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““Con el pueblo todo, sin el pueblo nada” [With the people everything, without the people nothing]: The New Mexican President Receives the Bastón de mando [Baton of Authority] from Indigenous Communities and Delivers His 100 Commitments (Spanish With English Translation)

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I have been writing about the most interesting speech delivered to the representatives of the Mexican state assembled in Congress at an gathering to which a large number of foreign representatives were also in attendance.  That gathering was both formal and the mandatory performance of the rituals of passages of power within the traditions of the Mexican Republic manifested through its political community as incarnated in its institutions and as recognized by foreign powers.  That last was a mouthful but intentional for all of the caveats and presumptions built into the ceremonies that culminated in President López Obrador's manifesto in the form of an inaugural speech. The text of that speech (in the original Castellano) along with  the briefest of analysis was posted yesterday ("Acabar con la corrupción y con la impunidad"--Text of the Speech delivered by Mexico's New President Andrés Manuel López Obrador en la tribuna del Congreso de la Unión). 

But that event was hardly the most profound or important ceremony parking the passage of power .
Andrés Manuel López Obrador will become the first president to take part in a traditional indigenous cleansing ceremony as part of his inauguration. Representatives of Mexico’s 68 distinct indigenous peoples as well as members of Afro-Mexican groups will hand over a bastón de mando – a staff or baton indicative of authority – to the new president as a show of confidence that he will govern for all citizens and make wise decisions. (Special recognition by indigenous people a sign of confidence in new president).
The ceremony was well documented by local press.  More important, was the speech that was given, the gravamen of which was centered on 100 commitments. These are, even more than the indications of policy and the prisms through which such policies will be analyzed, declared in the formal inaugural address, will point quite specifically to the way that the ideological lens of the new President will shape not just broad policy, but also more precisely, its operationalization.  The speech, Primer Discurso a la Nación del Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos desde el Zócalo de la Ciudad de México (1 Dec. 2018)  and the enfolding ceremony may be viewed and heard here. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QR-JWPTp-T0&feature=player_embedded
(click HERE)

The text of the speech follows below in the original Castellano. The reporting (in English) of the ceremony and the English translation of the 100 commitments follows with thanks to the Pressenza International News Agency which posted originally.

The most interesting part of the speech--and its most revealing, is the reference to Benito Juarez's dictum:  “con el pueblo todo, sin el pueblo nada” ["with the people everything, without the people nothing"]. The reason this resonates is because it has been a trope appropriated in quite related and distinct ways by 20th century leaders (Fidel Castro Speech to Intellectuals 1961 ("This means that within the Revolution, everything goes; against the Revolution, nothing."); Benito Mussolini The doctrine of Fascism 1932 ("For the Fascist, everything is within the State; and nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside the state")).

The within and the without remains at the center of the 21st century transformations of society. It injects the discourse of all states, whatever their political orientation. For (or with) Mexico, López Obrador has moved the center of that debate from the state, to the revolution, to the people. And now, of course, in all jurisdictions, the question becomes--to where will it migrate, again, when the people are moved to delegate its responsibilities? Better yet, it will return to the fundamental question--who are the people? For that all societies have provided answers that are both fragile and contextual. We will see where that takes the people, the state, and the revolution. There is much to think about here both for the overtones and its trajectories.



Discurso de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Mensaje a la Nación desde el Zócalo de la Ciudad de México


Aquí en el Zócalo de la Ciudad de México, principal plaza pública del país, luego de recibir el bastón de mando de los pueblos originarios de nuestra gran nación, reafirmo el compromiso de no mentir, no robar y no traicionar al pueblo.

Hoy hable en el Congreso sobre el antiguo régimen y de la nueva política para llevar a cabo la Cuarta Transformación de la vida pública de México; ahora quiero expresar lo que ya hemos hecho y estamos por iniciar; lo que bien podríamos llamar, una modernidad forjada desde abajo y para todos.

Reafirmo nuestros compromisos, puntualmente:

1. En primer lugar, vamos a darle atención especial a los pueblos indígenas de México; es una ignominia que nuestros pueblos originarios vivan desde hace siglos bajo la opresión y el racismo, con la pobreza y la marginación a cuestas. Todos los programas del gobierno tendrán como población preferente a los pueblos indígenas de las diversas culturas del país.

2. Se atenderá a todos los mexicanos sin importar creencias, clases, organizaciones, sexo, partidos, sectores económicos o culturales, pero se aplicará el principio de que, por el bien de todos, primero los pobres.

3. Se mantendrán las estancias infantiles de la antigua Secretaría de Desarrollo Social y se regularizarán los CENDIS promovidos por el Partido del Trabajo; ambos programas tendrán recursos garantizados en el presupuesto y pasarán a formar parte de las secretarías de Bienestar y de Educación Pública.

4. Los estudiantes de Primaria y Secundaria que provengan de familias de escasos recursos económicos recibirán becas educativas.

5. Todos los estudiantes de los Colegios de Bachilleres, escuelas técnicas, vocacionales y preparatorias públicas, recibirán una beca de 800 pesos mensuales.

6. Trescientos mil jóvenes, en condiciones de pobreza, que ingresen o estén estudiando en universidades, tendrán derecho a una beca de 2400 pesos mensuales.

7. En 2019 estarán funcionando 100 universidades públicas, con carreras acordes a cada región del país para atender con educación de calidad y sin pago de colegiatura a 64 mil estudiantes del nivel superior.

8. Se protegerá el patrimonio cultural de México. Se impulsará la formación artística desde la educación básica y se apoyará a creadores y promotores culturales.

9. Se promoverá la investigación científica y tecnológica; se apoyará a estudiantes y académicos con becas y otros estímulos en bien del conocimiento. El CONAHCYT coordinará el Plan Nacional para la Innovación en beneficio de la sociedad y del desarrollo nacional con la participación de universidades, pueblos, científicos y empresas.

10. Se cancelará la llamada Reforma Educativa, se establecerá en el Artículo 3º de la Constitución el derecho a la educación gratuita en todos los niveles de escolaridad y el gobierno no agraviará nunca más a maestras y maestros.

11. Hoy comienza el plan para apoyar a los damnificados de los sismos con trabajo, vivienda y servicios públicos . Esto incluye un programa de construcción y reconstrucción de escuelas, centros de salud, edificios públicos y templos que forman parte del patrimonio cultural del país.

12. También hoy comienza un programa de mejoramiento urbano en colonias marginadas de la frontera norte: Tijuana, Mexicali, San Luis Río Colorado, Nogales, Ciudad Juárez, Acuña, Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa y Matamoros.

13. Se hará realidad el derecho a la salud. El propósito es garantizar a los mexicanos atención médica y medicamentos gratuitos; comenzaremos en las unidades médicas del Seguro Social ubicadas en las zonas más pobres del país y poco a poco ser irá ampliando el programa hasta que logremos, a mediados del sexenio, establecer un sistema de salud de primera, como en Canadá o en los países nórdicos.

14. Bajarán los sueldos de los altos funcionarios y aumentaran proporcionalmente los sueldos de los trabajadores de base y sindicalizados que ganan menos de 20 mil pesos al mes.

15. Se aumentará la pensión a los adultos mayores en todo el país; es decir, se le entregará a cada uno mil 274 pesos mensuales.

16. También recibirán este apoyo un millón de discapacitados pobres, en especial, niñas y niños de pueblos y colonias marginadas.

17. Dos millones 300 mil jóvenes desempleados serán contratados para trabajar como aprendices en actividades productivas en el campo y la ciudad, y ganarán un sueldo de 3 mil 600 pesos mensuales.

18. En este mes iniciamos la construcción de caminos de concreto en municipios olvidados de Oaxaca, Guerrero y otros estados. Estos caminos se van a construir con trabajadores de las mismas comunidades para lograr un efecto multiplicador: el presupuesto quedará allí mismo, se reactivará la economía desde abajo, se crearán empleos con salarios justos y se harán las obras en beneficio de los pueblos.

19. Los pequeños productores del campo, ejidatarios, comuneros o pequeños propietarios recibirán un apoyo económico semestral para la siembra de alimentos.

20. Iniciará un programa de entrega de fertilizantes cuidando que no se dañen los suelos, en beneficio de productores agrícolas; el año próximo, este programa se aplicará de manera gratuita en apoyo a todos los campesinos del estado de Guerrero y así iremos ampliándolo en el resto del país. Además, pronto tendremos materia prima suficiente e iniciará la operación de la planta de fertilizante de Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz.

21. A los pequeños productores de maíz, frijol, arroz, trigo y leche se les comprarán estos alimentos a precios de garantía en almacenes o depósitos de Diconsa y Liconsa.

22. Se fomentará la actividad pesquera para mejorar la vida de las comunidades costeras y ribereñas. Los pescadores de atún y sardina recibirán un precio justo por sus productos.

23. Ya comenzaron los preparativos para plantar en los próximos dos años árboles frutales y maderables en un millón de hectáreas, con el objetivo de producir alimentos, reforestar, mejorar el medio ambiente, crear 400 mil empleos y arraigar a la gente en sus comunidades de origen.

24. Se unirán Diconsa y Liconsa en una sola empresa para el abasto y la distribución de alimentos de consumo popular. Se llamará Seguridad Alimentaria Mexicana (SEGALMEX). En los almacenes, tiendas y lecherías de esta nueva dependencia se distribuirá una canasta de alimentos básicos a precios bajos para combatir la desnutrición y el hambre del pueblo.

25. Se otorgará créditos a la palabra y sin intereses a ejidatarios, comuneros y pequeños propietarios para la adquisición de novillonas, vacas y sementales.

26. Los artesanos, dueños de talleres, tiendas y pequeñas empresas, también recibirán créditos a la palabra, baratos y sin tantos trámites y pérdida de tiempo.

27. Se transferirá a las comunidades mineras el impuesto que se cobra a las empresas por la extracción del mineral.

28. No aumentará el precio de las gasolinas, el gas, el diésel y la luz, solo se le aplicará el componente de inflación; es decir, no habrá gasolinazos.

29. Los apoyos que otorgue el gobierno al pueblo se entregarán de manera directa, sin intermediarios, para evitar “moches”, corrupción y manipulación política. Por eso se está levantando un censo casa por casa para identificar a cada beneficiario, entregarle una tarjeta y que él mismo retire sus apoyos.

30. Se creará el Banco del Bienestar para que la gente pobre, hasta en los pueblos más apartados, pueda cobrar la ayuda del gobierno y en esa misma cuenta pueda también recibir remesas y otros ingresos, así como mantener sus ahorros con rendimientos y garantías de seguridad.

31. El incremento del presupuesto para financiar los programas del bienestar se obtendrán de ahorros por no permitir la corrupción y gobernar con austeridad republicana.

32. No aumentarán los impuestos más allá de la inflación y no se crearán nuevos impuestos. Tampoco aumentaremos la deuda pública. No gastaremos más de lo que ingrese a la Hacienda Pública.

33. Seremos respetuosos de la autonomía del Banco de México y de sus políticas para evitar que haya inflación o devaluaciones.

34. Se aplicará una estricta política de austeridad republicana. No habrá amiguismo, nepotismo e influyentismo, ninguna de esas lacras de la política. Serán transparentes la nómina y los bienes de los funcionarios públicos y de sus familiares cercanos; haremos pocos, muy pocos, viajes al extranjero y solo por causa justificada; no sé comprarán vehículos nuevos para funcionarios; únicamente tendrán escoltas los funcionarios responsables de tareas de seguridad; solo habrá tres asesores por secretaría; no habrá atención médica privada, ni cajas de ahorro exclusivas para funcionarios.

35. No se comprarán sistemas de cómputo en el primer año de gobierno.

36. Solo tendrán secretarios particulares los funcionarios integrantes del gabinete ampliado.

37. Se cancelarán fideicomisos o cualquier otro mecanismo utilizado para ocultar fondos públicos y evadir la legalidad y la transparencia.

38. Se suprimen todas las estructuras y programas duplicados (oficialías mayores, oficinas de prensa, publicaciones, defensorías jurídicas, compras, contraloría interna y otras) y estas funciones o programas se centralizarán en una sola unidad o coordinación, dependiente de la secretaría relacionada con los asuntos en cuestión.

39. Se reducirá en 50 por ciento el gasto de publicidad del gobierno.

40. Los funcionarios de Hacienda, Comunicaciones, Energía y otras dependencias, no podrán convivir en fiestas, comidas, juegos deportivos o viajar con contratistas, grandes contribuyentes, proveedores o inversionistas vinculados a la función pública.

41. Ningún funcionario público podrá ocupar en su domicilio a trabajadores al servicio del Estado, si no lo tiene permitido o no cuenta con autorización para ello.

42. Ningún funcionario, sin causa de emergencia, podrá ordenar cerrar calles, detener el tráfico o pasarse los altos o estacionarse en lugares prohibidos.

43. No se comprará ninguna mercancía que exista en los almacenes públicos en cantidad suficiente.

44. No se remodelarán oficinas, ni se comprará mobiliario de lujo.

45. Sólo tendrán apoyo de choferes los secretarios y subsecretarios.

46. Salvo plena justificación, los policías y militares de las distintas corporaciones no estarán al servicio de funcionarios o particulares.

47. Se eliminarán partidas para vestuario o cualquier gasto de protocolo y ceremonial dedicado al Presidente, a sus colaboradores cercanos y a familiares.

48. Se cuidarán los bienes de las oficinas a disposición de servidores públicos para proteger el patrimonio colectivo.

49. Se evitarán gastos innecesarios en el extranjero. Las únicas oficinas del gobierno serán las embajadas y los consulados. Solo habrá una delegación del gobierno federal en los estados y en todas las oficinas se ahorrará energía eléctrica, agua, servicios telefónicos, de internet, gasolinas y otros insumos pagados por el erario.

50. Se tratará con amabilidad a los ciudadanos en las oficinas públicas y en cualquier lugar, aceptando con humildad que ellos son los mandantes de nosotros, los servidores públicos.

51. Las compras del gobierno se harán de manera consolidada; mediante convocatoria y con observación ciudadana y de la oficina de transparencia de la ONU.

52. Los contratos de obra del gobierno se llevarán a cabo con la participación de ciudadanos y de observadores de la ONU.

53. No se autorizará la contratación de despachos para elaborar proyectos de ley, planes de desarrollo o cualquier tipo de análisis, recomendaciones, informes y otros documentos que puedan elaborarse con el trabajo y la capacidad profesional de los servidores públicos.

54. Se descentralizará el gobierno federal y las secretarías van a estar ubicadas en distintos estados de la república, porque todo el país es México. Este proceso se llevará a cabo de manera voluntaria, sin afectar a los trabajadores al servicio del Estado; por el contrario, tendrán oportunidades para la adquisición de viviendas, educación para sus hijos, atención médica y seguridad social.

55. Habrá un auténtico estado de derecho. A nadie le estará permitido violar la Constitución y las leyes, y no habrá impunidad, fueros ni privilegios.

56. Se acabará la impunidad; se reformará el Artículo 108 de la Constitución para juzgar al Presidente en funciones por cualquier delito que cometa, igual que a cualquier ciudadano.

57. Estará prohibido y se convertirá en delito grave, sin derecho a fianza, la corrupción, el robo de combustible, la portación ilegal de armas de fuego, la falsificación de facturas para la evasión fiscal, el fraude electoral, la compra de votos y el uso de presupuesto para favorecer a candidatos y partidos.

58. No habrá partidas en el presupuesto a disposición de diputados o senadores. Se acabará la vergonzosa práctica de los llamados “moches”.

59. Ningún funcionario público podrá recibir regalos cuyo valor exceda los 5 mil pesos.

60. En las relaciones comerciales o financieras con empresas internacionales se dará preferencia a aquellas originarias de países cuyos gobiernos se caractericen por su honestidad y castiguen sin tolerancia alguna las prácticas de sobornos o de corrupción.

61. Desde hoy están abiertas las puertas de Los Pinos, que ha dejado de ser la residencia oficial del presidente para convertirse en un espacio dedicado a la recreación, el arte y la cultura del pueblo.

62. Ya el Estado Mayor presidencial pasó a formar parte de la Secretaría de la Defensa; de la misma manera desaparece el CISEN. No habrá espionaje a opositores ni a ciudadanos y la oficina sucesora tendrá como única encomienda hacer labores de inteligencia para garantizar la paz y preservar la seguridad nacional.

63. Está en venta el avión presidencial y toda la flotilla de aviones y helicópteros que eran utilizados para el traslado de altos funcionarios públicos.

64. Ya no recibirán pensión los expresidentes, ni tendrán a su servicio funcionarios púbicos sean civiles o militares.

65. No habrá inspectores de vía pública para estar supervisando a establecimientos comerciales, empresariales o de servicios. Vamos a confiar en los ciudadanos y se implementará un programa de vigilancia por sorteo. Se evitará el soborno o la mordida; otorgaremos confianza a los ciudadanos, quienes bajo protesta de decir verdad actuarán con rectitud y cumplirán con sus responsabilidades.

66. Reiteramos: no estamos en contra de quienes invierten generan empleos y se comprometen con el desarrollo de México, sino de la riqueza mal habida.

67. Se fomentará el turismo para impulsar el desarrollo y crear empleos; también, desde este mes, iniciará un programa de mejoramiento urbano en las colonias marginadas de cinco centros turísticos: Los Cabos, Puerto Vallarta, Bahía de Banderas, Acapulco y Solidaridad.

68. Se construirá el Tren Maya para comunicar por este medio de transporte rápido y moderno a turistas y pasajeros nacionales en los estados de Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatán y Quintana Roo.

69. Se creará un corredor económico y comercial en el Istmo de Tehuantepec que comunicará Asia y la costa este de EU. Se construirá una vía ferroviaria para contenedores; se ampliará la carretera; se rehabilitarán los puertos de Salina Cruz y Coatzacoalcos; se aprovecharán petróleo, gas, agua, viento y electricidad de la región; se instalarán plantas de ensamblaje y manufactureras, y habrá subsidios fiscales para promover la inversión y crear empleos.

70. Vamos a destinar mayor inversión pública para producir con urgencia más petróleo, gas y energía eléctrica y así enfrentar la crisis que dejaron los políticos neoliberales y los responsables de la llamada reforma energética. Llamo a los técnicos y obreros petroleros, en activo o jubilados, para actuar con patriotismo como se hizo en los tiempos del general Lázaro Cárdenas, y a que volvamos a rescatar la industria petrolera nacional.

71. Se rehabilitarán las seis refinerías existentes y se iniciará, en unos días más, la construcción de una nueva refinería en Dos Bocas, Paraíso, Tabasco, para lograr que en tres años se produzca en México toda la gasolina que consumimos.

72. Se detendrá el plan de desmantelamiento de la Comisión Federal de Electricidad; ni una planta más será cerrada, por el contrario, se modernizarán las existentes y se le dará atención especial a las hidroeléctricas para producir más energía limpia y de menor costo.

73. Impulsaremos el desarrollo de fuentes de energía alternativas renovables, como la eólica, la solar, la geotérmica y la mareomotriz.

74. Protegeremos la diversidad biológica y cultural de México. Impulsaremos prácticas agroecológicas que aumenten la productividad sin dañar a la naturaleza. No se permitirá la introducción y el uso de semillas transgénicas.

75. No usaremos métodos de extracción de materias primas que afecten la naturaleza y agoten las vertientes de agua como el fracking.

76. No se permitirá ningún proyecto económico, productivo, comercial o turístico que afecte el medio ambiente. Se evitará la contaminación del suelo, agua y aire y se protegerá la flora y la fauna. No se privatizará el agua.

77. Habrá cobertura universal en telecomunicaciones y se conectará al país con internet utilizando la infraestructura y las líneas de la Comisión Federal de Electricidad. Este servicio será gratuito en carreteras, plazas, escuelas, hospitales e instalaciones públicas.

78. En tres años quedará solucionado en definitiva el problema de la saturación del actual aeropuerto de la Ciudad de México; para entonces ya estarán funcionando las vialidades, dos pistas nuevas y la terminal de pasajeros en la base aérea de Santa Lucía, con lo cual se salvará el Lago de Texcoco y nos habremos ahorrado 100 mil millones de pesos.

79.Desde el 1 de enero se creará la zona libre en los 3 mil 180 kilómetros de frontera con Estados Unidos; es decir, el año entrante en esa franja de nuestro país se impulsarán actividades productivas, se promoverá la inversión, se crearán empleos, bajará el IVA del 16 al 8 por ciento y el Impuesto Sobre la Renta será del 20 por ciento. Costarán lo mismo los combustibles de este y de aquel lado de frontera y aumentará al doble el salario mínimo.

80. El salario mínimo nunca se fijará por debajo de la inflación, como llegó a suceder en el periodo neoliberal.

81. Se reformará el Artículo 35 de la Constitución para quitar todos los obstáculos y candados en la celebración de consultas ciudadanas, a fin de que el pueblo tenga siempre el derecho a participar en las decisiones de interés público.

82. Cumpliré el compromiso de someterme a la revocación del mandato; el primer domingo de julio de 2021, habrá una consulta para preguntarle a los mexicanos si continúo en la presidencia o si renuncio, porque como lo creo y lo he dicho muchas veces, el pueblo pone y el pueblo quita, el pueblo es soberano.

83. No habrá divorcio entre el poder y el pueblo, nunca perderé la comunicación con ustedes, con la gente; estaré cinco días a la semana en municipios y estados del país recogiendo los sentimientos del pueblo y resolviendo problemas y evaluando el avance de los programas de desarrollo y bienestar.

84. Todos los días, a partir del lunes próximo, desde las 6 de la mañana encabezaré en el Palacio Nacional, la reunión del Gabinete de Seguridad para garantizar la paz y la tranquilidad a los mexicanos.

85. Se creará, si lo aprueban el pueblo y el Congreso, una Guardia Nacional para garantizar la seguridad pública en el país.

86. Se van a constituir 266 coordinaciones de seguridad pública en todo el país atendidas por la guardia nacional para proteger a los ciudadanos que son víctimas de asesinatos, secuestros, robos y otros delitos.

87. El presidente de la República, de conformidad con la ley, es el Comandante Supremo de las Fuerzas Armadas, y nunca dará la orden de que el Ejército o la Marina masacren al pueblo. Se acabará la guerra; construiremos la paz y buscaremos la hermandad entre todos los mexicanos.

88. Hoy inició el proceso de amnistía para dejar en libertad a presos políticos o víctimas de represalias de caciques, funcionarios o gobernantes del antiguo régimen autoritario. Se cancelarán las acusaciones penales fabricadas en contra de activistas y luchadores sociales. La Secretaría de Gobernación tiene a su cargo hacer realidad esta determinación.

89. Se investigará a fondo la desaparición de los jóvenes de Ayotzinapa; se conocerá la verdad y se castigará a los responsables.

90. Se respetará la libertad de expresión; nunca el gobierno aplicará censura a ningún periodista o medio de comunicación.

91. La Fiscalía General contará, en los hechos, con absoluta autonomía; no recibirá consigna del Presidente de la República y sus prácticas se apegarán al principio del derecho liberal, según el cual, “al margen de la ley, nada y por encima de la ley, nadie”.

92. Mantendremos relaciones respetuosas con el Poder Legislativo y con el Poder Judicial y el Poder Ejecutivo dejará de ser el poder de los poderes.

93. Desde anoche entró en vigor el Plan de Protección Civil; el ABC para los casos de inundaciones, incendios, temblores y otros desastres.

94. La política exterior se sustentará en la cautela diplomática y en los principios de autodeterminación de los pueblos, no intervención, solución pacífica de controversias, igualdad jurídica de los estados, cooperación para el desarrollo, la amistad, la paz, la defensa de los derechos humanos, la protección del medio ambiente y el respeto a los derechos de los migrantes; los nuestros, los centroamericanos y los de todos los países y continentes.

95. La relación con el gobierno de Estados Unidos será de respeto, beneficio mutuo y buena vecindad. Es momento de cambiar la relación bilateral hacia la cooperación para el desarrollo. Crear empleos en México y en Centroamérica es la alternativa a la migración, no las medidas coercitivas.

96. Como nos comprometimos, los 50 consulados que México tiene en Estado Unidos se van a convertir en defensorías para la defensa de migrantes. Vamos a defender los derechos humanos de nuestros paisanos.

97. Se logrará el renacimiento de México haciendo realidad el progreso con justicia y una manera de vivir sustentada en el amor a la familia, al prójimo, a la naturaleza, a la patria y a la humanidad. Promoveremos el bienestar material y el bienestar del alma.

98. Se garantizará la libre manifestación de ideas y de creencias religiosas y la libertad de prensa. Estamos por el diálogo, la tolerancia, la diversidad y el respeto a los derechos humanos.

99. Vamos a convocar a maestros, antropólogos, psicólogos, sociólogos, filósofos y profesionales de otras disciplinas, así como a religiosos, librepensadores, ancianos respetables y ciudadanos en general para la celebración de un congreso en el cual se elabore una Constitución Moral, que ayude a fortalecer valores nacionales, culturales y espirituales.

100.Asimismo, vamos a preservar nuestra memoria histórica. Se promoverá la lectura en general y particularmente de la historia, el civismo, la ética; nunca se olvidará de dónde venimos; por eso se exaltarán nuestras culturas originarias, las transformaciones históricas y el sacrificio de nuestros héroes; por ejemplo, el año próximo que se cumplen 100 años del asesinato de Emiliano Zapata, en toda la papelería del gobierno se recordará su nombre y su lema “Tierra y Libertad”.

Amigas y amigos:

Les invito a que ayudemos todos convertir en realidad estos compromisos y que cada año, aquí en el Zócalo, los repasemos uno por uno y podamos saber si ya se han cumplido o siguen pendientes.

Discutamos en todas las plazas públicas de México si avanzamos o no, con el propósito de que haya transparencia y acabar con la corrupción y la impunidad. Analicemos en las casas, calles y plazas si mejora o empeora la situación económica y social de nuestro pueblo y tomemos siempre entre todos los acuerdos que más convengan a la sociedad y a la nación.

No dejemos de encontrarnos: mantengamos siempre la comunicación. No habrá divorcio entre pueblo y gobierno. Yo les necesito, porque como decía Juárez “con el pueblo todo, sin el pueblo nada”. No me dejen solo porque sin ustedes no valgo nada o casi nada; sin ustedes, los conservadores me avasallarían fácilmente. Yo les pido apoyo, porque reitero el compromiso de no fallarles; primero muerto que traicionarles.

Pero por encima de todo, actuemos con optimismo y alegría porque tenemos la dicha enorme de vivir tiempos interesantes; estamos ante un momento estelar de la historia porque entre todos empezamos a construir la justicia y la felicidad que nuestro pueblo se merece y una nueva vida a nuestra gran nación.

¡Viva México!

¡Viva México!

¡Viva México!

Zócalo de la Ciudad de México, 1 de diciembre, 2018
__________


Primer Discurso a la Nación del Presidente Constitucional de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos desde el Zócalo de la Ciudad de México (1 Dec. 2018)

ENGLISH SUMMARY (By Pressenza Int'l News Agency)


Latin American Summary, December 2, 2018.

Here in the Zócalo of Mexico City, the country’s main public square, after receiving the command staff of the native peoples of our great nation, I reaffirm the commitment not to lie, not to steal and not to betray the people.

Today I spoke in Congress about the old regime and the new policy to carry out the Fourth Transformation of public life in Mexico; now I want to express what we have already done and are about to begin; what we could well call, a modernity forged from below and for everyone.

I reaffirm our commitments, on the following points:

1. In the first place, we are going to give special attention to the indigenous peoples of Mexico; it is an ignominy that our original peoples have lived for centuries under oppression and racism, with poverty and marginalization on their backs. All government programmes will have as their preferred population the indigenous peoples of the country’s diverse cultures.

All Mexicans will be served regardless of beliefs, class, organizations, sex, parties, economic or cultural sectors, but the principle will be applied that, for the good of all, the poor come first.

3. The children’s rooms of the former Ministry of Social Development shall be maintained and the CENDIS promoted by the Labor Party shall be regularized; both programmes shall have guaranteed resources in the budget and shall become part of the Welfare and Public Education Secretariats.

4. Primary and Secondary students from low-income families will receive educational scholarships.

5. All students from high schools, technical schools, vocational schools and public high schools will receive a scholarship of 800 pesos per month.

6. Three hundred thousand young people, in conditions of poverty, who enter or are studying at universities, will be entitled to a scholarship of 2400 pesos per month.



7. In 2019, 100 public universities will be operating, with careers according to each region of the country to provide quality education without tuition fees to 64,000 students at the higher level.

8. Mexico’s cultural heritage will be protected. Artistic training will be promoted from basic education and support will be given to creators and cultural promoters.

9. Scientific and technological research will be promoted; students and academics will be supported with scholarships and other stimuli for the good of knowledge. Conacyt will coordinate the National Plan for Innovation for the benefit of society and national development with the participation of universities, peoples, scientists and businesses.

10. The so-called Educational Reform will be cancelled, the right to free education at all levels of schooling will be established in Article 3 of the Constitution, and the government will never again aggravate teachers.

11. Today begins the plan to support the victims of the earthquakes with work, housing and public services. This includes a programme of construction and reconstruction of schools, health centers, public buildings and temples that are part of the country’s cultural heritage.

12. Also today begins a programme of urban improvement in marginalized neighborhoods of the northern border: Tijuana, Mexicali, San Luis Rio Colorado, Nogales, Ciudad Juarez, Acuña, Piedras Negras, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa and Matamoros.

13. The right to health will become a reality. The purpose is to guarantee free medical attention and medicines to Mexicans; we will begin in the Social Security medical units located in the poorest areas of the country and little by little the program will be expanded until we manage, in the middle of the six-year period, to establish a first class health system, as in Canada or in the Nordic countries.

14. The salaries of high officials will be lowered and the salaries of grassroots and unionized workers who earn less than 20,000 pesos a month will be increased proportionally.

15. Pensions will be increased for older adults throughout the country; that is, 1,274 pesos per month will be given to each one.

16. This support will also be given to a million poor disabled people, especially children from marginalized towns and colonies.

17. Two million 300 thousand unemployed young people will be hired to work as apprentices in productive activities in the countryside and the city, and will earn a salary of 3 thousand 600 pesos per month.

18. This month we begin the construction of concrete roads in forgotten municipalities of Oaxaca, Guerrero and other states. These roads will be built with workers from the same communities to achieve a multiplier effect: the budget will remain there, the economy will be reactivated from below, jobs will be created with fair wages and works will be done for the benefit of the people.

19. Small farmers in the countryside, ejidatarios, communeros or small landowners will receive six-monthly economic support for the planting of food.

20. We will begin a programme of delivery of fertilizers taking care that the soils are not damaged, to benefit agricultural producers; next year, this programme will be applied free of charge in support to all the peasants of the state of Guerrero and thus we will be expanding it to the rest of the country. In addition, soon we will have enough raw material and will start operating the fertilizer plant in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz.

21. The small producers of corn, beans, rice, wheat and milk will be paid guaranteed prices in warehouses of Diconsa and Liconsa.

Fishing activities will be encouraged to improve the lives of coastal and riparian communities. Tuna and sardine fishermen will receive a fair price for their products.

23. Preparations have already begun to plant one million hectares of fruit and timber trees over the next two years, with the goal of producing food, reforesting, improving the environment, creating 400,000 jobs, and rooting people in their communities of origin.



Diconsa and Liconsa will be united in a single company for the supply and distribution of food for popular consumption. It will be called Mexican Food Security (SEGALMEX). In the warehouses, stores and dairies of this new agency, a basket of basic foods will be distributed at low prices to combat malnutrition and hunger of the people.

25. Interest-free loans will be granted to parcel holders, communeros and small landowners for the acquisition of heifers, cows and stallions.

26. The artisans, owners of workshops, shops and small businesses, will also receive cheap credits by word of mouth, without so much paperwork and waste of time.

27. The tax charged to companies for mineral extraction will be transferred to the mining communities.

28. The price of gasoline, gas, diesel and electricity will not increase, only the inflation component will be applied; that is, there will be no gasoline usury.

29. The support granted by the government to the people will be delivered directly, without intermediaries, to avoid “moches”, corruption and political manipulation. That is why a house by house census is being carried out to identify each beneficiary, to give them a card and for them to withdraw this support.

30. The Welfare Bank will be created so that poor people, even in the most remote villages, can receive government aid and in that same account can also receive remittances and other income, as well as maintain their savings with yields and security guarantees.

31. The increase in the budget to finance the welfare programmes will be obtained from savings for not allowing corruption and governing with Republican austerity.

32. Taxes will not be increased beyond inflation and no new taxes will be created. Nor will we increase public debt. We will not spend more than what enters the public treasury.

33. We will be respectful of the autonomy of the Bank of Mexico and its policies to avoid inflation or devaluations.

34. A strict policy of republican austerity will be applied. There will be no cronyism, nepotism and influence, none of those scourges of politics. The payroll and assets of public officials and their close relatives will be transparent; we will make few, very few trips abroad and only for justified reasons; new vehicles will not be purchased for officials; only officials responsible for security tasks will have escorts; there will only be three advisers per secretariat; there will be no private medical care, nor exclusive savings banks for officials.

No computer systems will be purchased in the first year of government.

36. Private secretaries will only be available to the staff members of the enlarged cabinet.

37. Trusts or any other mechanism used to hide public funds and evade legality and transparency will be cancelled.

38. All duplicate structures and programmes (major official offices, press offices, publications, legal ombudsmen, procurement, internal comptroller’s office and others) will be eliminated and these functions or programmes will be centralised in a single unit or coordination, dependent on the secretariat related to the matters in question.

Government advertising expenditure will be reduced by 50 per cent.

40. Officials from the Treasury, Communications, Energy and other agencies will not be able to share parties, meals, sports games or travel with contractors, large taxpayers, suppliers or investors linked to the public function.

41. No public official may occupy workers in the service of the State in their home if not permitted to do so or not authorized to do so.

42. No official, without cause of emergency, may order the closing of streets, the stopping of traffic or the passing of stops or parking in prohibited places.

43. No extra merchandise already existing in public warehouses in sufficient quantity shall be purchased.

44. Offices shall not be remodeled, nor shall luxury furniture be purchased.

45. Only secretaries and undersecretaries will have the support of drivers.

46. Unless fully justified, the police and military of the different corporations will not be at the service of civil servants or individuals.

47. Items for costumes or any protocol and ceremonial expenses dedicated to the President, his close collaborators and relatives shall be eliminated.

48. The assets of the offices at the disposal of public servants shall be taken care of in order to protect the collective patrimony.



49. Avoid unnecessary expenses abroad. The only government offices will be embassies and consulates. There will only be one federal government delegation in the states, and all offices will save electricity, water, telephone, internet, gasoline, and other supplies paid for by the treasury.

Citizens will be treated with kindness in public offices and elsewhere, humbly accepting that they are the principals of us public servants.

51. Government purchases will be made in a consolidated manner; through convocation and with citizen observation and the UN transparency office.

52. Government work contracts will be carried out with the participation of citizens and UN observers.

53. The hiring of offices to prepare bills, development plans or any type of analysis, recommendations, reports and other documents that can be prepared with the work and professional capacity of public servants will not be authorized.

54. The federal government will be decentralized and the secretariats will be located in different states of the republic, because the whole country is Mexico. This process will be carried out on a voluntary basis, without affecting workers in the service of the State; on the contrary, they will have opportunities for the acquisition of housing, education for their children, medical care and social security.

55. There will be an authentic rule of law. No one shall be allowed to violate the Constitution and the laws, and there shall be no impunity, favours or privileges.

56. Impunity will end; Article 108 of the Constitution will be amended to try the incumbent President for any crime he commits, just like any other citizen.

57. Corruption, fuel theft, illegal carrying of firearms, falsification of invoices for tax evasion, electoral fraud, vote buying and the use of budget to favour candidates and parties shall be prohibited and shall become a serious crime, without the right to bail.

58. There will be no budget items available to deputies or senators. There will be no more shameful practice of so-called “moches”.

59. No public official may receive gifts worth more than 5,000 pesos.

60. In commercial or financial relations with international companies, preference shall be given to those originating in countries whose governments are characterized by their honesty and punish without any tolerance the practices of bribery or kickbacks.
corruption.

61. As of today, the doors of Los Pinos are open, which has ceased to be the official residence of the President and has become a space dedicated to recreation, art and the culture of the people.

62. The Presidential General Staff is now part of the Secretariat of Defence; in the same way, the Cisen disappears. There will be no espionage of opponents or citizens, and the successor office will have as its sole task to do intelligence work to guarantee peace and preserve national security.



63. The presidential airplane and the entire fleet of airplanes and helicopters that were used for the transfer of senior public officials are for sale.

64. Former presidents will no longer receive a pension, nor will civil or military civil servants be in their service.

65. There will be no inspectors on public roads to be supervising commercial, business or service establishments. We are going to trust the citizens and a surveillance program will be implemented by lottery. Bribery or the cut will be avoided, we will give confidence to citizens, who under protest of telling the truth will act with rectitude and fulfill their responsibilities.

66. We reiterate: we are not against those who invest and generate jobs and are committed to the development of Mexico, but against bad wealth.

67. Tourism will be fostered to boost development and create jobs; also, starting this month, an urban improvement program will begin in the marginalized neighborhoods of five tourist centers: Los Cabos, Puerto Vallarta, Bahía de Banderas, Acapulco, and Solidaridad.

68. The Mayan Train will be built to communicate by this means of fast and modern transport to tourists and national passengers in the states of Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan and Quintana Roo.

69. An economic and commercial corridor will be created in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec that will communicate Asia and the east coast of the United States. A container railroad will be built; the road will be widened; the ports of Salina Cruz and Coatzacoalcos will be rehabilitated; the region’s oil, gas, water, wind and electricity will be harnessed; assembly and manufacturing plants will be installed; and there will be tax subsidies to promote investment and create jobs.

70. We will allocate more public investment to urgently produce more oil, gas and electricity and thus face the crisis left by neoliberal politicians and those responsible for the so-called energy reform. I call on the technicians and oil workers, active or retired, to act with patriotism as was done in the times of General Lázaro Cárdenas, and that we return to rescue the national oil industry.

71. The six existing refineries will be rehabilitated and, in a few days, the construction of a new refinery will begin in Dos Bocas, Paraíso, Tabasco, so that in three years all the gasoline we consume will be produced in Mexico.

72. The dismantling plan of the Federal Electricity Commission will be halted; not one more plant will be closed; on the contrary, the existing ones will be modernized and special attention will be given to the hydroelectric plants to produce more clean energy at a lower cost.

73. We will promote the development of alternative renewable energy sources, such as wind, solar, geothermal and tidal.

74. We will protect Mexico’s biological and cultural diversity. We will promote agroecological practices that increase productivity without damaging nature. The introduction and use of transgenic seeds will not be allowed.

75. We will not use methods of extraction of raw materials that affect nature and exhaust water sources such as fracking.

76. No economic, productive, commercial or tourist project that affects the environment will be permitted. Pollution of soil, water and air will be avoided and flora and fauna will be protected. Water will not be privatised.

77. There will be universal telecommunications coverage and the country will be connected to the Internet using the infrastructure and lines of the Federal Electricity Commission. This service will be free of charge in highways, plazas, schools, hospitals, etc. and public facilities.

78. In three years the problem of the saturation of the current airport in Mexico City will be definitively solved; by then the roads, two new runways and the passenger terminal at the Santa Lucía air base will be working, which will save Lake Texcoco and we will have saved 100 billion pesos.

79. From January 1, a free zone will be created in the 3,180 kilometers of border with the United States; that is, next year in that part of our country productive activities will be promoted, investment will be promoted, jobs will be created, VAT will be lowered from 16 to 8 percent and the Income Tax will be 20 percent. Fuels on this and that side of the border will cost the same, and the minimum wage will be doubled.

80. The minimum wage will never be set below inflation, as happened in the neoliberal period.

81. Article 35 of the Constitution will be amended to remove all obstacles and locks in the holding of citizen consultations, so that the people always have the right to participate in decisions of public interest.

82. On the first Sunday of July 2021, there will be a consultation to ask Mexicans if I continue in the presidency or if I resign, because as I believe and have said many times, the people put and the people take away, the people are sovereign.

83. There will be no divorce between power and the people, I will never lose communication with you, with the people; I will spend five days a week in municipalities and states of the country gathering the feelings of the people and solving problems and evaluating the progress of development and welfare programs.

84. Every day, starting next Monday at 6 a.m., I will lead the Security Cabinet meeting at the National Palace to guarantee peace and tranquility to Mexicans.

85. If approved by the people and the Congress, a National Guard will be created to guarantee public security in the country.

86. Two hundred and sixty-six public security coordinations will be set up throughout the country under the national guard to protect citizens who are victims of murders, kidnappings, robberies and other crimes.

87. The President of the Republic, in accordance with the law, is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and will never order the Army or Navy to massacre the people. The war will end; we will build peace and seek brotherhood among all Mexicans.

88. Today the amnesty process began to release political prisoners or victims of reprisals by caciques, officials or governors of the former authoritarian regime. The criminal accusations fabricated against activists and social fighters will be cancelled. The Ministry of the Interior is in charge of making this determination a reality.

89. The disappearance of the young people of Ayotzinapa will be thoroughly investigated; the truth will be known and those responsible will be punished.

90. Freedom of expression will be respected; the government will never apply censorship to any journalist or media.

91. The Attorney General’s Office will, in fact, have absolute autonomy; it will not receive a slogan from the President of the Republic and its practices will adhere to the principle of liberal law, according to which, “outside the law, nothing and above the law, no one”.

92. We will maintain respectful relations with the Legislative Power and with the Judicial Power and the Executive Power will cease to be the power of the powers.

93. Since last night the Civil Protection Plan came into effect; the ABC for floods, fires, earthquakes and other disasters.

94. Foreign policy will be based on diplomatic caution and the principles of self-determination of peoples, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, legal equality of states, cooperation for development, friendship, peace, defense of human rights, protection of the environment and respect for the rights of migrants; ours, Central Americans and those of all countries and continents.

95. The relationship with the U.S. government will be one of respect, mutual benefit and good neighborliness. It is time to shift the bilateral relationship toward development cooperation. Creating jobs in Mexico and Central America is the alternative to migration, not coercive measures.

96. As we promised, the 50 consulates that Mexico has in the United States are going to become ombudsmen for the defense of migrants. We are going to defend the human rights of our countrymen.

97. Mexico’s rebirth will be achieved by making progress a reality with justice and a way of life based on love for family, neighbour, nature, homeland and humanity. We will promote material well-being and the well-being of the soul.

98. The free expression of ideas and religious beliefs and the freedom of the press shall be guaranteed. We stand for dialogue, tolerance, diversity and respect for human rights.

99. We will convene teachers, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, philosophers and professionals from other disciplines, as well as religious, freethinkers, respectable elders and citizens in general for the holding of a congress at which a Moral Constitution will be drafted, which will help to strengthen national, cultural and spiritual values.

100. We will also preserve our historical memory. We will promote the reading in general and particularly of history, civility and ethics; we will never forget where we come from; that is why our original cultures, historical transformations and the sacrifice of our heroes will be exalted; for example, next year, 100 years after the assassination of Emiliano Zapata, his name and his motto “Earth and Freedom” will be remembered in all the government’s stationery.

Friends:
I invite all of us to help make these commitments a reality and that each year, here in the Zócalo, we review them one by one included pending ones so we can make them a reality.

Let us discuss in all public squares of Mexico whether or not we move forward, with the aim of transparency and ending corruption and impunity.

Let’s analyze in the houses, streets and squares if the economic and social situation of our people improves or worsens and let’s always take among all the agreements that best suit society and the nation.

Let’s not stop meeting: let’s always maintain communication. There will be no divorce between the people and the government. I need them because, as Juarez said, “with the people everything, without the people nothing”. Don’t leave me alone because without you I am worth nothing or almost nothing; without you, the conservatives would easily overwhelm me. I ask for your support, because I reiterate the commitment not to fail you; dead first than betraying you.

But above all, let us act with optimism and joy because we have the enormous joy of living in interesting times; we are before a stellar moment in history because together we begin to build the justice and happiness that our people deserve and a new life for our great nation.

Long live Mexico! Long live Mexico! Long live Mexico!
Mexico City Zócalo, December 1, 2018

And from the same web site:
The 100 commitments of the new president of Mexico, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, are published below. In addition to his ambitious roadmap, yesterday’s day was marked by an unprecedented and exciting ceremony in Mexico City’s Zócalo, in which AMLO received the baton of command from the indigenous peoples.

Thousands of people participated in this ceremony with a strong spiritual and political charge, being protagonists of this historic moment, exemplary for everyone.

Latin American Summary, December 2, 2018.

The original peoples performed a ritual and with chants they received the new president.

“We are going to consecrate our president of the Republic, Andrés Manuel López Obrador,” they said.

“It is an honor to be with you, we, the original peoples, are present, we ask you to allow us to perform a ritual of purification,” they said, then began the it.

Shortly after, they gave him the Baton of Command, “here is the symbol with which he will lead our people.

They asked to be taken into account and expressed their commitment to the president.

Shouting “president, president,” followed by other exclamations of “Obrador, Obrador,” at 5:05 the arrival of Andrés Manuel López Obrador to the capital’s Zócalo was announced.

And the people turned in joy, and began to chant “it’s an honour…”.

“Here is the baton of command with which you will lead our people, as long as, we want to remember, we are taken into account in the plans you have for these six years,” they told him when they handed him the baton. “Receive from our hands and on behalf of our people who will guide you, the indigenous peoples and the Mexican people give you their trust and commitment.

In the ceremony they explained that “the cane was consecrated at five o’clock in the morning, in the ceremonial centre that guards the wisdom of our ancestors, those men and women who came to this place to populate Tenochtitlán, the first town that today we call Mexico”. The cedar cane was made in Ayutla Mixes, in the northern highlands of Oaxaca.

Prior to the delivery of the cane, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and Beatriz Gutierrez received a purificatio from traditional doctors. At one point, one of the doctors knelt in front of López Obrador and while he was talking, his voice broke. Faced with this, visibly moved, the president also knelt.

In the greeting to the four cardinal points, the entire Zócalo participated, in what is probably the greatest ritual that there has ever been in the country.

8-Flora Sapio on the Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprise (Article 12 International Cooperation)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Musée Ariana, porcelain figures Meissen 1725-1730 )

Flora Sapio (Comments on the "Zero-Draft"), and I (Making Sausages?: Preliminary Thoughts on the "Zero-Draft") have been considering the challenges posed by the Zero Draft.  But we wanted to dig deeper.  To that end we wanted to avoid the altogether too easy exercise of textual exegesis to suggest the challenges that this draft might construct for itself.

Rather than consider text, or text in light of the various mandates and principles purportedly manifested in the language used to build the Zero Draft, we thought it might be useful to consider text within the context of the initial commentary it might generate among Zero Draft stakeholders motivated enough to make them. These, then, might usefully inform the reading of text, and sharpen analysis of its structure and consequences. 

To that end, and in this and subsequent posts, Flora Sapio  presents summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.  These, then, will be woven together first to develop both a critique of the Zero Draft, and thereafter to suggest the value of an alternative, framework, model for such a project.

This Part 8 focuses on Article 12 of the Zero Draft (International Cooperation). 






Summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG
Article 12 (International Cooperation)
Flora Sapio 


On 14 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG). According to Resolution 26/9, the Working Group has the mandate to: “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”

By “Other business enterprises” the Human Rights Council referred to all business enterprises having a transnational character in their operational activities. This designation does not apply to local businesses.

In establishing the OEIGWG, the Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG would be dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the future Treaty. Following deliberations, the Chairperson would prepare elements for the draft Treaty. Substantive negotiations on the Treaty would be held during the third session of the Working Group, based on the discussions held during the first two sessions.

The OEIGWG held its first session from 6 to 10 July 2015. A second session took place from 24 to 28 October 2016. Based on discussions held during the first two sessions, a third session was convened from 23 to 27 October 2017. During this session, the elements for the draft Treaty were discussed. Also, the OEIGWG requested the Chair-Rapporteur to complement the ongoing bilateral consultations with states and non-state stakeholders with informal consultations.

Following the third session, a Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Other Business Enterprises (OBEs) was prepared by Ecuador. In July 2018 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India released the draft for public comments.

The Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument (and a zero draft of an optional protocol to the binding instrument) formed the basis for a first round of substantive negotiations, held in Geneva from 15 to 19 October 2018. According to the program of work adopted by the OEIGWG, substantive negotiations saw experts, representatives of national states, transnational organizations, and NGOs comment on the Zero Draft.

In this and in following posts, I will be presenting summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.


Article 1 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 2 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 3 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 4 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 5 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 6 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 7 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 8 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 9 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 10 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 11 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 12 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 13 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 14 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 15 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018

Article12 (International Cooperation)



1. State Parties recognize the importance of international cooperation and its promotion for the realization of the purpose of the present Convention and will undertake appropriate and effective measures in this regard, between and among States and, as appropriate, in partnership with relevant international and regional organizations and civil society. Such measures could include, but are not limited to:

a. promote effective technical cooperation and capacity-building among policy makers, operators and users of domestic, regional and international remedial mechanism,
b. Sharing experiences, good practices, challenges, information and training programs on the implementation of the present convention,
c. Facilitating cooperation in research and studies on the best practices and experiences for preventing violations of human rights in the context of business activities of transitional character.


Article 12 of the Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises  was scheduled for discussion on 17 October 2018, from 10  AM to 13 PM, together with articles 10 (Legal Liability) and 11 (Mutual Legal Assistance).

Written comments specific to Article 12 were submitted by:

  • 1 expert
  • 3 states (Costa Rica, Egypt, Namibia)
  • 2 NGOs


Comments by Experts

Surya Deva, UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights: article 12 contemplates partnership not only among States but also between States and civil society to raise awareness, build capacity, share good practices, and conduct research to promote business respect for human rights. We would suggest that NHRIs should also be part of such collaborative partnerships. To appreciate better the concerns of diverse rights holders, it would also be critical to engage civil society actors who work specifically on the rights of women, children, indigenous peoples, migrant workers, and persons with disabilities.

Written comments by Maddalena Neglia, FIDH, are not available on the OHCHR website.

Comments by States

Costa Rica: Costa Rica recognizes the importance of promoting the international framework for human rights at the national and international levels, and cooperation plays a key role. My country considers it important to be inspired by the Guiding Principles, to promote effective international cooperation schemes and share the best practices on the subject at hand.

Capacity-building and awareness-raising initiatives can play a decisive role in helping all States to to fulfill its duty of protection. Costa Rica agrees that collective action through multilateral institutions can help the States to level the situation with respect to the observance of human rights by companies in different States and this must be achieved by raising the level of States lagging behind. A very important challenge is to work in a cooperative scheme where TNCs are not included.

Egypt: article 12 is one of the important elements of the draft document and we propose strengthening it by including references to transnational corporations and enterprises so that awareness programs are organized on the principles and standards of human rights and the obligations of the host State and the mother country to ensure compliance with those obligations.

Namibia:articles 11 & 12 are clear and is clearly based on other international instruments, which provides for MLA and International Cooperation, and which have been implemented with great successes.

Comments by NGOs

International Association of Democratic Lawyers:international cooperation is strategic to guarantee the effectiveness of the Treaty, therefore the State obligation to facilitate homologation and compliance with foreign judgment must be guaranteed, despite arguments about sovereignty and national security, which do not contribute to the consolidation of a global community of norms of protection of human dignity.

International Organization of Employers: many provisions in the Zero Draft Treaty focus on imposing sanctions on companies on the one hand, while strengthening international cooperation and mutual legal assistance between States on the other hand. With its focus on transnational corporations and not domestic enterprises, the Zero Draft Treaty does not adequately consider how such State-to-State action will improve the situation for victims of any business-related harm in the jurisdiction where the adverse impact occurred and not just lead to a two-tiered system of compliance. The Zero Draft Treaty does not propose any "sticks" to accompany the "carrots" for States or other measures to increase peer pressure between States to ensure they meet their human rights duties at the national level. Improving State performance on human rights, such as by achieving policy coherence between existing standards and national laws, is a long-standing challenge. It is not clear that this Treaty would succeed where other similar instruments have not.




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“变化世界中的公司”2018 年国际学术研讨会--2018 International Symposium on The Corporation in a Changing World

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It is my great delight to participate, for a second year, in the marvelous conference “变化世界中的公司”2018 年国际学术研讨会--2018 International Symposium on The Corporation in a Changing World. The conference is hosted by the China Commercial Law Society, the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law, East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law and is organized by and the SUFE Law School Commercial Law Center [主办:中国法学会商法学研究会 上海财经大学法学院 华东政法大学经济法学院 承办:上海财经大学法学院商法研究中心 ]. Special recognition for Ezra Mitchell, Professor, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law [以斯拉·米切尔 上海财经大学法学院教授] for making all of this possible. 
 
This post includes the program and participant lists in 中国语文 and English.  My own remarks will be posted in a few days. 


























9-Flora Sapio on the Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprise (Article 3 Scope)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Musée Ariana, porcelain figures Meissen 1725-1730 )

Flora Sapio (Comments on the "Zero-Draft"), and I (Making Sausages?: Preliminary Thoughts on the "Zero-Draft") have been considering the challenges posed by the Zero Draft.  But we wanted to dig deeper.  To that end we wanted to avoid the altogether too easy exercise of textual exegesis to suggest the challenges that this draft might construct for itself.

Rather than consider text, or text in light of the various mandates and principles purportedly manifested in the language used to build the Zero Draft, we thought it might be useful to consider text within the context of the initial commentary it might generate among Zero Draft stakeholders motivated enough to make them. These, then, might usefully inform the reading of text, and sharpen analysis of its structure and consequences. 

To that end, and in this and subsequent posts, Flora Sapio  presents summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.  These, then, will be woven together first to develop both a critique of the Zero Draft, and thereafter to suggest the value of an alternative, framework, model for such a project.

This Part 9 focuses on Article 3 of the Zero Draft (Scope). 






Summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG
Article 3 (Scope) 
Flora Sapio 


On 14 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG). According to Resolution 26/9, the Working Group has the mandate to: “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”

By “Other business enterprises” the Human Rights Council referred to all business enterprises having a transnational character in their operational activities. This designation does not apply to local businesses.

In establishing the OEIGWG, the Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG would be dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the future Treaty. Following deliberations, the Chairperson would prepare elements for the draft Treaty. Substantive negotiations on the Treaty would be held during the third session of the Working Group, based on the discussions held during the first two sessions.

The OEIGWG held its first session from 6 to 10 July 2015. A second session took place from 24 to 28 October 2016. Based on discussions held during the first two sessions, a third session was convened from 23 to 27 October 2017. During this session, the elements for the draft Treaty were discussed. Also, the OEIGWG requested the Chair-Rapporteur to complement the ongoing bilateral consultations with states and non-state stakeholders with informal consultations.

Following the third session, a Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Other Business Enterprises (OBEs) was prepared by Ecuador. In July 2018 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India released the draft for public comments.

The Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument (and a zero draft of an optional protocol to the binding instrument) formed the basis for a first round of substantive negotiations, held in Geneva from 15 to 19 October 2018. According to the program of work adopted by the OEIGWG, substantive negotiations saw experts, representatives of national states, transnational organizations, and NGOs comment on the Zero Draft.

In this and in following posts, I will be presenting summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.


Article 1 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 2 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 3 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 4 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 5 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 6 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 7 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 8 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 9 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 10 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 11 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 12 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 13 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 14 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 15 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018

Article 3

 
1. This Convention shall apply to human rights violations in the context of any business activities of a transnational character.

2. This Convention shall cover all international human rights and those rights recognized under domestic law.



Article 3 of the Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises  was scheduled for discussion on 17 October 2018, from 15 to 18 PM, together with article 4 (Definitions).

Written comments specific to Article 3 were submitted by:

  • 2 experts
  • 1 group of five states (Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Chile)
  • 7 states (Chile, China, India, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Switzerland)
  • 1 international organization
  • 5 NGOs


Comments by Experts

David Bilchitz, University of Johannesburg:

First, a common starting point should be that all states are concerned to ensure that the human rights of individuals are given effect to. It has little bearing on an individual whether someone who violates his/her rights is a massive transnational corporation or a smaller business. This consideration would support the recognition of a general obligation upon business not to violate human rights.

Secondly, we can recognize that there are many contexts in which businesses are not held to account for violations of fundamental rights. State are already under a duty in international law to protect individuals from harm by businesses and so a new treaty is not necessary to make this point in relation to domestic companies. But, realities are that, even in domestic systems alone, there is an enforcement gap often in relation to business. This consideration would support going beyond the state to develop regional or international accountability mechanisms to do so.

Thirdly, the fact that business crosses borders and is structured through complex global supply chains creates particular challenges for the enforcement of fundamental rights. Since no one state can address these problems, this consideration motivates for an international law resolution.

Article 3(1) states that the Convention should apply to human rights violations in the context of any business activity of a transnational character. One major worry about this definition is that business will attempt to exploit the focus on ‘transnational character’ to find loopholes to avoid liability in terms of the treaty.  The nature of business today is such that the global transnational corporations engage intimately with a range of small businesses which are largely locally based.

Olivier De Schutter, Professor, University of Louvain: the scope of application of the instrument is defined by the nature of the activity concerned, rather than by an attempt to distinguish transnational corporations from other business enteprises. It would be problematic to seek to establish a distinction between transnational corporations (TNCs) and other business enterprises (OBEs), or between enterprises which have activities of a transnational character and enterprises which do not have such activities (and whose activities thus are limited to a single jurisdiction). TNCs are simple networks of distinct companies (each of which is domiciled in a national jurisdiction), more or less tightly connected to one another by investment or contractual links, and that follow a global strategy under a more or less integrated leadership structure.

It is appropriate to base the scope of application of the future instrument on the transnational nature of the activity than on the nature of the corporation itself: in other terms, it is to the extent that the corporation deploys its economic activities across different national jurisdictions (by investing in a outside jurisdiction, by buying shares in companies domiciled in other countries, by licensing of franchisee agreements, or by contracting with suppliers or sub-contractors located in other jurisdictions) that the future instrument shall be of relevance to those activities.

The scope of application clause could be reworded as follows:

This treaty applies to the activities of all corporations, irrespective of their size, mode of creation or control or ownership. Its scope of application is limited to business activities that have a transnational character.

Written comments by Sandra Ratjen, Franscicans International are not available on the OHCHR website.

Written comments by Kinda Mohamadieh, South Centre, are not available on the OHCHR website.

Comments by States

Brazil, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Chile: the scope of this Instrument impacts its consistency and its effectiveness. Given this is a human rights instrument we are concerned because its scope is determined according to the type of activities, rather than by the gravity of their impact. The scope of this instrument should be broadened to all kinds of buiness activities. Limiting this instrument to a specific kind of business activities sets this Treaty apart from the UNGPs, and leaves room for interpretation regarding the transnational nature of business activities, as there are no clear, stable and uniform criteria for its determination. To be able to confer victims of effective remedy mechanisms and provided with legal certainty, there must be a precise regulatory framework that includes all companies.

Chile: we believe this instrument should include the activities of all enterprises. The present wording is inadequate. Any company that sporadically carries out transactions with an international impact, or that involve persons or assets located in two or more states could be included in the scope of application of the Treaty, according to the interpretation that is granted. Given the Treaty has not created a body competent to determine whether an enterprise is included within the scope of application, states can use different criteria to reach such a determination. The absence of clear, stable and uniform criteria to determine which enterprises are included in the Treaty creates legal uncertainty. The scope of the Treaty should be revised, to include all enterprises without distinctions.

China: this article should be examined according to the principle of legality
 
We support the content of Article 3.2 but a precise determination is needed on how to achieve its goal. First, international human rights are not clearly defined. This overly general expression does not conform to the principle of legality. There is a risk to impose on states international obligations they do not undertake or accept. We suggest that, as a legal basis for obligations and responsibilities, the international human rights here referred to be those that emanate from treaties to which the state is a party, and the customary international law accepted by the concerned state. This is the approach taken by the first operative paragraph of the 2005  Basic principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross violation of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violation of International Humanitarian Law.

Second, this article refers to human rights recognized under domestic law. Human rights recognized by each state are common, but they are also different. Some human rights have different legal meanings in different legal contexts. Unlike non-legally binding documents, and documents that can be autonomously executed by states, we are negotiating a binding instrument. Therefore, this wording will result in different standards for judging human rights violations in different countries. The criteria to determine legal liability are inconsistent, they lack predictability, and do not conform to the principle of legality.

India: on Article 3, India reiterates its position that this instrument should focus only on business activities of a transnational nature and not to national enterprises as we already have domestic laws to regulate them. India also believes that point 2 of Article 3 should be revised so as to ensure that there is no conflict between a state’s domestic laws and its international obligations.

Mexico: limiting the scope of the instrument to transnational enterprises allows to create consensus on the Treaty. But, we do not think it appropriate to limit the scope of application to transnational enterprises only, because not all legal or physical persons that can violate human rights have a transnational character. As Professor de Schutter said, state enterprises, or private enterprises with transnational operations have a significant economic power, and they are a majority of enterprises, therefore they can cause a greater number of human rights violations.

The application of the Treaty can be different in states where domestic legislation is not robust enough, and where mechanisms of regulation and prevention are not sufficiently solid. To avoid jurisdiction shopping we suggest to extent the scope of application to all business activities, regardless of their domestic or transnational character.

The term “violation” should only be used with reference to states, while “abuses” or “adverse impacts” should be used with reference to violations caused by business activities.

Peru: the concept of human rights includes a broad range of rights and the Treaty should define the rights it applies to. We reiterate our comments on the need not to make any distinction between different kinds of enterprises, according to the UNGPs.  It is necessary to create a process or a modality allowing to overcome the limitations created by the footnote to Resolution 26/9, and include domestic enterprises in the Treaty. Alternatively, a new Human Rights Council Resolution is needed.

South Africa:my delegation wishes to reiterate that this Intergovernmental Working Group as created by Resolution 26/9 was mandated to create a legally binding instrument for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. In this regard the scope should clearly reflect this. No business enterprise may violate human rights but at the same time the focus is on TNCs and OBEs (as mentioned by some delegations). The text in the Zero Draft should therefore use the language as agreed by replacing “business activities of a transnational character” with Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises to read
This Convention shall apply to human rights violations occurring as a result of the operational activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises

In addition, the text should include fundamental freedoms  to read:

This Convention shall cover all internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms and those further recognised under domestic law.

Furthermore, international humanitarian law including situations of occupation and armed conflict must be included.

Switzerland: Switzerland presented two requests for clarification:


Comments by International Organizations

South Center:proposed a textual exegesis of Article 3 that would allow inclusion of domestic enterprises in the scope of the Draft Treaty, concluding that “the zero draft seems to seek asserting the general principle that all business enterprises shall respect human rights, which basically makes the Guiding Principles’ language an integral part of a binding treaty, thus taking them a step forward. While doing that, the zero draft keeps the focus on the specific concerns emerging from transnational business conduct which requires international cooperation or will otherwise not be effectively addressed.”

Negotiating parties seeking further clarity and certainty in the negotiation outcome could seek clarifying language or footnotes, such as assertions that domestic laws to be developed in implementation of this Treaty would be done in a manner that does not discriminate among domestic entities or between domestic and foreign entities, although this should already be guaranteed as a result of obligations that States have, either deriving from constitutional law, or stemming from the principle of non-discrimination under international law.

Comments by NGOs

Corporate Accountability International: there is a legal vacuum in regards to corporate accountability in cases of human rights violations committed by transnational entities, due to a State centered paradigm established in the 1940s, when the international system of human rights became to take shape.  One of the great benefits that will be brought by the future treaty will be to expand the existing venues for victims to seek redress for human rights violations caused by transnational corporations. That can only by accomplished with the focus on business activities of transnational character, as well as by establishing direct obligations to them.

FIAN: we believe the mandate of this working group refers to the activities of transnational business enterprises but, we are concerned that the Treaty may create different rights for those affected by the activities of TNCs. Therefore, we suggest the inclusion of a non-discrimination clause when the obligations of the Treaty are applicable to national business activities or, alternatively, the explicit inclusion of a clause according to which the obligations deriving from Articles 9, 10.8 and 8 also apply to activities of a national nature when this is possible.

FIDH:individuals and groups on the ground are confronted to a variety of companies, and it isn't their structure or transnational character that determines if they violate human rights.  We propose that the text embody a hybrid approach :
  • the responsibility of all companies to respect human rights, which is well established under international law and recognized by the UNGPs should be set in the operational part of the text rather than in its preamble;
  • the definition of the activities that fall under the scope of the treaty should be flexible, and have the capacity to adapt and evolve following the changing nature and structure of business. It should be clarified that the criteria used for defining "activities of transnational character" are alternative and not cumulative;
  • State-owned enterprises should be included in the scope of the Treaty;
  • considering companies often operate through partnerships, joint ventures and other contractual forms associating several legal persons, it is important for the treaty to refer to "natural or legal persons" in plural and not in the singular form and to establish a joint liability for these types of associations.

Friends of the Earth International: we think respecting the mandate of Resolution 26/9 – a focus on TNCs – is essential. The rights referred to in Article 3.2 should include those enshrined in the main international convention on human rights, and in particular the right to the self-determination of peoples, environmental rights, and all collective rights of indigenous peoples and communities. It is essential to acknowledge environmental rights as human rights.

International Organization of Employers: it is not clear that direct international human rights obligations would apply only to State Parties, and not business. The use of the term "violations"  could imply that companies have a direct legal international human rights obligation under this Treaty.

Limiting the scope to "business activities of a transnational character" (which has no accepted definition) excludes domestic companies, and ignores the impact of SOEs. The Treaty will not serve most victims, and there is incentive for States to lead by example.

It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess the vast array of activities that have a "transnational character" and reasonably determine liability for a harm that involves a cross-border transaction. Given the failure to understand the three distinct ways that a business can be involved in a harm, if companies were to be held liable for a violation of all human rights in the context of an "activity of a transnational character" they would need the corresponding capabilities to meet such a huge responsibility.

The terms "all human rights" and "all international human rights" have no legal basis and it is not clear what human rights would be covered by the Treaty or which standards would be used to define a human rights violation.




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Ruminations 82: On the 70th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

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Monday, 10 December, is celebrated as Human Rights Day. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  International Organizations, and those individuals and groups who value that document, has sought to make the most of the event.  

This post celebrates the anniversary in a slightly different way. It uses to occasion of the anniversary to consider very briefly three different aspects of the human rights project that might well be now worth a moment of thought. The first of these is the danger of a relentless focus on the rights aspects of the Universal Declaration.  The second is the mania for victimization. The third is the need to re-focus on the obligations of states, other collective actors, and individuals.

I can think of no better way to celebrate the achievement of survival not by eulogizing its past, nor even by contributing to its (potent) mythology, but by considering the ripples it has produced in the organization of relations between individuals and power holders.

http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf


1. Focusing on the rights aspects of the Human Rights Declaration. It is not without reason that one centers rights in any consideration of the Universal Declaration.  Indeed, one of the great innovations of the Universal Declaration was precisely to focus on the individual, not as an object of rights, but as its source. Rights could not be vested in an individual by any power holder (states, religions, societal communities, and the like) because the rights were inherent in the person. Detaching rights in that way could radically alter the way in which one approached both the conception and the implementation of systems for the protection of those rights.  But more importantly, it acknowledged that the individual herself had the inherent authority to protect those rights herself.  An individual was not dependent on the good graces of a power holder for the elaboration and protection of her rights—she could assert them herself. That insight brought with it the possibility of an even more radically transformative possibility, that the individual need not be dependent on the state for the elaboration or vindication of her rights.  She could do that herself. The individual, in effect, became the central holder of power over her own rights.

The consequences have proven to be profound.  Over the course of the last 70 years, human rights have become detached from the state.  It has moved to first public international institutions which have elaborated more and more law and norms of human rights.  It has shifted the views of many about the hierarchy of law (and norms), displacing the state at its apex, with the international community. That has caused substantial reaction by states, to be sure.  Yet that radical possibility, inherent in the Universal Declaration is now quite respectably assumed even as the state retains the central role in administering these international instruments and norms.  Yet the full potential of this insight has not yet been realized. In the wings is the notion that those rights inherent in the individual and recognized in the Universal Declaration need not be dependent on politics, and political bodies, for their elaboration or vindication.  As rights are inherent in the individual, they might also precede politics.  Two consequences may follow.  The first is that rights may be elaborated and protected by any community; that is that individuals may band together in elaboration or defense of their rights.  The second is that rights themselves may be detached from any community. At this most radical level, rights no longer require a social context. And the relationship between the individual and communities, and between communities and political orders, becomes upended.  



2.  The mania for victimization. There has been a growing solicitude for the suffering of rights holders whose interests have been adversely affected by others—individuals, enterprises, social or religious communities, or the state. That solicitude reflects a general social trend in many developed states, that emphasizes the suffering causes by deprivations of the protections of rights at the hands of others. That trend has given rise to a curious recasting of the rights holder—who are all of us—into the victim, who represent only those rights holders who have suffered loss (and sometimes who have alleged such loss), at the hands of others.  Perhaps this is designed to refocus the business of the protection of rights more towards those who suffer loss.  Perhaps it is a means toward a political project of reform of the policy emphasis or on the modalities of approaching issues of remediation or prevention of such loss, in law and policy.  The result is the recasting of law and legal instruments, on the one hand, and the re-focus of policy, on the other, awayfrom the rights holder to the victim. Human rights has shifted its focus from elaboration to accountability, and from rights to remediation.

Whatever the value of that re-focus, it s consequences might have some radically transformative effects. First, it opens the possibility of creating a new status based legal category—the victim. To that extent, the connection between the individual and her rights become detached—that is the solicitude for victims evidenced in this manner effectively strips the Universal Declaration of its core achievement, individual, not as an object of rights, but as its source. It does so by shifting the understanding f rights from something inherent in the individual to something that arises only upon the occurrence of a triggering event.  In effect, it centers rights discourse on acts of violation, which acts create the “victim;” in this way rights become attached to an individual only as and when it is understood that they might be violated.  

Second, the trend toward the victimization of human rights produces the possibility of a further trend—the trend toward the detachment of agency from the individual rights holder, to those institutions with authority to declare the conditions for the violations of rights, and who can reserve to themselves the authority to vindicate those rights on behalf of the individual. Those in authority could include other individuals, states, international organizations, or civil society.  They need not ask permission. That deprivation of agency and subsequent shift of authority to act can at its limit itself constitute a violation of a core human right—that of human dignity and autonomy. Third, beyond detaching rights and depriving agency, the trend toward victimization appear to move the social and legal order back to status-based forms. 

Third, while the focus on remedy is laudable and necessary, it runs the quite significant risk of changing the character of the right itself.   At first blush this may strike the reader as odd.  Many of us have been taught that remedy is inherent in rights; that right without remedy is an illusion, and that the tie between the two is unbreakable.  At a very general level of abstraction, of course, all of this is true.  But consider what happens when rights are transformed into injury to victims, and remedy becomes the principal expression of rights.  It is possible, within this relational construct to see the notion of rights reduced to expression, and that expression itself constructed from out of the modalities of administration.  It is at this point that the consequences may well become, well, consequential. First, rights understood as expressions directed by one body against another loses its endogenous character and becomes exogenous.  That is, that the understanding of rights shifts from the individual to the expression. Second, the authority over such rights shifts from the rights holder to those who can define, and then administer such expressions of “triggering events.” Again, rights are framed to recognize victims and potential victims,  and they do so from an exterior position. It is a small thing, really, but one with great effect in a world where the agency of the individual tends in any case to be understood as a residuary principle.   



3. A Re-Focus on the obligations, of states, other collectives and even individuals may be necessary.  I have spoken of the core value of the Universal Declaration as sign post for the important development of the concept of rights in individuals. And I have suggested how some trends, especially that of solicitude for victims, can pose a threat to that development. I have suggested the primal importance of agency as against other actors as being at the core of the principles in the Universal Declaration.  Yet the Universal Declaration also includes limiting or at least balancing principles that have been overlooked as well. These limiting and balancing principles arise from the notion inherent in the Universal Declaration that rights are relational; they are relational in the sense of acknowledging a connection between those in whom rights reside, those whose actions may interfere with the enjoyment of those rights, and those (including the rights holder) with the obligation to prevent or remedy the consequences of such interference. To that end, it might be better to speak not of the centering of remedy in relation to human rights, but rather to speak to centering of the obligations of states, other collective and individual actors with respect to human rights.

That, lamentably, remains among the weakest of the achievements of 70 years of human right stalk. The reason of course is that it has remained to some large extent talk.  Yes, of course, high profile instances, when they align with the strategic interests of states, or of markets, tend to generate a lot of discussion and some action. But those are exceptional and speak more to the ordering interest of states and markets than to the inherent obligation that ought not to be detached from rights. Human rights, in consequence, usually serves as a fetish—words that are uttered in furtherance of some agenda or other.  They do not speak to a specific thing, but increasingly to an amorphous amalgam of desires and objectives conveniently clothed not just as human rights, but increasingly as human rights law. The entirety of human relations can be seen through the prism of a human rights lens.  The danger is that, at its limit, human rights loses its character as rights and becomes a set of ordering principles from out of which rights and obligations can be framed. It is this tendency, of course, that generates the drive to center remedy.  Yet perhaps it might be as useful to center obligation as well. But that is a hard task, and one that has eluded resolution almost from the moment the Universal Declaration was adopted. And principally, the hard task of obliging states to specify what each is willing to concede as human rights, the relation of those rights to remedy, and the mandatory obligations of power holders with respect to those rights. This, then, might be a useful task for the next 70 years of the Universal Declaration.


10-Flora Sapio on the Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprise (Article 4 Definitions)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Musée Ariana, porcelain figures Meissen 1725-1730 )

Flora Sapio (Comments on the "Zero-Draft"), and I (Making Sausages?: Preliminary Thoughts on the "Zero-Draft") have been considering the challenges posed by the Zero Draft.  But we wanted to dig deeper.  To that end we wanted to avoid the altogether too easy exercise of textual exegesis to suggest the challenges that this draft might construct for itself.

Rather than consider text, or text in light of the various mandates and principles purportedly manifested in the language used to build the Zero Draft, we thought it might be useful to consider text within the context of the initial commentary it might generate among Zero Draft stakeholders motivated enough to make them. These, then, might usefully inform the reading of text, and sharpen analysis of its structure and consequences. 

To that end, and in this and subsequent posts, Flora Sapio  presents summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.  These, then, will be woven together first to develop both a critique of the Zero Draft, and thereafter to suggest the value of an alternative, framework, model for such a project.

This Part 10 focuses on Article 4 of the Zero Draft (Definitions) (with China, India, and Mexico's comments quite interesting). 





Summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG
Article 4 (Definitions)
Flora Sapio 


On 14 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG). According to Resolution 26/9, the Working Group has the mandate to: “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”

By “Other business enterprises” the Human Rights Council referred to all business enterprises having a transnational character in their operational activities. This designation does not apply to local businesses.

In establishing the OEIGWG, the Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG would be dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the future Treaty. Following deliberations, the Chairperson would prepare elements for the draft Treaty. Substantive negotiations on the Treaty would be held during the third session of the Working Group, based on the discussions held during the first two sessions.

The OEIGWG held its first session from 6 to 10 July 2015. A second session took place from 24 to 28 October 2016. Based on discussions held during the first two sessions, a third session was convened from 23 to 27 October 2017. During this session, the elements for the draft Treaty were discussed. Also, the OEIGWG requested the Chair-Rapporteur to complement the ongoing bilateral consultations with states and non-state stakeholders with informal consultations.

Following the third session, a Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Other Business Enterprises (OBEs) was prepared by Ecuador. In July 2018 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India released the draft for public comments.

The Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument (and a zero draft of an optional protocol to the binding instrument) formed the basis for a first round of substantive negotiations, held in Geneva from 15 to 19 October 2018. According to the program of work adopted by the OEIGWG, substantive negotiations saw experts, representatives of national states, transnational organizations, and NGOs comment on the Zero Draft.

In this and in following posts, I will be presenting summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.


Article 1 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 2 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 3 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 4 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 5 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 6 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 7 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 8 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 9 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 10 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 11 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 12 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 13 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 14 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 15 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018

Article 4 (Definitions)



1. “Victims” shall mean persons who individually or collectively alleged to have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their human rights, including environmental rights, through acts or omissions in the context of business activities of a transnational character. Where appropriate, and in accordance with domestic law, the term “victim” also includes the immediate family or dependents of the direct victim and persons who have suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimization.

2. “Business activities of a transnational character” shall mean any for-profit economic activity, including but not limited to productive or commercial activity, undertaken by a natural or legal person, including activities undertaken by electronic means, that take place or involve actions, persons or impact in two or more national jurisdictions.



This is article affirms concepts, principles and rights contained, among others, in the following international instruments:



Article 4 of the Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises  was scheduled for discussion on 17 October 2018, from 15 to 18 PM, together with article 3 (Scope).

Written comments specific to Article 4 were submitted by:

  • 2 experts
  • 6 States (Argentina, China, India, Mexico, Peru, South Africa)
  • 1 international organization
  • 4 NGOs


Comments by Experts

David Bilchitz, University of Johannesburg: states are already under a duty in international law to protect individuals from harm by businesses and so a new treaty is not necessary to make this point in relation to domestic companies. But, realities are that, even in domestic systems alone, there is an enforcement gap often in relation to business. This consideration would support going beyond the state to develop regional or international accountability mechanisms to do so. The nature of business today is such that the global transnational corporations engage intimately with a range of small businesses which are largely locally based. I would therefore suggest amending the definition to include two further sentences:

‘Business activity of a transnational character’ should, include economic activity which is undertaken not solely for local purposes but for contributing supply to markets that cross international boundaries’, and economic activity that takes place as part of a network of relationships that cross international boundaries’.

It is suggested that there be a new provision added titled  General Principles of international law at the beginning of the treaty. It should include two important sections: first, it should bring the statement in the Preamble concerning corporate obligations into the operational provisions of the treaty itself and state the following:  All business enterprises, regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership or structure shall respect and contribute towards the realization of human rights’; secondly, it should recognize the state duty to ensure business enterprises meet their obligations. Laying down these provisions, would attempt to address the first two issues I mentioned. The scope provision could then say, that ‘without affecting the general principles outlined in this treaty, the scope of this Convention will focus on human rights violations in the context of business activities of a transnational character’.

Olivier De Schutter, Professor, University of Louvain: the definition of "business activities of a transnational character" in Article 4(2) may create confusion, and could be improved. Restricting the definition to "for-profit economic activity" alone stems from a sound intention but, it may be interpreted as excluding from the scope of application of the instrument all state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This would be a mistake, both because SOEs ought to be even more exemplary in their conduct, since States, as shareholders, can influence more easily their day-to-day operations, and because SOEs have gained major positions of influence in many world regions.  Secondly, defining activities "of a transnational character" as activities that "take place or involve actions, persons or impact in two or more national jurisdictions", may be excessively vague. As such, this formulation may be at the same time too broad and too narrow. The latter consequence  based on a restrictive (but literal) reading of the current definition of "business activities of a transnational character" contained in Article 4(2), would be especially problematic, since it would be inconsistent with the important provisions on human rights due diligence (Article 9. Prevention)

The  scope of application clause could therefore be reworded as follows:

This treaty applies to the activities of all corporations, irrespective of their size, mode of creation or control or ownership. Its scope of application is limited to business activities that have a transnational character. and the definition of "business activities of a transnational character" could be reworded as: Business activities of a transnational character are activities that a corporation conducts in another juridiction than the jurisdiction where it is domiciled:
(i) directly;
(ii) through branches, subsidiaries, or affiliates; or
(iii) through business partners with which the corporation has a continuous business relationship,
thus affecting human rights of individuals or groups located outside the jurisdiction where the corporation is domiciled.

Written comments by Sandra Ratjen, Franscicans International are not available on the OHCHR website.

Written comments by Kinda Mohamadieh, South Centre, are not available on the OHCHR website.

Comments by States

Argentina: the definition of victims is characterized by a lack of precision, that makes it difficult to know the limits necessary to apply this project. Under this definition, an undefined number of persons may be considered victims, opening up the way to extend the active legitimation to initiate actions that entail the risk of distorting the objectives of the system.

China: we have noticed how the definition of “victims” is based on the 2005 Principles and Guidelines. It can be the basis of negotiation. But considering we are negotiating a legal document, requests about clarity and precision of meaning are higher than those of the Basic Principles and Guidelines. Discussion of a specific wording in the future should not preclude necessary modifications.

Concerning paragraph 2, according to the mandate, the document we are negotiating is mostly for TNCs. The “business activities of a transnational character” mentioned in paragraph 2 are only a complement. Therefore, it may be considered to augment the definition of TNCs. The definition of “business activities of a transnational character” is broad, including the word impact, and needs further review.

India:
as far as Article 4 on ‘Definitions’ is concerned, the text requires to be revisited to bring in more clarity and flexibility. Phrases like ‘mental injury’ or ‘emotional suffering’ are difficult to define objectively in the legal sense. Hence it leaves room for their misuse. The reference to ‘environmental rights’ also needs to be revisited.

On the definition of ‘business activities of a transnational nature’, India believes that the definition requires to be fine-tuned as a number of elements in the definition raise concerns. Use of words and phrases like ‘impact’ and ‘including activities undertaken by electronic means’  have the potential to conflict with the growth of e-commerce activities. This impinges on the development of economic activities of states. Hence, further clarity is required on these points.

Mexico:the definition of “victim” may be problematic because it may differ based on domestic law. We consider it problematic that the quality of victim is acquired by the mere fact of claiming to have suffered damage, without establishing a direct causal relation between business activities and their effect. This may cause confusion between victims and petitioners.

The standard to follow in order to acknowledge the quality of victim of a person or a community must be the existence of a direct causal relation by the competent judicial or administrative authority, coherent with regulation of each state. A basis could be the admissibility requirements that are foreseen for petitions in the regional human rights protection systems.

Peru:concerning Article 4.1, that refers to “environemntal right”, a definition acknowledged by international law is necessary.

South Africa:the word victim should encapsulate the following:
  • Peoples or groups of peoples/ communities whose quality of life is affected/ has been affected by the activities of these entities resulting in HR violations.
  • Peoples or groups of peoples/ communities who are suffering/ formerly suffered harm at the hand of these entities as a result of the operational activities.
  • Furthermore, the definition must include individuals/ groups/organs of society who also suffer at the hands of TNCs and OBEs in line with the Declaration on the subject

In line with Resolution 26/9, the definition under Article 4.2 must be specific  and reworded to “Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises”. As formulated the term “business activities of a transnational character” covers one part of the mandate. In addition to the above, the scope should include the methods in which the entity can be involved. The definition for a transnational corporation should include: an entity whether fully or partially state-owned or privately owned which own or controls production, distribution, services that operates across more than two jurisdictions including a partnership, association, joint venture or proprietorship.

Comments by International Organizations

South Center: proposed a textual exegesis of Article 3 that would allow inclusion of domestic enterprises in the scope of the Draft Treaty, concluding that “the zero draft seems to seek asserting the general principle that all business enterprises shall respect human rights, which basically makes the Guiding Principles’ language an integral part of a binding treaty, thus taking them a step forward. While doing that, the zero draft keeps the focus on the specific concerns emerging from transnational business conduct which requires international cooperation or will otherwise not be effectively addressed.”

Negotiating parties seeking further clarity and certainty in the negotiation outcome could seek clarifying language or footnotes, such as assertions that domestic laws to be developed in implementation of this Treaty would be done in a manner that does not discriminate among domestic entities or between domestic and foreign entities, although this should already be guaranteed as a result of obligations that States have, either deriving from constitutional law, or stemming from the principle of non-discrimination under international law.

Comments by NGOs

FIAN:Article 4.2 must include explicit references to State-owned corporations, as well as to international financial institutions, and philantropic institutions funded by transnational business enterprises.

We suggest to include in the definition of victims two central groups: human rights defenders and traditional peoples and communities (pueblos y comunidades tradicionales).

FIDH: individuals and groups on the ground are confronted to a variety of companies, and it isn't their structure or transnational character that determines if they violate human rights.  We propose that the text embody a hybrid approach :
  • the responsibility of all companies to respect human rights, which is well established under international law and recognized by the UNGPs should be set in the operational part of the text rather than in its preamble;
  • the definition of the activities that fall under the scope of the treaty should be flexible, and have the capacity to adapt and evolve following the changing nature and structure of business. It should be clarified that the criteria used for defining "activities of transnational character" are alternative and not cumulative;
  • State-owned enterprises should be included in the scope of the Treaty;
considering companies often operate through partnerships, joint ventures and other contractual forms associating several legal persons, it is important for the treaty to refer to "natural or legal persons" in plural and not in the singular form and to establish a joint liability for these types of associations.

Friends of the Earth International:given the complexity of the structure of transnational enterprises, and their ability to create new legal forms to escape the law, a definition of “transnational enterprises” may be complicated. Definitions of the control relationship may be included. We propose: the control of the home enterprises over the value chain may be direct, indirect, financial, economic or of other kind” (el control de la empresa matriz sobre su cadena de valor puede ser directo, indirecto, financiero, económico o de otro tipo). It is also important to include a definition of supply chain, to determine the scope of responsibility of TNCs for human rights violations.

Finally, it is necessary to include the definition of other words, as “official international economic and financial institutions” and “impacted communities” (comunidades afectadas).

International Organization of Employers: it is not clear that direct international human rights obligations would apply only to State Parties, and not business. The use of the term "violations"  could imply that companies have a direct legal international human rights obligation under this Treaty.

Limiting the scope to "business activities of a transnational character" (which has no accepted definition) excludes domestic companies, and ignores the impact of SOEs. The Treaty will not serve most victims, and there is incentive for States to lead by example.

It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess the vast array of activities that have a "transnational character" and reasonably determine liability for a harm that involves a cross-border transaction. Given the failure to understand the three distinct ways that a business can be involved in a harm, if companies were to be held liable for a violation of all human rights in the context of an "activity of a transnational character" they would need the corresponding capabilities to meet such a huge responsibility.

The terms "all human rights" and "all international human rights" have no legal basis and it is not clear what human rights would be covered by the Treaty or which standards would be used to define a human rights violation.


• The terms "all human rights" and "all international human rights" have no legal basis and it is not clear what human rights would be covered by the Treaty or which standards would be used to define a human rights violation.

• Focusing obligations on "natural or legal persons" is far reaching and it creates tremendous legal uncertainty and risk.

• It is not clear how the inclusion of "environmental rights" would apply to the Treaty; what the term "omissions" means; and the definitions of the terms "victims" and "harm" are unclear, too broad and they do not reflect common civil law traditions.

South Center:

 - The South Centre is an inter-governmental organization of 54 developing countries. My intervention is part of the reflections by the South Centre’s secretariat on the zero draft of an International Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with respect to human, and does not necessarily reflect the views of members of the South Centre.

- My intervention concerns Article 3.1 on ‘scope’ together with Article 4.2 on ‘definitions’, which read as follows:

o Article 3.1: This Convention shall apply to human rights violations in the context of any business activities of a transnational character.

o Article 4.2: “Business activities of a transnational character” shall mean any for-profit economic activity, including but not limited to productive or commercial activity, undertaken by a natural or legal person, including activities undertaken by electronic means, that take place or involve actions, persons or impact in two or more national jurisdictions.

- My general reflections engage particularly the suggestion that the approach proposed under the zero draft would exclude domestic enterprises from coverage under the legally binding instrument.

- The approach proposed under the zero draft does not differentiate entities based on the mere fact of whether they are domestic or not.

- Taking this approach in conjunction with the assertion in the Preamble, which incorporate the Guiding Principles language that all business enterprises shall…respect human rights”, affirms that the proposed Instrument recognizes that it is indeed irrelevant whether an act of violation was committed by a national or transnational entity, and that all enterprises are susceptible of committing human rights violations.

- Yet, this approach shifts our attention from the legal nature of the entity and its nationality to the nature of its business conduct. So all entities are expected to be covered as long as their for-profit activities demonstrate one of three links expressed in Article 4.2, which are whether the activity took place or involves “actions, persons or impact in two or more national jurisdictions”.


 - So actions or omissions by businesses acting only within national jurisdiction/ domestically will not be omitted. For example, an enterprise acting in one jurisdiction at a scale that leads to transboundary impact will be covered. Similarly, a domestic company with no international subsidiaries but which operates with a sufficiently large scale to require sourcing intermediate material from another country or hiring from another jurisdiction would be covered under the treaty.

- In effect, this approach would cover all domestic or national enterprises of significant size allowing them to potentially affect human rights.

- This approach means that the Instrument will eventually cover all kinds of business entities involved in human rights violations, whether they are parent companies, branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, contractors, or business partners, as long as their conduct takes place or involves actions, persons, or impact in two or more national jurisdictions, which would thus require mechanisms of international cooperation to be utilized to achieve effective redress and remedy.

- It is worth noting that the zero draft does not include specific reference to TNCs or other kinds of business enterprises, besides the reference made in the title. It indeed focuses on “any business activity of transnational character”. Avoiding the use of terminology linked to specific legal form of the business entity would potentially be helpful in avoiding the effects of maneuvering such legal forms through restructuring the business entity.

- Other areas of the text include clear indications that no business enterprise is excluded due to the mere fact of operating within domestic jurisdiction only. One example is under Article 9 dealing with prevention and due diligence, where States are provided the possibility to “elect to exempt certain small and medium-sized undertakings from the purview of selected obligations under [the article on prevention] …”. This indicates that generally small and medium-sized enterprises are intended to be covered under the scope of this provision and the treaty, and are not excluded by virtue of the fact that they are domestic enterprises. If small and medium domestic enterprises are already excluded from the scope of the text by virtue of the approach adopted under scope and definitions, then such a provision would not be needed from the start.

- So the zero draft seems to seek asserting the general principle that all business enterprises shall respect human rights, which basically makes the Guiding Principles’ language an integral part of a binding treaty, thus taking them a step forward. While doing that, the zero draft keeps the focus on the specific concerns emerging from transnational business conduct which requires international cooperation or will otherwise not be effectively addressed.

- This approach seems legitimate given the reality of economic and business practices in the world today and seems well suited for a multilateral Instrument that will primarily serve as a preventive and remedial instrument focusing on victims’ access to remedy and justice. Indeed, as articulated by the Chair and multiple participants in this discussion, this would be an Instrument primarily concerned with enforcement of rights in particular situations where there are jurisdictional obstacles to hold business enterprises liable for their misconducts.


- It is worth recalling that the Accountability and Remedy Project of OHCHR recognizes the particular challenges posed by ‘cross-border’ cases1, and defines those cases as ones “where the relevant facts have taken place in, the relevant actors are located in or the evidence needed to prove a case is located in more than one State”.

- Negotiating parties seeking further clarity and certainty in the negotiation outcome could seek clarifying language or footnotes, such as assertions that domestic laws to be developed in implementation of this Treaty would be done in a manner that does not discriminate among domestic entities or between domestic and foreign entities, although this should already be guaranteed as a result of obligations that States have, either deriving from constitutional law, or stemming from the principle of non-discrimination under international law.

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Building a New American Global Liberal Order?--Reflections on Pompeo's Speech (Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order) to the German Marshall Fund 4 December 2018

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It is a pity no one takes the current administration seriously.  That lament is not personal--that is, it ought not to be interpreted as any sort of judgment about the actions or character of the people who now hold positions of authority.  I leave those judgements to the psychologists, politicians, ideologues, and sophists among us. Rather, it is a pity that the current administration's efforts to outline its vision for the emerging American global order has been mindlessly dismissed out of hand. That pitiable state acquires more important dimension when advanced by those who hold positions of influence (but no longer have personal or group access to power), who view this emerging Trump Administration vision, and the people who are advancing these ideas, as personal, professional, and ideological enemies.  As a consequence, the current campaign by those out of power (or with no access to influence within the state apparatus) to mount (effective) campaigns of marginalization, demonization, and personal attack, obscures emerging realities, even as it advances political and ideological objectives.  Agit-prop is no substitute for analysis, though it is a powerful weapon for advancing political agendas. And yet our intellectual classes have developed a taste for conflating the two.

This was very much in evidence among those with access to the global press, especially the establishment press that is used as a vehicle for the projection of influence among literate masses, in the wake of the recent speech delivered by Secretary of State Pompeo at the German Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium (Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order: Remarks delivered by Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo at the German  Marshall Fund, Brussels, Belgium, December 4, 2018).

"Responses ranged from tepid to hostile" (Pompeo Questions the Value of International Groups Like U.N. and E.U., New York Times). The speech was dismissed as ridiculous (Stewart Patrick, Tilting at Straw Men: Secretary Pompeo’s Ridiculous Brussels Speech, for the Council on Foreign Relations). But see Trump building a 'new liberal world order', says secretary of state Mike Pompeo. The Washington Post, already quite cross with this administration for other reasons, put forward a "perspective" chiding the United States for lecturing Europeans on their own affairs and then noting: "The third and most disturbing takeaway was the number of times panelists talked about the need to cope with the United States and China, as if there were no difference between the two countries in Europe’s eyes" (Europeans are quite aware of what they’re going through. Is Mike Pompeo?, Washington Post)

Though this last sentence was meant to heighten the criticism with which the perspective is larded, it does make the only point worth emphasizing--not as a negative but as a positive. As I have been suggesting for some time (and with greater certainty after the American elections of 2016), like it or not (and those once in positions of authority, along with influential sectors of the global intellectual classes based in the West, loathe it) two intimately related visions of the emerging global order have been emerging. Both have been dismissed out of hand.  The first is that developed as the natural progression from the principles and objectives of the great project of Chinese reform that was once understood as socialist modernization and is now embodied in projects like the Belt and Road Initiative and New Era ideology.  The other (which irritates people in the West more), the "America First" Initiative (an irritating name, to be sure) has become the visible expression of a cluster of ideas that are only now acquiring something that resembles a form of a different vision of the Western liberal world order. That emerging vision is organically related to the one on which powerful elements of the Western intelligentsia had banked most of its resources over the last generation, and yet it undermines its central post 1989 organizing principle--that the state must wither away under the guidance of an autonomous network of global institutional orders. 

The "New Era" American vision parallels in many respects, those emerging in China as unveiled in its 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017. It represents an acknowledgement, at least in some quarters in the West, that the context in which internationalism had emerged has now changed fundamentally.  That change is in large part a measure of its success, but one which appears to have consumed it.  These are the ideas worth examining not in the context of personal smear campaigns that appear to mark this era of American politics, but as ideas worthy of serious intellectual engagement. The question that Secretary Pompeo poses is an important one--is the era of global multilateralism characterized by the building of complex supra-national public and private institutions into which effective autonomous transnational regulatory authority is vested over, should it be re-considered, or must it be defended against the great states who bought built the system and now stand as its greatest opponents?

This post considers Secretary Pompeo's speech through that lens. 



Building a New American Global Liberal Order?--Reflections on "Restoring the Role of the Nation-State in the Liberal International Order,"Secretary Pompeo's Speech to the German Marshall Fund 4 December 2018
Larry Catá Backer
11 December 2018 

Secretary Pompeo started first by noting the death of former President George H.W Bush and then using that as a springboard to the issues that confront the Marshall Fund and confront our region as well.” (Pompeo 2018). He suggested that the concerns of his administration were those of former President Bush. 

“I actually think that he would be delighted for me to be here today at an institution named after a fellow lover of freedom, George Marshall. And he would have been thrilled to see all of you here, such a large crowd gathered who are dedicated to transatlantic bonds, so many decades after they were first forged.” (Pompeo 2018).

This effort to insinuate alignment was criticized by those who were not inclined to view what was to come with any measure of respect.  This was done in the name of the former President, though there is irony there, since it appeared only in death that Mr. Bush at last acquired even this sort of backhanded affirmation from many who at the time of his Presidency, were quite critical of his own vision. But political realignments have always had a curious effect on the perception (and retelling) of history.  And it is enough, for the moment to recall that irony.

With the preliminaries out of the way Secretary Pompeo then got to business. He started by reducing the objectives of the Allies after World War II in remaking the world to a simple essence—"only strong U.S. leadership, in concert with our friends and allies, could unite the sovereign nations all around the globe.” (Pompeo 2018). That is, that multilateralism after the Second World War was born of the conviction that the European Powers, much less the rest of the world, was incapable of self-destruction without the civilizing hand of a string power.  He suggested, effectively, that it was necessary to avoid the perils of the anarchy that marked the global order before 1945, and that this objective was attainable only by putting the U.S. at the center of a re-constituted global order. 

Multilateralism, then, was not an ends in itself, but the means by which a world order could emerge under the guidance and leadership of the United States.  “So we underwrote new institutions to rebuild Europe and Japan, to stabilize currencies, and to facilitate trade. We all co-founded NATO to guarantee security for ourselves and our allies. We entered into treaties to codify Western values of freedom and human rights.” (Pompeo 2018). The emphasis here, of course, is on the preservation of the core values of Western civilization—its ideologies and mores, the leadership responsibilities to preserve them, fell by right of war and victory to the United States. The United States, in effect, became the vanguard of the West, at least in a Leninist sense among the community of states, and assumed the obligation to lead through the creation of a united front of aligned states "to preserve Western ideals because, as President Trump made clear in his Warsaw address, each of those are worth preserving” (Pompeo 2018). 

And what were the fruits of this Pax Americana? For Pompeo, “This American leadership allowed us to enjoy the greatest human flourishing in modern history. We won the Cold War. We won the peace. With no small measure of George H. W. Bush’s effort, we reunited Germany.” (Pompeo 2018).

But it is at this point in the speech that Secretary Pompeo suggests a historical gap. For the Secretary’s listing of accomplishments of the old order appears to have ended with the triumph of the West in Europe almost half a century after the defeat of fascism, with the defeat of European Marxist-Leninism, the last of the partners of the infamous Pact between the Nazi’s and the Soviets for the partitioning of Eastern Europe in 1939.  It is not clear what happened to the old Pax America between 1991 and 2016.  But whatever it was, the implication is that it had lost its way.  Perhaps, of course, it had found a new way now that its principal mission had been accomplished.  For Secretary Pompeo, that new way was corrupt.  It would be tempting to suggest that Secretary Pompeo asserted that it reeks of corrosion of the old ideals in favor of a new path largely at odds with the core values on which the old system was crafted.  But he did not.  Rather, the corruption was one in which the means became the ends.  
“After the Cold War ended, we allowed this liberal order to begin to corrode. It failed us in some places, and sometimes it failed you and the rest of the world. Multilateralism has too often become viewed as an end unto itself. The more treaties we sign, the safer we supposedly are. The more bureaucrats we have, the better the job gets done.” (Pompeo 2018).
The result, however, was to substitute bureaucracies for values, and the forms of collective action for its spirit. In a sense, then, Secretary Pompeo rails against the administrative state, now gone global. These are arguments that have become more pointed over the last half century as the realities of the marriage of a popular taste for governmental regulation of broader and broader areas of human life with the administrative machinery of regulatory administration. The result has not been entirely satisfying, however necessary the result might seem.  Administrative regulation has to some extent caused a substantial democratic anomie (a state of normalessness) in the West, as direct mass participation in government has become increasingly attenuated. This is not just democratic deficit notions, but also a fundamental problem of representation, where representatives no longer have substantially direct control over the machinery of state. Is oversight enough? We have come to believe so.  But popular discontent has become more common. And it has acquired an ideology in both Marxist Leninist and Western systems. 

Still, it is a little late in the day to be complaining about the rise of the bureaucratic apparatus.  That apparatus has proven quite useful even to those who complain loudest about its autonomy (caricatured as the deep state, in part), and its inefficiencies (e.g., the Stalinist nomenklatura and its progeny). And bureaucracies do tend to do the dirty work that elected representatives find politically toxic. Indeed, on that score it might be argued that elected officials (and those who make their tenure possible) have little to complain about and much to explain as they free ride galore on the administrative state which serves them as both a sword and shield. That sword and shield could be  used both to protect their interests and to build accountability walls between them and the electorate. That may lead some to conclude that elected officials tend to be the agents of state that appear to profit most from the administrative state over which they preside and appear to be unable to control. The democratic deficit, the bureaucratic autonomy of the state apparatus, and its unresponsive cultures, are as much evidence of the failures of elected officials to undertake their duties faithfully (to someone other than themselves) as they point to failures of the operational systems over which democratic institutions preside. That is, the failures of the bureaucratic apparatus is that of the elected official, and neither that of the masses or of the bureaucrats themselves. The later is especially true where, taking their cue from the cultures of elected officials, bureaucrats view their role as first preserving their institutions and then preserving their own authority within it. 

Yet, the whining (and yes, that is a judgment about the quality of engagement) about the administrative state and its rudderless state of  operation, does provide Secretary Pompeo with an excellent rhetorical platform from which he asks a question worth asking—and worth asking especially of the leaders who ostensibly preside over their bureaucracies: “The central question that we face is that – is the question of whether the system as currently configured, as it exists today, and as the world exists today – does it work? Does it work for all the people of the world?” (Pompeo 2018). This is a question worth asking—and one that has been asked repeatedly in quarters that tend to be marginalized by the bureaucrats and their supporters among the intelligentsia and their allies in media organs of the press and television.  As the global order, perhaps even as a marker of its own success, moves into a “new era” of economic, social, and cultural relations, to what extent are the structures and cultures that brought us to this point still serving their purpose? Any purpose, really, other than their own self perpetuation? The question can be more pointedly asked as a variation of the old question about the medium becoming the message—to what extent have the forms of globalization and the methods of the global order have now displaced the normative objectives for which they were deployed.  

Now, these are questions worth asking. Secretary Pompeo was right to raise them, though of course one can quibble about he way in which he brings this up. And yet, by bringing it up at a very public meeting, he did two things that might be lauded. The first was to target the question, and the message, to the masses beyond the “insiders” to which these sorts of things are sometimes addressed. The second was that using the form of an address to raise these issues also brought up the issue of transparency.  Indeed, it might well have been taken as an implication that it is now time for someone other than insiders to consider the question. I have not the slightest sense that this will happen.  But it is nice form time to time to recall that the bureaucratic class and their overlords—elected officials—are not masterless ronin (浪人) running around as they please to be hired by who ever needs a handy sword. Western ideology demands accountability to the masses; and it is to the masses ultimately that the question of the organization of their state (and global) apparatus ought to be directed. The failure to do so detaches our ideology from practice in ways that may call into question the legitimacy of the resulting government.  And that—a point ceaselessly made by Western intellectuals against the Chinese Marxist-Leninist government—now nicely comes home to roost in the most unexpected form of speeches like this. 

 But back to business.  Having asked the question, Secretary Pompeo then seeks to provide an answer. He looks at contemporary multilateralism and sees in it institutionalized Jew-baiting, self-perpetuating peace missions that produce its opposite, and a state of realpolitikthat makes a mockery of the founding ideology of the Pax Americana—at least with respect to democracy and markets.  He points to examples from Europe, Asia to Latin America. He notes the draft in international financial institutions. And all from an American traditionalist ideological perspective—yet the one on which the institutions were for the most part founded. And then he plunged the knife into his host’s chest: “But Brexit – if nothing else – was a political wake-up call. Is the EU ensuring that the interests of countries and their citizens are placed before those of bureaucrats here in Brussels?” (Pompeo 2018).
Yes, of course, there is much to quibble about here.  And those who support the way the international system has moved to reconstitute itself in this new era in ways unchallenged (except from the periphery) before 2016, can (and should) easily dismiss this. Yet there is the point—either way ideology has shifted or institutional structures have drifted from founding ideology.  Either trajectory ought to have called for substantially more conscious and democratic deliberation than what appears to have occurred.  Perhaps that would have been a better point to have made. 

These questions, which Secretary Pompeo throws out, produce two conclusions: “Bad actors have exploited our lack of leadership for their own gain. This is the poisoned fruit of American retreat. President Trump is determined to reverse that.” (Pompeo 2018). This is worth unpacking. 

The first is easy enough to unpack, and Secretary Pompeo devotes a substantial part of his remarks to pointing fingers. The principal targets are China, Iran, and Russia, with Venzuela and Cuba lurking (as is appropriate for lower tier states in a de facto hierarchically arranged order of states).  These criticisms are drawn from, and attention is drawn to, the much overlooked U.S. National Security Strategy and its elaboration of what it “deemed “principled realism.” I like to think of it as “common sense.” (Pompeo 2018). The National Security Strategy of the United States (4 Dec. 2017) is itself something worth reading in its own right (my discussion here: Ruminations 76: From Global to Fortress America).  Secretary Pompeo suggests the extent to which it is not just a strategic but an ideological document.  For that reason alone it ought to acquire greater importance.  

The second is the more interesting. The suggestion is that the multilateralism of the post Soviet era  produced error.  It produced error by substituting the process of multilateralism for the substance of American leadership. It is in this sense that one can begin to understand the ideological element of the criticism of the structures, especially of post September 11, 2001 era globalism from the perspective of this administration.  Having embraced multilateralism as the means through which the old order was vindicated after 1989, the Americans then choose to lose themselves in the very order they created.  Rather than lead, they offered themselves up as the first sacrifice to a global order in which they would blend in with the rest.  In a sense, the fear of the Administration is precisely the goal, quickly abandoned by Stalin after 1924 (e.g., here)—that the Pax Americana, through its multilateral institutions, might well achieve what the Soviets could not after 1919: the withering away of the state (e.g., Lenin, "The State and Revolution"). And ironically, in this context, it is the American’s strategic competitors—Russia and China—that offered nationalist models for avoiding the plunge toward multilateralist oblivion. For the U.S., like the Chinese, the idea now of a global order under the leadership of an administrative apparatus to which the global community has ceded authority, is a step too far. That is what they see; that is what they fear; and the American intellectual elite  would have been complicit in this project.

Through this lens, then, it is much easier to understand the ideology underlying the way the question was asked: “Every nation – every nation – must honestly acknowledge its responsibilities to its citizens and ask if the current international order serves the good of its people as well as it could. And if not, we must ask how we can right it.” (Pompeo 2018).  The answer naturally followed:
“This is what President Trump is doing. He is returning the United States to its traditional, central leadership role in the world. He sees the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. He knows that nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests. He knows, as George H.W. Bush knew, that a safer world has consistently demanded American courage on the world stage. And when we – and when we all of us ignore our responsibilities to the institutions we’ve formed, others will abuse them.”
In place of the withering of the state within the bureaucracies of global administrative orders, the Trump Administration offers American leadership for mutually beneficial cooperation, a strategic nationalist multilateral engagement, among states engaged in the task of protecting their national interests and fulfilling their national aspirations.  But this mutually beneficial cooperation through multilateralism is, in form, almost identical to China’s mutually beneficial cooperation principle of foreign relations, one recently itself embedded into the international system by the U.N, Human Rights Council (for discussion, see On the Internationalization of China's "New Era" Theory). The difference is in ideological impact.  American leadership furthers American values—democracy and markets; Chinese leadership does the same for theirs; as do the Iranians. The ideologies are not entirely compatible and thus competition and alignment for mutual benefit where that is possible. Again the ideology of the US National Security Strategy jumps out.

Secretary Pompeo notes that the new American initiative is not a rejection of multilateralism, bur rather its re-focus along nationalist lines. He rejects the claim that “America is acting unilaterally instead of multilaterally, as if every kind of multilateral action is by definition desirable. Even our European friends sometimes say we’re not acting in the world’s interest. This is just plain wrong” (Pompeo 2018). And, implicitly criticizing the current understanding of the global multilateralism project, he asserts. 
“Our mission is to reassert our sovereignty, reform the liberal international order, and we want our friends to help us and to exert their sovereignty as well. We aspire to make the international order serve our citizens – not to control them. America intends to lead – now and always. Under President Trump, we are not abandoning international leadership or our friends in the international system.”(Pompeo 2018). 
 Secretary Pompeo then explains how this new approach works, at least he provides a summary of the ground rules of “America First Multilateralism.” He explains: “International bodies must help facilitate cooperation that bolsters the security and values of the free world, or they must be reformed or eliminated. When treaties are broken, the violators must be confronted, and the treaties must be fixed or discarded. Words should mean something.” (Pompeo 2018). 

The principal purpose of multilateralism is the ancient ones—advance American values (again with reference to the values triumphant after the end of the Second World War), and enhance security.  That is it.  Of course, many will quibble about what this means.  For traditionalists, of course, the Obama Administration’s position represents the contemporary expression of America values (and for them the speech is thus nonsense). As well, for them, multilateralism itself represents the sort of security to which the Pax Americana strove.  But those are precisely the principles rejected by the Trump Administration in favor of what it views as an earlier iteration of the multilateral enterprise, one grounded in national interest bent to the furtherance of common values. Though trade is missing here, one, again, would have to have the benefit of the National Security Strategy of the United States (4 Dec. 2017)  to understand the connection between trade and security within the world view of the Trump administration. 

This is not an entirely unilateral exercise.  The Trump Administration “is thus lawfully exiting or renegotiating outdated or harmful treaties, trade agreements, and other international arrangements that do not serve our sovereign interests, or the interests of our allies.” (Pompeo 2018). That approach is then used to explain the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate, the Iran nuclear deal, and the renegotiation of NAFTA into the USMCA. It is used to support U.S. to reform WTO, and to “refocus” the lending and technical support machinery of the IMF and World Bank. And echoing an earlier speech by John Bolton (e.g.,Thoughts on John Bolton: Address to the Federalist Society, Washington, D.C. on US policy toward the International Criminal Court), Secretary Pompeo relied on this view of multilateralism in the U.S. opposition to the project of an international criminal law and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 

And the point of these quite strategic interventions? Well, it represents the dismantling of a house built on weak foundations to rebuild multilateralism on principles of mutually beneficial cooperation under the leadership of the United States.  To that end, Secretary Pompeo asserts: “President Trump is not undermining these institutions, nor is he abandoning American leadership. Quite the opposite. In the finest traditions of our great democracy, we are rallying the noble nations of the world to build a new liberal order that prevents war and achieves greater prosperity for all.”

What does this mean in practice? Well, for starters it means support for public-private efforts to make economic transactions more efficient.  “For example, here in Belgium in 1973, banks from 15 countries formed SWIFT to develop common standards for cross-border payments, and it’s now an integral part of our global financial infrastructure” (Pompeo 2018).  But, of course, this economic cooperation has strategic value as well—it served as the front line for detaching Iran from the international financial system as part of U.S. sanctions. In addition, Secretary Pompeo offers both NATO and the “Proliferation Security Initiative, formed by 11 nations under the Bush administration to stop trafficking in weapons of mass destruction” (Pompeo 2018). 

And that is how Secretary Pompeo ends things.  He reaffirms that his project, and that of the U.S. Administration, is to dismantle the structures of institutionalized multilateralism, and to reduce the autonomy and authority of international organizations founded on multilateral efforts. He reaffirms that the state must be centered in multilateralism, and that American values, and its leadership, should also be centered in the construction of a values based strategic system of mutual cooperation serving the national interests of the United States and its allies, even as it reinforces shared values.   

Yet this ending also is steeped in irony.  On the one hand he wants to preserve and assert American values and leadership; on the other hand to succeed in that assertion, he will have to dismantle the products of American leadership and its (changed) values.  But then, that is the most important message that Secretary Pompeo did not make—that America had effectively betrayed its own values by conceding the transformation of multilateralism into its present form.  Contemporary multilateralism is both foreign and exotic to the American values President Trump would further.  And its fundamental faults lie in its marginalization of national interest and national identity.  Yet that is precisely the arc of development that the United States fostered since the demise of the Soviet Empire. It is in this sense, that Mr. Trump might view himself as anti-imperialist, drawing the United States back to its territory and away from the ideal that its values can be universalized as the United States merged into the world and the multilateral apparatus it had created. 

And this project is not viewed as narrowly nationalist, but also ideological—a return to a global battle of values that pits one nationalist multilateralism vision (America First) against a number of others, and principally China’s Belt and Road Initiative.  “Sometimes it’s not popular to buck the status quo, to call out that which we all see but sometimes refuse to speak about. But frankly, too much is at stake for all of us in this room today not to do so. This is the reality that President Trump so viscerally understands. Just as George Marshall’s generation gave life to a new vision for a safe and free world, so we call on you to have the same kind of boldness. Our call is especially urgent – especially urgent in light of the threats we face from powerful countries and actors whose ambition is to reshape the international order in its own illiberal image” (Pompeo 2018). 

And thus, the vision. It is neither implausible nor impossible. This is possibly the most irritating thing about the vision to its opponents; it belies efforts to dismiss this as the incoherent babblings of an individual and his administration “unqualified” to make them. The vision may be wrong, its principles not worth embracing, but it is not incoherent.  It reflects more the forward movement of emerging great powers—China and Russia in particular—rather than the values that produced the multilateral world order that the United States elected leaders abandoned in November 2016.  It has found its way into the very structures of multilateralism in the Human Rights Council.  Mutually beneficial cooperation grounded in the preservation of national interests and values in concert with others is at the base of China’s New Era approach to multilateralism; it is now as well that of the United States. I had suggested its broad outline as early as 2006 (see Ecomomic Globalization Ascendant).

It is fair enough to reject this vision on principle; indeed, much of the debate ought to be about the underlying principles that separate America First (and China’s Belt and Road Initiative), from the vision of global institutional multilateralism that both reject. It is the failure to engage these principles that s lamentable—attacks on the character of the President is no substitute. Where this will take the United States, and the world remains to be seen.  But from the perspective of the United States, this is another strategic move in a hybrid contest with its competitors and enemies.  
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___________
Remarks

Michael R. Pompeo
Secretary of State

German Marshall Fund
Brussels, Belgium
December 4, 2018

https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287770.htm



SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you, Ian, for the kind introduction. Good morning to all of you; thank you for joining me here today. It’s wonderful to be in this beautiful place, to get a chance to make a set of remarks about the very work that you do, the issues that confront the Marshall Fund and confront our region as well.

Before I start today with my formal remarks, it would be – I would be enormously remiss if I did not pay a well-deserved tribute to America’s 41st president, George Herbert Walker Bush. He was a – many of you know him. He was an unyielding champion of freedom around the world — first as a fighter pilot in World War II, later as a congressman. He was the ambassador to the United Nations, and then an envoy to China. He then had the same job I had as the director of the CIA – I did it longer than he did. He was then the vice president under Ronald Reagan.

I got to know him some myself. He was a wonderful brother, a father, a grandfather, and a proud American. Indeed, America is the only country he loved more than Texas. (Laughter.)

I actually think that he would be delighted for me to be here today at an institution named after a fellow lover of freedom, George Marshall. And he would have been thrilled to see all of you here, such a large crowd gathered who are dedicated to transatlantic bonds, so many decades after they were first forged.

The men who rebuilt Western civilization after World War II, like my predecessor Secretary Marshall, knew that only strong U.S. leadership, in concert with our friends and allies, could unite the sovereign nations all around the globe.

So we underwrote new institutions to rebuild Europe and Japan, to stabilize currencies, and to facilitate trade. We all co-founded NATO to guarantee security for ourselves and our allies. We entered into treaties to codify Western values of freedom and human rights.

Collectively, we convened multilateral organizations to promote peace and cooperation among states. And we worked hard – indeed, tirelessly – to preserve Western ideals because, as President Trump made clear in his Warsaw address, each of those are worth preserving.

This American leadership allowed us to enjoy the greatest human flourishing in modern history. We won the Cold War. We won the peace. With no small measure of George H. W. Bush’s effort, we reunited Germany. This is the type of leadership that President Trump is boldly reasserting.

After the Cold War ended, we allowed this liberal order to begin to corrode. It failed us in some places, and sometimes it failed you and the rest of the world. Multilateralism has too often become viewed as an end unto itself. The more treaties we sign, the safer we supposedly are. The more bureaucrats we have, the better the job gets done.

Was that ever really true? The central question that we face is that – is the question of whether the system as currently configured, as it exists today, and as the world exists today – does it work? Does it work for all the people of the world?

Today at the United Nations, peacekeeping missions drag on for decades, no closer to peace. The UN’s climate-related treaties are viewed by some nations as simply a vehicle to redistribute wealth. Anti-Israel bias has been institutionalized. Regional powers collude to vote the likes of Cuba and Venezuela onto the Human Rights Council. The UN was founded as an organization that welcomed peace-loving nations. I ask: Today, does it continue to serve its mission faithfully?

In the Western Hemisphere, has enough been done with the Organization of American States to promote its four pillars of democracy, human rights, security, and economic development in a region that includes the likes of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua?

In Africa, does the African Union advance the mutual interest of its nation-state members?

For the business community, from which I came, consider this: The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were chartered to help rebuild war-torn territories and promote private investment and growth. Today, these institutions often counsel countries who have mismanaged their economic affairs to impose austerity measures that inhibit growth and crowd out private sector actors.

Here in Brussels, the European Union and its predecessors have delivered a great deal of prosperity to the entire continent. Europe is America’s single largest trading partner, and we benefit enormously from your success. But Brexit – if nothing else – was a political wake-up call. Is the EU ensuring that the interests of countries and their citizens are placed before those of bureaucrats here in Brussels?

These are valid questions. This leads to my next point: Bad actors have exploited our lack of leadership for their own gain. This is the poisoned fruit of American retreat. President Trump is determined to reverse that.

China’s economic development did not lead to an embrace of democracy and regional stability; it led to more political repression and regional provocations. We welcomed China into the liberal order, but never policed its behavior.

China has routinely exploited loopholes in the World Trade Organization rules, imposed market restrictions, forced technology transfers, and stolen intellectual property. And it knows that world opinion is powerless to stop its Orwellian human rights violations.

Iran didn’t join the community of nations after the nuclear deal was inked; it spread its newfound riches to terrorists and to dictators.

Tehran holds multiple American hostages, and Bob Levinson has been missing there for 11 years. Iran has blatantly disregarded UN Security Council resolutions, lied to the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors about its nuclear program, and evaded UN sanctions. Just this past week, Iran test fired a ballistic missile, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

Earlier this year, Tehran used the U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity to bring baseless claims against the United States before the International Court of Justice – most all of this malign activity during the JCPOA.

Russia. Russia hasn’t embraced Western values of freedom and international cooperation. Rather, it has suppressed opposition voices and invaded the sovereign nations of Georgia and of Ukraine.

Moscow has also deployed a military-grade nerve agent on foreign soil, right here in Europe, in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention to which it is a party. And as I’ll detail later today, Russia has violated the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty for many years.

The list goes on. We have to account for the world order of today in order to chart the way forward. It is what America’s National Security Strategy deemed “principled realism.” I like to think of it as “common sense.”

Every nation – every nation – must honestly acknowledge its responsibilities to its citizens and ask if the current international order serves the good of its people as well as it could. And if not, we must ask how we can right it.

This is what President Trump is doing. He is returning the United States to its traditional, central leadership role in the world. He sees the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. He knows that nothing can replace the nation-state as the guarantor of democratic freedoms and national interests. He knows, as George H.W. Bush knew, that a safer world has consistently demanded American courage on the world stage. And when we – and when we all of us ignore our responsibilities to the institutions we’ve formed, others will abuse them.

Critics in places like Iran and China – who really are undermining the international order – are saying the Trump administration is the reason this system is breaking down. They claim America is acting unilaterally instead of multilaterally, as if every kind of multilateral action is by definition desirable. Even our European friends sometimes say we’re not acting in the world’s interest. This is just plain wrong.

Our mission is to reassert our sovereignty, reform the liberal international order, and we want our friends to help us and to exert their sovereignty as well. We aspire to make the international order serve our citizens – not to control them. America intends to lead – now and always.

Under President Trump, we are not abandoning international leadership or our friends in the international system. Indeed, quite the contrary. Just look, as one example, at the historic number of countries which have gotten on board our pressure campaign against North Korea. No other nation in the world could have rallied dozens of nations, from every corner of the world, to impose sanctions on the regime in Pyongyang.

International bodies must help facilitate cooperation that bolsters the security and values of the free world, or they must be reformed or eliminated.

When treaties are broken, the violators must be confronted, and the treaties must be fixed or discarded. Words should mean something.

Our administration is thus lawfully exiting or renegotiating outdated or harmful treaties, trade agreements, and other international arrangements that do not serve our sovereign interests, or the interests of our allies.

We announced our intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on climate change, absent better terms for the United States. The current pact would’ve siphoned money from American paychecks and enriched polluters like China.

In America, we’ve found a better solution – we think a better solution for the world. We’ve unleashed our energy companies to innovate and compete, and our carbon emissions have declined dramatically.

We changed course from the Iran deal, because of, among other things, Tehran’s violent and destabilizing activities, which undermined the spirit of the deal and put the safety of American people and our allies at risk. In its place, we are leading our allies to constrain Iran’s revolutionary ambitions and end Iran’s campaigns of global terrorism. And we needn’t a new bureaucracy to do it. We need to continue to develop a coalition which will achieve that outcome which will keep people in the Middle East, in Europe, and the entire world safe from the threat from Iran.

America renegotiated our treaty, NAFTA, to advance the interests of the American worker. President Trump proudly signed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement at the G20 this past weekend in Buenos Aires, and on Friday will submit it to the Congress, a body accountable to the American people.

The new agreement also includes renegotiation provisions, because no trade agreement is permanently suited to all times.

We have encouraged our G20 partners to reform the WTO, and they took a good first step in Buenos Aires this last week.

I spoke earlier about the World Bank and the IMF. The Trump Administration is working to refocus these institutions on policies that promote economic prosperity, pushing to halt lending to nations that can already access global capital markets – countries like China – and pressing to reduce taxpayer handouts to development banks that are perfectly capable of raising private capital on their own.

We’re also taking leadership, real action to stop rogue international courts, like the International Criminal Court, from trampling on our sovereignty – your sovereignty – and all of our freedoms. The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor is trying to open an investigation into U.S. personnel in connection with the war in Afghanistan. We will take all necessary steps to protect our people, those of our NATO allies who fight alongside of us inside of Afghanistan from unjust prosecution. Because we know that if it can happen to our people, it can happen to yours too. It is a worthy question: Does the court continue to serve its original intended purpose?

The first two years of the Trump administration demonstrate that President Trump is not undermining these institutions, nor is he abandoning American leadership. Quite the opposite. In the finest traditions of our great democracy, we are rallying the noble nations of the world to build a new liberal order that prevents war and achieves greater prosperity for all.

We’re supporting institutions that we believe can be improved; institutions that work in American interests – and yours – in service of our shared values.

For example, here in Belgium in 1973, banks from 15 countries formed SWIFT to develop common standards for cross-border payments, and it’s now an integral part of our global financial infrastructure.

SWIFT recently disconnected sanctioned Iranian banks from its platform because of the unacceptable risk they pose to a system – to the system as a whole. This is an excellent example of American leadership working alongside an international institution to act responsibly.

Another example: the Proliferation Security Initiative, formed by 11 nations under the Bush administration to stop trafficking in weapons of mass destruction. It has since grown organically to 105 countries and has undoubtedly made the world safer.

And I can’t forget, standing here, one of the most important international institutions of them all – which will continue to thrive with American leadership. My very first trip, within hours of having been sworn in as a secretary of state, I traveled here to visit with our NATO allies. I’ll repeat this morning what I said then – this is an indispensable institution. President Trump wants everyone to pay their fair share so we can deter our enemies and defend people – the people of our countries.

To that end, all NATO allies should work to strengthen what is already the greatest military alliance in all of history.

Never – never – has an alliance ever been so powerful or so peaceful, and our historic ties must continue.

To that end, I’m pleased to announce that I will host my foreign minister colleagues for a meeting in Washington next April, where we will mark NATO’s 70th anniversary.

As my remarks come to a close, I want to repeat what George Marshall told the UN General Assembly back near the time of its formation in 1948. He said, quote, “International organizations cannot take the place of national and personal effort or of local and individual imagination; international action cannot replace self-help.” End of quote.

Sometimes it’s not popular to buck the status quo, to call out that which we all see but sometimes refuse to speak about. But frankly, too much is at stake for all of us in this room today not to do so. This is the reality that President Trump so viscerally understands.

Just as George Marshall’s generation gave life to a new vision for a safe and free world, so we call on you to have the same kind of boldness. Our call is especially urgent – especially urgent in light of the threats we face from powerful countries and actors whose ambition is to reshape the international order in its own illiberal image.

Let’s work together. Let’s work together to preserve the free world so that it continues to serve the interests of the people to whom we each are accountable.

Let’s do so in a way that creates international organizations that are agile, that respect national sovereignty, that deliver on their stated missions, and that create value for the liberal order and for the world.

President Trump understands deeply that when America leads, peace and prosperity almost certainly follow.

He knows that if America and our allies here in Europe don’t lead, others will choose to do so.

America will, as it has always done, continue to work with our allies around the world towards the peaceful, liberal order each citizen of the world deserves.

Thank you for joining me here today. May the Good Lord bless each and every one of you. Thank you. (Applause.)
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11-Flora Sapio on the Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprise (Article 5 Jurisdiction)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Musée Ariana, porcelain figures Meissen 1725-1730 )

Flora Sapio (Comments on the "Zero-Draft"), and I (Making Sausages?: Preliminary Thoughts on the "Zero-Draft") have been considering the challenges posed by the Zero Draft.  But we wanted to dig deeper.  To that end we wanted to avoid the altogether too easy exercise of textual exegesis to suggest the challenges that this draft might construct for itself.

Rather than consider text, or text in light of the various mandates and principles purportedly manifested in the language used to build the Zero Draft, we thought it might be useful to consider text within the context of the initial commentary it might generate among Zero Draft stakeholders motivated enough to make them. These, then, might usefully inform the reading of text, and sharpen analysis of its structure and consequences. 

To that end, and in this and subsequent posts, Flora Sapio  presents summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.  These, then, will be woven together first to develop both a critique of the Zero Draft, and thereafter to suggest the value of an alternative, framework, model for such a project.

This Part 11 focuses on Article 5 of the Zero Draft (Jurisdiction). 




Summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG
Article 5 (Jurisdiction)
Flora Sapio 


On 14 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG). According to Resolution 26/9, the Working Group has the mandate to: “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”

By “Other business enterprises” the Human Rights Council referred to all business enterprises having a transnational character in their operational activities. This designation does not apply to local businesses.

In establishing the OEIGWG, the Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG would be dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the future Treaty. Following deliberations, the Chairperson would prepare elements for the draft Treaty. Substantive negotiations on the Treaty would be held during the third session of the Working Group, based on the discussions held during the first two sessions.

The OEIGWG held its first session from 6 to 10 July 2015. A second session took place from 24 to 28 October 2016. Based on discussions held during the first two sessions, a third session was convened from 23 to 27 October 2017. During this session, the elements for the draft Treaty were discussed. Also, the OEIGWG requested the Chair-Rapporteur to complement the ongoing bilateral consultations with states and non-state stakeholders with informal consultations.

Following the third session, a Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Other Business Enterprises (OBEs) was prepared by Ecuador. In July 2018 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India released the draft for public comments.

The Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument (and a zero draft of an optional protocol to the binding instrument) formed the basis for a first round of substantive negotiations, held in Geneva from 15 to 19 October 2018. According to the program of work adopted by the OEIGWG, substantive negotiations saw experts, representatives of national states, transnational organizations, and NGOs comment on the Zero Draft.

In this and in following posts, I will be presenting summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.


Article 1 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 2 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 3 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 4 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 5 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 6 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 7 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 8 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 9 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 10 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 11 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 12 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 13 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 14 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 15 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018

Article 5 (Jurisdiction) 



1. Jurisdiction, with respect to actions brought by an individual or group of individuals, independently of their nationality or place of domicile, arising from acts or omissions that result in violations of human rights covered under this Convention, shall vest in the court of the State where:
a. such acts or omissions occurred or;
b. the Court of the State where the natural or legal person or association of natural or legal persons alleged to have committed the acts or omissions are domiciled.

2. A legal person or association of natural or legal persons is considered domiciled at the place where it has its:
a. statutory seat, or
b. central administration, or
c. substantial business interest, or
d. subsidiary, agency, instrumentality, branch, representative office or the like.
3. Where a claim is submitted on behalf of an individual or group of individuals, this shall be with their consent unless the claimant can justify acting on their behalf without consent.


Article 5 of the Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises  was scheduled for discussion on 18 October 2018, from 10 to 13 AM.

Written comments specific to Article 5 were submitted by:

  • 1 expert
  • 8 States (Azerbaijan, Chile, China, India, Iran, Mexico, Namibia, South Africa)
  • 7 NGOs


Comments by Experts:

Olivier De Schutter, Professor, University of Louvain: it may create confusion to include provisions relating to natural persons' liability in this new instrument, not least since this would require a delicate assessment of how the future instrument would relate to the duties of States under the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. Nor is it clear whether a reference to an "association of natural or legal persons" is fully justified.

Transnational corporations have no legal personality of their own; the expression refers, rather, to networks of separate legal entities, and the challenge is precisely to ensure that the separation between such legal entities does not result in creating obstacles to victims' ability to seek reparation for the harms they have been inflicted.

The provisions concerning prevention and civil liability, however, render redundant the reference to "associations of natural or legal persons" in the other parts of the Zero Treaty, and the coexistence of these two logics -- both of which seek to respond to the same challenge, but through different legal techniques -- can only be a source of confusion.

The principle according to which a State may allow its courts to adjudicate claims filed against its nationals for human rights abuses committed abroad is uncontroversial. To the extent that States impose duties on corporations domiciled under their jurisdiction, it could be argued that there is no extraterritorial jurisdiction involved at all, although such duties may also relate to situations located outside the State's national territory. The kind of "extraterritorial jurisdiction" which the Zero Draft envisages to codify is "ajudicative", rather than "prescriptive" or "executive". Adjudicative extraterritorial jurisdiction would be exercised here in order to contribute to the protection of internationally recognized human rights. To the extent that it affirms the duty of States to ensure that their courts shall be empowered to receive claims filed against companies domiciled under their jurisdiction where such companies have allegedly committed human rights abuses, article 5 should not be seen as derogating from already well-established grounds of jurisdiction under international law.

Because article 5 of the Zero Draft is ambitious, as it seeks to ensure that victims of human rights
abuses shall not be left without a remedy, it does create a risk of positive conflicts of jurisdiction: the same corporation could be sued in different fora for the same alleged violations. It would be desirable to avoid such conflicts. Article 11 of the Zero Draft goes a long way towards minimizing that risk. However, in the absence of provisions in the Zero Draft of provisions allocating jurisdiction (the various grounds of jurisdiction are not hierarchized in article 5), the conclusion of supplementary conventions might be considered desirable.

Article 5 could provide for a more restrictive reading of the duty to accept jurisdiction, where the only link between the defending company and the forum State is that the company has a "substantial business interest" in that State; finally, the future instrument could (in line with what other human rights instruments provide) include a provision encouraging States to conclude conventions reducing the risk of positive conflicts of jurisdiction in cases that have their source in human rights abuses committed in transnational situations.

Written comments by Richard Meeran, Leigh Dayare not available on the OHCHR website.

Written comments by Lavanga Mijekoon, Littler, are not available on the OHCHR website.

Comments by States

Azerbaijan: We must make sure that this legally binding document will not be used to create provocations and legalize puppet regimes on the occupied territories of states. In line with the proposals made by our delegation earlier and as suggested and supported by some experts and Member States’ delegations yesterday, we suggest to make a reference to the humanitarian law in the draft legally binding document, as well as to introduce a separate article covering special cases in conflict and in post-conflict situations.

Chile: the possible conflict between different legislations applicable to the same facts, the expansive extraterritorial effects of domestic legislation and the lack of adequate exceptions to requests for reciprocal assistance and the recognition of foreign decisions are issues that need to be redefined in a new elaboration of the treaty. An interesting alternative would be requesting technical assitane from the Hague Conference on Private International Law.

China: Article 5 suggests two juridisctions: “the State where such acts or omissions occurred”. This belongs to territorial jurisdiction. The second kind is jurisdiction of the state where the legal person or association are domiciled. When the place where the violation occurred and the above places differ, in reality jurisdiction becomes a type of extraterritorial jurisdiction. But according to international law, there are reasonable limitations to extraterritorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the wording of Article 5.1 needs to be clarified or adjusted.



First is the criterion used in Article 5.2 to determine where a legal person has its domicile. Subparagraph C mentions “substantial business interest”. This idea is confused. Subparagraph D mentions “subsidiary, agency, instrumentality, branch, representative office”, this method is not an international practice and should be deleted.

Article 5 mentions associations of a natural or legal persons. This concept is unclear, and may result in the allocation or distribution of legal liabilitites among concerned associations and their constituents. The relationship with Article 10.6 is unclear. This article needs to be amended.

Article 5.3, about class actions and collective claims may be inconsistent with domestic legislation. We suggest to delete it.

The extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be limited to the extent permitted by current international law, in accordance with the preinciple of reasonableness and only as an exception. Universal jurisdiction has no basis under current international law and should not be adopted.

India: India believes that the text requires significant revision and clarification:

  • The right to bring an action under the instrument should be conferred to the victim. Permitting anyone to bring an action without the victim’s consent has the potential for abuse.
  • The article also needs to provide a mechanism to recognize the main proceeding in situations where there are multiple proceedings in place.
  • Point 2 of Article 5 should be harmonious with the domestic corporate law so as to avoid any ambiguity or misuse. Point 2(d) of the same article has enough ambiguity and leaves scope for misuse and hence should be removed.


Iraq: we think it is better  to facilitate the right of differentiation to the victim's nationality court and the victim's court, whichever is easier. Territorial jurisdiction is the original jurisdiction, and there is no need to have an exception to the original rule in order to provide broader guarantees for the victims and enable access to justice. We repeat yesterday’s observations about the wording of the Zero Draft. Article 5 needs to be reviewed and redrafted. It is necessary to define the terms, such as those referring to domicile, the central administration, subsidiary, agency, instrumentality, branch, representative office.

Mexico: the Mexican delegation asked a question to the panelists. A significant number of states adopt the rule on forum necessitatis. Even though the Draft Treaty does not contemplate it, Mexico would like to request the opinion of the panliests on whether it would be appropriate to include a provision where, subject to domestic civil procedure, States could provide a forum to avoid a denial of justice, when there is no other competent or appropriate forum.

Namibia: it is known that jurisdiction is traditionally based on territorial considerations aimed at establishing the existence of some link between the preferred or chosen forum and the dispute. There should thus be a real and substantial link between the two. This link usually relate to the subject matter of the litigation or to the parties.

Other jurisdictional requirements might also be established in addition to the above and this differs according to the jurisdictions. Given the mixture of different legal norms within which TNCs operate, the aim of this treaty should be to provide a uniform application.

Conflict of jurisdictions is a risk as the violations and abuses can occur in more than one State or territory, under the hand of one business. In that regard, we will have to consider the consequences on the ground. We also welcome the inclusion of Article 5 (3), but we are weary of a façade of consent in the absence of real consultations, especially in the case of illiterate victims and also in the case of indigenous or marginalized people.

South Africa: the question that we have to ask is whether this Article on jurisdiction will cover the huge remedial gap that exists.  Will it ensure that a victim can be guaranteed access to justice both where the violation occurred and faced with situations whereby TNCs settle out of court as a way to circumvent being held accountable?  On the other side, will it ensure that the home states litigate effectively? This Article must make specific provision for preventing home state courts from declining jurisdiction on the basis of the forum non conveniens in order to ensure that the victims can access justice. The draft treaty should also take into account the possibility of accessing justice in a third state where the victims may be domiciled after the violation has taken place. Regional approaches in accessing justice must also be included. Information regarding the jurisdictional activities of the transnational corporation must also be made available to local authorities within the jurisdiction to ensure transparency and accountability.  Article 5.2 should include:

    • Parent companies interest in the subsidiary as mentioned by Mr Meeran
    • The issue of subcontractors and suppliers;
    • Partnerships with whom they have an established commercial relationship;

The Article must further include reference to breaches of the duty of care by parent companies in ensuring that their subsidiaries do not cause harm to the communities in which they operate in.

Comments by NGOs

Amnesty International: firstly, the article deals only with civil jurisdiction. It is currently unclear who is the state that should act whenever the treaty discusses criminal action and criminal liability. This article should clarify the basis for exercising jurisdiction in relation to cross-border activities that constitute or result in crimes. 

Secondly, this article, or alternatively Article 8 on the rights of victims, should also expressly deal with the issue of forum non conveniens. Ensuring that courts have jurisdiction to hear claims is essential, but in some states it is only part of the solution. In some states, although courts may have jurisdiction, they may still choose not to exercise it on the basis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. To address this challenge, the treaty could take inspiration from the Council of Europe Recommendation on HR and Business of 2016 (The “doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be applied” in civil claims concerning business-related human rights abuses against business enterprises domiciled within the jurisdiction)  or from GC24 of the CESCR.

CETIM: we have some proposals in order to strengthen the article and ensure its effectiveness. It is essential to provide provisions to inhibit the use of the argument of forum non conveniens, one of the main component of corporate impunity.

Paragraph d) does not adequately cover the concept of supply chain. This means that there will be no provisions on responsibility for violations committed by subsidiaries, suppliers, subcontractors and licensees, nor on how to link parent companies to these entities. In addition, it is necessary to add clarifications on the liability links between parent companies and their supply chains, in order to be able to jointly attack the parent company and the entity in question before the same jurisdiction, as co-authors of the damage or violation. 
It is necessary that the article considers that in cases where national complaint mechanisms fail, affected communities must be able to bring their complaint before an international mechanism, and link this provision to article 14.

We propose the creation of an international court that would guarantee the implementation of the obligations established in the Convention. It would also be important to consider the opportunity to include a forum necessitatisthat could be used as an option in circumstances of denial of justice.

Friends of the Earth International: to achieve the purposes of Article 5.2, it must be better articulated with Articles 7 and 10.6: the Treaty must lift the corporate veil to enable the Courts ascertain the liability of parent and outsourcing companies over the activities of their subsidiaries and the entire value and supply chain, as the French law on duty of vigilance.

The Treaty must allow affected people to sue the guilty transnational corporations in the courts of their home country, and in the countries where they concentrate their assets. To reach this objective, it is indispensable to bring in more clarity and add several provisions to Article 5.

First, a provision must be added recognizing the joint responsibility of corporations as co-authors of a violation, thus enabling action against the parent, subsidiary, outsourcing or other entities in the supply chain before the same jurisdiction, including financiers. In this regard, we propose that the Convention borrows from the wordings of Article 2.2 on connected claims of the Sofia Guidelines of the International Law Association

A provision should be added to exclude the possibility for parent companies to carry out declaratory actions disclaiming their responsibility. Courts should rely on the principles of precaution, prevention, polluter pays, and absolute liability.

Article 5 includes a provision on forum necessitatis, and it must prohibit the use of the argument of forum non conveniens.

International Association of Democratic Lawyers: international law does not pose any obstacles to the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction as a meant to allow respect of human rights by TNCs. The Committee on the Rights of the Child has emphasized how states have the obligation to respect and guarantee rights within their jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction is not limited to territory. This includes finding means to regulate the behavior of non-state actors, as TNCs.

Besides international instruments, we can reflect on other possible solutions but it is necessary to take into consideration the concept of supply chain, because otherwise there will be no responsibility for violations committed by subsidiaries, suppliers, sub-contractors, etc.

Article 5.2 defines “domicile” according to four criteria, but this is a closed list, and a blanket clause should be added, allowing to address “other elements of relationship allowing an adequate reparation to rights that have been violated” (otro elemento de conexión que permitiera la reparación adecuada de los derechos vulnerados).

It is necessary to limit the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Indigenous Peoples’ International Centre for Policy Research and Education: in relation to Article 5, we recommend that an additional provision be included that will acknowledge the jurisdiction on customary justice systems in the settlement of disputes. As an example of a provision respecting indigenous peoples customary laws jurisdiction, we refer to the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Article XXII on Indigenous Law and Jurisdiction. This Declaration provides that:
“1. Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.
2. The indigenous law and legal systems shall be recognized and respected by the national, regional and international legal systems.”

International Organization of Employers: giving so much attention to extraterritorial jurisdiction does not respect national sovereignty, the principle of territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. Overall, the draft text fails to define the conditions under which the sovereignty and obligations of Host States would not be infringed.

Many of the Zero Draft Treaty's provisions are equally unclear and unrealistic. For example, the language concerning the "domicile" of a person (or association of natural or legal persons) who could face prosecution is imprecise and overreaching. There is no clear legal definition of "substantial business interest." Similarly, the terms "agency, instrumentality, branch, representative office or the like" are far too broad and unclear. They could apply to everything from telecommuting to contracting and they undermine applicable national corporate laws and other important considerations, such as national tax structures. The practical and procedural shortcomings of ETJ are also ignored in the Zero Draft Treaty.

Tides Center: regarding article 5, we would like to welcome the establishment of a broad concept of jurisdiction, ensuring affected communities the possibility to bring cases to the national courts of the business perpetrator’s home countries.  We would like to note a few aspects that will help to improve the protection afforded by article 5:

  • the criteria for the definition of domicile is too vague. Article 5 would benefit from a review on its text, in order to make it more precise, for instance by explicitly including mention to parent companies.
  • Draft article 5 did not explicitly contemplate human rights violations committed by companies exercising a degree of control in a global value chain without the formalized or exact relationships enumerated in 5.2. To ensure harmony between articles 10 and 5, we recommend that article 5 make explicit reference to inclusion of jurisdiction over such instances.
  • It would be quite important to have a provision prohibiting States and transnational corporations from making use of the forum non convenience doctrine, because this is one of the most used arguments to block affected communities from accessing the courts of home States.
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Informal Proceedings: “变化世界中的公司”2018 年国际学术研讨会--2018 International Symposium on The Corporation in a Changing World

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I had earlier circulated information about the marvelous conference “变化世界中的公司”2018 年国际学术研讨会--2018 International Symposium on The Corporation in a Changing World, including the program and participant lists in中国语文 and English (HERE).

I was delighted to be part of this event that considered a range of corporate law related issues from a comparative perspective. These included the challenges of independent board members, of corporate social responsibility, of good governance, of corporate engagement in the world, of the value of corporate codes of conduct, of integration between the commercial and financial sectors, of gender fairness, and of the challenges of corporate groups. My great thanks to the conference organizers and to Ezra Mitchell of the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.

This post includes my fairly informal proceedings of the Conference, which follows below.



2018 International Symposium on
The Corporation in a Changing World
Hosted by
China Commercial Law Society
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law
East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law Organized by
SUFE Law School Commercial Law Center
December 8th – 9th, 2018
T8, WuDong Road Campus, SUFE 

Conference Agenda Day One: Dec 8th (Saturday) 

9:00–9:30  Opening Ceremony

Weijun Ge, Professor & Vice Dean, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law
Opened the conference with words of welcome.

Xiaoyan Song, Professor & Dean, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law
Dean Song also welcomed the participants.  Over the past year much has happened but delighted to have old and new friends to come together to speak to the complex and emerging issues of corporate law in a rapidly changing world.  Corporate social responsibility and independent directors are vital topics in that conversation. A sophisticated international background is essential now more than ever.  Especially during this time of transition in relations between the U.S: and China there is much scholars can do to bridge the gap and foster solutions.

Xudong Zhao, Professor, China University of Political Science and Law Civil, Commercial and Economic Law School
Also expressed welcome from his institution. He thanks the SUFE leadership for its role in arranging this Conference.  The Conference theme is particularly apt in this time of great change.  As fast as the world changes, corporate law and practice must also adapt. This is especially important in the context of commercial law in the 40 years since the start of the Reform and Opening Up Era. China’s market economy is growing fast and that requires constant attention and reform, so that law remains relevant to practice and the challenges that change brings. In such an era of reform there is a very important pathway, learning from the rest of the world. China has been able to adapt expertise it has acquired from abroad, both for its internal development and to better synchronize with global practice  China is now an innovator as well as a recipient of the values and practices of commercial and corporate law.  One important method to continue this is through internal conferences and workshops, like this one.  This conference provides a significant window for mutual learning.  Now in its second year  has formed its own unique style that has been useful especially for younger scholars. One hopes that this year’s symposium will also produce excellent learning and mutual discussion to develop corporate law principles.  I wish you all great success.

Cindy Schipani, Professor, University of Michigan Ross School of Business

Expressed gratitude for the holding of the conference and thanked the conference organizers for bringing us all together for this important event.  She was grateful for the opportunity to continue the discussion begun last year. Those conversations with representatives form all over the world sparked substantial research  projects and embedding new ideas into current work.  Looking forward to what this conference will add to that conversation.

Yulin Qian, Professor & Acting Vice Dean, East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law
Honor and pleasure to co host this event. Corporation law must be founded on mutual learning because of the way in which economies now interact. Companies also must should corporate responsibility.  We need to strike a balance among the various interest in economic activity.  Themes of corporations and topics of concern contributed by the speakers reflect these concerns.  No longer merely concerned about investment, there is a broader understanding of the interests that must be subsumed within the study of corporate law and practice. Hope that the exchanges will profit form mutual learning and wish the conference much success.
9:30–9:40 Conference Photograph

9:40–12:00 Panel One
Moderator: Xudong Zhao
Speakers:
9:40–10:00 Ciyun Zhu, Professor, Tsinghua University School of Law Corporate Governance of Chinese Listed Companies: Practice and Research Highlights
Corporate governance principles for listed companies was published in 2015 and was reformed again in 2018. Her students collected documents related to the changes to principles of corporate governance worldwide. Focus of talk was on comparative approaches to corporate governance to inform Chinese reform. Reform is required in a number of areas.  One is in the area of the rights of minority shareholders. This requires changes to voting rights, and greater transparency and disclosure mechanisms relating to majority interests, especially with respect to control relationships exercised through proxies or other means.  Reform of dividend rules are another area that requires some consideration. Additionally, the rights to put forward shareholder proposals offers some benefit to shareholders, but it is subject to abuse when used in ways that suggest conflict of interest. Have a long way to go yet.  Should also consider the capacity of supervisory boards.  Should it be shareholder or board centered? Right now it is board centered but perhaps some accountability to shareholder is appropriate.  But what mechanisms? Not clear but they should be directed toward managing incentives toward abuse.  In that respect, the terms of board members require some attention—sometimes board elections are not held regularly, and that should be better policed.  Improving board committees merits attention as well.  Avoid abuse by delegating authority is an important element but other measures of accountability need to be built in as well.   The role of independent directors also is important. Enterprises ought to better report on their CSR but listed companies can be guided to do better. They need to respect rules and otherwise describe /explain why they failed. Xudong Zhao, in comments, noted the difficulty of CSR reporting under the current system. Listed companies will only do what is required either by listing agreements or in law.  That speaks to the value of nonmandatory schemes. 

10:00–10:20 Gongyun Gu, Professor, East China University of Political Science and Law The Governance of Internet Platform Companies
Offered ideas for the governance of internet companies. Two layers of implications of conference theme: (1) the world is changing; (2) companies are also changing. Responds to theme of the Conference by focusing on internet companies. Biggest influence—new types of companies emerged because of the development of the internet.  These companies are distinct from traditional enterprises.  This kind of internet platform company is different because it combines two distinct corporate organizations—the organization of the enterprise itself, and the organization of the platform (where effectively it becomes a regulator or market maker).  This combination produces challenges to governance that combines traditional issues of corporate governance with the issues of government that face a regulator.  To what extent can one separate the regulatory business of the platform, from the traditional profit driven enterprise that manages that governance apparatus?  This is to be distinguished from state owned enterprises because it is to the ownership but the functions of the business that distinguish them from both traditional companies and SOEs.  If that is the case, then how can one approach the issue of corporate governance for the business of market making or of governance? Perhaps one way is to treat internet platform companies the way one treats the business of stock exchanges.  But there are differences. Internet platforms not only make and manage markets, but they tend to regulate the characteristics of the market itself, and they do so in close connection with the imperatives of the state.  He offered some suggestions for governance and reform.  Chinese e-commerce law is one step.  Impose duty to monitor the markets they make; compliance of users, the quality and conduct of the people and businesses that use the platform.  This is a form of governmentalization of the private sector by leveraging regulation through private actors. The internet platform then standing in the role of the state, but the state can go after the enterprise where it fails in its monitoring and controlling functions.  He then provided a typology of internet platform companies—and suggested that compliance and monitoring duties ought to be different depending on the type of platform that is being supported. He noted as well, the government ought to retain certain responsibilities even as it delegates regulatory authority to internet platform companies. He offered the example of shared bicycles in Shanghai where government intervention in the shared bike market caused bankruptcies and reduced the utility of this service rather than to enhance its efficiency. Xudong Zhao, in comments, noted the difficulties of aligning autonomous governance, external governance, and the supervisory role of the government over governance. 

10:20–10:40 Cindy Schipani, Professor, University of Michigan Ross School of Business The Elusive Monitoring Function of Independent Directors.
Looked to the question of the effectiveness of independent board members as gatekeepers in corporate governance. Noted the central importance of the principle of independent director as a foundation of good corporate governance.  Yet scandals continue in all facets of corporate activity—corruption, safety issues, sex harassment, and the like—despite the presence of independent board members in the corporations involved in these scandals. These may point to board failures to comply with its gatekeeper responsibilities.  Contradiction—independence means that such directors are inherently not fully informed.  The information gatekeepers, the officers, are the very people the independent directors are supposed to oversee. Stated with an examination of board independence, then looks to empirical evidence of effectiveness and ended with some suggestions for reform. The ideology posits that independent directors are neutral, unbiased.  That premise produced the expansion of rules mandating independent directors from the 1980s. Courts have deferred to the determinations of independent directors in the area of fiduciary duty.  Perverse incentives—the more directors monitor, the less officers might reveal. Institutional framework may also impede effectiveness of the independent directors. Empirical evidence is mixed. Some evidence reveals the possibility of coopting outside directors by CEOs who may have a hand in selection process, yet outside directors are positively correlated with ousting poor performing CEOs. Her study suggests that independent directors did not appear to have as great an effect on positive corporate governance cultures than might have been assumed. For example, insider trading manifests with both insiders and outsiders on the board.  Their study showed evidence of complicity related to “abnormal” profits. The data indicated that officers, top executives, and outside directors earned similar premiums, suggesting some participation. SOX impacted the rate of insider trading but not by as much as they might have suspected.  Post SOX outside directors still earned 16% premium. Xudong Zhao, in comments, noted that the role of independent directors is problematical in China, at least as currently implemented. He noted that while the Chinese were looking to the US for guidance on fixing the problems of the independent directors, he noted that it seems that both systems requires further study on the matter. 

10:40–11:00 Ezra Mitchell, Professor, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law The Irreparable Failure of Independent Directors and Boards of Directors in Chinese Listed SOEs and A Workable Replacement
Looked to the issue of independent directors in the Chinese enterprise. He argues that govern the realities of the way that partially listed SOEs operate, then the principle and use of independent directors do not serve their purpose in enterprises in which the state, the CPC, and the private sector meet.  It is not enough to place the forms of independent directors over the realities of the SOE, but rather to embrace the nature of the SOE. He argues that in this context, it makes no sense to keep a board of directors in SOEs, but rather to restructure the SOE in ways that mimic the government apparatus to which it is responsible.  The object is not to create a corporate with Chinese characteristics, but rather to create Chinese corporations.  He briefly described the rise of the independent board in the United States from the 1960s.  He noted the connection between corporate governance reform form the 1960s to political and social changes of that time.  From prioritizing a principle of efficiency and wealth maximization to cultures of compliance and risk management tended to work in the background to move from an insider to outsider set of board governance principles. The process was effectively completed by the end of the 1990s, at least as a n ideological matter.  It was useful not only for internal governance but also streamlined the efficiency of markets for corporate control by commodifying the enterprise. It was at this stage that Chinese corporations began to consider reform. Yet none of the problems that contributed to the shift to independent directors in the U.S. had anything to do with the problems faced by Chinese companies at the time China turned seriously to corporate reform.  Perhaps the U.S. forms might have contributed to ameliorating the most egregious breaches of Chinese corporate practice.  Yet it has little to do with the realities of corporate organization within a Leninist State. Do independent directors make sense at all in China?  Is there a better mechanism?  He argues yes, by placing ultimate authority in the CEO. The CEO’s exposure to discipline by the state, the CPC, and the market, would make for more efficient governance.  In effect, it makes more sense to start with the pre 1960s U.S. position, than to apply the forms of post 1990s U,S, corporate ideological sensibilities. Indeed, collective corporate decision making in China may not need a board—balancing interests is undertaken with the Party units, and worker units, a bard is unnecessary. The contemporary monitoring board does not fit.  More importantly, the principles of democracy inherent in the U.S. board has little resonance with the Leninist principles of Chinese governance.  It should mirror the organization of the CPC and state rather than from the principles of voting for representatives that incorporates political ideologies of the West in its construction. He concluded by suggesting that the Chinese supervision law and anti-corruption laws make a better basis for good corporate governance in China—aligning corporate and political practice with Chinese characteristics. Board. Xudong Zhao, in comments, noted that his approach was broadly in line with some thinking among Chinese academics. He noted especially the problem of legal transplantation in this area.  He noted as well the interesting proposal of importing the anti-corruption laws into the corporate sector.

Commentators:
11:00–11:10 Jianwei Li, Professor, China University of Political Science and Law Civil, Commercial and Economic Law School.  Sharp words about the failure of the supervisory board; but is this a failure that is irreparable? Perhaps it would be useful to find solutions in the current context.  Disagreed about the utility of the use of the Supervisory Law. He agreed that independent directors work differently in Chinese SOEs than in Western SOEs. That difference ought to inform the analysis and may affect the positioning of the CPC within corporate governance in SOEs. Unmentioned was the role of the CPC in private companies, though also worth considering.  The connection with the CPC is indeed worth noting, but the translation of the Supervisory Law to corporate practice would prove difficult. For example, the duty of the CPC is to protect state assets, and not necessarily the interests of small private investors in the partially listed SOE. That produces a conflict of interest that shapes the CPC board relationship. CSRC system appears to work better. Legal system in China not good for independent directors. In practice in regulating everyday work legal transplantation is thus problematic. Still independent directors do still have some use—even if only symbolic. 

11:10–11:20 Wei Yu, Deputy Chief Judge, Shanghai High People’s Court Civil Trial Chamber II. Noted the difficulty of regulating internet platform enterprises, combining market regulation with governmentalization of the sector. He noted that the approach might differ between small platforms and the very few large ones in China. Perhaps using competition law principles. With respect to corporate governance, he noted that listed companies rarely litigate corporate governance issues compared to private companies. At least with respect to listed companies, resolution appears to lie elsewhere than the courts.  With respect to those issues around controlling rights, Judges tend to be cautious in these cases, respecting corporate autonomy, yet are increasingly sensitive to bullying by majority or controlling shareholders.  

11:20–11:30 Gairong Hu, Professor, East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law. Noted the difficulty of reconciling democratic centralism principles in CPC discipline with Board duties in the case where the board member is a CPC member who is asked to vote on a matter with respect to which the local CPC committee has already adopted a position. On the other hand, she noted that it would be difficult to engage in radical change to the forms of corporate governance at this stage; and moreover, that might present problems for the outward activities of Chinese companies. 

11:30–12:00 Open Discussion

12:00–13:30 Lunch

13:30–15:15 Panel Two
Moderator: Yulin Qian, Professor & Acting Vice Dean, East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law
Speakers:
13:30–13:50 Larry Cata Backer, Professor, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. Making Sausages?: Internationalized Regulation of Corporate Responsibility and the Reshaping of Corporate Law Through the Lens of Human Rights. Suggested that corporate law was no longer driven solely by its own self referencing ideology. Instead international human rights law has now started driving corporate law, especially with respect to human rights and sustainability issues, in ways that may upend core principles of corporate law and organization.  At issue is the approach to the question: what is the purpose of economic activity? The ideologies of corporate law and governance, and of international law and sustainability, including human rights, differ substantially. The differences were illustrated by considering the provisions of the recently distributed  “Zero Draft” of a Comprehensive Treaty for Business and Human Rights. The implications for Chinese corporate law was also highlighted. 

13:50–14:10 Jian Wu, Associate Professor & Vice Dean, East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law; Protecting Shareholders and Creditors in Corporate Charitable Donation. Charitable donations can be tied to marketing.  How to respond to creditors and shareholders with respect to donations? New Charity Law is silent on the internal mechanisms for corporate philanthropic activities. It tends to be left to the discretion of the enterprise as specified in its charter.  Can shareholders block an intended board donation decision? Corporate law permits the articles to give the authority either to board or shareholders.  Most articles fail to specify the mechanisms. That produces problems. Art. 74 and 104 of the Company Law offer some help but are ambiguous, especially where the donation is opposed for reasons of breaches of duty or corporate waste. The issue of corporate waste is a difficult one in Chinese law, especially in the context of excessive donations. Tax law has something to say about this as well.  In that it shows some parallels to Delaware law of charitable contributions.   

14:10–14:30 Barnali Chouhdury, Senior Lecturer, University College London Faculty of Law; Corporate Duties to the Environment. Not duties (e.g. legal obligations), but rather responsibilities (e.g., soft law). She started with the case for corporate responsibility for the environment.  This is grounded on corporate power to impact environment. Primary responsibility belongs to states, responsibility to corporation, and also to individuals.  She turned to the tension between profit and planet conflict, paralleling Backer’s fundamental tension in purpose of economic activity (as an ends for investors versus as a means for collective welfare).  There is a business case for corporate responsibility for corporate responsibility for the environment. Looking for a win-win situation.  Concern—this risks commodifying environmental concerns. One might also privilege only environmental concerns that align with corporate economic goals. And it may create incentives toward greenwashing. To overcome this, she makes am intergenerational equity rationale—that long term time horizon is critical in corporate decision making sensitive to environmental responsibilities. If that is taken as a baseline, then what are corporate responsibility to the environment? No one defining instrument, no analogue to UNGP. But due diligence obligation transposes to the environmental area (environmental management system: duly diligent to prevent harm). As the bottom line corporations ought to embed environmental considerations at all decisions—at board level. Three options offered: (1) board environmental committee; (2)  environmental advisory panel staffed by experts and reporting to the board; (3) independent director for environmental issues.   
Commentators:
14:30–14:40 Xujun Gao, Professor, Tongji University Law School.  He noted that making sausages might produce something tasty but the process is complicated, but in the course of cooking you may not like what you see. The Zero Draft approach was critiqued. He noted that there were substantial implications for Chinese companies.  The extensive jurisdiction, transparency and other provisions were noted. He also noted the importance of the difference between the official policies of the United States with respect to the Zero Draft  (negative) and those of its intellectuals (supportive). The amorphous nature of human rights would cause trouble.

14:40–14:50 Shan Jiang, Deputy Chief Judge, Shanghai Putuo District People’s Court. He provided detailed commentary on the operation of the Charity Law on the management of charitable giving by corporation.  He noted the interplay between legal regimes and social norms in the regulation of charitable given.   

14:50–15:00 Jian Fan, Lecturer, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law. First summarized the ideas of Chouhdury. And then he provided his own insights.  He noted the sometimes difficult balancing between economic and environmental goals.  The illustration was the decision of Beijing to allow coal fired plants to operate, causing severe pollution in Beijing, in order to avoid threatening the livelihood of its workers. The prudence principle in environmental decision making was also discussed. He noted that China had a longer way to go than in the West in this respect.

15:00–15:15 Open Discussion

15:15–15:30 Break

15:30–17:15 Panel Three
Moderator: Zhongxiao Yang, Professor & Director of Development Planning Department, East China University of Political Science and Law
Speakers:
15:30–15:50 Jean du Plessis, Professor, Deakin University Law School. Delving deeper into some recent corporate collapses: Have voluntary corporate governance codes failed us?
Confronts the quite controversial issue of the utility of corporate governance codes.  These had been very much in favor since the end of the last century as a set of guides to aid corporations in reforming their corporate cultures and aligning them with governance ideals. The Cadbury Commission Report of 1982 and its Code then gave birth to similar efforts worldwide.  He looked at the Hong Kong Code but focused on the Australian one: 8 general principles of corporate governance principles. Most principles grounded in soft law approach. Enforcement by stock exchanges through listing rules and soft enforcement. The principle of comply or explain at the core of all of the CG codes.  Focus on non-executive (independent) directors. Listed companies must have an audit committee. Driving forces; (1) scandals; (2) retain competitiveness; (3) avoid black letter law; (4) corporation self-determination. He then turned to two case studies to consider the effectiveness of these CG codes. The first was Steinhoff in South Africa—a global retailer listed on Frankfurt and Johannesburg exchanges. The collapse occurred in 2017 with a German local investigation of CEO. CEO resigns; stocks fall, losing 10.3€ in 3 days. Steinhoff was organized as a complex interlocking set of enterprises. With he debts mounting why did no one pick this up? Two tiered board structure with a supervisory function did nt work because of relationship among members. Lawsuits filed against controlling individuals.  What went wrong? What did the CG Code do for the enterprise? The second was the Carillion Company a UK enterprise, 43K employees worldwide. Huge debts and government contracts when they collapsed. Massive failure of corporate governance at all levels.  Gross financial mismanagement. As it collapsed, they increased salaries and dividends.  He argued on that basis that soft law does not work; that CG Codes need to be rewritten to reflect the times; time to rethink shareholder primacy model. 

15:50–16:10 Feng Deng, Professor, Peking University Law School. Industry Controls Finance in the form of Corporate Group:What’s the Problem?
In China the problem is understood as the integration of economics and finance.  At the 1st level there are 3 phenomenon; (1) private dominant companies; (2) big SOEs; (3) multinationals with internal financing or financial institution arm. What they have in common is that parent engages in industrial business but with subsidiaries that have licenses to engage in financial business.  From 2004 there was a big increase in the number of companies in the financial business embedded within larger enterprises, or have shares in such companies. Provided statistics about ownership among SOEs. They have integrated their industry and financial operations. By the end of 2015 there were up to 224 entities as financial subsidiaries. Why enter into this sector? High profit margins, and substantial monopoly position –barriers to entry are high. Aided by local governments seeking to increase the number of top 500 companies in their territory. Central governments encouraged because it appeared to help the financial position of operating companies as well. The principal issue here goes both to the corporate governance and conflict of interest in the context of financing—augmented where the SOE owned a financial institution—and the related problem of anti-competitive activity.  But the other is the broader structural problem of financing policy and the management of macro issues in economic policy. The only comparable model is the Koncern concept in German law. Otherwise unprecedented. In 1993 adopted US model of banking law. The twist was the way that the industrial companies began to control the financial companies. In 1994 law was reformed to try to reduce ability of industrial companies to invest in financial institutions slightly harder but by 2010 the integration was strong.  No one knows how to deal with this model.  What are the risks of industrial companies controlling banks and other financial institution. He offered several solutions to the problem of this sort of integration. 

16:10–16:30 Mutsuhiko Yukioka, Associate Professor, Kobe University Graduate School of Law & Faculty of Law. “Parent-Subsidiary Listing” – A Brief Overview of Corporate Governance Issues.
Unique Japanese phenomenon. Issue touches on questions when both the parent and the subsidiary are listed on stock exchanges.  This form of dual listing commonly used to structure corporate groups in Japan.  The structure was debated before Japanese corporate reform in the early 2010s.  Characteristics: controlling block held by parent company while the rest of the shares are widely held. The parent company’s shares are also widely dispersed. No individual or family that controls the corporate group. Absence of ultimate control a distinguishing feature. Fairly prevalent in Japan. 10.9% of companies have a parent company (383 companies out of 3507 listed on Tokyo Exchange). More than 80 % of listed subsidiaries have a listed parent. Why adopt this structure?: (1) increase incentive for sub’s management and employees; (2= market price of sub provides additional monitoring device; (3) parent can maintain the synergies from the group; (4) capital raising becomes easier.  This raises corporate governance issues: (1) managerial agency problems mitigated by parent’s monitoring effects; the horizontal agency problem between the controlling and minority shareholders tend to arise. With respect to the last, the controlling shareholder may abuse its influence in pursuit of its own interests. Fiduciary duties of controlling shareholder not recognized; derivative actions nor class actions permitted. This puts minority shareholders in a bad situation. But dispersed ownership of the parent may mitigate against risk of abuse. The reputational risk to the parent may also produce incentives against abuse. He then discussed the 2014 reforms: hotly debated.  Moderate procedural reform—more disclosure of conflict transactions, and narrow definition of outside director. But there were strong arguments against regulatory reform: (1) not clear that minority shareholders were systematically harmed; (2) costs of imposing duty would be large compared to the benefit; (3) to determine the desired level of legal intervention is very difficult. Concluding remark: path dependency affected the debate and the outcome.
Commentators:
16:30–16:40 Jing Leng, Professor, East China University of Political Science and Law International School of Law and Finance.  Commented on Du Plessis presentation. She noted that China has a CG Code just recently reformed in 2018.  She noted the driving forces described by du Plessis and speculated that focusing on the bad actors missed the stories of successes. Yet case study does not prove persuasive in light of lack of empirical research.  She posed unsettled question; (1)  while du Plessis noted in the case study that no one picked up over indebtedness, yet high leverage rates are not unusual among industries; (2) regarding effectiveness of soft law approach; two recent cases is too small a sample; in addition, even soft law can be hardened by contract. 

16:40–16:50 Ke Chen, Chef Judge, Shanghai High People’s Court Enforcement Chamber. Commented on Deng presentation. He focused on issues of intra-group governance. In that context might all group be united by a single obligation to maximize the group’ interests,  He then considered Yukioka’s paper and considered the issues of multiple subsidiary listing. He agreed that transparency was critical. 

16:50–17:00 Dongguang Wang, Associate Professor, East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law. Focused on Yukioka’s presentation. He raised efficiency concerns.  And further noted that changing the perspective o efficiency changes the analysis. He did not think that conflict of interest was necessarily large. Yet minority shareholders solicitude is grounded in vulnerability. But all such rules do not get to the heart of the problem, which is inherent in the nature of their ownership interest. Perhaps alternatives exist besides giving them voting rights; are there not more practical solutions to their vulnerability? That is worth exploring. 

17:00–17:15 Open Discussion

18:00 Conference Dinner


Day Two: Dec. 9th (Sunday) 

9:00 – 11:20 Panel Four
Moderator: Ziliang Xu, Deputy Chief Judge, Shanghai Baoshan District People’s Court
Speakers:
9:00 – 9:20 Roseanne Russell, Lecturer, University of Bristol Law School The corporation in a changing world: Companies and the rise of neoliberal feminism
Speaking to issues of companies and feminism. Theme: women are good for business. Rise of a trend in popular culture of powerful women discussing issues of gender in business. The coincides with rise of neoliberal feminism; Sandberg “lean-in” manifesto of self-empowerment and self-investment; Ivanka Trump speaking to life changing journey as mother and entrepreneur.  These high-profile interventions appear positive, but Russell is more cautious.  She maintains the focus on women in its current guise is deeply problematic.  It is grounded in woman as stock framework, or as a form of gender capital.  Women treated as instrumental, and that ought to trouble. This has the collateral effect of pushing other voices to the margin.  Need to return to key feminist ideas of early debates that speak to injustice. She first describes “neo-liberal feminism”: focus on self-empowerment (does not challenge the structures of work), equates women with feminism, closely aligned with market idea (tends to reward those at the top of the economic ladder), highly seductive (e.g., “my best self;” “be a better you”, etc,; encourages people to turn themselves into brands).  Different from liberal feminism and relational feminism.  These differences inform the current gender based governance debates (e.g., women in the board room on a diversity framework). Selling idea of women empowerment by selling women on the idea of finding emancipation in the market. This can be traced back to the ideology of shareholder (usually short term) welfare maximization. The two ideologies converge.  But this is a political choice rather than a jurisprudential truth.  But this allows us to make other political choices in its place. She ends by suggesting the way that feminism might provide a way forward: (1) recognize corporate dependencies in unpaid labor, especially care (the ideal worker supported by support at home; culture of overwork); (2) acknowledge complex dependencies created by globalization (migration bringing in cheap labor as women leave home but need to purchase care); and (3) reform corporate purpose (proportionality principle in the Equality Act of 2010 a model?).   

9:20 – 9:40 Eli Bukspan, Senior Lecturer, The Radzyner Law School of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya; Class Actions and Class Actions Public Fund.
The “class action funding” fundis both a model fo its kind and a laboratory for considering the normative issues of corporate discipline through litigation.  He started by reviewing the role of class actions as a disciplinary technique—vesting disciplinary power not in the state but in the shareholders through collective action. The extent to which that collective right to remedy is broadened provides a substantial modality for accountability in corporate governance and social responsibility issues. He noted the rise of class action as a vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights (Brown v. Board of Educ.). China has one of the few legal systems aside form the US that permits class actions in line with its collectivist traditions.  Class actions, of course, are inhibited by limitations on scope, by procedural rules, and by the costs of maintaining collective action. Israel has a relatively young class action law  but it has produced a substantially effect.  It is intended to promote a variety of objectives. He argues that the objectives were broad enough to include social and public issues against business corporations in the conduct of their economic activity. That possibility is enhanced by the Israeli Class Action Fund, provided to enhance the use of class actions.  He described the organization of the fund.  The Fund Committee represents many sectors of society. Fund does not engage in securities class actions (there is another fund for that). He noted a correlation between financing by the fund and the chance of a suit’s success, though it is not clear that there exists a causation effect. Fund use approval varied over a variety if rights, mostly consumer related and insurance claims. He gave some examples (e.g., discrimination against women, discrimination against Arabs, environmental claims, etc.). He then turned to the broader normative implications: eroding separation between public and private law (class actions and CSR); use as a substitute for state regulation (more efficient means of regulation than law or markets), and complements civil and criminal actions by the state. It is this last normative point that he then developed. Tied in to the UN Accountability and Remedy Project started in 2014. Class actions would improve access to justice through well-ordered judicial mechanisms. 

9:40 – 10:00 Lei Duan, Associate Professor, East China Normal University Law School
The Reform in Share Repurchase Rules and Its Influence: Comparing with Japanese Law
His focus was on the changes to share repurchase laws, comparing Japanese efforts with those of China. He elaborated three principal areas: How was the corporation law amended, how will it influence listed companies, what problems remain unresolved for future direction of reform. With respect to the first, he reviewed the six principal areas of reform.  Wirth respect to the reform itself, he noted its objective to simplify procedures and to make the device more flexible. Also public companies can use repurchases as a means of dividend distribution. Dividend payout useful to shareholders especially with respect to tax implications. It also affected considerations of corporate finance, creating incentives for the issuance of convertible securities. Lastly, still to be resolved is the issue of fairness among shareholder classes. Another issue relates to the availability of this mechanism to public companies; the issue of fairness for private companies remains unresolved.  In Japan there is regulation  that may suggest a way forward—focusing on transparency and equal access to buy back schemes. But fairness to shareholders remains the central issue, and the avoidance of strategic actions that may effectively freeze out minority shareholders. Spoke as well to the utility of “tag along” rights for shareholders. As well the need for a “wrap up” clause was noted. Going forward, it remains to be seen whether listed companies will use this mechanism as a defensive tactic against hostile acquisitions. 

10:00 – 10:20 Fan Yang, Partner, King & Wood Mallesons. Practice and Unique Problems of Valuation Adjustment Arrangement in China.
 Shared experience in valuation adjustment arrangements in China. In China valuation adjustment is broad, including put options triggered by conditions negotiated in contract. These shareholder buy backs are useful. China does not fully recognize effectiveness of cases, but beyond that there is little clear guidance,  Supreme People’s court cases are quite useful despite their lack of legal effect. He discussed the leading cases that flesh out the issues and approaches to valuation adjustment (e.g., Haifu v Shiheng, Wisdom Asia and Lu Bo (the Haifu case)) dealing with VAM (valuation adjustment mechanisms demanded by private equity investors and the cases that then developed those principles since 2012. Other leading cases were discussed, fleshing out approaches to interpreting ambiguity in the legislation and regulations. VAMs now ubiquitous, as a basic protection for investors. In the past it was limited to companies going public, but now more widely used, especially when connected to share buy back when contingencies fail. It is an alternative to taking over the company, which investors sometimes are not interested in doing. He then turned to unique issues in China.  The first includes issues touching on foreign companies.  VAM was problematic especially where all aspects of transactions were reviewed and approved by the state regulators.  But that has changed since the revision of law that has reduced the scope of government review. The second concerns the triggering mechanisms for VAMs.  There is a strategic dimension, and especially where the difficulties arise from political conditions (trade war, local violence, etc.).  The role of force majeur remains unresolved (market risk versus triggering even).   
Commentators:
10:20–10:30 Wei Shen, Professor & Dean, Shandong University Law School. Commented on Prof. Russell’s presentation.  Noted that the background of corporate law did not fit well within the analysis.  Placing liberal feminism within this context raises a contradiction with the profit maximization principle.  Thus, it was understandable the need to advocate reform of core corporate purpose principle.  But that may be a near impossible project. Major argument in favor is gender equality, but wondered whether efforts to correct gender inequality can create greater inequality.  Noted the problems of affirmative action programs in that regard. He noted issues of practical effect: does it actually improve corporate governance as a whole.  There are some empirical studies focusing on Nordic states. He wondered about the viability of women as stakeholder in that context gender inequality might be easier to frame.  Globalization makes feminism issues more complex.  With respect to Professor Bukspan’s presentation, he wondered about the characterization of the program. Unsure why the fund is addressed to private enforcement, trying to link to public enforcement. Second question related to the use of the fund—does it increase caseload, and thus reduce quality of judgement? Does it achieve its purpose; and are more class action cases good for society. The issue of societal versus corporate welfare may require more thought. He noted parallel issues in China, noting the difficulties of the class action device in China in the face of political and societal constraints. In that case the issue of using court cases might promote social instability, an issue that may be different from the context of Israel. 

10:30-10:40 Xiaoning Li, Associate Professor, Fudan University Law School. With respect to Professor Russell, she noted the trend of highly educated women in China to go back home to raise children. The issue is to get these women back to work in the face of social custom and constraints. This includes fostering idea of fathers staying at home, and more flexible work time. In China there may be a CSR issue about corporate provision of child care and elder care for employees. With respect to Professor Bukspan, she noted the differences between Chinese and Israeli approaches to class actions.  Major difference is the use of an opt in rather than an opt out role. With respect to the other presenters she noted the difficulty of finding sources in Chinese law.  She noted that the Supreme People’s Court attitude has been changing. Article 142  of Company Law should help understand the place of VAMs.  Is the problem that all of these are really forms of distribution and ought to be treated as such.  If it reduces the net value of the company, would that impair capital, and should that be the basis of the analysis?

10:40 – 10:50  Daile Xia, Lecturer, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. For Prof Russell, she was more interested in the feminism part.  Reminded her of the progress of gender equality in China. Wondered what kind of difference more women leaders will bring.  More research needed.  But that suggests that women are different than men, and thus they will stress different thing and approach issues differently. But are they educated and nurtured to be different; does gender equality on that basis then reinforce gender differentiation in nurture? For Prof. Bukspan, she asked whether there are studies that point to who benefits from the funds? She wondered whether it was the lawyer class rather than the plaintiffs who were the primary beneficiaries. For Prof. Lei, she agreed with the general approach. Seems the legislator paid more attention to conflict of interest between shareholders than between the company and shareholders.  That ought to be considered. She also noted the changing interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court, criticizing some of the recent decisions. She noted, with respect to Mr. Fan’s presentation that a debtor-creditor model might be a better basis for analysis.
10:50 -11: 20 Open Discussion

11:20 – 11:30 Closing Ceremony
Moderatr: Hongtao Sun, Professor & Vice Dean, East China University of Political Science and Law, School of Economic Law
Speakers: Larry Cata Backer, Professor, Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law
Closing Remarks
“Since the start of his leadership, President Xi Jinping has emphasized the Chinese principle of mutually beneficial cooperation. That policy has been the cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, and is at the heart of China’s Go Out Policy, and now its Belt and Road Initiative.  It is central to socialist modernization and an essential part of the approach to the fundamental contradiction of the New Era—the contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life. These three principles, mutually beneficial cooperation, global engagement, and fairer distribution of the fruits of economic activity, are also central issues in the West. 
This Conference was filled with that spirit of mutually beneficial cooperation, global engagement, and fairer distribution of the fruits of production. And for that we are grateful to the leadership of SUFE and the conference organizers, the China Commercial Law Society, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law, and East China University of Political Science and Law School of Economic Law. Special thanks to the organizer SUFE Law School Commercial Law Center, Dean Song, Acting Vice Dean Qian, Vice Dean Sun, and my old and dear friend Ezra Mitchell.
The conference brought together scholars from around the world. We considered the challenges of independent board members, of corporate social responsibility, of good governance, of corporate engagement in the world, of the value of corporate codes of conduct, of integration between the commercial and financial sectors, of gender fairness, and of the challenges of corporate groups. Through their careful scholarship our conference scholars demonstrated the ways that mutually beneficial cooperation can become part of the working style of academic engagement across borders and systems, and the way in which such mutually beneficial cooperation sits at the heart of the study of finance and economics, generally—and of the study of corporations in particular. We will spend the next year thinking carefully about the many themes explored during this conference, taking advantage of the many ways in which, we continue to learn from each other." For that I am truly grateful.
Thank you.

Ezra Mitchell, Professor, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics School of Law. 
Thanked all participants and hosts.  Looking forward to next year.  Noted the great spirit cooperation and shared learning that can be possible under these circumstances.

11:30–13:00 Closing Lunch

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12-Flora Sapio on the Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprise (Article 1 Preamble)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Musée Ariana, porcelain figures Meissen 1725-1730 )

Flora Sapio (Comments on the "Zero-Draft"), and I (Making Sausages?: Preliminary Thoughts on the "Zero-Draft") have been considering the challenges posed by the Zero Draft.  But we wanted to dig deeper.  To that end we wanted to avoid the altogether too easy exercise of textual exegesis to suggest the challenges that this draft might construct for itself.

Rather than consider text, or text in light of the various mandates and principles purportedly manifested in the language used to build the Zero Draft, we thought it might be useful to consider text within the context of the initial commentary it might generate among Zero Draft stakeholders motivated enough to make them. These, then, might usefully inform the reading of text, and sharpen analysis of its structure and consequences. 

To that end, and in this and subsequent posts, Flora Sapio  presents summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.  These, then, will be woven together first to develop both a critique of the Zero Draft, and thereafter to suggest the value of an alternative, framework, model for such a project.

This Part 12 focuses on Article 1 of the Zero Draft (Preamble). 




Summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG
Article 5 (Jurisdiction)
Flora Sapio 


On 14 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG). According to Resolution 26/9, the Working Group has the mandate to: “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”

By “Other business enterprises” the Human Rights Council referred to all business enterprises having a transnational character in their operational activities. This designation does not apply to local businesses.

In establishing the OEIGWG, the Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG would be dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the future Treaty. Following deliberations, the Chairperson would prepare elements for the draft Treaty. Substantive negotiations on the Treaty would be held during the third session of the Working Group, based on the discussions held during the first two sessions.

The OEIGWG held its first session from 6 to 10 July 2015. A second session took place from 24 to 28 October 2016. Based on discussions held during the first two sessions, a third session was convened from 23 to 27 October 2017. During this session, the elements for the draft Treaty were discussed. Also, the OEIGWG requested the Chair-Rapporteur to complement the ongoing bilateral consultations with states and non-state stakeholders with informal consultations.

Following the third session, a Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Other Business Enterprises (OBEs) was prepared by Ecuador. In July 2018 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India released the draft for public comments.

The Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument (and a zero draft of an optional protocol to the binding instrument) formed the basis for a first round of substantive negotiations, held in Geneva from 15 to 19 October 2018. According to the program of work adopted by the OEIGWG, substantive negotiations saw experts, representatives of national states, transnational organizations, and NGOs comment on the Zero Draft.

In this and in following posts, I will be presenting summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.


Article 1 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 2 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 3 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 4 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 5 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 6 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 7 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 8 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 9 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 10 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 11 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 12 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 13 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 14 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 15 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018

Article 1 Preamble

The State Parties to this Convention,

Stressing that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and inter-related;

Upholding that every person has the right to equal and effective access to justice and remedies in case of risk or harm decisive for the enjoyment of their rights;

Recognizing the rules of international law and international human rights law with respect to the
international responsibility of States;

Stressing that the obligations and primary responsibility to promote, respect protect and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms lie with the State, and that States must protect against human rights abuse by third parties, including business enterprises, within their territory or otherwise under their jurisdiction or control, and ensure respect for and implementation of international human rights law;

Recalling the UN Charter articles 55 and 56 on international cooperation, including in particular with regard to universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction of race, sex, language or religion;

Underlining that all business enterprises, regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure shall respect all human rights, including by avoiding causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities and addressing such impacts when they occur;

Upholding the principles of non-discrimination, participation and inclusion, and self-determination;

Desiring to contribute to the development of international law and international human rights law in this field;

Pursuing the fulfillment of the mandate established by the Human Rights Council Resolution 26/9;

Hereby agree as follows:
 

Article 1 of the Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises was scheduled for discussion on Thursday 18 October 2018, from 15 to 18 PM, together with Article 14 (Institutional Arrangements) and Article 15 (Final Provisions).

After an introduction by the Chair, Luis Gallego Chiriboga, permanent representative of Ecuador at the UN in Geneva, comments on Article 1 were submitted by 2 experts. Written comments specific to Article 1 were submitted by:

  • 6 states (Azerbaijan, China, Mexico, Peru, Russian Federation)
  • 1 observer state
  • 4 NGOs

Comments by Experts

Bradford Smith, Human Rights Treaties Branch, OHCHR: treaties follow a well established pattern – title, preamble, and then the articles covering the main text and final clauses.  As such, Article 1 should follow the Preamble.  
I assume the title will be modified using the word Convention – For example Convention for the protection of the human rights of all persons in the context of activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
 
Human Rights treaties deposited with the SG generally do not have article headings but the CRPD does and other treaties deposited with the SG do, and these can be very helpful. 

Human Rights treaties deposited with the SG typically use the term “Part” instead of Section.
 
Layla Hughes, Center for International Environmental Law: it is crucial that the treaty be rooted in the lived experiences of those who suffer most as a result of business activities. It is essential, therefore, that the treaty takes into account the different, often disproportionate, impacts on women’s rights, and the additional barriers women face in seeking access to remedies.

The preamble should make this point. It should acknowledge gender equality as a fundamental right, which is also a Sustainable Development Goal. It should also recall the obligations of State Parties under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women to protect women from business-related human rights abuses.

Comments by States

Azerbaijan: Insert “international humanitarian law” in paragraph three of the Preamble after “Recognizing the rules of international law”. The paragraph shall read “Recognizing the rules of international law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law with respect to the international responsibility of States;”.

The principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity is the primary principle that serves as a basis for any further engagement whether political or economic. This principle was also covered under the draft elements document that we were discussing last year. We therefore request inserting that principle in paragraph seven of the Preamble after “Upholding the principles of…”.

Paragraph eight of the Preamble shall also make reference to the international humanitarian law and shall read “Desiring to contribute to the development of international law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law in this field;”.

China: the purpose, guidelines and principles set out in Resolution 26/9  should be confirmed in the Preamble. We propose to add the reaffirming of respect for the principles and purpose of the UN Charter, and to confirm the positive role of industry and commerce in development, to make the preamble more accurate and balanced.

Mexico: the Preamble should not be among the articles of this instrument. This position is coherent with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. The Preable does not have the same force as the text.

We consider positive the wording of Paragraph 4. This is in harmony with the criteria and the principles of international human rights law. It is important that this Instrument obliges states to apply the Treaty not only in their territory, but in the spaces where states exercize any jurisdiction in accordance with international law, such as aircrafts and vessels, the areas adjoining the territorial sea, exclusive economic zones, protectorates or territories occupied de facto.

As the UNGPs are an internationally acknowledged and respected standard, we propose to replace, in paragraph 6 of the Preamble, “shall” with “should” to highlight the responsibility of all enterprises to respect all human rights, regardless of the size, sector, operational context, property structure. This responsibility exists independently of the effective implementation of state obligations.

Namibia: we concur with those delegations who requested for the preamble to not form part of the articles, but to be free standing followed by the Statement of purpose as Article 1. This is indeed in line with the drafting style of international instruments. We will also propose language to the drafters to streamline the new Article 1.

Peru: we suggest the inclusion of a paragraph on the committment of states to guarantee the universal respect of fundamental rights and freedoms as stated in the Universal Declaraion. We also suggest to include a reference to international humanitarian law in Paragraph 3.

Russian Federation: the terminology needs to be improved. Paragraph 8 of the Preamble refers to certain principles, but their significance for the purposes of this Treaty is unclear. It would be more logical for this paragraph to conform to the generally accepted principles and norms of international law.

We suggest deleting the reference to Resolution 26/9 as it is redundant and not typical of such international treaties.

Comments by Observer States:

The Holy See:  in shaping the Preamble, we cannot forget that we are called to a “responsible stewardship” of our common home. The Delegation of the Holy See would like to insert into the preambular language the following sentence: “stressing that the urgent challenge to protect our common home includes a concern to bring the whole human family together to seek a sustainable and integral development”.

Comments by NGOs:

APWLP and AWID: we suggest the preamble refers to Article 13 of the UN Charter.  Any incompatible law or obligations with the Instrument must be severed according to the doctrine of severability. The Instrumentshould embrace the principle of international solidarity to provide coherence and conceptual operational framework for the implementation of this Instrumentbased on the primacy of human rights We recommend the Instrument be explicit on direct obligations of TNCs. This will include TNCs’ obligation not to undermine states’ human rights obligation through their business activities. We recommend the Preamble to make specific reference to the multiple, intersecting and historically accumulated forms of discrimination women experience.  The next Draft should recognise the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) as a corollary of the internationally-recognised right to self-determination and the right to development.

FIAN: the Preamble should state the primacy of human rights over international trade and investment agreements, reaffirming Article 103 of the UN Charter. The Draft Treaty does not seriously address gender discrimination.

International Association of Democratic Lawyers: Article 1 is contradictory, because it cannot be an article and a preamble at the same time. There exist contradiction between the principle of indivisibility, universality and interdependence of human rights, and the list of rights in Article 8.12.
The responsibility of states to protect human rights is not primary, but the responsibility of states and enterprises is separated, because enterprises have a responsibility to respect human rights. These obligations should be included in an additional article.
The preamble must acknowledge the obligations deriving from international human rights law, above all existing instruments, and in particular trade and investment treaties.

International Organization of Employers: it is not clear that direct international human rights obligations would apply only to State Parties and not to business in the Zero Draft Treaty. The language in the "preamble" contains an ambiguous sentence when it says that "all business enterprises… SHALL respect all human rights." Many jurisdictions have concluded that the word "shall" can mean "must" (as well as "will" or "may"). On top of this, while it is not certain that preambular paragraphs themselves are legally-binding1, this preamble is listed under the very first Article in Section 1 implying that it would be fully part of the Treaty.

The "preamble" speaks of "all business enterprises" but the rest of the Zero Draft Treaty uses the term "business activities of a transnational character." It is also illogical from both a practical and legal perspective when the preamble says that the Treaty would cover "all human rights.


The Commodification of Labor and the Price of Labor Wage Remittances: Venkatesh Nayak on "RTI reveal: More than 10 Indian workers died every day in Gulf countries in the last six years; 117 deaths for every US$ 117 remitted"

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(Pix credit here)

We have come to understand that despite all of the glorious talk about individual dignity and human rights, all economic systems continue to center productive forces in their economic calculus.  One of the great consequences of that universal impulse is the commodification of labor (as a product that itself generates value for the employer--usually the state) and the abstraction of individuals (into streams of income repatriated from abroad plus fees extracted through this process). There are exceptions, of course. High status workers acquire individuality; and those who serve their masters and whose working conditions can be used strategically to advance political and other objectives (for example when conditions acquire a political dimension, e.g., here).

This commodification and abstraction takes distinct forms within global production.

Commodification forms are exemplified by the economic policies of Cuba and N. Korea.  Both states see in their workers a commodity that can be leased to others.  Sometimes the transaction is direct and pedestrian--N. Korea leases its workers to man the factories of advancing developing states in need for cheaper labor inputs to reduce overall production costs (e.g., here, and here). Other times it is tied to strategic political objectives.  Cuba has managed both to advance its political agenda and to earn substantial cash from its programs leasing doctors and other medical facilities to (mostly) developing states through its so-called policy of medical internationalism (e.g., here, here, here, and here).

Abstraction forms are exemplified by the encouragement of labor migration targeted to certain areas for the purpose of generating remittances home. The export of domestic labor abroad, then, serves to generate wealth at home  through the expectation that such exported labor will send home whatever cash they can. The individual laborer, then, is transformed to an income stream, the present value of which serves as an important element in macro-economic policy. Cuba has been famous for exploiting this effect as a part of its macro-economic policies (e.g., resources here). But other states across the middle and lower tiers of development have also relied heavily on this technique.  South Asia is an important participant in this respect (e.g., here ("Pakistan is expected to receive remittances worth a record $22 billion in financial year 2018-19 as the government has offered an incentive package to overseas workers to attract more money through official banking channels, experts said.")). The Philippines offer another model--exporting domestic workers (e.g., here ("But one "export" that remains critically important is the outflow of Philippine workers to overseas countries from where they send home huge total cash remittances.")).

Developing states which profit form the practice, civil society that encourage or tolerate the practices without much criticism, and international institutions tend to see in the practice the positive values of wealth creation (for someone, it is not clear just what portion of the wealth created actually flows to the earner and her family) may not pay enough attention to the costs of such production of income. Attention is usually paid to such costs in the wake of scandal (e.g., Kuwait: Death of Filipina maid highlights abuse of workers; 6 out of 10 maids in Singapore are exploited; Mexican workers say they are victims of abuse on Canadian farms), though the role of international bodies could be subject to some analysis (e.g., UN labour body drops case against Qatar of migrant worker abuse).

Many of these stories fail to adequately consider the systemic costs to life of the generation of income strategies embodied in commodification and abstraction policies. And, indeed, the costs in terms of life and living conditions appear to "zero out" in any analysis that considers the "value added" of income generation that is represented by policies of labor leasing or remittance production. The effect is to create a system of income generation in which the state effectively "free rides" on the lives of the workers exported. Yet one wonders about the extent to which a state undertakes its duty to protect human right sin a context in which  it effectively zeros out the lives and working conditions of individuals who have effectively traded their humanity for streams of income to themselves and ofr the state.

Venkatesh Nayak has sought to capture at least a sense of the enormity of those costs in the context of the export of Indian labor to the Middle East. His essay written for  Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), RTI reveal: More than 10 Indian workers died every day in Gulf countries in the last six years; 117 deaths for every US$ 117 remitted (6 November 2018) follows. Its core finding is embedded in the essay's title and is worth highlighting here:
1) Available data indicates that at least 24,570 Indian workers died in the six Gulf countries between 2012 and mid-2018. This number could increase if the complete figures for Kuwait and UAE are made available publicly. This amounts to more than 10 deaths per day during this period
The essay follows below. I have posted work from Mr. Nayak before: on big data governance in Indiadeath sentencing in India; whistle Blower protections; and extra judicial killings.




RTI reveal: More than 10 Indian workers died every day in Gulf countries in the last six years; 117 deaths for every US$ 117 remitted


Image courtesy: Christopher Pike

By Venkatesh Nayak

According to data tabled in Parliament in April 2018, (see attachment 10) there are 87.76 lakh (8.77 million) Indians in six Gulf countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). While replying to an Unstarred Question (#6091) raised in the Lok Sabha, the Union Minister of State for External Affairs said that during the first half of this financial year alone (between April-September 2018), blue-collared Indian workers in these countries had remitted USD 33.47 Billion back home.

Not much is known about the human cost of such earnings which swell up the country’s forex reserves quietly. My recent RTI intervention and research of proceedings in Parliament has revealed that between 2012 and mid-2018 more than 24,570 Indian Workers died in these Gulf countries. This works out to an average of more than 10 deaths per day. For every US$ 1 Billion they remitted to India during the same period there were at least 117 deaths of Indian Workers in Gulf countries.
Please read further for the details of the RTI intervention and data analysis.

The RTI Intervention

In August 2018, I submitted a request for information under The Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act) to the Union Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) through the Central Government’s RTI Online filing facility seeking the following information (see page 1 of attachment 1):
"1) The year-wise list of the names, age, sex, and occupation of Indian workers who died in the countries of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Quwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between 01 January, 2012 till date; and
2) The cause of death as mentioned in the death certificates of every deceased Indian worker referred to at para 1 above for the same period."
The Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) promptly transferred the RTI application to the CPIOs of the Indian Embassies situated in the six Gulf countries (see page 3 of attachment 1). It appears that the MEA does not maintain data about the deaths of Indian Workers unless queries are raised in Parliament.

The CPIO of the Embassy of Kuwait replied that most of the details regarding deaths of Indian Workers in that country was available online on their official website (attachment 2). Indeed, month-wise data is available on this website, but only 2014-onwards. The CPIOs of the Indian Embassies in Bahrain (attachment 3), Oman (attachment 4) and Qatar (attachment 5) provided year-wise data about deaths of Indian Workers in those countries. The Indian Embassy in Saudi Arabia provided year-wise data after I filed a first appeal against the CPIO’s initial rejection order (attachment 6).

Both the CPIO and the First Appellate Authority of the Indian Embassy in UAE refused to provide even this data citing Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act which exempts the disclosure of personal information which may cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual or where the disclosure has no relationship to any public activity or interest (attachment 7). Despite showing the good practice of proactive information disclosure adopted by the Indian Embassy in Kuwait, the Embassy in UAE continues to refuse even basic data.

The other Indian Embassies have refused details regarding the deaths of Indian Workers sought in the RTI application by either citing Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act or by claiming that the information was held in multiple files in disaggregate form. They are striving to adopt the lowest common denominator instead of following the sterling example of the Indian Mission in Kuwait.

Analysis of the data regarding the deaths of Indian Workers in Gulf countries

In order to fill up the gaps in the data (between 2012-2013, which the Indian Embassy in Kuwait did not display) and the data which UAE refused to disclose, I researched the websites of the Lok Sabha (Lower House) and the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) in Parliament and found some data. A preliminary analysis of these collated datasets indicates the following trends (the data sets are in the form of tables in attachment 8 and graphs in attachment 9):
1) Available data indicates that at least 24,570 Indian workers died in the six Gulf countries between 2012 and mid-2018. This number could increase if the complete figures for Kuwait and UAE are made available publicly. This amounts to more than 10 deaths per day during this period (see Table 1 in the attachment 8 and graphs 1 and 2 in attachment 9);

2) At 10,416, the most number of deaths occurred in Saudi Arabia during this period while Bahrain accounted for the least number -- 1,317 deaths (see Table 1 in attachment 8 and graph 1 in attachment 9);
3) The most number of deaths occurred in 2015 (4,702whereas the smallest number was reported in 2012 (2,375). By July-August 2018, 1,656 deaths had already occurred (see Table 1 in attachment 8 and graph 1 in attachment 9).

4) Only the CPIO of the Indian Embassy in Qatar provided some information about the cause of deaths. While more than 80% of the deaths were attributed to natural causes, almost 14% of the deaths occurred in accidents. Almost 6% of these deaths were due to suicides (see Table 2 in attachment 8 and graph 3 in attachment 9).

Comparing datasets of deaths with datasets relating to remittances

Most of the Indian diaspora is also a very important source of forex earnings for the country. The World Bank publishes estimates of remittances from every country sent to every other country on the globe in its annual Migration Reports. Although these figures are estimates only, they have received currency in official circles as the Central Government often reports from these figures when questions regarding remittances are raised in Parliament. However, while World Bank publishes data based on the calendar year, the Reserve Bank of India publishes weekly remittance data based on the financial year cycle (see Tables 3 and 4 in attachment 8). Nevertheless, country-wise data regarding remittances is not traceable on RBI’s website.

A comparative analysis of the data regarding remittances received from Indians working in Gulf countries with the datasets relating to death reveals the following preliminary results:
1) Indians working in Gulf countries accounted for more than half of the remittance that India received from all over the world between 2012-2017. While Indian received a total of US$ 410.33 billion in remittances from the world over, remittances from the Gulf countries accounted for US$ 209.07 Billion (see Tables 5 and 6 in attachment 8 and graph 8 in attachment 9);

2) According to World Bank estimates, UAE topped the list of Gulf countries from which remittances were received at US$ 72.30 Billion, followed by Saudi Arabia (US$ 62.60 billion); Kuwait (US$ 25.77 Billion); Qatar (US$ 22.57 billion); Oman (US$ 18.63 Billion) and Bahrain came last with US$ 7.19 Billion;

3) When compared with the dataset on deaths of Indian workers obtained through RTI and parliamentary records, there were more than 187 deaths for every US$ Billion received from Oman during 2012-17; more than 183 deaths for every US$ Billion received from Bahrain and 162 deaths for every US$ Billion received from Saudi Arabia. Qatar accounted for more than 74 deaths for every US$ Billion received while the lowest figure of 71 deaths for every US$ Billion received was from UAE (see Table 7 in attachment 8 and graph 6 in attachment 9);

4) Interestingly, while UAE was the source of the highest amount of remittances from Indian workers during 2012-2017 (US$ 72.3 Billion), it also had the lowest deaths per US$ Billion remitted to India (a little over 71 deaths). Conversely, Bahrain, which came at the bottom of the list in terms of total remittances during the same period (US$ 7.19 Billion only), stands at second place in terms of the number of deaths of Indian workers per US$ Billion remitted (a little over 183 deaths). In other words, every US$ Billion earned by Indian Workers remitted from Bahrain cost much more in terms of deaths than a similar amount remitted from UAE (see Table 7 in attachment 8 and graph 6 in attachment 9);

5) A comparison of the remittances data from Gulf countries with the remittances from the Indian diaspora in the advanced countries of the western world, namely, UK, USA and Canada shows some interesting trends. Indian workers in the UAE remitted US$ 72.3 Billion between 2012-2017 while remittances from Indians in the USA were only US$ 68.37 Billion during this period. Remittances from the UK at US$ 23 Billion and a mere US$ 17.3 Billion from Canada compare poorly with the remittances that Indian workers sent from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman and Kuwait during the same period (See Tables 5 and 6 in attachment 8 and graphs 4 and 7 in attachment 9). However, the Indian diaspora in the developed world seems to wield more political influence in India than the Indian worker community eking out a living in Gulf countries. This phenomenon also needs a deeper examination from researchers and academics;

6) Further, remittance from Nepal to India (US$ 17.37 Billion) was only slightly lower than the remittance from Canada to India (US$ 17.39 Billion) between 2012-2017. While remittances from Singapore amounted to only US$ 5.5 Billion during this period, remittances from Bangladesh to India stood at US$ 4.7 Billion. Remittances from Pakistan and Sri Lanka individually during the same period were higher than the remittance received from Indian workers in Bahrain. Interestingly, remittance data from Pakistan to India is available only for the years 2013-2014 (US$ 9.46 Billion) (see Table 6 in attachment 8 and Graph 7 in attachment 9). The World Bank Migration Reports indicate that similar data was not made available by the authorities in Pakistan for other years covered by this study. Similarly, the Central Government was not able to provide data about the number of persons of Indian origin or NRIs in Pakistan in its reply tabled in the Lok Sabha in April 2018 (see attachment 10);

7) It appears that blue collared workers are contributing more to India’s forex kitty than the white-collared workers in the developed countries. However, as a proportion of the total forex reserves at the end of the calendar year, the share of the remittances seems to be declining in recent years. In 2012, remittances from Gulf countries were equal to 12.57% of the forex reserves (excluding gold and Special Drawing Rights) declared by RBI for the week ending December 29. In 2017, the remittances were only 9.97% of the year-end forex reserves declared by RBI; and

8) According to data tabled in Parliament by the Central Government, 7.75 lakh Indian workers were issued emigration clearances (ECR) in 2014, enabling them to work in the six Gulf countries. This number has since fallen, year after year. 7.6 lakh workers were issued ECR clearances in 2015, 5.07 lakh workers issued ECR in 2016. During the first 10 months of 2018 only, 3.46 lakh ECRs were issued by the Central Government. The number of ECRs seems to have halved since 2014. In its reply to an Unstarred Question raised in the Lok Sabha, the Government also listed a slew of measures put in place to provide safeguards for Indian Workers in Gulf countries. However none of these measures include any mention of steps taken to study the phenomenon of deaths of Indian Workers in Gulf countries. (see Table 10 in attachment 8 and attachments 10 and 11).
The above comparison is not an attempt to label the remittances from the Gulf as blood money. Instead the purpose of this comparative analysis is to highlight the shockingly large number of deaths of Indian workers in Gulf countries. This phenomenon requires urgent examination. It is hoped that the Central Government will start this exercise by making more information about deaths of Indian Workers in these countries public. There is an urgent need to commission experts to study the cause of deaths -- especially the large number of deaths labelled in Qatar as “natural deaths” and examine the conditions under which Indians work there and identify measures that will prevent avoidable deaths

Meanwhile, I will file an appeal with the Central Information Commission to examine the good practice of the Indian Embassy in Kuwait and direct the other Embassies to emulate their standard of proactive information disclosure regarding the deaths of Indian Workers abroad.

13-Flora Sapio on the Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprise (Article 14 Institutional Arrangements)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Musée Ariana, porcelain figures Meissen 1725-1730 )

Flora Sapio (Comments on the "Zero-Draft"), and I (Making Sausages?: Preliminary Thoughts on the "Zero-Draft") have been considering the challenges posed by the Zero Draft.  But we wanted to dig deeper.  To that end we wanted to avoid the altogether too easy exercise of textual exegesis to suggest the challenges that this draft might construct for itself.

Rather than consider text, or text in light of the various mandates and principles purportedly manifested in the language used to build the Zero Draft, we thought it might be useful to consider text within the context of the initial commentary it might generate among Zero Draft stakeholders motivated enough to make them. These, then, might usefully inform the reading of text, and sharpen analysis of its structure and consequences. 

To that end, and in this and subsequent posts, Flora Sapio  presents summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.  These, then, will be woven together first to develop both a critique of the Zero Draft, and thereafter to suggest the value of an alternative, framework, model for such a project.

These Commentaries form part of a larger Coalition for Peace and EthicsProject on the Effort to Elaborate an International Instrument on Business and Human Rights.Go to CPE Treaty Project Page: HERE.

This Part 13 focuses on Article 14 of the Zero Draft (Institutional Arragements). 






Summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG
Article 14 (Institutional Arragements)
Flora Sapio 


On 14 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG). According to Resolution 26/9, the Working Group has the mandate to: “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”

By “Other business enterprises” the Human Rights Council referred to all business enterprises having a transnational character in their operational activities. This designation does not apply to local businesses.

In establishing the OEIGWG, the Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG would be dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the future Treaty. Following deliberations, the Chairperson would prepare elements for the draft Treaty. Substantive negotiations on the Treaty would be held during the third session of the Working Group, based on the discussions held during the first two sessions.

The OEIGWG held its first session from 6 to 10 July 2015. A second session took place from 24 to 28 October 2016. Based on discussions held during the first two sessions, a third session was convened from 23 to 27 October 2017. During this session, the elements for the draft Treaty were discussed. Also, the OEIGWG requested the Chair-Rapporteur to complement the ongoing bilateral consultations with states and non-state stakeholders with informal consultations.

Following the third session, a Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Other Business Enterprises (OBEs) was prepared by Ecuador. In July 2018 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India released the draft for public comments.

The Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument (and a zero draft of an optional protocol to the binding instrument) formed the basis for a first round of substantive negotiations, held in Geneva from 15 to 19 October 2018. According to the program of work adopted by the OEIGWG, substantive negotiations saw experts, representatives of national states, transnational organizations, and NGOs comment on the Zero Draft.

In this and in following posts, I will be presenting summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.


Article 1 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 2 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 3 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 4 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 5 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 6 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 7 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 8 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 9 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 10 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 11 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 12 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 13 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 14 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 15 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018

Article 14. Institutional Arrangements
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Committee

1. There shall be a Committee established in accordance with the following procedures:

a. The Committee shall consist, at the time of entry into force of the present Convention, (12) experts. After an additional sixty ratifications or accessions to the Convention, the membership of the Committee shall increase by six members, attaining a maximum number of eighteen members. The members of the Committee shall serve in their personal capacity and shall be of high moral standing and recognized competence in the field of human rights, public international law or other relevant fields, who shall serve in their personal capacity.

b. The experts shall be elected by the States Parties, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution, the differences among legal systems, gender balanced representation.

c. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties, they shall be elected for a term of 4 years. Each State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at the Conference of States Parties by majority present and voting. At least four months before the date of each election, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their nominations within two months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.

d. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date of the entry into force of this Convention. The term of six of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election, the names of these six members shall be chosen by lot by the chairperson of the meeting referred to in this article.

e. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party which nominated him or her shall appoint another expert from among its nationals to serve for the remainder of his or her term, subject to the approval of the majority of the States Parties.

f. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure and elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be re-elected.

g. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the effective performance of the functions of the Committee under this Convention. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the Committee. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall be provided in its rules of procedure.

h. With the approval of the General Assembly, the members of the Committee established under the present Convention shall receive emoluments from United Nations resources on such terms and conditions as the Assembly may decide.

2. States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to their undertakings under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of the Convention for the State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary reports every four years on any new measures taken and such other reports as the Committee may request.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports to all States Parties.

4. The Committee shall have the following functions:

a. Make general comments on the understanding and implementation of the Convention based on the examination of reports and information received from the States Parties and other stakeholders.

b. Consider and provide concluding observations and recommendations on reports submitted by State Parties as it may consider appropriate and forward these to the State Party concerned that may respond with any observations it chooses to the Committee. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include this suggestions and general recommendations in the report of the Committee together with comments, if any, from States Parties.

c. Provide support to the State Parties in the compilation and communication of information required for the implementation of the provisions of the Convention

d. Submit an annual report on its activities under this Convention to the States Parties and to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

e. The Committee may recommend to the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to undertake on its behalf studies on specific issues relating to the present Treaty.

Conference of States Parties

5. The States Parties shall meet regularly in a Conference of States Parties in order to consider any matter with regard to the implementation of the Convention, including any further development needed towards fulfilling its purposes.

6. No later than six months after the entry into force of the present Convention, the Conference of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General


Article 14 of the Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business En tyerprises was scheduled for discussion on Thursday 18 October 2018, from 15 to 18 PM, together with Article 1 (Preamble) and Article 15 (Final Provisions).

After an introduction by the Chair, Luis Gallego Chiriboga, permanent representative of Ecuador at the UN in Geneva, comments on Article 1 were submitted by 3 experts. Written comments specific to Article 1 were submitted by:

    • 5 states (China, Mexico, Namibia, Peru, Russian Federation)
    • 6 NGOs

Comments by Experts

Bradford Smith, Human Rights Treaties Branch, OHCHR: submitted the following comments on Article 14:

1(a): Here the full name of the Committee should be spelled out and it usually mirrors the title of the Convention.

1(b) You may wish to reflect language found in GA resolution 68/268 para 13:  “States parties shall give due consideration to equitable geographical distribution, the representation of the different forms of civilization and the principle legal systems, balanced gender representation and the participation of experts with disabilities. 

1(c): Regarding nominations, you may also wish to reflect language found in GA resolution 68/268, para 10: “States parties are encouraged to consider adopting national policies and processes with respect to the nomination of candidates for human rights treaty bodies.”  This would be novel but practical to encourage States to use processes, as some States do, to ensure that candidates have the appropriate background etc.

You may also wish to clarify whether members can be renominated and term limits. CRDP specifies that members are eligible for re-election once.  Other human rights treaties are silent and so you have members serving for 10 years or more, and some for even 20 years.  

Regarding Conference of States Parties in this section, there is no reference to a quorum – all HR treaties provide for two-thirds of States parties for a quorum – for elections and other matters (follows ROP of GA).

1(e):  In cases of a member dying or resigning, the draft provides that the State party may appointment a replacement subject to the approval of the majority of States parties– This could prove rather cumbersome to administer.  This would need to be done through depositary notification and then one would need to wait for States to respond which could take a very long time which is not practical.  The draft could provide for a simplified procedure so that if a majority of States do not object within 6 weeks from the date of the depositary notification that candidate is deemed approved.   This is the case of CED.   I note that NO other human rights treaty has this provision.  Instead the replacement candidate is subject to the approval of the Committee – and this is the case for CERD, CEDAW, CRC, CAT, and CMW. 

1(g):  Regarding meeting times – I note that meeting time is allocated based upon a formula which takes into consideration the number of reports, individual communications etc. pursuant to GA resolution 68/268.  It is not a decision of each individual Committee.   As such, I would suggest instead to use the standard language found in the human rights treaties that the Committee shall normally meet annually in order to consider reports submitted in accordance with article … of the present Convention.

2. Reporting periodicity – I would suggest every 5 years instead of 4 year.  Why - most States do not report on time, and  reporting requirements under numerous treaties are creating a burden on States.  While most human rights treaties are every 4 years after the initial report, CMW is 5 years. Such provisions also typically provide that the reports shall indicate factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the degree of fulfillment of the obligations under the relevant Convention, and shall also contain sufficient information to provide the Committee with a comprehensive understanding of the implementation of the Convention in the country concerned.  You may wish to consider adding this type of language.

3.  I would suggest that instead of the SG of UN shall transmit reports to all SPs that the SG makes available the reports of all States Parties which is in line with other human rights treaties and practice of the Secretariats.  Reports are available on webpage and through ODS.  In addition, other human rights treaties do have provisions obliging States parties to make their reports widely available to the public in their own countries and so I would suggest including this language. 

4:  The functions of the Committee are usually not delineated in text of treaty but in the Rules of Procedure.   I would suggest aligning the draft with other human rights treaties in this regard.  I would suggest a new article on Consideration of Reports as this is the main function of any Committee:  Each report shall be considered by the Committee, which shall make such suggestions and recommendations on the report as it may consider appropriate and shall forward these to the States parties concerned.  The State party may respond with any information it chooses to the Committee.  The Committee may request further information from States parties relevant to the implementation of the Convention.  I would suggest looking a relevant provisions of CEDAW and CRPD, with respect to articles on Reports, Consideration of Reports – including the issue of overdue reports; Cooperation between State Parties and the Committee, and Annual Report of the Committee. I would also suggest including an article on Relationship of the Committee with other Bodies which would cover specialized agencies and other UN bodies, and civil society, national institutions etc.

With respect to 4(e) – Committee may recommend to GA to request SG to undertake on its behalf studies on specific issues relating to the present Treaty - This provision does not exist in other HR treaties and to be frank I am not sure how the Committee would actually do this.  Typically, States parties would sponsor resolutions relating to the Convention and this request could go into such a resolution but this is done informally through working with the relevant States Parties.  This should be looked at more closely.   

Article 14 should be divided into several articles as alluded to already, for example:
  • One article on the Committee which would cover its establishment, membership, initial elections, elections, vacancies, ROP etc.  
  • Another article on Reports by States Parties;
  • Another article on Consideration of Reports;
  • Another article on the Report of the Committee to the GA; and
  • Another article on Conference of States parties.
  • You may wish to place all of these articles under a Part entitled “Application of the Convention”
  • I would suggest looking at the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for guidance in this regard. 

Layla Hughes, Center for International Environmental Law:  in line with the UN’s own gender-parity strategy, gender balance in the monitoring of the treaty implementation should be achieved, rather than considered. Gender balance among human rights treaty bodies experts is still far from being reality.

Only the CEDAW Committee has more women than men. However, gender balance addresses formal inequality only. We also need the Treaty to require gender expertise as a criterion for the selection of experts, and to ensure that the committee adopts a gender-sensitive approach in discharging its mandate, given the highly gendered dimension of business-related human rights abuses.

Carlos Lopez, International Commission of Jurists: the Committee conforms to the practice followed by other states, but is insufficient, given the theme at stake. This model should be improved including a strong element of social participation in the composition and working of the Committee. A provision allowing participation by specialized organs and agencies of the United Nations could be added. Members of the committee should not have conflict of interest, and a mechanism to verify compliance with the Code of Conduct for Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council.

The article on Conference of States Parties is extremely brief, and it is necessary to clarify or develop expressions as  “any further development needed towards fulfilling its purposes.”

Provisions on solving disputes among state parties concerning the interpretation and the application of the Treaty are absent, even though other international instruments contain these provisions

It would be appropriate, also with reference to the comments made by other delegations, to create an organ or an agency for technical cooperation and mutual legal assistance.



Comments by States

China: it is necessary to consider whether to establish a reporting committee reviewing the implementation of the treaty. This is has to coonform to the current process on strengthening human rights treaty bodies, and avoid functional overlaps between such bodies.

Mexico: we would like to better understand the vision of the Presidency about the Committee and its sustainability, in particular in the context of Article 14.1(h), given the challenges faced by human rights treaty bodies as a whole.

Namibia: we welcome the inclusion of “equitable geographical” representation in the Committee as set out in Article 14 (1) (b). We agree with Mr. Lopez on his point that there should be no conflict of interest of committee members. This is important for impartiality and fairness.
Article 14 (2) – We agree with Mr. Smith to increase the periodicy to 5 years, but this can depend on the complexity or simplicity of the reporting mechanism. In this regard, the challenges that States already have in complying with reporting obligations should be kept in mind.
Article 14 (5) and (6) on Conference of States Parties is not clear on the periodicy of the meetings, although (6) makes mention of a biennial meeting at the instance of the UNSG or the COSP. We propose harmonization of the two subsections. We also propose that Article 15 includes a sub article requesting States party to the treaty to declare their willingness to use this treaty as the basis for MLA and International Cooperation, thus providing, as in ICL, a common platform for such cooperation.

Peru:we believe the establishment of the Committee should take into account the review process of the treaty bodies, as it is normal practice in human rights conventions.

Russian Federation: before discussing the ideas of creating bodies within the Treaty, it is necessary to conduct a review of existing international mechanisms in the field of human rights, which could be sufficient to discuss business and human rights. Many international organizations and bodies are already engaged in the analysis of various aspects of the activities of TNCs. The mandate of the proposed Committee may conflict with the powers of the Human Rights Council itself.

The establishment of a permanent organ under the Convention is premature and creates risk of functional overlaps, fragmenting the efforts of the international community. It is also important to understand the financial implications of the creation of the Committee.

Comments by NGOs

ABIA: in the Draft Elements there were two control mechanisms: an International Court on Trasnantional Corporations and Human Rights, and the Committee. The effectiveness of existing human rights committees has been scarce or null. We propose the creation of an independent International Monitoring Centre for TNCs. In the rest of their submission, ABIA outlined the powers and functions of the International Monitoring Centre.

APWLD and AWID: we recommend the next Draft to re-insert and elaborate the possibility of the International Court on Trasnantional Corporations and Human Rights, raised in the Draft Elements.

CETIM: proposed the creation of an International Court on Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, outlining its powers and functions.

FIAN: observed how existing treaty-based bodies of the United Nations have not been fully effective in putting a halt to violations and abuses of human rights and allowing victims to access justice. Suggested that the recommendations and decisions of the Committee be binding, or at least have the same force of monitoring instruments. Suggested to include an obligation, for states, to include in domestic legislation reference to the binding force of Committee decisions.

Justiça Ambiental, Friends of the Earth International: we were disappointed to discover that many recommendations contained in the Elements Paper published last year were not included in this Draft. It is clear that the treaty must include direct legal obligations for TNCs, as firmly corroborated by some States as well as many civil society and experts’ interventions. This is a crucial aspect that we expect to see included in Draft One.

We need strong implementation mechanisms at the international level, and with this in mind we call for the establishment of an International Court on TNCs and Human Rights. A coalition of groups from Friends of the Earth Africa elaborated a concrete proposal that includes a model statute of this future Court.

We stand firm with civil society organisations here in the strong condemnation of the commercial retaliation that the IoE has threatened states in this room with, and highlight the impact it could have on the ongoing integrity of the activities of this working group if concrete proposals on protecting the process from corporate capture are not taken.

International Organization of Employers:we find the Article on Institutional Arrangements confusing not least because of the sudden release – without forewarning – of the Draft Optional Protocol weeks after the Zero Draft Treaty. Both should be seen alongside each other and both raise big concerns, which are in our Joint Business Response. We are also concerned about the proposal for a Convention of State Parties – in such loose language – especially with the term that says it would consider "any further development needed."
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International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) 2018 Report

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The International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) recently distributed its 2017-2018 Annual  Report. ICoCA has its objectives to promote, govern, and oversee the implementation of The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, and to promote the responsible provision of private security services. ICoCA certifies Member Companies to the requirements of the Code (here). The ICoCA oversees compliance with the Code and provides tools and guidance (here). And the ICoCA receives and processes complaints on alleged violations of the Code (here).

The ICoCA Annual Report describes a number of undertakings accomplished this year.  Most of them deal with institutional efficiency and operation.  To my mind, the most significant involves the development of a multi-lateral non-state non- judicial mechanisms for its members ("In June 2018 we launched our first thematic guidance on developing and operating Company Grievance Mechanisms (ICoCA Code ¶¶ 66-68) to guide member companies as they implement and seek to comply with the Code’s requirements. In line with our diverse membership, the guide is available in English, French, Spanish and Mandarin." 2017-2018 Annual Report, supra, p. ii (transmittal letter)).  It is to be hoped that these efforts advance the objectives of the UN Office High Commissioner in its Accountability and Responsibility Project (ARP III), whose progress has been considered earlier (here). 

This post includes the Annual Report's Cover Letter and the table of contents of the Annual Report, and links to the Grievance Mechanisms Manuel and Interpretive Guidance. Both will be the subject of a later analytical post The Report may be accessed HERE




Transmittal Letter to 2017-2018 Annual Report

Dear Members,


2018 marked the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ Association (ICoCA). This last year was an important milestone in the life of the Association, as we consolidated our operations and concluded our transition into full operational mode. This report covers the key activities of the Association from Oct 1, 2017 to Oct 31, 2018.
The Association has worked on a number of fronts over the last thirteen months to increase recognition of ICoCA from governments, industry, civil society and the clients of private security companies. Recognising the critical role governments play as regulators and clients of private security companies, as well as a bellwether for the industry at large, we strengthened relationships with the seven government members, maintaining their support and laying a solid foundation on which to grow our government membership. In line with our global mission, we have continued to diversify our industry membership base over the last twelve months. With companies operating in over 92 countries and headquartered in 34, the ICoCA membership has become truly international. We broadened our substantive engagement with different audiences and platforms, including a range of United Nations bodies, civil society organisations and industry associations. We also saw an increase in client buy-in and recognition during the period, with a growing number of organisations referencing ICoCA membership in their procurement policies, guidelines and tendering processes. Thanks to these efforts, the ICoCA is increasingly becoming recognised as the leading global initiative in ensuring the provision of responsible private security. 

Throughout 2018 we strengthened our operational procedures and developed tools to help build the capacity of our members in complying with human rights and international humanitarian law. The Secretariat worked closely with Certification Bodies to streamline the certification process. 14 more companies achieved ICoCA certification over the last twelve months. Two more field based reviews were conducted during the period, one in Iraq and one in Ghana. These reviews, along with other field activities, for example in China and Costa Rica, solidified ICoCA’s presence on the ground and showed operational possibilities of the Association. As the number of field based reviews grows, the operational awareness and footprint of the Association are helping build its credibility in the private security arena globally.

In June 2018 we launched our first thematic guidance on developing and operating Company Grievance Mechanisms to guide member companies as they implement and seek to comply with the Code’s requirements. In line with our diverse membership, the guide is available in English, French, Spanish and Mandarin. We have been developing a set of Guidelines on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse. Once finalised these will also be made publically available on the ICoCA website. In line with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, during the past year the Association has focused on ensuring access to remedy and in this spirit, our own grievance mechanism is now freely available online in English, French, Spanish and Arabic. 
Finally, as we mark our five year anniversary, we are engaging with members and other stakeholders for guidance on the strategic orientation of the Association, laying the groundwork for a five-year Strategic Plan for 2019-2023. We look forward to working with you all in the months and year ahead as we finalise this Plan to realise ICoCA’s mission of promoting the provision of responsible private security and implementation of the Code of Conduct.




__________



Guidance on Company Grievance Mechanisms - Code paragraphs 66 to 68


As Members of the Association, Companies commit to establishing fair and accessible grievance mechanisms that offer effective remedies. In order to assist Member Companies to fulfil their commitments under the Code, the Association drafted guidance in cooperation with the support of its Member Companies and experts.


  1. Manual: explains how to use the Guidance and offers a checklist linked to an Executive Summary;
  2. Interpretative Guidance: provides further information and explanation. It describes good practices in more detail and explains why and how they are linked to the requirements of the Code as well as other international standards and principles.


The Guidance is a ‘living document’. The Association expects to revise it in the future, in the light of Member Companies’ experience, developments in the industry and lessons learned from the Association’s own review and handling of complaints it receives. To that end, the Association welcomes feedback from Companies that implement company grievance mechanisms (CGM) and use this Guidance.

The Guidance on Company Grievance Mechanisms is also available in the following languages:

Français: 1) Manuel et 2) Guide d'interprétation
Chinese: 1) Manual and 2) Interpretative Guidance

14-Flora Sapio on the Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprise (Article 15 Final Provisions)

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018; Musée Ariana, porcelain figures Meissen 1725-1730 )

Flora Sapio (Comments on the "Zero-Draft"), and I (Making Sausages?: Preliminary Thoughts on the "Zero-Draft") have been considering the challenges posed by the Zero Draft.  But we wanted to dig deeper.  To that end we wanted to avoid the altogether too easy exercise of textual exegesis to suggest the challenges that this draft might construct for itself.

Rather than consider text, or text in light of the various mandates and principles purportedly manifested in the language used to build the Zero Draft, we thought it might be useful to consider text within the context of the initial commentary it might generate among Zero Draft stakeholders motivated enough to make them. These, then, might usefully inform the reading of text, and sharpen analysis of its structure and consequences. 

To that end, and in this and subsequent posts, Flora Sapio  presents summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.  These, then, will be woven together first to develop both a critique of the Zero Draft, and thereafter to suggest the value of an alternative, framework, model for such a project.

These Commentaries form part of a larger Coalition for Peace and EthicsProject on the Effort to Elaborate an International Instrument on Business and Human Rights.Go to CPE Treaty Project Page: HERE.

This Part 14 focuses on Article 15 of the Zero Draft (Final Provisions); the comments of China and Palestinian delegations are worth reviewing carefully. 






Summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG
Article 15 (Final Provisions )
Flora Sapio 


On 14 July 2014, the Human Rights Council created an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with respect to human rights (OEIGWG). According to Resolution 26/9, the Working Group has the mandate to: “elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”

By “Other business enterprises” the Human Rights Council referred to all business enterprises having a transnational character in their operational activities. This designation does not apply to local businesses.

In establishing the OEIGWG, the Human Rights Council also decided that the first two sessions of the OEIGWG would be dedicated to conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature, and form of the future Treaty. Following deliberations, the Chairperson would prepare elements for the draft Treaty. Substantive negotiations on the Treaty would be held during the third session of the Working Group, based on the discussions held during the first two sessions.

The OEIGWG held its first session from 6 to 10 July 2015. A second session took place from 24 to 28 October 2016. Based on discussions held during the first two sessions, a third session was convened from 23 to 27 October 2017. During this session, the elements for the draft Treaty were discussed. Also, the OEIGWG requested the Chair-Rapporteur to complement the ongoing bilateral consultations with states and non-state stakeholders with informal consultations.

Following the third session, a Zero Draft of a Legally Binding Instrument (LBI) on Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and Other Business Enterprises (OBEs) was prepared by Ecuador. In July 2018 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India released the draft for public comments.

The Zero Draft of the Legally Binding Instrument (and a zero draft of an optional protocol to the binding instrument) formed the basis for a first round of substantive negotiations, held in Geneva from 15 to 19 October 2018. According to the program of work adopted by the OEIGWG, substantive negotiations saw experts, representatives of national states, transnational organizations, and NGOs comment on the Zero Draft.

In this and in following posts, I will be presenting summaries of discussions on each article of the Zero Draft, based on the written submissions available on the website of the OEIGWG.


Article 1 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 2 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 3 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 4 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 5 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 6 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 7 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 8 – summary of discussions - Monday 15 October 2018
Article 9 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 10 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 11 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 12 – summary of discussions - Wednesday 17 October 2018
Article 13 – summary of discussions - Tuesday 16 October 2018
Article 14 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018
Article 15 – summary of discussions - Thursday 18 October 2018

Article
 
 
Article 15. Final Provisions

Implementation

1. States shall take all necessary legislative, administrative or other action including the establishment of adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure effective implementation of this Convention.

2. Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws and regulations that give effect to this Convention and of any subsequent changes to such laws and regulations or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which shall be made publicly available.

3. In policies and actions pursuant to this Convention, Parties shall act to protect these policies and actions from commercial and other vested interests of the [business sector] in accordance with national law.

4. Special attention shall be undertaken in the cases of business activities in conflict-affected areas including taking action to identify, prevent and mitigate the human rights-related risks of these activities and business relationships and to assess and address the heightened risks of abuses, paying special attention to both gender-based and sexual violence.

5. In implementing this agreement, State Parties shall address the specific impacts of business activities on while giving special attention to those facing heightened risks of violations of human rights within the context of business activities, such as women, children, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, migrants, refugees and internal displaced persons.

6. The application and interpretation of these articles shall be consistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law and shall be without any discrimination of any kind or on any ground, without exception.

Depositary

7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the depositary of the present Convention.

Signature

8. The present Convention shall be open for signature by all States and by regional integration organizations at United Nations Headquarters in New York as of (date).

Consent to be bound

9. The present Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States and to formal confirmation by signatory regional integration organizations. It shall be open for accession by any State or regional integration organization which has not signed the Convention.

Regional integration organizations

10. “Regional integration organization” shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention.

11. This Convention shall apply to regional integration organizations within the limits of their competence; subsequently they shall inform the depositary of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence. For the purposes of paragraph 17, and paragraphs 22 and 23 of this article, any instrument deposited by these organizations shall not be counted. Such organizations may exercise their right to vote in the Conference of States Parties with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Convention. Such right to vote shall not be exercise if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.

Entry into force

12. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit of the [---] instrument of ratification or accession.

13. For each State or regional integration organization ratifying, formally confirming or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the ---- such instrument, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the deposit of its own such instrument.

Reservations

14. Reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.

15. Reservations may be withdrawn at any time.

Amendments

16. Any State Party may propose an amendment to the present Convention and submit it to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall communicate any proposed amendments to States Parties, with a request to be notified whether they favor a conference of States Parties for the purpose of considering and deciding upon the proposals. In the event that, within four months from the date of such communication, at least one third of the States Parties favor such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted by a majority of two thirds of the States Parties present and voting in the Conference of the Parties shall be submitted by the Secretary-General to all States Parties for acceptance.

17. An amendment adopted and approved in accordance with paragraph 15 of this article shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the number of instruments of acceptance deposited reaches two thirds of the number of States Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter into force for any State Party on the thirtieth day following the deposit of its own instrument of acceptance. An amendment shall be binding only on those States Parties which have accepted it.

18. If so decided by the Conference of States Parties by consensus, an amendment adopted and approved in accordance with paragraph 15 of this article which relates exclusively to the establishment of the Committee or its functions, and the Conference of States Parties shall enter into force for all States Parties on the thirtieth day after the number of instruments of acceptance deposited reaches two thirds of the number of States Parties at the date of adoption of the amendment.

Denunciation

19. A State Party may denounce the present Convention by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The denunciation shall become effective one year after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.

Authentic texts

20. The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of the present Convention shall be equally authentic.

21. In witness thereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Convention.


Article 15 of the Legally Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises was scheduled for discussion on Thursday 18 October 2018, from 15 to 18 PM, together with Article 1 (Preamble) and Article 14 (Institutional Arrangements).

After an introduction by the Chair, Luis Gallego Chiriboga, permanent representative of Ecuador at the UN in Geneva, comments on Article 1 were submitted by 2 experts. Written comments specific to Article 1 were submitted by:

    • 7 states (Azerbaijan, China, Mexico, Namibia, Peru, Russian Federation)
    • 1 observer state
    • 8 NGOs

Comments by Experts

Bradford Smith, Human Rights Treaties Branch, OHCHR: submitted the following comments on Article 15:

  • The Final Provisions should be divided into articles which should be grouped under a Part entitled “Final Provisions”. 
  • The final clauses need to be sent to Treaty Section of OLA for review in accordance with ST/SGB/2001/7.
  • Regional integration organization – Language should be included obliging such organizations to declare their competence in their instrument of formal confirmation or accession as well as modifications. Also language should be added that references to “States Parties” in the Convention shall apply to regional integration organizations within the limits of their competence to make it clear that obligations also extend to such entities.
  • EIF of Convention and amendments, instruments deposited by regional integration organizations should not be counted and this draft has that language – we just need to make sure that the final numbering of the articles/paragraphs are properly cross-referenced to correspond to the articles on entry into force and amendments.
  • Conference of States Parties, typically there is language to the effect that regional integration organizations in matters within their competence may exercise their right to vote in the Conference of States Parties with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are parties to the Convention BUT that such an organization shall not exercise its rights to vote if any of its members exercises their right and vica versa. I would suggest looking at the CRPD in this regard. 
  • Regarding the EIF:  The trend is to have a lower threshold – all of the recent human rights treaties - CEDAW, CRC, CAT, CMW, CRPD and CED – have specified 20 ratifications/accessions for entry into force of the treaty.
  • the obligation of States parties to furnish copies of its laws and regulations, this is an administrative function and not a depositary function which will fall to the Secretariat of the Committee to discharge.   You may wish to encourage States parties to provide courtesy translations into official languages were possible in the text as without a specific budget for this, UNOG does not have the capacity to translate such documents into working languages. Further reflection may be needed here as there are budget implications.  Again, UNODC maintains a repository of laws in English or French or Spanish with links to government webpages. 
  • I note that the depositary will circulate depositary notifications on the designated central authority but will not maintain lists as this is an administrative function and so you may wish to also include that such a list be maintained by the Secretary-General which will then be delegated to the Secretariat of the Committee for the convenience of States to locate such information.   UNODC, for example has online directories of central authorities for treaties for which its performs secretariat functions
   
 
Layla Hughes, Center for International Environmental Law: Article 15 contains crucial provisions, which need to be fleshed out in other articles of the treaty to operationalize them. For instance, article 15 paragraph 4 on business-related abuses in conflict-affected areas should have corresponding obligations in article 9 on prevention, by imposing enhanced and mandatory due diligence on businesses in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

Article 15.3 is fundamental to the successful implementation of the treaty. The undue, persistent influence of corporate interests on law and policy-making has adisproportionate impact on women.

Article 15 paragraph 5, which recognizes the heightened risks of violations of the rights of certain groups, does not sufficiently integrate a gender perspective. This provision looks like an afterthought, and instead, a gender dimension should be adopted throughout the treaty. This is fundamental.




Comments by States

Azerbaijan: we welcome article 15.5 as is.

China: this article should respect the autonomy of states to implement the Treaty in accordance with the framework of the Treaty.

Article 15.3 poses the risk of an opposition between business and human rights, and this issue should be considered from the consensus that “development and human rights are mutually connected and mutually reinforcing”.  The nature of the relationships governed by this document and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control is different. In this document, business is an important engine of the promotion of economic development, and from this point of view it can promote human rights by promoting development. Naturally, adequate regulation is necessary to guarantee that business respects human rights, and to ensure a timely and effective remedy to acts of violations. This has also been confirmed by Resolution 26/9 therefore, we suggest to solve this issue in a more balanced and positive way. The relevant content can be moved from Article 15 to the Preamble, and content reflecting the contribution of business to development, and guaranteeing that business respects human rights in its activity can be added.

Mexico: it is appropriate to eliminate the reference, in Article 15.3, to the “vested rights”, because this may result in a violation of the general principles and norms of international law.

Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 may be eliminated or they may be part of the Preamble. In relation to paragraph 12, it is extremely important to reach a number of ratification necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty, taking other human rights conventions as an example.

Namibia: Since it is the duty of States to safeguard the rights of the people, States are required to ensure that its policy and legal framework reflect the diligent execution of this duty, thus Article 15 (3) is valuable in this regard although the rights of all interested parties should be considered and carefully balanced. 

Peru: concerning Article 15.5, we believe it is important that the groups at most risk of violations and abuses of human rights be considered also in other articles of the Draft Treaty.

Russian Federation: the inclusion in the Draft Treaty of provisions on certain national mechanisms, as in paragraph 1, is superfluous. Each state has the right to independently decide through which national institutions it will ensure the fulfillment of its obligations.


Comments by Observer States

Palestine: Article 15.6 does not refer to the applicability, where appropriate, of international treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict. This would be essential addition to Article.7, particularly when we are addressing situations of conflict. In such situations, the treaty would benefit from reiterating state obligations under both international human rights law and humanitarian law to guarantee maximum protection for individuals and communities.

We commend the effort on adding special attention to cases of business activities in conflict- affected areas in provision 4 under Article 15. But unfortunately, we see that the language is not strong enough and needs to be strengthened. While we agree that a focus on gender-based and sexual violence is necessary in the treaty, we see that having a separate provision on this point is more appropriate than adding it to a provision that focuses on conflict-affected areas.

On provision 15.3, we are encouraged that this provision of the Zero draft is addressing concerns regarding the imbalances that states face from corporate representatives and other vested interests, and the undue influence they exert over government policies and laws. It is particularly concerning to see how some corporate representatives and other vested interests intervene in the foreign policy making process of some countries to encourage arms sales that perpetuate conflicts in many regions, in the interests of corporate profits.

We note the text of article 15.3 reflects the proven successful example of how to address corporate conflicts of interest contained in article 5.3 of the framework convention on tobacco control. 

Since Article 15.3 holds the potential to be a powerful preventive measure to defend the public policy and law-making arena from the undue influences of corporations and vested interests, we would recommend that the text of article 15.3 be moved to the section of the instrument dealing with preventative measures.  

We recommend removing the words ‘in accordance with national law’ from article 15.3 for fear it would weaken the efficacy of this article.

Comments by NGOs

Al-Haq, ALTSEAN-Burma, AWID, CIHRS, ESCR-Net, FIDH, WILPF, ACCA, SOMO:  despite the inclusion of conflict areas under Article 15 of the Draft Treaty, it is imperative that such language is expanded and strengthened.  The current text seriously fails to sufficiently prioritize the rights and protections afforded to individuals, communities and peoples against corporate abuses; victim’s access to remedy; and corporate accountability in conflict areas.

Article 15(4) on Final Provisions should be reinforced and echo the UNGPs which recall a set of existing obligations for states under international law, including humanitarian and criminal law, applicable to situations of conflict.

We call on you to enhance the Treaty’s provisions on conflict areas to allow for a genuine alternative avenue for accountability during situations of conflict where impunity for perpetrators often prevails.

APWLD and AWID: we are concerned over the convergence of conflicts over resources, use of militarism to facilitate corporate profits and systematic oppressions on democratic civil resistance.  This directly links to access to justice of victims, and the protection of women, environmental and human rights defenders in the context of resisting corporate abuse and exercising their freedom of expression and right to democratic participation.  Ex-ante, periodic and ex-post human rights, gender and environmental impact assessment particularly of existing and future trade and investment agreements can serve as a fundamental preventive measure. We recommend Article 15 paragraphs 4 and 5 to be moved under Article 9 and clearly be linked to Article 2.

Economic integration policies of regional integration organisations conflict with States’ human rights obligations and undermine policy coherence. We recommend Paragraphs 10 and 11 be removed from the Zero Draft.


The Center for Constitutional Rights and the Adalah Justice Project:  our organisations have a strong focus on the activities of a powerful lobbying group called the American Legislative Exchange Council, or ALEC.  ALEC has pushed hard for the adoption of an infamous law in many US states called the 'Stand Your Ground' law. This law lead to the acquittal of a man who shot and killed an unarmed Black teenager named Trayvon Martin in Florida. 

We also witness corporate pressure on intergovernmental processes as well. In this very room today we are witnessing a craven attempt by the International Organisation of Employers to threaten states with commercial retaliation if they ratify the future treaty.  The IoE released THIS additional analysis with an annex that reads – and I quote - “This appendix illustrates the major exports of selected treaty proponent countries that may be placed at risk from treaty ratification”.  The countries listed are Ecuador, South Africa, Pakistan, Philippines, Venezuela, Nambia, Azerbaijan, Nicaragua, Benin, Morocco and Burkina Faso.  

It is for these reasons that we strongly support the inclusion of article 15.3, and any other measures that OHCHR and the Chair can take to protect this process.  We commend the Working Group for responding to the will of those states and civil society organisations that have recommended the treaty include a provision similar to article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control .

To ensure this provision is as strong as possible we do however recommend the removal of the words ‘in accordance with national law’ from the provision, and ask the Working Group move the article to the section of the treaty dealing with preventive measures.

Corporate Accountability: it is necessary to develop means to protect governments from the interests of TNCs, and the Working Group shouls base its work on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, as suggested on Tuesday by Mr. Nicolas Guerrero, of the Framework Convention’s Secretariat. We also recommend that measures against corporate capture of the Treaty be integrally included in the text, and to develop concrete means to improve transparency, develop codes of conduct for public officials, afford protection against conflict of interest, and prohibit the system of revolving doors. These should be obligations of states, and obligations directed to enterprises. Likewise, article 15.3 should reflect these means and be part of Article 9.
 
DKA Austria: as a children-based organization, we welcome the fact that children are explicitly named in article 15.5. Nonetheless, a profound children’s rights approach is not embedded in the zero draft itself.  In general, it is challenging for children to obtain remedy in the courts or through other mechanisms, when their rights are infringed upon, even more so when their rights are violated by business enterprises. Given the broad range of children’s rights that can be affected by business activities and operations, we ask you to include this perspective in the ongoing work on the binding treaty. The situation of children should be taken into account in all relevant articles of the treaty, for example children’s access to justice and children’s rights due diligence. It is another important focus for us that the committee's work ensure, that children are heard and their situation is taken into account. 
 
FIAN: Article 15.3 – the provision to combat corporate capture is extremely relevant, and we believe this article should detail the specific measures states should take in this respect. Means to avoid corporate capture should also be reflected in other articles, such as Article 8 and Article 9. 

Article 15.4 – a clearer language should be used to refer to conflict areas. The beginning of this sentence should be: “states are under the obligation to respect and protect human rights in those cases when enterprises operate in areas affected by conflict” (Los estados están obligados a respetar y proteger los derechos humanos en casos donde las empresas operan en zonas afectadas por conflicto).

Article 15.5 – we recommend the explicit mention of  provisions about groups in a situation of vulnerability and human rights defenders, as well as agricultural workers (campesinos/campesinas) and other persons working in rural areas.

We recommend an additional clause stating that when parliaments cannot ensure a timely compliance with their legislative function, or do not legislate to implement the Treaty, courts can directly apply the treaty, in accordance with Paragraph 4, General comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities.

International Association of Democratic Lawyers:we want to notice how Article 15.4 is insufficient   [to regulate] the activities of enterprises in conflict areas. We want to reiterate how we consider the treatment of women under Article 15.5 inappropriate. We want to receive a special attention. We want the text to adopt a gender approach including:

  • the acknowledgement of the negative effects of TNCs specific to women
  • a focus on gender justice, to help overcome historical prejudice, inequality and discrimination against woman and children [gendered female]
  • specific mechanisms to protect human rights defenders

International Organization of Employers:It is not clear when the Chair envisages that the Zero Draft Treaty and the Draft Optional Protocol would enter into force.


Announcing Publication of "Paths for Cuba: Reforming Communism in Comparative Perspective" (Scott Morgenstern, Jorge Pérez-López, and Jerome Branche, eds.)

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I am delighted to announce the publication of Paths for Cuba: Reforming Communism in Comparative Perspective (Scott Morgenstern, Jorge Pérez-López, and Jerome Branche, eds., University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018) (408 Pages, 6 x 9 in.; January, 2019; isbn : 9780822965497).

Here is the official blurb from the backmatter:
The Cuban model of communism has been an inspiration—from both a positive and negative perspective—for social movements, political leaders, and cultural expressionists around the world. With changes in leadership, the pace of change has accelerated following decades of economic struggles. The death of Fidel Castro and the reduced role of Raúl Castro seem likely to create further changes, though what these changes look like is still unknown. For now, Cuba is opening in important ways. Cubans can establish businesses, travel abroad, access the internet, and make private purchases. Paths for Cuba examines Cuba’s internal reforms and external influences within a comparative framework. The collection includes an interdisciplinary group of scholars from around the world to explore reforms away from communism.

The book is valuable for anyone interested in  understanding the power, triumphs and failures of the great and unfinished ideological experiment that commenced with the flight of Fulgencio Batista from Havana on the eve of 1959.

The table of contents follows:













Introduction

Reforming Communism: Cuba in Comparative Perspective 
Jorge Perez Lopez, Scott Morgenstern, & Jerome Branche


Section 1: Economics

1. Models of Economic Reform and Cuba's "Updating" of its Model 
Scott Morgenstern and Jorge Perez Lopez, with Kevin Morrison and Carlos Alzugaray

2. Initial Conditions and Economic Development: The East Asian "Tigers" and Cuba
 James W. McGuire

3. Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in Cuba: Lessons From China
Jorge Perez-Lopez and Yu Xiao

4. Resolving Pre-Revolutionary Property Rights 
 Matias Travieso-Diaz


Section 2: Policy and Politics

5. Socialist Social Contracts and Accountability 
 Martin Dimitrov

6. The Cuban Communist Party on the Cusp of Change
 Larry Catá Backer

7. The Prospects for Cuban Democracy in the Post-Transition Era
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán and Scott Mainwaring

8: Cuban Social Security Reforms Compared with Latin America, China And Vietnam
Carmelo Mesa-Lago

9. The Future of Cuban Social Protection System and the Cuban Mirror
Javier Vazquez-D'Elia

10: After The Fall: Postcommunist Dynamics In Central And East Europe and Their Implications For Cuba
Ron Linden 


Section 3: Citizens and Society

11. The Living Lie and the Living Eye" Cuba's Reforms and the Racial Contract
Alan West-Durán

12: From Domestic to Statist Violence: Debate and Representation in the Cuban Cultural Field
Ana Belén Martín Sevillano

13. Somos Mucho Mas: An Analysis of Cuban Hip Hop Artivism and Arts-Based Public Spheres
Tanya Saunders


Conclusion/Summary 
Comparative Lessons for “Updating” Cuban Policy: Politics, Economics, and Society
Scott Morgenstern and Ronald Linden
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In Defense of America First: Brief Reflections on the Resignation of James Mattis as U.S. Secretary of Defense

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James Mattis delivered a very public letter of resignation to President Trump on 21 December 2018. 
Officials said Mr. Mattis went to the White House with his resignation letter already written, but nonetheless made a last attempt at persuading the president to reverse his decision about Syria, which Mr. Trump announced on Wednesday over the objections of his senior advisers.  Mr. Mattis, a retired four-star Marine general, was rebuffed. Returning to the Pentagon, he asked aides to print out 50 copies of his resignation letter and distribute them around the building. (Jim Mattis, Defense Secretary, Resigns in Rebuke of Trump’s Worldview).
 The influential press outlets in the United States and elsewhere produced the expected commentary/coverage of the event (e.g., here, here, and here). They delight in taking the position that the General's resignation was a rebuke both to the President and to his policies (e.g., herehere).  And it ties in nicely with the cult of personality that Mr. Trump's opponents have managed to build around the President (e.g., here, and here).

A careful reading of the resignation letter suggests otherwise, at least in part. It is not unlikely that the resignation was a personal rebuke of Mr. Trump, the man. But it is less clear that the resignation was a rebuke of policy.  Indeed, General Mattis' resignation letter suggests otherwise.  It appears more a principled defense of Mr. Trump's America First Initiative (against its betrayal by the President himself). Tied to that defense is an endorsement of the National Security Strategy of the US with which the America First Initiative is conjoined (here).  This becomes clearer when one considers Mr. Mattis' resignation letter alongside his remarks at the U.S. Naval War College Commencement, Newport, Rhode Island 15 June 2018, both of which follow below along with brief reflections.


Let us consider carefully what General Mattis explained in his resignation letter. The personal element, and the subtext of betrayal of duty and to a fidelity to a policy of the Administraiton's own making. His remarks are send to the President but addressed to the men and women serving the Department of Defense and its military. They (and by omission not the addressee of the letter) serve both Americans and their ideals.

 For General Mattis, those ideals were articulated in the National Security Strategy of the US around which the capabilities of strategies of the Defense department and its military were directed and deployed. For General Mattis, that strategy was based on American leadership over a strong alliance of like minded states (echoing the remarks of Secretary of State Pompeo in Brussels on 4 December 2018). The idea of America First as a strategic initiative was to deepen the traditional post 1945 core alliances of the United States, under American leadership, to advance shared values--again under the guidance of the Americans. This was once a value that the President also appeared to share ("Like you, I have said from the beginning that the armed forces of the United States should not be the policeman of the world. Instead, we must use all tools of American power to provide for the common defense, including providing effective leadership to our alliances" Mattis Resignation Letter).  

The object of this alliance system was to ensure protection against competitors and enemies, agaibnst which the alliance of states led by the United State sis essential--essential to protect American and shared values. "It is clear that China and Russia, for example, want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions—to promote their own interests at the expense of their neighbors, America and our allies. That is why we must use all the tools of American power to provide for the common defense." (Ibid.). Those values are economic, political, and social. The affect  the character of globalization and the basic rules through which markets operate.  

Thus, for General Mattis, this current stage of history, produces a double obligation.  The first is to understand that against one's competitors and enemies modern warfare is effectively total in its use of all available mechanisms (economic, social, cultural and political, as well as military) and must be met by an equal countermeasures in all fields of activity.  The second is to provide leadership for onew's allies that reaffirm the authority and legitimacy to lead.  That requires treating American allies with respect, and with sensitivity to the shape of the multilateral systems of alliances that the United States has forged since 1945. 

General Mattis suggests that the President has failed these fundamental principles of American values as expressed in its National Security Strategy.  The final rupture appears to have involved the decision to betray a key ally of the United States, an ally that has sacrificed much for American interests in the middle east to satisfy the needs of America's strategic competitors and enemies.  Removing American protection of Kurdish forces in Syria to satisfy the Ottoman ambitions of the current Turkish leader, and to accommodate the Russian interest may well have motivated the timing of the decision. That is what others have suggested in the news articles cited above. On the other hand, the long standing relationship between the Turkish Kemalist Republic and the United States also requires tending. But the tone of the letter suggests that  while General Mattis had much respect for the President's policy, he had less for critical decisions purportedly made thereunder. The betrayal for Mattis, then, might be better understood as of the very policy the President adopted (for himself and others), of American allies (without which there are no like minded states over which to serve in a leadership role), and ultimately of American interests and its America First initiative, which itself is built on a global order of friends, competitors and enemies.    

These fundamental notions were made quite clear in General Mattis' remarks at the U.S. Naval War College Commencement. In it, he defined both the scope of the challenges facing the United States, and the approach that America First offered from a military and geo-political perspective. He spoke in terns of  defining "the categories of challenges in the following way: urgency and power and will -- political will." (Ibid.) With respect to the first, General Mattis identified the threat of North Korea and of Middle Eastern extremism, "It is the urgency of this fight that compels us all to act decisively against terrorism, denying terrorists the safe haven they seek. And we carry out this counterterrorism campaign by, with and through our allies and partners" (Ibid.).  With respect to power, he spoke to military power and the Russian Federation. The threat, he suggested, was not merely military, but fundamentally ideological.
For the first time since World War II, Russia has been the nation that has redrawn international borders by force of arms in Georgia and Ukraine, while pursuing veto authority over their neighbors' diplomatic, economic and security decisions. Putin seeks to shatter NATO. He aims to diminish the appeal of the Western democratic model and attempts to undermine America's moral authority. His actions are designed not to challenge our arms, at this point, but to undercut and compromise our belief in our ideals.
And with respect to the third challenge, of will, he identified as the strategic manifestaiton of will to displace America leadership for that of another ideologocal and geopolitical center. Here h spoke to
political will, and that is a potential rivalry, with China harboring long-term designs to rewrite the existing global order. The Ming Dynasty appears to be their model, albeit in a more muscular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states, kowtowing to Beijing; espousing One Belt, One Road, when this diverse world has many belts and many roads; and attempting to replicate on the international stage their authoritarian domestic model, militarizing South China Sea features while using predatory economics of piling massive debt on others. (Ibid).
These challenges suggested a new era for American leadership that required a new comprehensive approach to American leadership. To that end the National Security Strategy represented a comprehensive approach that created a coherent relationship between economic, political, military, and political policy, the object of which was to preserve and advance America values against threats--in the market, as well as in more traditional fields of battle. It represented an acknowledgement that 5th generation warfare was now comprehensive in the sense that conflated all policy toward a policy either of aligning more carefully with one's allies, or of  meeting the threat of competitors or enemies, on all fronts.   
In response to these competitive challenges of urgency, power and will, this last January, our Department of Defense released its first National Defense Strategy in over a decade, and this filled a vacuum, one of strategy-free actions. To protect America's experiment in democracy, our National Defense Strategy has three lines of effort.(Ibid.).
On the military side that suggested three core objectives for General Mattis.  The first was to build a more lethal force in defense of our values and institutions.The second was to strengthen military alliances and build new partnerships, "for history is clear: nations with allies thrive. Every allied and partner-nation officer here today brings value." (Ibid.). Last was the overhaul of the Defense Department itself.

It was in defense of those values and those objectives--values and objectives were to mark this Administration--that General Mattis resigned.  None of this suggests anything like a rejection of the policy initiatives of the last two years.  But it does suggest that everyone, including the President, ought to be held to its values.  And paramount among these values is the core principle of the United States in peace and war--that the United States does not betray its allies or those who have given their lives in the defense of the interests of the United States. The new American multilateralism, like its predecessor, is impossible in the absence of a vigorous adherence to this principle. It must be conceded that there is a wide scope of discretion in moving form principle to decision. But as one approaches those limits, accountability principles, also at the heart of the American Republic, come into play. It is for the President to convince the other political branches of the justifications for his decision in light of his paramount duty to the nation. The National Security Strategy provided a baseline against which such justification and accounting might be made. And if the President doesn't take the lead on that exercise, other political actors surely will. As for the rest, that I leave to the intellectual classes better fit for that task. 

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Resignation Letter (reproduced in James Mattis’s Letter of Resignation 20 Dec. 201, The Atlantic)
Dear Mr. President:

I have been privileged to serve as our country’s 26th Secretary of Defense which has allowed me to serve alongside our men and women of the Department in defense of our citizens and our ideals.

I am proud of the progress that has been made over the past two years on some of the key goals articulated in our National Defense Strategy: putting the Department on a more sound budgetary footing, improving readiness and lethality in our forces, and reforming the Department’s business practices for greater performance. Our troops continue to provide the capabilities needed to prevail in conflict and sustain strong US global influence.

One core belief I have always held is that our strength as a nation is inextricably linked to the strength of our unique and comprehensive system of alliances and partnerships. While the US remains the indispensable nation in the free world, we cannot protect our interests or serve that role effectively without maintaining strong alliances and showing respect to those allies. Like you, I have said from the beginning that the armed forces of the United States should not be the policeman of the world. Instead, we must use all tools of American power to provide for the common defense, including providing effective leadership to our alliances. NATO’s 29 democracies demonstrated that strength in their commitment to fighting alongside us following the 9-11 attack on America. The Defeat-ISIS coalition of 74 nations is further proof.

Similarly, I believe we must be resolute and unambiguous in our approach to those countries whose strategic interests are increasingly in tension with ours. It is clear that China and Russia, for example, want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions—to promote their own interests at the expense of their neighbors, America and our allies. That is why we must use all the tools of American power to provide for the common defense.

My views on treating allies with respect and also being clear-eyed about both malign actors and strategic competitors are strongly held and informed by over four decades of immersion in these issues. We must do everything possible to advance an international order that is most conducive to our security, prosperity and values, and we are strengthened in this effort by the solidarity of our alliances.

Because you have the right to a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on these and other subjects, I believe it is right for me to step down from my position. The end date for my tenure is February 28, 2019, a date that should allow sufficient time for a successor to be nominated and confirmed as well as to make sure the Department’s interests are properly articulated and protected at upcoming events to include Congressional posture hearings and the NATO Defense Ministerial meeting in February. Further, that a full transition to a new Secretary of Defense occurs well in advance of the transition of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September in order to ensure stability within the Department.

I pledge my full effort to a smooth transition that ensures the needs and interests of the 2.15 million Service Members and 732,079 DoD civilians receive undistracted attention of the Department at all times so that they can fulfill their critical, round-the-clock mission to protect the American people.

I very much appreciate this opportunity to serve the nation and our men and women in uniform.

James N. Mattis

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Remarks By Secretary Mattis at the U.S. Naval War College Commencement, Newport, Rhode Island 15 June 2018

Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES N. MATTIS: Thank you, Admiral Harley, distinguished guests, those of you who took time to attend today. You're most welcome here. A very significant day, I would say, for our forces and for those of our allies and our partners, on this beautiful, sunny, picture-perfect day.

(Laughter.)

I say that with no tongue in cheek, since any day outside Washington, D.C. is sunny for me.

(Laughter.)

I believe it --

(APPLAUSE)

-- it probably adds seven years to my life to be with you today.

But -- and, for you mothers there who have got young ones who are yelling out a little bit, please stay in your seats. Whatever your little ones say can only add to the intellectual content of my remarks. (Laughter.)

So no problem at all. Those little ones are a reminder of why we do what we do here at the Naval War College. And I would also tell you --

(APPLAUSE)

Yeah. They really are, aren't they?

But congratulations to all of you graduates on your achievements here today, and to the families that stood by you as you burned the midnight oil here, in a school known for its intellectual rigor.

I would tell you that, having tried unsuccessfully several times in my career to make the cut to attend one of the schools, I felt, to say the least, a little bit humbled when I got the invitation, and surprised.

I attribute that to the professional courtesy of your -- of your president here, because I owe him a lot, and, in the naval service, we do not forget the debt that we owe to our shipmates. So thank you, Admiral, for inviting me up here. You helped to get me out of every jam that I got us into. (Laughter.)

But it is an honor to be with you because I couldn't make the cut, so, obviously, I come here with a certain amount of envy of those of you who got the benefit of this great education up here.

And I would just tell you that we expect that, if you turn to a fresh page in your lives, that you're at the top of your mental, physical and spiritual game.

You've had a year to refresh, to learn from each other and a superb faculty. And I think your education will continue even after you leave here, along the lines of what we just hear our chaplain pray for: that we continue to go forward and meet these challenges that surely await us.

Admiral Stephen Luce, when he founded the college on this rocky shore so many years ago -- I think it was about 134 years ago -- he wanted a lighthouse for leaders, a lighthouse where they could exchange ideas and broaden their perspectives and thus illuminate the path ahead for generations to come.

And we saw it start immediately, certainly with then (kept ?) and Alfred Thayer Mahan's lectures on sea-power that served as the foundation for maritime strategy and shaping naval thought for decades and decades to come.

Captain Charles Stockton -- he came here. He added to that legacy when he developed the first code for international law for naval operations, which became the basis for our modern law of naval warfare and, certainly, when we saw this campus exercise its intellectual prowess, helping to develop the Rainbow Plans of the 1930s and preparing its students for the challenges to come.

That's what you get when you testify too often in front of Congress, by the way. (Laughter.)

But, in the words of Admiral Chester Nimitz -- he said nothing he encountered in the Pacific during the war was either strange or unexpected, for this campus had prepared him well. I'm very confident -- thank you very much. (Laughter.)

If this was vodka, it would be a lot better speech. (Laughter.)

(APPLAUSE)

But I'm not supposed to glamorize alcohol anymore, so, young folks, you ignore what I just said. (Laughter.)

I am confident that you're going to carry forward that legacy of what those officers found here or brought to this school as you take your intellectual firepower forward and tackle the security problems of our time, because we are witnessing a world awash in change, as former Secretary of State George Schultz described it, a world beset by the reemergence of great power competition.

And we define the categories of challenges in the following way: urgency and power and will -- political will.

First, on urgency, we see it epitomized by the North Korea situation, as well as by the threat from violent extremist organizations, two very, very different challenges that have our ongoing attention.

Certainly, President Trump's historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un proves, and I quote here, "The past does not have to define the future," unquote.

But, while a possible new avenue to peace now exists with North Korea, we remain vigilant regarding pursuit of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.

And, meanwhile, half a world away and despite our international coalition's significant success against ISIS' geographic caliphate, extremist organizations continue to sow hatred in the Mideast and murder innocents around the world, from Europe and Africa, to south Asia and the Sulu Sea.

It is the urgency of this fight that compels us all to act decisively against terrorism, denying terrorists the safe haven they seek. And we carry out this counterterrorism campaign by, with and through our allies and partners, with over 70 nations united the -- in the Defeat ISIS campaign, and 41 nations united under NATO's flag to defeat terrorism in Afghanistan.

The second category of competition is military power, and we see the Russian Federation as the nation closest to us in nuclear parity, and proven willing to use conventional and irregular power in violation of international norms.

For the first time since World War II, Russia has been the nation that has redrawn international borders by force of arms in Georgia and Ukraine, while pursuing veto authority over their neighbors' diplomatic, economic and security decisions.

Putin seeks to shatter NATO. He aims to diminish the appeal of the Western democratic model and attempts to undermine America's moral authority. His actions are designed not to challenge our arms, at this point, but to undercut and compromise our belief in our ideals.

The third category is that of political will, and that is a potential rivalry, with China harboring long-term designs to rewrite the existing global order.

The Ming Dynasty appears to be their model, albeit in a more muscular manner, demanding other nations become tribute states, kowtowing to Beijing; espousing One Belt, One Road, when this diverse world has many belts and many roads; and attempting to replicate on the international stage their authoritarian domestic model, militarizing South China Sea features while using predatory economics of piling massive debt on others.

After World War II, our Greatest Generation, in collaboration with our allies and partners, built the open international order that has benefited global prosperity. It's unrealistic to believe, today, that China will not seek to replicate its internal authoritarian model elsewhere, as it expands globally.

China has benefited enormously from the open international order, but it had no say in drafting it. Today, how we engage with China and how the Chinese choose to collaborate by it dictates to the world that it will provide the roadmap for our future relationship.

In response to these competitive challenges of urgency, power and will, this last January, our Department of Defense released its first National Defense Strategy in over a decade, and this filled a vacuum, one of strategy-free actions. To protect America's experiment in democracy, our National Defense Strategy has three lines of effort.

First, we are building a more lethal force. Our adversaries must know -- work with our diplomats and within the international order, for, if you threaten our experiment in democracy, it will be your longest and worst day.

Second, we are strengthening our military alliances and building new partnerships, for history is clear: nations with allies thrive. Every allied and partner-nation officer here today brings value.

The third line of effort is we are reforming and modernizing the Department of Defense for greater performance, accountability and affordability, ensuring that we earn the trust of Congress and the American people.

We have an obligation to spend wisely every tax dollar entrusted to us, while adapting our department to tomorrow's security challenges. And this is to preclude us from being dominant, yet irrelevant, because we didn't adapt in the tradition of the Naval War College in the interwar years.

In support of these lines of institution, lines -- excuse me, these lines of effort, this institution has embraced the ever-changing character of warfare, updating your curriculum to reflect the strategic environment of today and, more importantly, of tomorrow.

If we are to uphold a rules-based order for the international community, one beneficial to all, military leaders must embrace the ethos of a fighting admiral, as defined by William Toohey, describing an approach to warfighting in all domains.

"A fighting admiral is the ultimate embodiment of an adroit leader possessing an eagerness to close with the enemy, an unflappable ability to execute operations in the heat and confusion of battle, and the power to instill a fighting spirit in those under their command."

After the year here, we expect you to be at the top of your game mentally, physically and spiritually, and to work to maintain that standard throughout the rest of your career. You now have the credentials to measure up in the crucible of combat, and your character must do the rest.

Your education here has prepared you well to integrate Naval, joint and coalition campaigns across all domains: air, land, sea and, now, the contested warfighting domains of outer space and cyberspace.

We are counting on you graduates to live and breathe this fighting admiral ethos, regardless of your rank or position, branch of service or nationality.

Don't shy away from the hard problems and even tougher solutions by saying that something is above your pay grade. Your nations and services did not invest a precious year of the finest education possible for you to take a timid view of your leadership responsibility.

Keep your wits about you. Keep your grace under fire, your civility with subordinates, inspiring those you lead with humility and intellectual rigor in reconciling war's grim realities with your political leaders' aspirations.

As you take your next steps, put into action our line of effort of strengthening our alliances and partnerships using your initiative, remembering that not all the good ideas come from the nation with the most aircraft carriers.

Down in Washington, D.C., four statues stand in Lafayette Square, overlooking the White House, and they are there as reminder. These are statues of men who hailed from France, Poland and Prussia, and they came -- and I quote here from one of the monuments -- "to offer their swords to the American colonies, serving as fellow laborers in the cause for liberty during our Revolutionary War."

These four men -- Lafayette, Rochambeau, Kosciuszko and von Steuben, serve as reminders, just as this War College student body does today, that America does not stand alone. No single nation resolves security challenges in this world.

For all the times that I was privileged to fight for America, I never fought in a solely American formation as a U.S. Marine. And seldom, if ever, will you, in your future leadership roles -- shall find yourself carrying out your -- your mission without communication and collaboration across national lines, for your ability to build trust and harmony will be as critical to victory as your operational ability.

So, as you depart this year of study and newfound friends, remember: You are your nations' unconventional ambassadors, strengthening relationships in every interaction with allies and partners.

The War College has prepared you well for this endeavor, with 66 foreign nations, nearly 20 percent of the student body, represented here today.

So carry these relationships forward. Reinforce them while forging new ones, for, by knowing how to fight well together, you strengthen deterrence and help to hold on to peace for one more year, one more month, one more week, one more day, as our diplomats work to solve problems.

In closing, I want to venture back to the college's earliest days, when Admiral Luce laid out his admittedly lofty expectations for this new institution.

He said, "If attendance here will serve to broaden an officer's views, extend his mental horizon on national and international questions and give him a just appreciation of the great variety and extent of the requirements of his profession, the college will not have existed in vain."

You graduates now must give proof that Admiral Luce's vision was not in vain, for you carry our hopes, you fine young graduates of many nations, for a better world. And I am confident that, thanks to Admiral Harley and his Newport team, you are primed to meet the many challenges that lie ahead.

Congratulations to all of you, and thank you again for allowing me to take part today. (Applause.)

"They will not be used in little-known or forgotten conflicts that slowly fall away from the national consciousness;" Reflections on Keith Kellogg, "US succeeded in Syria. Now it's time to leave"

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I have written brief reflections on the resignation of  former U.S. Secretary of Defense Retired General James Mattis  (In Defense of America First: Brief Reflections on the Resignation of James Mattis as U.S. Secretary of Defense). 

The Trump Administration could not possibly let that very public resignation go unanswered.  It was written by a former high military officer, and touched on military issues and related policy affecting the relations of the United States and its Allies. The best way to counter the opinion of a military leader is with another military leader.

Enter Retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg.  Now Vice President Pence's National Security Advisor, he was previously chief of staff and executive secretary of the NSC. But he was also embroiled, like virtually everyone else in the current administration, in the factional fighting that tends to mark the politics around high office holders.
President Trump's new national security adviser, John Bolton, was eager to find a face-saving way to remove Keith Kellogg from his senior role on the National Security Council, three sources with knowledge of the high-level internal conversations tell Axios.Between the lines: When Vice President Mike Pence suggested the idea of taking on Kellogg — a man the president loves — as his national security adviser about a week ago, senior officials including Chief of Staff John Kelly and Bolton viewed it as a “win-win. (The backstory on Pence’s decision to bring on Keith Kellogg).
Retired Lieutenant General Kellogg has penned a short but quite direct opinion piece distributed Christmas eve, that has been picked up by a number of news media outlets, appearing in print the day after Christmas. That essay, "US succeeded in Syria. Now it's time to leave," along with my brief reflections, follows.



The Lieutenant General's opinion piece  presents a direct and quite interesting defense of what had been perceived in the press to be the final decision that triggered the resignation of Secretary (General Rt.) Mattis. It is grounded on the quite sensible insight that if you can command the definition of a term, you can ensure that whatever it is you claim can fit within that definition. The key term here is "success." The Opinion carefully defines success, molds a history of moving toward the collection of facts that would constitute the attainment of success so defined, fully justifying the action then ordered. This is not the defense of a strategy, or of an integrated policy with a directed mechanics.  It is, instead, the calculus of an offense stripped of its context.  

Lieutenant Generl (Retired) Kellogg cannot resist starting with a (gratuitous) swipe, not at General Mattis, but at the former President, Barack Obama.  Referring to President Trump, the Opinion declares: "He has shown that he will never be a president who talks tough about red lines with little accompanying action." (Kellogg, Opinion). This a reference to President Obama's famously flexible red lines on Syria (which had been widely criticized at the time) (President Obama and the ‘red line’ on Syria’s chemical weapons; Inside the White House During the Syrian 'Red Line' Crisis). In the process, the Lieutenant General (retired) describes the objective--to destroy the Islamic State in Syria. 

But this was not a vague objective.  It actually could be reduced to three military objectives that could be assessed in "after action reports": "His intent was to retake the caliphate's capital (the Syrian city of Raqqa), defeat its ground forces and put its leaders on the run." And again, the (unnecessary) swiping (in part) at former President Obama ("Trump outlined a strategic effort tailored to minimise American boots on the ground and to succeed where others did not.").

Having set this measure for assessing success, the Opinion was able to declare mission accomplished; "Raqqa is no longer under Islamic State control, the caliphate ended and its remaining senior leaders are hiding in the shadows as we continue to hunt them. When we find them, we will kill them." (Opinion, supra). So, the operation is effectively done, though not quite--but perhaps done enough to claim the three part objective had been met.

That should have been the end of it.  But it could not be.  The rest of the Opinion attempted a justification.

First. the opinion reminded readers that the United States had undertaken a large share and operational load of this Syrian effort.  While it was an American success, it was supported "on the ground from other allies, including France, the UK and Syrian Democratic Forces." (Ibid.).

Second, there is an admission that the fight against terrorism is by no means done, but that the U.S. involvement in that fight with its own troops in Syria is quite done. And then one understand the justification for such a narrow victory--the idea that the war on terrorism is a distraction from other, more important contests ("But we cannot continue to be distracted by protracted conflicts in the Middle East").

Third, aaaaah, well then, by what ought the United States to be distracted? The answer is both direct but odd.  The simple answer is Russia, China, and North Korea.  Without the slightest reference to the 2017 National Security Strategy, the Opinion appeared to shift two of these from competitor to enemy status.  But more importantly, the Opinion revealed a strange military preference in two parts.  First it suggested that the United States would choose its own enemies in its own time ("We will fight at places and times of our choosing"). But more importantly, it suggested that at least the writer of this Opinion has little taste for the sort of enemy that the Islamic State and other well organized institutional religious groups pose.

Fourth, the reason for the preference for conflict with "big power" or "nuclear power" bullies, identified by name, then, is telling.  It is not just that these are traditional foes who (hopefully) would engage the United States in (for the military of the generation of the Lieutenant General (Retired) at least), but more importantly, because of his sense that those wars could be won, but the war against Middle East terrorism cannot ("protracted wars of the Middle East are a drain on our national blood and treasure." Opinion).  And indeed, it appears that Islamic State fighters will be released making a claim to victory all that much harder to maintain (Thousands of ISIS prisoners 'to be RELEASED after Trump pulls out US soldiers').

Fifth, if this is the case, then what the Lieutenant General (Retired) is actually suggesting is that "victory" in Syria is actually a strategic retreat made possible by the fig leaf of attaining the 3 prong narrow objectives identified above.   Indeed, the Opinion makes clear that the United States is not prepared for the new warfare now refined by combatant groups in the Middle East ("Perpetual war is not the American way of war. Our people deserve better than constant conflict" Ibid). The Opinion rejects the idea of modern generation warfare in virtually its entirety ("Those who argue that war is a perpetual continuum fail to honour our sacred duty to our military." Ibid).  And it suggests a scope of warfare, and the military's role in it that harks back to the 20th century.

Sixth, though the Opinion began with a defense of the Trump Administration's full throated defense of the Syrian "adventure" against the Islamic State, by the time the Opinion reaches this stage in its justification, it appears to abandon that initial position almost in its entirety.  It starts by asserting the principle that American military might ought "not be used in little-known or forgotten conflicts that slowly fall away from the national consciousness."  (Opinion).  And then it explains (again with a swipe at the Obama Administration, though in this case not undeserved) that "[o]ur involvement in Syria has been one such conflict, forgotten by those who ignored the initial warning signs in that country." (Opinion).
Forgotten by those who overlooked the creation of an Islamic State caliphate. Forgotten by those who let its thuggish leaders hide in plain sight. And forgotten by those who halfheartedly committed our armed forces without clear direction or purpose. President Trump did not forget. He led, and under his leadership, we succeeded. It is now time for other stakeholders in the Middle East to take ownership of their security. (Ibid).

Seventh, interestingly, though, in swiping against the Obama Administration, the Opinion swipes against the decision  to exit Syria, despite its best efforts to avoid that conclusion.  The Opinion goes to some pains to distinguish the situation in Syria, from the threat posed by the Islamic State. And yet, in the process, the Opinion leaves unmentioned the "warning signs in that country" (Ibid). What are those warning signs? The threat that the current Turkish leadership might pose not just to its Kurdish nemesis in Syria, but also in Northern Iraq.  Even a year ago the signs were quite clear (Turkey’s Erdogan pledges to uproot ‘terror nests’ in Kurd-controlled Syrian towns; Turkish forces push into Kurdish-controlled Afrin in Syria; Erdogan threatens to 'strangle' new US-backed Syria force). And in the wake of the announcement, those threats have reappeared almost on cue, though for the Americans, that has been recast as seeking Turkish help to eliminate remaining militants (Trump, Erdogan Agree to Coordinate US Pullout From Syria("Erdogan said late last week that Turkey is postponing an operation against Kurdish forces in Syria in the wake of Trump's decision.")).   

Eight, the Opinion leaves little doubt that irregular allies (non state communities and quasi states like Kurdistan) count for nothing in the calculus of the United States. That is an odd position indeed, especially for a nation that prides itself on its leadership of a large number of like minded states on which the United States can call to spill blood and treasure for their shared interests. That hardly seems right. And it points both the the overargument and underargument which ends the Opinion.  Indeed, what the Opinion makes clear is that the role of the military in this case, was to intervene quickly, produce a carefully managed set of conditions the attainment of which can be scored a "victory" and then to go away. "It is now time for other stakeholders in the Middle East to take ownership of their security." (Ibid.). Yet left unclear is the extent to which there lingers any American interest--the sort of interest that, perhaps, brought us in to the region in the first place.

Only time will tell whether this vision of American military leadership, or that articulated by General (Retired) Mattis, is in the long term best interest of the United States. And the answer may be muddled by an ineptness in execution that has appeared to dog American military interventions from time to time since the beginning of this century. In the meantime, this vision will put our allies on warning--and may well increase the costs to the United States of bargaining with its allies the next time we require their aid.  But then again, the Opinion appears to suggest that the U.S. needs no one's help to protect its interests or assert its leadership role.  Only time will tell about that as well.   



__________

Opinion: US succeeded in Syria. Now it's time to leave
Ret. Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg

OPINION: The day Donald Trump became commander in chief, he immediately made the effort to destroy the reprehensible Islamic State caliphate in Syria a priority. He has shown that he will never be a president who talks tough about red lines with little accompanying action.

While still a candidate, Trump took a clear-eyed view on the use of military force, including the need to fight the Islamic State on its home ground. His intent was to retake the caliphate's capital (the Syrian city of Raqqa), defeat its ground forces and put its leaders on the run. As president, Trump outlined a strategic effort tailored to minimise American boots on the ground and to succeed where others did not.

The results speak for themselves. Raqqa is no longer under Islamic State control, the caliphate ended and its remaining senior leaders are hiding in the shadows as we continue to hunt them. When we find them, we will kill them.

As a nation, we have borne a large share of the operational load in this effort, including advising, training, fighting, providing logistical support and financing the fight against the Islamic State in Syria.

With support on the ground from other allies, including France, the UK and Syrian Democratic Forces, we have succeeded. It is time to shift the fight to a different footing.

Fighting terrorism in all its forms is a critical mission, and we are not abandoning that fight. But we cannot continue to be distracted by protracted conflicts in the Middle East.

We will fight at places and times of our choosing. We face larger existential threats to our nation in the form of a resurgent Russia, expanding Chinese interference and the continued threat from North Korea. These threats to our nation are clear, while protracted wars of the Middle East are a drain on our national blood and treasure.

Perpetual war is not the American way of war. Our people deserve better than constant conflict. Those who argue that war is a perpetual continuum fail to honour our sacred duty to our military. Wars should be the exception, not the norm; our men and women in uniform need to know they will be used when needed and supported to their fullest. They will not be used in little-known or forgotten conflicts that slowly fall away from the national consciousness.

Our involvement in Syria has been one such conflict, forgotten by those who ignored the initial warning signs in that country. We were slow to pick up that Islamic State leadership had moved to Syria after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the creation of the caliphate in 2014.

Forgotten by those who overlooked the creation of an Islamic State caliphate. Forgotten by those who let its thuggish leaders hide in plain sight. And forgotten by those who halfheartedly committed our armed forces without clear direction or purpose. President Trump did not forget. He led, and under his leadership, we succeeded. It is now time for other stakeholders in the Middle East to take ownership of their security.

Trump has not forgotten the defence of our nation nor the wonderful men and women who serve. He has not forgotten his duty to them, working to ensure that the defense budget was increased, not cut. He has not forgotten to provide our troops with the best equipment, the best training and fair compensation.

When committed to action, he provides commanders wide latitude and full support. He has not forgotten to hold the Department of Veterans Affairs accountable for taking care of our troops after they have served. He will never forget the quiet dignity of that sobering moment when he received a fallen service member at Dover Air Force Base. And he will never forget to honour our great young men and women in uniform.

We are not abandoning the fight - far from it. We are recommitting ourselves to what is best for America, our citizens and the most precious resource we have: our men and women in uniform.

Ruminations 83(1): Looking Back on 2018 in Epigrams and Aphorisms

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018)

The year 2018 is ending with the great rifts opened in 2016, and exposed in 2017, now acquiring a greater urgency and show and revealing the power of its consequences. Global divisions have become more acute, even as these reflect in turn the even more acute rifts within both great and small global actors--states, societies, religions, civil society, and enterprises.

2018 is rich with rift events.  This was the year of America First and the Belt and Road Initiative.  It was the year of great rifts among allies--especially the great family of post World War II Anglo-European allies--and of growing compatibility among rivals. This was the year of the exposure corruption--in  which  Latin American corruption brought down the government of Perú and the President of Brazil. Corruption swirled around the highest levels of the United States and of China. It was the year of great social transformation spurred by revelations--of sexual improprieties, and of policing and race in the United States. It was a year in which the U.S. President continued to serve as lightening rod  and the international order was upended. But it was also a year in which Brexit appeared to invite failure. But all of this seemed like a build up to resolutions that lie beyond 2018.  In the end, 2018 might be understood as a year of stage setting  

With no objective in particular, this post and a number that follow provides my summary of the slice of 2018 to which I paid attention through epigrams and aphorisms.  It follows an end of year  tradition I started in 2016 (for those see here) and 2017 (for these see here).  

This is Part 1. Share your own!

Ruminations 83: 2018 in Epigrams and Aphorisms
Part I (On education and knowledge).


1. The ultimate sign of decadence is marked by the way the current generation seeks to protect its children from the genius of their predecessors; to that end the relationship of society to the human body provides a constant measure; though the human body remains a constant, the way it is perceived is constantly changing--and that change is usually cloaked in the language of the protection of our children from ourselves
["L’insegnante di una scuola elementare di Hyrum (nello Utah, Stati Uniti), Mateo Rueda, è stato licenziato a seguito delle proteste di alcuni genitori di una classe di studenti di 10-11 anni, ai quali l’insegnante ha mostrato dipinti di nudo di François Boucher, Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres e Amedeo Modigliani." (The teacher of a primary school in Hyrum (Utah, United States), Mateo Rueda, was fired following protests by some parents of a class of 10-11 year-old students, to whom the teacher showed paintings ofnude by François Boucher, Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres and Amedeo Modigliani).  Stati Uniti, insegnante mostra in classe nudi di Modigliani, Boucher e Ingres: licenziato; also here].

2. Beware of servants bearing responsibility; it is almost always true that those who offer to make things easier for someone else will take not just the burden of a responsibility but its authority as well; the Carolingian major domus eventually deposed the king they served; in contemporary times that has been the great story of the governance of the university where the servant has indeed become the master. 
["Expect that the role of faculty will continue to be reduced as the chasm between faculty and administrative cultures continues to grow.  In the long term the trajectory points to the reduction of faculty in their effective service role and the transformation of shared governance. The trend also suggests the growth of an authority in the university to impose cultural orthodoxies on thought and behavior expressed in class, in research and in private life. More importantly it shifts the role of faculty from governance to compliance."  Higher Education Trends for 2018: Reflections on " Saddle Up: 7 Trends Coming in 2018" Plus Six of My Own].

3. The last thing to be abandoned is the idea of a thing; long after the reality has changed, people cling to its forms some to mask the change, and others to make the change more palatable.  
["A recent case worth noting is University of Southern California v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 17-1149 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  The case represents a challenge by the university to a decision of the National Labor Relations Board that determined that USC's contract faculty were not managerial employees. . . . Yet the case, and the arguments, would have been incomprehensible when the original legal rule was pronounced in 1980.  And the reason has little to do with the understanding of shared governance (and its "mis-understanding;" though that is what all sides hope to keep centered in the judicial proceedings). Rather, and something both sides might downplay, is not that shared governance has changed but that the character of faculty have changed--and that change ought to produce legal consequences (but it also produces substantial challenges to faculty solidarity)."Shared Governance and the Managerial Character of Faculty in the Evolving University: Dueling Amicus Briefs From University of Southern California v. National Labor Relations Board, No. 17-1149 (D.C. Cir. 2017)].

4. Like religion before them, governments now attempt to create not just model societies, but model workers, model families, and relationships; the greater the embrace of personal freedom and choice, the more precise the control of what may be chosen
["As private enterprise takes an increasingly prominent role in the creation and management of ostensibly public urban space, as neo-authoritarianism spreads unchecked, and as pervasive technology weaves itself ever more intimately into all the sites and relations of contemporary life, all of the material conditions are right for Chinese-style social credit to spread on other ground. Consider what Sidewalk Labs’ neighborhood-scale intervention in Toronto implies—or the start-up Citymapper’s experiments with privatized mass transit in London, or even Tinder’s control over access to the pool of potential romantic partners in cities around the world—and it’s easy to imagine a network of commercial partners commanding all the choke points of urban life. The freedoms that were once figured as a matter of “the right to the city” would become contingent on algorithmically determined certification of good conduct." Adam Greenfield, "China's Dystopian Tech Could Be Contagious: The PRC’s “social credit” scheme might have consequences for life in cities everywhere." The Atlantic].

5.  Great states influence the interpretation of historical trajectories; when they act on these interpretations, politics becomes history paid forward.    
[What follows are the Remarks by President Trump and President Berset of the Swiss Confederation Before Bilateral Meeting, posted to the White House Website.  They suggest a development of the new American position on trade that appears to affirm that the American Administration has come to believe that the U.S. has entered into a new historical stage and is developing U.S. principles and engagement for this "New Era" of global engagement."America First" Explained at the Davos World Economic Forum: Text of President Trump's Address And White House Background Briefing].

6. Democracy like Logos is incarnated, not by its theology,  but by the power of theologians to impose meaning acquires  form through a theology that at once describes and distances the Logos , like God, develops its connection to humans through the  is defined not by power but by the ability to impose meaning among a community of believers.  

7.  It is always interesting to see how the marketplace of ideas is being managed by its guardians. It is even more interesting to see exposed its disciplinary character where orthodoxies clash for dominance within their idea factories
["The academy has overtaken the Church and other norm producing institutions as the priesthood for those basic principles (not the premises underlying them to be sure--those are rarely debated) for the orderly management of the institutions of state, of society and of good order and proper thinking."Disciplining Orthodoxy in the Neo Liberal Academy: What Amy Wax and George Ciccariello-Maher Can Teach Us About the State of the Market-Place of Ideas in the Academy].

8. It appears to be something of a global trend now, or at least a movement with sufficient repetitions to merit some notice, that governments are becoming more selective in the scope and character of the information they make available and yet increasingly eager to produce transparency in non governmental enterprises and other institutions
[e.g., "On the one hand, what is emerging is a greater reluctance on the part of the state to reveal itself to others.  States are increasingly seeking information about itself from the bottom up--but also increasingly unwilling to disclose that information--even when it might have substantial implications got economic activity. On the other hand, states--and the largest enterprises--have become increasingly data driven--they thrive on the ability to harvest and utilize disclosures by others. The move toward this data driven operation, and its converse, the increasing reliance on compliance as governance, seems to be at the center of the movement that will transform transparency regimes.  And also to change its character. "Strategic Disclosure in an Age of Transparency: Cuba as Model for Emerging State-Based Trade and Production Orders].

9. Internationalizing education poses significant threats to the management of political knowledge
["The controversy arises from the use of the avenues of globalized education as an avenue for the extraterritorial projection of the education vision/mission of a state outbound into other states. Thus education globalization can serve to develop its own values consonant with the developing of norms, mores and outlooks at the international public and private spheres, it can be used to displace, challenge or develop national and traditional ways of understanding and explaining the world on which national societies are ordered, and it serves as a means to project national values outward.  Each has manifested itself simultaneously in the operation of university education systems globally."The Globalization of University Education and Interference in the Domestic Social and Political Orders of States: Considering Chinese and Australian Approaches].

10. Globalization has produced both a convergence of knowledge and the weaponization of education, the later both as an internal tool of social control and, projected abroad, as a tool for disrupting the social and economic orders of target societies.   
["It is clear that global society is already in the midst of great disruption--the technological aspects are merely the tip of icebergs under which the great disruption in the shape and use of knowledgeable are already proving their value in the high stakes games of states, of societies and of other communities.  The recent interactions between German civil society organizations and China suggest some of its current contours."Irressistible Disruption and the Weaponization of Knowledge Production, Analysis, and Education--A View From National Battle Lines Between Germany and China].

11.  Bloated institutions that are more machine than human centered institutions, it is not clear exactly what it is that emerging university factories are meant to produce other than stability, good order, and the manufacture of a product that can be consumed as it is produced
["The model of administration that the political, economic, and intellectual classes have fashioned of the university over this past generation has resulted in the monstrosities that one sees emerging across the nation. . . . That combination of cult of personality around "leaders" and an institutional framework grounded in compliance as a bureaucratic organism has proven to be quite useful in managing the smaller irritations of institutional life--at great expense and against the increasingly fungible bottom layers of the academic employment pool.  It has not, however, proven particularly useful when deployed against itself--when it is tested against its greatest challenge--to monitor, report and contain reprehensible behavior at the highest levels."  Compliance and the Cult of Personality in University Administration: Administrators and the "Army of Survivors" of Athletic Sex Scandals].

12. Nothing is ever a thing in itself; if one thinks institutionally, one will never see process; if one thinks process, one will never see networks; and if one thinks networks, one will be blind to institutions and process; in this way knowledge production that is blind to itself will be incapable of seeing the objects of its study
["Regulating the  Multinational Enterprise as Entity, as a Network of Links and as a Process of Production," may be accessed HERE. ].  

13.  Awards are always borrowed; they say more about the present sensibilities of the people who award than of the past merits of those awarded, and thus past merit is always understood to be contingent on current worth--to those in the business of "giving" awards
["The award, according to the museum, is given annually “to an internationally prominent individual whose actions have advanced the Museum’s vision of a world where people confront hatred, prevent genocide and promote human dignity. . . .  But Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi, the museum said, has failed to live up to that vision.”"U.S. Holocaust Museum Revokes Award to Aung San Suu Kyi].

14. History can be recounted through stories; stories can be based on history; both are expressions of politics, that is of the civil affairs of a community, and as such are elaborations of imagination reduced to credo.  
["interviews with committee members set out its aims: to use evidence such as archaeological finds and DNA to prove that today’s Hindus are directly descended from the land’s first inhabitants many thousands of years ago, and make the case that ancient Hindu scriptures are fact not myth. . . . In doing so, they are challenging a more multicultural narrative that has dominated since the time of British rule, that modern-day India is a tapestry born of migrations, invasions and conversions."Special Report: By rewriting history, Hindu nationalists aim to assert their dominance over India].

15. If the ultimate mechanics of knowledge production is to make natural persons irrelevant, then we will finally understand the extent to which knowledge is judgment.
In December, Italian graffiti artist Laura Ghianda was forced to remove an image of the naked paleolithic woman, who dates back to somewhere between 25,000 and 28,000 BC. . . . Ghianda had appealed the censorship four times since December by the time Facebook finally apologized, saying it was a mistake due to its algorithms. . . . It is not the first time Facebook has penalized users for sharing images of famous artwork. Late last year, the company took down the iconic image of Marisol who was pictured nude on the cover of the magazine Interviu in 1976.Paintings by Italian artist Amedeo Modigliani and Gustave Coubet‘s 19th-century work ‘The Origin of the World‘ were both removed for showing female genitalia and breasts."Too hot to handle: Facebook mistakes Willendorf Virgin for porn]

Ruminations 83(2) (On Systems): Looking Back on 2018 in Epigrams and Aphorisms

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018)

The year 2018 is ending with the great rifts opened in 2016, and exposed in 2017, now acquiring a greater urgency and show and revealing the power of its consequences. Global divisions have become more acute, even as these reflect in turn the even more acute rifts within both great and small global actors--states, societies, religions, civil society, and enterprises.

2018 is rich with rift events.  This was the year of America First and the Belt and Road Initiative.  It was the year of great rifts among allies--especially the great family of post World War II Anglo-European allies--and of growing compatibility among rivals. This was the year of the exposure corruption--in  which  Latin American corruption brought down the government of Perú and the President of Brazil. Corruption swirled around the highest levels of the United States and of China. It was the year of great social transformation spurred by revelations--of sexual improprieties, and of policing and race in the United States. It was a year in which the U.S. President continued to serve as lightening rod  and the international order was upended. But it was also a year in which Brexit appeared to invite failure. But all of this seemed like a build up to resolutions that lie beyond 2018.  In the end, 2018 might be understood as a year of stage setting  

With no objective in particular, this post and a number that follow provides my summary of the slice of 2018 to which I paid attention through epigrams and aphorisms. It follows an end of year  tradition I started in 2016 (for those see here) and 2017 (for these see here).  

This is Part 2 (On Systems). Share your own!

Ruminations 83: 2018 in Epigrams and Aphorisms
Part I (On Education and Knowledge).
Part II (On Systems).





1. The perfection of systems is inevitably marked by the imperfections of those who serve it.

["The flight attendants of flight UA1284 felt that the innocent animal was better off crammed inside the overhead container without air and water,' he wrote on Facebook. 'They INSISTED that the puppy be locked up for three hours without any kind of airflow. They assured the safety of the family's pet so wearily, the mother agreed.' . . .  The airline's policy states that all animals traveling inside the cabin should be in a carrier and 'fit completely under the seat in front of the customer and remain there at all times.' . Ten-month-old French Bulldog puppy dies on a United Flight after air crew 'order its owner to put it in overhead compartment'].

2.  The necessary consequence of the fragmentation of trade is a fragmentation of the means used for its finance; and for that even the state and its coinage may be ultimately unnecessary in relations between systems. 
[("So far, the efforts of exporters to tap the Venezuelan market through the Dubai route have not been successful due to payment issues. Rao estimates that India could export up to half-a-million tonnes to Venezuela on a regular basis, if a rupee-based payment mechanism is set up. ") India eyes rupee-route, barter for Venezuelan crude; ("The petro is designed to raise hard currency and to function as a payment method for foreign suppliers now that most transactions have been stymied by financial sanctions imposed by Washington last year. But some analysts see the petro as a desperate move to secure cash amid an unprecedented economic meltdown brought about by Maduro’s socialist policies.") Venezuela's new bitcoin: an ingenious plan or worthless cryptocurrency?]


3. Some systems are at their most powerful only when they exist only as ideas.
[("The members-states of the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America-Peoples’ Trade Treaty (ALBA-TCP) gathered in Havana, Cuba to celebrate 14 years of working to defend regional peace and consolidate Latin American and Caribbean integration.") ALBA-TCP Summit: In Defense of Latin America and the Caribbean].

4. The distance between the judge and the law is measured by the customs and traditions of the state; the customs and traditions of the state are founded on the independence of the judge but also on the dependence of law.
[Just Published-- "Between the Judge and the Law: Judicial Independence and Authority With Chinese Characteristics," Connecticut Journal of International Law 33(1):1-41 (2017). The article suggests the value of approaching an analysis of the state of the Chinese judiciary and its reform from within the context of the normative structures of the Chinese political system--including its separation of powers principles. That approach is a necessary predicate to understanding both the trajectory of judicial reform in the "New Era" and the range of plausible approaches it may take move toward universal objectives of "good" or "sound" judicial function. ]

5. A political community, like any other system, sometimes finds itself defined not by what they are but what they are not.    
[("Bannon praised Le Pen’s ambivalence over the left-right divide, saying “she described it perfectly”. The more pertinent political split, he said, is whether “you consider the nation state as an obstacle to be overcome or as a jewel to be polished, loved and nurtured”.. . . “Let them call you racist, let them call you xenophobes, let them call you nativists. Wear it like a badge of honour. Because every day we get stronger and they get weaker,” he said, before concluding on a “God Bless America. And vive la France,” sending FN supporters leaping to their feet to cheer.") Wear 'racist' like a badge of honour, Bannon tells French far-right summit]



6. The idea of systems and societies are perfect; those who animate those ideas and systems are not; to confuse the perfection of one for the imperfection of the otjer never turns out well
[("Several professors and students demanded the statue be taken down due to Gandhi's well-documented racism towards Africans. According to BBC Africa, India's former President Pranab Mukherjee unveiled the statute in 2016 as a symbol of the strong ties between the two countries. Shortly after, professors organized a petition, citing racist passages that Gandhi had written in which he called Indians "infinitely superior" to black Africans. Gandhi lived and worked in South Africa between 1893 and 1914.") A Statue of Gandhi Has Been Removed From the University of Ghana Following Student Protests]

7. A system will minimize its error, and its agents will diminish in every way those they serve, in proportion to the extent to which it must pay for its mistakes.
[("Okra busts like these are good reason for taxpayers to be skeptical about the wisdom of sending guys up in helicopters to fly around aimlessly, looking for drugs in suburban gardens. And that's not to mention the issue of whether we want a society where heavily-armed cops can burst into your property, with no grounds for suspicion beyond what somebody thought he saw from several hundred yards up in a helicopter.") Heavily armed drug cops raid retiree’s garden, seize okra plants].

9. Systems are at their most useful when they are not corrupted by politics; politics work best for communities when restrained by systems; the welfare of a community is a function of its willingness to humanize systems through politics.
[("Rather than investing the time and energy spent on reshaping ATS (and the constructions of relevant international law) to suit the times (as the legal community has sought to do for a generation), the opinion appears to suggest that this time might be better spent on getting the desired result in Congress. And that, the possibility of direct statutory authority creating extraterritorially applied liability against persons and corporations for violations of international law wherever committed, to some real extent, is a victory (and the great challenge) for those who seek to do exactly as Justice Sotomayor and the dissenting Justices argue is both right and good.") Brief Thoughts on Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. --- (2018): The State of Judicial Remedies for Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations].

10.  Mockery is the sincerest form of criticism, and the most damning for systems and their operators.
[("And there was mockery aplenty directed toward the leaders of Penn State University. And that leadership now appears to have moved from the office of its titular administrative heads to another place, that is from the individuals designated as the lead officers of the university to the risk and compliance algorithms of the university (and the individuals who tend them), which now appear to have assume the highest authority at the university. That, at least, is what we appear to be told in the way in which some decisions are now made at American universities. . . . The recent decisions by the leadership algorithms of Penn State (not of course by those administrators who serve those decision makers) to disband three ancient student clubs because their activities were too dangerous  provide a nice but generalized example of the trend that affects all universities."Are Risk Algorithms the New Leaders of the 21st Century American University?: The Riskless University and the Veiling of Discretion)]


 (Pix Credit U.N.)

11. Human rights has been transformed from one centered on the character of human autonomy to one intent on building systems of assessment and duty.
[(""three different aspects of the human rights project that might well be now worth a moment of thought. The first of these is the danger of a relentless focus on the rights aspects of the Universal Declaration.  The second is the mania for victimization. The third is the need to re-focus on the obligations of states, other collective actors, and individuals.) On the 70th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights].



12.  What falls "within" and what lies "without" remains at the center of the 21st century constructions and transformations of society, injected into the discourse of all states, whatever their political orientation, but changing its central focus from state, to vanguard, to people, and back again.
[("For (or with) Mexico, López Obrador has moved the center of that debate from the state, to the revolution, to the people. And now, of course, in all jurisdictions, the question becomes--to where will it migrate, again, when the people are moved to delegate its responsibilities? Better yet, it will return to the fundamental question--who are the people? For that all societies have provided answers that are both fragile and contextual. We will see where that takes the people, the state, and the revolution. There is much to think about here both for the overtones and its trajectories). “With the people everything, without the people nothing”: The New Mexican President Receives the Bastón de mando [Baton of Authority] from Indigenous Communities and Delivers His 100 Commitments")]

13.  Systems invariably function on the basis of assessment and self assessment, but its assessment markers tend to turn on themselves; quantitative markers, for example, start as proxies for quality and then become themselves the incarnation of the quality they were meant to measure.
[("The value of knowledge production is measured by dollars. It's impact is now understood as a species of "clickbait," the value of which is to enhance the clickable potential of that which follows, which relentless follows, with regard only to time. For if time is now money, then the efficient use of time is measured by the artifacts, by the measurable things, with which it may be filled--graduation rates, bar passage rates, employment rates, citation rates, production rates, grant award rates, invitation rates, mention rates, collaboration rates.") The AAUP Will Now Investigate the Mass Terminations at Vermont Law School]


14. Administrative convenience remains the first principle of systems; it is the expression of the drive toward self preservation that is the first duty of any system (political, economic,religious, social, or cultural).
[("This year, the annual Pennsylvania Farm Show will be without one of its most popular — and cutest — features, the duck slide. The duck slide will not operate this year due to being “extremely labor intensive,” the state agriculture department told LehighValley.com.") Pa. Farm Show to go without its most adorable feature this year, report says].

15.  If the first principle of systems is self-preservation, then the principal corollary must be to channel anti-system actions so that .
[("Protesters stormed an Ebola triage center in the volatile eastern region of Congo on Thursday and set fire to parts of it in a new wave of violent political unrest, aggravated by delays in a long-anticipated election.")  As Congo Election Nears, Rioters Storm an Ebola Center and Unrest Grows].

Ruminations 83(3) (On the Things that Divide and Join Us): Looking Back on 2018 in Epigrams and Aphorisms

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(Pix © Larry Catá Backer 2018)

The year 2018 is ending with the great rifts opened in 2016, and exposed in 2017, now acquiring a greater urgency and show and revealing the power of its consequences. Global divisions have become more acute, even as these reflect in turn the even more acute rifts within both great and small global actors--states, societies, religions, civil society, and enterprises.

2018 is rich with rift events.  This was the year of America First and the Belt and Road Initiative.  It was the year of great rifts among allies--especially the great family of post World War II Anglo-European allies--and of growing compatibility among rivals. This was the year of the exposure corruption--in  which  Latin American corruption brought down the government of Perú and the President of Brazil. Corruption swirled around the highest levels of the United States and of China. It was the year of great social transformation spurred by revelations--of sexual improprieties, and of policing and race in the United States. It was a year in which the U.S. President continued to serve as lightening rod  and the international order was upended. But it was also a year in which Brexit appeared to invite failure. But all of this seemed like a build up to resolutions that lie beyond 2018.  In the end, 2018 might be understood as a year of stage setting  

With no objective in particular, this post and a number that follow provides my summary of the slice of 2018 to which I paid attention through epigrams and aphorisms. It follows an end of year  tradition I started in 2016 (for those see here) and 2017 (for these see here).  

This is Part 3 (on the things that divide and join us). Share your own!

Ruminations 83: 2018 in Epigrams and Aphorisms
Part I (On education and knowledge).
Part 2 (On Systems).
Part 3 (On the Things that Divide and Join Us).





1.  No one is ever protected  from the logic of system; systems find it irritating when they are used against themselves, and such irritations tend to be rectified in accordance with the logic of the system.
["The Stanford University chapter of College Republicans is accusing the university of actively silencing conservative viewpoints on campus after the university blocked the group’s hosting of conservative speaker Dinesh D’Souza. . . .  Stanford’s Student Activities and Leadership Office told the College Republicans that they would be required to pay over $19,000 in security fees for the event. . . . The College Republicans secured a donation by a private donor who is willing to pay the security fees, but the group was hit with yet another obstacle from university administration.  They are now being told that “on-campus sources” must constitute at least half of the funding for their event." (Stanford CRs clap back at school after $19,000 D'Souza security fee; Controversial Dinesh D’Souza event tentatively set for Feb. 28, pending funding); ("Qiu Zhanxuan, head of the Peking University Marxist Society, was grabbed and forced into a waiting car outside the college’s east gate by a group of heavy set men who identified themselves as police, a student said. . . . Qiu had been on his way to attend an event to mark the Mao anniversary, that not only had he organised but had also been warned about the day before by a school adviser, the person said. “What’s wrong with remembering Chairman Mao? What law does it break? How can they publicly kidnap a Peking University student?” the student said. The Ministry of Public Security did not respond to a request for comment.") Chinese Marxist student leader taken away by police on 125th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth]

2. The defense of organized religion is very much a function of economics and state relations.  
[("'Cold, hard interests will always carry the day' in international relations, said Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia Program at the Washington-based Wilson Center. 'The Muslim world's deafening silence about China's treatment of Muslims can be attributed to its strong interest in maintaining close relations with the world's next superpower.'") 'They want to eliminate Islam': Pakistani men reveals how Chinese authorities capture their Muslim wives were taken by Beijing and sent to internment camps to be 're-educated']

 3.  Both God and the Devil are moral beings in their own domains, and their opposite in the realm of the other.
[("First and foremost, it will press forward with the “sinicization” of religions in China, a process intended to shape religious traditions and doctrine to better conform with Chinese society and CCP objectives. This has been a primary focus of Xi’s religious policies since his April 2016 speech at the National Religious Work Conference, in which he asserted that in order to “actively guide the adaptation of religions to socialist society, an important task is supporting China’s religions’ persistence in the direction of sinicization.”") The CCP’s Plan to 'Sinicize' Religions; ("") ].



4. The state is now in the middle of everything, existing only as the product of a fugue state of lawfulness.
[("The fugue state is the only possible way one territorial community can remain viable in the face of multiple simultaneous and incompatible assertions of rule of law and democratic normativity. The fugue state permits Pakistan to adhere to Western values in its outbound relations—that is to walk away from its Islam—when it interacts with the international community that requires conformity to global standards (at least as its members would see it interpreted). At the same time it permits Pakistan to adhere to national values in its political relations –that is to walk away from internationalism and strict religious rule of law premises (of the privileged sect at least) to continue the post 1947 project of constructing a viable political entity (Pakistan) from out of the bits and pieces of the South Asian sub-continent from which it was cobbled. And at the same time, the fugue state permits Pakistan to adhere to the rule of law of Islam as expressed locally—that is to walk away from both national aspirations and internationalism in the construction of a normatively legitimate state in favor of the older and more powerful ties of the dar al-Islam as expressed locally. The resulting fracture produces uncertainty in law. Yet perversely perhaps, it also produces the certainty that power relations and bargaining will effectively determine the outcome of collisions among these three rule of law domains. But for states like Pakistan, it also produces a contingency that is hidden behind aggressive and belligerent action by a state apparatus caught in multiple middles.") The Rule of Law's Fugue State in the New Era--Blasphemy and Asia Bibi in the Fractured Global


5.  Cultural conversations about race are never only about race; race, like other distinguishing characteristics, can sometimes be a proxy for far more complex tensions in polities that thrive both on sharpening distinction and cultivating tension as the null state of social relations.
[("But more interesting still may be the way that discipline--at least at the intersections of race, ethnicity, class, employment status, weight, "foul" language, class, etc.--has now moved the state to the background.  Social norms have indeed begun to move, it seems--but perhaps only those of the employer class. They certainly do not seem to have moved much at the level of personal interactions among at least some individuals.  But it is the employer that seems to have become the vanguard in changing and enforcing rules of acceptable public behavior.  The state is essentially invisible. Yet the enterprises are engaging in this project of social reconstruction for their own reasons. ") At the Front Lines of Contemporary Intersectionality: A Side Dish of Life in a Fast Food Restaurant; "'F*** you, you white piece of s**t': Burger King employee is FIRED after shocking video shows her unleash racist rant against a HISPANIC couple"].

6. As institutional power grows, the autonomy and agency of the individual diminishes, even if for all of the most just of causes; at its limit, the institution is humanized and the individual is merged with her status within it.  
[("There are two trajectories whose arcs appear to be pushing in different directions, both of which appear to be joined in newer approaches to human rights instruments (discussed briefly here in that context). Both also appear to more and more clearly define the "new era" of human rights in economic activity, especially (and for some only) when undertaken by classical profit making enterprises. The first touches on the legal construction of the status of "victim" bound up in the relation between individual and their attached rights. The second suggests the way that this new legal status appears to strip its bearer of agency--the conferral of the status of victim makes an individual a victim twice over. The first takes place when the individual's (legal, moral, societal, communal or other) rights have been violated; the second occurs when the state confers a status on the rights holder that effectively shifts agency over both rights and vindication from the individual to those who mean to manage both. This post very briefly opens a consideration this perversion--in protecting those who bear rights, the normative structure of law commits a potentially greater offense.") Ruminations 80: If the Focus of Regulation is on the Victim, are Individuals Made Victims Twice? Rights, Autonomy, and the Emerging Governance Framework for Business and Human Rights].


7. Imitation flatters; but it also threatens both the old order and the control of the new.
[("The US Senate on Wednesday passed legislation overhauling the way the federal government lends money for foreign development, a measure developed largely in response to China’s growing influence. . . . The measure creates a new organisation, the US International Development Finance Corp, that consolidates the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and other government development organisations. Those institutions lend money for projects in developing countries such as energy, ports and water infrastructure.") US Congress, eyeing China, votes to overhaul how US lends money for foreign development].

8.  Every state must wrestle with its demons and those usually do not take human form, much as it might otherwise be hoped.
[("The pardon, issued by then-president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski before he was himself brought down by a corruption scandal, triggered a wave of protests by human rights organizations and by victims of Fujimori's crackdown.Fujimori, a Peruvian of Japanese descent, has been living in Lima but has been hospitalized four times since his release last December.") Peruvian court orders arrest of ex-president Fujimori, overturning pardon].



9. Every age has its point of convergence; but convergence itself is a sign that fracture is not far behind.
[("The point, worth considering, is that the emerging America First policy better aligns with the progressive ideals of the Global South than it represents some sort of reactionary fever dream (e.g., here).  And that, perhaps, may be the most irritating part for those elements in the global North that continue to cling to a world view that may well be passing.  But ironically enough, for the authors and advocates of America First, this may also be quite irritating for precisely the opposite reasons. ") "America First,""Belt and Road,""Mutually Advantageous Cooperation" and the Rise of the Global South: Preliminary Thoughts on Remarks by President Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (25 September 2018)]

10. Even the strongest institutions can fracture in an instant, never to be the same again.
[("First, the Moscow Patriarchate is terrified. Should a reunited Ukrainian Orthodoxy be recognized by Constantinople as “autocephalous” and therefore not subordinate to Russian Orthodoxy, Moscow’s claim to be the “third Rome” would be gravely imperiled. . . . Second, Russian Orthodoxy, continuing a long, unhappy tradition of playing chaplain-to-the-czar (whatever form he takes), has provided putatively religious buttressing for Vladimir Putin’s claim that there is a single Russkiy mir (“Russian world” or “Russian space”), which includes Ukraine and Belarus. . . . That is also why Putin is likely encouraging his new friend, President Erdogan of Turkey, to turns the screws on Bartholomew, whose presence in Istanbul (the former Constantinople) depends on Turkish governmental goodwill.") An Orthodox Fracture With Serious Consequences].

11. The powerful act; the weak speak; the powerless generate ideas.
[("Europe appears to be faced, again, with the hard task of balancing its relations among frenemies while retaining its wealth. To that end it works from its strengths: it barters influence and the influence of ideas for material advantage; the influence of ideas, in this sense, may be Europe's most potent remaining basis of power. It rides on the embers of empire, and Europe's still potent productive and consumptive capacities, to serve a a global superego. It has been seen in earlier guises through the so-called "Brussels Effect" campaign (to embed European values in European regulations to which those seeking entry in European markets would have to conform). China, the United States, and Russia are left to squander muscle as they will, always subject to the legitimating judgment of this superego. ") The EU Parliament's "Statement on China-EU Relations"; Statement on China-EU Relations. ]

12.  In a world on which the highest form of reality is the data maintained by the state, the individual can only understand herself by reference to information duly recorded and certified in the data banks of the state.
[("A 69-year-old Dutchman is battling to legally reduce his age by 20 years so he can get more work and attract more women on Tinder. Emile Ratelband argues that if transgender people are allowed to change sex, he should be allowed to change his date of birth because doctors said he has the body of a 45-year-old. . . . And he says his move would also be good news for the government as he would be renouncing his pension until he reaches retirement age again. The judge said that he had some sympathy with Mr Ratelband as people could now change their gender which would once have been unthinkable.")Pensioner, 69, 'who identifies as a 45-year-old' begins legal action to have his age reduced so he can attract more women on Tinder].



13. The straight lines of political narrative sometimes feels the tug of history, especially as the scope of that history broadens.
[("The Oluwo of Iwo, Abdulrosheed Adewale Akanbi, has apologised to the victims of slave trade in Nigeria for the role played by traditional rulers who helped in selling their subjects to foreign buyers. . . . Thursday, the monarch said his apology was to establish the damage done by slavery, in order to make progress, adding that it was time Nigerian children were told of the roles of the various monarchies in slavery, which witnessed innocent blacks sold by their African brothers for peanuts. . . . “White men never forced us to sell our children as slaves. Our fathers voluntarily released their children on excitement for peanut. Then, there was no means of payment. Humans were offered in exchange for glittering material gifts.") Nigerian monarch apologises for traditional rulers’ participation in slave trade].

14. If the institutionalization of government incarnates the state as the manifestation of the collective individual; then the cult of the leader re-incarnates the state in the individual.
[("Recep Tayyip Erdogan has appointed himself chairman of Turkey’s sovereign wealth fund, the latest move to consolidate his control over state institutions. The president announced on Wednesday that Berat Albayrak, his son-in-law, would act as his deputy as part of an overhaul of the board of the fund, which was founded in 2016 and later took over government shares in Turkish Airlines, Turk Telekom and a string of banks.")Erdogan takes control of Turkey’s sovereign wealth fund].



15.  Public speech is managed either by the state or by the market; in either case the fundamental modalities of management likely converge.
[("And now over 1,400 pages of leaked documents, obtained by The New York Times, has revealed rulebooks that the company uses to moderate the content on its platform, as well as how it polices posts and shortcomings of the 7,500-plus moderators who survey and control the posts from its 2 billion users.The documents published Thursday by the Times are purportedly used to advise thousands of moderators about how to deal with any content that may be deemed problematic and "distill highly complex issues into simple yes-or-no rules." The moderation work is outsourced and the Times notes that some moderators rely on Google Translate to make split-second decisions on what is deemed hate speech or not.") Facebook's leaked rulebooks highlight struggle with content moderation; ("How can Facebook monitor billions of posts per day in over 100 languages, all without disturbing the endless expansion that is core to its business? The company’s solution: a network of workers using a maze of PowerPoint slides spelling out what’s forbidden.")  Inside Facebook’s Secret Rulebook for Global Political Speech]
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