historical progress.
Como se puede apreciar, en breve espacio de tiempo han tenido lugar profundas transformaciones institucionales. Con la constitución de esta Asamblea Nacional, la elección del Consejo de Estado, su Presidente y vicepresidentes, y la designación del Consejo de Ministros, concluye en lo fundamental este histórico proceso de institucionalización de nuestra Revolución. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, supra, 2 Dec. 1976) [TRANS: "As one can appreciate, profound institutional transformations have taken place in a short space of time. With the constitution of this National Assembly, the election of the Council of State, its President and vice-presidents, and the appointment of the Council of Ministers,  this historic process of institutionalization of our Revolution has been concluded"].
But one is aware of the problems of personality in representation.  And one declares (though it is less clear how the modalities of organization contribute toward the realization of the declaration) of a fiduciary element inherent in representation both within the PCC and the popular assembly.
Trabajan en el Partido y en el Estado no aquellos que aspiren a un cargo sino a los que los militantes y el pueblo asignen una tarea. En el socialismo los cargos no se aspiran, los ciudadanos no se postulan. Ni las riquezas, ni las relaciones sociales, ni la familia, ni la publicidad o la propaganda, como ocurre en la sociedad burguesa, deciden ni pueden decidir para nada el papel de un hombre en la sociedad. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, supra, 2 Dec. 1976) [TRANS: Those who work in the Party and in the State are not people who aspire to a position but those who to whom tasks are assigned by PCC cadres [militantes] and the people. In socialism one does not aspire to responsibility and citizens do not apply for positions. Neither riches, nor social relations, nor family, nor advertising or propaganda, as occurs in bourgeois society, determine  nor can they determine at all the role of a person in society.].
Again the Chinese experience is not very far from view.
Hay hoy una nueva dirección política en China. . . . Se señalan cosas increíbles sobre la forma en que un grupo de aventureros se apoderó virtualmente de la dirección del Partido. Lo que no está claro todavía en las explicaciones oficiales procedentes de China, es mediante qué mecanismos ese grupo pudo dirigir a su antojo la política china durante muchos años, y cómo la viuda de Mao Tsetung pudo en vida de Mao Tsetung, en el seno de un partido comunista y dentro de un Estado socialista, cometer esos crímenes. La experiencia que de ello se derive tiene que ser forzosamente útil al movimiento revolucionario mundial. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, supra, 2 Dec. 1976) [TRANS: "There is a new political direction in China today. . . . Incredible things are revealed about the way in which a group of adventurers seized virtually the entire direction of the Party. What is not clear yet in the official explanations from China, is by what mechanisms that group could guide Chinese politics at will for many years, and how the widow of Mao Tsetung could in Mao Tsetung's lifetime, in the bosom of a communist party and within a socialist state, commit those crimes. The experience derived therefrom must necessarily be useful to the global revolutionary movement."].
And in the end,  Fidel Castro could look at the institutionalization of revolutionary political power in the PCC, and popular power in the Nacional Assemble and see the perpetuation of a singular popular authority.  "Nuestro proceso revolucionario fue, desde el principio, profundamente popular y estuvo sólidamente enraizado en las masas. El primer acto soberano del pueblo fue la revolución misma." (Ibid.) [TRANS: Our revolutionary process was, from the beginning, profoundly popular and solifdly rooted in the masses. The first sovereign act of the people was the revolution itself"].

But these institutions did not spring forward fully formed from the theoretical droppings of Leninist theory applied elsewhere (though those might prove useful post hoc). We have already encountered the challenge perceived by the Cuban revolutionary government after the 2nd Havana Declaration respecting the modalities of mass approval assemblies and the beginnings of efforts to change the model without endangering(at least at a general level) its theoretical (and ideological) premises (Part 4: The Asamblea General Nacional del Pueblo de Cuba and the Origins of the Socialist Plebiscite 1960-1962). Those experiments reached a threshold of success in the years immediately before they were nationalized through during the 1st PCC Congress and then memorialized in the 1976 Constitution. Fidel Castro noted their importance in key speeches from 1974, referencing for example, the Poderes Populares experiment in Matanzas Province ("Y otra razón muy importante: el énfasis que la Revolución le quiere dar a este importantísimo experimento revolucionario que se lleva a cabo en la provincia de Matanzas con la constitución de los Poderes Populares, que ustedes los matanceros han acogido con tanto entusiasmo y han apoyado tan calurosamente. " (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE EN JEFE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER SECRETARIO DEL COMITE CENTRAL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA Y PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN EL ACTO CENTRAL EN CONMEMORACION DEL XXI ANIVERSARIO DEL ATAQUE AL CUARTEL MONCADA, EFECTUADO EN LA EXPLANADA FRENTE AL ESTADO MAYOR DEL EJERCITO CENTRAL, EN MATANZAS, EL 26 DE JULIO DE 1974, "AÑO DEL XV ANIVERSARIO") [TRANS: And another important reason, the emphasis that the Revolution desires to give this most important revolutionary experiment that is being realized in Matanzas Province  with the constitution of the Poderes Populares, that you people of Matanzas have embraced with such enthusiasm and have supported so warmly"]).

That experiment was to produce the template for the creation of local, provincial and national popular assemblies, and in the process replace the mechanism of mass affirmation of the people physically present in a large space with a representative body.  But that movement also triggered the fundamental contradiction of representative assemblies--the notion that they could not in form or operation, replicate the corruption and class exploitation principles of the form which the revolutionary government had attacked with such force in the course of the genesis of the two Havana declarations. And thus the need for experiment--in its pragmatic but also its fundamental ideological dimensions.
Como ustedes saben, se decidió llevar a cabo en esta provincia ese experimento. Experimento en un sentido, no en cuanto a la decisión ni a la seguridad de nuestro Partido de llevar adelante estas ideas en todo el país; el experimento es precisamente para poner a prueba los métodos, los mecanismos, las regulaciones y todo lo que concierne a la constitución de los Poderes Populares antes de aplicarlo nacionalmente. Es decir, el experimento nos enseñará a perfeccionar la idea; pero la idea es aplicar estos principios a todo el país. ((DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE EN JEFE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, 26 July 1974, supra) [TRANS: As you know, a decision was taken to undertake this experiment in this province [Matanzas]. It was an experiment in a sense, but not one respecting the decision  [to proceed itself] or [respecting the] security of our Party to carry forward these ideas throughout the country; the experiment is precisely to put to the test the methods, the mechanisms, the regulations and everything that concerns the constitution of the Popular Powers before applying it nationally. That is, the experiment will teach us to perfect the idea; but the idea is to apply these principles to the entire country.]

Part of that also involved the so called rationalization of the provinces, a process that required the subdivision of the traditional provinces. The object in part was to make more practical the division of provincial popular assemblies in the service of locality, state and PCC.
Siempre nos toca un poco el sentimentalismo cuando pensamos si vamos a dividir algunas provincias; pero como unido a esto está la cuestión de la organización de los Poderes Populares (APLAUSOS), para un adecuado establecimiento de los Poderes Populares es necesario que el tamaño y la extensión de las provincias sean más racionales. (DISCURSO PRONUNCIADO POR EL COMANDANTE EN JEFE FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRIMER SECRETARIO DEL COMITE CENTRAL DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA Y PRIMER MINISTRO DEL GOBIERNO REVOLUCIONARIO, EN EL ACTO CENTRAL EN CONMEMORACION DEL XXII ANIVERSARIO DEL ATAQUE AL CUARTEL MONCADA, EFECTUADO EN LA CIUDAD DE SANTA CLARA, LAS VILLAS, EL 26 DE JULIO DE 1975, "AÑO DEL PRIMER CONGRESO") [TRANS: One becomes a little sentimental when one thinks about dividing some of the provinces, but tied to that issue is the question of the organization of Poderes Populares [popular assemblies]. For the adequate establishment of the Poderes Populares it is necessary for the size and extent of provinces to be more rational"]
Implicit in that rationalization were two insights with political effect. The first was that mass assemblies could not be relied on for the exercise of popular affirmation of PCC leadership. The second was that such assemblies would have to be institutionalized if they were to serve the PCC and the administrative apparus in an ideologically useful way.

That sovereign affirmation could then be utilized to reconstitute itself pragmatically along institutional lines, but one in which sovereign power remains undivided.  "El poder es uno, el del pueblo trabajador, que se ejerce a través de la Asamblea Nacional y de los organismos del Estado que de ella dependen." (Ibid.) [TRANS: Power is unified, that of the the workers, which is exercised through the National Assembly and the state organs which depend on it"]).

And there it is. All of these centripetal forces, the experimentation in large part in reaction to outside and internal challenges, produced a long term process of solidification the contours of which might have been evident early on, but the character of which eventually also represented the cululation of reactionary political calculus. Note here that this is not to suggest ideological reaction; rather the focus is on the nature of the relational dynamics between the revolutionary apparatus and the challenges which it confronted in its formative years. Those dynamics were politically reactionary (one responds pragmatically to political challenges) even as they became, in political reaction, ideologically  the opposite.

Video Recording of Event: "China’s Socialist Consultative Democracy" for the Conference "Marxist-Leninism 2.0: Theory and Practice of Emerging Socialist Democracy in China and Cuba .

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Last month I circulated information about an event I was fortunate enough to have been able to organize, a conference on comparative Marxist-Leninism and its important developments in the early 21st century (Conference Details: "Marxist-Leninism 2.0: Theory and Practice of Emerging Socialist Democracy in China and Cuba" 12 February 2019 Penn State University). 

The conference brought together a marvelous group of academics from Europe, the U.S. and China to speak to issues around the new developments in China and Cuba, and their potential ramifications in areas of trade, foreign relations, globalization, and theory (especially constitutional and political theory)(Conference Concept Note). It was divided into two parts. The first was to consider the emerging structures of Chinese governance and its internal and global ramifications (Concept Note HERE). The second considered the developments of participatory democracy and engagement in Cuba around its 2018-2019 project of constitutional reform (Concept Note HERE).



Unfortunately an unanticipated snow and ice storm closed the university on the day scheduled for the event. But with great good humor and a spirit of adventure the conference participants gathered together and held the first part of the Conference-- China’s Socialist Consultative  Democracy. My great thanks to Flora Sapio (Uni Naples L'Orientale), Sun Ping (East China University of Politics and Law); Nicolas Schuiltz (NATO); Keren Wang (Penn State), Miaoqiang Dai (Penn State) and James Korman (Penn State) for their participation and insights.

In the process we were able to engage in a marvelously productive conversation around the work presented by each of the participants. These ranged from the history socialist consultative democracy through the CPPCC, to the current state of its operations and it challenges, to the transposition of consultative democratic practice to the Special Administrative Zones to the external ramifications of United Front work and the role of democratic centralism, to the potential for theorizing a new Leninist endogenous democracy.

Links to the Videorecording of the Panel, along with statements and PowerPoints follow below. We hope you enjoy watching the proceedings as much as we enjoyed the engagement. We are grateful to the Coalition for Peace and Ethics, the Foundation for Law and International Affairs, for helping to make this possible.


"Socialist consultative democracy has been developed around the United Front Parties as well as other representative institutional social organs.  It serves as a means through which popular engagement can be institutionalized and made effective.  Yet it appears to mean much more than that—integrating most aspects of official life within a tight web of consultation, monitoring, and review guided by the CPC. . . Contributions will seek o theorize this emerging Marxist-Leninism 2.0, and to consider the role of key institutional actors and organs—the CPPCC, the state institutions, and other social and political forces—as well as their relationship to the CPC.  Analysis will be undertaken from a Chinese, Western and comparative perspective.  The core object of participants will be to seek to extract the fundamental theory and characteristics of the emerging systems, and to point to the likely paths to further development."









"The Problem of the Enterprise and the Enterprise of Law: Regulating the Multinational Enterprise as Entity, as a Network of Links, and as a Process of Production"

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The conception and use of the multinational enterprise as a basis for regulatory analysis and policy has interested me for some time (e.g., The Concept of Constitutionalization and the Multi-Corporate Enterprise in the 21st Century; Regulating Multinational Corporations — Trends, Challenges and Opportunities; The Evolving Relationship between TNCs and Political Actors and Governments). The entity, so-called, poses substantial challenges in a number of respects.  First, while lawyers and others have gotten into the habit of speaking about this "thing", it does not exist, for the most part, in law. That has been a problem (in need of solution) especially in the emerging area of the regulation of the human rights effects of economic activity (and especially that undertaken through production chains). Second, even if one could overcome the problem of crafting this form of enterprise as an object of law, it has proven difficult regulate this "thing" through the territoriality constrained law making efforts of states.  Third, state efforts to overcome the limitations of their territory by trying to project their legal regimes outward on the backs of their enterprises has not proven entirely successful--even among the most powerful states most likely to be able to successfully undertake such projection of law.  Fourth, the object of regulation is not necessarily centered on the organization or operation of such enterprises as much as it is about its effects; as such, regulatory issues tend to center on the allocation of legal liability for tort, contract, and the like. 

I recently posted a draft of some additional thoughts about the "problem" of the MNE for law (Regulating the Multinational Enterprise as Entity, as a Network of Links and as a Process of Production). I was lucky enough to have been given a chance to speak to that manuscript to a marvelous group of faculty on a recent visit to the University of San Diego School of Law

This post includes the PowerPoints of that presentation.  The draft (for those interested) may be accessed HERE.























Video Recording of Event: "Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba" for the Conference "Marxist-Leninism 2.0: Theory and Practice of Emerging Socialist Democracy in China and Cuba

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Last month I circulated information about an event I was fortunate enough to have been able to organize, a conference on comparative Marxist-Leninism and its important developments in the early 21st century (Conference Details: "Marxist-Leninism 2.0: Theory and Practice of Emerging Socialist Democracy in China and Cuba" 12 February 2019 Penn State University).

The conference brought together a marvelous group of academics from Europe, the U.S. and China to speak to issues around the new developments in China and Cuba, and their potential ramifications in areas of trade, foreign relations, globalization, and theory (especially constitutional and political theory)(Conference Concept Note). It was divided into two parts. The first was to consider the emerging structures of Chinese governance and its internal and global ramifications (Concept Note HERE). The second considered the developments of participatory democracy and engagement in Cuba around its 2018-2019 project of constitutional reform (Concept Note HERE).



Unfortunately an unanticipated snow and ice storm closed the university on the day scheduled for the event. But with great good humor and a spirit of adventure the conference participants regrouped.  We were able to hold this second part of the Conference--Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba--for the superb group of International Affairs students at Penn State's School of International Affairs. My great thanks to my collaborators, Flora Sapio (Uni Naples L'Orientale) and James Korman (Penn State).  Special thanks to Sun Ping (East China University of Politics and Law); Nicolas Schuiltz (NATO); Keren Wang (Penn State), Miaoqiang Dai (Penn State)  for their intense consideration of the presentation of our draft, The Democratic Constitution of Illiberal States—An Empirical Approach to Theorizing Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba. Their comments and observations were deeply appreciated and profound.

Ironically our event was scheduled for the same time that the Organization of American States organized its own program considering aspects of the Cuban constitutional project,“The New Cuban Constitution and the Inter-American Democratic Charter” (video here). It is also no doubt worth considering, though it likely approaches the issues we discussed from an entirely different framework ("At the Washington conference, the General Secretariat of the OAS considered Cuba’s constitutional referendum “illegitimate” and said that this measure only serves to “mask” the “dictatorship” before the international community"here). Our project seeks to place that constitutional project within a wider context and offers a means of judging constitutional reform principally against the governmenmt's own political model.

Link to the Videorecording of the Presentation, Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba, along with the PowerPoints follow below (with apologies--due to some difficulties with the equipment the first few introductory minutes of the presentation were lost; but the presentation itself recorded well). We hope you enjoy watching the proceedings as much as we enjoyed the engagement. We are grateful to the Coalition for Peace and Ethics, the Foundation for Law and International Affairs, for helping to make this possible.






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  (Popular Participation, Representation and Constitutional Reform in Cuba  
Concept NoteHERE)



























Jock Whittlesey-- International Environmental Governance; Presentation at the Penn State School of International Affairs 4 Feb 2019

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It was my great pleasure to host Jock Whittlesey at the Penn State School of International Affairs for a lecture on "International Environmental Governance.  The presentation brought us a quite sophisticated view of the issues from the institutional perspective of the United States.  The presentation was marvelous and Mr. Whittlesey has kindly permitted me to share his PowerPoints.

 They follow below.









 


















La debida diligencia de derechos humanos: La Empresa Universitaria/Human Rights Due Diligence: The Enterprise of the University

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It was my great good fortune to have been invited by the University of Seville's law faculty to speak about the emerging issues of human rights due diligence.  Human rights due diligence forms the heart of the responsibilities of enterprises to respect human rights as enshrined in the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights, and through them to the obligations of enterprises under the OECD's Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.  At the same time, the due diligence required of enterprises with respect to the human rights consequences of the economic activities is missing from the state's paramount duty to protect human rights under the UNGPs--with respect to which state's retain the authority to order their approach under their constitutional systems, constrained by their capacity and political ideology, as well as the calculus of their ruling parties (as those may change form time to time ).
Fue una gran placer haber sido invitado por la facultad de derecho de la Universidad de Sevilla con intento de considerar los problemas emergentes de la diligencia debida en materia de derechos humanos. La debida diligencia en materia de derechos humanos constituye el núcleo de las responsabilidades de las empresas de respetar los derechos humanos consagrados en los Principios Rectores de las Empresas y los Derechos Humanos de la UN. Al mismo tiempo, la debida diligencia requerida de las empresas con respecto a las consecuencias para los derechos humanos de las actividades económicas falta en el deber primordial del estado y sus obligaciones de proteger los derechos humanos en cuenta de los UNGPs, con respecto a qué estado conservan la autoridad para ordenar su enfoque bajo sus sistemas constitucionales, restringidos por su capacidad e ideología política, así como el cálculo de sus partidos gobernantes (ya que estos pueden cambiar de un momento a otro). 
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The subject has been an area of focus for the UN's Working Group for Business and Human Rights and the subject of its last report to the General Assembly, "Corporate human rights due diligence – emerging practices, challenges and ways forward" (my more specific comments on which follow in a future post).   The Working Group centers its study on an aspirational approach to the possibilities of human rights due diligence and its broadest transposition into systems of legal regulation. That approach sought to aid in the convergence of frameworks and approaches to human rights to due diligence that includes the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct. Both provide generalized guides for approaching the issue of HRDD, but neither provides guidance for the issues of implementation beyond the most general approaches to structure. And they differ in the sense that the UNGPs focus on human rights risks and the OECD focuses on business risks with respet to the same conduct.
El tema ha sido un área de enfoque para el Grupo de Trabajo de las Naciones Unidas sobre Empresas y Derechos Humanos y el tema de su último informe a la Asamblea General, "Diligencia debida sobre derechos humanos corporativos: prácticas emergentes, desafíos y formas de avanzar" (Mis comentarios más específicos en el que seguiremos en un futuro post). El Grupo de Trabajo centra su estudio en un enfoque aspiracional a las posibilidades de diligencia debida en materia de derechos humanos y su transposición más amplia a los sistemas de regulación legal. Ese enfoque buscó ayudar a la convergencia de marcos y enfoques de derechos humanos a la diligencia debida que incluye la Guía de diligencia debida de la OCDE para una conducta empresarial responsable. Los dos proporciona guías generalizadas para abordar el tema del DRHD, pero ninguno proporciona orientación para los problemas de implementación Más allá de los enfoques más generales de la estructura. Y difieren en el sentido de que los UNGPs se enfocan en los riesgos de derechos humanos y la OCDE se enfoca en los riesgos de negocios con respecto a la misma conducta.
Yet those issues of implementation are critical to HRDD.  To that end, it might be useful to begin to think about ways of modeling HRDD within complex organizations. For that purpose I chose the modern American university as a model.  It presents most of the complexities of major multinational enterprises yet it has been neglected as an economic and human rights actor.  It presents as well the meeting points between private institutions and state instrumentalities, and between private commercial and religious organizations. My initial thoughts on those convergences and the insights they provide for the organization of HRDD were presented  as La debida diligencia de derechos humanos y la empresa universitaria/Human Rights Due Diligence and the University Enterprise.
Sin embargo, esos problemas de implementación son críticos para HRDD. Con ese fin (de la resolución de esas problematicas), podría ser útil comenzar a pensar en formas de modelar HRDD dentro de organizaciones complejas. Para ello elegí como modelo la universidad americana. Esas instituciones presentan la mayor parte de las complejidades de las grandes empresas multinacionales, sin embargo, se ha descuidado como un actor económico y de derechos humanos. También presentan los puntos de encuentro entre instituciones privadas e instituciones estatales, y entre organizaciones privadas comerciales y religiosas. Mis reflexiones iniciales sobre esas convergencias y las ideas que proporcionan para la organización del HRDD se presentaron como La debida diligencia de los derechos humanos y la empresa universitaria / La diligencia debida en materia de derechos humanos y la Empresa universitaria
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Great thanks to Carmen Márquez Carrasco, Catedrática de Universidad del Departamento de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales, for organizing the event, as well as for her leadership in this field.  The PowerPoints of the presentation follow in English and Castellano.

Muchas gracias a Carmen Márquez Carrasco, Catedrática del Departamento de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales, por organizar el evento, así como por su liderazgo en este campo. Los PowerPoints de la presentación siguen en inglés y castellano.
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Part 6: On the Nature of Voting in Cuban Marxist-Leninism; Situating Popular Assent Within an Ideological Cage -- Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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(Pix Credit (c) Larry Catá Backer 2017)
In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years series theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite.

This Post includes Part 6: On the Nature of Voting in Cuban Marxist-Leninism; Situating Popular Assent Within an Ideological Cage.



On the eve of the plebiscite on the 2019 reforms to the Cuban Constitution, Jaime Aparicio Otero the former president of the Comité Jurídico Interamericano of the Organization of Amerucan States, published a widely circulated opinion in which he denounced the anti-democratic character of the plebiscite and the political-governmental system from which it emerged (“Apariencias cubanas; La Constitución que se vota hoy en la isla es una obra de ingeniería política para seguir controlando el poder,” El Pais (España 24 February 2019 (https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/02/22/opinion/1550860771_801464.html) and in full below). In it one can find encapsulated the liberal democratic critique of the notions of popular participation developed under principles of Caribbean Marxism in Cuba.

Mr. Aparicio Otero’s critique is quite simple and based on an even more specific set of principles form which there can be little deviation: Latin America embraced notions of European constitutionalism, grounded in the core ideal of the Reschtsstaat (estado de derecho) after 1945.  Those principles were then internationalized within the family of Latin American States through a series of international agreements, many with the force (such as it is) of international law especially after (ironically) 1959 with the Declaration of Santiago, an agreement to which Cuba subscribed at the time. These clearly signaled the necessary elements of democratic constitutionalism in Latin America—direct and free popular elections of government representatives, subject to autonomous direction, a government based on separation of powers, respect for individuals rights, multi-party political organization, and freedom of liberty and expression. The Cuban constitution as reformed does little to embrace any of these principles. The Constitutional project takes important elements not just from European Soviet manifestations, but also from that of Western fascism, particularly Franco’s Spanish variation.

Mr. Aparicio Otero’s key insight is also his most ironic:

El régimen de Fidel Castro tuvo la habilidad de adueñarse por muchos años de la cultura internacional y de las emociones que cautivaron a una generación. Hoy, el intento de mantener el enclaustramiento de la sociedad cubana en la prisión de una ideología arcaica que niega de raíz los derechos del individuo, demuestra que también aquella habilidad se ha desvanecido. [TRANS: For many years, Fidel Castro’s regime used its abilities to capture international culture and to capture the emotions of a generation. Today, the intent to maintain the cloistering of Cuban society] in the prison of an archaic ideology that denies individual rights, evidences the way this ability to capture a generation’s imagination has also vanished].  

It is in fact the ability to own the narrative and to assert an ideological orthodoxy that has marked served as the foundations of conflict from the middle of the 20th century (except in those areas where religion still serves those purposes). But that ownership, and the prison’s of orthodoxy tend to mark liberal democracy as well as its Marxist Leninist and religious variations.  This is not to suggest any ideological failures of liberal democracy.  But it does put a spotlight on two issues.  The first is that the failures of one ideology cannot usefully be measured by suggesting its inability to conform to the principles of another.  That, of course, is the principal weakness of Mr. Aparicio Otero’s argument (and of most of those coming from the West). The second (and more important) is that the failures of an ideology requires a more rigorous focus on that ideology’s own principles—something that tends to work well within liberal democracies. But liberal democracies are not interested in applying the same self-critique to other systems (viewed as in need of reforming not analysis) because to do so would be to aid in their legitimization.  And that, liberal democracy finds intolerable, in much the same way that Soviet Marxist Leninist systems (and Cuban elites) find liberal democracy beyond redemption.

With this in mind, from the perspective of the principles of liberal democracy, Mr. Aparicio Otero is right. And he makes the most powerful conventional argument for Cuban nonconformity with the strictures (in ideology and practice) of the core manifestations of liberal democracy. He reminds us that these core ideologies have now been embraced as a fundamental part of the project of Latin American regionalism, one that calls for mutual defense of these principles at least, as we have seen, in the cases of Honduras in 2009 and Venezuela in 2019.  At the same time, it also illustrates an unwillingness to consider the failures of the Cuban political model in its own terms—and subject rigorously to scrutiny on the basis of its own principles.

More importantly, it highlights, especially with respect to the mechanics of democratic practice. The result tends toward adherence to a rigid and immovable approach to the issue of democracy that has the potential to lose relevance through ossification, and to become a tool for power relations. In this respect, and from the perspective of the Cuban Constitutional project, though, Mr. Aparicio’s essay is most interesting for its view of the necessary character and expression of popular participation in the state through voting.  

El proyecto de Constitución cubana que se someterá a referendo hoy es una obra de ingeniería política y jurídica para aparentar reformas cuya aplicación seguirá controlada por el poder. El motivo por el que el actual Gobierno cubano se ha propuesto aprobar una nueva Constitución tiene que ver con la estrategia seguida en otros países del antiguo bloque comunista: la voluntad de legitimar cierta apertura económica necesaria para traer mayor inversión, evitando emprender reformas políticas de contenido democrático.[TRANS: The Cuban constitutional project that is to be submitted to a referendum today is a work of political and juridical engineering to advance reforms whose application will continue to be controlled by the political apparatus. The motives animating the Government’s move to seek popular approval of the new Constitution has more to do with strategies followed in other states from the old soviet bloc: the need to legitimate certain economic reforms necessary for mayor investment, but avoiding political reforms with democratic content.]

The question worth considering then, is what exactly is the ideology of voting and of representation at the base of the construction of the Party and state apparatus after 1975 (assuming of course that much has happened since its “big bang” with the 1st PCC Congress).  Also worth considering are the related questions: to what extent does this ideology augment the difficulty of cross systemic discussion (we have seen a good example in the essay by Aparicio Otero), and then the extent to which it is worth considering whether the current constitutional project lives up to its ideological principles in fact. Left for another time is the harder question: might this ideological system posit a view of democracy that might itself be legitimately viable in relevant context.  

In the run up to the 24 February plebiscite on the 2019 Cuban Constitutional Project I have been trying to develop a more meaningful context from which one might better appreciate (even without agreeing with) the core principles and historical practices from out of which the current plebiscite has been fashioned (hereParts 1-5). The arc of development of notions of popular engagement from 1959 on reflected in part the ideological development of those who drove out the prior dictatorship from a sort of hard leftist and anti-imperialist concoction well understood in then contemporary Latin America to a more orthodox Leninism with Marxist objectives for which the institutional structures of European Soviet Leninism proved convenient.  

That development had one constant--the leading role of the core revolutionary group that ousted the prior government. The manner in which that leadership role was to be asserted, and how it was to be eventually institutionalized, proved to be a more uncertain task than might have been expected.  And of course, much of it was undertaken not from a positive but from a reactive framework; to some extent what was fashioned was as much a product of U.S. initiatives as it was of Cuban reaction. Sadly, though, that dynamic has set the pattern of ideological and institutional development in Cuba that continues to structure state, government and ideology. Irrespective, by the middle of the 1970’s the ideological and institutional course had been set by what had been a more free-form revolutionary government—it was to embrace some version of orthodox (for its time and then set in stone) European Marxist-Leninist structure founded on what would become a more well defined Caribbean variation of Marxist ideology.

That leadership role, however, was from the first meant to be attached to popular participation in some form. What emerged early on, from 1960, was that this popular participation was to have little relation to the forms or ideologies of liberal democratic states. Yet, the revolutionary group's early experiments (or uncharitably its publicity stunts) have also distinguished its approach to popular participation from those of other Marxist-Leninist states. Indeed, and ironically enough, there appeared to be more concern about the operation of what in China would be called the “mass line” (the principle of “from the people to the people”) in the early period of the Cuban revolutionary government than there was in more orthodox Marxist-Leninist states. The notion here from the first appeared to be to embed popular participation withinthe structures of the leadership of the revolutionary government, and thereafter within those of the Communist Party-State. But until that leadership structure (and its institutions) was established and settled, it would be impossible to expect much stability to the corresponding notions (or practices) of popular participation.  That settlement came with the 1st Communist Party Congress and the 1976 Cuban Constitution and its establishment both of the institution of the revolutionary government within the Cuban Communist Party and the institutionalization of popular participation within the structures of the National Assembly of Popular Power.

The organization of popular participation within the structures of the National Assembly of Popular Power, however, tell us little about the ideological character of popular participation.  Moreover, it appears to add a layer of confusion respecting the forms through which popular participation is manifested.  So let us try to start at the ideological beginning.

From the time the revolutionary group rolled into Havana in the early days of 1959, it was confronted with a core ideological problem--how to remain revolutionary and how to be democratic.  To do both required a considerably long journey away from the structures of liberal democracy that were even then taking definitive shape (though they had not yet by any means taken that definitive orthodox shape then). But it was not clear that the road would necessarily lead inevitably to an identity with what was passing for the ideological structures of European Marxist-Leninism (already weakened in fact (e.g., Hungary 1956), despite (or because of) a long and intense effort at a theoretical elaboration of a system that was meant to be profoundly liberal and democratic (and which in fact was neither). On the other hand, Marxist-Leninism provided the revolutionary government with the one key ingredient it needed if it were to try to perpetuate its rule without appearing (theoretically) to descend into the common mud pit that was Latin American dictatorships). To that end an ideology was necessary, and the appearance of an avoidance of a cult of personality (the caudillo effect so well known within the ancient boundaries of the old Spanish Imperium). And it needed some connection with democratic institutions as well, both because the revolutionary party rode to power in part on that promise, and because that too might present an avenue for longevity. 

The first efforts at direct democratic performance (discussed  Part 2: Caribbean Socialist Democracy 1.0--A pure Theory of Elections Within A Caribbean Leninist State) produced a number of insights.  The first was that the practice or direct democracy tended to serve as an important method for the management of the direct connection between the revolutionary government and the people. The second was that the physical performance of direct democracy was not then possible, except for extraordinary events. We leave for another day whether technology has now made possible in cyber spaces what the revolutionary government attempted to do in physical space. The third was the development of a distinct view of the meaning and practice of voting. The fourth was that alternatives were necessary to develop at least theoretical connections between the revolutionary government and the people.  To that end, the rudimentary modalities of supervision could also be used as a means of acquiring information about popular sentiment with respect to revolutionary government initiatives.  The fifth was that a mechanism was necessary to establish two sets of institutions--the institutionalization of the revolutionary government and the institutionalization of popular participation--which required a further refinement of the meaning and practice of voting.  The sixth was a need to preserve direct popular participation in extraordinary cases (following the model of the Havana Declarations).  And the seventh was to be able to distinguish both voting and participation from its counterparts in liberal democratic states.  To fail to make that distinction was to open the Cuban state apparatus (and rightly) to the criticism that it was merely creating showcase institutions and events with no real meaning to cover up the structures of dictatorship (criticisms that echo strongly in the Aparicio Otero opinion essay. 

Reduced to its essence, however, these insights turned, in their ideological manifestations on two principal elements--voting and participation of the people. Each will be discussed briefly in turn. 

Voting. At first glance one might be tempted to say voting is voting.  There can be little ideologically to quibble about voting except its object.  And in that respect both Caribbean Marxism and liberal democracy agree.  Where liberal democracy sees contests among factions (political parties, for example, but also interest groups and the like), Caribbean Marxist Leninism sees the use of voting to mask a dictatorship built along class lines. Caribbean Marxist-Leninists, then, view voting as the means by which the class dominance of (in their view) capitalist elites can be maintained by providing the appearance of choice and political clashes over policy while masking that those clashes actually ensured that the same ruling class continued in power (whatever the voter's choices among policy options). That provided no choice but reinforced the class corruption at the heart of which was the voting system that served as the foundation of liberal democratic practice itself. Thus to vote for any particular candidate was to vote for a different mask behind which the same class ruled.

If that was the case, then both the issue of representation and the issue of voting presented substantial obstacles to popular participation. For them, the way around the problem involved three distinct elements.   

The first was voting as an act of affirmation or rejection. Voting was to tie the regulation of voting to the guidance of a revolutionary party committed (and in theory at least obliged to ensure) that all actions be drawn to further the fundamental goals of the society. If that was the case then voting moved from democratic to corporate principles--and the revolutionary government (and later the PCC) transformed itself from a revolutionary system of soviets to a board of directors required to obtain shareholder approval of actions they initiated.  The revolutionary party  itself however would be self regulated, internally responsible only to itself. It would follow that direct popular participation through voting would be limited to the purpose of affirming and rejecting the actions put to them for a vote. In the context of the constitutional plebiscite, the idea would be that the proposed constitution could be affirmed or rejected by the voters and if rejected that would signal that the leadership of the PCC as well as of the people's representatives in the Asamblea del Poder Popular had also failed in their leadership.  In theory that also ought to produce a crisis of leadership requiring purges of the leadership group who failed in their responsibilities. At the margins, limited affirmation should also send strong signals that the PCC would be obliged to recognize and to which it ought to respond. 

The second was the voting for the representatives of popular power in local and national assemblies. Here voting posed the greatest challenge for the Cuban revolutionary government--how to distinguish popular voting for representatives to a legislative national and local assembly for the elections at the heart of liberal democratic states. Here, again, the idea was to move from the liberal democratic baseline of voting for one of several competing candidates, each competing on the basis of personal agendas and qualifications, to one of affirming the selection by the ruling leadership of a slate of candidates.  Here again, the act of voting is detached from the act of choosing to the act of affirming a set of choices made under the guidance of the ruling party.  The idea is that such candidates could be affirmed (elected) and removed by the people as they liked, but that those choices would be made under the shadow of the overarching obligation by voters and the PCC to select and retain only those representatives committed to the economic and political model and the long term objectives toward which the state was obliged to move. This makes perfect sense within a Marxist Leninist framework, where the fundamental commitment is to move the state and society toward the goal of establishing (ir in the case of Cuba of preserving specified elements) of a communist society. The only was around that was not through elections (this is the case in liberal democracies as well) but through a revolutionary act that overcomes the basic economic and political model.

The third was the shifting of the focus of democratic accountability from voting to participation (within the struct boundaries of the political and economic model). Voting as affirmation becomes more palatable (perhaps) when what is to be affirmed is the product of a substantial amount of popular consultation.  It is this thinking that makes plausible this quote: "Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez also exercised his right, announcing on his Twitter account that he voted for the continuity of the Cuban Revolution. "I defended a Constitution that is the result of a collective project with a ‘Yes,’ which reaffirms the will of the majority, and which protects the future of my family and of the heroic people ratifying the independence and sovereignty of socialist Cuba."  ('A Victory for Latin America': Cuban President Diaz-Canel Votes on New Constitution) Of course that is true only to the extent that the consultation is deep enough, and effective enough to warrant public trust. And it will evidence its tolerance of popular voices by the extent to which it encourages or acknowledges opinions and suggests inimical to the proffered guidance. But the theory at least suggests that a comprehensive enough process for effective consultation that produces changes invokes a democratic accountability that reduces the centrality of voting to the construction of democratic mechanisms (e.g., here).  Of course, the chasm between theory and practice may be broad.  But if there is a theory that justifies, then the issue changes complexion, at least in terms of any legitimacy argument. 

These three theoretical approaches to voting, then, permit a more rigorous consideration of Cuban practice on its own terms. Clearly, the core understanding of the role and practice of voting within the Cuban political model raises significant issues.  But it also suggests that the usual criticism grounded in the deviation between Cuban practice and the ideal model of liberal democracy also reduces itself to farce. Everyone can agree that Cuba's system does not conform to the theory or practice of liberal democracy.  But the Cubans would tell you this themselves. If that is all one was looking for then there is no point in investing any more time in the matter, and one moves back to the issue of "transition." But if instead we move to the question of the theoretical possibility of democratic structures in systems grounded in popular affirmation and consultation, then the issues become far more interesting. More interesting still are the host of issues around the question: whether the current constitutional project lives up to its ideological principles in fact. Within the constitutional project itself the principal questions ought to go to the extent and value of the popular consultations, both at the time of the reconceptualizaiton of the economic and political model before the 7th PCC Congress and thereafter in the context of constitutional reform. Also important is the extent to which those consultations are transparent--for example circulating the public and formal consultations presented to the National Assembly--it is too late in the day to claim that this is not possible given the sophistication of the state's web presence. Lastly, the balloting for the affirmation and the consequences to those who voted "no" would be of interest. Related to this is the issue of the state with respect to a failure to capture a large affirmation (e.g.,Cubans expected to voice unprecedented opposition in constitutional vote).  How much affirmation is enough to provoke a review and reform of the proffered text?

Yet these are questions that become possible to consider only once considers the possibility that there is an ideological possibility for the construction of democratic models are do not conform to the principles of liberal democratic states as these have been refined since 1945. These are the issues to which this series turns its attention in future posts.

Part 7: The Results of the Cuban Constitutional Referendum -- Series, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project, From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite

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In this post and those that follow we will begin to flesh out what we see as the great challenges of democracy in illiberal states, and the methods undertaken by the Caribbean (Cuban) form of Marxism Leninism, to meet those challenges. We will asses the extent to which they might claim success, and more importantly the extent to which the gulf between theory and execution remains a problem. We hope you will join us on this journey and look forward to engagement and discussion over the month. develop an approach. This February series is wrapped around work that Flora Sapio, James Korman and I are undertaking on the Cuban process of constitutional reform.

For Cuba, of course, the development of a viable socialist democracy is essential if it is to survive the passing of its revolutionary generation. And for that reason alone, Cuba provides a quite compelling laboratory for next generation democratic theory built on non-Western liberal assumptions. For these reasons we have chosen this years series theme: Caribbean Marxism's Socialist Democracy, Considering the Cuban Constitutional Project From Communist Party to Popular Plebiscite.
This Post includes Part 7: The Results of the Cuban Constitutional Referendum 2019.







The results of the Cuban constitutional referendum, held Sunday 24 February 2019, has been announced today.  The results were not unexpected--a large majority of Cuban voters affirmed the changes to the Cuban constitution.  Yet almost three quarter of a million voters (9% of the more than 7,800,000 voters) voted no and another handful of ballots, over 5% of the vote,was deemed irregular.  The positive vote was lower than the affirmative vote obtained for the last constitutional revision project in 1976.    
Marc Frank and Nelson Acosta's reporting for Reuters nicely summarized the results and its context:

Cubans overwhelmingly ratify new socialist constitution
Marc Frank, Nelson Acosta

HAVANA (Reuters) - Cubans have overwhelmingly ratified a new constitution that enshrines the one-party socialist system as irrevocable while instituting modest economic and social changes, according to the national electoral commission.

Alina Balseiro Gutierrez, president of the commission, said at a Havana press conference on Monday that preliminary results showed 84.4 percent of the 8.7 million potential voters participated in the Sunday referendum.

She said 86.85 percent of voters ratified the charter, 9 percent opposed ratification and 4.5 percent spoiled or left ballots blank.

By comparison, in 1976 when the current constitution was ratified, 99.02 percent of voters in a 98 percent turnout reportedly ratified and just 54,000 were opposed.

There are no independent observers of Cuban elections, however citizens may observe the count at their precincts.

Scattered local reports on social media seemed to somewhat confirm the results.

Cuba’s best-known dissident and pioneer blogger, Yoani Sanchez, who runs an online newspaper from a barrio known for its support of the government, wrote she braved insults and yelling to witness the count in her precinct of 400 yes votes, 25 no votes and 4 blank ballots.

The independent online newspaper El Toque asked readers to send in local tallies, a dozen of which showed overwhelming support for ratification. 

A report from a district in central Villa Clara province had the new constitution ratified by 414 votes versus 66 opposed, and another from a district in westernmost Pinar del Rio reported 298 yes votes and 18 no votes.

Debate over the constitution has dominated Cuba’s politics for months, with the government arguing it represents both continuity of former leader Fidel Castro’s policies and adaptation to today’s demands and opponents insisting it is a continuation of Communist party rule and oppression.

The government orchestrated a grassroots debate on a draft of the new constitution last year, but after it approved a final version for the referendum in December it used its monopoly of traditional media and public spaces to press for approval.

Nevertheless, dueling campaigns to vote ‘yes’, ‘no’ or abstain raged on the internet. The Roman Catholic Church issued a critique read in churches, and many evangelicals said they were opposed.

Dissidents, who were divided between those who advocated a ‘no’ vote and those who called for abstention so as not to legitimize a process they deemed a fraud, reported a few incidents across the country of members being temporarily detained or harassed.

“The Cuban government engaged in an unprecedented campaign to assure an overwhelmingly positive vote on the new constitution as a way to legitimize both the market-oriented economic reforms underway and the new leadership of President Miguel Diaz-Canel and the post-revolutionary generation,” American University professor of government and Cuba expert William LeoGrande said.

There are important changes in the new constitution that reflect the gradual opening of the Caribbean island nation since the fall of its former benefactor, the Soviet Union.

There are references to markets and recognition of private property, foreign investment, small businesses, gender identity, the internet, the right to legal representation upon arrest and habeas corpus.

* * *

(Corrects number of potential voters in paragraph 2 to 8.7 million instead of 7.8 million and changes percentages to reflect actual voters in paragraphs 2 and 3.)


Reporting by Marc Frank, additional reporting by Nelson Acosta; Editing by Phil Berlowitz and James Dalgleish 
None of this was unexpected.Including the criticism nicely summarized in the reporting above.  And yet consider those criticisms in light of what one now understands as the theoretical model under which this referendum was structured.

1. "Debate over the constitution has dominated Cuba’s politics for months, with the government arguing it represents both continuity of former leader Fidel Castro’s policies and adaptation to today’s demands and opponents insisting it is a continuation of Communist party rule and oppression. "
All three statements are true and not inconsistent. Debate has dominated portions of the Island's population. That the state encouraged this or at least permitted a substantial flexibility with respect to dissenting views was to some extent (in the Cuban context) remarkable. One need only compare the expectations within Chinese Marxism under which such open dissent might not have been tolerated int he same way. Second, both state and PCC made it clear over and over that the entire constitutional project had as its objective the preservation of traditional Caribbean Marxism but now operationalized within a contemporary context. Third, it is also true that by continuing with the political and economic model (as adopted by the 7th PCC Congress), the object was to ensure the continuation of PCC rule.  That continuation would be seen as necessary by its supporters and as oppression by its opponents; support or opposition, of course, determined by an adherence to quite distinct models of political organization. 

2. "The government orchestrated a grassroots debate on a draft of the new constitution last year, but after it approved a final version for the referendum in December it used its monopoly of traditional media and public spaces to press for approval."
This statement is also both true and quite unremarkable in the context of Cuban theories of voting and engagement we have discussed in earlier posts. The state orchestrated a campaign of debate.  The more interesting question ought to be the extent to which that campaign effectively produced robust engagement at the grassroots level,  Here there is room for substantial debate (and to that extent also substantial room for criticism of the forms of engagement and thus the value of the process including the referendum).  It would also be true that once that debate was concluded and the Constitution reformed on the basis of that debate, that the state would actively campaign for an affirmation of the final product. At this point the assumption would have been that the document itself already reflected the will of the PCC and the people, and that this assumption could be tested by an up or down vote on the final product. 

3.  "Nevertheless, dueling campaigns to vote ‘yes’, ‘no’ or abstain raged on the internet." 
This was also true.  And not just on the internet.  But here the campaign bled well beyond the national territory; and it picked up some elements from the exile community. That debate was lively and to some extent amplified the official debate.  But at the same time it served to leverage the voices of those seeking to turn popular opinion against the project.  This was especially true with respect to certain key wedge issues.  Our data suggests a quite specific form of debate, much of which was not focused entirely on the legitimacy of a Marxist Leninist Party -State.
4. "Dissidents, who were divided between those who advocated a ‘no’ vote and those who called for abstention so as not to legitimize a process they deemed a fraud, reported a few incidents across the country of members being temporarily detained or harassed."
There can be little doubt that there was some irregularities.  But those might have affected only a marginal number of the ballots (if that marginal number was large).  One does have to confront the issue of voter affirmation in this context in ways that suggest the power of the status quo even against the blandishments of an alternative theoretical framework for democratic organization, and int he face of substantial economic malaise. This is worth further consideration. So are the issues of transparency, and the secrecy of balloting in small precinct where anonymous voting migth have been impossible.
 5. "The independent online newspaper El Toque asked readers to send in local tallies, a dozen of which showed overwhelming support for ratification."
This is true but leaves open the fundamental question for the PCC itself.  How should the PCC respond to a substantial dissidence (about 10% of the voters).  Theoretically, in the face of substantial engagement, the rate of affirmation should have been much higher.  That the PCC was unable to obtain such an affirmation suggests a failure of leadership that ought to produce a response other than one that dismisses the "no" voters as dissidents or ignorant folk.  Leadership is leadership and it the PCC means to retain it, some positive response might be required--at least that is what the current ideology suggests.

Article Published: "Aligning Emerging Global Strategies to Combat Corporate Corruption," The International Lawyer 52(1)1-45 (2019)

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I am delighted to announce the publication of "Aligning Emerging Global Strategies to Combat Corporate Corruption,"The International Lawyer 52(1)1-45 (2019).  My great thanks to the editors at the International Lawyer which is the official triannual publication of the American Bar Association's Section of International Law, for their work on this article and for a outstanding volume 52(1). 

The article considers the ways that different legal and regulatory mechanisms within public and private institutions might be better aligned to develop hybrid regulatory strategies to combat (and in the process to better manage the risk and magnitude of) corruption as well as its effects.  More particularly, it suggests that an alignment of prosecutorial practice with the risk management and compliance infrastructures of enterprises and lenders (including sovereign lenders), might be a useful step toward a coherent and comprehensive strategy. This combines elements of practice int he United States with those emerging in China to sketch what I call a two thrust strategy using an intertwined program of coordinated financial and criminal regulation. 

The Abstract and the Introduction follow. Comments and engagement always welcome. To order, visit the ABA store or contact the ABA Service Center. The Chinese language version of this essay appeared in the Jilin University Journal, social science edition 吉林大学学报社科版.



"Aligning Emerging Global Strategies to Combat Corporate Corruption" 
 The International Lawyer 52(1)1-45 (2019).
Larry Catá Backer
Abstract

The commitment of governments, international organizations and enterprises to combating corruption appears to have intensified in recent years. The efforts of these institutions appear centered on a “Two Thrust Approach,” consisting of the simultaneous application of the development and enforcement of public legal regimes and the implementation and operation of private compliance systems. This system dies not produce regulatory coherence between the law making by the government and the compliance systems created by business are not coordinated well. However, recent regulatory and compliance trends suggest the emergence of a “Two Swords, On Thrust Strategy” as a supplemental approach to the enforcement of anti-corruption rules and norms. The Two Swords-One Thrust Strategy combines the power of state officials to exercise discretion in managing anti-corruption laws and the authority of financial institutions to control the access of enterprises to their investment universe or to exercise their shareholder authority to influence corporate behavior. The essay examines the possibility of developing this strategy. To that end, the essay first considers the emerging efforts to institutionalize rules for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in criminal investigations to compel corporate governance reform. It then considers the “second sword”, the use of market power by sovereign investors to influence compliance oriented corporate governance reform that parallels those advanced by prosecutors. The essay ends by suggesting the utility of this strategy for Chinese anti-corruption efforts by considering the possibility of coordinating the work of the procuratorate with the financial power of Chinese sovereign wealth finds in the exercise of their shareholder power and their power to limit access to investment markets.

 


I. Introduction

Who cares about corruption?[1] In September 2017, the media reported that parliamentarians at the Council of Europe had been bribed by Azerbaijan to mute criticism of their government within the Council's human rights organs.[2] Also in September 2017, France’s financial prosecutor announced the commencement of a corruption investigation against the son of the former president of the International Association of Athletics Federations for payments to influence the choice of host cities for the largest global sporting events.[3] At the same time, authorities in Brazil launched a probe into vote buying for the 2016 Olympics, a criminal offense.[4] In January 2016, the Norwegian Pension Fund Global intensified its efforts to engage in more aggressive anti-corruption investment strategies.[5] In December 2013, Vietnam reported that it had sentenced bankers to death in connection with embezzlement from a state owned bank.[6]

“It’s a message to those in this game to be less greedy and that business as usual is getting out of hand,” said Adam McCarty, chief economist with the Hanoi-based consulting firm Mekong Economics. “The message to people in the system is this: Your chances of getting caught are increasing,” McCarty said. “Don’t just rely on big people above you. Because some of these [perpetrators] would’ve had big people above them. And it didn’t help them.”[7]

It is noteworthy that Colombia, shortly after the peace settlement ending fifty years of civil war, turned its attention to the control of criminal corruption in response to corruption scandals involving transnational corporations that reached to the office of the president of the republic.[8]“Already seven people have been jailed in the case, including a former senator and an ex-vice minister of transport. The attorney general also asked the Supreme Court of Justice to investigate five other members of congress.”[9] In China, Ding Ning, the chairman of Yucheng Group, was recently sentenced to life in prison for his role in an online lending fraud scheme.[10] In August, 2017, “[t]he Supreme People’s Procuratorate said China would strictly crack down on any crimes that seriously damaged financial security and that destroyed financial orders.”[11]

Corruption, especially bribery, has become a matter of international concern. The United Nations (U.N.) Global Compact, a voluntary initiative between large enterprises under the leadership of the U.N. committed to implement universal sustainability principles and to take steps to support U.N. goals, is built around ten principles.[12] Its tenth principle states that “[b]usinesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.”[13] The U.N. Global Compact has expressed the view that “[c]orruption is a considerable obstacle to economic and social development around the world. It has negative impacts on sustainable development and particularly affects poor communities.”[14] In that respect, the U.N. Global Compact highlights a “two thrust” attack on corruption. “New and tougher anti-corruption regulations continue to emerge worldwide. All companies need robust anti-corruption measures and practices to protect their reputations and the interests of their stakeholders.”[15]

These “two thrusts”—the first consisting of national legislation (criminal and civil) and the second consisting of corporate self-regulation against corruption—have become the foundation of contemporary measures to combat corruption, especially when committed by individuals within the largest public or private enterprises. [16] The extent of national legislation and international efforts to make national legislation coherent is well known.[17] National efforts continue to develop. For example, in 2017, the government of the United Kingdom adopted the Criminal Finances Act of 2017.[18] In addition, the range of international agreements respecting corruption touches virtually every country on earth.[19] The international community has also adopted some soft law instruments with some influence in developing customary standards of conduct and expectations in economic relations.[20] In the United States, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) has served as a model, variations of which have been adopted elsewhere.[21] The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China prohibits “official bribery,” which applies to state officials and state entities, as well as “commercial bribery,” which applies to virtually everyone else.[22] A great number of other states have enacted anti-bribery and corruption laws as well.[23]

Recent reports from the global financial sector have highlighted the way in which this “two thrusts” strategy has also begun to be felt by actors in financial markets, especially those firms that are in the business of investing in or lending to operating companies worldwide. In one recent case,

[a]n American mutual fund manager said in an SEC filing [] that it sold all shares it held in Petrofac because of an ongoing corruption investigation by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office. That SFO investigation is focused on Petrofac’s past relationship with Unaoil. Ohio National Fund, Inc. said the “escalating fraud investigation seems to us a thesis changer.”[24]

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has noted the priority to which it has given corruption cases under the FCPA; its enforcement actions suggest the preference for civil penalties as punishment for violations of the Act.[25] The complex nature of extra territorial effects of anti-corruption measures and the weaknesses of arguments against such efforts have also been noted.[26] Indeed, financial institutions, and most notably, sovereign wealth funds, have begun to more vigorously defend against corruption by building anti-corruption measures and requirements into their investment strategies as well as in their shareholding policies.[27]

Related to these emerging trends is another—the increasing emphasis on monitoring and compliance programs imposed formally and informally on and by enterprises.[28] Governments incentivize this obligation by their willingness to enforce cooperation agreements with enterprises facing corruption probes in order to avoid criminal sanction.[29] These have been advanced in the United States[30] and in the United Kingdom.[31] What makes this interesting is the way that governments, having created a strong tradition of respecting the autonomy of corporations even when they are subsidiaries, now seek to treat production chains as a single enterprise for purposes of corruption probes. Most interesting among these efforts is the so-called Pilot Program launched by the U.S. Department of Justice in April 2016,[32] which was designed to encourage company self-reporting and cooperation to avoid exercises of prosecutorial discretion to seek criminal penalties against companies or their employees.[33] Additional due diligence efforts may be required under provisions of the U.K.’s Criminal Finances Act of 2017.[34] Under this Act, an enterprise may well incur criminal and civil liability for acts attributable to it occurring within its supply chain if connected with torture involving public officials.[35] In Brazil, the Clean Companies Act[36] includes a leniency provision permitting state prosecutors to enter a “deferred prosecution deal for companies willing to plead guilty and settle corruption charges.”[37] The effect is that the legal relationships among corporate enterprises or between corporations and their clients (with whom there may be no ownership relationship) are now treated as irrelevant for purposes of criminal investigation.[38]

These trends tend to challenge the traditional legal and societal principles for the organization of business and its responsibilities. They also point to a new and heightened importance of corruption for both states and financial institutions. The trends suggest some of the ways in which legal systems and the practices of large institutions in global markets have been contributing to changes in the frameworks within which corruption is detected, controlled, and punished. This essay first examines two less well known elements of the “two thrusts” approach to corruption that focus on corporate compliance programs. The first is the use of sovereign investing as a tool for the correction of corruption and the supervision of institutional reform to avoid future corruption. The second is the use of prosecutorial discretion to allow legal regimes to manage corporate compliance programs. In the former case, state officials use private power to aid corporate self-regulation; in the latter case, state officials use public authority to devolve supervision to corporate surveillance mechanisms. [39] In the next section, the essay considers the way in which sovereign wealth funds are emerging as potentially useful instruments of corruption management. The section that follows briefly considers the utility of government policies that favor settlement and cooperation agreements to manage company efforts at corruption self-regulation in the context of sovereign lending practices that aid in anti-corruption efforts. The effect, though little publicized, can be quite potent—a “Two Swords One Thrust” can serve as another effective strategy in governmental and private efforts to combat corruption. The “Two Swords One Thrust” Strategy combines the power of state officials to exercise discretion in managing anti-corruption laws and the authority of financial institutions to control the access of enterprises to their investment universe or to exercise their shareholder authority to influence corporate behavior. This essay suggests briefly the utility of this strategy for Chinese anti-corruption efforts. Within China, it may be possible to coordinate compliance efforts by the procuratorate with that of the Chinese sovereign wealth funds through the medium of social credit systems currently being developed.


NOTES:

[1]. See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares about Corruption, 37 J. Int’l Bus. Stud. 807, 807-822 (2006) (arguing that anti-bribery laws abroad may act as a deterrent against engaging in corruption in foreign countries, but that corruption results in relatively higher FDI from countries with high levels of corruption). [1].


[2]. See Jennifer Rankin, Azerbaijan Revelations Spark ‘Great Concern’ at Council of Europe: News of Country’s $2.9bn Lobbying and Money-Laundering Scheme Could Herald Shake-Up at Rights Body, The Guardian (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/05/azerbaijan-revelations-could-herald-shake-up-at-council-of-europe?CMP=share_btn_fb (“The details of the payments came as an independent panel began confidential hearings into alleged corruption at [the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe] Pace in Strasbourg, one of the world’s oldest human rights bodies.”).


[3]. See French Prosecutor Pins Corruption in IAAF on Son of Ex-President, France 24 (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.france24.com/en/20170905-france-french-prosecutor-pins-corruption-iaaf-son-ex-president?ref=fb.


[4]. See Brazil Police Launch Raid to Probe Vote-Buying for 2016 Olympics, France 24 (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.france24.com/en/20170905-brazil-police-launch-raid-probe-vote-buying-2016-olympics?ref=fb.


[5]. Norway Fund Blacklists China’s ‘Corrupt’ ZTE, Loc. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.thelocal.no/20160107/norway-fund-blacklists-chinas-zte-over-corruption/ (“The world’s biggest sovereign wealth fund, Norway’s public pension fund, has divested from Chinese telecom equipment maker ZTE because of corruption fears, the Norwegian central bank which manages the fund said on Thursday.”); see also Decision on Exclusion of Company from the Government’s Pension Fund Global, Norges Bank (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.nbim.no/en/transparency/news-list/2016/decision-on-exclusion-of-company-from-the-government-pension-fund-global/.


[6]. See Patrick Winn, Vietnam Is Sentencing Corrupt Bankers to Death, by Firing Squad, PRI (Apr. 3, 2014), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-03/vietnam-sentencing-corrupt-bankers-death-firing-squad (“In March, a 57-year-old former regional boss from Vietnam Development Bank, another government-run bank, was sentenced to death over a $93-million swindling job”).


[7]. Id.


[8]. Juan Manuel Bedoya-Palacio, Colombia Enters the Age of Enforcement, The FCPA Blog (Aug. 31, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/8/31/juan-manuel-bedoya-palacio-colombia-enters-the-era-of-enforc.html.


[9]. Id.


[10]. See Ding Ning: China’s Biggest Ponzi Scheme Mastermind Sentenced to Life in Prison, The Independent (Sept. 12, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/china-ponzi-scheme-ding-ning-yucheng-group-prison-sentence-ezubo-beijing-a7941811.html.


[11]. Stella Qiu & Vincent Lee, China’s Top Prosecutor to Intensify Crackdown on Financial Crimes, Reuters (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-finance-crime/chinas-top-prosecutor-to-intensify-crackdown-on-financial-crimes-idUSL4N1L841V (“This year, high profile regulators who have been caught up in President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive include the former head of the insurance regulator, former vice chairman of the securities regulator and former assistant chairman of banking regulator.”).


[12]. The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) (“The ten principles are derived from: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption”).


[13]. Id.


[14]. Anti-Corruption, U.N. Global Compact, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work/governance/anti-corruption (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).


[15]. Id.


[16]. See, e.g., Dimitri Vlassis, The U.N. Convention Against Corruption Origins And Negotiation Process in 66 Resource Material Series 126 (2005).


[17]. See, e.g., id.


[18]. Criminal Finances Act 2017, c. 22 (U.K.). The Act made provisions in connection with terrorist property and created corporate offenses for cases where a person associated with a corporate body or partnership facilitates a tax evasion offense.


[19]. See, e.g., United Nations Convention against Corruption, Dec. 9, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, Sept. 29, 2003, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5; Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, Eur. T.S. No. 174 (open to non-member states); Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, Eur. T.S. No. 173 (open to non-member states; Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, May 15, 2003, Eur. T.S. No. 191 provides that adhering states embed in their national criminal law the criminalization of active and passive bribery in both the public and private sectors, including bribery of members of foreign and domestic parliamentary assemblies and of officials of international organizations); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (open to all OECD countries and some non-member countries); OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43 (open to all OECD countries and some non-member countries).


[20]. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 51/191, Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions, (Dec. 16, 1996). For a review of how this declaration fits into the broader context of the fight against corruption, see Vlassis, supra note 16.


[21]. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006); see also D. Michael Crites, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act at Thirty-Five: A Practitioner’s Guide, 73 Ohio St. L.J. 1049 (2012).


[22]. See Hui Xu & Sean Wu, Bribery and Corruption: China, Global Legal Insights (2018), https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/bribery-and-corruption/global-legal-insights—-bribery-and-corruption/china; see also Ron Cheng, Why US Companies Should be Paying Attention to China’s New Anti-Corruption Laws, Forbes (July 27, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/roncheng/2016/07/27/why-us-companies-should-be-paying-attention-to-chinas-new-anti-corruption-laws/#6905e4a41db1.


[23]. The International Bar Association has created a database with the relevant anti-bribery laws from fifty-six states, as well as international conventions. See National Anti-Bribery Legislation, Int’l B. Assoc. (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Criminal_Law_Section/AntiCorruption_Committee/Resources.aspx (“texts of international anti-bribery conventions as well as the anti-bribery legislation of a number of countries [are] accurate as of 1 December 2014”).


[24]. Richard L. Cassin, Fund Dumps Petrofac Shares on SFO Probe Concerns, The FCPA Blog (Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/8/fund-dumps-petrofac-shares-on-sfo-probe-concerns.html. Petrofac designs, builds, operates, and maintains oil and gas facilities worldwide. Our Story, Petrofac.com, https://www.petrofac.com/en-gb/about-us/our-story/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). Unaoil provides “industrial solutions to the energy sector in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. These include green and brownfield Engineering and Construction, Workforce Solutions, Operations and Maintenance, and the provision of niche equipment and products, such as production chemicals.” Chairman’s Message, Unaoil.com, http://www.unaoil.com/about/chairman-s-message/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). On July 19, 2016, the U.K. Serious Frauds Office (SFO) issued a Press Release in which they announced that the SFO is “conducting a criminal investigation into the activities of Unaoil, its officers, its employees and its agents in connection with suspected offences of bribery, corruption and money laundering.” Unaoil Investigation, SFO.com (July 19, 2016), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/19/unaoil-investigation/. See generally, Unaoil, SFO.com (July 18, 2018), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/unaoil/.


[25]. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, SEC.gov, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last updated Oct. 2, 2018) (listing companies and amounts of civil penalties from 2018 back to 1978).

U.S.


[26]. See Larry Catá Backer, Soft Extra Territorialism and Anti-Corruption Campaigns: On the Perverse Folly of Corrupt States, Law at the End of the Day (Sept. 15, 2006), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/09/soft-extra-territorialism-and-anti.html.


[27]. See Bestemmelser om forvaltningen av States pensjonsfond, 21. Dec. 2005, nr. 123.


[28]. See Alun Milford on Deferred Prosecution Agreements, SFO.gov (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/09/05/alun-milford-on-deferred-prosecution-agreements/.


[29]. On U.S., Canadian, and U.K. government’s view of what constitutes an effective compliance program, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual, § 9-47.120 (2018) [hereinafter Justice Manual]; Corporate Compliance Programs, Canada.ca, http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03927.html; Ministry of Justice, The Bribery Act 2010: Guidance (2010).


[30]. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (2017), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download. See generally, Justice Manual, supra note 29, § 9-28.000.


[31]. See, e.g., U.K. Bribery Act 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.).


[32]. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

Enforcement Plan and Guidance (2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download.


[33]. See id. The Press Release explained that the Pilot Program was in part “designed to motivate companies to voluntarily self-disclose FCPA-related misconduct, fully cooperate with the Fraud Section, and, where appropriate, remediate flaws in their controls and compliance programs” U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Criminal Division Launches New FCPA Pilot Program, Justice.gov (April 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/criminal-division-launches-new-fcpa-pilot-program.


[34]. See Criminal Finances Act 2017 (U.K.); see also Richard J. Rogers & Sasho Todorov, Compliance Alert: Due Diligence Under the U.K.’s Critical Finances Act of 2017, The FCPA Blog (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/7/compliance-alert-due-diligence-under-the-uks-criminal-financ.html.


[35]. Rogers & Todorov, supra note 34 (“if a company is unfortunate enough to identify a Gross Human Rights Abuse with which it is connected, it may wish to consider proactively investigating the allegations. This will help the company beat civil society to the punch, and will demonstrate a good faith effort to mitigate any potential violations.”).

[36]. Lei No. 12,846/13, de 13 Agosto 2013, Diário Oficial Da União [D.O.U.] de 13.8.2013 (Braz.).


[37]. Felipe Rocha dos Santos, New Guidance for Brazil Anti-Corruption Settlements, The FCPA Blog (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/7/felipe-rocha-dos-santos-new-guidance-for-brazil-anti-corrupt.html. The settlements have proven controversial, and have sometimes been blocked by the Brazilian Federal Prosecutor’s Office for excessive leniency. Id.


[38]. See Lei No. 12,846/13.


[39]. See Justice Manual, supra note 29, § 9-28.000; Bestemmelser om forvaltningen av States pensjonsfond, nr. 123.







On the Human Rights of States--Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights

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The development of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights by John Ruggie and his team now serves as one of the most influential. templates for developing normative and framework structures for embedding human rights--and for privileging the interests of human rights holders--in many aspects of human activity within and among states. Among the most important recent parallel efforts to develop Guiding Principles was that undertaken by John Knox-- Framework Principles of Human Rights and the Environment.

One of the areas that has generated substantial interest in the business sand finance sectors has been the role and the responsibilities of financial institutions for monitoring the human rights breaches of those companies in which they invest to to which they provide financing.  That focus has now extended from the private to the public sector.   
In his report the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, presents guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of economic reforms, which set out the human rights principles and standards that apply to States, international financial institutions and creditors when designing, formulating or proposing economic reforms. (Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights 19 Dec. 2018)
The Report may be accessed HERE in multiple languages:

HRC 40th 19/12/2018A/HRC/40/57 Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of economic reforms - Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights E F S A C R

The Report is remarkable for its expansion of the fundamental ordering characteristics of human rights--from a class of rights inherent in the very character of the individual, to the ordering basis for all economic, political (and eventually religious, cultural and social relations). The Report is well worth reading for its content that focuses on the Obligations of States with respect to economic policies and human rights ("Obligations under human rights law should guide all efforts to design and implement economic policies. The economy should serve the people, not vice versa." Preamble ¶ 2).  But perhaps more important are its implications for the construction of a comprehensive human rights based approach to the assertion of public as well as private power in every sphere of human activity--and that those human rights are, in origin necessarily a product of consensus among the community of nations. One moves here along a trajectory that has, since the 1940s seen the shift in the focus of the language of governance first from politics to economics (producing the structures of globalization) and then from the language of economics to that of human rights. Human rights in this sense ceases to be normative and specific and instead becomes the very language through which one mus speak economics, politics, society, religion and culture.

The Guiding Principles on human rights impact assessments of economic reforms follow.


Preamble........................................................................................................................................ 3
  1. Scope and purpose......................................................................................................................... 4 Principle 1 Scope and purpose of the guiding principles ........................................................... 4
  2. Obligations of States ..................................................................................................................... 5 Principle 2 − Obligations of States with respect to economic policies and human rights ............. 5 Principle 3 Burden of proof and obligation to conduct human rights impact assessments ........ 5 Principle 4 Obligations of local and subnational governments .................................................. 6
  3. Applicable human rights standards ............................................................................................... 6 Principle 5 Human rights standards and pertinent law ............................................................... 6 Principle 6 − Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights............................................ 7 Principle 7 Equality and combating multiple and intersectional discrimination ........................ 7 Principle 8 Non-discrimination based on gender and substantive gender equality .................... 8 Principle 9 Progressive realization and maximum available resources...................................... 9 Principle 10 Prohibition of retrogression ................................................................................... 10
  4. Articulation of policies .................................................................................................................. 11 Principle 11 Policy coherence .................................................................................................... 11 Principle 12 Debt sustainability, debt relief and restructuring ................................................... 13
  5. Other obligations of States, international financial institutions and private actors ....................... 14 Principle 13 International assistance and cooperation ............................................................... 14 Principle 14 External influence and policy space ...................................................................... 14 Principle 15 − Obligations of public creditors and donors............................................................ 15 Principle 16 − Obligations of private creditors ............................................................................. 16
  6. Human rights impact assessments ................................................................................................. 17 Principle 17 Basis and purposes of a human rights impact assessment ..................................... 17 Principle 18 − Ex ante and ex post assessments............................................................................ 18 Principle 19 Participation ........................................................................................................... 19 Principle 20 Access to information and transparency ................................................................ 20 Principle 21 Access to justice, accountability and remedies...................................................... 21 Principle 22 Who should conduct the assessment(s).................................................................. 22
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Preamble
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1. In its resolutions 34/03 and 37/11, the Human Rights Council requested the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, to develop guiding principles for assessing the human rights impact of economic reform policies, in consultation with States and all other relevant stakeholders, for submission to the Council at its fortieth session. The present guiding principles distil over two years of research and collective and participatory work with a dedicated focus on the human rights impacts of economic reforms on the human rights of millions of people around the globe and lessons learned over decades.1
2. Obligations under human rights law should guide all efforts to design and implement economic policies. The economy should serve the people, not vice versa.
3. While economic reform policies that could negatively affect human rights are more commonly found in the context of economic and financial crisis responses, these reforms have also been observed in less challenging economic times. This is why it is crucial to know to what extent human rights are effectively protected and respected both in times of economic crisis and in other circumstances.
4. Not all economic reform policy responding to economic crises is intrinsically against human rights, and economic reforms that are carefully formulated based on human rights can contribute to the betterment of human rights. In fact, responding to economic crises often requires actions by the Government that are dictated by the urgency to protect resources and assets that will, in the long term, serve to protect and fulfil human rights. Above all, Governments must ensure that measures put in place serve to pursue economic recovery for the benefit of the whole population, instead of only a few.
5. The realization of human rights is often affected by resource scarcity; hence, economic reform policies that affect availability of resources can negatively and deeply affect all human rights. As human rights are indivisible and interdependent, international human rights law needs to provide a consistent and comprehensive response to those economic reform policies.
6. Contractual obligations do not occur in a vacuum. Both the relationships between creditor and borrowing States and the relationship between States and their populations fall under the framework defined by international human rights law.2 A human rights impact assessment is a structured process for identifying, understanding, assessing and addressing the potential or actual adverse effects of economic reform policies and serves to ensure that such policies are consistent with international human rights law. As they entail broad participation, transparency and accountability, human rights impact assessments also help democratize resource mobilization and spending policies.
7. More specifically, a human rights impact assessment, on the one hand, can support Governments, international financial institutions and private creditors by providing a clear and specific framework and process for assessing whether certain economic reform policies are consistent with international human rights law. On the other hand, it is an essential review and accountability procedure for the design, monitoring and implementation of economic reform policies. It contributes to evidence-based and transparent policymaking as it provides an analytical basis for evaluating potential human rights impacts when choosing among policy options. Using human rights impact assessments helps identify the institutional changes required to prevent adverse human rights impacts of economic reforms in the short/long term. This is why States should strengthen their capacity to conduct such assessments.
For more information and details of all these meetings and activities, see www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/IEDebt/Pages/DebtAndimpactassessments.aspx. The Independent Expert wishes to express his appreciation for all contributions to this process. See A/70/275.
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8. The present guiding principles aim to identify and systematize existing human rights obligations, and also provide commentary on their implications. They thus offer guidance to States and other stakeholders to ensure respect and fulfilment of those obligations. The guiding principles are based on all core international human rights instruments, in particular, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and their authoritative interpretation by the treaty body monitoring mechanisms, as well as, where relevant, the contribution of special procedure mandate holders. They complement and build upon relevant development-related commitments, in particular the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Declaration on the Right to Development. Nothing in the principles should be read as limiting or undermining the existing human rights obligations of States or other actors.
9. The guiding principles also build upon relevant commitments, in particular those referring to business and human rights,3 foreign debt and human rights,4 human rights impact assessments of trade and investment agreements5 and extreme poverty and human rights.6 All these principles should be considered and applied in coordination and conjunction with one another.
Scope and purpose
Principle 1 Scope and purpose of the guiding principles
The present principles provide guidance for economic policymaking, in compliance with international human rights obligations to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights. They apply whenever economic reform policies may foreseeably result in impairment of human rights. These principles are likely to be most relevant in the context of acute economic and financial crises (reactive function) but will also be relevant in less challenging economic times in the course of the design and implementation of short-, medium- and long-term economic reform policies considered or/and implemented (preventive function).
Commentary
1.1 Some economic policies, such as fiscal consolidation, structural adjustment/reforms, privatization,7 deregulation of financial and labour markets and lowering environmental protection standards, can have adverse consequences on the enjoyment of human rights.
1.2 The guiding principles should be applied to different economic situations in which economic reform policies are considered and/or adopted. Such situations notably include: (a) acute economic and financial crises (involving sudden or gradual economic downturn and collapse of the values of public or private financial assets), where the risk of adverse human rights impacts is heightened and in which an urgent response is required; (b) medium-term economic reforms, where fiscal consolidation may stretch into multi-year processes that go beyond the immediate responses to and implications of economic and financial crises; and (c) longer-term processes, such as the systematic review of public budgets and their distributional assessments, cumulative and long-term effects of fiscal consolidation measures on human rights, or the effects of labour market reforms.
A/HRC/17/31. A/HRC/20/23 and Corr.1. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5. A/HRC/21/39.
See A/73/396.
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II.
Obligations of States
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Principle 2 Obligations of States with respect to economic policies and human rights
States are obliged to manage their fiscal affairs and to adopt economic policies to ensure that they respect, protect and fulfil all human rights. Economic choices made by States, whether acting alone or as members of international financial institutions, must comply with their international human rights obligations at all times, including during times of economic crisis.
Commentary
2.1 States are responsible for carefully examining different policy options at any and all times and for determining the most appropriate measures in the light of their circumstances and their international and domestic human rights obligations.
2.2 Taking timely, effective and preventive measures is a critical part of ensuring all human rights during economic and financial crises.
2.3 In times of economic and financial crisis, Statesefforts are often directed at trying to stabilize the economy. This comes with the risk of disregarding their human rights obligations with regard to those who suffer most from the economic crisis. Governmental efforts at stabilization can also exacerbate human rights violations. This approach is counterproductive because it is precisely during these periods that the population in particular those who are disenfranchised, living in poverty or at high risk of falling into poverty is in greatest need of State compliance with its obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights.8
2.4 These obligations apply to all branches of the State (executive, judicial and legislative) and all levels of government (national, subnational and local) within their allocated sphere of responsibilities.
2.5 Commitments to fiscal discipline policies, whether stated in domestic constitutions or in regional or international agreements, must not lead to sacrificing international human rights obligations. States should undertake full assessments of the potential impacts of fiscal discipline policies in different national and subnational contexts before committing to such policies.
Principle 3 Burden of proof and obligation to conduct human rights impact assessments
States and other creditors, including international financial institutions, should demonstrate that their proposed economic reform measures will realize, and not undermine, Stateshuman rights obligations. This implies a duty to carry out human rights impact assessments to evaluate and address any foreseeable effects of their economic policies on human rights. Consulting on, and making public in adequate formats the results of, human rights impact assessments are important components of complying with this obligation.
Commentary
3.1 States and other creditors, including international financial institutions such as development banks, must carry out a human rights impact assessment before recommending or implementing economic reform policies that could foreseeably undermine the enjoyment of human rights. States have to establish, through the steps
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 2 (1990) on international technical assistance measures, para. 9.
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outlined in the guiding principles regarding timely collection, sharing and discussion of relevant information, that their chosen response will not lead to human rights violations or abuses, or impermissible retrogression in human rights.
3.2 While human rights impact assessments should take account of the evidence and experience of civil society and experts, it is ultimately the States responsibility to prove that its policies do not violate human rights. This requirement of proof means that States should approach the process of generating, publishing and subsequently updating impact assessments with openness to the available evidence and expertise.
Principle 4 Obligations of local and subnational governments
Economic and financial crises should not be used to justify a reduction of the policy and fiscal space necessary at local and subnational government levels to ensure the protection of human rights. In turn, although all levels of government have human rights obligations, the central Government can in no circumstances circumvent its responsibilities for the human rights impacts of its policies by delegating economic reform-related powers or functions to local governments.
Commentary
4.1 Effective implementation of human rights cannot be achieved without the proactive involvement of local and subnational governments. International human rights law is binding on all levels of government, and is of particular relevance when taking into account the growing global phenomenon of decentralization in recent decades. Economic reforms at the central level should also take into account responsibilities assigned or delegated to local and subnational governments within the domestic spheres.
4.2 Decentralization is not always favourable to the implementation of human rights law, and it can be especially burdensome if it is not combined with sufficient resources or policy space (both internal and by facilitating community participation) for the implementation of human rights. Recognition of multilevel governance in areas such as revenue collection, tax policy, labour reforms and solidarity across regions is crucial. The national Government remains responsible for ensuring that appropriate cross-government coordination mechanisms and processes exist and that subnational governments are given the necessary resources to fulfil their human rights obligations.
4.3 When carrying out economic reforms independently, local and subnational governments have the same obligations as States with regard to carrying out human rights impact assessments.
III. Applicable human rights standards
Principle 5 Human rights standards and pertinent law
In taking economic action or choosing the path of inaction, States and creditors must be guided by existing international human rights law relating to civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights.
Commentary
5.1 This includes core international human rights treaties, as well as their authoritative interpretation in general comments, statements, open letters, decisions, concluding observations and recommendations issued by treaty monitoring bodies. It also includes other interpretative tools, guiding principles and recommendations developed by global and regional human rights mechanisms.
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5.2 In keeping with the principle pro homine, the most protective human rights standards (whether domestic or international) should guide States and creditors in their economic reform policies.
Principle 6 Indivisibility and interdependence of all human rights
Economic reform policies can negatively affect all human rights (civil, cultural, economic, political and social). Therefore, States, and creditors when applicable, should ensure that all measures are taken to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights, especially in times of economic downturn.
Commentary
6.1 While concerns about the human rights impact of economic policy measures are often focused on economic, social and cultural rights, it is crucial that States also ensure that economic policies do not have a negative impact on civil and political rights. For instance, budget cuts to public services, such as law enforcement, legal aid, education, health services or social care, may result in a failure to guarantee the civil rights to a fair trial, family life, non-discrimination, freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or even the right to life. The right of political participation may also be undermined where economic reform policies are adopted without the meaningful participation of the affected population. In practice, the multidimensional nature of economic reform policies can jeopardize a wide range of human rights. Even where a policy appears primarily to have a particular impact on one right, it may set off a chain reaction in terms of others, owing to the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights.
6.2 States may not claim a lack of resources as an excuse for failing to guarantee human rights. For example, in the case of persons deprived of liberty, States parties have the obligation to respect the bodily integrity of such persons, and they may not invoke a lack of financial resources to absolve themselves of this obligation.9
6.3 It is of crucial importance to underline that certain economic measures for example, restrictive loan conditionalities or constraints imposed by trade agreements privileging corporate interests are clearly and directly linked to Statesabilities to address phenomena that are manifest violations of multiple human rights, such as pollution, prevalence of life-threatening diseases, widespread hunger and malnutrition, extreme poverty and homelessness, among others.
Principle 7 Equality and combating multiple and intersectional discrimination
Economic reform policies and measures must not be discriminatory, and they must endeavour to ensure equality and non-discrimination for all. For this purpose, the directly and indirectly discriminatory impact of economic reform policies on the most disenfranchised or marginalized individuals has to be assessed, and alternative measures evaluated.
As part of the requirement to prevent economic reforms from having discriminatory impacts, human rights impact assessments should seek to identify and address the potential and cumulative impacts of measures on specific individuals and groups and protect them from such impacts. In doing so, it should be borne in mind that women are particularly exposed to multiple and intersectional discrimination. Direct, indirect, multiple and intersectional discrimination particularly for disenfranchised or marginalized groups within society needs to be carefully assessed and prevented.
9 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, para. 25.
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Commentary
7.1 It is most often the combination and accumulation of individual economic decisions, such as the combination of fiscal consolidation, reforms of the labour market, taxation and public expenditure, that cause the most damage if the impacts of the decisions fall on the same population groups, simultaneously or over time. A human rights impact assessment can help identify how people confronting cumulative and/or intersecting inequalities may be affected and how to protect them from the discriminatory impact.
7.2 Identifying the particular individuals and groups that are most marginalized and discriminated against in a particular country and in specific circumstances requires a profound and sophisticated understanding of the various population groups and of the context in which a particular measure is to be taken. Groups that are frequently discriminated against include women; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex persons; persons with disabilities; children; older persons; indigenous peoples; migrants; refugees; internally displaced persons; people living in poverty; the unemployed and those with precarious jobs; single parents; and ethnic, national, linguistic, religious or other minorities.
7.3 The meaningful participation of all relevant stakeholders and affected individuals and groups, including those groups at risk of vulnerability and exclusion in economic reform policy formulation, implementation and review, should be ensured across all stages of the assessments, including impact assessments. Where needed, appropriate adjustments should be made to facilitate the participation of such groups. Importantly, the participation of relevant stakeholders should also be ensured during the monitoring and evaluation phases to determine whether findings have sufficiently informed implementation or revision of policy measures.
Principle 8 Non-discrimination based on gender and substantive gender equality
Economic reforms should prevent any kind of direct and indirect form of discrimination based on gender, in law or practice, and should promote substantive and transformative gender equality. Human rights impact assessments should always include a comprehensive gender analysis.
Commentary
8.1 The current dominant economic system is, for the most part, based on and perpetuates gender inequality and discrimination in the labour market, worsening the potential adverse human rights impacts on women. In particular, unpaid care work (i.e. care for children, older people and others) is overwhelmingly undertaken by women and often invisible in current economic analysis. Further, women are generally overrepresented in public sector positions and in precarious, informal and low-paid jobs.
8.2 Therefore, economic reforms which encourage, among other things, labour market flexibilization, reductions in the coverage of social protection benefits and services, cuts to public sector jobs and the privatization of services tend to have a negative impact on womens enjoyment of human rights.10 Economic reform should aim to prevent gender discrimination and transform existing inequalities, instead of creating such situations.
8.3 Policies that might improve overall social indicators might not do so for women, or for particular groups of women. Human rights impact assessments, incorporating a clear gender focus and womens central participation in the assessment process, can support the realization of womens human rights in practice
8
10 See A/73/179.
through contextualized analysis aimed at identifying and preventing direct and indirect discrimination; addressing structural socioeconomic and sociocultural barriers; redressing current and historical disadvantage; countering stigma, prejudice, stereotyping and violence; transforming social and institutional structures; and facilitating womens political participation and social inclusion.
8.4 During times of economic crisis, public investment in childcare and elder care can create virtuous cycles by which the investment not only addresses the care deficit through the delivery of crucial care services, but also kick-starts a multiplier effect in generating jobs and/or other effects.
Principle 9 Progressive realization and maximum available resources
In relation to economic, social and cultural rights in particular, States are obliged to progressively realize such rights by all appropriate means, which requires States to:
(a) Design and implement fiscal, tax, debt, trade, aid, monetary and environmental policies in conjunction with other measures, so that they are deliberately directed towards the realization of human rights;
(b) Demonstrate that every effort has been made to mobilize all available resources, even in times of economic crisis. In particular, States must generate, adequately allocate and make use of the maximum of their available resources to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the achievement of the full realization of economic, social and cultural rights.11
Commentary
9.1 In assessing potential economic policies in the light of these obligations, States should consider the following guiding factors: the extent to which the measures are deliberate, concrete and targeted towards the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights; whether the State party is exercising its discretion in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner; whether the State partys decision (not) to allocate available resources is in accordance with international human rights standards; where several policy options are available, whether the State party adopts the option that least restricts the enjoyment of rights; the time frame of the States steps; whether the measures take into account the precarious situation of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups; and whether the measures prioritize grave situations or situations of risk.12
9.2 States must not only use existing resources to fulfil this obligation but also generate potential resources in a sustainable way when the former are not sufficient to ensure the realization of rights. This requires, for example, seeking international assistance and cooperation, mobilizing domestic resources in ways compatible with environmental sustainability and with the rights of people affected by extractive industries, as well as regulating the financial sector.
9.3 Statesobligation to mobilize resources includes: tackling tax evasion and avoidance; ensuring a progressive tax system, including by widening the tax base with regard to multinational corporations and the richest; avoiding international tax competition; improving the efficiency of tax collection; and reprioritizing expenditures to ensure, among other things, adequate funding of public services.
  1. 11  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 3 (1990) on the nature of States parties’ obligations, paras. 9−12; and general comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities, para. 23.
  2. 12  E/C.12/2007/1, para. 8.
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9.4 Available resources must also be measured in the light of international cooperation requested by States in cases where States cannot guarantee the enjoyment of human rights with their own resources, with such requests for international cooperation to be made as soon as possible.
9.5 Mobilizing resources to ensure the progressive realization of rights is also critical to address the minimum core content of economic, social and cultural rights as a minimum floor for protection. States cannot attribute their failure to meet their minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources, unless they demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposal.13 Ensuring achievement of the minimum core content can serve to address the most egregious situations, such as extreme poverty, homelessness or acute malnutrition. However, minimum core content should not be construed to mean a ceiling in the efforts that are required of States.
Principle 10 Prohibition of retrogression
Any proposed economic reform that may result in impermissible retrogression in terms of the realization of economic, social and cultural rights is considered a prima facie violation of such rights. Measures that would result in backward steps in terms of the achievement of these rights is permissible only if States can prove that such retrogressive measures are:14
(a) Temporary, in nature and effect, and limited to the duration of the crisis;
(b) Legitimate, with the ultimate aim of protecting the totality of human rights;
(c) Reasonable, in that the means chosen are the most suitable and capable of achieving the legitimate aim;
(d) Necessary, in that the adoption of any other policy alternatives or the failure to act would be more detrimental to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, especially if there are less harmful alternative financing mechanisms;
(e) Proportionate, in that the measures chosen do not unduly restrict human rights and their costs do not outweigh their benefits;
(f) Non-discriminatory, and have the ability to prevent or mitigate the inequalities that can emerge in times of crisis and they ensure that the rights of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and groups are not disproportionately affected;
(g) Protective of the minimum core content of economic, social and cultural rights at all times;
(h) Based on transparency and the genuine participation of affected groups in examining the proposed measures and alternatives;
(i) Subject to meaningful review and accountability procedures, including human rights impact assessments.
  1. 13  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 3, para. 10.
  2. 14  See, for reference, “Public debt, austerity measures and the International Covenant on Economic,
    Social and Cultural Rights: statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (E/C.12/2016/1); Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 19 (2007) on the right to social security, para. 42; and “Letter dated 16 May 2012 addressed by the Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to States parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”.
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Articulation of policies
financial flows;
Financial sector regulation is required to identify, prevent, manage and
fairly allocate the human rights risks created by financial instability and illicit
Debt policies should be consistent with broad goals related to sustainable
economic development and the realization of human rights;
15 16
Principle 11 Policy coherence
States should ensure that governmental departments, agencies and other State- based institutions that take part in and/or shape economic reform policies take into account Stateshuman rights obligations when fulfilling their respective mandates, and that policy coherence is guaranteed for short-, medium- and long-term economic reforms, in order to protect all human rights. In particular:
(a) Adequate financial resources should be allocated for the effective implementation of social policy, fully taking into account the economic situation of the population. Social policy should be designed to address and reverse the effects of economic downturns, while ensuring respect for human rights;
(b) Fiscal policy should be used as a countercyclical tool to prevent and/or manage crises, as well as to equalize opportunities and maximize the realization of human rights;
(c) Monetary policies should be coordinated and consistent with other policies with the aim of respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights;
(d) (e)
(f) Proposed economic reform measures should be informed by and align with individual and collective State measures to facilitate national and global environmental protection, recognizing the interdependence between human rights and a healthy environment.15
Commentary
11.1 Social policy includes a wide range of policies, from social security (retirement/pensions and insurance, including unemployment) to labour,16 education and health. Other areas are often affected either directly or indirectly by privatization of services traditionally provided for by the State, such as water and sanitation services, social housing, prisons and detention centres, and migration management. Some social policies are directed to specific population groups, such as persons with disabilities, refugees and asylum seekers or persons living in poverty. All have a clear gender component that has to be included to avoid increasing the gender divide in access to resources (education, health services, housing, labour market, etc.).
11.2 Fiscal policy can play a major role in achieving equality, tackling discrimination and strengthening governance and accountability, as well as combating poverty and funding development. Fiscal policy also has a clear and well- documented effect on economic growth: while pro-cyclical contractionary fiscal policy reduces economic growth, expansionary fiscal policy during downturns increases growth. Positive and negative changes in government expenditure are likely to have a higher than proportional impact on growth. In turn, changes in economic growth will affect the tax revenue of Governments. Domestic resource mobilization can be a tool to ensure the realization of human rights and promote inclusive growth. Increasing government revenue more directly depends on robust redistributive and progressive taxation regimes. The respective impact of revenue
A/HRC/37/59, paras. 11 ff. See A/HRC/34/57.
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and expenditure variations should be evaluated in terms of the associated outcomes for economic growth, human rights and long-term debt sustainability.
11.3 Decisions on fiscal policy should not result in expenditure cuts that curtail the guarantee of rights, mainly in sectors such as education, health and social insurance particularly important for women, children and persons with disabilities or in deepening social or economic inequality and poverty through indirect and regressive taxes, such as value added tax.
11.4 Direct and progressive taxes should be prioritized. Tax policy should promote the redistribution of wealth to overcome the disadvantaged situation of the population in situations of social vulnerability (the poor, minorities and women, among others) and other priority care groups, notably older adults, children and persons with disabilities.
11.5 Tax reform measures include, for example, taxing higher-income categories and wealth more strongly; taxing certain financial transactions; shoring up the tax base; and enhancing tax collection, the efficiency of the tax administration and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance. International, binational or regional regulation is crucial for efficiency in combating evasion, avoidance, tax fraud and illicit financial flows. All States should support global norms and agreements to prevent international tax avoidance and evasion. In this regard, it is necessary that Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information agreements be effective in order to acknowledge the final beneficiary of a transaction and establish responsibilities in cases of loss of useful resources needed to guarantee rights. Full participation and access to such information to all countries should be ensured.17
11.6 Decision-making processes around tax and fiscal policies need to be open to genuine public debate informed by processes of inclusive, broad, transparent and deliberative social dialogue, which should include a wide range of economic theory and evidence, expressed in language accessible to the public. These provisions also apply to tax exemptions (including tax exclusions, deductions, credits, concessions, preferential rates or deferral of tax liabilities), which reduce the public revenues that can be accrued from taxes.
11.7 Central banks are State institutions and, as such, they are obliged to comply with international human rights law and standards. Inflation and employment targets, among other targets, need to be in line with the States human rights obligations in order to avoid any impermissible retrogressive measures.
11.8 Authorities that coordinate massive responses that stabilize the financial sector as well as those which opt for doing little to address a sovereign debt crisis need to demonstrate if and to what extent their strategies would help protect and respect human rights.
11.9 Accumulation of foreign reserves and restrictions on short-term capital inflows and outflows can often be considered effective monetary policies. However, massive accumulation of foreign reserves beyond those recommended in the rules of international financial institutions, leading to large unutilized amounts of reserves accumulated in central banks, should be balanced against the immediate needs of the State, especially from a social investment and human rights perspective. On the other hand, limiting speculative financial movements may open up space to pursue policies to facilitate the realization of human rights.
11.10 States should have a transparent and democratically discussed bailout and interest rate formation regime established by law. States should use a mix of tools to ensure appropriate global and domestic financial market regulation with the aim of curbing excessive credit growth. This mix should include measures of prudential regulation, debt sustainability analysis and capital controls.18
  1. 17  See A/HRC/31/61.
  2. 18  See A/HRC/31/60.
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11.11 States should consider how proposed economic reforms may impact directly on or otherwise reduce a States ability to address national ecological conditions and significant global ecological thresholds which affect the realization of human rights.
Principle 12 Debt sustainability, debt relief and restructuring
Independent debt sustainability analysis should incorporate human rights impact assessments. Findings of human rights impact assessments should be used to inform debt strategies, debt relief programmes and restructuring negotiations, potentially triggering the latter where actual or potential adverse impacts are identified. Debt audits can contribute valuable information in conducting such assessments.
Commentary
12.1 Structural adjustment programmes are often only oriented towards short-term fiscal targets to regain debt sustainability. Debt sustainability analysis is still based on a narrow understanding of sustainability, focusing primarily on the ability of a country to pay back its public debt without having to resort to exceptional financing or major policy adjustments.
12.2 The result is that sometimes a stock of public debt may be considered sustainableeven if its service entails the States failure to comply with its human rights obligations because the resources necessary for servicing its debt deprive it of the financial means to realize human rights. Debt service payments should not compromise the promotion and fulfilment of human rights over time.
12.3 A more comprehensive definition of debt sustainability incorporates economic, social and environmental sustainability, meaning that debt sustainability is only achieved when debt service does not result in violations of human rights and human dignity and does not prevent the attainment of international development goals.
12.4 Debt cannot be called sustainableif the social and human rights dimensions of sustainability are ignored. Projections of repayment capacities of borrowing States need to ensure that the obligations of States to promote the Sustainable Development Goals and progressively realize economic, social and cultural rights can be effectively fulfilled.
12.5 Identification of actual or potential adverse impacts can guide decision- making on revision of repayment terms, on the volume of debt relief necessary to ensure that the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights can be met by States, and on the size and the distribution of losses incurred by different creditorsgroups.
12.6 Systematic, independent human rights impact assessments carried out within regular debt management work and sustainability assessments can also support early identification of where constraints on fiscal space due to debt servicing are leading to an undermining of Stateshuman rights obligations, notably towards women and other groups in situations of vulnerability. Findings can thereby contribute to timely debt restructuring, and mitigate the gravity and prevent adverse human rights impacts of economic crises.
12.7 In particular, in the context of but not limited to privatizations, it should be noted that States have an obligation to ensure that the fiscal risk of all debt is properly accounted for and on balance sheet and that private creditors similarly have an obligation to ensure that they do not undermine this obligation of any public- sector counterparty. The process and criteria by which States calculate the fiscal impact of certain privatization projects should be in accordance with industry- recognized best practices.
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12.8 Creditors and debtors should also engage in debt relief and restructuring negotiations with the aim of supporting the freeing up of fiscal space to safeguard the capacity of States to meet their human rights obligations.
12.9 Ensuring that the findings of impact assessments systematically play a role in debt restructuring reflects the shared responsibility of creditors and debtors for sovereign debt burdens.
12.10 The environmental assessment implies an analysis of the commitment of the countrys natural resources, mainly its strategic resources such as minerals and water. The social impact, the environmental remediation and the contribution to climate change must be established in the case of public debt payments based on the extraction of natural resources.
12.11 Lenders have an independent duty to ensure, to the best of their ability, that government officials are authorized under applicable domestic law to enter into the agreements and that the arrangement is otherwise consistent with such law.
Other obligations of States, international financial institutions and private actors
Principle 13 International assistance and cooperation
States have an obligation to provide international assistance and cooperation in order to facilitate the full realization of all rights. As part of their obligations with regard to international cooperation and assistance, States have an obligation to respect and protect the enjoyment of human rights of people outside their borders. This involves avoiding conduct that would foreseeably impair the enjoyment of human rights by persons living beyond their borders, contributing to the creation of an international environment that enables the fulfilment of human rights,19 as well as conducting assessments of the extraterritorial impacts of laws, policies and practices.20
Principle 14 External influence and policy space
States, international or regional financial institutions and other non-State and State actors should not exert undue external influence on other States so that they are able to take steps to design and implement economic programmes by using their policy space21 in accordance with their human rights obligations, including when trying to cope with economic or financial crises. The systematic use of transparent and participatory human rights impact assessments in the design of economic reform programmes attached to international loans can serve to support debtor States in implementing a programme of crisis response free of undue external pressure and demonstrating national ownership that allows them to meet their human rights and environmental obligations.
Commentary
14.1 Undue external influence means direct or indirect intervention in the economic affairs of a State through the use of economic and/or political measures seeking to influence States to adopt certain economic policies or to secure from them
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 24 (2017), para. 37; and Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011).
Guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights (A/HRC/21/39), para. 92.

See Sustainable Development Goal 17.15; Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, annex, sect. I, para. 9; and General Assembly resolution 25/2625.
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19
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advantages of any kind that undermine the ability of States to respect, protect and fulfil their human rights obligations. Economic measures can include both conditionalities attached to financial assistance programmes and implicit conditionalities informally urged by international or regional institutions.
14.2 States in difficulty following a debt crisis or other adverse economic event may temporarily lose access to some sources of funds. In these situations, the remaining lenders have a responsibility not to use their enhanced bargaining power to exercise influence on the borrower that could lead to human rights violations. Instead, lenders actually have an enhanced responsibility with regard to the human rights impacts of their loans and the conditions attached to them.
14.3 States should also be able to design and implement economic policies, including responses to financial and economic crises, in accordance with their human rights obligations. In doing so, they should be free from undue influence from corporations or those working to further their interests that seek to privilege corporate economic interests over, or otherwise disrupt, the realization of human rights or the environmental well-being necessary for such realization. States must take action to identify and prevent such conflicts of interest by developing a regulatory framework that ensures, among other things, that relevant interactions are transparent and accountable. Such a regulatory framework could include regulation regarding the financing of political parties and the prevention of corruption.
14.4. Host States should enact foreign investment laws in such a way that includes an obligation on investors to undertake human rights impact assessments through neutral entities in a transparent and inclusive manner. Host States and investors should undertake to use such assessments as a means of enhancing the sustainability and development impact of investments in such a way that is beneficial to all stakeholders, including investors.
Principle 15 Obligations of public creditors and donors
International financial institutions, bilateral lenders and public donors should ensure that the terms of their transactions and their proposals for reform policies and conditionalities for financial support do not undermine the borrower/recipient States ability to respect, protect and fulfil its human rights obligations.22
States, whether acting alone or within international financial institutions, as well as international financial institutions themselves, should not compel borrowing/receiving States to compromise satisfying their international human rights obligations or contribute to such compromise, either directly or indirectly. As a consequence, international financial institutions, bilateral lenders and other public donors, when granting a loan or giving policy advice in the context of economic reform measures, have an obligation to assess the human rights impact of those measures.
Commentary
15.1 Human rights impact assessments should be a mandatory element in the design of all economic reform and adjustment programmes and avoid human rights violations. This applies also to programmes developed with international financial institutions, bilateral lenders and public donors in the context of debt management and financial assistance activities. All proposed measures and loan conditionalities should be subject to a human rights impact assessment. These should be prepared prior to the conclusion of the agreements and in time to influence the outcomes of the negotiations, and include an analysis of the impact of policies on commonly marginalized groups. In urgent situations at least, flexible instruments should be considered to allow for sufficient space to develop well-tailored adjustment
22 E/C.12/2016/1, para. 8.
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measures that respect human rights. Release clauses with regard to specific conditions should be put in place where actual or potential adverse human rights impacts are identified.
15.2 The obligations mentioned in the previous paragraph include, for example, participating in debt relief programmes and restructuring negotiations in good faith through a formal process of deliberative policy engagement and social dialogue.23 They also include actively seeking debt agreements that are financially sustainable and respect human rights. Creditors should refrain from predatory or obstructive behaviour that could compel States to act in contravention of their human rights obligations in order to repay debts or directly impact Statescapacity to meet these obligations.
15.3 States cannot escape responsibility for actions or the exercise of functions that they have delegated to international institutions or private parties (re blended finance and privatization): delegation cannot be used as an excuse to fail to comply with human rights obligations, in abnegation of the extraterritorial character of these obligations.
15.4 Bilateral lenders and other public donors, including Government-guaranteed financial institutions or private institutions extending loans with government guarantees, have extraterritorial human rights obligations governing their decisions in the context of economic reform measures of the concerned States.
Principle 16 Obligations of private creditors
Private creditors, when negotiating transactions with States or other public entities, including taking decisions in the context of economic reforms, should not undermine the States ability to respect, protect and fulfil its human rights obligations. Among other things, these creditors should assess the human rights impacts of their own actions as well as those of the activities financed by them, unless they have ascertained that debtor States or international and regional financial institutions have carried out effective assessments, including with regard to gender equality and the environmental impact.
Commentary
16.1 In order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for adverse human rights impacts of certain actions or inactions, private creditors should carry out human rights impact assessments. This requirement should be further elaborated in national action plans on business and human rights.24
16.2 In connection with principle 13 and commentary15.3, host and home Statesobligations to protect human rights, including their extraterritorial obligations, require the establishment of adequate safeguards against negative human rights impacts resulting from the conduct of private companies.
16.3 Private creditorsobligations include the obligation to act in good faith, as established for public creditors.25 In addition, private parties bringing vague investment treaty-based claims against States in situations of debt distress could violate this good-faith principle, particularly when such claims are brought with the
  1. 23  General Assembly resolution 69/319.
  2. 24  See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (A/HRC/17/31); and Committee on
    Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 24, para. 5. “Private creditorsinclude private bondholders, private banks, other private financial institutions, and manufacturers, exporters and other suppliers of goods that have a financial claim.
  3. 25  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 10 January 2012, principle No. 7.
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hope or intent of extracting more favourable settlements than for the rest of the creditors and/or investors.26
Human rights impact assessments
Principle 17 Basis and purposes of a human rights impact assessment
States and creditors should carry out human rights impact assessments of economic reform policies considered and taken in response to acute economic and financial crises that are likely to cause adverse human rights impacts. States should also carry out regular and periodic human rights impact assessments of short-, medium- and long-term economic reform processes in less challenging economic times. A human rights impact assessment of economic reform policies should:
(a) Prompt investigation of and analyse the extent to which the proposed measures, in combination with other economic measures and policies being or to be implemented, could contribute to fulfilling the States human rights obligations or potentially undermine them;
(b) Serve to demonstrate how proposed measures, jointly with other economic measures and policies being or to be implemented, could impact the human rights of the whole population, particularly the individuals and groups most disenfranchised or at risk;
(c) Identify any prima facie retrogressive measure as well as alternative economic policy options that could be the least restrictive of human rights and avoid any impermissible retrogression;
(d) Establish a (non-exhaustive) list of preventive and mitigating measures to ensure conformity of the economic reform policies considered with the States human rights obligations.
Commentary
17.1 An ex ante human rights impact assessment is a structured process to review alternative policy options and analyse the impacts of proposed measures on human rights.27 The process contributes to evidence-based policymaking by making human rights impacts more visible on the basis of historical experience, and provides a firmer basis for forecasting potential impacts and assessing the effects of proposed prevention, mitigation and compensation measures.
17.2 Human rights impact assessments can provide empirical evidence to properly assess the proportionality and legitimacy of economic measures from a human rights perspective and ensure that womens rights will be taken into account. Hence, all States should prepare human rights impact assessments in order to determine whether the economic reforms under consideration are consistent with their human rights obligations. Statesdecisions on economic policies should be consistent with the outcome of human rights impact assessments. These assessments should be widely published in accessible forms and discussed with affected people, and include options discussed and agreed upon.
17.3 Considering ways to prevent or tackle an economic crisis includes, for example, countercyclical measures, full or partial debt relief and medium- or long- term suspensions of the creditorspayments, and tax policy reviews.
17.4 The analysis should include various policy options, including budget cuts, new tax measures, monetary policies and other adjustment measures such as labour
See A/72/153 and Corr.1.
See Center for Economic and Social Rights,
Assessing Austerity: Monitoring the Human Rights Impacts of Fiscal Consolidation, briefing, February 2018.
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market deregulation, that are likely to affect the population, in particular those members of the population who would be expected to suffer or have suffered a unique or cumulative impact of the measures and the groups in the most vulnerable situations. It should use a variety of quantitative and qualitative tools and methods, including participatory ones, and carefully compare the human rights impact of different scenarios including budget cuts, tax increases and measures against tax evasion and avoidance, and a review of tax expenditures.
17.5 An analysis that looks at the potential (and cumulative) distribution of impacts is necessary to ensure that the most vulnerable are not disproportionally affected by the crisis due to specific contextual and/or global conditions and that, on the contrary, they are protected from impacts, to the maximum of the available resources from the State and international community.
17.6 Taking measures during times of economic crisis requires a State to balance competing priorities and make appropriate trade-offs under conditions of potentially severe financial, political and time pressure. A human rights impact assessment can help States to justify hard choices if they are aligned with the normative guidance of human rights and aim to avoid discriminatory measures and minimize disproportionate impacts across the population.
17.7 The process should also include the design of economic policy responses that prevent, mitigate or provide redress (including but not limited to compensation) for impacts that cannot be avoided, taking a comprehensive view of all measures taken to respond to a crisis. Responses to a crisis may involve a range of measures that cumulatively and collectively affect the whole population. Policy responses should indeed protect all human rights of all people, and in particular those of the most vulnerable.
17.8 Human rights impact assessments of economic reforms shall incorporate complementary tools designed for and implemented in related areas. A human rights impact assessment, if carried out properly, can incorporate regulatory, environmental and social impact assessments and should contain a human rights- based budget analysis. For example, when a human rights impact assessment pursuant to the present guiding principles is conducted, the fiscal and economic sustainability of trade and/or investment agreements must be incorporated. In particular, since compliance with the obligations imposed under trade and/or investment agreements typically is ensured by the threat of economic sanctions or reparations authorized or awarded by an agreement-specific dispute settlement mechanism or international arbitral tribunal, attention must be given to the impact that such enforcement obligations, including the potential cumulative impact of such obligations, may have on public budgets.28
Principle 18 Ex ante and ex post assessments
Human rights impact assessments should form a regular part of decision- making processes with respect to economic reform policies or loan conditionality, and should be carried out at regular intervals. They should be carried out both ex ante to assess the foreseeable impacts of proposed policy changes and ex post that is, looking back to assess the actual impacts of policy change and implementation, in order to address such impacts.
Commentary
18.1 Human rights impact assessments should be a regular element of economic reform policies. They should be incorporated in the policy continuum, from design to monitoring to implementation. They should be started as early as possible in the policymaking process so that they can influence the choice of alternative policy
18
28 A/HRC/19/59/Add.5, appendix, para. 1.3.
options, and prior to the conclusion of agreements on programmes with creditors in time to influence the outcomes of negotiations. They should serve to look back and evaluate the short-term measures already taken and to propose adjustments as well as to provide evidence for medium- to longer-term planning going forward.
18.2 In the context of an acute financial or economic crisis in which the Government is forced to make decisions under extreme time pressures, it may not be possible for the State to carry out a thorough human rights impact assessment before deciding on its response to the crisis. In these situations, the Government is obliged to complete and publish a human rights impact assessment to the extent possible under the circumstances before taking any policy decisions or actions. The Government should also (a) publicly explain why it is unable to do a full ex ante impact assessment; (b) undertake a fully compliant ex post human rights impact assessment as soon as conditions allow; and (c) take steps to remedy all adverse human rights impacts identified in either impact assessment as promptly as possible.
18.3 For mid- to longer-term reforms, a human rights impact assessment can help States and international financial institutions to create capacities for adaptation to necessary changes in the economy, so as to better address the next economic and financial crisis and to ensure a robust sense of social inclusion. This is particularly worthwhile for women in situations where they are usually excluded from decision- making. Thorough and well-documented scrutiny will also contribute to evidence- based decision-making by the same or other States in future crises.
18.4 Throughout the policy cycles, economic reform programmes should be evaluated in accordance with whether they have ensured a fair and equitable distribution of social adjustment burdens, and not only whether they have reduced budget deficits and restored debt sustainability or economic growth. Such evaluations should assess the extent to which reform programmes have protected human rights, in particular those of the groups in situations of vulnerability or at risk of greater impacts, and identify gaps to be addressed.
18.5 Human rights impact assessments should not be limited to considering potential or actual adverse human rights impacts, but should also be used to identify steps to advance the enjoyment of human rights and opportunities for duty bearers to further the realization of human rights within the implementation of economic reforms.
18.6 Capacity-building in conducting human rights assessments is of crucial importance as it would make the exercise less time-consuming, more predictable, less costly, and help assessments to become increasingly accurate and comprehensive. Governments should build the systems to ensure that necessary data and information are produced and published and closely work with members of civil society during “good timesso that they are equipped to participate promptly in human rights impact assessments when necessary, whether on a regular or extraordinary basis.
Principle 19 Participation
The right to participate should be embedded in the process of conducting human rights impact assessments. It should also be central in the consideration of policy options, in the outcome document(s) (publication and reporting of information and the assessment), in the implementation of policy responses and in the monitoring of the impact of such responses.
Commentary
19.1 In formulating measures requiring human rights impact assessments, States and international financial institutions must allow for and seek the broadest possible national dialogue, with the effective, timely and meaningful participation of all individuals and groups, including marginalized groups and those particularly at risk
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of vulnerability from such policies. As women, children and persons with disabilities are generally underrepresented in both the political and economic spheres, special efforts must be made to ensure their capacity to co-decide the measures by using innovative methods of participation. Civil society organizations and actors in the broadest sense should also have adequate and timely channels for participation.
19.2 Different levels of government should also be adequately informed and consulted, and corresponding channels of communication and information should be followed, including within the legislative branches and administrative mechanisms in place for interaction among different levels of local and subnational governments.
19.3 Genuine participation can only be possible if Governments provide timely, comprehensive and accessible information on all aspects of public finance, including budgets and macroeconomic performance. Governments should also provide adequate justifications of policy choices to the population in general, and specifically to those most likely to be affected by the reform.
19.4 Several human rights should be protected in order to ensure effective and meaningful participation, including freedom of expression and access to information, freedom of the press, the right to peaceful assembly and freedom of association.
19.5 Economic reform policy measures should be adopted by the competent bodies following the procedures established by domestic law. They should be scrutinized and discussed by parliament to allow for effective political participation and necessary checks and balances.
19.6 Where labour market reforms are being contemplated, particular efforts should be made to consult, as early as possible, with local and national trade unions and employersassociations using, where they exist, national mechanisms for social dialogue. As any labour reform must include efforts to overcome horizontal and vertical gender segregation, womens representatives should also be part of this social dialogue.
19.7 Public debate and oversight over policies should start at the earliest possible moment and apply not only to policies and initiatives carried out by the State, but also to agreements with supranational institutions and/or lenders. Conditionality packages attached to financial assistance programmes should be subjected to ample discussion, ensuring the participation of the population, and oversight and discussion by parliament.
Principle 20 Access to information and transparency
In order to guarantee the right to freely impart, seek and receive information in a transparent manner, a human rights impact assessment of economic reforms requires a diverse range of both quantitative and qualitative data. States should endeavour to ensure that such information is available, accessible and delivered in a timely and transparent manner, and that its analysis assists in understanding the implications and impacts of the economic reform policies.
Commentary
20.1 Global and regional human rights standards guarantee not only the right to freely impart information but also the right to freely seek and receive it as part of the freedom of expression.
20.2 Obstacles to access to information can undermine the enjoyment of both civil and political rights, in addition to economic, social and cultural rights. Core requirements for democratic governance, such as transparency, the accountability of public authorities or the promotion of participatory decision-making processes, are unattainable in practice without adequate access to information.
20.3 The validity and credibility of the data collected need to be assessed in the light of clearly articulated and transparent standards that reflect the principles of non-discrimination, equality, inclusion and participation. In order to ensure compliance with the human rights requirement of non-discrimination and that due attention is paid to the situation of groups at risk of marginalization or vulnerability, it is essential that the indicators used provide information disaggregated by gender, disability, age group, region, ethnicity, income segment and any other grounds considered relevant, based on a contextual, country-level identification of groups at risk of marginalization.29
20.4 There are a number of methods for quantitative analysis. Well-developed approaches to modelling distributional impacts using income quintiles and deciles can be used. In order to ensure compliance with the human rights requirement of non-discrimination and that due attention is paid to the situation of groups at risk of marginalization or vulnerability, it is essential that those indicators provide information disaggregated in line with what is indicated in the previous paragraph. These human rights impact assessment standards need to be adaptable to potentially different levels of data availability and overall capacity to carry out a human rights impact assessment so that the tool can be used in a wider range of circumstances.
20.5 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes a large number of indicators. Reliable and disaggregated data are needed to strengthen modelling, or at least to inform a more detailed analysis. While the indicators of the Sustainable Development Goals may not necessarily be rights based and the resulting data may not provide a comprehensive overview of all aspects of human rights, such data- collection processes could serve as a source of useful complementary information to those working in a human rights impact assessment context. However, the validity of data reported through the Sustainable Development Goals process should be carefully examined before using the data as a basis for decisions and economic policies.
20.6 In terms of qualitative data, targeted studies, surveys, testimonies and consideration of other types of analysis are paramount, including, when available, on administrative complaints, case law and jurisprudence on individual and collective cases, as they also offer a glimpse of the type of violations, trends and limitations encountered when accessing assistance, reparation and justice. Even in contexts where disaggregated data are readily available, they should always be triangulated with qualitative data on discriminatory situations.
20.7 Qualitative analyses need to ensure that contingencies in the use of quantitative models are recognized and, if possible, avoided. Such contingencies might stem from reliance on historical data, the choice of variables, etc.
20.8 International cooperation can be particularly relevant in this regard for countries with limited resources for data collection.
20.9 Transparency and wide dissemination of information are also critical when carrying out the impact assessment, including by publishing the findings in their entirety and reporting on the assessment, its conclusions and recommendations.
Principle 21 Access to justice, accountability and remedies
States must ensure that access to justice and the right to an effective remedy are guaranteed, through judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative and political mechanisms, with regard to actions and omissions in the design and/or implementation of economic reform policies that may undermine human rights. States should ensure that the population is fully informed about the procedures, mechanisms
29 For guidance, see, e.g., Organization of American States, Progress Indicators for Measuring Rights Under the Protocol of San Salvador, 2015; and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation, 2012.
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and remedies available to them and that these mechanisms are physically and financially accessible to all.
Commentary
21.1 The right to an effective remedy includes reparations and guarantees of non-repetition. An independent, well-financed and proactive judicial branch is essential to both preventing economic reforms from harming human rights and to providing effective remedies should harm occur. A human rights impact assessment can serve to ensure that accountability procedures exist and mechanisms are in place by requiring clearly articulated and justified policy choices that have been developed through inclusive participation of the potentially affected population.
21.2 Engaging in an inclusive and accountable decision-making process strengthens the legitimacy and ownership of the choices made. Furthermore, it is likely to reduce social conflict, which can undermine democratic institutions and the rule of law. A functioning system of national, regional and international human rights accountability mechanisms, including independent and empowered national human rights institutions, is critical to this aim. States should take all measures to implement the recommendations of national, regional and international human rights bodies.
21.3 Measures covered by the present guiding principles should be agreed at all governmental levels, paying special attention to the ways in which burdens are distributed over and financial resources allocated to local authorities, which are often the main providers of social services to the population. These measures should also be open to oversight, including judicial scrutiny of applicable law, and public officials involved in the design and adoption of such measures should be accountable for any policy decisions that endanger the enjoyment of human rights.
21.4 Since corruption can play a role in the design, implementation and monitoring of economic reform policies, clear measures and mechanisms to prevent and combat corruption must be put in place with a view to ensuring accountability.
Principle 22 Who should conduct the assessment(s)
Human rights impact assessments of economic reform policies should be independent, robust, credible and gender responsive. In this regard, each country should decide which institution(s) is/are best suited to be in charge of carrying out this exercise, based on applicable criteria.
Commentary
22.1 The present guiding principles are flexible enough to be adjusted to the particular needs of government departments, advisory bodies, parliamentary committees, national human rights institutions, courts, international financial institutions, private creditors, international human rights mechanisms, academic institutions or civil society organizations.
22.2 The appropriateness of the institution or team conducting the impact assessment should be measured against pre-established criteria, which should include, as a minimum, the following aspects: its independence from the executive branch and any creditor/creditor-aligned institution; appropriate expertise; adequate funding;30 diversity of members of the team or body in charge of carrying out the assessment and, notably, gender parity; engagement of affected communities; and credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of different stakeholder groups such as government agencies, international actors and civil society.
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30 See A/HRC/19/59/Add.5.
22.3 Independence from any creditor or creditor-aligned institution responsible for designing adjustment programmes is necessary in Statesown assessments, given that findings can be used to inform borrowing policies and debt management, as well as triggering debt-restructuring activities. This does not preclude the participation of these actors in an assessment, or in undertaking assessments in the context of their own decision-making.
22.4 States should develop a domestic, professional and independent policy analysis capacity within the public sector to avoid dependence on private providers. Clear, rigorous and transparent criteria for appointment, regulation and accountability mechanisms should be created in advance, with independent oversight within the State, for private parties to be appointed to carry out human rights impact assessments. These private parties/corporations should be considered to be as responsible as any other entity performing a public service function. The States delegation of a private corporation or third party does not, in any way, free the State from any of its obligations under international human rights law nor the private actor from applying all legal substantive and procedural standards enumerated in the present principles.
22.5 States should take steps to support the ability of affected communities and civil society generally to provide parallel information to assessment processes and, as far as possible, to conduct human rights impact assessments directly.
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